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The Old and the New World Order – between European Integration and the Historical Burden: Prospects and Challenges for Europe of 21st Century
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INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND ECONOMICS
Proceedings
The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Edited by Duško Dimitrijević
Belgrade, 2014
Proceedings from the international conference
Belgrade, May 29–30, 2014
The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Publisher Institute of International Politics and Economics Makedonska 25, Belgrade
For the Publisher Duško Dimitrijević, Ph.D., Director Institute of International Politics and Economics
Editor Duško Dimitrijević, Ph.D. Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade
Reviewers Blagoje Babić, Ph.D. Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade Joackim Becker, Ph.D. Institute for International Economics and Development, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria
Layout Sanja Balović
Prepress, „Mala knjiga”, Novi Sad
ISBN 978-86-7067-207-9 Editorial Board
Duško Dimitrijević, Ph.D., Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, Vice President Professor Eckart Stratenschulte, Ph.D., Europaichen Akademie, Berlin, Germany. Professor Blagoje Babić, Ph.D., Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade . Professor Dragan Simeunović, Ph.D., Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Belgrade Professor Joachim Becker, Ph.D., Institute for International Economics and Development, Wien, Austria. Professor Natalia Kulikova, Ph.D., Institute of Economy Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia. Professor Zhang Yuyan, Ph.D., Institute of world economics and politics, Bejing, China Prof. Taro Tsukimura, Ph.D., Doshisha University Faculty of Policy Studies, Japan. Professor Bogdan Stoyanov, Ph.D., Vitosha Research, Bulgaria Professor Stefano Pilotto, Ph.D., Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Trieste, Italy Mikhail M. Lobanov, Ph.D., Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow Russia. Professor Vladan Jončić, Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade. Slobodan Zečević, Ph.D., Institute of European Studies, Belgrade. Professor Pero Petrović, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade Professor Miloš Šolaja, Faculty of Political Sciences, University of Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The thematical proceedings was financially supported by the Ministry of Education and Science of the Republic of Serbia within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period. The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Content
I – World order and Europe
Dragan Simeunović New World Order, globalism and globalization ...... 17
Branko Rakić Globalisation as a historical pattern of the world society ...... 33
Branko Rakić Mihajlo Vučić Globalisation as the cause of creation and dissolution of the European Union ...... 66
Joko Dragojlović Nenad Bingulac The evolution of the European Union – historical heritage as a foundation for future development ...... 84
Nenad A. Vasić Changes in international relations and the order of the European Union ...... 100
Risto Mijalov Goran Kitevski Contemporary socio–political problems and processes in Europe ...... 124
Slobodan Zečević The challenges of the European Union federalization process ...... 135
5 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Senad Ganić Europe in conflict with “Europe“ ...... 158
Zoran Milivojević Europe at the crossroads ...... 164
II – World order – between cooperation and conflict
Ljiljana Nikšić Serbian-German cultural and friendly relations as intangible cultural heritage – honouring 825 years of Serbian-German diplomatic relations (1189–2014) ...... 181
Dragan Đukanović Attempts to “restore” Austria-Hungary after 1918 – between austronostalgia and reality ...... 209
Petar Petković Christian democracy in Western Europe between the two World Wars ...... 224
Zlatko Ivanović Balkan Pact and Yugoslavia after World War II ...... 235
Vladimir Trapara Continuity and change in U.S.-Russian relations as the key factor in post-Cold War international relations ...... 257
Brano Miljuš The Old and New World Order – between the Kosovo precedent and Crimea burden ...... 275
Miloš Jončić Aleksandar Jazić The New World Order between unipolarism and multipolarism ...... 287
Miloš Todorović Dominant forces and small countries in contemporary global processes ...... 302
6 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Jovan Manasijevski The European Security Strategy and formatting of the EU as a functional global actor – between ambitions and limitations ...... 310
Mina Nikolić European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and new threats ...... 326
Žaklina Novičić Surveillance and internet control: toward global totalitarianism? ...... 347
Jelena Matijašević-Obradović Darko Golić The development of information society in the process of globalization – a historical continuity as a challenge to the further development of the European Union ...... 360
Dragoljub Todić The Old and New World Order – the European Union and climate change ...... 379
Jędrzej Czerep Krajowcy movement revived ...... 389
Milorad Đoković Definition of state and anarchism in the New World Order ...... 397
Borislav Dekić Economic crisis, globalization and political extremism ...... 414
III – World order and the Balkans
Duško Dimitrijević “The New international legal order” and new states in the Balkans ...... 427
Miloš Šolaja Transition and tradition in the Balkans between democracy building and state building ...... 442
7 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Jelena Trivić Saša Petković Institutional environment in candidate and potential candidates – how far are we? ...... 458
Branko Krga Military-security determinants of Serbia’s position in contemporary Europe ...... 472
Goran Nikolić Potential effects of relative economic decline of the European Union on Serbia ...... 480
Dušan Dabović Prospects and challenges of the European Union and the Republic of Serbia in the field of agriculture in 21st century ...... 494
Nano Ružin The Orbanization of the Balkans – populism between Zdanovism and Disneyland ...... 506
IV – World order and economic-social development
Svetla Boneva New moments in the European Union macroeconomic governance: the contribution of the European semester ...... 521
Bogdan Stoyanov Strategy for growth in the European Union, the main objective of the Europe 2020 ...... 534
Jelena Šuput Enlargement of the European Union and protection of its financial interests ...... 541
Uroš Zdravković Characteristics of the European Union’s membership in the World Trade Organization ...... 552
8 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Mikhail Lobanov Jelena Zvezdanović Lobanova New World Order and post-Soviet border issues: an economic potential of the Russian-Ukrainian border region ...... 568
Pero Petrović Aleksandar Živković Integration process and the specificities of planning in an international environment ...... 586
Dobrica Vesić The impact of globalization and integration processes of economic restructuring ...... 595
Silvana Jovčeska International business – creator of a new economic structure with new functional characteristics of the international organizational structures and new typology of international corporate cultures ...... 606
Natka Jankova The need for new reformed education as an important factor for easier EU integration ...... 617
Dalibor Adžić Social heritage – the cause of conflicts in the modern European school ...... 624
V – World order and law
Jelica Gordanić Development tendencies in human rights law in Europe – challenges for the New World Order ...... 637
Filip Turčinović Some international law aspects of human rights protection regarding cultural heritage ...... 650
9 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Žaklina Spalević Milan Palević The right to water as a human right and a New World Order ...... 659
Žarko Radić Citizenship as an impediment for extradition in the light of the Old and the New World Order and European Union law ...... 673
Jasmina Vukotić The role of Community law (European Union law) in the European integration process ...... 697
Milena Trgovčević Prokić Public notary in South Slavic regions ...... 713
10 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
PREFACE
In co-operation with the German Hanns Seidel Foundation Institute of International Politics and Economics organised the international scientific conference “The Old and New World Order – between European integrations and historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century”. The conference took place in Belgrade on 29 and 30 May 2014. It was supported by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Serbian European Integration Office. The conference was focused on political, legal, security, economic and social phenomena determining the historical processes in Europe from the end of the Great War up to the present times. The need to scientifically study the so-called Old and New World Order results from the attempt to achieve the state’s foreign policy priorities. They are, among other things, manifested in establishing effective bilateral and multilateral relations, in integrations to the EU and other regional organisations, in fostering balanced relations with the key factors in international politics that can contribute to maintaining peace and security within the frameworks of general international law and fundamental principles contained in the United Nations Charter. Considering the development international relations this is, by itself, a big and delicate challenge. Presenting of different knowledge and experiences of political, legal, military- security, economic and social aspects of the phenomenon of globalism and globalisation of the so-called Old and New World order and integration processes enables more objective perceiving of development potentials of European countries. They can contribute to political, economic and security stabilisation, achievement of an accelerated process of institutional and legal reforms, improvement of the technology foundation of the society, increasing competition on international markets, achievement of long-term and sustainable economic growth as an indispensable pre-condition for attainment of a higher level of common progress and peaceful co-existence of various nations, states and regions in Europe and beyond it, in the world.
11 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Since it was established in 1947, Institute of International Politics and Economics has devoted special attention to the study of the geostrategic position of the state within broader research of global political problems. Also, it has particularly dealt with the research of establishment of good neighbourly relations and co-operation between European states by studying contemporary processes and phenomena in Europe or by actively exploring current topics in the field of international politics and economics. In that sense, in the future, the Institute will keep on studying the geopolitical aspects of harmonisation of relations between Serbia and other states. This also includes Serbia’s foreign policy methods which have been brought into accord with its real interests, needs and possibilities. Priority will be given to the scientific research of political, legal, economic and security elements which are significant for defining of the foreign policy strategic foundations proposal. On this occasion, I express my sincere gratitude to Mrs. Jadranka Joksimović, Minister without portfolio responsible for European integration, Mr. Srđan Majstorović, M.A., Deputy Director of the Serbian European Integration Office, Prof. Dragan Simeunović, Faculty of Political Science, University of Belgrade, Prof. Eckart Stratenschulte, European Academy, Berlin, and Mr. Lutz Kobler, Head of the Hanns Seidel Foundation Project in Serbia and Montenegro, who supported this international conference by delivering their introductory speeches.
Editor Duško Dimitrijević, Ph.D.
12 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Die Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung (HSS) mit Sitz in München ist seit dem Jahre 2001 mit einem Projektbüro in Belgrad vertreten. Von diesem Zeitpunkt an arbeitet die HSS mit verschiedenen serbischen Projektpartnern aus dem staatlichen Bereich sowie aus dem Sektor der Nichtregierungsorganisationen (NGO) eng zusammen. Die HSS selbst ist eine NGO mit “non-profit-Charakter“, die ihre Finanzmittel für die konkrete praktische Tätigkeit in Serbien vom Ministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland erhält. “Im Dienst von Demokratie, Frieden und Entwicklung” – mit diesem Motto überschreibt die Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung ihre Arbeit und ihren Auftrag. Das Verständnis für Demokratie muß in jeder Generation neu erworben werden. Gerade jungen Menschen müssen politische Zusammenhänge deutlich gemacht werden. Nur dann wird man sie auch motivieren können, sich selber zu engagieren und Verantwortung zu übernehmen. Zu dieser Überzeugungsarbeit für unsere Demokratie und die freiheitliche, rechtsstaatliche und soziale Ordnung gehört aber auch die Vergewisserung und Verankerung der Grundwerte und Normen unseres Gemeinwesens im Bewußtsein der Bürgerinnen und Bürger. Der rasche und tiefgreifende Wandel, in dem sich das Land befindet, verstärkt den Bedarf an Wertorientierungen, an Verwurzelung in verläßlichen Strukturen und überschaubaren Ordnungsräumen. Gemäß der Projektkonzeption der Stiftung ist ihre Tätigkeit in Serbien auf die gesellschaftspolitische Erwachsenenbildung und auf den politischen Dialog ausgerichtet. Das wichtigste Ziel der HSS besteht in der aktiven Unterstützung des Landes bei seinen Bemühungen um die Schaffung von Voraussetzungen für die Aufnahme in die Europäische Gemeinschaft. Das 1947 vom ehemaligen jugoslawischen Staat gegründete Institut ist eine der größten und bedeutendsten, für internationale Beziehungen spezialisierten wissenschaftlichen Institutionen sowie ein Forschungszentrum von beachtlicher internationaler Reputation. Das IIPE befasst sich mit dem Studium der Politik, der Wirtschafts- und Rechtswissenschaft sowie mit dem Erforschen gesellschaftlicher Prozesse und Phänomene im Bereich internationaler Politik und Wirtschaft, sowie der Analyse rechtlicher Aspekte internationaler Beziehungen. Als Forschungs- und Dokumentationsbasis für die Definierung der außenpolitischen Prioritäten Serbiens unterstützt das Institut in enger
13 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Zusammenarbeit mit dem Außenministerium der Republik Serbien die zuständigen Staatsbehörden bei der Formulierung der strategischen Ausrichtung zur Entwicklung und Etablierung der internationalen wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen und Außenpolitik des Landes. Die Veranstaltungen des Belgrader HSS-Büros mit dem IIPE bearbeiten Themenbereiche vom Aspekt der aktuellen geopolitischen, diplomatischen, sicherheitsbezogenen und wirtschaftlichen Gegebenheiten Serbiens. Im ersten Quartal 2014 wurden die Weichen für die politische Zukunft Serbiens gestellt. Am 21. Januar des Jahres begannen die Beitrittsverhandlungen zwischen der EU und Serbien. Die Aufnahme dieser offiziellen Gespräche stellt den größten Erfolg der amtierenden Regierung dar. Kurze Zeit nach Beginn der Beitrittsverhandlungen erklärte die Staatsführung, dass Serbien bis 2020 als 29. Mitglied in die EU aufgenommen werden sollte. Zum einen, muß der EU-Aspirant eine demokratische und rechtsstaatliche Ordnung garantieren, die Menschenrechte wahren sowie Minderheiten schützen. Zum anderen, sollte er über eine funktionsfähige Marktwirtschaft und ausreichende Wettbewerbsfähigkeit verfügen. Anlässlich des Gedenkens zum 100. Jubiläum des Ersten Weltkrieges, veranstaltete die HSS zusammen mit dem IIPE eine wissenschaftliche Konferenz. Die Konferenz bot den Teilnehmern, die sich aus wissenschaftlichen Experten und gesellschaftspolitischen Entscheidungsträgern zusammensetzten, die Gelegenheit, neue Perspektiven aus dem ersten Weltkrieg, seine Rezeption und seine Bedeutung für das heutige, vereinte Europa zu thematisieren. Die zahlreichen Teilnehmer aus dem In- und Ausland tauschten sich über diverse historische, sicherheitsbezogene, wirtschaftliche, soziologische und philosophische Aspekte der alten und der neuen Weltordnung aus. Den Schwerpunkt der Tagung bildete eine wissenschaftliche Diskussion über Geschehnisse und Entwicklungen in Europa der letzten 100 Jahren und der Umgang heutiger junger Europäer mit den Erfahrungen und Lehren des Ersten Weltkrieges und der Perspektiven im gegenwärtigen Europa. Die erste Konfenz befasste sich mit den historischen Entwicklungen und bildete den Auftakt für eine weitere wissenschaftliche Diskussionsrunde und der Möglichkeit des Erfahrungsaustausches über die Herausforderungen und Chancen für das Europa des 21. Jahrhunderts. Lutz Kober Projektleiter der Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung für Serbien und Montenegro
14 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
The Hanns Seidel Foundation, having its headquarters in Munich, has been present in Belgrade since 2001. From its beginnings, this Office has realized intensive cooperation with diverse partners in Serbia, both governmental and non-governmental institutions. Hanns Seidel Foundations is a non-for-profit organisation financially supported by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development of the Republic of Germany to carry out concrete measures in Serbia. “In the service of democracy, peace and development” - this is the motto steering the activities of the Foundation. An understanding of democracy has to be newly acquired by every new generation. Young people in particular need to have political issues and interrelations clearly explained if they are to be motivated to commit themselves and to take on responsibility. In addition to work on behalf of our democracy, freedom, the rule of law and a just social order, the fundamental principles and norms of our community also have to be ensured and firmly anchored in the conscience of all citizens. The fast-paced and far-reaching changes currently facing our country have increased the demand in the society for values, reliable structures and a comprehensible order. The concept of the Foundation's Project activities in Serbia is aimed at the social and political education of adults and at political dialogue. The key objective of these activities is reflected in providing active support to the country in its efforts to meet the requirements for the EU accession. The Institute of International Politics and Economy was established in the former Yugoslavia in 1947 and it is, first and foremost, one of the largest and most prominent scientific institutes specialized in international relations, but also a research centre enjoying enviable reputation in international circles. The Institute of International Politics and Economy focuses on studies in politics, economics and law likewise researches in social processes and phenomena in the field of international politics and economy. The Institute also deals with analysing the legal aspects of international relations. Fostering an intensive cooperation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, the Institute, as a research and documenting basis for defining the foreign policy priorities of Serbia, provides support to the relevant government services in
15 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century wording strategic commitments aimed at developing and affirming the country within international economic relations and foreign politics. The events organised by the Hanns Seidel Foundation's Belgrade Office in cooperation with the Institute of International Politics and Economy address topics from the perspective of the current geopolitical, diplomatic, security and economic circumstances in Serbia. The course of Serbia's political future was defined in the first quarter of 2014. Serbia has started accession negotiations with the European Union on 21 January this year. The formal start of these negotiations is the greatest success of the current Government. Shortly after the commencement of the negotiations, state leaders expressed their belief, that Serbia will become the 29th member-state of the European Union by 2020. On the one hand, countries wishing to join the EU should ensure the stability of their institutions granting democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the respect and protection of minorities. Furthermore, aspiring countries should have a market economy in place which is functioning and able to cope with the pressures of competitiveness within the Union. On the occasion of the First World War Centenary and in cooperation with the Institute of International Politics and Economy, the Hanns Seidel Foundation organised a scientific conference. The participants of that conference were experts and social and political decision makers, who had the opportunity to discuss new perspectives and ideas relating to the First World War and its importance for the current, united Europe. Numerous participants from the country and abroad exchanged their views on the historical, security, economic, social and philosophical aspects of the old and new world order. The work during the conference focused on expert discussion about the happenings and tendencies in Europe during the last hundred years and the approach of young Europeans to the experiences of and lessons learned in the First World War. The prospects in Europe today were discussed as well. The first conference also examined the historical development after the First World War and it was an introduction to the next expert discussion and opportunity to exchange ideas about the challenges and chances in Europe in the 21st century.
Lutz Kober Head of Office of the Hanns Seidel Foundation Project in Serbia and Montenegro
16 I – World order and Europe
Dragan SIMEUNOVIĆ1
NEW WORLD ORDER, GLOBALISM AND GLOBALIZATION2
Abstract: Even after decades of use, the terms like new world order, globalism and globalization are still used without proper understanding, even as synonyms, which results in conceptual confusion. Globalism is an ideology, globalization is a process, and the New World Order is a system. Globalism is an example of how a particular ideology is born from a general one. It is nothing but one subspecies of liberalism and that one is thereby, usually called an economic option of neoliberalism. Since the 1970s, it is pronouncedly focused on implementation of those political principles that provide profit. Globalism is only neoliberalism on a mission. Globalization is the process of intertwined political, military and economic activities of a series of political, economic and military subjects led by USA. This country is the carrier of globalization and its actions (as well as actions of its followers) are aimed at directing the totality of human society towards the realization of the postulates of liberalism. The new world order is an emerging system that establishes the political, economic and military domination of the USA and a group of highly industrialized and developed Western countries gathered around some international organizations of economic, military and/or political character over most countries of the world. As a system of unequal participants, it means the adoption of certain values of cosmopolitan democracy by everyone and the development of certain rules of behavior for everyone, while maintaining different standards for their implementation in order to assure that all included in the system are in line with the realization of the strategic interests of the carriers of globalization. Key words: New World Order, globalism, globalization, domination, USA, Western countries.
1 Professor Dragan Simeunović, Ph.D., Faculty of Political Science University of Belgrade. The paper was written as part of a scientific research project of the University of Belgrade - Faculty of Political Science, Political identity Serbia in regional and global context, (register number: 179076) funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of Republic of Serbia. 2 Introductory lecture by invitation.
17 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
The human entity is predisposed to domination precisely because it is subject to fear. With fear we are born, with various fears we live, and in fear we die. The human offspring is the most powerless of all and frightened by the awareness of its own inferiority. We secure ourselves from fear by gaining control over the environment, especially by creating a surplus of power that inevitably leads to domination, even when it is not intended. We primarily need power to protect ourselves, but very soon, we become aware of its other advantages, and because of it, we refuse to see the darker aspects that accompany power. The essential problem with power rests in at least two qualities. First, it inebriates more than drugs, and second, it belongs to genus apeiron, the infinite, without final frontiers, without real moral shores, and without sufficient internal checks when it becomes part of us. In craving for more power of all kinds, the human entity created various systems of dominance, formally for its own protection, and really for domination over others. Transferring these systems from the micro social to the macro social level was always just a matter of technique, instruments and capacities for the realization of plans moving towards the universal and eternals rule over others. Henry Kissinger may not be right in his claim that in every century “there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values“,3 but he is completely right that such developments are possible and do happen. Although there is no such temporal regularity in the emergence of this phenomenon, which always sees itself as a “new order of the world”, there was always a “will to power” of the strongest states in the world or at least of those who considered themselves as the strongest. There were always, as well, their plans to arrange the world in accordance to their views, needs and interests. This historical fact was built on the military, political and cultural dominations of the ancient Persians, Greeks, Romans and others, and verified with the swords of their generals from Alexander the Great and other “first conquerors of the world”, from Caesar and later Attila, Tamerlane and Napoleon, to contemporary wielders of absolute domination, having different faces but of the same order. The USA, currently the strongest world power, also has such plans and such a will. Like all former dominant world powers, it has its allies, its followers and its enemies. Enemies of the strongest power rarely openly identify themselves as such, simply due to their fear of the strongest. Many friends of the strongest are not, however, sincerely on their side, but are in principle, on the side of whoever is
3 Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy I, Simon and Chuster, New York, 1994, p. 17.
18 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the strongest at the moment, for they see it as a way to promote their interests. It was always, as it is now, in human nature to side with the winner. The aspiration of the USA and countries formally or informally gathered around it are today designated by several terms, the most frequent being globalism, globalization and the “New World Order”. These terms are frequently used by many without proper understanding, even as synonyms, which result in conceptual confusion. It is, therefore, necessary to underline the fact that they represent three different concepts, related because they refer to intertwined phenomena. Their conceptual contents are similar, but not quite identical. Rather, they intersect. What today is referred to with either positivism or atavistic fear, the “New World Order”, implies the establishment of inviolable political, economic and military domination of the USA and a group of highly developed Western countries gathered in or around some economic, political or international military organizations over almost all other countries of the world. This domination manifests in the endeavors to achieve their strategic economic, political and military interests, as well as the interests of their allies, by leading a foreign policy predominantly from a position of power and interfering with the internal matters of sovereign states. This is done not only with the help of hitherto “owned” military, economic and political institutions and international organizations, but also by the utilization of such organizations as the UN, which, until the beginnings of the establishment of the “New World Order”, were meant to be of universal benefit to all member states and, more or less, functioned that way. Since its basic principle is to enforce this expression of domination and superiority of all kinds, it is only natural that the functionality of the “New World Order” predominantly boils down to using its position of power. This could explain the behavior of the group of countries dominant in the “New World Order” being more and more characterized by not only the disregard for, but also the breaking of norms of international law. International law, in the final analysis, is nothing more than the expression of a power balance in world politics and until recently, valid norms of international law were nothing but the historically agreed to legal expression of the Western and Eastern bloc balance of powers. When this balance disappeared, the need to respect these norms also vanished. No one need obey the legal norm if the sanction for breaking it is impossible to implement. It is too soon to speak about the “New World Order” as fully designed, and especially as a materialized concept. Although there are clear indications of the goals and methods of the “New World Order” establishment, there is no clear or final distinctiveness of the concepts’ content. Will its establishment bombastically announced in history many times come to effect, or will it be in the form that now seems inevitable to many people
19 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century remains questionable. Let us add that the future as scion of history usually only resembles its ancestors, yet always looks like something new in the present. That is why, for now, it is better to use this term in quotation marks, which in no way demeans its significance as a research subject. The establishment of the “New World Order” only at first glance seems to manifest itself as the establishment of a system of global domination of one power center group, one state and one ideology. However, there are conspicuous continental and regional dominions with a tendency to increase all of their resources of power. Economically, politically and militarily, even before unification,4 the most powerful country of Europe has been undisputedly Germany. The same position of continental and regional domination is increasingly occupied by China (more) and Japan (less) in the Far East. China, but Russia as well, in their new and, for now permanent rise, have still not disclosed their ambition to counterbalance the present top position in global proportions in terms of dominating the “New World Order”. It is however, according to all indicators, expected in a relatively short time, less than two decades, that China will strengthen proportionally to decrease the USA economic, and accordingly political and military power. Like the law of communicating vessels, economic power that is now narrowly concentrated will have to diffuse to at least two points. They will be, at least in the beginning, highly mutually interdependent, and with only relative differences in terms of resources of power. The prestige race, which will only then be publically recognized, cannot be decided if one of them is stronger in only some areas, like economic or military. The decisive factor of their competitiveness remains in the total amount of their power and degree of interdependence which could never before be so important, because of the very different levels of technological, monetary and economic development. This phase in the development of conceptualization and materialization of the “New World Order” could easily become the phase to equalize power in increasingly trilateral world domination. This could last for as long as one of the centers of power is able to
4 European predictions from the beginning of the 1990s about the political, economic and military consequences of German unification on Europe have proven to be quite accurate. For example, 43% of the French predicted that the political unity of Europe will be harder to achieve, and 37% thought that the French position in Europe would be weakened. The French recognized German economic and political supremacy even before the unification, while disputing its democracy. This explains the rise in fears in France from 39% in 1987 to 42% in 1989 regarding the economic power of Germany. It is interesting that beside this 48% of French subjects saw Germany as France’s best friend, and this percentage rose to 54% in October 1989. In Germany in 1983, 77% of people saw the USA as Germany’s best friend, while in 1988 sympathies for the USA dropped significantly and surveys show that 67% of Germans saw France as Germany’s best friend. (SOFRES, L’état de l’opinion 1991, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1991, pp. 82–86).
20 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century significantly expand its domain of influence in pursuing economic, political and military interests on the others’ turf, without endangering its former position in a shared domination. By then, it would be realistic to expect that Europe and Japan will further increase economic, financial and political resources of power, while the USA will focus on military and political ones. China will try to increase economic, financial and military resources of power, but Russia will try to increase more its military resources. However, military power is no longer, and likely will not be, the only deciding factor of prestige in global, world proportions. The ratio of economic power as the basis of total power between three already existing economic and military centers of the world (1. USA, EU and Japan as the moderator of economic opportunities and power of the Far East, 2. China and 3. Russia) will decide whether the USA will keep in the future the highest position of global power, or will they be forced to share it. Their current, and probably future, dominant position in the military power sphere will not be worth much without maintaining viable economic power as the basis of universal supremacy,5 just as military power would be of no use today for Russia and China if the former less and latter more, hadn’t relatively quickly improved their economies. It is to be expected that economic powers such as Germany and Japan, even though their military power increased, will not in the future strive to achieve their interests by use of military force in the international context (especially not by use of their own forces), but to use channels of economic and particularly technological and financial influence, accompanied by extensive use of multilateral institutions. This could explain the aspirations of Germany and Japan, as well as some other regional powers, to enter the UN Security Council as soon as possible, and as permanent members to get a bigger share of political power and capacities for decision-making and global influence. This also could explain why France and Great Britain, for long second-grade powers who draw power mostly from this positional advantage to Germany and Japan, are opposed to such a development. After all, the USA for now has the “greater co-optive power than other”6 countries precisely thanks to its dominant position in most globally important international organizations and institutions (UN, IMF, GATT, OECD, NATO). But, although the position of the USA was historically gained and determined, it is different from that of Great Britain and France. These two countries, unlike the USA, draw their political power primarily from positions earned in the past – such as permanent membership in the UN Security Council.
5 Apart from the highest indebtedness in the world, the USA dropped from first to third position in world export, and their share in world gross product dropped from 45% after WW2 to only 22%. 6 Nye, Joseph, “The Changing Nature of World Power”, Political Science Quarterly, (Summer 1990) vol. 105, no. 2. p. 181–183.
21 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
While USA power, on the contrary, consists not only in some historical right to power, but also represents the very clear expression of the present total and huge political, economic and military strength of the USA. This scramble for entering the UN Security Council becomes even more understandable if we take into account that one of the attributes of the “New World Order” is an elitism conceived as the possibility of possession and use of exclusive positions of power. Using a worldwide tendency towards dislocating centers of government from the legislative to the executive sphere, the constructors of the “New World Order” have turned the UN General Assembly from the main organ to a second-rate body, and the Security Council into the body of first-rate significance, even the embryo of world government. This was justified by the need for quick decision-making as a valuable factor in the process of helping “endangered” countries and nations. Thanks to such transformation, which made possible the almost absolute dominance of the USA’s will within the UN, the UN has more and more turned into the legal, but ever less legitimate instrument for favoring strategic military, political and economic interests of the economically and politically most powerful world countries. These countries aim to establish the “New World Order” as the permanent state of their own predominance in the world community, with disregard of the interests and will, or in spite of the will and especially interests of the majority of UN members who are categorized as developing countries. In addition, it is necessary to consider the significant power potentials for the international action of Russia and China. Their areas of interest are more or less permanent in which periods of conflict with Germany and Japan alternated with periods of cooperation. Putin’s tendency to restore Russia’s power within its imperial, not Soviet borders and to strategically connect with Germany and then with China on every level except military, is obvious. Also, regional powers, such as Turkey (although Brazil, Nigeria, India, Pakistan and others can also to be considered, though for now mostly useful minions of the USA) – can in the future significantly contribute to truncating the USA’s total power. Partly this can happen for historical and religious reasons, such as the periodical expressions of animosity towards the western world (never to be underestimated as a casus belli). However, this can also be caused by the redistribution of economic power. Since regional powers are, as a rule, because of their insufficient economic development, economically very dependent on foreign economic aid, it is logical to expect that they will in the future also take sides as they have done – standing by the one who can and will offer the most economic help. Turkey is now a regional power, but its influence on its region remains an open question. Is this region of current domination in line with Turkey’s ambitions and goals and can someone, guessing its wishes, promise more? This is true for other regional powers, since the main point is not that regional powers are only
22 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century economically dependent on foreign help, but are dependent too on those elements that are substantial for their status as regional powers. If political, economic and especially financial power are those aspects of power increasingly important in obtaining a dominant position in global relations, military power is, and will be for even longer, the form of power that will decide dominance in the regional framework. Neither Turkey or Brazil, nor India or Nigeria are capable soon of becoming, political, economic and, least likely financial powers, but they are and will for long remain, regional powers because of their military power. The commitment to mediation from a position of power in global proportions, as a new and possibly universal mode of cooperation with other, especially disobedient nations and states, is particularly pronounced with respect to the sovereignty of other countries. The fact that those Western countries who were, at the time, the sharpest critics of the Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty are now the chief proponents of a similar, if not an even more radical concept of the “preservation of international stability” which looks like historical cynicism, since their concept is to be in effect practically worldwide, while Brezhnev’s was valid only within the territories of the Warsaw Pact. This also illustrates the utilization of the UN by the constructors of the “New World Order”. While once this world organization abhorred any violation of sovereignty, especially that of small countries, and condemned it as the biggest sin, now, through legalization of the right to intervention for the sake of peace and security it practically approves violating the sovereignty of any country if that is in the interest of the most powerful. In keeping with this dominant atmosphere in the UN is the statement of its former president, Boutros Ghali, at the end of 1992, that the “time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty is over”. By all odds, the “New World Order” also implies the transformation in understanding the right to self-determination, since it is, for now, by its creators interpreted only as the right of people to national, but not political, and especially not economic self-determination. Such an approach points to subjectivism as possibly the dominant characteristic of the foreboded “New World Order”.
7 Friedrich Engels, 1849: “The Slovenes and Croats cut off Germany and Hungary from the Adriatic Sea, but Germany and Hungary cannot allow themselves to be cut off from the Adriatic Sea on account of “geographical and commercial necessities”, which ... are just as much a vital question for Germany and Hungary as, for example, the Baltic Sea coast from Danzig to Riga is for Poland. And where it is a question of the existence of the free development of all the resources of big nations, such sentimental considerations as concern for a few scattered Germans of Slavs will not decide anything!“. And David Rockefeller in 1991 said “The supranational sovereignty of an intellectual elite and world bankers is surely preferable to the national auto-determination practiced in past centuries.“
23 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Quotations from Friedrich Engels and David Rockefeller7 at the bottom of this page show, through similarities in interests and content, – that the right to self- determination is viewed from the perspective of one’s own national or state collective. Therefore, both the founder of scientific socialism and the world’s leading capitalist in different times advocated the same attitude towards the right to self-determination. Their position is similar, regardless of the time and distance between them, namely that the specific interest of their national or state collectives remain paramount. In the words of Ludwig Fleck, human perceptions are always much less individual than we believe, because, most of the time, “we look with our own eyes, but we see with the eyes of our collective body“.8 Forcing other countries to perceive and recognize the interest of the dominant “New World Order” countries as their own is done ostensibly by moralizing, but is also essentially accomplished by a deep involvement in the internal affairs of these countries in the name of principles and global struggle for the permanent securing and implementation of human rights and democracy. It is obvious from this, that one of the goals of the “New World Order” is not its standing as a “long era of peace”,9 but in the heads of its constructors may be an eternal supremacy, even though history consistently teaches them that every power is temporary. Besides, the use of force and threat of force as the “law of the mace” has never provided eternal dominance for anyone in history, but on the contrary, only contributed to the historical branding of the satraps, their rule and attempts to rule as inhumane, and therefore accelerated their exit from the stage of history. By the methods employed, the “New World Order” for now, draws its contours as a system of violence which favors the threat of force, coercion and pressure as the basic forms – and subversion, military intervention and war as the complex forms of violence. Such a concept cannot be evaded even by the rising powers, as they strive to be more actively engaged in solving world problems, since it can substantially contribute to their international promotion and confirm their rising power, and not just their current status. Large countries such as Russia and China, with the restoration or enlargement of their power, openly, unlike Japan and Germany, confirm their ambition to share world supremacy by increasing their reliance on force, which can be seen in the most recent example of Ukraine. Therefore, they are not against the “New World Order”, as many of its critics thought or hoped, but are an important component. Hence, they are not against its principles, but against globalism as its current ideology in the service of a single center of power.
8 Fleck, Ludwig: Erfahrung und Tatsachen, 1983, p. 154 (in: Kolboom, Ingo: Vom geteilten zum vereinten Deutschland, Bonn, 1991) 9 From US president George Bush’s speech in the UN, October 1, 1990 said about the “new world order, as a long era of peace”.
24 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Globalism is an example of universal ideology giving birth to a particular one. It is nothing but a subspecies of liberalism, one often called the economic option of neoliberalism, which starting from the 1970s focused on the application of those political principles that secure economic benefits, more precisely profit. Globalism is, actually, neoliberalism on a mission. Although all ideologies aim to turn their principles into practice, globalism differs from others by its underlying orientation towards pragmatism, in accordance with principle – “Politically good is what is, finally, economically useful”. This ideology tries to act in many fields, but its primary target is the field of economics. Its most important goal is a world without borders (or at least, without solid borders), in order to provide the free flow of goods and turn the world into a big free market, led by large multinational corporations, while everyone else would have only the formal right to compete with them. Globalism is actually an ideology of these corporations, and they are its key carriers, to such an extent that even big states as the USA and Great Britain (where globalism started) sometimes look like their executors. The political order of the world organized in such way should be termed the “new world neoliberal order”,10 because what secures dominance and provides advantage within any system is the ability to set the rules of the game. Therefore, the aim is not only to create a world market free from impermeable nation-state borders, but equally to organize that market on liberal principles. Since its start in the West, globalism implies the penetration of Western values into other parts of the world, especially the East, which is a process called “westernization”. However common the critique that the West flooded the world with its brands of fast food and unhealthy drinks, it must consider the response from the East that is also present, not only through the mass expansion of its cuisine in the West, such as Chinese, but also with its cheap low quality goods that have flooded the West, including the USA, and which could be called “easternization”. Critics of globalism claim that this is “junk for junk” trade, where both sides make a profit and only the consumers are in the end dissatisfied, though without other options. What interferes with globalism and what globalism cannot support is the insistence of some states concerning national or state sovereignty, which is indeed a serious barrier to globalization. Therefore, globalism preaches an era of post sovereignty when states would be deprived of the right to be keepers of nations and religions, and this task would be transferred to the international community. Globalism tries to eliminate the fears of the small and weak by the introduction
10 See: Simeunović, Dragan, Le Nouvel Ordre Mondial l’Etat-Nation, Dialogue, Paris – Guernes, France, 1995.
25 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of minority protection principles (applied to all kinds of minorities), in terms of the protection of uniqueness, and more precisely of everything that is ethnic, religious, cultural, gender or even of sexual determination, if those are not in the way of accomplishing global political and economic interests. This is also used to justify the worldwide presence and use of force by those countries that are the carriers of globalization. As its main opponent, globalism sees nationalism and the nation state, which are guided by national rather than universal interests, and strives to enclose these nations within their borders, with customs and regulations that hamper the flow of goods and that decrease the profit of large multinational corporations. However, the main problem is informal resistance. National states are not those actors who can stop the dash of globalization, simply because they are a lesser force than countries that are proponents of globalization. The problems are with ethnic and religious extremists, who put themselves in the position of defenders of fate and nation, using violence primarily in the form of terrorism. Terrorism is globalized itself and makes the march of globalism neither easy nor fast, involving difficult and expensive clandestine and public battles. Although some parts of the world, especially the Middle East, Asia and Africa, resist the ideology of globalism, globalization seems to be unstoppable at least on the economic level, while in other fields the issue of whether it will be accepted is tied with skillfully overcoming very diverse obstacles, e.g. opposing religions such as Islam, or traditions of autonomous political existence as with the Chinese. No one in history has managed to establish a global order of the world, because among other things the world is not only very diverse but also volatile, challenging, and full of new aspirations, completely in accordance with human nature. We shall see whether the world of neoliberalism will succeed. Its chances lie in the unprecedented predominance of the USA with respect to the rest of the world in offering an order that is for many countries, more precisely to their political and economic elites, economically and politically attractive enough to adopt. If globalism is an ideology, and the “New World Order” is a system, what is globalization? Globalization is the process of an interconnected operation of economic and military activities by a series of political, military and economic subjects, led by the USA as a state – the political, carrier of globalization, which directs the course of the entire human society towards the realization of the postulates of globalist ideology.11 The flywheel of globalization is large multinational companies seated in the USA or Western Europe. It manifests,
11 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The choice: global domination or global leadership, Basic Books, New York, 2004, p. 143.
26 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century primarily, in the realization of economic goals supported politically and militarily by countries that are the carriers of globalization. The economic goals of globalization are a single world market, trade without borders, internationalization of production by direct investments of multinational companies and the building of a comprehensive system of integrated financial markets. The purpose of all this is to achieve high profits, by use of the cheapest raw materials, especially energy resources and workforce with minimal investments. Globalization could be designated as a process of the expansion of the world community of democratic, market-oriented countries, accomplished on the economic, political, cultural as well as every other level. The reach of this process is global, since its realization is planned in world proportions, specifically, as Bill Clinton precisely formulated, until “every man in the world” is able to enjoy the advantages of such a community by living in it (“Bush and Clinton spoke of the New World Order as if it were just around the corner”).12 Henry Kissinger argues that international relations have, for the first time in history, “become truly global... Communications are instantaneous; the world economy operates on all continents simultaneously”.13 Besides, many other problems such as environmental protection, demographic explosion, containment of contagious diseases, terrorism etc., are really of such a nature that they can only be solved globally. The fact that globalization is above all, an economic process is obvious, since it is on the economic level, practically unstoppable. The resistance to globalization is primarily political in nature, e.g. about maintaining sovereignty, and almost never about economic issues. Both Russia and China have fully embraced globalization as an economic inevitability. In this sense, globalization has already almost accomplished its aim to be the economic order of the world. Regarding those dimensions of globalization that manifest as a process of desovereignization and denationalization of states, resistance will certainly be much more pronounced. In this sense, the national state with its concept of sovereignty, national borders and relatively independent politics, proving its autonomy by the tendency to govern its own economy, presents a strong obstacle to globalization. Globalization knocks even harder on the closed door if in such states nationalism is prominent. All this only slows the flow of people and goods and
12 Cited in: Kissinger, Henry, op. cit., p. 806. 13 Kissinger, Henry, op. cit., p. 24.
27 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century thus decreases profits. Elites leading the multinational corporations do not wish to share and lose if it is not necessary, and it is not – because the constellation of international relations is such that there is only one great power that for the moment is unequaled. The erosion of sovereignty as a decrepit category and depriving national states of autonomous economic policy are therefore very important goals of globalization. It is understandable that not all countries behave equally, even less cooperatively when it comes to losing sovereignty. That is why the USA as the major power carrier of globalization approaches desovereignization and denationalization as a “non- simultaneous process”,14 using various methods, ranging from “voluntary capitulation”, which Zbigniew Brzezinski speaks of, to coercion by force. The covert resistance of those who are on the side of globalization is also to be considered. For example, many European countries who, due to substantial differences in power cannot count on maintaining their sovereignty in the face of globalization, so discretely perform the process of resovereignization through supranational communities such as the European Union, which enables them to save at least part of what they lost as national states.15 Although European states are, along with the USA, the chief proponents of globalization, they show some tendencies towards localism, even if it is meant to include the whole continent. This is visible from transfers of state competencies to the EU, the conjuncture of subsidiarity principle, drawing two kinds of borders – soft between “us” and hard between “us” and “them” and the orientation to ideals of a closed planned economy. However, the conveniences that globalization brings to big players in the world economy are forcing many, including EU states, to defer to it, since their economic and financial elites request it. For example, globalized financial markets enable easy coverage of state deficits, which makes leading successful policies easier for governments, and lets them keep their standing among voters, although the governments are aware that this leads to dependence on foreign investors16 and makes it harder to take part in decisions about international production or influencing it in order to direct its effect onto the national economy. The next big obstacle to globalization is terrorism, followed by organized crime and corruption. Terrorism denies its omnipotence and discredits its authority; organized crime endangers its profit by illegal money flows; and
14 Zürn , Michael, “Schwarz-Rot-Grün-Braun: Reaktionsweisen auf Denationalisierung“, in: Ulrich Beck (Hg.), Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, p. 299. 15 Kreile, Michael “Globalisierung und europäische Integration“, in: Wolfgang Merkel und Andreas Busch (Hrsg.), Demokratie in Ost und West, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, p. 607. 16 Cohen, Daniel, Fehldiagnose Globalisierung, Frankfurt am Main, 1998, p. 150.
28 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century corruption prevents the superiority of multinational companies to come into effect. That is why countries, the carriers of globalization, demand from those countries in which democratization is finished or has at least started to utilize all resources to combat terrorism, organized crime and corruption. Regardless of the variety of their motives and circumstances, no society needs these evils. Globalization does not imply the creation of a universal state, nor even universality on every level. It is more, as defined by Joseph Nye, a “network of interdependence”. Interdependence is visible in situations when events in different parts of the world, as well as their participants, affect each other.17 Globalization, at least for now, despite numerous fears of its opponents, does not show an orientation towards the creation of a world state, but instead only of a global society and its order as a system of behaviors and values, shaped by the rules of the globalization carriers. Obviously, what Anselm Feuerbach,18 first known critic of the world state concept, described at the beginning of the 19th century as “inescapable despotism”, the world state (Weltstaat) where “only one acts autonomously” and “only one thinks for all and decides about everything, while the rest suffer, serve and obey” cannot happen for now. Criticizing Napoleon’s idea of a world state, Feuerbach called such a state the “tomb of humanity”. World government leads to the apparent rule of law, but actually to the rule of force, and that is why, according to Feuerbach, humanity needs global law, not global government. Certainly, it is not a coincidence that the EU initiated the establishment of an international criminal court that would have authority over everyone,19 meaning global authority, nor is a coincidence that the USA refused to join that action led by the UN. It is understandable that those who have less power tend to limit greater power by using the law, but it is also understandable that the greatest power does not want to be tied by any new responsibilities, especially international ones. The politics of globalization is the mighty lever of economic globalization that paves its way, and serves also as its corrector if necessary. It consists of the promotion and imposition of the ideological postulates of globalism such as neoliberalism, systematical and monitored democratization of states and the increased significance of international organizations such as NATO, International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization etc.
17 Nye, Joseph, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 4th ed, Longman, New York, 2003, pp. 185–189. 18 Paul Johann Anselm Ritter von Feuerbach (1775–1833). 19 The so-called “Roman Court”.
29 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
When politics cannot overpower resistance to globalization, its carriers use military force. To achieve the global arrangement of the world, the introduction of rules by which the world should function is necessary, and sometimes that can be secured only by force. The most important rule is absolute respect for the will of the strongest, expressed as maximum cooperation. To achieve this, wars are waged and so-called humanitarian interventions are deployed. The privatization of war and the influence of multinational corporations in these conflicts are reflected in increased engagement of so-called corporate soldiers, members of private military and security companies. In 2008, there were 30,000 mercenaries, and they were the second largest military force functioning in Iraq.20 On a cultural level globalization, after the IT revolution is spreading instantly through use of the Internet and other communication achievements such as satellite and cable television. Whatever happens in the world is available to all in the form of news in the electronic media. The world has indeed become a “global village” thanks to the expansion of communication technology. However, this also implies domination, if not surveillance, since nine tenths of the information capacities in the world is held by the USA. In other fields of culture, the situation is similar. Hollywood makes four fifths of all movies in the world. Because of this, the once mighty national film industries like the French have almost stopped producing movies. English is not only the language of diplomacy and business, but the language of the Internet. The dollar is long since the universal currency. Brzezinski claims that every year half a million young people from all around the world come to the USA to study.21 The fact that American cultural patterns are very attractive for young generations worldwide is obviously reflected in the “McDonaldization” of the world, Coca Cola cult and sportswear brands. Speaking of the relationship between globalization and religion, although there has been fear that globalization was the boogeyman that would, while unmaking nation-states, unmake their religions, Christian theorists, including Orthodox ones, do not share those fears. First, they argue that religions are not national, nor confined to one state, and second, that globalization insists on cohabitation of every sort, including religious. Hence the conclusion of the Greek metropolitan John Zizioulas, that globalization, even though it is essentially a huge challenge, “makes possible for all religions... to live with other religions and other cultures, and cooperate”.22 For Serbian theologian Vladeta Jerotić, for example, the “New World Order” is just one of many unfinished eschatological
20 According to the Report of Congressional Research Service, 2008. 21 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives, Basic Books, New York, 1998, p. 25. 22 Interview with the Metropolitan of Pergamon, John Zizioulas, Iskon, February, 2005, pp. 76–77.
30 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century projects.23 Things are somewhat different in Islam, which spawns serious resistance to globalization both as an ideal and as practice. Proponents of globalization accentuate its importance for removing all obstacles to “free trade”. They also believe that globalization will bring democracy to the whole world, stimulate employment and sustainable development, reduce international and interreligious tensions, contribute to complete protection of all kinds of minorities, help by force if needed, to keep world peace and increase general living standards. Proponents of globalization are everywhere in the world mostly from the ranks of politicians and the wealthy, since it is not hard to practice politics within the globalist family, and extra profits and acquisition do not bother the rich. Opponents of globalization, spread in a wide spectrum from Islamic fundamentalists in the East to anti globalist movements in the West, believe that it brings “unfreedom” to small nations and countries; that it obliterates national, cultural and religious identities; that it is of use only to shareholders of multinational corporations – that it will increase unemployment throughout the world, contribute to faster pollution of the soil, water and air, the formation of ozone holes, disappearance of plant and animal species, and increase poverty and crime. Opponents of globalization mostly come from the class of ordinary people, including some intellectuals. Joseph Nye thinks that the frequency of financial crises and the drastic increase of unemployment could cause large mass movements to resist globalization.24 The “New World Order” is still an unfinished world system that, as an order of cosmopolitan democracy implies the establishment of certain rules of behavior for all and the adoption of certain values by all. That does not mean that everyone should behave in the same way. This order is, namely, a system of unequals in wealth and participation in the creation of the world societal policies. If it is true that this order was conceived by the richest and most powerful people in the world, then it was logically conceived not to equalize others with them, but to increase their own wealth and power. Nye thinks that one of the properties of globalization is “followed by widening the gap between the rich and the poor. It does not imply either uniformity or equality”. Rules of behavior are, hence, already divided into those that apply to the privileged and those that apply to others. This was best articulated by one of the proponents of globalization saying that the world will have to get used to these double standards.
23 Vladeta Jerotić, “Vera i nacija”, Odabrana dela, Izdavački fond Arhiepiskopije beogradsko- karlovačke i Ars Libri, Beograd, 2000, p. 30. 24 Nye, Joseph, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, p. 190.
31 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
The different attitude towards small countries and nations is caused not only by USA interests, but also by the stance of small countries and nations towards the USA. If small countries and nations see a mighty shelter in the USA and their politics, they are welcomed and protected – and by aegis, no less of Zeus’ magic shield that provides them not only absolute protection from all others, but permits them the possibility of carefree attack on other “small ones”. Those on the other side of the shield automatically become “bad”. Their guilt is only in their delay to join. He who is the first to become a member of the “global family” is right, because in international relations, the strongest has always been the judge. All current forms of resistance to globalization, from the protests of the anti- globalist movements to Islamic and anarchist terrorism, do not look like serious obstacles that could stop it – they only impede its progress. Whether we want it or not, this is the time of the domination of one power and its circle – and that is exactly what it does. Dominates! Some call it globalization.
32 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Branko RAKIĆ1
GLOBALISATION AS A HISTORICAL PATTERN OF THE WORLD SOCIETY
Abstract: Globalisation is a term which is often written about, though rarely from a truly scientifically insightful and comprehensive viewpoint. Usually, it is done for the ideological and political purposes or from a partial viewpoint of the particular field of social activity, for example economic. When numerous deficient or twisted definitions of globalisations are cast aside, it remains clear that globalisation is essentially a process, which is historically inevitable. It is a historical pattern of society that has its roots in the inherent need of humanity for progress. In order to create conditions for globalisation to develop, it should rely on the material base in the form of a certain level of scientific, technical and technological development. It is without doubt that globalisation can be abused for political purposes and for any other form of domination over weaker members of the world society by powerful ones. However, in that form, globalisation becomes no more than an ideology, which can be designated as globalism so to differentiate it from the interpretation of globalisation in this article. Globalisation as a process is not a new phenomenon at all being rooted in the dawn of the social organisation. As Middle Age feuds became too narrow in scope through globalisation and transformed through unification into nation states, so the contemporary process of globalisation overgrows those same nation states and pulls the society to the formation of universal international organisations that can satisfy the needs of the modern globalised economy. Key words: globalisation, progress, globalism, nation state, international organisations.
1 Professor Branko Rakić, Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade.
33 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
The Notion of Globalization – Globalization as the Social Pattern Before we start to analyze the relation between the European process of integration, which emanates mainly in the form of the European Union, as the most solid European integrationist organization, and the process of globalization, we need to establish what does globalization purports. Among the contemporary social phenomena, globalization is a subject of numerous and vehement debates, in the course of which it is equally being commended and contested. It is also often the cause of various protests, which regularly turn into violence. Mainly, globalization is spoken of quite emotionally and it is more often than not a subject of evaluation, but fairly less of serious scientific analysis and insight. From this, the impression is derived, that the participants in these discussions, entrenched in their positions and emotionally fueled, discuss the notion which essence and coverage they do not grasp identically and integrally. On these differing views on globalization and the understandings of the notion, Miroslav Pečujlić wrote: “However, globalization, its grasp and nature are a field of passionate theoretical and ideological disputes, clashes of rival conceptions”. (D. Held, et. al., 1999; N. Guillen, 1999). While some in the globalization see the emanation of the iron historical necessity, for the others it is but a myth, a degree of mutual connection of states is under the level that existed prior to the First World War. If the globalization is for some an objective and spontaneous planetary process, for the others it is entirely a project of western domination, of the global Americanization. While for one strand it represents the global integration, for the other it causes inevitable fragmentation, ever-wider gap between worlds and the clash of civilizations. If the winners in globalizations find exclusively the progress of civilizations and new benefits for mankind, for the losers it is but a destructive force. The multitude of differing conceptions, which was scantly illustrated, gathers unto the two utterly different, great theoretical pictures of globalization: the strand of hyperglobalism and the strand of scepticism, which mentions D. Held in his famous classification (D. Held, et. al; D. Held, A. McGrew, 2000). We might add to this dichotomy the strand of critical theory of globalization (Z. Bauman, 1998, 2000; U. Beck, 2000; M. Castells, 2000; A. Giddens, 2000, D. Held, 1999).“2 Dr Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan and Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann have created in the course of Program on the Geopolitical Implications of Globalization and Transnational Security of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy an overview and
2 Miroslav Pečujlić, “Two aspects of globalization“, in Ivana Pantelić, Vlado Pavićević, Vladimir Petrović, Goran Milovanović (eds.), Aspects of Globalization, Belgrade, Beogradska otvorena škola, 2003, http://www.bos.rs/materijali/aspekti.pdf, 1.4.2014, p. 9.
34 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century analysis of a larger number of definitions of globalization which have appeared in literature, in the text titled as “Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition”,3 finally to give their own definition of the term. By these authors, globalization is the “concept that has been defined variously over the years, with some connotations referring to progress, development and stability, integration and cooperation, and others referring to regression, colonialism, and destabilization”.4 From 114 definitions which they present in their work, 67 relates to economical notions and terms. Some of the definitions are utterly general and imprecise, more of a figurative review of the notion being defined such as the definition by David Harvey which says globalization is “... the compression of time and space”,5 or the definition of Kenichi Ohmae: “...globalization means the onset of the borderless world...”6 Other definitions are too one-sided and limit themselves only to some aspects and domains of human activities. The majority of such definitions relates to economy, as is the case with the definition from a document by ОЕCD from 1993. “...understood as the phenomenon by which markets and production in different countries are becoming increasingly interdependent due to the dynamics of trade in goods and services and the flows of capital and technology”,7 which is very similar to a definition from a study of International Monetary Fund “Globalization refers to the growing economic interdependence of countries worldwide through the increasing volume and variety of cross-border transactions in goods and services and of international capital flows, and also through the more rapid and widespread diffusion of technology”,8 or the definition which was given by
3 Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, Gérard Stoudmann, Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition, Geneva, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2006, http://www.sustainable history.com/articles/definitions-of-globalization.pdf, 20.11.2013. 4 Ibid, p. 3. 5 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: David Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989), as cited in R. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 8. 6 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Power and Strategy in the Global Marketplace (London: HarperCollins, 1992), as cited in RAWOO Netherlands Development Assistance Research Council, “Coping with Globalization: The Need for Research Concerning the Local Response to Globalization in Developing Countries”, Publication No. 20, 2000, p. 14. 7 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: OECD, Intra-Firm Trade (Paris: OECD, 1993), p. 7, as cited in R. Brinkman and J. Brinkman, “Corporate Power and the Globalization Process”, International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 29, No. 9, 2002, pp. 730–731. 8 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook, A Survey by the Staff of the International Monetary Fund”, “Meeting the Challenges of Globalization in the Advanced Economies”, in the World Economic and Financial Surveys, 1997, p. 45, see http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/WEOMAY/Weocon.htm (Chapter 3).
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Gijsbert Van Liemt “…the growing interdependence of national economies”.9 Among the definitions related to a particular domain, some relate to culture, as for example the one given by Vilashini Cooppan “…a process of cross-cultural interaction, exchange, and transformation“,10 some relate to the state structures and their overcoming, as the one given by Ulrich Beck “Globalization – however the word is understood – implies the weakening of state sovereignty and state structures“,11 and some to computer technology, as the definition by the Australian Griffith University: “The process of developing, manufacturing, and marketing software products that are intended for worldwide distribution. This term combines two aspects of the work: internationalization (enabling the product to be used without language or culture barriers) and localization (translating and enabling the product for a specific locale).”12 It is obvious that every such definition is given from the angle of those which deal with given fields of human activity. Some of the definitions, as a rule those which express a very negative attitude towards globalizations, view this phenomenon ideologically simplified, as does the definition by Stuart Hall according to which “…it is a hegemonizing process in the proper Gramscian sense“,13 definition given by Immanuel Wallerstein, “globalization represents the triumph of a capitalist world economy tied together by a global division of labour“,14 or the definition by Martin Khor “Globalization is what we in the Third World have for several centuries called colonization”15.
9 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: Gijsbert Van Liemt, “Labour in the Global Economy: Challenges, Adjustment and Policy Responses in the EU”, in O. Memedovic et al. (eds.), Globalization of Labour Markets: Challenges, Adjustment and Policy Responses in the European Union and Less Developed Countries (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998), as cited in V. S. A. Kumar, “A Critical Methodology of Globalization: Politics of the 21st Century?”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 10, Issue 2, Summer 2003, p. 97. 10 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: Vilashini Cooppan, “World Literature and Global Theory: Comparative Literature for the New Millennium”, Symploke, Vol. 9, Issue 1-2, 2001, p. 15. 11 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity”, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, Issue No. 1, January/March 2000, p. 86. 12 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: Griffith University, “Software Internationalisation Glossary of Unicode Terms”, Australia, March 2000, see http://www.cit.gu.edu.au /~davidt/cit3611 /glossary.htm. 13 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: Stuart Hall, “The Multicultural Question”, Pavis Lecture, Walton Hall Campus of the Open University in Milton Keynes, October 19, 2000. 14 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974), as cited in R. J. Holton, Globalization and the Nation-State (London: Macmillan Press, 1998), p. 11. 15 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann: Martin Khor, 1995, as cited in J. A. Scholte, “The Globalization of World Politics”, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 15.
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Finally, some of the definitions contain odd elements, which should not be a part of this notion, as is the case with the definition by Nayef and Stoudmann, which contains natural phenomena: “Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and transcultural integration of human and non-human activities”, whereas these authors explain the existence of non-human activities in their definition of globalization in following way: “It is also important to include non-human activities, which incorporate, but are not limited to, the spread of bacteria and non-human diseases such as bird flu, as well as natural disasters such as tornadoes, tsunamis, earthquakes, and hurricanes. As all of these issues impact human and global security, it is our opinion that a truly comprehensive definition must address them.”16 The extremely large abundance of the globalization theme in academic literature and the differences in the approach to defining globalization has led Cesare Poppi to put an equation between the globalization and the discussion on globalization: “The literature stemming from the debate on globalization has grown in the last decade beyond any individual’s capability of extracting a workable definition of the concept. In a sense, the meaning of the concept is self-evident, in another, it is vague and obscure, as its reaches are wide and constantly shifting. Perhaps, more than any other concept, globalization is the debate about it.”17 In order to define the term globalization, it is best to start from the etymology of this word. At the same time, etymology of the term mondialization which has the same meaning should be considered. Both words stem from Latin language. Globalization has its origins in the word (le)globe (both in French and in English), actually farther in the past from the Latin word globus, which is the term for the planet Earth. The term mondialization has its origins in French wordlemonde (il mondo in Italian), actually farther in the past from the Latin word mundus, which means world. Starting from the origin of both words, and the meaning which is given to them by almost everyone that uses them, globalization and mondialization denote the same notion, or process (but the result of the process as well) of upgrading social processes and relations from lower (by spatial coverage actually narrower) levels to the world level, actually the global level. Globalization is a social pattern, it is something that happens unconditionally and cannot be prevented, even if we want it to be. This is why the negative or
16 Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, Gérard Stoudmann, Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition, op. cit., pp. 5-6. 17 Cеsare Poppi, “Wider Horizons with Larger Details: Subjectivity, Ethnicity, and Globalization”, in Alan Scott (ed.), The Limits of Globalization: Cases and Arguments (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 300, n. 1; quoted by: Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, Gérard Stoudmann, Definitions of Globalization: A Comprehensive Overview and a Proposed Definition, Geneva, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, 2006, p. 8, accessed on, 20 November 2013. from: http://www.sustainablehistory.com/articles/ definitions-of-globalization.pdf.
37 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century positive attitude towards globalization as a notion, polarization for and against globalization, and generally evaluative, and even emotional attitude towards it is absurd, equally absurd as the attitude for or against a particular natural pattern, for example gravitation. What is it that makes globalization actual right now, what is it that makes possible now the upgrade of social processes on the world level, and it did not make it in earlier times? That is the development of key variable factor in the progress of human society and human civilization – and that key factor is the spread of human knowledge, actually the scientific, technical and technological progress, which further creates the basis for the development and conditions the economical and other human activities progress. In the contemporary times the attained level of the scientific, technical and technological progress has created possibilities of communication on the global level which just a few decades ago seemed impossible. The spread of communication possibilities and their ever more growing speed create an illusion of the spatial constriction, the basis for development stipulating the development of economy and other fields of human activity. The world is becoming ever more a „global village“. Futurologists delve into questions of how will the world look like in future, even that not too far, how will the people move upon the world and mutually communicate physically and through technical means, but neither science nor unbridled human imagination can clearly envision where the human civilization progress leads.
The roots of globalization But, even the contemporary level of the scientific, technical and technological progress is not only a work of contemporary people, but also of former generations’ heritage. Contemporary level of the scientific, technical and technological progress and the included level of communicational progress which enables the upgrade of social processes on the global level are but a one phase in the constant process of development of these civilizational achievements. However, this phase would be impossible without previous phases, upon which it simply builds, and they altogether constitute a single unique process. If we bear in mind everything said, then it could be stated that the globalization started with the appearance of science, technique and technology, even in those early phases when they existed in rudimentary shapes. It can be said that the globalization started from the moment when man, contrary to other animals or those rare and isolated members of its own species which have stayed beyond the reach of the civilization, started to accumulate knowledge and achievements based on it, to upgrade what the former generations have achieved. Because only man, civilised man, was unique in that every next generation lives
38 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century in a different manner than the former, exactly because of this accumulation of knowledge and achievements based upon it, while all animals and those rare tribes that were being discovered in isolated places in which they had lived out of reach of the civilization, lived and live in the same manner in every generation. That specific manner of the civilized man, that ever-present accumulation, development and upgrade of knowledge and achievements based upon it, in the first place science, technique and technology, and all those things which stem from them, is what we call progress. Progress is the feature of civilized man, which follows him from the moment when he began to get civilized. Not all the other creatures concern with progress. It is not their feature. Is the progress good for a man or not, is a separate question. It is questionable whether a man would be more contented and the survival of his species would be more ensured if from generation to generation it would live in the same manner, without progress and constant tendency toward progress and never satiated craving for newer, better, higher, and in the manner which would certainly exclude the adverse effects on the environment produced by civilization. But, the civilized man does not live like that, progress is its inherent feature and today it is regarded as an axiom that the progress is good and suitable. However, since the progress is the inherent feature of civilized man, that which makes him for what he is, even the evaluative attitude towards it as such, its treatment as something which is good or bad, is also absurd. Globalization, therefore, begins at the moment when progress begins as well, and that is the moment of the establishment of civilization. That can perhaps be best illustrated by a simple, even banal example. One of the key modern, sophisticated means through which modern man crosses wide expanses and to which he can substantially give credit for the fact that an array of social functions effectuates on global level, is certainly a plane. One of the first great technical discoveries was a wheel. A wheel enabled the primitive man who discovered it to transport burden easily and to move easier and faster by simple vehicles which moved thanks to wheels. And, those vehicles had been through times constantly perfectioned and became ever more comfortable for traversing wider expanses. The important part of the majority of modern transport vehicles are wheels, modernized, but again based on the discovery that dates back thousands of years. The important part of modern planes is wheels. Through the discovery of the wheel, man began the process of the creation of the plane.
Globalization and its abuse There exist two key reasons why the globalization is exposed to fierce critique and often-tumultuous negative reactions: one of the reasons is economical-social-
39 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century ecological and the other is cultural. The first thing that creates resistance against globalization is the fact that many view as its essential component the engagement of large capital from developed countries in the exploitation of cheap labor in poor parts of world, whereas in those poor parts dirty technologies are being exported and environmental standards are disrespected (this disrespect cuts on expenses and enlarges profits). Second reason for the resistance to globalization is that many consider an essential component of it the disappearance of local, national or regional specificities, and the cultural, evaluative and so-called civilizational uniformization in accordance with models of the rich parts of the world, which could lead to the identity loss of certain national, ethnical and other traditional groups. In both of these fears is there a grain of truth, but only partially. The fact is that developed parts of the world, especially their large capital, show more of the abilities and readiness to use new conditions which are created by the scientific, technical and technological progress, wider possibilities of communication and the possibilities and needs of the functioning of the economy and other segments of human activity in the wide, global space (as is the global economic functioning, which supposes the usage of raw materials and labor from the global space and the placement of goods on the global market). This is normal and expected, since the rich parts of the world and large capital naturally have greater possibilities for the uses of the results of science, technique and technology to which they alone are the most often initiators and financiers, often with the monopoly on the plan of their usage. But, that does not mean that the scientific, technical and technological progress which enables communication and functioning on the global level does not bring with it means and possibilities of benefit to all mankind, including those which are contemporary poorer. Richer sectors of society have before many centuries been the first to pull benefit from the industrialization (which is also the result of scientific, technical and technological progress), which establishment have they alone initiated, but finally whole mankind enjoyed great benefit from it (despite the fact that even today the rich have more benefit from it than the poor).Class divisions and exploitation existed and exist in even narrower, national or other frameworks, so it is only logical that they exist on the global plane. With the spread of economical process to the global level, these class divisions and exploitation are translated to the same global level. As it was led and as it is led in the lower, spatially narrower levels, fight for social justice should be led in the global level, with the aim of elimination of social injustice and exploitation on the global level, not only in narrower frames. But fighting against globalization as such, against the upgrade of social processes and relations on the global level is absurd (since that fight is futile, condemned to failure, since it is a fight against a social pattern) and harmful (since it is a fight against a process which is basically positive, the same as progress as such is
40 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century something positive and beneficial under the notions of a civilized man). Fight against globalization, and not against class differences and exploitation, which exist on lower levels and now even more on global, reminds a little of the fight of workers against machines, because of which these same workers were left workless, during the movement of Ludists in XIX century England, even though at the end numerous labour rights, in the first place right to a reasonable working hours, came to be widely spread civilizational achievement thanks to the fruits of industrialization. Today’s geographically defined class divisions, which are usually called divisions between rich North and poor South, will be overcome one day, since the capital does not know or accept national or regional qualification and since with the flow of capital to the regions with cheaper raw materials and labor will come gradual levelling in development. Class divisions will continue to exist, but they will become global, with no geographical determination, that is rich and poor, exploitations and exploited, and will be more or less equal in all parts of the world. Until the society of social justice comes to be established on global level, and we hope it will, it is important to stream the energy towards the fight against class differences and exploitation on all levels and in all forms, and not towards the futile, absurd and in many ways harmful fight against globalization. Examples of speedy development of some Far Eastern countries thanks to existing conditions and habits adapted to western model of economic management and in great measure to western capital, but also to wise management of those nations, are the indicators that it is possible in the conditions of globalization, and in great measure exactly because of it, for other parts of the world which are not the West, to be intensively developed.And, the circle of those perspective economies is geographically spreading, so to Asian countries join others from other continents, as Brazil or South Africa. As for cultural and civilizational unification, it should be said that a part of it was caused by the very use of modern technical achievements, and not through imposed foreign models. For example the use of electric energy and other technical means fueled by it or the use of motor vehicles has changed the way of life, that is part of habits and customs, in all parts of the world, so that contemporary Englishman thanks to those means lives differently than his compatriot 150, 100 or 50 years ago, same as for example a citizen of Burma from the same reasons lives differently than his ancestors. These changes are even more visible in more developed parts of the world, in which the possibilities for the use of modern techniques are larger and the technique itself is much more available than in lesser- developed parts. The fact that the most important scientific, technical and technological achievements in last few centuries were discovered firstly in western countries does not mean that they are the inherent feature of the western civilization which it in turn imposes to others. On the contrary, all the civilized nations tend to achieve technological advances, just in some historical periods some of the nations
41 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century or groups of nations, those that have achieved in given period the higher level of progress, more easily grasp new scientific, technical and technological achievements and innovations than the others. And, the fact that those are the achievements everyone tends to, since they are a feature of progress as a tendency of all civilized nations, leads to easier acceptance of those achievements in other parts of the world, as soon as the conditions are created. In some earlier historical periods, important scientific, technical and technological achievements were firstly discovered in some other parts of the world, not in West, and they were later accepted worldwide, but this spread is not considered as imposition or manifestation of cultural imperialism. We use today paper and gunpowder, which were discovered in China, or the numerical system discovered by Arabs, and no one considers that because of that we have become victims of civilizational conquest and strangle. Simply, progress is the feature of the civilized man and the geographical epicenters of the spread of progress have throughout the history of mankind migrated from some regions to others. However, the fact, that in the conditions of global communications functioning, and the economic globalization, there exists a tendency of imposing values, perceptions and life habits characteristic for western world and its people to those parts of the world and its nations who those values, perceptions and life habits through the nature of things do not share and do not accept, should not be denied and neglected. That imposition should naturally require the suppression and elimination of values, perceptions and life habits of these other non-western nations, that is the loss of the elements of their identity. That would be deadly for not only these nations, but for whole mankind, since the depletion and elimination of cultural and civilizational diversity would mean cultural and civilizational impoverishment of whole mankind, even those nations whose culture and civilization would not be endangered but imposed to others. This is why is it necessary to stand against this imposition of foreign and elimination of own civilizational elements, that is elements of identity, that is against generally cultural and civilizational uniformization and impoverishment of mankind, and not only against very globalizations which should not necessary bring this impoverishment. What is more, the enlarged possibilities of communication and their spread to global level open possibilities for the increased cultural and civilizational exchange, mutual acknowledgment and permeation, that is promotion and advance of cultural and civilizational achievements of rich and poor, large and small alike, and generally the upgrade of cultural and civilizational diversity (while this level of cultural and civilizational achievements is not necessarily in correlation and proportion with the level of economic development and the numbers of the nation whom it belongs to, so the cultural heritage od some poorer and smaller nations is far greater and richer than the heritage of some larger and richer nations).
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Both phenomena, the use of globalization with the aim of global exploitation and strangle of diversity by imposition of own cultural and civilizational models, have their ideological superstructure (or base). This ideology, the ideology of the use of globalizations for those two aims is called globalism or mondialism. Thus, with both phenomena the catch is about the following notions, which are even can be said the result of the abuse of globalization, and not the part of its essence. Therefore, they must be prevented and mitigated, and their ideologization disputed, but the fight against globalization as such is futile, absurd and even harmful. On the need to differentiate between the terms globalization and globalism Mihailo Marković wrote: Term “globalization” covers today two very different meanings. One is scientific: as we have seen, objective social processes gain ever more, on one side, all encompassing, global character. That means, globalizations denotes the development of modern technology, communication, scientific research, unification of economic and political institutions and models in various parts of the world, connection among various national and regional cultures and civilizations, worldwide degradation of the environment etc. The second meaning is ideological and it prevails today. In that sense, the term is used to denote the ever-larger control of the world economy, politics and culture by governments and multinational corporations; remaining superpower and its allies (Group G-7). They use the term “new world order” to justify and rationalize dictatorial structure of the relations between particular states and regions. These different meanings should not be connected to the same term, since this would cause the unwanted, in fact purposefully created confusion. It is a question of two different meanings which should be expressed by using two different terms: “globalization” which relates to objective scientific, progressive notion of the world integration and “globalism” which expresses ideological and very regressive term of the fight for world domination. Any text which does not differentiate between these two stays at the very best confused and contradictory, and in the worst case is an intentional rationalization of the greatest evil of contemporary civilization.”18 In accordance with the general terminological discord and variety, other distinctions between the terms globalization and globalism can be found in literature. So, did Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye define globalization as a
18 Mihailo Marković, „Globalizacija i globalizam“, in Jovica Trkulja (ed.), Iskušenja globalizacije – Globalizacija, evropeizacija i nacionalni identitet (Challenges of globalization – globalization, europeanization and national identity), Collection of articles from the round table held in Kikinda, 2/3. October 2003. (from the series „Kikindski dijalozi“ (Kikinda dialogues), volume 3), Skupština opštine Kikinda, 2004.
43 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century process (the same as its opposite term deglobalization), and globalism as a result of that process: “… we define globalism as a state of the world involving networks of interdependence at multi-continental distances. These networks can be linked through flows and influences of capital and goods, information and ideas, people and force, as well as environmentally and biologically relevant substances (such as acid rain or pathogens). Globalization and deglobalization refer to the increase or decline of globalism.”19 Even under the terminology which we have determined, globalization is the process, but for the result of that process the appropriate term would be Serbian expression globalizovanost (the quality of being globalized), and not globalism, even if we do not consider this other term reserved only for ideology and the tendency toward world domination as Marković did. Here, of course, should be taken into consideration the different spread of coverage and certain measure of dissimilarity of the meanings of the terms from different languages (so called semantic fields), whereas, we believe, in the domain that is analyzed, Serbian offers more possibilities than English, and the fact that in Serbian for terms that deal with ideological matters usually word which end with suffix “ism” are used. Keohane and Nye point to the other difference between globalism (as they define it) and the other phenomenon on which they have published a book in 1977,20 and that is interdependence: “As compared to interdependence, globalism has two special characteristics: 1) Globalism refers to networks of connections (multiple relationships), not simply to single linkages. We would refer to economic or military interdependence between the United States and Japan, but not to globalism between the United States and Japan. US-Japanese interdependence is part of contemporary globalism, but by itself is not globalism. 2) For a network of relationships to be considered “global”, it must include multicontinental distances, not simply regional networks. … Islam’s quite rapid diffusion from Arabia across Asia to what is now Indonesia was a clear instance of globalization; but the initial movement of Hinduism across the Indian subcontinent was not, according to our definition.”21
19 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye., Jr., “Introduction” to the book: Joseph S. Nye, John D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p. 2. 20 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1977. 21 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye., Jr., “Introduction” to the book: Joseph S. Nye, John D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p. 2.
44 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Globalization as the historical phenomenon – the rise of nation-states As a result of the accumulation of human knowledge, that is the development of science, technique and technology, throughout the history of mankind the spatial coverage in which the social process developed has spread, only recently to attain global level. That process of spreading, conditioned by mentioned initiators and determining factors was naturally progressive, with certain delays in moments when important world civilizations suffered falls, as a rule after defeats from peoples on lower civilizational level, but with higher vitality. Keohane and Nye22 state that globalism has different dimensions, foremost economic, military, environmental, social and cultural but again political, legal and many others (as scientific, linguistic etc.), that is, it can emanate and effectuate in all these domains particularly, and they also state examples from history when the movements and relations in some of these domains reached a very wide even global level. Based on this they differentiate between globalist movements and tendencies that are known to history and contemporary globalization of wider material coverage: “When people speak colloquially about globalization, they typically refer to recent increases in globalism. Comments such as ‘globalization is fundamentally new’, only make sense in this context; but are, nevertheless, misleading. We prefer to speak of globalism as a phenomenon with ancient roots, and of globalization as the process of increasing globalism, now or in the past. The issue is not how old globalism is, but rather of how ‘thin’ or ‘thick’ it is at any given time. As an example of ‘thin globalization’, the Silk Road provided an economic and cultural link between ancient Europe and Asia, but the route was plied by a small group of hardy traders, and the goods that were traded back and forth had a direct impact primarily on a small (and relatively elite) stratum of consumers along the Road. In contrast, ‘thick’ relations of globalization involve many relationships that are intensive as well as extensive:
22 Keohane and Nye state: “The division of globalism into separate dimensions is inevitably somewhat arbitrary. Nonetheless, it is useful for analysis, because changes in the various dimensions of globalization do not necessarily co-vary. One can sensibly say, for instance, that ‘economic globalization’ took place between approximately 1850 and 1914, manifested in imperialism and in increasing trade and capital flows between politically independent countries; and that such globalization was largely reversed between 1914 and 1945. That is, economic globalism rose between 1850 and 1914, and fell between 1914 and 1945. However, military globalism rose to new heights during the two world wars, as did many aspects of social globalism. The worldwide influenza epidemic of 1919, which took 21 million lives was propagated by the flows of soldiers around the world. 1So did globalism decline or rise between 1914 and 1945? It depends what dimension of globalism one is referring to. Without an adjective, general statements about globalism are often meaningless or misleading.” – Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye., Jr., “Introduction” to the book: Joseph S. Nye, John D. Donahue (editors), Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000, p. 6.
45 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
long-distance flows that are large and continuous, affecting the lives of many people. The operations of global financial markets today, for instance, affect people from Peoria to Penang. ‘Globalization’ is the process by which globalism becomes increasingly thick.”23 We are of the opinion that the cases and examples of „rare“ globalized nature should be treated as historical excursions which should not necessary be a part of a stable trend of the spread of social relations and functions on the wider spatial level, thanks to the progressive development of science, technique and technology, but that only examples of “dense“ globalized nature should be a part of progressive course of the spread of social relations and functions in its late phase, when larger number of these relations functions reach the world level. Miroslav Pečujlić wrote on permanent evolutive character of globalization and its historical development, and noted on the lack of one-sidedness in its development, and to the unpredictable of the future movement of this process: “Globalization, which has long prehistory, is an emanation of the particular anthropologic-civilizational code, it is an aspect of a fascinating evolution from the first lonely groups of humanoids over the archaic empires to the modern world order. The expansion of great religions and civilizations, military conquests and huge empires, are an archaic model of the unification of the mankind, of the connection between worlds. Against all the deep and sharp differences between modern and premodern conceptions (protoglobalization), we have one universal and permanent tendency of the mankind. Globalization, however, does not gain the form of a constant evolutionary line. On the contrary, in its tempestuous and dramatic history periods of expansion and contraction interchange, rises and brutal falls – caused by the unstoppable forces of the industrial revolution and colonial expansion, it lives its never presaged soar which begins during the fifth decade of 19th century to the First World War. Two great world wars and Cold War will bring, however, brutal fall and ebb. The fall of communism and the triumph of the West will sign the period of its brain storming acceleration, the era of turboglobalization. But, the track of the world remains opened and uncertain – it can move from environmental or nuclear cataclysm, over the new division of the world into giant regional blocks, to the single democratic and Orvelian “New World Order.“24
23 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye., Jr., “Introduction” to the book: Joseph S. Nye, John D. Donahue (eds.), Governance in a Globalizing World, Washington D.C., Brookings Institution Press, 2000, pp. 6–7. 24 Miroslav Pečujlić, “Two aspects of globalization“, in Ivana Pantelić, Vlado Pavićević, Vladimir Petrović, Goran Milovanović (eds.), Aspects of Globalization, Belgrade, Beogradska otvorena škola, 2003, http://www.bos.rs/materijali/aspekti.pdf, 1.4.2014, p. 11.
46 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
However, we should differentiate between the development and evolution of the political structures and the development of basic social relations and processes, firstly those economical in nature. The process of the spread of territorial coverage of the economical process and economic relations, and other basic social relations, conditioned directly by the development of science, technique and technology, is mainly constantly upwarded, that is these relations over time ask for ever wider space for their effectuation. As for political structures, things are slightly different, that is their development was, as for their spatial coverage and its spread, both progressive and regressive. That is because the measure of their determination is always lesser with the progressive development of science, technique and technology (lesser because that influence is less direct) as it is the case with economy and other basic relations. As for the development of political structures, the more dominant determining factor is the human political will, that is, the tendency to rule over the ever-wider space. So does the history acknowledge great empires even in the antics and middle ages, which are much bigger than the later (including contemporary) nation states. Those empires rose, spread and gained impressively wide spatial coverage, and then decayed. They have managed to establish on that wide space political power, which in some period of their existence appeared solid and efficient, but later they weakened, and that weakness in combination with outer enemy has resulted in the fall and decay of those empires. In the most important example of those empires, Roman Empire, following elements were established, which enabled the efficient functioning of that huge and in political sense unified whole: unified branched administration, as in the center of the Empire so in the provinces, solid army with legions in garrisons spread over the whole territory of the Empire, developed legal system, which became a basis of contemporary continental law, mostly in the field of civil law (but which in the longest period of the Empire’s existence related only to roman citizens – cives, and not to other subjects, latins and particularly peregrines, the subjects of the newly conquered lands, in which the roman authorities left local self-government intact and local law as well), for those technical conditions developed road, even water supply network, not only in the Empire’s center but in some measure in the farther provinces, which purpose was to give logistic support to the remote military garrisons. Besides that, in some provinces, in those closer to the Empire’s center, the Romanisation of the languages of the indigenous populations occurred. However, despite of the substantial civilizational and civilizing role of the Roman Empire, we can only talk about the establishment and the functioning of Roman state, not about the establishment and existence of Roman society (except perhaps in the center of the Empire) with the meaning of the word that is used today, that is in the way that in the last few centuries and now we can talk about the existence of French, Italian, Polish, Bulgarian, Serbian, and even at the times of the existence of the Yugoslav
47 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century state, Yugoslav society, etc. Also, it can be hardly talked about single Roman economy, single economical process which functioned on the whole territory of the Empire, but the economic relations amounted more to the collection of taxes by the central authority in the provinces and the relatively limited trade on this wide expanse. Or to concentrate on concrete, widely known examples, can it be said that the Judea and Galilea in the times of the first Roman emperors, Octavian Augustus25 or Tiberius26, time which is described in biblical texts, although they were under Roman political, administrative and military rule, were a part of the same society in the essential meaning of the word as Rome itself? It is clear they were not, as were not the tribal societies of Gaul and Britain etc. To repeat, if the word “society“ we concept as it is conceived today. The development of science, technique and technology at the time of the Roman Empire did not allow for the intensity of communication which would be necessary for the establishment of more solid social ties among faraway regions, and it particularly did not allow the creation of unified economical process on the territory of the whole huge empire, which led to the lack of unity in other social relations as well. Montesquieu, for example, in his study, “Considération sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence“ from 1734. ascertains the lack of imposition of roman rules and customs to conquered and oppressed peoples, but only the demand for obedience, although he, it seems, treats this as more the matter of choice of roman authorities, than the implication of the lack of means for such imposition on the wide space because of underdeveloped technical and communicational means: “Remarquez, je vous prie, la conduite des Romains. Après la défaite d’Antiochus, ils étaient maîtres de l’Afrique, de l’Asie et de la Grèce, sans y avoir presque de ville en propre. Il semblait qu’ils ne conquissent que pour donner; mais ils restaient si bien les maîtres que, lorsqu’ils faisaient la guerre à quelque prince, ils l’accablaient, pour ainsi dire, du poids de tout l’univers. … Ainsi Rome n’était pas proprement une monarchie ou une république, mais la tête du corps formé par tous les peuples du monde. Si les Espagnols, après la conquête du Mexique et du Pérou, avaient suivi ce plan, ils n’auraient pas été obligés de tout détruire pour tout conserver.
25 Ruled from 16. January 27. BC until 19. August 14. AD. 26 Ruled from 18. September 14. AD until 16. March 37.
48 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
C’est la folie des conquérants de vouloir donner à tous les peuples leurs lois et leurs coutumes; cela n’est bon à rien: car, dans toute sorte de gouvernement, on est capable d’obéir. Mais, Rome n’imposant aucunes lois générales, les peuples n’avaient point entre eux de liaisons dangereuses; ils ne faisaient un corps que par une obéissance commune, et, sans être compatriotes, ils étaient tous romains. On objectera peut-être que les empires fondés sur les lois des fiefs n’ont jamais été durables, ni puissants. Mais il n’y a rien au monde de si contradictoire que le plan des Romains et celui des Barbares; et, pour n’en dire qu’un mot: le premier était l’ouvrage de la force; l’autre, de la faiblesse; dans l’un, la sujétion était extrême; dans l’autre, l’indépendance. Dans les pays conquis par les nations germaniques, le pouvoir était dans la main des vassaux; le droit seulement, dans la main du prince. C’était tout le contraire chez les Romains.“27 Indicating the difference between the Greek city-states, which were spatially small to function as rounded societies, and wide Roman Empire which stayed socially heterogeneous, Véronique Harouel-Bureloupstates: “De son côté, Rome offre un exemple contraire aux cités grecques. Rome en effet s’affirme dès le départ comme un lieu d’asile pour les étrangers. Le numerus clausus y est inconnu. L’idée d’intégration est vivante à Rome et sert à consolider les conquêtes de la cité. La citoyenneté romaine renvoie à une citoyenneté juridique contrairement à la citoyenneté grecque qui suppose une communauté de vie. L’Edit de Caracalla qui, en 212, accorde la citoyenneté à tous les habitants de l’Empire romain, n’interdit pas le maintien de coutumes et d’institutions locales, même si cette extension du droit de cité permet à tous d’utiliser le jus civil. ... Fiers de leur civilisation et persuadés qu’elle continuerait à s’imposer aux autres peuples, les Romains «se sont efforcés de les associer à leur système, sans chercher à les assimiler de force» (N. Rouland).“28 Different authors ascribe to political will of the central authorities in Rome this survival of social heterogeneity, that is the lack of establishment and tendency to establish civilizational and other social homogeneity on the wide expanse of
27 Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, Considération sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence, 1734, Collection “Les auteur(e)s classiques”, édition électronique de l’Université du Québec à Chicoutimi, http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1522/cla.moc.con, 12.11.2013, p. 46–47. 28 Véronique Harouel-Bureloup, (Maître de Conférences à l’Université de Paris 8), “Etat et nation: un rappel historique…”, Grotius International, Géopolitiques de l’humanitaire, http://www. grotius.fr/etat-et-nation-un-rappel-historique/, 12.11.2013.
49 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the Roman Empire, held tightly under the mighty military-political control and rule. However, that will, that is the lack of will for social cohesion and homogeneity, are the consequence of the lack of means, that is the under development of transport and communicational means in those times, and also means of production and other techno-technological conditions that would enable and request such homogeneity. Even if such will existed, and it would have probably existed if objective possibilities for its realization had existed, it would not realize due to the imperfections of these objective possibilities. The Middle Ages knew the empires, such as Byzantine or Frankish, as also the slightly looser but more permanent construction of the Holy Roman Empire of German people, which was in constant struggle for primacy with the Holy See in Europe, which beside the supreme spiritual authority tended to acquire supreme secular power on the continent (as did the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire have pretensions on the spiritual plane). However, those empires as well, as the kingdoms which existed in the Middle Age, were in the first place political entities, which built its greatness on the military force and military success, as on political skill (including the dynastical marital combinations).Economical processes developed in the frame of smaller entities called feuds. Substantial social relations were all but begun and ended there. Although they formed in part due to the military-political reasons, through so-called benefits, the gifts of land from the rulers for the military service, which propelled a layer of feudal lords, which tied for those granted fiefs formerly free peasants which became serfs. Feuds with territorial reach related to the space on which the development of means of production, conditioned by the development of science, technique and technology, enabled the building of rounded economical processes and relations. Because in the frame of feuds production and consumption untied, and the production was just enough to satisfy the necessary consumption in the frame of the feud, with no meaningful surplus (the degree of the development of the means of production did not allow for it), so the exchange between feuds was negligible, and the trade was primarily in products which were necessary for life, and could not be produced in every feud, as are salt, spices and others. Feuds functioned as autarchic entities and their closeness did not exist only in economy. Feuds were by large rounded and closed entities in array of social relations, actually some mini societies, while wider entities as kingdoms and empires, were mainly political structures with loose and rare social connections whose spatial reach relied to that of the whole state. Although a statement can be found that by creation of feuds the particularization of the economy and other social relations and processes arose, that is not true, since even before feudalism those relations and processes existed and unwound in confined spaces of villages, in which the huge majority of people lived, sparse cities and limited tribal groups. The level of the development of
50 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century communications, that is science, technique and technology, did not allow for wider territorial reach. Feudalism has just established tighter and in the other manner-hierarchized structure of these limited entities, with the relation of utmost subordination of serfs to landlords, for whose fief they were tied. In the same way, the feudal tradesmen guided production, as the trade production of the earlier periods, was not nearly developed as to tie into a single economic entity, and with it into a social one, a geographical region wider than the feudal territorial patchwork. Only with the development of the manufactured, and especially industrial production, that is with the establishment of the means of production which enable mass production, which demands wider raw materials base and wider market, economical process starts to demand much wider space than the space of earlier feuds, and that space through its reach often in some measure relates to the spaces on which groups of the same or similar origin, language, faith, customs and culture live. That spread of space, caused and conditioned by scientific, technical and technological progress upon which rounded economical process is operated and upon which, as a consequence, other substantial social relations effectuate, is followed by the establishment of matching political structures with the same spatial reach. Thus emanate the first nation-states, which in some cases continue the existence and functioning of the previous “ruler states“ (les États princiers). Nation-state according to UNESCO can be defined as: “The nation-state is an area where the cultural boundaries match up with the political boundaries.“29 Although at present important number of states is multicultural and multi-ethnic, the establishment of contemporary states has in large measure followed the ideal and tendency of achieving this overlap of political with cultural-identity frame, and thanks to matching frame in which the new age economical process has operated. Even today we can identify states in large measure with cultural, that is civilizational model of the existence and functioning of nations. The creation of nation-states in literature is usually ascribed to the will of the political leaders, and not to the objective circumstances caused by scientific, technical and technological progress, and foremost to the spread of spatial reach of the economical process determined by these factors, which has, after the introduction of manufacturing and especially industrial production, but also because of the modernisation of agricultural production, started to demand a much wider raw materials base and wider market than it was the case with feudal structure.
29 From the official site of UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/ international-migration/glossary/nation-state/, 12.11.2013.
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So for example, Pierre Beaudry gives credit to the creation of the French nation-state in the first place to Louis XI and the group of his allies, that is, to the political will that they have effectuated: “Au sortir d’une Guerre de Cent ans dévastatrice, Louis XI (1461-1483) créa le premier Etat-nation moderne, en défiant les seigneurs féodaux qui contrôlaient le royaume. … Les grands protagonistes de la bataille pour l’Etat-nation français furent la papauté, le roi Louis XI et son premier secrétaire Philippe de Commynes, René II, duc de Lorraine, allié incertain mais habile de Louis, et la maison financière des Médicis, notamment Laurent de Médicis. Dans l’autre camp, il y avait l’Etat-cité de Venise, Charles le Téméraire et une partie significative de la vieille aristocratie et de la noblesse médiévale qui souhaitaient maintenir l’ordre féodal et leurs propres privilèges. En vingt ans, Louis XI et ses alliés les plus proches constituèrent une forte alliance dite “Ligue de Constance” à laquelle participèrent plusieurs importants duchés dont les dirigeants restèrent fidèles au Roi. A l’époque, la France était composée de 14 duchés féodaux et de 94 grandes villes, que Louis XI avait unifiés sur la base du bien commun et des possibilités de développement commun. L’idée du “bien commun” se propagea dans le pays sous le slogan: “Un droit, un poids, une monnaie”. En même temps, le Roi renforça l’armée permanente établie par son père Charles VII. La stratégie de Louis consistait à gagner des cités, développer des centres culturels, créer des manufactures et ouvrir des foires commerciales internationales, etc., afin d’attirer dans ces centres tous les talents des régions rurales ainsi que de l’étranger. Les villes à leur tour défendirent avec enthousiasme cette politique. Mais pour unifier la nation, le Roi avait besoin du duc René II, le chef des princes de Valois qui contrôlaient alors une grande partie du centre de la France. ... Plus tard, René sera en effet le héros de la “bataille de Nancy” qui consacra l’unité de la France.”30 Therefore, although under this interpretation the unification of the fragmented space was based on the idea of common good and although this strategy of formation of nation-state includes the development of culture and economy, and in the frame of the latter foremost manufactured production and trade, under this interpretation that approach is a result of ruler’s and his allies will, and not the necessary consequence of the scientific, technical and technological progress, which the progressive individuals of the time only articulated and effectuated. It should not, of course, neglect the role of the individuals, but it is the fact that their
30 Pierre Beaudry, Louis XI, créateur de l’Etat-nation, http://www.solidariteetprogres.org/documents -de-fond-7/histoire/article/louis-xi-createur-de-l-etat-nation.html, 12.11.2013.
52 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century attitudes and actions were a product of given circumstances. Finally, in the opinion of the cited author, the final rise of French nation-state is even temporally precisely definable and tied to the par eхcellence political event, the victory of the royal ally in the Battle of Nancy, on 5th January 1477. Further in the same text, author goes into more details to present the construction of the society and economy on new bases as a vital element of the establishment of the nation-state, and he ascribes that to the will and actions of Louis XI: “Au cours de ses 22 années de règne, il parvint à briser le pouvoir de l’aristocratie terrienne féodale. Ce fut là le plus important changement politique par rapport aux siècles précédents dominés par le règne des seigneurs. Il jeta une nouvelle base de la société et de l’économie en créant et protégeant des manufactures dans les villes de France, en ouvrant des échanges réciproques avec l’Angleterre et signant des accords avec Gênes, Florence, Naples, la Sicile et la Calabre. Louis garantit l’expansion des manufactures en subventionnant les villes, y compris les cités médiévales; ces subventions provenaient de l’impôt sur le revenu, levé en proportion inverse à la productivité du contribuable, afin de décourager la richesse improductive et d’encourager le travail qualifié. … Au-delà, le changement crucial effectué par Louis XI fut la création de nouvelles écoles et universités humanistes sous autorité royale.“31 Although the shown presentation of the rise of French nation-state is based on accurate historical facts and statements, it is as many other similar presentations and interpretations, limited to the most distinct historical events and persons, and the will of those persons, and that in one limited time periods, and it neglects key social patterns and processes that determine whole history, even the period and process that is presented. Because not only the creation of nation-states cannot be ascribed to the simple will of individuals or groups of individuals, but rather it is in the first place the result of previously described objective circumstances and processes, which conditioned and defined the acts of individuals and their results. besides, that creation cannot be tied to a certain precise event or shorter time period, since nation-states in Europe have risen through centuries, not only when the whole of the continent is looked upon and the creation and development of states that have faster included themselves in the process and those which retarded, but even when the creation and development of every particular state is observed. When we say that the territorial reach of the rounded economic process at the creation of nation-states matched the spatial reach on which live groups of same
31 Ibid.
53 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century or similar origin, language, faith, customs and common culture, it should be stressed that those groups were not entirely compact and coherent in the view of those features at the moment of the integration of this economical process, so that the economical spatial integration influenced the rise of this cohesion and homogeneity. Sometimes that cohesion and homogeneity was realised through coercion. Especially important elements of this cohesion and homogeneity, which was followed by the national sentiment and unity, were language and religious affiliation, which served as the confirmation and the addition to the unique origin of certain groups which constituted into nations. So, in France, which over centuries is an example of homogenous nation-state, the process of lingual and legal unification and religious consolidation lasted for centuries. Véronique Harouel-Bureloup writes the following lines on this topic: “Le sentiment d’appartenance à une même nation est favorisé avec la diffusion de la langue française, notamment grâce à l’ordonnance de Villers- Cotterets de 1539. Puis un siècle plus tard, en 1636, Richelieu crée l’Académie française afin que l’Etat détienne la maîtrise de la langue. Aussi, dès le XVIe siècle, le latin et la langue d’oc devaient-elle s’effacer devant le français. Il en va de même dans le domaine du droit où la royauté cherche depuis longtemps à unifier les coutumes. Leur rédaction officielle, en même temps que leur simplification afin d’arriver à une certaine uniformisation, date du XVe siècle (ordonnance de Montil-lès-Tours, 1454). Par la suite, le mouvement d’unification du droit continue en droit public, mais aussi en droit privé avec les ordonnances royales des XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles. Néanmoins, dans cette apparente unité, la question religieuse posée au XVIe siècle va engendrer un véritable problème pour le maintien de l’unité de la nation. Aussi, en prenant la décision de se convertir publiquement en 1593, Henri IV soumet ses convictions religieuses aux intérêts de l’Etat. Puis, avec l’édit de Nantes de 1598 s’inspirant des édits de pacifications précédemment adoptés, Henri IV subordonne les passions religieuses aux intérêts de l’Etat, et oblige les deux partis à abandonner leur dogme de fidélité à une église pour reporter leur fidélité sur l’Etat. L’édit de Nantes assure la coexistence religieuse et l’intégration des réformés dans le royaume. Il déroge au droit commun. Avec ce texte, le roi impose à tous une tolérance de droit. Dans le même temps, les autres pays d’Europe construisent, quant à eux, l’uniformité religieuse: le Danemark développe une législation contre la franc-maçonnerie; les Catholiques réfractaires sont persécutés en Angleterre et en Irlande, Cromwell mène une guerre sanglante contre les Catholiques.“32
32 Véronique Harouel-Bureloup (Maître de Conférences à l’Université de Paris 8), “Etat et nation: un rappel historique…”, Grotius International, Géopolitiques de l’humanitaire, http://www.grotius.fr /etat-et-nation-un-rappel-historique/, 12.11.2013.
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How long is the process of creation of homogenous nation is confirmed by a fact that in France even at the time of the Revolution a struggle was fought for the elimination of numerous local and minority languages, called slightly abusively les patois (inadequately translated as “jargons“), so that in the state, which has attained the highest level of political and civil freedoms in history, the linguistic unification and possibility of normal mutual communication among citizens in common, French language would be attained. Therefore, in its report on the topic, Henri Grégoire writes to the National Convention in 1794: “On peut assurer sans exagération qu’au moins six millions de Français, sur- tout dans les campagnes, ignorent la langue nationale; qu’un nombre égal est à-peu-près incapable de soutenir une conversation suivie; qu’en dernier résultat, le nombre de ceux qui la parlent purement n’excède pas trois millions; & probablement le nombre de ceux qui l’écrivent correctement est encore moindre. Ainsi, avec trente patois différens, nous sommes encore, pour le langage, à la tour de Babel, tandis que pour la liberté nous formons l’avant-garde des nations.”33 On the origin of the mentioned linguistic fragmentation of French space and the relationship of that fragmentation with the feudal one, Grégoire writes: “Du joug des Romains, la Gaule passa sous la domination des Francs. Les Alains, les Goths, les Arabes & les Anglais, après y avoir pénétré tour-à-tour, en furent chassés; & notre langue, ainsi que les divers dialectes usités en France, portent encore les empreintes du passage ou du séjour de ces divers peuples. La féodalité qui vint ensuite morceler ce beau pays, y conserva soigneusement cette disparité d’idiômes comme un moyen de reconnoître, de ressaisir les serfs fugitifs & de river leurs chaînes. Actuellement encore l’étendue territoriale où certains patois sont usités, est déterminée par les limites de l’ancienne domination féodale.“34 Noting that it is necessary to diminish the number of languages in Europe (since not only French linguistic space is fragmented), but also that the establishment of one universal, world language impossible because of the political situation in the world, Grégoire adds that the French people should lead other nations in matters of language formation:
33 Henri Grégoire, Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d’anéantir les patois et d’universaliser l’usage de la langue française, Convention nationale, 1794, http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Rapport_Grégoire, 10.11.2013, p. 4. 34 Ibid, pp. 2–3.
55 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
“Mais au moins on peut uniformer le langage d’une grande nation, de manière que tous les citoyens qui la composent, puissent sans obstacle se communiquer leurs pensées. Cette entreprise, qui ne fut pleinement exécutée chez aucun peuple, est digne du peuple français, qui centralise toutes les branches de l’organisation sociale, & qui doit être jaloux de consacrer au plutôt, dans une République une & indivisible, l’usage unique & invariable de la langue de la liberté.“35 Thus, Nation-states have risen over centuries, whereas from various historical reasons, the process of the constitution of some has begun and ended prior to the beginning and end of the matching process of the other nations. With some nations, as a rule with those that have earlier formed national state, such as France, to the creation of the national state framework has come at the time when the nation in its essential meaning, that is the related cohesion of cultures and the identity feelings, was not fully established, while with the others which have in the process of the creation of national state entered later, such as Germans or Italians, cultural and identity homogeneity, that is the construction of the nation in its essential meaning, was almost totally finished in the moment of the creation of the state.
Globalization as the historical phenomenon – overcoming the nation-state Over time, the scientific, technical and technological progress leads to the fact that the economy demands wider raw materials base and market. Also, an array of other social functions, especially those directly related to the technical progress, begins to traverse borders. The need for permanent management of these trans- frontier functions leads to the creation of the international organizations. Although in the idea of international organising (which in great measure corresponds to the idea of European integration and dates back to Middle ages) over centuries has dominated the understanding that permanent and institutionalized connection between nations, rulers and states through international organizations (including integration organizations) should be realised mainly on the political level, primarily for the need to preserve peace, and that the political connection will pull economical one and other social connections, and although in practice the forerunners of international organizations were international conferences and congresses, as forms of part-time multilateral diplomacy, which dealt mainly with problems of war and peace, the first international organizations were created in the non-political sphere. After the river commissions, that appeared in the first half of XIX century with the aim of integrated management of navigation and trade on the international rivers, in the latter half of the same century administrative alliances emanated, as the early
35 Ibid, p. 4.
56 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century forms of international organizations, in non-political domains in narrow sense of the word: telegraph, postal services, measures, precious metals, intellectual property protection etc., and at the start of XX century, with the aim of regulating questions of prices, import and export quotas and other questions tied to the trade in certain goods, various goods councils are formed for particular products (starting from the Goods Council for sugar, founded in 1902, so that similar organizations were formed for tea, wheat, rubber, wood, wool, cotton and so on).36 Also on the ideas level, former push for connection, even integration of states and nations, primarily in the political field, from the XIX century are being substituted by the idea that economy and other non-political domains should have advantage, and the political domain in narrow sense should follow suit.37 The first organization of general character as the jurisdiction is concerned, but whose field of operation was dominantly political, the League of Nations, was founded only in 1919. The creation of international organizations is therefore a direct consequence of the gradual spread of spatial reach of some social functions, caused and conditioned by the scientific, technical and technological progress, spatial reach that overcomes the frame of nation-state, same states that its existence owes to the scientific, technical and technological caused and conditioned by the spread of social functions, especially economic, and the essential overcoming of the feudal fragmentation. On this historical primacy of non-political domains over political when it comes to the creation of early international organizations Paul Reuter wrote the following: “L’histoire des 150 organisations internationales actuelles montre qu’elles se développent essentiellement dans des matières limitées qui présentent in caractère de haute technicité... Les plus anciennes sont les Commissions fluviales (1815: Rhin; 1856: Danube) puis suivent à une cadence moyenne, qui va porter leur nombre à peu près à 15 en 1914, des organisations internationales en matière de mesures (Union internationale du mètre), en matière de chemins de fer, en matière de santé publique, ainsi que pour certains problèmes économiques limités (le problème du sucre). Il faudra attendre 1919 pour voir une organisation internationale ayant un objet général. Cette constatation suggère déjà quelques réflexions: l’organisation internationale va être, pour les techniciens, une terre d’élection, puisque ce sont dans des matières techniques que se développent la plupart d’entre elles.
36 Vojin Dimitrijević, Obrad Račič, Međunarodne organizacije (International Organizations), Belgrade, Pravni fakultet univerziteta Union i Službeni glasnik, 2011, pp. 2–11. 37 Branko M. Rakić, La présence, les intéractions et l’évolution des éléments politiques, économiques et juridiques dans les idées d’intégration européenne jusqu’à la création des Communautés européenne – àla lumière des approches modernes à la réalisation de la paix et du processus moderne d’intégration européenne -, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Presses Universitaires de Septentrion, 2003.
57 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Dans la double mesure où ce sont des facteurs techniques qui commandent l’évolution de l’humanité et où celle-ci doit s’unifier, elle va donc le faire non sous le jeu de quelques facteurs métaphysiques, mais sous la contrainte de la technique. On ne peut pas faire fonctionner des réseaux de chenins de fer, sur un plan international, sans une organisation internationale.“38 Pointing to the essential determination of the creation, development and functioning of the international organizations, and generally the connection and integration of mankind, primarily through technical factors, and based on that on the central role of technicians in the domain of international organising, Reuter asked himself what is the role of political decision makers like in that field, and stated that it cannot be nearly such as the role of the technicians: “Ainsi les techniciens sont-ils en matière d’organisation internationale volontiers optimistes. La situation des politiques est-elle aussi confortable? Les hommes politiques s’appuient inéluctablement sur l’opinion. Or, à l’heure actuelle y a-t-il une opinion internationale? Répondre négativement, c’est écarter la possibilité, pour des hommes politiques, d’assumer des responsabilités dans une organisation internationale au nom de cette opinion. Or, on met en doute l’existence d’une opinion publique internationale parce qu’il n’existe pas de ‘milieu’ qui lui prête sa force. Les églises, les syndicats et les organisations capitalistes ont pu être ou aspirer à être des forces internationales réelles: ils ne représentent pas aujourd’hui une force politique réelle de caractère international.“39 Stating therefore the limits of politicians and political sphere in the field of international organizing, Reuter states the following supposed situation and analyses its solution: “On se trouve ainsi en présence d’un problème fondamental auquel personne ne peut répondre par les ressources, si raffinées soient-elles, de la technique. Créer une organisation internationale? Oui. Lui donner des pouvoirs? Oui. Confier ces pouvoirs à des hommes politiques? Comment répondre ici affirmativement, puisqu’il ne peut y avoir que des hommes politiques nationaux, faute d’une opinion et de forces internationales.”40 So has professor Reuter, one of the key participants in the drafting of the first documents and proposals of documents in the frame of European integration process (Schuman Declaration, Plevens Plan, Treaty on the Establishment of the
38 Paul Reuter, “Techniciens et politiques dans l’organisation internationale“, Paul Reuter (ed.) Le développement de l’ordre juridique international, Ecrits de droit international, Paris, Economica, 1995, p. 156. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid, pp. 156–157.
58 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
European Community for Coal and Steel, Treaty on the Establishment of European Defence Community, etc.) in the article published at the time of the full bloom of the international organising, both on universal and regional level, stated the existence of such measure of interaction and connection of mankind in technical sphere which represents adequate base for matching international organising, but at the same time that the level of social basis which would benefit the essential international organizing led by classical political factors, which are essentially limited by national frameworks, interests and needs has not been attained. Technique had, therefore, already become enough transnational, so that the way of thinking of technicians was alike, and they are therefore eligible to lead international organizations, but the social opinion has stayed essentially national, which is the case with politicians that have to follow this opinion, which in turn limit their capacity for international organising. International organizations appeared, therefore, at the moment when the number and volume of trans-frontier functions, thanks to the scientific, technical and technological progress had attained the level necessary to establish inter-state institutional mechanisms which could in organized and permanent way deal with management of the functions and their realisation. The state was not overcome by this, it still continues to exist and not only parallel with the international organizations, but also as their base and the precondition of their existence, as the existence of international law too. Thus Serge Sur states: “As the first amongst international institutions, the state is the pillar of classic international law. International law cannot be contemplated without the state, even less so can it be thought of as being against the state. The existence of international organizations does not create an exception to this, for they are, as is well known, also inter-state, even intergovernmental, bodies for the most part It is as an international institution that the state ensures civil peace and public order within its own territory, contributing to the peace and stability of the international society and carrying out its communication and cooperation functions with other states“41 Although the state is still the basic organizational form and base for the other forms of organization on the international level, contemporary time, time when the globalization is everywhere present a theme in academic and political discussions, characterizes such, by the scientific, technical and technological progress caused and conditioned intensification of trans-frontier communications and the translation of social functions and processes to the trans-frontier level, ever more to the global level, so that the state by large becomes too narrow a
41 Serge Sur, “The State between Fragmentation and Globalization“, European Journal of International Law, 1997, Vol. 8, Issue 3, p. 422.
59 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century frame for those social functions and processes, even the obstacle for their development. Equally as sometimes, thanks to the scientific, technical and technological progress, that is industrialization, the frame of the feud became too narrow for economical and other social processes and relations, and the nation- state became not only the dominant form of political organization but also the matching frame for the development of these processes and relations, so today that same nation-state ceases to be an adequate frame for the same processes and relations, which thanks to the scientific, technical and technological progress, rise to the global level. Serge Sur states that there are three ways in which today the dual function of the state is becoming lost and relativized. There exists a tendency for the melting and fragmentation of this function from the inside, as well as the tendency of overcoming from the outside and merging in wider forms: “It is in this dual role, domestic and international, that the state is today being brought into question. Firstly, concerning its internal homogeneity, national identity itself is being put to the test by regional-level demands, minority rights issues, cross-border relations, immigration, disrupted societies, and growing opposition between the rich and the poor. Secondly, territoriality, the traditional domain of the state, can no longer ensure the state’s enclosure nor can it protect this identity. Borders have become increasingly permeable to human, material, goods and service, and intellectual exchanges. In place of logic of a fixed juxtaposition, there is a tendency toward international nomadism, which not only effaces space, but also penetrates borders. Given this, the classic domestic/international distinction is being eroded. By the very nature of things, transnational questions multiply in number, whether they concern trade, the environment, or human rights. Finally, in imagining the state as a functional regulatory authority, a provider of norms and services, it can be seen that the state framework is ill suited to such tasks. The opening up of markets and the globalization of trade is turning the state into an out-dated intermediate authority, dismissed by history. Too big for the local level, too small for the international, off the track, a framework for oppression, the state is ill-adapted, it disturbs, it annoys, it bothers, it gets in the way. It must be reduced in size before we can get rid of it Moreover, has not the history of recent years been one of a drawn-out illness of the state, a decline which could lead to its ultimate crisis?“42
42 Ibid, p. 422.
60 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
The state is therefore a deciduous historical phenomenon, came to be in its mode for that we call nation-state, only a few hundred years ago, through the pass from feudal to capitalistic system caused by technological modernization and industrialization, and which will over time lapse in contemporary form and meaning, as was the case before with the feuds. However, as the earlier feuds did not disappear completely, but some of the traces are still visible in some territorial divisions of nation-states to particular administrative units, thus will the traces of today’s state frames survive after the lapse of states in contemporary form and meaning, probably again as a kind of transmission in the translation of social processes and relations to global level. State in the process of globalization should survive with another function, to stay in the service of primarily creation, and then the functioning of globalized world, same as the feuds in large measure transformed into territorial- administrative units of nation-states. That is the opinion of for example Robert Cox, who in his definition of globalization, also cited in the work of Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann in the following way sees the role of the state in the „globalizing world“: “The characteristics of the globalization trend include the internationalizing of production, the new international division of labor, new migratory movements from South to North, the new competitive environment that accelerates these processes, and the internationalizing of the state… making states into agencies of the globalizing world.“43 And, for the fact that the feudal fiefs, after the loss of previous importance through the creation of nation-states, in large measure served as the base for political-administrative division of nation-states, proves the French example again. We saw that Henri Grégoire noted the historical connection between the linguistic fragmentation and the feudal fragmentation of the same space. And, the feudal fragmentation in France has left its trace in the form of provinces (les provinces), as administrative units (analogous to counties), which existed up to 4th March 1790 when they were substituted by the departments (les départements). Henri Grégoire in his report enumerates dialects spoken in France of that time, which names indicate the relationship with existing provinces, which trace their origin to Middle Age feuds: “Nous n’avons plus de provinces, & nous avons encore environ trente patois qui en rappellent les noms.
43 Cited by Al-Rodhan and Stoudmann (p. 10), Robert Cox, “Multilateralism and the Democratization of World Order”, paper for the International Symposium on Sources of Innovation in Multilateralism, Lausanne, May 26-28, 1994, as cited in J. A. Scholte, “The Globalization of World Politics”, in J. Baylis and S. Smith (eds.), The Globalization of World Politics, An Introduction to International Relations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 15.
61 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Peut-être n’est-il pas inutile d’en faire l’énumération : Le bas-breton, le normand, le picard, le rouchi ou wallon, le flamand, le champenois, le messin, le lorrain, le franc-comtois, le bourguignon, le bressan, le lyonnais, le dauphinois, l’auvergnat, le poitevin, le limousin, le picard, le provençal, le languedocien, le velayen, le catalan, le béarnois, le basque, le rouergat & le gascon ; ce dernier seul est parlé sur une surface de 60 lieues en tout sens. Au nombre des patois, on doit placer encore l’italien de la Corse, des Alpes- Maritimes, & l’allemand des Haut & Bas-Rhin, parce que ces deux idiômes y sont très-dégénérés.”44 Today’s territorial division of France still traces its origin in former provinces, as the residues of feudal past. Today’s regions (divided to departments) in European part of France (not including the „overseas territories“) are: Alsace, Aquitaine, Auvergne, Basse-Normandie, Bourgogne, Bretagne, Centre, Champagne- Ardenne, Corse, Franche-Comté, Haute-Normandie, Île-de-France, Languedoc-Roussillon, Limousin, Lorraine, Midi-Pyrénées, Nord-Pas-de-Calais, Pays de la Loire, Picardie, Poitou-Charentes, Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur, Rhône-Alpes.45 Therefore, earlier feudal fiefs were in larger measure still present in traces. They ceased to be in essential meaning central social units, in whose frames on a whole the largest part of most important social processes and relations developed, but they in a measure not the least negligible continued to live, not only symbolically in meaning and form, but as administrative units in new basic socio- political units, nation-states. And today, when the frames of nation-states expand ever wider, due to the scientific, technical and technological progress, they become too narrow for the realization of economical and other social processes, that translate to global level, nation-states are those that, similar to feuds at the time of the creation of the nation-states, lose on importance and purpose. Globalization, as Ulrich Beck said in cited definition “implies the weakening of state sovereignty and state structures”.46 But, similarly to that which happened to the feuds, that loss of the nation-states does not happen with the perspective of their total disappearance. They actually, as Robert Cox said in cited definition, ever more become “the agencies of globalizing world“.47
44 Henri Grégoire, Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d’anéantir les patois et d’universaliser l’usage de la langue française, op. cit., p. 3. 45 Source: http://www.villorama.com/france/regions.html, 12. 11. 2013. 46 Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Perspective: Sociology of the Second Age of Modernity”, British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 51, Issue No. 1, January/March 2000, p. 86. 47 Robert Cox, “Multilateralism and the Democratization of World Order”, op. cit., p. 15.
62 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
As the international organizations appeared just in time when the frames of nation-states became too narrow for the realization of certain social functions, especially those of non-political nature that are in more direct relation of dependence on the scientific, technical and technological progress, and which became, due to that development, more and more trans-frontier and demanded permanent organized, trans-frontier, that is international management, it would be logical that with the rise of trans-frontier functions comes to the rise in number and importance of international organizations, and that with the translation of ever wider circle of social functions to the global level ever larger importance gain the universal organizations. However, as Serge Sur notes, a different phenomenon, opposite to what is expected, comes into play. Speaking on the United Nations, the most important international organization of universal character, he says: “It is striking to observe that the globalization theme leads to a minimization of its role as well as the role of multilateralism developed within it Not only do the General Assembly’s resolutions find themselves relegated to a lower rank, but the major UN conferences also appear to be things of the past The multifaceted theme of the new economic, information or communications order has come to an end. The 1992 Rio Conference on ‘Environment and Development’ appears to be the last in the series. The New Information Order is CNN. With regard to the ambitions of a New Economic Order, the WTO is a minimal institution. ... The Security Council itself has been sidelined from the resolution of conflicts – in the Middle East, in Central Africa – after, admittedly, some unfortunate experiences following tbe Gulf War. In short, the United Nations have, on the whole, been kept out of the new style of globalization; and with them, multilateral diplomacy, which is an inter-state, collegial] diplomacy, has remained on the outside. There only remains one real moderator in international relations, and this moderator is a single state, the United States, not an international organization“48 Although the facts provided by Serge Sur are accurate, and in large measure widely known, although indeed the USA, followed by a group of predominantly western states, have grasped the monopoly on management of the international relations (which was especially notable in the time when his article was written), using the existing international organizations when they deemed them useful for vehicles of imposition of their will (as was the case with economic sanctions to FRY and Iraq and others), and circumventing them often, that is every time when they would think that their mechanisms and procedures under which they function would burden or slow the realization of their intentions and plans, one
48 Serge Sur, “The State between Fragmentation and Globalization“, op. cit., pp. 429–430.
63 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century should not regard that situation and that demeanour by the USA as the consequence or the necessary part of the process of globalization. This is simply a fact that, after the fall of Berlin wall and decomposition of Soviet Union, one superpower, the USA, with a group of allies, gained such a sway that it left her with no serious rival, who could stand against its will and intentions. It is obvious that the USA, and this country’s capital, used the process of globalization for the pursue of their interests, as they have used anything else with the same aim, and they were not given any resistance for that matter. Simply, an imperial structure of international community was established and the empire used it, and it still uses it, for the pursue of its imperial tendencies. What differs the imperial position of the USA from the end of ХХ century to the beginning of ХХI from the positions of all the dominant empires from the past is that this American hegemony of global proportions, a world hegemony, which was never the case before. And, that global reach of imperial influence is a product, or better said a part of the phenomenon of globalization. However, even today we sense and they are ever more present, some authors, among them even from the USA (such as Henry Kissinger, Samuel Huntington, Zbigniew Brzezinski),49 who precipitated this even at the time of the article of Serge Sur if not earlier still. Therefore, as in the frame of one state there should be a balanced relation of powers of the political decision maker, then as a rule we have democratic society, or it is possible that only one group, or even individual, imposes in such measure to displace the influence of other social groups, in which case we have a non- democratic society, even the dictatorship, and the structure of the international community can, based on the division of power, be polarized, which makes relations more equitable, humane and democratic, or the imperial, which leads to the dictate of the imperial power.50 However, that situation does not bear any special tie or is it conditioned by a degree of social integration and measure of social interactions neither on the state nor on the international community level, including global level. We can therefore conclude that the process of globalization, that is the upgrade of social processes and relations to a global, world level, advances rapidly, pursued by the scientific, technical and technological process and that
49 The cited authors have written in following works on the temporal limitation of the absolute American domination and the necessity of the establishment of new multipolarization: Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994; Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996; Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy And Its Geostrategic Imperatives, New York, Basic Books, 1997. 50 Radoslav Stojanović, Vojin Dimitrijević, Međunarodni odnosi (International Relations), Belgrade, Novinsko-izdavačka ustanova Službeni list SRJ, 1996, pp. 366–368.
64 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century ever more social functions become transnational, overcoming the state borders. And, because of that states lose their importance. On the other hand, it is natural that international organizations, which appeared as institutional frames for permanent management of trans-frontier functions, with the rise of the number and intensity of such functions, gain in importance. Of course, with the weakening of the role and importance of states, due to their obsolete framework, it is probable that the interstate character of the international organizations will lessen, and they will, by following the ever-larger integration of the function for which they were founded, have to become more integrated on their own, to become more supranational.
65 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Branko RAKIĆ1 Mihajlo VUČIĆ2
GLOBALISATION AS THE CAUSE OF CREATION AND DISSOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Abstract: In the article the term globalisation is presented as the inevitable historical pattern stripped of any interpretation that would consign to it either positive or negative values. In the frame of that definition, the authors give their view of the purpose, original context and the perspective of the further development and eventual disparition of the European Union. The authors suggest that the EU was given birth in the historical moment when the scientific, technical and technological development of society reached a certain level which could maintain its functioning. EU is not, therefore, an entity essentially based on the political arrangement, but rather a historical pattern of society. Its idea had already been exposed before, but in those circumstances, the level of scientific, technical and technological development was not sufficient to uphold it. Again, thanks to the continued development of this material basis, the EU will in future become an obsolete category of itself, since its political structure and market will become inadequate to the new and wider range of social relations in this field. Eventually, the EU will probably submerge into even more universal organisations of kind, which would be able to follow this development more closely. EU Law, partially constitutionalised, remains a permanent particular regime of supranational law which leads to ever larger fragmentation of international law, which in turn, demands the need for the constitutionalisation of the universal international legal order as a whole. Key words: globalisation, EU, fragmentation, constitutionalisation, international law.
1 Professor Branko Rakić, Faculty of Law, University in Belgrade. 2 Mihajlo Vučić, M.A., Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period.
66 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Globalisation and law – deconstitutionalisation of the national law and constitutionalisation and fragmentation of international law The process of the upgrade of social functions on the international, and even more to the global level, leads to the change in positions, role and mutual relation between national legal systems, primarily constitutional ones, and international law. Antonio Segura-Serrano writes on this topic in his article “The Transformation of International Law”, and states that this process on the legal level became especially intensive after the Cold War, through the upward transfer of jurisdictions: “It is said that the globalization phenomenon carries, together with the decay or modification of the nation-state role, an evolution of the international system. This evolution would mean that the cooperation proposed as an alternative to mere peaceful co-existence, has achieved such levels and is developed under such parameters that the traditional international structure has been overcome, and the international community has been reinforced as the end-result. After the fall of the Berlin wall, there has been an apparent transformation in the exercise of the state constitutional competences, which are now exercised to a large extent within a higher or external level. Indeed, competences such as those related to security policy, the protection of human rights, equality and solidarity policies, among others, are managed at the international or global level, through the decisions of international organizations or the conclusion of international treaties.”3 Bearing in mind this situation, he poses a question: “If States are no longer in a position to exercise their state constitutional functions as was the case before, the question is whether that de-constitutionalization might be balanced through a process of constitutionalization of international law.”4 Stating that “some authors have recently crafted a conceptual apparatus supporting a constitutional international order” by “starting from the process of legal and de facto denationalization provoked by globalization, which has led to the ‘internationalization’ of constitutional law and the ‘constitutionalization’ of international law”,5 he shows several conceptual approaches to the constitutionalisation of the international law, and states that for the present moment, as the era of globalisation, it is characteristically the development of two parallel processes in the legal field: “State function in international law has been disaggregated. Besides, as a consequence of the same process, international law has been ‘decentralized’ or disaggregated too, in the sense that several international
3 Antonio Segura-Serrano, “The Transformation of International Law”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 12/09, pp. 4–5. 4 Ibid, p. 6. 5 Ibid.
67 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century legal regimes of a specialized character have been created”.6 Although some authors try to embed the idea of the constituonalisation of the international law, as the process that develops related to the deconstituonalisation on national levels, in the real state of affairs through the elaboration of the conception of gradual constitutionalisation, which should realise in the form of multi-level hierarchical construction with divided sovereignty between different levels of management, Segura-Serrano states that the existing fragmentation of the international law enables only the partial, fragmented constitutionalisation: “Even though there is some appeal in the idea of unification derived from the constitution as a response to polarization, it is highly difficult taking into account the current conditions in the international society that there will be a re- constitutionalization in international law. Together with globalization, as a process of vertical disempowerment, fragmentation, as the result of the existent different regimes or horizontal decentralization, cannot lead but to a partial constitutionalization, a constitutionalization limited to each of those regimes.”7 It seems exactly that the major degree of the constituonalisation of the international law is realised on the regional, rather than the universal level. That is a logical consequence of the fact that the major part of social functions, by overcoming national frameworks, that is by effectuating on the transnational level, reached the regional one, while still are minor functions which reached the universal, that is the global level, although their number is growing constantly. Besides, the same functions that with a certain degree of intensity effectuate on the global level, effectuate much more intensively on the regional. Legal order of the EU is an example of such legal order which is enough integrated so the tendency of its constitutionalisation is ever more discussed,8 but again enough particular so it can be talked about its autonomy to the general international law, that is to take it as an example and indicator of the fragmentation of the international law. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice has tended over time to acknowledge and affirm both cited features of the community’s legal order. Although the constitutionalisation of the community’s law and its autonomy from general international law two separate notions and tendencies, their simultaneous existence and development leads some authors to note their mutual conditioning, which, it seems to us, is not quite true. Thus Diane lе Cottier, analysing the jurisprudence of the ECJ, writes: “Although the Community does not have a constitution in formal sense (as a written document ratified by the member states), the Court still recognizes
6 Antonio Segura-Serrano, op. cit., p. 6. 7 Ibid, p. 8. 8 On the constituonalisation of the EU law see: Branko M. Rakić, „Fragmentacija međunarodnog prava i evropsko pravo – na Zapadu nešto novo“, “Fragmentation of the international law and European law – something new in the West“, Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu, n. 1/2009, pp. 122–147.
68 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the existence of the constitutional structure which binds member states. In the basis of this structure lies the principle of autonomy of the Community legal order, separated from the international law“.9 Surely one legal order can be autonomous only if it is constructed and rounded enough (no matter if we call this rounded construction constitutionalisation or not) but it is not necessary that one legal order is autonomous (if under the autonomy we purport to its disincorporation in the wider legal order and the lack of hierarchical subordination of its norms to the higher norms from the same order) in order to be constitutionalised. The best example of this is the fact that national laws today are hierarchically subordinated to the international law, including there (and in the first place) general international law, that ever more national constitutions (which are the essence of the constitutionalisation of these national laws) explicitly foresee this.10 That subordination of the national laws to the international testifies to the notion of the deconstitutionalisation of national laws, but this notion as such, if it stays on the moderate measure of the translation of sovereignty from the national to the international level, should not be equated with deconstitutionalisation. It is all but a question of measure. As for the fragmentation of the international law, it follows as an appearance the formation of the international organisations, which generate their own legal systems.11 On this notion wrote Louis le Fur, still in the period between two world wars, when the number of the international organisations was much lower, expressing his understanding, but at the same time noting the need for the existence of single legal principles which would make general international law, hierarchically supreme to the specific legal rules from the fragmented sub-systems.12 In the meantime, with the spread of international organisations and legal systems which form in their frameworks, also with the development of general international law, the question of the unity of international law, that is the question of the relation between the general international law and separate, fragmented international legal systems, has become quite acute, and the subject of discussions and analyses in the most eminent legal circles. Therefore, the presidents of the International Court of Justice have stressed in several of their yearly speeches to the General Assembly of
9 Diane lе Cottier, “L’exception communautaire en matière de protection des droits fondamentaux: quelle hiérarchie entre le droit international et le droit communautaire? Commentaire de l’arrêt Kadi”, http://m2bde.u-paris10.fr/content/l%E2%80%99exception-communautaire-en-mati%C3%A8re- de-protection-des-droits-fondamentaux-quelle-hi%C3%A9rarchie, 1.4.2014. 10 Such as in articles 16(2) and 167(1(1)) of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia of 2006. 11 On the fragmentation of the international law see also Branko M. Rakić, „Fragmentacija međunarodnog prava i evropsko pravo – na Zapadu nešto novo“, “Fragmentation of the international law and European law – something new in the West“, op. cit., pp. 122–147. 12 Lois le Fur, Međunarodno javno pravo, Public international Law, Beograd, Izdavačka knjižarnica Gece Kona, 1934, pp. 362–365.
69 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the UN one segment of this fragmentation, the proliferation of the international adjudicatory bodies and the ensuing problems.13 And the Commission for the International Law of the UN has formed a study group led by the Finnish expert Martti Koskenniemi, which made a Report of the Study Group, titled “Fragmentation du droit international: difficultés découlant de la diversification et de l’expansion du droit international“,14 which is followed by an appendix that contains the Draft of the conclusions of the work of the Study group.15 Both documents were adopted by the Commission in 2006, and passed to the General Assembly. However, pure fact that the appearance of the fragmentation of the international law is so old that it was written about more than a half a century ago, bearing in mind that the contemporary international law is a relatively new branch of law, points that it is not only the division of the already formed unified international legal system to segments, that is subsystems, but that international law, which is even today, despite its great diversification, still not nearly enough a solid and finished construction, at its conception, in large measure developed as a batch of separate regimes, with the limited number of common principles (general international law) which tie, although not solidly and clearly enough, these subsystems in the unified entity. Therefore, it is not a matter of the decay of the single legal order in several entities, but of more or less simultaneous conception and development of general international law and specific subsystems which are created (primarily but not exclusively) by international organisations, so that the expression “fragmentation“ is not the most adequate, since it leads to the wrong conclusion of the decay of once unique entity. International law appeared actually by following the development of the social functions which were becoming trans-frontier and therefore demanded the creation of trans-frontier, that is international institutions which would manage them, as well as trans-frontier, that is international legal regulation. As some functions reached the world level, specialised organisations of universal character appeared which managed these functions and separate batches of legal rules (created mainly in the frameworks of those organisations) which regulated these functions. Some of the trans-frontier functions reached the regional level, so for them were created regional international organisations and regional
13 That was done by presidents Stephen Myron Schwebel in 1999 and Gilbert Guillaume in 2000 and 2001, respectively. 14 Commission du droit international, Fragmentation du droit international: difficultés découlant de la diversification et de l’expansion du droit international, Rapport du Groupe d’étude de la Commission du droit international, Établi sous sa forme définitive par Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682, du 13 avril 2006. 15 Commission du droit international, Fragmentation du droit international: difficultés découlant de la diversification et de l’expansion du droit international, Projet de conclusions des travaux du Groupe d’étude de la Commission du droit international, Établi sous sa forme définitive par Martti Koskenniemi, A/CN.4/L.682/Add.1, du 2 mai 2006.
70 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century legal subsystems in the framework of the international law. And sometimes the functions from the same sector reached in some measure the world, and in some measure wider regional level, which led to the parallelism, in the regional and universal level, as in the field of international organising, so in the field of the construction of the international law. Thus, the development of the international law had in view of its contents and spatial reach mostly the similar and related dynamics with the development of the international organising. And even that dynamics is finally conditioned by the dynamics of the scientific, technological and technical progress. That is why in the future, with further spread of spatial and material trans- frontier functions and their higher rise to the global level, that is with the acceleration of the process of globalisation, one should expect ever larger integration of the international law and its transformation into a solid and stabile order. The general international law will grow stronger compared to the particular ones and will spread on their account, and the international law in general (both in the regional and the universal and both in the materially specialised and materially general level) will grow stronger compared to the national laws and will spread on their account. And that process, which we can observe even now, but which will intensify nonetheless, will perhaps be called the constitutionalisation of the international law. Actual discussions about the fragmentation of the international law and the attempts for it to be overcome for the benefit of general international law are not the consequence of the fact that the international law is now more fragmented than before (relatively observed, of course, since on all levels it is today much copious than in previous decades, not to mention centuries), but of the ever more present tendency to get it ever more integrated and solidified on the universal level. The need for the idea of the constitutionalisation of the international law and the discussion about it at this particular moment, Segura-Serrano explains in the following way: “And there is the question of why the debate about the constitutionalization of international law has emerged exactly now.181 To a large extent, the current situation of international relations and international law, where globalization is pushing back the ability of the State to accomplish its functions, and when the recent and rampant unilateralism from the US has fatally undermine international cooperation, may explain this wanted trend towards constitutio- nalization. 182 In fact, in the seemingly desperate effort displayed by the European discourse in order to find out (or to put in motion) a constitutionalization process within the international law domain there may be a more straightforward explanation: effectiveness. In other words, behind this attempt there may very well be just an anxiety to construe an international law with ‘real teeth’.”16
16 Antonio Segura-Serrano, “The Transformation of International Law“, op. cit., p. 36.
71 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
“Natura daedala rerum“ – bracing of the influence of cultural and economic factors History has shown, in the process of the creation of the nation-states, that the economy, whose development and the spread of territorial reach were a consequence of the scientific, technical and technological process, was a key cohesive factor which created essential relations, mutual interests and solidarity between the citizens of the rising states, and that the linguistic, religious and other cultural-civilisational differences were an obstacle to the establishment of the unity which was to be removed, or at least mitigated, through various mechanisms, including coercion. Exactly at the time when Henri Grégoire reported to the National Convention his work,17 in Königsberg Immanuel Kant wrote his work titled “Zumewigen Frieden. Einphilosophicher Entwurf”,18 which was published in 1795.19 (“Report“ was passed to the National Convention in 1794), and in which a proposition was given which in the literature was descripted as a “… plan … based on the … idea (of) a great confederation of European states (which) became a classic of international government”.20 In that time, Kant’s nation, Germans, still had not formed its national state, which will be done almost eighty years after, similar situation was with some other European nations, such as Italian, and the already formed nation-states, such as France, worked on the internal linguistic and generally cultural and civilisational homogenisation. But Kant did already, considering means to secure permanent peace among nations, among which the state of war was in his opinion natural state, suggest the connection and unification of states and nation in wider whole. From the three possible models of connection which he considered (civitas gentium, foedus pacificum and pactum pacis), Kant deems the best that which would purport the states to „give up, as individuals did, its wild (anarchic) freedom, to adapt to the public coercion of the law and therefore form the ever freely growing state of the nations (civitas gentium), which would finally spread to all the nations in the world“, however
17 Henri Grégoire, “Rapport sur la nécessité et les moyens d’anéantir les patois et d’universaliser l’usage de la langue française“, Convention nationale, 1794, http://fr.wikisource.org/wiki/Rapport _Grégoire, 10.1.2013, pp. 3–4. 18 This Kant’s work was published under the title „Večni mir, Filozofski nacrt“, in the book: Imanuel Kant, Um i sloboda, Spisi iz filozofije istorije, prava i države (Mind and Freedom, writings from the philosophy of history, law and state), Beograd, izdanje časopisa Ideje – Velika edicija ideja, Beograd, 1974, pp. 135– 169. It was later published again as: Imanuel Kant, Večni mir, Filozofski nacrt, Beograd, Gutenbergova galaksija, 1995. 19 On this Kant’s project see more detailed in: Branko M. Rakić, La présence, les intéractions et l’évolution des éléments politiques, économiques et juridiques dans les idées d’intégration européenne jusqu’à la création des Communautés européenne - à la lumière des approches modernes à la réalisation de la paix et du processus moderne d’intégration européenne -, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Presses Universitaires de Septentrion, 2003. 20 Sylvester John Hemleben, Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1943, p. 88.
72 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century in his opinion, state do not want that model, and “with the lack of any positive idea on the world republic, we are left only (if we do not want to lose everything) negative substitute (surrogate) in the view of the permanent alliance, which would constantly spread, which could protect from war and restrain the flood of unfriendly emotions towards law“. This solution is in Kant’s words some kind of “peace alliance (foedus pacificum) ... which would differ from the peace agreement (pactum pacis) in that it would have for aim to finally stop all wars, while the latter stops only one.“ And the difference between the suitable but impossible state of the nations (civitas gentium) and the possible and realisable peace alliance (foedus pacificum) is that in the first case the common state of the nations would create its own law such as internal law and the nations that would form it would be subordinated to the legislator, while in the second states would keep their freedom, and their relations would be regulated by the international law, which Kant call “cosmopolitan law“, or “the law of the world’s citizens“ (Weltbürgerrecht). The establishment of the “cosmopolitan law“, is by Kant, conditioned and enabled by the degree of connection among various nations, and its historical reality and necessity he explains in the following way: “Since the relations (more or less close) among the nations in the world have spread so much that the breach of law in the one place can be felt everywhere, the idea of cosmopolitan law cannot be any longer deemed fantastical or eccentric legal conception“. That “cosmopolitan law“, by Kant “has to be limited to the conditions of the universal hospitality“, and that “hospitality is the law which belongs to every stranger, so not to be treated as the enemy in the country in which he arrives“, under the condition that that country “does not endanger its existence in any way by this“ and that that person, behaves in peaceful way.“ Such description of the cosmopolitan law which Kant promoted, led one writer to conclude that such law should “constitue l’ amorce de la reconaissance internationale des droits de l’ homme”.21 Pleading for voluntary and gradual establishment of the federal liaison among countries,22 but deeming as unacceptable the creation of the “universal monarchy“ in the way that some of the states would become more powerful than all others and subject them through merging, Kant notes that the nature, which he earlier calls “great artist nature“, that is “nature, the creator of all things“ (naturadaedalarerum), would establish ways and mechanisms to prevent the enslavement of mankind, “through cunning or force“, by some states and therefore the disappearance of nations (which will stay
21 Marcel Merle, Pacifisme et internationalisme, XVIIe - XXe siècles, Paris, Armand Colin, 1966, p. 137. 22 Kant says: „The possibility of the realisation (the matter at hand is objective reality) of the federational idea, which should gradually spread to all countries, and therefore lead them to perpetual peace, can be imagined. Since if it would happen, somehow, that one powerful and enlightened nation organises itself into a republic (which naturally inclines toward perpetual peace), there would exist a center of federative alliance to whom other states could join, so to secure their freedom, in accordance with the idea of the international law, and to, step by step, spread that alliance on the other associations of kind“.
73 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century permanently separated and independent entities), but also to overcome the conflicts which naturally exist among these independent coexisting nations and to secure mutual connection and permanent peace. Kant describes the former of these two cunnings of nature, which prevents the enslavement and elimination of nations: “There are two ways in which it prevents the mixing of nations to separate them one from another. These are various languages and religions. In that diversity is hidden, however, the affinity for mutual hatred and excuse for war, but it nevertheless leads, through the development of culture and gradual approximation of the people, to greater consent in principles and agreement in peace, which would not be realised and secured as the despotism, on the graveyard of freedom, by weakening of all forces, but by their balance in the liveliest game.“ On the other hand, nature cared to find the mean of connection among nations which should lead to the securement of perpetual peace among them: „The same as it wisely separates nations, which every state, even calling upon international law, would like to unify by cunning or force, nature also, on the other hand, unifies nations, which would not be protected from violence and war by the notion of the rights of the citizens of world, using their mutual self-interest there at. That is the commercial spirit which cannot exist parallel with war, and which sooner or later, gets to rule over every nation. And since from all the means available to a state, money is certainly the most reliable force, it is (and not, of course the moral reason) it that pushes all states to help the noble peace and to mediate for the prevention of war everywhere in the world, where the danger of it breaking out would exist, exactly as they were in permanent anti-war.“ Thus, Immanuel Kant, who at the time of the creation and homogenisation of the nation-states, that is decades before the creation of the first international organisations and century and a half before the start of the European integration process, insisted on the federal connection of the nations with the aim of the realisation of perpetual peace, and he foresaw that the process, in which the nations should coexist and voluntary tie into a permanent peaceful alliance, develop through the simultaneous dividing effect of language and religion, that is culture, and the connecting effect of economy. Those are exactly the factors which in the similar way worked in favour of the creation of the nation-states, whereas economy proved to be more efficient. However, it should be noted that cultural (primarily linguistic and religious) differences which existed with some groups of citizens which joined particular nation-states were lesser than the differences in the same fields in on wider levels, regional, or even world ones. However, it seems that functions which are established on the transnational level in various spheres of human activity, manage to deal, in large measure, with this limiting factor. Specific and specialised jargons which are used with the trans frontier exertion of these functions, mostly based on the terminology built in English language, which has a tendency of becoming lingua franca on the global level, are an example of dealing with such limits: probably the most characteristic and widely known example is the terminology used in computer
74 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century technology and communication, but universal jargons exist in other domains, as air- transport, sports, fashion, popular music and similar. In some fields, as medicine, for some time there is a practice of communication, mostly in written form, on Latin, since the vocational terminology in various countries was built upon this language, and in addition there is a practice of building vocational terminology and communication in English. Science, technique, and technology, and by them conditioned ever larger possibilities of communication and ever wider reach of mostly economical, but also other social processes, are obviously able to overcome even the most subtle and persistent obstacles, such as linguistic and other cultural barriers. Of course, that does not mean that the development of these factors and ever larger trans frontier nature of the social functions, which stem to the global level, should lead to the diminution of the cultural and civilizational diversification, that is to the cultural impoverishment of the mankind and the suppression of the cultural identity of various national or other groups. That impoverishment of mankind can be prevented by organised action, as in national, so on the international level, regional or world. What is more, ever larger and wider possibilities of trans-frontier communication open ever larger and wider possibilities of presentation and evaluation, on the wide international plane, of cultural heritage and values from various parts of the world, as of the useful and enriching civilisational and cultural suffusion among nations.
European Union in the process of globalisation What is the position and the future of the European integration process and foremost European Union in the process of globalisation? When we observe the development of the idea of peaceful integration of the European nations, which appears in the works of certain good nature, enlightened and foresighted thinkers since the start of XIV century (usually as the first project of this kind is cited the “De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae” of French jurist and advisor to Filip IV the Beautiful, Pierre Dubois, from 1306),23 we can see that, although the
23 After Dubois, projects of European integration (which are at the same time the precursors of international organising, since Europe for centuries was the only relevant political space, that defined the political fate of the most part of other known parts of the world) were made by other enlightened thinkers: in XV century Bohemian king Jiri z Poděbrad, in XVII century French priest and mathematics professor Emeric Crucé, then the former „ministre principal” of Anry the IV, duke Maximilien de Sully and English Quaker William Penn, founding father of the Pennsylvania state, in XVIII century the most important projects of this kind were formed by l’Abbé de Saint- Pierre, then one of the founders of the utilitarism Jeremy Bentham, as well as Immanuel Kant, in XIX century, socialist oriented thinkers as Comte Henri de Saint-Simon-Sandricourt and Pierre- Joseph Proudhon, and between I and II world war Austrian count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi,
75 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century preservation of peace was the key preoccupation in virtually all projects until the Schuman Declaration of 9th May 1950, the document which initiated the European integration process which has reached today the level of 28 members of the EU, it is still characteristic that since somewhere at the beginning of ХIХ century it comes to the change in order of priorities that are given to different domains of human activity in which the integration process should start to realise. Until that period, the proposition was that the connection, organisation and integration of the European nations should start primarily on the political level, and that the political connection will lead the connection in economy and other non-political domains. That connection would be an expression of will of the ruler, similar to the creation of antique and feudal empires, but in this case motivated by a wish to secure peace among European nations (and often also to secure other aims, as the successful fight against infidels, liberation from the Papal or Holy Roman Emperor’s tutorship and similar), and not as a result of by scientific, technical and technological progress established objective circumstances which would create the basis and the need for connection of social functions and their realisation on wider, European space. It is not a coincidence that with the idea of connection and integration of European nations, which as we have mentioned, in great measure coincides with the idea of general international organising, since the beginning of ХIХ century comes the prioritising of economical and other non-political domains. It is the same time in which the first international organisations appear, and they, as we have seen, appear in non-political domains. Scientific, technical and technological progress has established functions, non-political of nature, which reach overcame the frameworks of then existing nation-states (whose creation was not finished) and for whose realisation the organising on the international level was needed. Practice has answered to that need with the creation of the international organisations where it
23 founder of the Paneuropean movement, then the famous Danish doctor Christian Frederick Heerfordt and French politicians Edouard Herriot and Aristide Briand. Also an array of famous artists declared themselves for European integration, even if not presenting concrete projects, but only advocating the idea of European unity. These are Dante Alighieri, Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, Johann Wolfgang von Gœthe, Friedrich von Hardenberg-Novalis, Heinrich Heine, Victor Hugo, Paul Valéry and others. About these projects more detailed information can be found in Sylvester John Hemleben, Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1943; Denis de Rougemont, 28 siecles d’Europe, Paris, Christian de Bartillat, 1990;Bernard Voyenne, Histoire de l’idée européenne, Petite Bibliothéque Payot, Paris, 1964; Jean-Pierre Faye, L’ Europe une, Les philosophes et l’ Europe, Paris, Gallimard, 1992; Gérard Soulier, L’Europe, Histoire, civilisation, institutions, Paris, Armand Colin, 1994; Charles Zorgbibe, Histoire de la construction européenne, Paris 1997, Presses Universitaires de France; Elisabeth du Réau, L’idée d’Europe au XXe siècle, Bruxelles 1996, Editions Complexes; Branko M. Rakić, La présence, les intéractions et l’évolution des éléments politiques, économiques et juridiques dans les idées d’intégration européenne jusqu’à la création des Communautés européenne – à la lumière des approches modernes à la réalisation de la paix et du processus moderne d’intégration européenne -, Villeneuve d’Ascq, Presses Universitaires de Septentrion, 2003, as in many other works as well.
76 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century was necessary, and human thought went a step further on the ideal level and discussed and proposed the connection which would start from these non-political domains of traditional character and range, but which would in its final outcome reach the solid and all-encompassing form of some sort of European federation. Therefore, key variable and determining factor in the development of mankind, the scientific, technical and technological progress, defined the nature and contents of the European integration idea. In Shuman Declaration in the following sentence is contained the formula for implementation, as the time showed, of the successful integration process, which should have, with the final aim of the realisation of peace in Europe, led to the creation of the European federation: “L’Europe ne se fera pas d’un coup, ni dans une construction d’ensemble: elle se fera par des réalisations concrètes créant d’abord une solidarité de fait.“24 In the Declaration it was proposed that one of the first “concrete realisations“, should be the integration of black metallurgies (production of coal and steel) of France and Germany, and other states that would join them („all the states willing to participate“) which would establish “L’établissement de cette unité … jettera les fondements réels de leur unification économique.“25.In the further text of the Declaration, a following statement can be found: “Ainsi sera réalisée simplement et rapidement la fusion d’intérêts indispensable à l’établissement d’une communauté économique qui introduit le ferment d’une communauté plus large et plus profonde entre des pays longtemps opposés par des divisions sanglantes.“26 So was concisely expressed the functionalist approach to the integration, based on the ideas of French economist Jean Monnet, who influenced the minister of foreign affairs of France Schuman. Monnet’s functionalise, with federalist finality (final aim the creation of European integration) is an elaboration of an older functionalist concept. Аnd functionalist theoretical concept, whose founder is British author David Mitrany, who gave his views on the subject in the book “A working peace system: An argument for the functional development of international organization“ from 1943,27 is exactly based on the division of human activities on political and non- political.28
24 Text available at http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/europe-day/schuman- declaration/index_fr.htm, 14.1.2014. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 David Mitrany, A working peace system: An argument for the functional development of international organization, London, Oxford University Press, 1943. 28 On functionalist and non-functionalist theoretical concept see further in: Ostvarivanje mira preko međunarodnog organizovanja i integrisanja država – (priručnik, Beograd, Pravni fakultet u Beogradu, 2009, p. 7.
77 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
And while some authors, such as Hans Kelsen, which wrote at the same time as Mitrani, thought that the politics defines economy and other non-political domains, functionalists had the opposite attitude: by them, non-political sphere, primarily its technological segment, but by it conditioned economic, social and other non-political domains, determine political functions, that is the whole of human activity and human society. That functionalist attitude is stated in one work as following: “L’ histoire du monde est dominée par l’ évolution des techniques. La poussée de la technique a pour conséquence de tisser entre les peuples des liens de plus en plus nombreux, de plus en plus complexes. Elle débouche sur la planétarisation et la solidarité de fait des hommes et des pays.”29 Thus, not only the technical development was the determining factor of human history, but it, in the opinion of these authors, still at the time when they published the cited text, back in 1968, created solidarity on the planetary, that is global level. By functionalists, as cites Charles Pentland, political activities (diplomacy, defence, internal security, internal struggle for power etc.) are inherently controversial, meaning that they bring with them a seed of conflict, while non-political activities (economy, health care, culture, science, education etc.) are noncontroversial or technical, that is far more suitable for cooperation and positive interactions.30 Due to such nature of these two spheres of human activity, by the same author: “... there is a continuous tension between technological progress and political structure, the former representing man at his rational, adaptable and fraternal best, the latter showing him at his particularistic, conservative and obscurantist worst.”31 By functionalists, one of the key characteristics of the technological, economic, social and other domains from the non-political sphere is the transbordeness, as of need so of ways of their fulfilment, and during historical development that characteristic became ever more expressed. Mitrany says: “The functional approach emphasises the common index of need. There are many such needs that cut across national boundaries, and an effective beginning could be made by providing joint government of them.”32 And that establishment of the common management means the foundation of matching international organisations, specialised for management in certain fields and themes from non-political sphere, which crosses the gap that appeared between the non-political domains themselves, and primarily technology and by its development determined economy, which are dynamic and changeable, and static and non-flexible structures of power, that are emanated
29 Louis Armand, Michel Drancourt, Le Pari Européen, Paris, Fayard, 1968, p. 161. 30 Charles Pentland, International Theory and European Integration, New York, The Free Press, A Division of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973, p. 74. 31 Ibid, p. 66. 32 David Mitrany, “The functional approach to World organisation”, in Cosgrove, C.A. and Twitchett, K.J. (eds.), The new international actors: the UN and the EEC, Macmillan, London, p. 72.
78 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century primarily in the nation-state. Charles Pentland says the following about this attitude: “All these writers stress the dangerous gap between man’s technical capacities and his social structures, between the universalism of the former and the particularism of the latter.”33 While Armand and Drancourt note: “Les effets inéluctablesde la technique sont généraux, mondiaux; les structures de gouvernement et d’ organisation de la sociétédemeurent incertaines, limitées, nationales.”34 In Mitrany’s words, functionalism is based on “binding together those interests which are common, where they are common, and to the extent to which they are common”,35 and in that way it comes to gradual overcome of national sovereignties: “Sovereignty cannot in fact be transferred effectively through a formula, only through a function. By entrusting an authority with a certain task, carrying with it command over the requisite powers and means, a slice of sovereignty is transferred from the old authority to the new; and the accumulation of such partial transfers in time brings about a translation of the true seat of authority.”36 Mitrany underlines that only through such gradation can the political divisions be overcome, noting that functionalism is such approach, that is such method, “which would ... overlay political divisions with a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all the nations would be gradually integrated”.37 From the point of view of functionalists, this gradual overcome of nation-states is necessary since the role and place of modern nation-states in the modern world is out-dated. Mitrany says that they are “too weak to secure us equality and too strong to allow us liberty”,38 while Charles Pentland in following terms describes the relationship between functionalists and nation-states: “As a structural fossil from an era of limited economic and social problems and rudimentary technology, the nation- state is seen by these theorists as the chief barrier to rational organization for human welfare. ... Nations remain the focus of men’s irrational, dysfunctional and often destructive emotions. ... As such they cannot be attacked directly, but can be rendered harmless gradually if welfare needs are organized and frontiers made meaningless ‘through the continuous development of common activities and interests across
33 Charles Pentland, op. cit., p. 69. 34 L. Armand, M. Drancourt, op. cit., p. 176. 35 David Mitrany, “A Working Peace System”, op. cit., p. 69. 36 Ibid., p. 31. 37 Ibid., op. сit, p. 38. 38 David Mitrany, “The Progress of International Government”, op. cit., p. 141; “A Working Peace System”, op. cit., p. 62.
79 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century them’. The integration of mankind will thus come about not through, above or beyond, but despite, the nation-state.”39 Staying out of further elaboration of the functionalist theoretical concept, we can note that the European integration process, emanated in former European Communities, and today the European Union, formed and developed exactly in accordance with it, primarily in economic sphere, where the social functions were already at the start of this process in great measure trans-border, due to scientific, technical and technological process. When the historical circumstances (the start of Korean war and greater need for ever larger engagement of Europeans themselves in the field of their defence), and the federalist impatience of the leaders of the European integration process led to the fact, that while the establishment of the Community for coal and steel was still in motion, the integration shifted from functionalist to federalist waters and overall to the political field (no less than its most sensitive part- defence) through the signing of the Treaty for the creation of the European Defense Community on the 27th of May 1952. in Paris (and then the creation of the Draft of the Treaty which contained the Statute of the European Community in March 1953, which should have shifted the integration on the field of foreign policy), that attempt fails because of the denial of National Assembly of France to ratify the Defense Community Treaty on the 30th of August 1954, which in turn leads to the great crisis of the whole integrationist project.40 The crisis was overcome with the return to functionalist waters, that is, with the return to economical field in integration, by adoption in Rome of the Treaty for the establishment of the European Community for Atomic Energy on the 25th March 1957. The conditions for the integration on economic level were obviously ripe, but not the same was true for political one, where political will alone was not enough. When all mentioned is taken into view, is it coincidental that the successful integration process was started exactly during the fifties of ХХ century, and is it the result of simple determination of political decision makers in six original members, primarily France and Germany, to overcome the rivalry and enmity which had led them to three bloody wars in past eighty years. We have seen that the integration idea had existed even earlier, over the centuries, and started to be visible and stronger in the times of war atrocities. However, at that time the integration did not come to life. The attempt of integration on the political level in the fifties neither. At the same time, integration on the economic level succeeds and from there rises the contemporary EU.
39 Charles Pentland, op. cit., p. 81. This citation is cited by Mitrany, (David Mitrany, “A Working Peace System”, op. cit., p. 62.). 40 See more about this failure in Branko M. Rakić, Za Evropu je potrebno vreme – O preuranjenom pokušaju uspostavljanja evropske odbrambene i političke integracije –, Beograd, Pravni fakultet u Beogradu, 2009.
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European communities appeared as one large economical, primarily market organisation which comprised six strong European economies. The essence of EC- s was the common market, in such measure as that expression came to be the synonym for them. This is mostly the case even in today’s 28 members Union. Six states that founded EC-s were six highly economically developed countries, which during the fifties managed to recover economically from the war. In comparison with the USA, then leading world economy, which arose from the war even economically stronger than it had been, those six states were in terms of territory and population relatively limited, even France FR Germany and Italy, not the mention Benelux countries. By scientific, technical and technological progress determined degree of their economic development needed wider raw materials base and market. Objective conditions of non-political nature were key for the integration attempt, after the centuries-long battle in the field of ideas, to be successfully realised. After six decades of successful development of European integration process, we live in a time when the social processes and relations move quickly to global, world level. Scientific, technical and technological progress created a world communication network, and economy, primarily multinational capital whose origin and seat is as a rule in most developed western countries, has the need to spread globally. That the European frames, even when interpreted as the whole of the Continent, become too confined for needs and reaches of contemporary economy, proves an example of textile trade between Serbia and EC/EU, a commercial domain of the special importance for these relations, which was regulated by special sectorial agreements both before and after the Yugoslav crisis.41 Although it is hard to reach clear conclusions of the influence that various events and factors had on this segment of trade before and after Yugoslav crisis (since Yugoslav state broke up and therefore its economic potential weakened due to the fragmentation, economy dropped due to war, economic sanctions and later “transition“ abuses), one thing is clear: Serbia (and any other European country) cannot be nearly enough of a strong and important partner to the EU in the field of production of textiles and their export to the EU as it was a case a quarter of a century ago, from one reason which is obvious at first glance and widely known – today the majority of textile products used in West are produced in Far East and other Asian countries, partly in Africa too. This is not a consequence only of economic “opening“ of China, although it should not be neglected (however it should be stressed that it needs to
41 On this matter see more in: Duško Lopandić, La Communauté économique européene et la Yougoslavie, Paris, Editions Yougofranc, 1985, or Branko M. Rakić, Les aspects juridiques des relations entre la Yougoslavie d’une part et la Communauté européenne et le Conseil de l’Europe de l’autre, mémoire de DEA, Centre européen universitaire de Nancy, Université de Nancy II, Octobre 1991. For newer information see Vladimir Međak, Branko Budimir, Vodič kroz pristupanje Srbije Evropskoj uniji, Beograd, Fond, Centar za međunarodne i bezbednosne poslove, 2013, http://www.isac- fund.org/download/EU_VODIC.pdf, 3.1.2014.
81 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century be viewed in the light of objective circumstances which enabled it and made it inevitable). The key reason is again the scientific, technical and technological progress, which enabled such a level of communication development and such beneficial prices of transportation of products on great distances, which in combination with cheap labour, makes the goods from Far East and other mentioned regions cheaper and more competitive than the goods from Serbia or other European countries, where the labour is more costly. And in many other economical areas situation is similar. It is therefore the globalisation of economic relations and processes, and their upgrade to the world level, whereas not only the frameworks of nation-states, but also of regional integrationist organisations such as EU, become too narrow and out-dated for most of these relations and processes.
Conclusion As before the Middle Age feud, due to scientific, technical and technological progress, became out-dated, too narrow a framework for economic relations and processes, which demanded wider raw materials base and market, as for other basic social processes and relations as well, and instead came nation-state as the central unit of the territorial division of the society, and as the nation-state already at the end of XIX century was becoming too narrow a framework of primarily non- political relations and processes, so the international organisation started to appear, including from the second half of XX century integrationist organisations as the EC-s, so in today’s world, with ever larger obsolescence of nation-states, which become too narrow a framework for great number of social processes and relations that rise to the global level, the regional integrationist organisations as the EU, start to be in various aspects, too narrow and out-dated. Economical and other social relations and processes simply rise to the global level, and it only can be adequate level for the majority of them. Over six decades of its development, European integration process partially adapted to this spread of reach of social relations by accepting new members and therefore spreading its own framework, at the cost of deepening of the existing integration. However, since EU is a European organisation, the possibility of this spread is limited by European borders. Today, especially at the times of economic crisis which enveloped the world, even the EU, many authors state pessimistic foresights in relation to the future of the organisation. It is spoken of the collapse, decay, implosion of the EU, its economic or political unsustainability. Especially is noted the rise of negative political will towards EU among the citizens or political elites in the part of the members, including original or early members. In Great Britain, a referendum on whether it should quit the EU is announced. The disaffection with the EU in countries especially hit by crisis, as Greece, is very large.
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However, EC and EU passed through crises in the past as well, but the process of integration survived and its essence was preserved, although sometimes slowed down or somewhat modified. “Factual solidarity“, which resulted from several “concrete achievements“, as spoken by Robert Schuman, played its positive and constructive role. But the European process of integration must be observed in the light of wider social patterns which are over and beyond of the political will of nations and elites that necessarily determine the fate of humankind. One of the patterns is the globalisation. By scientific, technical and technological progress, caused and determined spread of the reach of economical and other relations and processes cannot bypass the EU. As the nation-states become too narrow and obsolete, so the regional integration arrangements become narrow and obsolete too. Social processes and relations need wider, world level. As it appeared as the reaction to the out-dated and too narrow frames of its member states, EU represents in fact a phase in the process of globalising social processes and relations. It stands in front of the choice: whether it will attempt to protect itself from globalisation by closing on itself, to become and exclusive club of rich countries (even the least developed countries of the EU are relatively rich in comparison with the majority of countries in the world), or it will meet the globalisation headlong and find its place and role in it. First option would be certain failure, since it is impossible to stand against a social pattern. As for the second, it would mean the acceptation of the relativisation of political and institutional frames and structures of the EU, that is their melting in the process of globalisation. But European values, the acquis communautaire, should impose itself on the world level through its quality, superiority. Sixty years of integration practice brought about the piled experience of states and nations that could be used on the global level. European integration could serve as some kind of a model of the integration of mankind in the process of globalisation. As in our opinion, the institutional and political frames and structures of the EU are condemned to melting in the process of globalisation; Serbia should in its European path less to tend to join them, but more to tend to accept the acquis communautaire, s the essential element of the process of integration, which holds more certain future. Its acceptance is an essential element of the proper regulation and structure of our own society, necessary for its succesful functioning in the internal affairs, but also for the successful international cooperation with not only EU and its members, but the other states in the world as well. Finally, this essential Europeanisation through the implementation of European standards, that is acquis communautaire, is not only the only important matter in the long term, but it does not in any way lead us to the situation to be exposed to political extortions and pressures, as is the case when we insist on formal membership in the EU.
83 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Joko DRAGOJLOVIĆ1 Nenad BINGULAC2
THE EVOLUTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION – HISTORICAL HERITAGE AS A FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE DEVELOPMENT
Abstract: Starting with Kant’s idea in the “Eternal Peace” that for establishing peace it is necessary to achieve the principles of freedom and equality, to secure submission to the legislator, but also to federalism of sovereign countries, we can perceive the need for creation a big and functional European country in a more understandable way. Although there were many ideas of creating a united Europe under various names and systems of organization after the end of World War II when Europe was almost entirely ravaged, while observing all aspects starting with cultural to infrastructural and due to mass unemployment, in his speech in 1946, Churchill proposed, besides reconciliation between France and Germany, the creation of the “United States of Europe” in order to rebuild and develop European states through cooperation and integration. The evolution of the integration process from the “United States of Europe” to this day is a way of connecting national sovereignty and supranational integration into one entirely new political system that is still developing, but also we should not forget that Europe is a synonym for multiculturalism, and therefore it is necessary to work on the improvement of common identity. The authors will make a brief review of the historical development of the European Union starting with the European Coal and Steel Community up to the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), with special reference on European identity problems, bearing in mind that one of the main European Union objectives is strengthening the
1 Joko Dragojlović, LL.M., doctoral student and teaching Assistant in the Criminal Law Department, The Faculty of Law for Business and Justice in Novi Sad, University Business Academy in Novi Sad. 2 Nenad Bingulac, M.Ec., doctoral student and teaching Assistant in the Criminal Law Department, The Faculty of Law for Business and Justice in Novi Sad, University Business Academy in Novi Sad.
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common identity on the international level, primarily through the common foreign and security policy. Key words: historical heritage, development of EU, integration, identity.
The circumstances that preceded the creation of the ECSC After the celebration of the Victory Day on 9 May 1945 and the end of World War II, a new chapter in the history of Europe began and it has continued in a determined way. Europe was destroyed under the weight of all the horrors that took place within the war faced with non-functioning international institutions and organizations that existed between the two World wars, with almost ruined infrastructure, devastated commercial buildings, mass unemployment, inflation, the absence of any vision, perspective and the like. There is no doubt that a complete restoration was needed and a there was also a need for cooperation in order to avoid repeating of the history itself. The creation of the European Community is not a historical inevitability, but it was a matter of political decisions of the six countries that began the process of European integration. In “Eternal Peace”, Kant explores the possibility of establishing everlasting peace. From the point of view of the ancient Greeks, a natural state of humans is a state of war and peace is what is to be created. Kant’s ideas are used to establish peace through the achievement of the principles of freedom and equality ensuring the subordination of one to the legislature but with federal sovereign states.3 In Europe, there was a need for the creation of new institutions that would not only represent bridges of cooperation, especially in the reconstruction of the destroyed European countries, but would also be factors in the prevention of future conflicts through addressing potential disputes through dialogue. The League of Nations, which had been formed in 1919 with the idea of preventing a new war and establishing stability in the world, was replaced by the United Nations in 1945 (although it was originally established in 1942 with 26 signatories), with the idea of solving human rights, credit development, development assistance, etc.4 During the ongoing Second World War, in 1944 the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were established in order to stabilize the currency, to facilitate access to credit and to give out the credit for the formation of
3 Rodoljub Etinski et alia, Osnovi prava Evropske unije (Foundations of European Union law), Pravni fakultet u Novom Sadu, Novi Sad 2010, p. 3. 4 League of Nations, accessed on http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/leagueofnatins.htm, 16.03.2014.
85 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century development needed by the devastated European and the undeveloped world countries.5 In 1946, Churchill in his speech at the University of Zurich, in addition to calling for the reconciliation of France and Germany, proposed the creation of the “United States of Europe” for the reconstruction and development of European states through cooperation and integration.6 As soon as in 1947, the “Marshall plan” followed maintaining the idea of economic reconstruction of Western and Southern Europe, while the Soviet zone was excluded for not accepting the plan.7 Some of the earliest forms of integration after the war were seen when Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg formed of Benelux, first as a customs and later as an economic union in 1948.8 That same year, the so-called “Defence Treaty” (Treaty of Western Europe), which got together Britain, France and the Benelux countries, was established.9 The first European institution with wider responsibilities was formed in 1949 under the name of the Council of Europe, which by the original idea represented the cornerstone of future European federation with the adopted Charter of Rights, courts, the common market, currency and so on. That same year, the NATO was formed and its goal was set on creating a European defense alliance. The Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was signed in 1950, in Rome, taking into consideration the Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. In 1950, inspired by the speech of Jean Monnet French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, proposed the integration of the coal and steel industries of Western Europe, which followed shortly after the adoption of the Treaty of Paris of 1951 with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community.
From Paris to Lisbon The Treaty of Paris’ European Coal and Steel Community along with the Treaty of Rome of 1957 which established Euratom (European Atomic Energy
5 David Driscoll, “The IMF and the World Bank – How do they differ?”, accessed on https://www. imf.org /external/pubs/ft/exrp/differ/differ.htm, 17.03.2014. 6 Winston Churchill, “Calling for a United States of Europe”, accessed on http://europa.eu/ about-eu/eu-history/foun ding-fathers/pdf/winston_churchill_en.pdf, 17.03.2014. 7 Office of the historian, The Marshall Plan, accessed on http://history.state.gov/milestones /1945-1952/ marshall-plan, 17.03.2014. 8 Benelux Economic Union, accessed on http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopedia/history/ benelux-economic-union. html, 17.03.2014. 9 Council of Europe, Brussels Treaty 1948, accessed on http://www.coe.int/t/dgal/dit/ ilcd/archives/selection/ Brus sels/default_en.asp, 17.03.2014.
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Community) and the European Economic Community with the idea of performing other common tasks that were not performed by the ECSC and Euratom are the basis of creating a new integration of Europe into a single (separate) community. The establishment of the ECSC formed five authorities including the High Representative, the Council of Ministers, the Common Assembly, the Court and the Consultative Committee. In some way, they can be recognized even today as the bodies of the European Union. In 1955, the Council of Europe decided to adopt the idea of a European flag, which is still used today, although officially only since 1983 after the European Parliament adopted it as the official symbol of the then European Community.10 In 1972, the Council of Europe decided to proclaim Beethoven’s “Ode to Joy “as the anthem which was later adopted11 by the Parliament in 1985. Apart from the established communities and institutions, the flag and anthem certainly represent one of the symbols of the European unity and identity. Further work on the integration of Europe is carried out by the idea of a smaller number of member countries, and in 1958, the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) was formed as a subsidiary body of the Council and in the same year at the conference in Stresa, it made basic decisions concerning the establishment of a common agricultural policy. The following year (1959) Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with the aim of building an EU duty-free zone. The earlier development of the unified Europe had faced physical obstacles as well. In Berlin, in 1961, a wall with a clear goal of separation of the East from the West was made, while the rest of Europe was covered by a new wave music culture led by the Beatles in 1963. This period was marked by the demonstrations of students and workers in France in 1968 with shocks occurring in other European countries. It was also primarily marked by the disdain of the ideas proclaimed by the inept and inter governments and the protests against the Vietnam War and the nuclear arms race. The same year is to be remembered because in Europe tanks were to be seen again in the streets (in Prague). In addition to the above-mentioned riots, this period will be remembered for the Convention of Yaoundé in 1963 and the Agreement on Trade between the European Community and the 18 African countries, which is one of the first joint operations of the united European countries in this manner. An emphasis can be
10 The European flag, accessed on http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols/flag/ index_en.htm, 17.03.2014. 11 The European anthem, accessed on http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic-information/symbols /anthem/index _en.htm, 17.03.2014.
87 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century put on another year, namely on 1965 when a treaty was signed merging the executive bodies of the existing Communities (ECSC, EEC and Euratom). The next step towards integration was the so-called “monetary snake” that was established between Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands with the idea of limiting currency fluctuations, and which, some thirty years later, resulted in a single currency. That same year, the finance ministers of Finance of Denmark, Ireland, Norway and Great Britain in Rome came to an agreement concerning the establishment of the European Monetary Cooperation Fund, which was the first stage of the economic and monetary union. At the summit in Copenhagen in 1973, an agreement was achieved on the introduction of a common energy policy along with the adoption of the Declaration of European identity through merging a common heritage with reference to previously achieved unity in the Community.12 The European Regional Development Fund was formed in 1974 with the purpose which was reflected in the transfer of money from rich to poor regions for improving roads and communications, attracting investment and creating jobs. When it comes to the European Parliament, it should be noted that in 1979 the citizens of the Community for the first time directly elected members of the Parliament. Until then, they were delegated by national parliaments. When observing the members of the Parliament, a certain kind of unity can be seen as they belonging to organized trans-European political groups rather than to national groups. The 1986 Single European Act followed a modification of the Treaty of Rome. The European Parliament extended its powers, while legal regulations in the field of environmental protection were built into the contractual structure of the Community. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, political changes in the countries of the former Soviet bloc followed, which have led to the changes in circumstances and allowed for the continuation of European integrations. During this period (1991 and onwards) Europe saw another war that led to the dissolution of the SFRY and as a consequence we have, despite all the negative circumstances that happened in war, the creation of smaller states. This problem Europe tried to resolve at the London Conference in 1996, where a plan concerning the implementation of the peace agreement in the former Yugoslavia was adopted. At the peak of the war in the Balkans, in Maastricht in 1992, the Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs of the member states of the Community
12 Declaration on European Identity, Copenhagen 1973, accessed on http://www.cvce.eu/ content/publication /1999 /1/1/02798dc9-9c69-4b7d-b2c9f03a8db7da32/publishable_en.pdf, p. 2., 17.03.2014.
88 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century signed the Treaty on the European Union, and already in 1993 the Russian Federation and the European Union signed the declaration aimed at strengthening their relationships, especially political, but on the other hand in 1995, an agreement was signed between Euroatom and the United States on the use of nuclear energy. European integration continued in the same direction: the Commission adopted an action plan for the single market in 1997 and the same year the Council adopted the agreement banning tobacco advertising, with the aim of prevention and health care in mind. In the sphere of ecology, it is important to note signing of the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change in New York in 1998. Further European integration can be seen through the monetary policy of t 2002 and the single currency – the euro. One of the most serious problems that followed in Europe was voting for the Constitution of the European Union which failed in 2004. This was in a certain way extended and in some ways overcome in 2007, with signing of the Treaty of Lisbon, which complements the previous contracts. With this agreement, the EU defines its objectives through a democratic and transparent policy, fighting targets that include global challenges such as climate change, sustainable development, security and others. The Lisbon Treaty was ratified by all EU countries and its implementation began in 2009.
Enlargement of the European Union from 6 to 28 members So far, we can see that the European Union is a single economic and political union, which covers almost the entire area of the European continent. We have pointed out the idea and motives that were considered reasons for the formation of the European Union, but have not paid attention to the dynamics of the expanding membership of the European Union. The European Coal and Steel Community from 1951 and therefore, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community from 1957 had been established by six countries, namely Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. The first expansion took place in 1973 when Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined it. In 1981, Greece accessed the Community, too. Spain and Portugal joined it in 1986. In 1995, the fourth enlargement took place and then Austria, Finland and Sweden joined it and thus, almost all of West European countries became its members. The largest accession of ten countries took place in 2004 when the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia joined the EU. The final expansions took place in 2007 when
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Bulgaria and Romania joined it, and in 2013, when Croatia became its member country.13
Source: For making the chart, the data were used from the Enlargement Policy, accessed on http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/from-6-to-28-members/index_en.htm, 22.3.2014.
In the early 1990s, there was a dilemma in the Union whether to accept new members individually or collectively. Individual option would mean that countries in the EU would join when they made certain conditions, while the group option would be an admission of certain groups of countries, for example, Baltic, Central European, Southern European, etc. As the advantage of the group approach it was emphasized that it was non-discriminatory and that such integration in the EU solved some certain regional issues as well. A significant problem with the group options was reflected in how they would receive countries that not only did not fulfill the requirements for admission, but where there were also very uneven transitional development with a notable exception of the above-mentioned Baltic countries. Eventually, the loss of enthusiasm for the group receiving occurred, so they gave up this idea as an option for the
13 European Commission – Enlargement policy, accessed on http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement /policy/from-6-to-28-members/index_en.htm, 22.03.2014.
90 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century expansion of the Union. Countries in the EU would be accepted on the basis of individual vesting.14 Today, the process of accession to the European Union is a complex procedure in fulfilling the necessary requirements and the terms and conditions in various areas of society and organization. The above-mentioned conditions are known as the Copenhagen criteria. The Copenhagen criteria and the “access criteria” are an essential path which the future EU member states have to pass. The conditions are specified in Article 49 and the principles prescribed in Article 6 of the Treaty of the European Union. The above-mentioned criteria were adopted by the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993 and were further reinforced by the European Council in Madrid in 1995. Future member states must fulfill the following criteria: 1) stability of institutions (which guarantee) democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and protection of minorities; 2) the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market developments within the Union; 3) the ability to take over the obligations of membership, including the acceptance of the aims of political, economic and monetary union and the administrative capacity necessary for the effective implementation and enforcement of the EU. After fulfilling the criteria, the European Council may decide to open negotiations for the accession.15 A candidate applies for membership to the Council, which requires from the Commission to estimate the candidate’s ability to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria. When the Commission’s opinion is positive, then the Council may enter into negotiations, as was already mentioned. Countries that are currently waiting to start negotiations or that have started them are Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.16 We would point out a precedent that applies to Greenland (Denmark as a colony) that joined the Union in 1973 in the same period when Denmark accessed the Community. The Government of Greenland was determined to leave the Community because of the problems with sovereignty over Greenland fishing
14 Miroslav Prokopijević, European Union - introduction, Službeni glasnik, Belgrade, 2009, p. 559. 15 European Commission – Accession criteria (Copenhagen criteria), accessed on http://europa. eu/legislation _summaries/glossary/accession_criteria_copenhague_en.htm, 22.03.2014. 16 European Commission – Current status of countries, accessed on http://ec.europa.eu/ enlargement /countries/check-current-status/index_en.htm, 22.03.2014.
91 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century area. In Greenland in 1982, a referendum was held and the majority voted for leaving the Community, what occurred in 1985 after the formal negotiations.17 In the spirit of what has already been mentioned we would point out that the Lisbon Treaty provides the mechanisms for voluntary and unilateral abandonment of the European Union, which is provided by Article 50 of the Treaty on the European Union. A Member State wishing to withdraw is required to notify the European Council, which continues to implement procedures for the conclusion and adoption of the agreement for the withdrawal of member states of the European Union.18
35 Steps to EU membership As it has been pointed out, the negotiations between candidate countries for membership in the European Union are primarily led by the criteria that should be followed if one wishes to join it as well as by the implementation of the European Union legislation, while for every Member State implementation of the acquis communautaire19 is required. The said negotiations are in the final stage of the integration process of candidate countries to the EU, which is preceded by the conclusion of the Association Agreement and the candidate status. The areas to negotiate are divided into 35 chapters and each chapter is discussed separately. One of the main negotiation ideas is the fact that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.”20 The subjects of negotiations represent the following areas:21 Chapter 1: Free movement of goods Chapter 2: Free movement of workers Chapter 3: Right of establishment and freedom to provide services Chapter 4: Free movement of capital Chapter 5: Public Procurement Chapter 6: Company law
17 The Greenland Treaty of 1985, accessed on http://eu.nanoq.gl/Emner/EuGl/The%20 Greenland%20Treaty.aspx, 23.03.2014. 18 Summaries of EU legislation – Withdrawal clause, accessed on http://europa.eu/legislation_ summaries/ glossary/withdrawal_clause_en.htm, 23.04.2014. 19 Collective rights and obligations arising from treaties and EU law, see: http://en.euabc.com/ word/12, 23/03/2014. 20 Understanding Enlargement, The European Union’s enlargement policy, European Commission – Directorate General for Enlargement, Brussels, 2013. p. 11. 21 The Government of the Republic of Serbia, European Integration Office, accessed on http:// www.seio.gov .rs/dokumenta/EU dokumenta.894.html, 23/03/2014.
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Chapter 7: Intellectual Property law Chapter 8: Competition policy Chapter 9: Financial Services Chapter 10: Information society and media Chapter 11: Agriculture and rural development Chapter 12: Food safety, veterinary and phitosanitary policy Chapter 13: Fisheries Chapter 14: Transport policy Chapter 15: Energy Chapter 16: Taxation Chapter 17: Economic and monetary policy Chapter 18: Statistics Chapter 19: Social policy and employment Chapter 20: Enterprise and industrial policy Chapter 21: Trans-European Networks Chapter 22: Regional policy and coordination of structural instruments Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights Chapter 24: Justice, freedom and security Chapter 25: Science and research Chapter 26: Education and culture Chapter 27: Environment Chapter 28: Consumer and health protection Chapter 29: Customs Union Chapter 30: Foreign relations Chapter 31: Foreign, security and defense policy Chapter 32: Financial Control Chapter 33: Financial and budgetary provisions Chapter 34: Institutions Chapter 35: Other issues Without going deeper into the issue of negotiations, when the criteria is met by certain chapter this chapter closes and then it is moved to the next one. A candidate can meet the criteria of multiple chapters at the same time. Based on the experience of the most recent negotiations with Croatia, the most complex chapters are 23 and 24. Those chapters deal with law and justice, human rights, freedom and security. For the facts mentioned above, the European Union made a decision to consider them a perfect start to the negotiations, because when these
93 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century chapters are opened first candidates have more time to adjust to the EU standards in these areas. This model has been applied in the negotiations with Serbia.22 Due to the implementation of the new model which is being negotiated, the Serbian government has full understanding of the new methodology for conducting the negotiations, as they will pay particular attention to the sections 23, 24 and 35 for to the significance of these chapters for the dynamic of negotiations and doing harmonization with the EU acquis, international standards and the implementation of the agreements that have been made.23 As you can see, in addition to chapters 23 and 24, special attention in the negotiations for Serbia’s membership in the European Union will be paid to chapter 35 and to the specific situation in the southern Serbia’s province. When it comes to the issue of normalization of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, they should be considered a separate item under the chapter 35 entitled “Other matters” and shall be applied mutatis mutandis (when the necessary changes are made) with special emphasis on identifying and reviewing transitional measures taking into account the progress in the normalization of these relations.24 Serbia is expected to continuously: a) implement in good faith all agreements reached upon in the dialogue with Kosovo; b) fully respect the principles of inclusive regional cooperation; c) resolve other outstanding issues based on practical and sustainable solutions through dialogue and in a spirit of compromise and cooperate with Kosovo on necessary technical and legal issues; d) effectively cooperate with EULEX and actively contribute to full and smooth implementation of EULEX’s mandate throughout Kosovo. In addition to the aforementioned obligations, if Serbia makes any disputes regarding the boarder in question the problem is to be resolved taking into account the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, including, if applicable, compliance with the mandatory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice or arbitration mechanisms and the fulfillment of Serbia’s obligations under the Agreement Stabilization and association as well as the progress achieved in resolving the Serbian problematic areas that indicate the Commission’s Opinion.25
22 Pregovaračka poglavlja ka Evropskoj uniji (Negotianing chapters towards the European Union), Informacioni centar EU, Beograd, 2014, p. 13. 23 Vlada Republike Srbije, Međuvladina konferencija o pristupanju Republike Srbije Evropskoj Uniji – uvodna izjava Republike Srbije (Inter-governmenatl conference on the accession of the Republic of Serbia to the European Union – The introductory statement), Brisel, 2014, p. 11. 24 Conference on Accession to the EU – Serbia, meeting at unit level opens the intergovernmental conference on the accession of Serbia to the European Union - EU common position, accessed on http://www.seio.gov.rs/upload/documents/pristupni_pregovori/pregovaracki_okvir.pdf, 23.3.2014, pp. 13. 25 Ibid, pp. 7–8.
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European identity To ponder about the future of the European Union is extremely difficult without knowing its history. Decisions should be taken when the past is acknowledged as well as by analyzing to what measure the effects should be considered, not only the present but also, also the future ones. We could see that creating a community in the 1950s is a form of cooperation between the countries with similar attitudes and value, as well as the countries that felt the need to form the defensive power against the Soviet bloc. There is no doubt that the historical roots of the European Union date back to the period of the Second World War and the need and will of the Europeans to prevent the repetition of such circumstances. After the war, instead of unification that followed, Europe had become divided to the East and the West and from then the so-called Cold War began. Western European states created the Council of Europe in 1949, what symbolizes the first step towards cooperation between them. On 9 May 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman presented a plan for deeper cooperation, and since then, 9 May is celebrated as “Europe Day”.26 At the same time, while the United States and the Soviet Union fought to conquer the space, the “fight” for the creation a new state, the European Union, was in progress.27 While the creation of the European Union was marred by many problems, some problems during its creation also disappeared. With the formation of the Union, the Soviet threat to Western European countries was reduced. With the abolition of customs duties, establishment of the common market and later with the creation of a common currency, the economic rise and development of member countries was achieved. The creation of the Eurozone allowed the reduction of costs but also reduced business risks. After every enlargement of the European Union there followed the process of political and economic stability in these countries.28 It should be noted that the creation of the European Union eased conflicts in member states, such as northern Italy, Northern Ireland, and the dispute between Great Britain and Spain over Gibraltar, Hungary with Slovakia and Romania over the Hungarian minority, etc.29
26 History of European Union 1945-1959, accessed on http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/1945- 1959/index_en.htm, 23.03.2014. 27 The Soviet Union beat the United States in the space race by launching the first satellite called Sputnik 1, in 1957 and in 1961. The Soviet Union won again because of the successful launch of the first cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin. 28 Miroslav Prokopijević, European union – introduction, op. cit., p. 645. 29 Ibid.
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Some of the problems that have arisen are primarily related to the desire of some to form the United States of Europe, while others have felt that it is enough to have a common market without integration, while others have felt that the EU should address externalities that go beyond national boundaries such as the global environment protection, international crime, the fight against terrorism and the like.30 Without going deeper into the question of the draft constitution, whose creation was long and complicated with some expected and some unexpected failures, we will only mention those concerning the issue whether the new legal act should be a constitution or contract, because in this way the European Union can be seen as a kind of super-state, if the constitution is ratified.31 In some way and to some measure, everything mentioned so far, has influenced the shaping of the European identity. If we look at the EU with countries beyond the point, it will probably look quite nicely and therefore the common understanding of identity is entirely justified. On the other hand, we can see that in the European Union there are divisions. Some of them are obvious and apply to both large and small member states on the territory and population. There are those, “dwarf” states such as Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg. States are divided into old and new members. There are divisions of the states that want more integration and of those which want less integration. Some member states have high taxes and high government spendings, while others exhibit opposite circumstances32. Additional problem is that there is no country in the European Union, which could be a model according to which other Member States would adapt.33 Referring to the European identity, in addition to the already mentioned development of nation states, the rule of law and the common market, something that could not be missed is a reference to the cultural heritage which primarily includes Catholic and Orthodox Christian religion, ancient Greco-Roman culture and the like. Europe is not a geographical term, but in the history of mankind, it represents a moral and spiritual form with a special meaning. Specifically, Europe is a “community of values”, a very specific view of the man, society and the world.
30 Ibid., p. 646. 31 Eurofound, Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, accessed on http://www. eurofound.europa.eu/areas/industrialrelations/dictionary/definitions/treatyestablishing aconstitutionforeurope.htm, 24.03.2014. 32 Miroslav Prokopijević, European union-introduction, p. 664. 33 Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Europeanization: The Domestic Impact of European Union politics”, Handbook of European Union politics, 2007. p. 496.
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Europe can be seen as a symbol of a cultural form, as a spiritual space, which makes it more difficult to define only by its borders.34 The Catholic Church has explicitly requested that the text of the first constitution of the European Union should be recognized as a common Christian heritage of Europe and this view is welcomed by the Orthodox Church of Greece as well with the aim of highlighting respect to the common consciousness of European nations on their common Christian roots. There was a sharp opposition to this idea and what followed was a compromise in a way that the text of the European Constitution emphasized only the “cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe”.35 By exploring the European identity in this way, we met with the views of the authors who have simplified the existing theories of the European identity in such a way as to extract three dominant approaches to the study and they are “cultural”, “civil” and “instrumental” approaches.36 The difference in them lays in the questions such as: what are the possible sources of European identification and which elements are considered crucial in defining a European identity?37 If we take into consideration the assumption that cultural unity is a good basis for strengthening the European identity, the cultural theory proponents believe that the European Union can build their identity at the supranational level. Supporters of the civic theory believe that the essence of the EU membership is a commitment to common values, rights and duties of the civil society and that the European identity can be established only as purely political. Supporters of the instrumental theory believe that the European identity can be built on “the calculated individual self-interest.”38 When speaking about the European identity it can be questioned whether EU citizens identify themselves as members of their nation or as members of the European Union. Between 21% and 65% proclaimed that nationality was crucial for identity. Citizens of EU member states believe that there is a strong link with the nation states in relation to the EU, especially if we look at the key tasks people perform through them rather than through the Union because the levers of power,
34 Gordana Živković, ,,Evropska unija i nacionalni identitet” (The European Union and national identity), accessed on http://pravoslavlje.spc.rs/broj/1040/tekst/evropska-unija-i-nacionalni -identitet/, 24.03.2014. 35 Ibid. 36 Milena Gligorijević, ,,U potrazi za evropskim identitetom: uloga kulturne, građanske i instrumentalne komponente u izgradnji evropskog identiteta” (Searching for the European identity: The role of cultural, civil and instrumental component in building of the European identity), Univerzitet u Beogradu Fakultet političkih nauka, Godišnjak 2012, VI, no 8, 2012, pp. 152–153. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.
97 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century taxation, internal order, pensions, education, health and so on are in the hands of nation states.39 Based on the aforementioned, we can understand their views. Not expressing our own opinion, we must mention that some authors claim that the European identity does not exist at other levels except on the theoretical one and that the European identity is really just a theoretical paradigm.40 Strengthening or creating a common European identity on the international level is a goal recognized by the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Taking a joint action as the European Union, member states have considerably more weight and influence than when they act alone or if there are 28 different policies. The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union was established by the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 with the objectives of preserving peace and strengthening international security, promoting international cooperation, developing and consolidating democracy and the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Lisbon Treaty adopted in 2009 has further strengthened and formed the position of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, whose role is to coordinate the foreign policy of the European Union.41
Concluding remarks By considering the beginning of the European Communities, not as a historical necessity, but as a political decision, we can understand the process of European integration, with the constant reminder of the Kantian idea of the establishment of peace as being a necessary thing for achieving the principle of freedom and equality and ensuring subordination of one legislator to federalism of sovereign states. In Europe, after the Second World War, there was a need to create new institutions that would not only represent bridges of cooperation, especially in the reconstruction of destroyed European countries, but also to be factors in the prevention of future conflicts through addressing potential disputes through a dialogue. In this paper, we have attempted to address the political and economic circumstances that existed in Europe before the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community with special emphasis on the emerging European institutions, conventions and ideas (especially ideas of Churchill and Schumann).
39 Miroslav Prokopijević, European union, op. cit., pp. 662-663. 40 Gordana Živković, ,,Evropska unija i nacionalni identitet” (The European Union and national identity), op. cit. 41 Foreign and Security Policy, accessed on http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm, 25.03.2014.
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Then, we have covered the period after the establishment of the ECSC, Euroatom and the European Economic Community and the Treaty of Lisbon in order to get closer to the circumstances of the historical development of the European Union in order to be able to understand the steps in creating of the European identity. Evolution of the integration process is a way of connecting national sovereignty and supranational integration into an entirely new political system that is still developing. The European Union as a single economic and political community that consists of almost countries of Europe, so we have covered the dynamics of expanding membership of the European Union, because with every new member, besides the territory and the population, the multicultural European Union expands as well, which absolutely is one of its feats. Although today the process for the accession to the European Union is a complex procedure to fulfill and make necessary requirements and terms and conditions of various areas of society and regulation, there is still a will of candidates as well as the Union members for its enlargement. All decisions that were made in the past affect the present and the future of the European Union and its common identity. Citizens of the European Union primarily identify themselves as members of their nations, to a lesser extent as members of the European Union exclusively, primarily because of the everyday connections to their nation states. These views are understandable, although there are authors who believe that the European identity is actually a paradigm. Will a German or a French as a citizen name the European Union as “his” in the near future (rather than the nation state) is yet to be seen, as though it has been only 60 years since its original startup.
99 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Nenad A. VASIĆ1
CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE ORDER OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Abstract: The modern world has been going through great and far-reaching changes after the Cold War and the fall of Berlin Wall in 1989. In the first place, uni-multi-polarity was established in international relations, then since 2008, non- polarity and finally from 2014, there is a new global–expanded bipolarity. Changes in international relations also inevitably affect the order of the European Union. The issue of borders, enlargement, citizenship and receiving countries to full membership in the EU with open issues, governmental and inter-ethnic disputes had an impact on its old order and will affect the new order. Key words: changes, international relations, European Union, uni-polarity, non- polarity, a new global-extended bipolarity, order.
Introductory remarks Starting from the history of civilization and culture, the history of diplomacy and foreign policy in contemporary international relations, two important concepts that characterize and define much of humanity and the modern world besides adjusting and interdependence, are: first changes, and then order. From these two last-mentioned terms, which are contained in the very title of this scientific work, there can be sensed and in many ways understood the methods in our research approach. Changes in international relations and order of the European Union, which are our focus, cannot be only observed just theoretically, historically and by comparison, but also with a different aspect of political science in the corpus of social sciences.
1 Nenad, A. Vasić, Ph.D., The Institute of Serbian Culture, Leposavić. This paper was written as a part of the project Material and spiritual culture of Kosovo and Metohija (Ev. No. 178028), funded by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.
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In this research work, changes in international relations are recognized, understood and defined as a process in which different event actors cause with their actions certain reactions that have had consequences on other people and different nations, states, form of governments, international organizations and institutions. Changes or attempted changes always affect the former state as a possible breakup with it, in which people in power have found themselves in public services together with citizens in any country of the modern world. For this reason, besides changes in international relations, it is very important to review the issues of order both in countries and the world as a whole. And not only that! It is important to take into consideration any order in the history likewise contemporary international relations, even if it is an example of a study case of order within the European Union. This will be addressed in detail in the third part of this scientific work. The order is recognized, understood and defined as an internal and external international legal constitutional system of government relations between the various political and diplomatic actors as subjects of international relations.
1. The dominant theory and the question of a new paradigm in the science of international relations According to Kenneth Waltz, one of the most famous experts on international relations and foreign policy, in contemporary science about the international relations, the theories of international politics2 are also important.Throughout the history of international relations there have been a lot of theories with which famous intellectuals (from philosophers and historians to various University professors) tried, sometimes with more success or less possibility and unsuccessfully, to explain people and events that they have been engaged to. It is an undeniable fact that the foreign policy officials in government, everywhere in the world are in principle, the strategic by its approach (if not, should it be), and current by space and time of conducting. However, what is very complex to evaluate and understand correctly concerning both international political processes and relationships of relevant actors are: 1) issues of decision- making, and 2) behaviour of the authorities and the opposition on the most important issues in domestic and especially in foreign policy. The Officials in the government have adopted various decisions, laws and sub-legal normative acts that inevitably have implications and consequences on the foreign policy position of some governments in international relations and diplomacy. However, of the most important significance are certainly the
2 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Waveland Press, Inc. Long Grove, 2010.
101 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century dominant initiatives and activities of officials of the most powerful countries around the world that affect decisively, sometimes directly or from time to time, indirectly, on changes of position, interests and relations in the international system of the world. In this regard, changes in contemporary international relations can be monitored, evaluated and professionally commented with three relevant scientific and theoretical paradigms. 1. Declinism – (global process of pre-dislocation factors of power from the West to the East part of humanity is understood and practically accepted as a necessity). Starting from the 80-ies of the twentieth century and with a historian, Paul Kennedy3, the question has been asked from the standpoint of the science about the international relations, theory and the history of diplomacy, is it really so? But a little more and more specifically on this, will be mentioned later on. On the other hand, according to journalist and author Fareed Zakaria today’s world is – post American World.4, 3 2. Realism – (factor of power as a central concept of all realistic theories of international relations), ranging from the classic - Hans Morgenthau5 to a defensive realism and offensive realism –of a theorist of international relations, John Mirshajmer6 including there the inevitable, already mentioned, Kenneth Waltz’s neorealism7 and his theory of international politics. 3. Liberalism – (where is the factor of cooperation a central concept of all liberal theories of international relations) with the theory of historical sociology - the third time as a combination of realism and liberalism in international relations,
3 Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, Random House, New York, 1987. 4 One of the most important and influential thinkers of the modern world, it is certainly Farid Zakaria. According to him, the United States remains the undisputed on political and military level and the only superpower. In other dimensions, among which he mentions about: industrial, financial, educational, social and cultural, there is a redistribution of power. This does not mean that the present world in most of humanity is anti-American. However, the present world is according to Zachary, “a post American World: it is defined and managed from different places, and it involves many nations.” Farid Zakaria, Postamerički svet, Heliks, Smederevo, 2009, p. 4. About the American declinism see also: Dragan R. Simić, Dragan M. Živojinović, Od Sputnjika do Lenova: šest talasa američkog deklinizma posle drugog svetskog rata, in: Godišnjak 2010, Faculty of Political Sciences, Belgrade, 2010, pp. 269-293. 5 The central concept in classical realist theory of international relations, Hans J. Morgenthau’s power. See about: Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Knopf, New York, in 1948. 6 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, New York, 2001. 7 Žaklina Novičić, Kenneth Waltz i neorealizam, in: Priredio i uredio Dejan Jović, Realizam, Politička kultura, Zagreb, 2013, pp. 264-287.
102 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century starting with Professor Raymond Aaron8 and his student Stanley Hoffman,9 and finally to his students Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, and their learning and the famous phrase “complex interdependence.”10 Taking into account everything that we have dealt with in this part of the scientific work and scientifically and theoretically analyzed, it is also important to clarify the following question: Is there a new paradigm in contemporary international relations? Our unambiguous answer is, yes. That new, dominant paradigm in contemporary international relations is a realistic theory which dominates in most practical (sectoral) policies related to foreign affairs of the officials in the governments in the international system of the world.
2. Changes and the orders in the history of international relations There is no doubt that the history of diplomacy11 is of particular importance for the science of international relations. Throughout the history of international relations, the power of some individual stakeholders sometimes grew or declined. When in the focus are the most powerful countries in the world, and officials of government, in our particular case, the United States, it is extremely competent and professionally done by Dragan Simić and Dragan Živojinović, especially in 2011. “Studying different waves of American declinism since World War II until present day, as well as taking into consideration our arguments about the uncertainties of declinistic learning,
8 Remon Aron, Mir i rat među nacijama, Izdavačka Knjižarnica Zorana Stojanovića, Sremski Karlovci- Novi Sad, 2001; Srđan Slović, Aronova teorija međunarodnih odnosa i aktuelno kosovsko pitanje, Institut za srpsku kulturu, Priština-Leposavić, 2009, pp. 15-270. 9 Stanley Hoffmann, World Disorders: Troubled Peace in the Post-Cold War Era, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham Maryland-Oxford, 1998. 10 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, Longman, New York-San Francisco- Boston, 2001, p. 20. Besides the complex interdependence, Dragan Živojinović from the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade successfully worked on the phenomenon, issue and various points of view regarding globalization. In his famous scholarly work on globalization, Živojinović analyzed and commented on the relationship between globalization and interdependence in international relations, as they were conceptually determined and realized by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in joint scientific work. See: Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Globalization, What’s New, What’s Not, and So What? In: Foreign Policy, Washington, DC, No. 118/Spring 2000, pp. 104-119. How Živojinović considers, while keeping the focus of their scientific work, “globalization is a sort of subtype of interdependence ...”. Dragan M. Živojinović, Globalizacija u međunarodnim odnosima – pojam, dimenzije, istorijat, protivrečnosti, in: editor, Dragan Đukanović, Savremeni međunarodni izazovi: globalna i regionalna perspektiva, Institute of Interanational Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2008, p. 388. 11 David Đ. Dašić, Istorija diplomatije, Altera, Belgrade, 2012.
103 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century our conclusion is that the decline of American power today can be certainly discussed, but not as a final state of things, that is to say, as the end of American dominance in world affairs.”12 From the very beginning of rulers and states, the phenomenon of ascending and descending of personal or collective power was the topic and the subject of numerous analyses, expert reviews and articles. That and such relationship has been particularly intensified since the Middle Ages up to the present day. For this reason, for each state as a subject of international relations was, is and will be important: 1. the size of the population 2. territory, 3. natural resources, 4. economy, 5. military power, 6. culture, and 7. information technologies. According to an expert on international relations and Americanologist, Dragan Simić, who successfully, among other things, have studied systematically and multidisciplinary the issues and discussions about the order, the term or phrase “world order’ is at the center of this debate.”13 Changes and issues about the orders in contemporary science of international relations and diplomatic history can be clearly identified and followed by three major events. A. Westphalian peace and international order of sovereign states. B. Summit at Yalta and the division of spheres of interest on the European continent in the world after World War II. C. Summit in Malta and the end of the international order – the Cold War. We will briefly mention and look at the basic characteristics of the three mentioned, major transformations in the history of modern and contemporary international relations. That, all the more so because it is their correct observance and professional understanding that is important for assessment and accurate evaluation of the current situation but also as the way of contemplating the foreign policies of the relevant actors in the international system of the world.
12 Dragan R. Simić, Dragan M. Živojinović, Da li je opadanje neminovno? – nekoliko argumenata protiv, in: Srpska politička misao, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, No. 2/2011, p. 186. 13 Dragan R. Simić, Rasprava o poretku, Zavod za udžbenike, Belgrade, 2012, p. 12.
104 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
A. The Peace of Westphalia and international order of sovereign states Peace of Westphalia14 was negotiated and signed on 24 October 1648, after a thirty-year war between the Emperor Ferdinand III, the German princes, representatives of the Netherlands, France and Sweden. It was based on three important principles: (1) rex est imperator in regno suo – (king is an emperor on his national territory), the sovereign cannot be a subject to a higher authority including the Christian church, and every king is independent and equal in rights to any king, (2) cujus regio, ejus religio – (the ruler determines which religion will be present on the national territory where he is sovereign) up to that moment, from the outside no one has the right to intervene in someone else’s sovereign territory of the state even if he has the right to intervene for religious reasons and (3) stratera virtutis – (balance of power), whose goal is the prevention of the establishment of hegemony on the European continent that would dominate all other rulers and peoples in their own countries. The Peace of Westphalia established a new international Westphalian order15 and the Westphalian diplomacy, which was based on so-called principle of balance of power, and which had in its essence the balance of power and the balance of fear. “In the West, the only examples of functioning the balance of power can be found in the city-states of ancient Greece and in Renaissance Italy, as in the European state system created after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. The main feature of the system was that the real situation – the existence of numerous states of approximately equal powers – understood as the principle that will govern the world order. In intellectual terms, the idea of balance of power reflected the belief of all the leading political thinkers of the Enlightenment era.”16 The beginning of the twentieth century, relations between the officials of the state of the world of that time, brought a new constellation of international uncertainty and diplomatic vastness. That was affected, first by two Balkan Wars then World War I, but also the 5th October 1917, when it was brutally overthrown tsarism of the Romanov dynasty in Russia, where revolutionary communists – the Bolsheviks, came to power led by Vladimir Lenin. Later on was formed the USSR led by the dictator
14 Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, in: The American Journal of International Law, Washington DC, Vol. 42, No. 1/1948, p. 20. 15 Charles W. Kegley, Gregory A. Raymond, Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia - Building World Order in the New Millennium, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2002. 16 Henri Kisindžer, Diplomatija, Verzal press, Beograd, Vol. 1/1999, p. 8.
105 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century and tyrant Joseph Visarionovic Stalin, after the death of Lenin. In international, organizational, institutional and diplomatic sense, though, the first half of the twentieth century will be marked by, among other things, the formation of the previously mentioned international organization known as - the League of Nations. One of the most important proposals for the establishment of the League of Nations was given by a famous philosopher from the period of German classical idealism, Immanuel Kant and his ideas and proposals of the world community of nations in the function and purpose of eternal peace.17 It is believed that a specific proposal to then-president Woodrow Wilson for the formation of the League of Nations, and which he accepted, came from the then British Foreign Secretary Edward Grey. The formation of the League of Nations was anticipated by Paris Peace Conference on 25th January 1919 and was established on 28th June in the same year by the Secretariat of the League of Nations. The charter of the League of Nations, at the beginning, was officially signed by 44 representatives of countries and 31 representatives of countries that supported the Triple Entente in the First World War. However, already mentioned the League of Nations held its first meeting on January 10, 1920 in London, and the Secretariat has acted and during World War II war, up to 1946, when it was dissolved. All rights and property was handed over to the newly formed international organization - the United Nations in New York on the East River, which has begun its existence since 24th October 1945. As you can see, between the two world wars in the twentieth century emerged a new and powerful country - the United States. “After the disaster represented by the First World War, Europe has never fully regained its leading role on the world stage. As the main actor, appeared the United States, but Woodrow Wilson soon made clear that his country refuses to behave in accordance with European rules.”18 Large, global (Western) economic crisis of capitalism, which lasted from 1929 to 1933, left huge consequences, especially in Europe, but also in most of humanity of the modern world. Earlier, in 1924, will appear a book by Adolf Hitler - Mein Kampf,19 which will partly affect the later condition of mankind in terms of keeping the internal and foreign policy officials of states and their diplomacy. In Europe, the first country whose representatives would be against the League of Nations, even though they were full-fledged members, was the latter being Nazi Germany, which by this act liquidated
17 In addition to Eternal peace, the philosopher Kant wrote: “The Republican Constitution, with its light origin from the pure source of the legal concept includes in itself the hope that will lead to the desired consequence – to an eternal peace.” Imanuel Kant, Večni mir, Valjevska štamparija, Beograd – Valjevo, 1995, p. 40. 18 Kisindžer, Diplomatija, op. cit., p. 9. 19 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Zentralverlag der NSDUP, München, 1940.
106 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Versailles international order and their diplomacy. “The Lausanne Conference in 1932 suspended, as a matter of fact, German reparations. Next year, in 1933, in January Nazis took full power over Germany, and on October 19, of the same year, Germany, as Japan earlier, came out of the League of Nations.”20 Nazi Germany led by the Führer Adolf Hitler and Fascist Italy with Benito Mussolini led to the commencement of World War II.
B. Summit at Yalta and the division of spheres of interest in the European continent and in the world after World War II With the beginning of World War II, there was formed the anti-Hitler coalition with the leaders of three of the most powerful states, the USA, the United Kingdom (Great Britain with Northern Ireland) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with their leaders. “Big Three anti-Hitler coalition - Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin started, even during World War II diplomacy at the top.”21 Otherwise, diplomacy of anti-Hitler coalition, ended with Churchill Fulton’s speech. “The dissolution of this specific diplomacy at the top during the World War II, did not significantly affect the results achieved by this diplomacy on conferences in three, especially the ones from Yalta and Potsdam.”22 The Summit in Yalta, where were Sir Winston Leonard Spencer Churchill, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, thirty-second President of the United States and Visarionovich Joseph Stalin, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was held from 4th to 11th February 1945, in Crimea. (Picture 1) From the history of international relations and diplomacy, it is known that the above-mentioned, the Yalta summit between the three major leaders in the contemporary world, agreed to a division of spheres of interest in the European continent and in the world, but also the formation of the United Nations after the end of the World War II on May 9, 1945.
C. The Summit on Malta and the end of the international order – of the cold war Changes after the World War II led to the profiled structuring and formation of modern diplomacy. Soon there was a division of mankind in the western
20 Branimir M. Janković, Poreklo i razvitak diplomatije, u: Diplomatija – Zbornik radova, IP Vaša knjiga doo, Beograd, 2006, p. 44. 21 M. Janković, Poreklo i razvitak diplomatije, op. cit., p. 47. 22 Ibid.
107 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century world, (which are represented by officials of the United States as a single bloc (with strategic allies formed on April 4, 1949, NATO) and the eastern bloc of the world of mankind, which was led by the officials of the USSR, who formed (as a counterpoint to NATO), the Warsaw Pact, which began its existence on 15 May 1955. Such their bilateral and multilateral relations created the bipolar international order and antagonistic diplomacy. There was a period called the Cold War, which also caused the formation of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which is essentially anti-block in terms of classifying nations and countries. “After twenty-five years of its action, Non- Aligned Movement had built its political strategy in order to achieve the program established at the founding conference in Belgrade in 1961. Non-Aligned Movement focused its activity on the maintenance of the three-year summits of their countries and the governments and, in particular, in the framework of the United Nations as a kind of a political bloc in the world organization. Practice has shown that the non-aligned countries have built specific forms of traditional diplomacy and multilateral diplomacy, which they call the diplomacy of non-aligned countries.”23 The rivalry of officials in power in the United States and the Soviet Union did not turn out only at the international and diplomatic field, but also in the military, in the context of the development and use of highly sophisticated weapons and technology generation of a higher level of training such as nuclear weapons. After throwing nuclear bombs on the Japanese cities – Hiroshima on 6 August 1945 and Nagasaki 9 August 1945, the nuclear era has started in international relations as well as the bipolar diplomacy. “By the end of the forties, the USA was the only nuclear power in the world until 1949, when the Soviet Union carried out an explosion of a nuclear bomb. Since 1955, the West no longer has a monopoly on nuclear weapons, and in the late fifties, the USSR became a strong nuclear force. And from that moment begins ‘nuclear diplomacy’, as in the historical period that followed; the destructive power of nuclear energy knew no bounds in the destruction of the values of our civilization. For possible survivors all illusions were gone; all the theories about the possible destruction of the opponents gaining the benefits based on rapid effects of nuclear missiles became meaningless.”24 Thus began the era of nuclear diplomacy in the new international relations that was particularly evident in the days of the Cuban Missile Crisis,
23 M. Janković, Poreklo i razvitak diplomatije, op. cit., p. 48. For the Non-Aligned Movement states there are two important international events that are a precursor to their first conference held in Belgrade from 1 to 6 September 1961, as follows: 1) Asia-Africa Conference held in Bandung from 18 to 24 April 1955, and 2) Meeting of president Josip Broz Tito, Gamal Abdel Nasser and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at Brioni on 18 and 19 July 1956. On this see closer and more detail: 1955–1992, Documents of the Conferences of the Non-Aligned Countries – Volume 1, Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 1992, pp. 5–11. 24 M. Janković, Poreklo i razvitak diplomatije, op. cit., p. 48.
108 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century which lasted 14 days, from 14 to 28 October 1962. Thanks to the engagement of the best diplomats and so-called discreet diplomacy, it was peacefully ended. The end of the twentieth century, among other important historical events, marked the demolition of the Berlin Wall and the end of communism,25 as opposed international system of the world to the capitalist system of the world. “In the night between the 9th and 10th of November 1989, the Berlin Wall, that frightening symbol of the bipolar world, ideological intolerance and bigotry was demolished.”26 Disintegration of the bipolar system of diplomacy in contemporary international relations began with the arrival of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev came to power in the USSR in 1985. “When on March 11, 1985, he was elected for the general secretary CC CPSU, from that moment on, nothing was the same as before in the USSR, which was leading the typical communist (totalitarian) state, and especially in April when he started process of perestroika (re-alignment) as a means to this “glasnost” ( loudness). An initiator, strategist and chief promoter of the reform, but essentially of a communist project of pe-restroika, was and remains Gorbachev.”27 By the Summit on the top of two of the then president, Ronald Reagan, the United States and the Soviet Union Mikhail Gorbachev, first in Reykjavik (the meeting ended without concrete results, but resulted in Agreement on nuclear disarmament, which is the specific contribution of their foreign policy of detente). In 1986 and later, by the meeting and their signatures in Malta, finally the era of bipolarity and the Cold War28 in international relations was over, but not – nuclear diplomacy. At the Summit in Malta and by the signatures of the two aforementioned presidents, the end of the international order – the Cold War was marked on December 3, 1989.
25 The fall of communism has been announced, before the fall of the Berlin Wall, by Zbigniew Brzezinski. For him, communism was a big failure. See: Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century, Charles Scribners’s Sons, New York City, 1989. 26 Jovica Trkulja, Osvajanje demokratije – Ogled o postkomunizmu, SING λογοζ, Belgrade, 1995, p. 21. 27 Nenad A. Vasić, Krah realnog socijalizma u SSSR-u i Istočnoj Evropi – Socijalističkoj Federativnoj Republici Jugoslaviji, u: Baština, Priština-Leposavić, Vol. 21/2006, p. 233. 28 See: Džon Luis Gedis, Hladni rat: mi danas znamo, Clio, Beograd, 2003. Still, the famous British historian Eric Hobsbawm believes that the Cold War ended in Reykjavik and Washington. “Practically the Cold War ended with the two summits in Reykjavik (1986) and Washington (1987).” Erik Hobsbaum, Doba ekstrema – istorija kratkog dvadesetog veka, Beograd, Dereta, 2002, p. 191. In this context it is interesting to comments Predrag Simić for Faculty of political Science in Belgrade. “The End of the Cold War marked, however, and the end of the system of international relations... ”. Predrag Simić, Evropa posle hladnog rata, in: Međunarodni problemi, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Belgrade, No. 3-4/1991, pp. 268-269.
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Table 1. Incidents of near nuclear use
Date Incident States involved Cause October 1962 Operation Anadyr Soviet Union Miscommunication
27 October 1962 British nuclear forces during the United Kingdom Conflict escalation Cuban missile crisis 27 October 1962 Black Saturday United States Conflict escalation and miscommunication 22 November 1962 Penkovsky false warning Soviet Union Espionage
October 1973 1973 Arab–Israeli war Israel Conflict escalation
9 November 1979 NORAD: Exercise tape mistaken United States Exercise scenario tape causes nuclear alertfor reality
3 June 1980 NORAD: Faulty computer chip United States Faulty computer chip
25 September 1983 Serpukhov-15 Soviet Union Technical error
7–11 November 1983 exercise Able Archer-83 Soviet Union, United States Misperception of military training
18–21 August 1991 Failed coup Soviet Union Loss of command and control structure 25 January 1995 Black Brant scare Russia Mistaken identity of research rocket launch
May–June 1999 Kargil crisis India, Pakistan Conflict escalation
December 2001–October 2002 Kashmir standoff India, Pakistan Conflict escalation
Source: Patricia M. Lewis, Heather Williams, Benoît Pelopidas, Sasan Aghlani, Too Close for Comfort Cases of Near Nuclear Use and Options for Policy, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 2014, pp. VI.
110 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
In his famous speech, which was held on November 9, 1991 in the House Chamber (The House of Representatives) on Capitol Hill in Washington, then US President, George Herbert Walker Bush, in a live broadcast of the national television and radio, mentioned that Americans together with Arabs, Europeans, Asians and Africans were working on achieving the “principle and the dream of a new world order.”29 After that there was created a so-called post-cold war era of mono polar world order30 in the 90-ies of the twentieth century, that would get, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the new contour elements and dimensions of uni (multi polar) world order in international relations as well as the globalization of diplomacy. It was also the period of the American cultural domination and cultural diplomacy. “The level of American cultural dominance itself has neither rivals or historical comparisons, nor there is a rival in sight. Moreover, as the world is becoming more urbanized, as humanity becomes increasingly interdependent and interactive, and that more traditional and predominantly rural parts of the world are becoming smaller and softer, the American cultural dominance is becoming more and more stronger.”31 Brzezinski once saw America as the only country in the role of a global leader of mankind. However, this was not the case with Joseph Nye who has warned the officials of the government of the United States that “our desire to go alone may ultimately weaken us.”32 In that context the next question is inevitable: what was the essence of Nye’s once true and useful warnings to government officials in the United States? “Modern information and its accompanying sign, globalization, transforms and reduces our world. At the beginning of this new century, these two forces have increased American power, including our ability to influence others
29 George Herbert Walker Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the Persian Gulf Crisis and the Federal Budget Deficit, (Internet, 14/04/2014), http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/ research/public_papers.php?id=2217& year=1990&month=9. Interestingly, this is a particular occasion to note the observation of an theorist of international relations and former Ambassador of the USA, Christopher Hill regarding the beginning of the crisis in the Republic of Ukraine since October 2013, the annexation of the Crimea neighboring country to the Russian Federation until 21 April 2014, resulted in the end of the new world order. “The new world order lasted almost 25 years.” Christopherr Hill, The End of the New World Order, (Internet, 07/30/2014), http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/christopher-r—hill-calls-on-the-west-to- prepare-for-a-long-struggle-with-a-revanchist-russia#wPdph rWDiCYP1BRH.99. Otherwise, according to Hill, “a conciliatory spirit of Russia and its commitmentto a ‘new world order’, no matter how problematic it was, represents one of the greatest achievements of the era of the Cold War.” Hill, The End of the New World Order, ibid. 30 Egon Macner, Monopolarni svetski poredak: o socioekonomiji dominacije SAD, Dosije, Belgrade, 2003. 31 Zbignjev Bžežinski, Američki izbor: globalna dominacija ili globalno vođstvo, Politička kultura – Zagreb/CID – Podgorica, 2004. 32 Džozef S. Naj, Paradoks američke moći: zašto jedina svetska supersila ne može sama, BMG, Beograd, 2004, p. 11.
111 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century through our attractive or ‘soft’ power. But over time, the technology will spread to other countries and people, and our relative superiority will be reduced.”33 This pro futuro insightful statement and accurate statement of Joseph Nye on the decline of American power reflected on the soft power34 as opposed to former normal, highlighted findings of a theorist and international relations strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski was valid until 10 February 2007. The upward continuation and culmination in foreign policy and public diplomacy of Russian Federation, was presented on the annual Munich Conference on Security Policy, where on 10 February 2007, the active participation took the then President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. In the history and science of international relations it is considered as the differentia specifica of the previous unipolar world order with hegemony and dominance of the United States and NATO and the establishment of a new (uni) multi polar world order, which marks the return of the authorities of the Russian Federation in the global international relations and strong economic growth in the People’s Republic of China with a restriction of its culture (it’s not universalistic), viz cultural diplomacy35 which is now in a modest advent and expansion in all parts of the modern world. But let’s get back to aforementioned international conference in Munich. To then President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, the type and format of the conference itself, and not only that, allowed him this to say: “The unipolar world has nothing in common with democracy.”36 On that occasion, Putin particularly emphasized and read to his critics: “Russia has been always taught about democracy but those who teach us, for some reason are reluctant to learn about democracy.”37 Unquestionably, it is understood that basically – (uni) multi polar world order is still in nuclear diplomacy. “The international order in the twenty-first century will be marked by something that at first glance seems contradictory: on the one hand there will be fragmentation, on the other increasing of globalization. At the level of inter-state
33 S. Naj, Paradoks američke moći: zašto jedina svetska supersila ne može sama, op. cit., p. 11. 34 Joseph S. Nye, Jr. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Public Affairs, New York, 2005. Also: Jan Melissen, The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005. 35 About Chinese cultural diplomacy, see: Herbert Passin, China’s Cultural Diplomacy, Praeger, New York, in 1963. 36 Влади�мир Влади�мирович Пу�тин, Выступление и дискуссия на Мюнхенской конференции по вопросам политики безопасности, (Интернет, 26. 09.2010.), http://archive.kremlin.ru/ appears/2007/02/10/1737_ type63374type63376type63377 type63381type82634_118097.shtml. 37 Пу�тин, Выступление и дискуссия на Мюнхенской конференции по вопросам политики безопасности, также.
112 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century relations, the new order will be more like the European system of the states from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but the rigid structures of the Cold War.”38 The beginning of the twentieth century was characterized by intensive development of multilateral diplomacy, in addition to the traditional, well- known, double-sided and in our previous review, partly mentioned, as it was necessary, as described – bilateral diplomacy. “At the same time, international relations for the first time have truly become global. Communications are current; world economy operates simultaneously on all continents.”39 Many of the problems that have emerged in the modern era and contemporary international relations (nuclear proliferation, environmental and climate change and environmental protection, demographic growth and economic interdependence of humanity) can be resolved only at the global level administration. All this has contributed to a significant increase in the number of subjects of public international law, with all its flaws and shortcomings. This is especially true for the new states and the newly formed international organizations, which has led to an increase not only of international contacts, but also to strengthen the diplomatic service in the world as such. Unlike the old image of international relations, which a political writer and a renowned theorist of the foreign policy of Morton Kaplan,40 described as a balance of power, bipolarity compared to other model of the international system, we are according to Richard Haass’s41 finding in a non-polar world, with a tendency
38 Kisindžer, Diplomatija, op. cit., p. 10. 39 Kisindžer, Diplomatija, op. cit., p. 10. 40 Morton A. Kaplan, Balance of Power, bipolarity and Other Models of International Systems, in: Edited by James N. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy – A Reader in Research and Theory, The Free Press, New York, Collier-Macmillan Limited , London, 1968, p. 343. 41 Richard Haas finds that there are three main reasons that have contributed to non-polar world: “First, some states have gained power through economic progress. Second, globalization has weakened the role of all states by allowing other entities to gain significant power. Third, American foreign policy has accelerated the relative collapse of the United States compared to other states.” Ričard N. Has, Živeti u nepolarnom svetu, u: Danas, Beograd, No. 3859/2008, p. 16. Also see: Richard N. Hass, The Age of Nonpolarity – What Will Follow US Dominance, in: Foreign Affairs, New York, Volume 97, No. 3/2008, pp. 44-56. For us it is especially important that Has reviewed the consequences of all previously mentioned in the perception of power in the world. “The consequence of all this is a world in which power is more shared and not concentrated.” Has, To live in a non-polar world, op. cit., p. 16. We could say that in the world, on foreign policy and diplomatic field, it’s definitely there, a change of polarity. The polarity of the power in the world’s foreign policy and diplomatic transition from (uni) multipolarism though non-polarism to the extended t bipolarity, not the new multipolarity. So, there is a new extended bipolarity. In addition, the new expanded bipolarity is an essential feature of the modern world on foreign policy and diplomatic fields. However, all this will be in the context of national and state interests of Serbia and on our foreign policy strategy only partially (more positive than negative) has an impact. This is all the more so because it is still the power of the
113 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century towards a multi polar world. Note also that one of the former American ambassador in Belgrade, otherwise outstanding connoisseur of regional foreign policy and domestic political processes and relationships among actors in the Western Balkans and the region of Southeast Europe - William Montgomery wrote an analytical column titled - Welcome to a multi polar world.42 Starting from the realistic theory in contemporary international relations, the current situation in the international world system I have called - extended bipolarity. What is the extended bipolarity and how I define it? The extended bipolarity is a new order in the international system of the world as opposed to a neutral and non-aligned states, where on the western half of humanity of planet Earth there is a dominance of the US with most Allied governments of full United Nations member states, in regard to its eastern half with formed a three-state counterpoint - Russian federations – People’s Republic of China – Republic of India as an integral part of the group of states or BRICS with the Eurasian Union, without generally accepted leadership and clearly profiled molded center of interdependent power. So, there is no multi polarity in the modern world, although such interests undoubtedly exist. We, as mankind are, however, in an extended bipolarity dominated by the USA and its strategic partners and allies. According to the scholar and analyst of international relations Dragan Petrović, from the Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade, the formation of BRIC43 (now BRICS after joining South Africa on April 13, 2011 – Federative Republic of Brazil, Russian Federation, Republic of India, People’s Republic of China, Republic of South Africa), marked among other things, an attempt to turn towards a multi polar world order. The former old paradigm (the old center of the world in terms of organization – the seat of the largest international organizations of the UN remains in New York and institutionally in Washington, IMF and World Bank), has been changed by the new reality of
United States in local spheres of interest of their diplomatic activity and regional international relations in the Western Balkans and Southeastern Europe so far dominant with all prospects will be so in the near future with a strategic partnership with the EU and NATO, but with significant influence officials and businessmen from the Russian Federation. Although still a possibility is that even such a dominant position may change in someone else’s benefit. All this certainly should not be a reason to neglect the bilateral and multilateral relations with all relevant actors to acknowledge in international relations – the representatives of the UN member states. 42 Vilijem Montgomeri, Dobrodošli u multipolarni svet, in: Danas vikend, Belgrade, No. 3862- 3863/2008, p. VII. 43 Dragan Petrović, Ka multipolarnom svetskom poretku, Pešić i sinovi/Centar za razvoj međunarodne saradnje, Belgrade, 2010, p. 11. The first summit of BRIC countries was held on June 16, 2009 in Jekatarinburg in the Russian Federation.
114 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the extended bipolarity of the USA with state officials and allies and RF officials allied countries, including the member states of BRICS. The project of Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin – Eurasia44 from the 3rd of October 2011, as an Agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union45 and an alternative to the existing European Union, has begun with its realization in Astana on May 29, 2014, when it was approved and signed by Nursultan Nazarbayev Abishuly,46 the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, then president of the Russian Federation and Alexander Grigoriyevich Lukashenko, President of the Republic of Belarus. In the first part - Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, Chapter I General provisions in Article 1, Establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union, paragraph 1, it is written: “By the existing contract, the parties have established the Eurasian Economic Union (here and after – EAEU) within which the free movement of goods, services, capital and labor, will be implemented by a coordinated, coherent and unified policy in the sectors defined in this Treaty and with international agreements within the Union.”47 In Article 1, paragraph 2, the following is provided: “The Union is an international organization of regional economic integration, which has an international legal subjectivity.”48 In the second Section II - Basic principles, objectives and competencies and Union law, in section 4 – basic principles of functioning of the Union, it is written:
44 Влади�мир Влади�мирович Пу�тин, Новый интеграционный проект для Евразии — будущее, которое рождается сегодня, (Интернет, 17. 05. 2014.), http://izvestia.ru/news/502761 #ixzz320jQM6Br. Among the most important ideologues, theorists and promoters of Eurasia and future Eurasian Union are the philosopher Aleksandr Dugin Gelyevich and historian and director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, Leonid Petrovich Reshetnikov. The two were the closest associates to current RF Prime Minister, Putin. See: Александр Гéльевич Дугин, Мистерии Евразии: Сакральная география, Арктогея-Центр, Москва, 1996. Александр Гéльевич Дугин, Наш путь: стратегические перспективы развития России в XXI веке, Арктогея центр, Москва, 1999. Александр Гéльевич Дугин, Евразийский путь как национальная идея: стратегические перспективы развития России в XXI веке, Арктогея центр, Москва, 2002. See especially: Александр Гéльевич Дугин, Основы Евразийства, Арктогея-Центр, Москва, 2002. с. 5-787. Александр Гéльевич Дугин, Проект “Евразия”, ЭКСМО, Яуза, 2004. Леонид Петрович Решетников, Вернуться в Россию: Третий путь, или тупики безнадежности, ФИВ, Москва, 2013. 45 Договор о Евразийском Экономическом Союзе, (Интернет, 29. 07. 2014.), http://online.zakon.kz/ Document/?doc_id=31548839. Otherwise, the Eurasian Economic Union can be compared to the European Economic Community of 25 March 1957 to the formation of the Economic Community of July 1, 1967, prior to the European Union, which was established in the Maastricht Treaty on 7 February 1992, and began to be implemented from January 1, 1993. 46 Александр Гéльевич Дугин, Евразийская миссия Нурсултана Назарбаева, РОФ “Евразия”, Москва, 2004. 47 Договор о Евразийском Экономическом Союзе, также. 48 Ibid.
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“The Union operates within the jurisdiction assigned to it by the Member States in accordance with this Agreement, based on the following principle: – compliance with universally recognized principles of international law, including the principle of sovereign equality of member states and their territorial integrity; – respect for diversity of political structures; – member states; – mutually beneficial cooperation, equality and national interests of the parties; – adherence to the principles of market economy and fair competition; – functioning of the customs union, no exceptions and limitations after a transitional period. Member States should create favorable conditions for the realization of its functions and the Union and shall refrain from measures which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of the Union.”49 In Chapter III - The bodies of the Union, Article 8 of the bodies of the Union, paragraph 1, the following is regulated: “1. The bodies of the Union are: – High Eurasian Economic Council (hereinafter - the High Council); – Eurasian Intergovernmental Council (hereinafter - the Intergovernmental Council); – The Eurasian Economic Commission (hereinafter - the Commission, EEC); – The Court of the Eurasian Economic Union (hereinafter - the Court Union). 2. Councils of the Union shall act within the powers given to them by this Treaty and with international agreements within the Union. 3. Councils of the Union are based on the principles set out in Article 3 of this Agreement. 4. Presidency of the Supreme Council of the Intergovernmental Council and the Council of the Commission shall be on a rotational basis by the Russian alphabetic order of a Member State of the Union within one calendar year without a new opportunity. 5. The conditions of stay in the territory of the member states are determined by specific international agreements between the Union and state of residence.”50
49 Ibid. 50 Ibid.
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In Chapter XXVIII Final Provisions, Section 108, allows the Member States as follows: “Joining the Union 1. The Union is open to all countries that pursue their goals and principles, under the terms agreed by the member states. 2. In order to obtain the status of a candidate country for membership in Union, the states send their requests to the President of the Supreme Council. 3. For the decision about giving the status of a candidate to some state, it is necessary to have the prior approval of the Supreme Council of the Union by the consensus. 4. Based on the decision, the Supreme Council forms a working group of representatives of the candidate countries, Member States and the Union (hereinafter - a working group) to investigate the level of preparedness of the candidate to assume the obligations of Union law, to make an action programme on the accession of the candidate countries to the EAEC, as well as a draft of international Agreement on the accession of the State of the candidate to the Union, which defines the scope of the rights and responsibilities of candidates, as well as the format of participation in the work of the Union. 5. The programme of Action for the candidate to enter the Union should be approved by the Supreme Council. 6. The Working Group regularly submits a report to the Supreme Council on the implementation of the State Program of candidates for the Action accession to the Union. On the recommendation of the working group that the candidate country has fully complied with the obligations arising from Union law, the High Council shall take a decision on the signing of the candidate international agreement on accession. The achieved contract is subject to approval.”51 In the above mentioned Section XXVIII of Final Provisions, Article 110, it is provided the usage of the working language of the Union Councils as well as the language of international treaties within the Union and the Commission’s decisions. “1. The Working language of the Union Council is Russian language. 2. The International Contracts within the Union and the Commission’s decisions are binding on member states, adopted in Russian and then translated into the national languages of the Member States, if so provided by its law in a manner determined by the Commission.
51 Договор о Евразийском Экономическом Союзе, также, op. cit.
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Translations into national languages of the Member States shall be paid from the account of funds allocated in the budget of the Union provided for this purpose. 3. In the case of differences in interpretation of international treaties and decisions referred to paragraph 2 of this article, the text in Russian is being used.”52 Finally, in the above mentioned Section XXVIII Final Provisions, Article 118, it has been provided the possibility of leaving the Eurasian Economic Union, of the rightful member states to clearly prescribed manner. “Withdrawal from the Union 1. Any Member State may withdraw from this Agreement, submitting to the Depositary Agreement by the diplomatic channel, written notice of its intention to withdraw from the existing contract. The implementation of the existing Agreement with respect to such State shall cease after 12 months from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the Contract of such notification. 2. Member State which has notified in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article, of its intention to withdraw from this Agreement shall be obliged to repay financial obligations incurred in connection with its participation in this Agreement. This obligation applies despite the withdrawal of the state from this Agreement to its full implementation. 3. Based on the information specified in paragraph 1 of this Article, the Supreme Council makes the decision about the beginning of the process of fulfilling obligations in connection with the participation of member states in this Agreement. 4. Withdrawal from this Agreement automatically entails the termination of membership in the Union and exit from international agreements in the framework of the Union.”53 Active implementation of the Treaty on the Eurasian Economic Union will start from January 1, 2015. Otherwise, the Eurasian Union is in many ways a replacement for the former Soviet Union, and the completion of the aforementioned advent of perestroika took place Anatolyevich Dmitri Medvedev of the Russian Federation President Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin after 7 May 2008, which once started Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev.
52 Ibid. 53 Ibid.
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Nevertheless, the Warsaw Pact compensates for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,54 and for the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the Organization of the Collective Security and Cooperation i.e. CSTO– the Collective Security Treaty Organization.55
Table 2. Summary of the history of international relations from the sixteenth century to the 29th of June 2014
Period leading countries main sources of power
Gold bars, grocery colonies, mercenary armies Sixteenth century the Kingdom of Spain and dynastic connections
The Kingdom of the Seventeenth century Trade, capital markets, Navy Netherlands
population size, industry of agricultural Eighteenth century The French Republic products; efficient public administration, military, culture (soft power)
Industry, political unity government in the state, stable finances and efficient credit The UK - Great Britain system, the Navy, the liberal norms (soft Nineteenth century and Northern Ireland power), the insular position of the country (which makes it easy for military defense in case of an attack)
- Economic power leadership in the field of scientific and technical achievements, The USA – geographic location, military might and power Twentieth century The United States ally, universal culture and the formation of of America international regimes that reflect liberalism (soft power)
The United States until June 29, 2014 (with military allies and strategic partners) versus BRICS and the Eurasian Union (with allies and strategic Twenty-first century partners in the era of expanded bipolarity of the international system of the world)
54 上海合作组织, Шанхайская организация сотрудничества, (Internet, 30. 07. 2014.), http://www.sectsco. org/. 55 Организация Договора о коллективной безопасности, (Internet, 30. 07. 2014.), http://www.odkb- csto. org/.
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3. The order of EU and integration of Serbia As we have detailed and multidisciplinary reviewed all the relevant aspects and dimensions of change and establishment of orders that they caused in the history of international relations, then it is also necessary to think and analyze the current order of the EU as well as the position and possible perspective of integration into the same, for our country – the Republic of Serbia. For each country in the world and its people, that is to say the citizens, it is important the type of dominant constitutional and political order with the leadership elite. This is definitely the case with the European Union. However, there is one, among other important issues in the science of international relations and diplomacy theory: what is actually present, newly established political and legal order of the European Union, with its 28 full-fledged member states by the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009? Map 1. EU with its 28 full-member states
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There are four of our thesis and supporting arguments that we could use to identify and explain how it has been created and changed the order of the EU. 1. The history of the idea of Europe from the myth to the most successful peace project of the United Nations and the governments of current European Union – is the result of thoughts and work of many known and unknown people, first of all, Jean Monnet, Robert Schumann and Konrad Adenauer. 2. Without the support of the Americans, approval of officials of the United Kingdom and finally, the Franco-German strategic partnership would not have been the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom, the Treaty of Rome, the European Economic Community, the European Community, the Copenhagen criteria, European Monetary Union (EMU) and therefore not present EU. 3. Undoubtedly, the current EU have has a very powerful monarchical tradition, nobility, county, labor and liberal and social capitalism, the Christian heritage with Islam and other small religious communities, the acquis communautaire, electoral, representative and participatory democracy in the European Parliament but also republicanism56 as a form of government, consensual decision-making in the European Commission and the European Council. 4. Finally, the current EU is a part of the North Atlantic collective defense – NATO with Euro corpus and security police system with Europol. As rightly pointed and commented on the Lisbon Treaty by Juan Mayoral, the democratic legitimacy57 of the European Union is first mentioned in the Preamble, and later in the Article 10, which we will analyze later. Of course, in the center of the political system of the European Union there is a person i.e. a citizen in the name of the citizen of full member states. In the Title II Provisions on democratic principles, Kosnsolid’s Treaty for the European Union which came into force on 1 December 2009, Article 9 regulates the issue of the citizens. “In all its activities, the Union respects the principle of equality of its citizens, who are equal before its institutions, agencies and bodies. EU citizen is any person who has the nationality of a Member State. Citizenship of the Union shall be added to the national citizenship and does not replace it.”58
56 Damian Charlmes, Gareth Davies, Giorgio Monti, European Union Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge/New York/Melbourne/Madrid/Cape Town/Singapore/Sao Paulo/Delhi/ Dubai/Tokyo, 2010, p. 132. 57 Juan Mayoral, Democratic improvements in the European Union under the Lisbon Treaty: Institutional changes regarding democratic government in the EU, European Union Democracy Observatory (miracle)/Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies / European University Institute, Fiesole, 2011, p. 1. 58 Konsolidovani Ugovor o Evropskoj uniji: od Rima do Lisabona, Preveo i priredio Milutin Janjević, JP Službeni glasnik, Belgrade, 2009, p. 32.
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Also, the Title II, Article 10, regulates the functioning of the European Union, which is based on democratic representation. “The functioning of the Union shall be founded on the democratic representation. 2. The Citizens are, at the level of the Union, directly represented in the European Parliament. The Heads of State or Government of the Member States are in the European Council and in the Council by their governments, which are in line with democratic principles accountable to their national parliaments and to their citizens. 3. Every citizen has the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union. Decisions are made in public and on the level as close as possible to the citizens. 4. Political parties at European level contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union.”59 However, the question arises: what is the current EU – the state or an international organization? The present EU is a semi-state, semi-national organization with a common foreign and security policy and personality in international relations. Otherwise, in 48 countries around the world there are diplomatic missions of the EU. According to the keynote address, Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić, Serbia is a candidate country in the accession negotiations for full EU membership by 2020. This goal is not impossible if good access negotiations with the harmonization with the EU Acquis communautaire are completed by 2018, and the negotiations for full membership of our country successfully come to an end by 2020, which is publicly proclaimed goal. “I want clearly to say – The European Union is not an ideal community, for it has its own flaws and problems. But it is the best state association that currently exist in the world and our place is in its membership. Already during the negotiations on the EU membership, our society will be modernized and changed, because we are going to adopt a number of standards in the public administration, the judiciary, education, health, economy and society. Small and poor societies, such as ours, these standards alone would never have reached and that is why for us the EU membership is a great advantage and opportunity. We continue negotiations in good faith that we will finish them by the end of this government. This process is our priority and if we work hard, I believe that Serbia by the end of this decade could become a member of the European Union.”60
59 Konsolidovani Ugovor o Evropskoj uniji: od Rima do Lisabona, op. cit., p. 32. 60 Aleksandar Vučić, Okvirni ekspoze: „Predsednika Vlade Republike Srbije Aleksandar Vučić”, Vlada Republike Srbije, 27/04/2014, p. 8.
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Final review The issue of changes in international relations and the conduct of foreign policy is essential for all officials in power in any internationally recognized state of the world, of any full member of the United Nations. Bearing in mind our overall, the previous detailed and multidisciplinary review of change in international relations and the order of the European Union, we draw four conclusions. 1. Changes in international relations are frequent, dynamic by its contents and numerous by the direct and indirect participants, and finally, far-reaching by the significance. 2. As humanity, we are in an era of the extended bipolarity, but not in the stage of a new Cold War. 3. The Order of the EU as a semi-state and semi-international organization is incomplete and will be subject to further reforms, constitutional, institutional and organizational structuring but also further intensification of the process of enlargement on the European and Asian continent. 4. The crisis and the war in Cyprus from 20 July to 15 August 1974, a military air campaign of NATO bombing and the war in Kosovo from March 24 to June 10, 1999, the war in Georgia (Abkhazia and South Ossetia) from 7 August to 16 August 2008, with the rejection of the EU’s enlargement policy of the Eastern partnership with Ukraine on 21 November 2013, a democratic referendum secession of Crimea on 16 March 2014 and the civil war, the open question of the status of the city Kaliningrad (Russian territory between the Baltic sea, the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania with a total area of 15,100 km² within a distance of 320 km from the state border of the Russian Federation to the European Union) and the pro-Russian secession of Transnistria (Republic of Moldova) with occasional complications in negotiations on integration European Union with the Turks, will result in de facto obtaining eastern and southern territorial borders of the EU. In the Republic of Serbia as a pro-European and military neutral country in the Western Balkans in Southeastern Europe, the most serious alternative to 2020, before eventually full-fledged membership in the EU, will represent the project and support together with the followers to the Eurasian Union with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the CSTO. Thus, there is an alternative to the European Union, and whether Serbia will be a full member state of the European Union, the citizens will decide on the publicly announced and conducted democratic referendum.
123 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Risto MIJALOV1 Goran KITEVSKI2
CONTEMPORARY SOCIO–POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES IN EUROPE
Abstract: The history of the European continent is marked by constant social and political developments and processes that are actually seen as the main generators of multiculturalism and the higher, developed and liberal European society today. However, today’s open and globalized world poses in the dynamic processes that have specific social, cultural, economic and political characteristics with a prominent dynamics creating space for the evolution of the European society in terms of the fragmentation process on one side, and Europeanization as the main process on the other. The main problems and processes in Europe have different dynamics and their character will be outlined and elaborated in the paper. These are demographic aging, some aspects of the Islamization of Europe, secessionist ideas, multiculturalism and other, which create the basis for the transformation of the “European society”. Key words: European society, fragmentation, Europeanization, demographic aging, Islamization, transformation.
Introduction Practically speaking, almost every phenomenon and process of wider nature that takes place on the European continent has adequate nascent through the grandiose continental history. In fact, the evolution of Europe’s “society” consists in cyclically sorted problems and processes, creating a multicultural and colorful geopolitical entity. Thus, in general, through the complete history of Europe, the
1 Risto Mijalov, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Institute of geography, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia. 2 Goran Kitevski, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Institute of geography, Skopje, Republic of Macedonia.
124 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century political dynamics is evolutionary continuity, which on the one hand, greatly influenced the social conditions on continental level, and vice versa, the social conditions, were key factor of the specific geopolitical movements. When discussing the geopolitical history of a continent where civilizations first appeared, the home of the first grand empires, a continent that is home to fast growing civilization advances, the germ of the colonial world and home to the fragmentation that turned into world wars, it is more than necessary to highlight the need of update of events in continental level. Because in the vast continental frame, there are a number of events with different aspect and character dynamics, and they are separate and complementary at the same time, there is a need for regional review. This paper will focus on contemporary socio – political issues and processes in Europe. So, the paper will cover the main points that set the main geopolitical platform in the continent. Besides intersection problems and processes will emphasize the special importance of the generators of geopolitical issues and points in Europe, despite its role as a factor, innovate and dynamic appearance. For specific coverage and elaboration of grand geopolitical issues that compromise the state of European society, a variety of methods and methodological approaches are used, primarily relying on the theoretical approach of research and elaboration because it is a complex and dynamic subject that offers space for maximum approach and the opportunity to explore. The main contemporary issues and processes continent of Europe can be distinguished: Europeanization which is homogenization Following the geopolitical aspect; conversion, which is a process that can consider the social, economic, cultural and political aspects; separatism, which is a latent process that depends on many factors; and demographic aging as a process of social, political and economic aspects, mainly affecting most of the problems and processes of modern Europe.
Contemporary problems and processes Of particular importance is the categorization of geopolitical currents affecting the European continent. Besides the main division of the processes and problems, starting from the premise that the processes in nature do not represent and geopolitical problem, there are specific criteria for appreciation of phenomena, and their caliber and aspects. With that, it could be argued about the genesis of the problems, as well as their type: geopolitical problems that have demographic nascent – the demographic aging of the European continent; the cultural nascent – ethnic (national) issues that
125 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century have secessionist / separatist nature and fall into problems of highest kind; social problems originated from demographic aging (relation between workers and retired people that is unsustainable for society), migrations originating from previously highlighted problems etc. In fact, it is quite clear that almost all of the problems are represented as the main platform of the modern European politics. Processes of Europeanization and Islamization are emphasized as geopolitical processes of highest order. These two, which have the opposite direction of action, are the main and rounded geopolitical aspect of the problems, even in the world. Through the prism of history, the concept and thematic share of the Europeanization had a different character, often formulated as unique idea for a single center, especially in terms of governance, to the form of Christianization of the continent, compiling a homogeneous geopolitical entity. Today, the term Europeization has a narrower aspect, although its motives have strong foundations in the history, mainly in the cultural domain. Europeanization today is creating a continental synchronized value converted into a value of 28 geopolitical units, on the base of the great cultural variations. From geopolitical aspect, the European Union is the main form of creationism in the process of Europeanization. As a beginning of the European Union is considered the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community, with the Robert Schuman’s Declaration of 9 May 1950. With the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1951, France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy left its recent past behind in the sake of the new economic order and future political perspective, to work together and create the core for spreading the new European value.3 One of the main ideas of the European Union is the concept of the United States. In fact, if theorize that the world after the processes of fragmentation aims at more unitary distribution (USA, EU, BRICS etc..), The European Union is a reliable and solid project that follows the world’s convergent platform. Of course, the European Union from its establishing form (Economic Union) is experiencing an evolution from formal, legal and economic nature, to the administrative - territorial, demographic and political level. Today, the European Union has 28 members (last state which was integrated was Croatia in the summer of 2013). A few states have practical member’s relationship with the EU (EFTA members - Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Liechtenstein), and most of the countries in Europe, analogous their foreign policy, tend to integrate in the geopolitical family.
3 Kitevski Goran (2012): Geographic aspects of geopolitical problems and processes of XX and XXI century, master thesis, Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, Institute of geography, Skopje, p. 577 (In Macedonian).
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Primary to the main idea of Europeization (the geopolitical character), the main interest is the integration of more (tendency to all) countries of the European continent in the European Union. However, the evolution in grand geopolitical entity is represented in a number of obstacles and problems. First, we talk about the great difference in the EU (which means members of the EU) and countries that have yet to be integrated. Most countries that are not yet integrated in the Union are countries which over the second half of the XX century were part of the Eastern Bloc, and have socialist emphasis. Hence, they pull systematic differentiation, for which the European Union sets out criteria that must be met before a particular country can become an official member (liberalization, democratization, etc.). Some states, however, because of their firm political orientation, have no intention to join (integrate) in the European Union (such as Russia and Belarus). It is worthwhile to note the existence of different “geostrategic yardstick” when it comes to integration, i.e. the criteria and differentiation. Over the last 20 years, the European Union dramatically expanded its borders to the east, shifting the geopolitical center of gravity to the Russian Federation. So, most of the states that were integrated are states that until the fall of the Berlin Wall were members of the Soviet Union (the Baltic States), or were under the hegemony of the Communist Moscow (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria). There is a question if the countries that were integrated into the European Union in the post-communist wave fulfilled the “criteria” for membership, unlike some countries which for many years tend to be integrated into the big European family. In the context of this perspective, it is worth to mention the pursuit of R. Turkey for the European Union, for which there is still no concrete answer or possibility of (positive) forecast for the membership aspect of this bicontinental state. The decades-old pursuit of Turkey accession in the EU poses many questions that can be theorized and answer why Turkey is not yet a member of the European Union: With the admission of Turkey into the EU, Europe would get greater administrative - territorial role, and will share borders with countries like the Islamic Republic of Iran, Syria and Iraq. Turkey is a secular Islamic country with a different cultural tissue, which does not correspond to one of the cornerstones of Europeanization. With its territory, demography and political basis, Turkey as a member will be promoted as an important factor in the creation of European policies The administrative - territorial aspect is theoretical and abstract, but very real opinion. As for the demographic character, since Turkey is a country where over 76 million people live (with the possible reception would be the second largest
127 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century country in the EU after Germany), with a strong European Diaspora and different cultural domain, primarily referring to Islam as a religion, although the state is secular. It is a European Islamophobia or rejection of the European society towards Islam. The touch of Europe with the Islam as a religion and culture has historical character (Islamization of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire, the burst of the Arabians in Iberia, etc.), which more or less affected the cultural identity of the region. Contact with European culture which created Islamophobia is due to the last XX century, with the extensive labor immigration from Islamic countries to the European continent. Besides the “Islamophobia“ that despite the abstract and theoretical version, enters in the social orientation in the European countries, there is another criterion of “Islamophobia” and it is with geopolitical aspect, where the Islamic countries are seen as distinctive and aggressive enemy of liberal society as the European Union. The third category of countries that are not integrated into the EU only highlights the issues around the demographic criterion that covers Turkey. It specifically addresses the countries of the Balkan Peninsula, which tend to be members of the EU: Albania, Republic of Macedonia, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The common denominator of these countries is a good portion of the population in the Islamic framework. Practically, almost all of these countries have grounds to be called “Islamic”. They are among the states that, if followed Islamophobia as an integration criterion, should not be integrated in the EU. Even better example in the context of Serbia that if it includes Kosovo, which in 2007 announced its independence, goes a long way to the integration (with the history of Serbia in relation with the external factor and Kosovo since the end of the XX and the beginning of the XXI century); by loosening the position of Serbia in the question of Kosovo, is strengthening the European integration connections – Serbia became a candidate in 2013, and is on the best way to become the first member of the region in the next few years. Albania, for example, became a member of NATO in 2008, and got candidate status in June 2014, but the EU membership is not yet in practical terms. As for Macedonia and the great potential for geopolitical crisis that Macedonia has, the name dispute with southern neighbor Greece is used as a key geopolitical obstacle toward Europeanization. For more prominent structure in the integration and the creation of a single European Union in the future, large processes and operations are more than needed. These include possible scenarios for revamping the Balkans (separation of part of Macedonia, division of Bosnia, etc.), with the activation of the separatist movements. Change of the policy of the states that have no ambitions for integration is also a big undertaking that can cause a problem of larger scale, such as the activation of orientation issue of Ukraine and the relaunched “buffer question” of the EU with Russia.
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Separatist movements and ideas are a major antagonistic processes and problems of the continent in the idea of Europeanization. The spoken historical identity of Europe with its grandiose history and great cultural diversity, contributed to the possibility of a number of ethnic communities and groups that have developed a strong national consciousness. In the structure of European society and European state, national diversity looks like a major problem, and it is especially pronounced when it comes to sound related entities that where are separatist movements and processes. Almost every country in Europe has a separatist idea, which has, or has not strong political support, but throughout the European separatism, there are several solid ideas that can make a difference in grandiose geopolitical scene. 1. Basque and Catalan separatism in Spain. The character, intensity and shape of their persistence vary cyclically, but there is a strong national consciousness with the constant repetition of the idea of an independent Catalonia and the Basque Country, with a possible referendum. It is worth noting that the idea for an independent Basque state was so aggressive, that one of the most notorious terrorist groups in the world ETA has fought for independence for many years. 2. Independent Scotland. The idea has been around since the unification of the United Kingdom. There are two variants of the possibility of splitting Scotland from the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. One scenario is that the referendum scheduled for this (2014) year will be unsuccessful and the situation will remain status quo; another possibility is that independence would only be quite formal, although today Scotland has considerable state flexibility. And the third option is the division of Scotland, which will mark the beginning of the “balkanization” of Western societies, which will be a concrete sign for the other entities that tend to separation. It is difficult to theorize about the future of Britain and Scotland, although indications show that the UK will survive in normal terms, when the main portion of the political platform in Scotland is against secession is considered, as it was the case in the past referendums on the same issue. 3. Belgium. Belgian issue has ethnic and regional aspect, because it has a well- marked ethnic border inside the borders of this country. Northern part of the state is Flemish (tending towards the Netherlands) and southern part is Wallonia (Walloons tend to France). The problem is Brussels, which is located in Flanders, but is inhabited mainly by Walloons. Belgium through recent history experienced many political problems and crises (long period without a government), and further separatist moments are analogous to other possible geopolitical turmoil in the region and Europe. These are three of the major secessionist movements in Europe. Furthermore, we can mention the problem in Transnistria (Moldovan part of which is inhabited by pro-Russian population that tends to join the “Parent” Russia) which can take
129 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century a further geopolitical value analogous to the Ukrainian question and the issue of Crimea, which has already grown into a world problem for Ukraine taking on the eastern parts of Ukraine inhabited with pro-Russian people, creating a geopolitical conflict that still rages on; the Åland archipelago (federal demilitarized populated part of Finland with Swedish majority population with separatist ideas); ideas for political developments in Austria (Tyrol), Northern Italy, Corsica in France and many others. The Balkans also has geopolitical points of European importance. Besides the standard issue of Kosovo, there are also other ideas which gravitate to Greater Albania, like the ethnic – territorial differentiation in Macedonia (western part of the republic where the majority Albanian population lives). Problem is also Bosnia, the federal entity formed after the Dayton agreement which has proved unsustainable. Both countries are expected to resolve problems with appropriate access in the near future Separatist ideas and philosophies quite have potential for political progress. History has shown that the “use” of that potential is necessary to strengthen the national spirit and the creation of additional national values against other integrative role. One way of fueling the idea of separatism is social instability, or economic discomfort. What can generate social diversification in Europe and which may trigger separatist movements across the continent, is located in the demographic and cultural basis of the old continent. Thus, the demographic aging is considered as one of the main problems and processes in Europe. European population in 2014 is estimated at 733 million, which is a figured as a zenith point of the population growth of Europe. According to the middle variant projections, number of Europe’s population is expected to drop to 691 million by 2050, when the world according to the same medium variant from the Population Division of the United Nations would be numbered 9.1 billion. As a result of increasing life expectancy and declining mortality rate, percentage of population that has 65 or more years in Europe has been steadily increasing. In fact, Europe’s largest countries have the highest percentage of “old” population. Germany and Italy comprise 20 percent of the population that has more than 65 years. Over 15 percent of senior citizens live in Spain, United Kingdom, Austria, Portugal, Greece, Switzerland, France, Finland, Belgium, Slovenia, Croatia and the Baltic countries. Other European countries may not be found in the “endangered” list, but have a 12 to 15 percent of senior citizens. It is estimated that in 2014, over 22 percent of Europe’s population belongs to residents of 60 years and older. The largest percentage goes to the mature population, which makes up as much as 58 percent, while only 20 percent of the total populations in Europe are people from 0 to 19 years. It is expected the proportion of elderly population to continue to grow in the future (expected 35 percent of the population having 60 years and over in 2050), together with the gradual reduction
130 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of low levels of fertility and mortality, and the increase of the life expectancy of the population. The median age of the population in Europe in 2013 was 39.9 years. The average age of the male population is 38.4, while the average age for women was 41.3 years. Life expectancy for Europeans is estimated at 77.8 years (men 74.6, women 81.2 years). From the demographic vital statistics, it is very important to emphasize the birth rate, mortality and specific fertility in Europe. The birthrate is 10.3 pro miles, while mortality was 11.5 pro miles. It means that Europe is already situated with negative natural grow rate from 1.3 in 2013 which was accompanied by an influx of 1.3 migrants per 1,000 inhabitants.4As for the specific fertility, it is the lowest in the world. No other continent is characterized by the low ratio of specific fertility as Europe. In 2013, specific fertility in Europe was 1.5, with average woman in her fertile period giving birth to 1.5 children. When it is known that the minimum number of children per woman for simple reproduction of the population is 2.1, then concludes that the European continent is far below that required to reproduce the population in the next generation. Old Continent earns its nickname, but it brings economic and social problems that translate into big geopolitical problems and processes in the continent, and thus in the whole world in general. The psychology of modern times explains the demographic trend of regression of Europe. The continent that through the times wore the demographic lever of the world has come to a position to be maintained from the immigrant streams gradually supplementing the difference between the numbers of births and deaths. Many things affect the situation which contributed to the low participation of the Europeans in demographic frame of the continent. Liberal societies and modern ways of life dramatically changed the view of young people who are reluctant to decide on life in marriage, and if they do, they are more reluctant on having children.5 Larger women’s rights and their role in social life and careers contributed to decline of the fertile potential. And there are a few more modern ways that spoiled the demographic trends in the practically most civilized continent in the world. The high degree of civilization is the main cause of demographic setback. And when it comes to geopolitics and demographic setback, we can argue about the economy. Europe as one of the economically most developed continents is yet to face a labor shortage that will continue to produce to maintain such a strong economy. On the other hand, the number of retirees who depend on pension funds which are produced by the labor will contribute to economic instability in
4 Worldstat info [www.en.worldstat.info]. 5 Kitevski, G. (2012), p. 486.
131 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century each country characterized by old age structure. Over the past decades, the media and politicians in Europe consistently ignored the demographic indicators that spoke about the beginning of the economic crisis on demographic basis. However, over the past, Europe and the other strong economic societies lived golden age when the situation was ideal. Now that the European Union is already experiencing the first moments of crisis, there are some concrete elaborations about correcting the poor demographic situation. Of course, one of the solutions is the increase of immigration quotas and “import” of labor from regions around the world which have excess young labor force. And it will further complicate the situation previously mention as a side: that is the ethnic and religious composition of the European population.6 The demographic aging process is a process that may encourage other “active points” in Europe that are close related to separatism. The increase in unemployment, poverty and the age level of retirement are major difficulties of functioning of the welfare state, which can arouse the revolutionary ideas that are outlined in constant separatism. In fact, all processes in Europe with various characters have similar content and connectivity. Earlier in the context of Europeanization, it was the question of Islamophobia, which again corresponds to the conversion, a process that already gets its plastic and real role in 21st century Europe. Accordingly, to the demographic setback and in the demand for labor force in Europe, there is a surplus of labor force and demographic progress in Islamic countries. Through the course of the XX century, the labor market and cheap labor for European countries (after their colonial regime) was located precisely in these countries. Performing migration of young, working population, much of the Western economies gradually violated domestic national and cultural identity and unity. In fact, the present appearance of Western societies is obtained by immigration inflows of population needed to developed European economy. Thus, much of the western countries have increased their share of non-Christian - Muslim population (3-5 percent). That share, basically has the ability to advance, because the Muslim population in Western countries is, practically speaking, the only one that provides a positive natural growth. Thus, on account of demographic setback, there is a demographic progress of the Islamic population. Meanwhile, demand for labor force still exists.
6 Ibid, p. 487.
132 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Table 1. Demographic movement of population in Europe with reference to the Muslim population (1950–2010).
year 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
total 547.424.812 604.423.269 655.996.572 692.899.864 720.758.128 726.156.921 732.729.325
Muslims 10.765.329 13.426.082 19.918.527 24.726.900 31.939.389 37.323.237 42.052.724
Source: H. Kettani, “World Muslim Population: 1950–2020”, International Journal of Environmental Science and Development (IJESD), Vol. 1, No. 2, June 2010.
One of the moves to loosen problem with Islam and Islamophobia in Europe, and avoiding the “only” way to get labor force, was also previously mentioned integration process, in which many countries in the post-Soviet space, despite their geopolitical position (zone of Russia, landlocked position etc...) are countries that can be incorporated into the European economy, as well as to participate in the labor market (due to the economic differentiation of poorer countries). Thus, at least in the current range, the main source of cheap work force is the Eastern European countries. However, it should be noted that these countries are in similar, even in worse demographic situation of Western, i.e., the problem of demographic aging is not just a feature of liberal, Western society, but it is a feature of the whole “old continent”, with the only difference in the factors that contributed to demographic aging and declining of the European population fund. Besides the extreme idea of Islamization of the continent Europe originating in the seventies of the last century, can be theorized on a flexible level, going to the transformation of European society. Liberalism is the main affinity of European society today, but, on the other hand, is the opposite of Islamic principles. In general, the Islamization is not coming into effect “overnight”, but Islam occupies a real bite in many European societies. In general, Muslims transmit their culture where they decide to live and it mainly affects the domicile culture tending to change. Thus, despite the geopolitical rise of Islam in the Balkans (for several countries can establish themselves as part Islamic), it is mostly cultural influence of Europe and encourages disputes or other processes. Through a number of states and cities in Europe, there are Islamic neighborhoods and blocks that contain complete Islamic culture and function. It is followed by a negative manner by the liberal European environment. Thus, it creates differentiation and antagonism in European societies. Same, together with social problems and other immigration processes, gives rise to separatist right-wing opinions and views. So, there, we can talk about complete gradual transformation of European society, from liberal to conservative, with separatist movements opposite to the great process of Europeanization.
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Because of wide cultural variety of Europe, at first can be argued about the regionalism, which first works on ethnic and / or multiconfessional hegemony, and then gets wider, economic role. So, there are problems and processes, which on the one hand tend toward homogenization of the heterogeneous European continent, and on the other hand, there are a number of processes that are mutually hindering the process of homogenization, starting a new process of regionalism.
Conclusion From the performed in the paper, it can be estimated that this is a complex topic that covers more thematic units, which requires a broader research approach. Speaking of contemporary problems and processes in Europe of social and political character, it can be concluded that it is a chain association of broad social and political events. Demography and economy, primarily lead in the creation of the cultural and administrative changes and processes over the course of the XX century, but the same problem occurs as fashionable in current circumstances in Europe. It is crucial to realize how all processes are related to each other and produce major problems, in the pursuit of the world modern complex distribution, or creation of single European society, which precede the processes of regionalism and transformation of European society, in a cyclical manner, from the liberal to conservative, such as the recent case in most “concerned” European countries.
134 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Slobodan ZEČEVIĆ1
THE CHALLENGES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FEDERALIZATION PROCESS
Abstract: The European integration process has been characterized by the federalization of the institutional system of the Community and of the European Union and by the expansion of the degree of competences of European institutions. Therefore, today, the process of adopting legislative acts of the Union is closer to the federal model in sense that a kind of European government (Commission) proposes legislative acts to the council of people (European Parliament) and to the council of states (Council). Historically, the expansion of the competences of the European Community or the European Union took place on two grounds. It had its legal form in the shape of changes in the Memorandum of Association on the one hand, but what also happened was a silent expansion of competences on the basis of the interpretation of the provisions of the Memorandum of Association or by case law of the Court of Justice, on the other hand. However, the changes of the Agreement made in Lisbon in 2009 open opportunities for the regression of competences of the European Union in favour of the member states. In this regard, the question is what caused this change of direction, opposite to the several decades of federalist enthusiasm which marked the process of European integration? At the end of the twentieth and early twenty-first century, fundamental differences in understanding the future of the European Union came to the fore. France and Germany are generally committed to the idea of gradual establishment of a European federal state, while the UK wants to see the EU only as a broad area of free trade where the states at the rim of the continent, such as Turkey and Ukraine, would be involved. The assignment of new responsibilities to EU institutions in Brussels has become controversial and therefore, it is considered that the latter have a lack of democratic legitimacy. Specifically, citizens see them as distant technocratic bodies that do not have original support of the people. Therefore, in the context of further transfer of competences to the European Union, it is necessary to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the European authorities. Institutional arrangements that should achieve the motto of the EU constitution in 2004, which read “United in Diversity”, were not given in advance nor can they be found on other continents. Due to the
1 Prof. Slobodan Zečević, Ph.D., Institute of European Studies, Belgrade.
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historical and cultural specificities of Europe, what has been mentioned above has been and will be the result of the creative efforts of several generations. Key words: European Union, competences, federalism, European institutions, subsidiarity, Commission, European Parliament, Council, Common Foreign and Defence Policy.
Introduction The process of unification of European countries which was launched in Paris in 1951 with the Treaty on the European Coal and Steel has lasted for sixty-three years. It is a creative “architectural” effort for the area of the European continent to find an alternative solution to the existing model of government based on nationality, religion and national sovereignty, which was established back in the eighteenth century.2 In fact, the still dominating national model of governance should have led to equality between states and non-interference in internal affairs through the application of the principle of state sovereignty. In practice, however, in Europe it actually brought to the domination of large over small states and to conflicts of interest that were resolved by either diplomatic or military means. The catastrophic consequences that World War I and II led to on the humanitarian as well as on the material sphere were a hint that the reference to the nation and the state’s sovereignty was not enough to ensure peace and economic prosperity. War-torn and economically fragmented European countries lost their economic and political clout and credibility on the international stage staying in the shade of territorial and population of great powers like the United States and the former Soviet Union. Therefore, the idea of creating a link between the federal states expanded into European political, economic and intellectual circles from in 1945. This idea was again met with resistance on the part of the ruling national structures that sought to preserve the levers of power, but also to protect the national identity of the “old” European countries. The course of the European integration began in the economic sphere by signing of the Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in Paris in 1951 and then the Agreement on the European Economic and Atomic Energy Community in Rome in 1957. The area of the economy was the most suitable ground for launching of the integration process, because it contributed to the development of the war-ravaged European countries, while being less threatening to the state sovereignty. The institutional model predicted by the Treaties Establishing the Community should have met two naturally opposing goals. One was to establish the institutions of the united Europe competent in
2 A. Pecheuil, Le traite de Lisbonne-La constitution malgres nous (The Treaty of Lisbon-Adopting it in spite of us), Edtion Cujas, Paris, 2007., p. 12.
136 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century various areas of economic and social life that would be able to effectively make decisions and not to be deprived of power and not to marginalize old European states and nations. The European integration process was characterized by the expansion of the area of competences of European institutions and federalization of the institutional system of the Community and the European Union. Since it has received ten new member states from Eastern Europe in 2004 this process has been stopped which is partly reflected in some segments of the Lisbon Treaty. The question of the evolution of the institutional system of the European Union and its development is essential for the peoples and countries of Europe. What would happen if the economic and political system of the European Union fell apart, i.e. if the borders were re-introduced, if the flow of goods, people, capital were limited and free provision of services was hindered, if “euro“ as a common European currency was terminated, if the democratic system and respect for human rights were no longer the applicable European standards? Could the aggressive nationalism, in circumstances of the disappearance of the European Union, be hampered and the war in Europe prevented and could the European countries compete equally with the modern economic powers such as the United States, Russia, China and India? Would there be, in the absence of the European Union in general, real political and economic sovereignty of European countries in today’s globalized world, which is characterized by the dominance of large territorial states with large populations?
1. Process of Federalization of European Communities and European Union The original problem of equalizing the European Communities and the European Union with international organizations In theory, there was an opinion according to which the European Communities of the regional international organization were responsible for the development of economic cooperation between the member states.3 Other scholars have expressed somewhat more nuanced opinion, bearing in mind the specific features of the institutional system of the Communities in terms of the existence of the European Parliament which includes people directly elected in the Member States and the Commissions which consist of experts as international officials, while the Communities are international organizations with supranational characteristics.4
3 R. Đurović, Međunarodno privredno pravo (International economic law), Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1997, p. 93, etc. 4 V. Dimitrijević, R. Stojanović, Međunarodni odnosi (International relations), Beograd, 1988, p. 130; O. Račić, V. Dimitrijević, Međunarodne organizacije, IV edition, 1988, pp. 17–18.
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This position was actually based on the perception underlining some of the characteristics of the institutional setup of the European Communities. In the previous presentation, it was noted that the European Communities were, as is today the European Union, established by an international agreement as an instrument of public international law. Treaties on Establishing were concluded by the Member States in accordance with the rules and procedures of public international law which involve negotiations of authorized representatives of states, signing of treaties and their ratification. Amendments to the Memorandums of Association were also marked with the interstate negotiations within the Intergovernmental Conferences of Member States. In addition, the advocates of equalization of the Communities and the Union with an international organization had in mind that the Member States did not lose their sovereignty and that the decision-making body in the institutional system of the Communities was the Council at which representatives of the Member States (Ministers of State), who negotiated and voted on the basis of instructions from national governments, were present. Furthermore, the original European Communities did not have the traditional competences that were at disposal of federal states in the field of foreign affairs, defence, justice and home affairs, but only in economy. For the implementation of the acquis communautaire, the national state apparatus was competent.5 Although at first glance, the convincing previously exposed arguments about the nature of the European Communities and the European Union did not sufficiently take into account the historical context in which the European integration process was launched, its essential goals, the possibility of expanding the competences of the European Communities and the European Union as well as federal potential that was embedded in the institutional provisions of the Treaty Establishing the European Community and the Union.
1.1. Historical roots of the European process of federalization In understanding the nature of the institutional system of the European Communities and the European Union, we need to consider the historical context in which these entities occurred. Due to the devastating effects of World War I and II on the peoples and countries of Europe, already in 1946 the idea of creating a federal relationship between the European states appeared which resulted in the establishment of more pro-European organizations and movements.6 However, due to disagreements of the UK with the European federal concept, in, 1949 the
5 S. Hiks, Politički sistem Evropske unije, Službeni glasnik (Political system of the European Union), Beograd, 2007, p. 55. 6 D. Siđanski, Federalistička budućnost Evrope (Federalist future of Europe), Prosveta, Beograd, 1996, p. 41, etc.
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Council of Europe was established as a typical international organization authorized to develop cooperation between the Member States in the field of human rights, criminal and civil law, and culture.7 Decisions of the Council of Europe (Committee of Ministers) were brought on the basis of the consent of all representatives of States which respected the sovereignty of the state as one of the core principles on which the international public law was based. Experience with the Council of Europe showed, however, that the concept of cooperation within international organizations could not meet the needs and ambitions of European countries and it was because no international organization established on the European soil was able to guarantee peace, nor to internationally develop and promote European countries both in the economic and in political field. In order to become an equal partner with world powers like the United States or Russia, it was necessary for European countries to build stronger relationships between each other and institutionalize a joint appearance. Therefore, in the declaration of French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman from 1950 when the European Coal and Steel Community was founded, inter alia, he stated that “putting coal and steel production under the joint competences of the High Authority, whose decisions bind France, Germany and other countries acceding, was the first station to the European Federation necessary for the preservation of peace. ”8 From the foregoing it follows that the founders of the European Coal and Steel Community were actually aware that the integration in the field of heavy industry was just the first step in an ambitious process of building a specific European federal structure as well as the expansion of powers of European institutions in the field of economy and to other areas was part of the long-term development strategies. Historically, this expansion of competences was not straight, but was marked by ups and downs. For example, the draft agreement on the European defence and political community from 1953 was rejected, because at that point it was too ambitious due to competence areas of new communities (defence, foreign and home affairs) and the expressed characteristics of federal political institutions of the European Union.9 However, this failure did not stop the process of the European integration because already in 1957, the European Economic Community was founded with a mission to establish a common European market, which referred to all types of industrial and agricultural products.10 With the establishment of the European Union,
7 Ph. M. Defarges, Les institutions europeennes (European institutions), Armand colin, Paris, 1998, p. 14. 8 J. Boulouis, Droit institutionnel de L’ Union eurpeenne (European Union institutional law), Montchrestien, 5 edition, Paris, 1995, p. 15. 9 Ph. Manin, L’ Union europeenne (The European Union), Pedone, Paris, 2005, p. 34 and further on. 10 Le traite de Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam e Nice, textes comapres (Treaties of Rome, Amsterdam and Nice, texts compared) , La documentation frnacaise, edtion 2002.
139 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century according to the Treaty of Maastricht from 1993, the competences of the newly created European Union expanded into the field of foreign affairs and defence and justice and home affairs,11 by which the Union at least apparently covers the fields of action of a federal state. This appearance of federalism, however, stemmed from the fact that in the area of foreign affairs and defence and justice and home affairs, institutional mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation were still used.12 In these areas, a key role was played by intergovernmental bodies such as the European Council and the Council of Ministers under whose auspices decisions were made unanimously as the Commission and the European Parliament remained on the margins of the decision-making process. By the Treaty on European Union of Maastricht, another important step was made toward federalization of the EU in the monetary sphere.13 In this sense, the programme was set for a period of several years for the introduction of the single European currency into circulation, which would abolish the national ones. In addition, the establishment of the European Central Bank was provided, which would manage the single European currency. The process in question was a substantial transfer of economic sovereignty from the Member States to the EU institutions. In addition, the Treaty of Maastricht established the citizenship of the European Union14 and on its basis citizens still enjoy certain rights such as the right to freedom of movement and work in its territory, the right to vote in elections for the European Parliament, the right to participate in local elections in the Member State in which they reside, or the right to diplomatic protection on the territory of the third countries. According to the Treaty of Lisbon from 2009 concerning the European Union and the functioning of the European Union, the Union was awarded new federal properties. By that time, the complex internal structure of the Union, which was based on three pillars, i.e. on the communities in which economic integration was performed, the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Cooperation in justice and home affairs, was replaced by the assumption that the European Union as a single entity of the European integration was active in the field of economy (the completion of the internal market), the Common Foreign and Security Policy and cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs. Thus, the European Community, within the framework of which from 1957, economic integration of the Member States was going on, ceased to exist. The Treaty of Lisbon also made a clear division of competences between the Union and the Member States.15 In
11 L. Cartou, J. L. Clergerie, A. Gruber, P. Rambaud, L’ Union europeenne (The European Union), Dalloz-precis, 6 edition, Paris, 2006, pp. 55-56. 12 Ph. Manin, L’ Union europeenne (The European Union), Pedone, Paris, 2005, p. 51. 13 Ph. Manin, L’ Union europeenne (The European Union), Pedone, Paris, 2005, p. 51. 14 The former Article 17 of the Treaty on the European Union. 15 I Chapter of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union.
140 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century addition, the Lisbon Treaty recognized the status of a legal person to the European Union, i.e. full legal capacity to enter into treaties with other states and international organizations.16 Thus, the European Union acquires the abilities of federal states like the United States or the Russian Federation to participate fully in international relations. The Lisbon Treaty provides for the expansion of regulatory actions by applying the ordinary legislative procedure (adoption of normative acts at the proposal of the Commission in the European Parliament and the Council which shall decide by qualified majority) in the field of justice and home affairs.17 Moreover, the EU is given the authority to establish a special police unit to assist the national border police in the border monitoring.18 The Lisbon Treaty provides for federalization of cooperation between the Member States in the field of justice and home affairs as it introduces a normative operation of institutions of the Union in this area through the regular legislative process, i.e. through enactment of legislation at the Commission’s proposal with their vote in the European Parliament and the Council which shall decide by a qualified majority. It refers primarily to the harmonization of national standards and the establishment of minimum rules in the field of civil and criminal law (definition of certain offenses, the harmonization of rules of procedure) as well as police cooperation.19 In order to combat offenses that threaten the financial interests of the Union, according to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, the Lisbon Council is primarily responsible for issuing a decree establishing the „European prosecution by applying the special legislative procedure20 which starts from the composition of Eurojust.”21 If in this matter there is no consensus in the Council, nine Member States may initiate enhanced cooperation22 leading to the establishment of the European Prosecutor’s Office. European prosecution would be in charge, if necessary, of cooperating with Europol in investigating, prosecuting and before a competent judicial authority for accusing persons who have committed acts of endangering the financial interests of the Union as they are determined by regulations approved for this purpose.
16 Article 47 of the Treaty on the European Union. 17 V Chapter of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. 18 Article 77 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. 19 Chapers 82, 87 and 88 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. 20 The Council decides by consensus after confirmation of the Regulation by the European Parliament. 21 Article 86 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union. 22 Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the European Union.
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1.2. Process of Federalization of the Institutional System of the European Union In theory, there is a perception of European federalism as a process which as such is different from the understanding of Federation as a state.23 The model of federal federalism is characterized by constitutional precision, legal simplicity and strict political mandatories. The model of dynamic federalism is, however, characterized by the coexistence of political communities that co-exist as autonomous entities united in a common order to preserve independence. Regardless of the theoretical debates, analyses of the causes of the emergence and development of the institutional system of the European Union points to the existence of its process of federalization. The reason why the European Communities and the European Union differ significantly from the international organizations lies in the organization of the European institutional system. The institutional system of the Community envisages the establishment of the Commission as a supranational institution whose members are autonomous and legally independent of the Member States. The Commission, like governments in the States, has the authority to propose legislative acts. However, in contrast to the national governments, the Commission was unable to make the executive acts that complement and clarify the legal acts, unless it was not the duty entrusted by the Council.24 Under the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, by legislative acts of the EU, the Commission can be delegated executive powers i.e. the right to, by its acts that are not legislative, complete or in part, amend the elements of the legislative act that are not essential.25 In the institutional system of the Communities, the decision-making body was the Council as a typical interstate institution that brought together ministers i.e. representatives of the governments of the Member States.26 However, the evolution of the institutional system went in the direction of expanding the area where decisions in the Council are brought by a qualified majority at the expense of the unanimous decision27, thus relativizing state sovereignty. With the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009, decision-making by a qualified majority in the Council became the rule and unanimity the exception.28 The most striking example of federalization of the
23 S. Samardžić, Evropska unija kao model nadnacionalne zajednice (The European Union as a model of supranational community), Institut za evropske studije, Edicija Analize, Beograd, 1998, pp. 51-53. 24 Former Article 211 of the Treaty of the European Community. 25 Article 290 Paragraph 1 of the Treaty on Functionon of the European Union. 26 Article 16 of the Treaty on the European Union. 27 J. Rideau, Droit institutionnel de l’ Union et des communautes europeennes (European Communities and European Union institutional law), LGDJ, 4 edition, Paris, 2002, p. 337. 28 Article 16 Paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the European Union.
142 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century institutional system of the Communities and the Union can be seen in terms of the evolution in the way the appointment and responsibilities of the European Parliament. In this institution, members of national parliaments of the member states were initially delegated, but the agreement on the European Economic Community’s decision was envisaged as temporary.29 Since 1979, the process of direct election of the members of the European Parliament has been used in general parliamentary elections to be held in the Member States, which has strengthened the democratic legitimacy of the institution.30 Given that its deputies get political legitimacy directly from the people, the European Parliament has intensified pressure on the Member States to give it the competences which is available to the Parliaments in federal states. The problem was that it was originally under contract to the European Economic Community that the Parliament had only an advisory role.31 However, the institution in question consistently fought for the expansion of its powers. So in the 1970s, the European Parliament gained competences in the budget sphere,32 and in the 1980s it earned the right to issue consent for the admission of new member states to the Community and to the conclusion of the Association Agreement. With the adoption of the EU Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, the European Parliament became the authority that approved the Council to conclude the most significant international agreements in the field of economy. However, what is more important, with the Treaty of Maastricht, this institution acquired competences of the legislative co-decision-making with the Council in the adoption of legislative acts.33 In this way, the legislative process in the area of economy has taken federal characteristics. Today, the process of adopting legislative acts of the Union is even closer to the federal model in sense that a kind of European government (Commission) proposes legislative acts to the council of people (European Parliament) and the council of states (Council).34 However, in order to adopt this act, the consent of both chambers is required, which moves away from the federal model where the council of people typically has the final say in the legislative process.
29 L. Cartou, J. L. Clergerie, A. Gruber, P. Rambaud, L’ Union europeenne (The European Union), Dalloz-precis, 6 edition, Paris, 2006, p. 133; Ph. Manin, L’ Union europeenne (The European Union), Pedone, Paris, 2005, p. 298. 30 The Act on election of representatives into the European Parliament in direct elections with a general right to vote, 20.9.1976, JOCE n. L 278, 28.10.1976. 31 D. Simon, Le systeme juridique communautaire (The Community legal system), PUF, 3 edition, Paris, 2001, p. 227. 32 D. Simon, Le systeme juridique communautaire (The Community legal system), PUF, 3 edition, Paris, 2001, p. 227. 33 Former Article 251 of the Treaty on the European Community. 34 Article 289 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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The legislative activity of the Union in the economic sphere has been very extensive particularly in the field of harmonization of production and environmental standards. In the 1990s, the European Union brought on average more than one hundred twenty regulations per year taking into account only the regulations and directives, not counting decisions.35 The highlight of the legislative activity took place between 1987 and 1993, when over three hundred legislations were adopted aiming at ending the creation of the internal market. Some scholars estimate that the EU sets over 80 per cent of the rules that govern the production, distribution and exchange of goods, services and capital on the markets of the Member States.36
1.3. The Tacit Extension of Competences of Community/Union Institutions Since it has been launched, the process of European integration has been characterized by the fact that, in the federalist spirit, more and more new areas regulated by the Member States have been transferred to the Community institutions and the European Union. Historically, the expansion of the competences of the European Communities and the European Union took place on two grounds. It had its legal form in changes in the Memorandums of Association on the one hand, but there was also a silent expansion of competences on the basis of the interpretation of the provisions of the Memorandums of Association or by case law of the Court of Justice, on the other. Thus, there was an expansion of Community competences under Article 308 of the Treaty on the European Community. The Community was obliged to act “within the competences assigned to it and the goals addressed to it by the Treaty on establishing.”37 However, the Article 308 of the Treaty on the European Community38 envisaged that “when Community action appears as necessary in order to achieve, within the context of the functioning of the common market, one of its goals without the contract predicting competences for that purpose, the Council by a unanimous decision, at the Commission’s proposal and the consultation with the European Parliament, adopted the necessary measures. ” This provision actually meant that the Community competences were not rigidly defined, but could be adapted to the needs and circumstances. However, the sovereignty of the states was still protected if we bear in mind that this type of the Community action for the purpose of achieving the necessary goals required a
35 S. Hiks, Politički sistem Evropske unije (Political system of the European Union), Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2007, p. 88. 36 S. Hiks, Politički sistem Evropske unije (Political system of the European Union), Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2007, p. 25. 37 Former Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Community. 38 Originally, Article 235 of the Treaty on the European Economic Community.
144 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century unanimous vote of all Ministers of the Member States in the Council. Nevertheless, at the beginning the Article 308 of the Treaty on European Community was extensively used,39 which led to the expansion of the Community competences besides formal changes of the Memorandum of Association at the intergovernmental conferences of the Member States. Thus, in practice, by the laws of the Council, common policies had been established before they were codified by the changes of the Memorandums of Association such as environmental policy, regional policy and consumer protection.40 In addition, the Council decided on increasing the borrowing capacity or the creation of new bodies such as the Regional Development Fund and certain agencies. The jurisprudence of the Court of Justice contributed to the expansion of the Community competences. The Court of Justice applied the theory present in public international law on the interpretation of the norms of international agreements in the function “of efficiency.“41 The fact is that the standard text should not be interpreted literally as it follows, but in the function of its final objectives. In relation to this, the problem could be caused by the fact that the Treaties on Establishing the Communities explicitly assigned and counted the competences. Regardless of the previously disclosed fact, the Court of Justice, however, decided to use the theory of the “beneficial effects“. Thus, the Court held that although the Treaty on the European Economic Community did not give it competences in the area of criminal law, partial harmonization of the national criminal legislation was allowed for the effective exercise of common environmental policy. Thus, the institutions of the Communities can normatively regulate a particular area, not only when it is expressly provided for under the provisions of the Memorandums of Association, but also when it is necessary to achieve a standard that is expressly provided for in the Treaty. In the area of foreign affairs, in the sense of international economic relations, since the European Economic Community was only in charge of economy, the problem was that according to the provisions of the Memorandums of Association the Community was given very specific competences (tariff and commercial agreements,42 association agreements43). Therefore, the Court of Justice developed the thesis of “tacit (implied) ” competences of the Community. In the judgment of 31 March
39 A. Berramdane, J. Rossetto, Droit de l’ Union europeenne (European Union law), LGDJ, 2 edition, Paris, 2013, p. 228. 40 G. Isaac, M. Blanquet, Droit general de l’ Union europeenne (European Union law), Sirey, 10 edition, Paris, 2012, p. 77. 41 B. Alomar, S. Daziano, Th. Lambert, J. Sorin, Grandes questions europeennes (Big European questions), Sedes, 3 edition, Paris, 2013, p. 114. 42 Former Article 113 and 114 of the Treaty on the European Economic Community. 43 Former Article 238 of the Treaty on the European Economic Community.
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1971,44 the Court of Justice pointed out that Community competences did not derive only from the powers expressly assigned to by the Memorandum of Association. Foreign policy powers can derive from the laws that were enacted by the Community institutions in the framework of the implementation of the provisions of the Memorandum of Association, especially when it comes to achieving the established common policies. Once the community has certain common rules in order to achieve a common policy, the Member States neither individually nor collectively can contract obligations with third countries which are in conflict with these rules. Here, the Court of Justice actually draws a parallel between the internal and external competences of the Community explaining that the common rules adopted in exercising the common policies are of such a nature as to justify the international competences of the Community in the same area.45 In legal practice in the mid-1970s46 the Court of Justice went further because it emphasized that the foreign policy competences of the Community were an automatic extension of the competences of the Interior,47 and that, if necessary, its international operation would not have been necessary if an internal legislative activity had been previously undertaken in this area. In this case, therefore, the Member States are practically deprived of their foreign policy competences for the conclusion of international agreements in specific areas by provisions of the original contract. Finally, the expansion of the Community competences appeared in a function of a well-functioning “internal market“. Expanding the Community competences was especially expressed with the adoption of the Single European Act in 1989. Specifically, with this agreement it was provided that the Council was competent to adopt measures for the approximation of the laws of the Member States whose aim was the establishment and functioning of the “internal market“.48 Approximation of laws of the Member States at the Community level was needed to prevent national interference of free movement and sale of goods or the right to cross-border provision of services that evolved due to national differences in regulations on the quality of production or packing of goods, of environmental standards and the like. In this regard, at the Commission’s proposal about three hundred of most detailed precise legal texts were adopted that had to provide a well-functioning internal market in terms of achieving free movement of goods
44 CJCE, 31.03.1971, AETR, aff. 22/70, Rec. 263. 45 A. Berramdane, J. Rossetto, Droit de l’ Union europeenne (European Union law), LGDJ, 2 edition, Paris, 2013, p. 231. 46 CJCE, 14.07.1976, Kramer; CJCE, 26.04.1977, avis 1/76, Rec. 741. 47 D. Simon, Le systeme juridique communautaire (The Community legal system), PUF.droit, 3 edition, Paris, 2001, p. 144. 48 Former Article 95 Paragraph 1 of the Treaty on the European Community.
146 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century and freedom to provide services.49 Such normative precision narrowed the freedom of interpretation of the Community legislation as well as a choice of ways to get on with the implementation by the Member States authorities. Moreover, the notion of a well-functioning internal market gave the Community the opportunity to regulate areas that were not initially foreseen in the Treaty. Originally, the domain of culture was in the competences of the states; however, when cultural products became subject to commercialization (e.g. audio-visual rights) they entered in the realization of the internal market, i.e. acquis communautaire. In addition, an abortion could be seen through the freedom to provide medical services within the Community or professional sport in terms of freedom of movement of workers. The Member States had the impression that the field of application of Community law could spread endlessly, given that the most human activities had their economic aspect and were therefore, related to the good functioning of the internal market.50 For the sovereignty of states an additional threat was the fact that the norms of harmonization of national legislation for the purpose of the internal market were adopted at the Commission’s proposal by a qualified majority in the Council with the consent of the European Parliament or currently according to the regular legislative process as called in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009.
2. Contemporary crisis of development of European Federalism 2.1. The absence of deepening European integration processes Increase in the number of Member States has traditionally been associated with the deepening of the European integration process.51 Thus, the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal during the 1980s was accompanied by the completion of the European internal market and the formalization of cooperation between the Member States in the field of foreign affairs. Entering of Sweden, Austria and Finland was preceded by the creation of the European Union in 1993 by the Treaty of Maastricht which received competences in the fields of economy, foreign affairs and justice and home affairs as well as in the fields of a single currency and a central bank. However, it was noticeable that the entry of ten countries of Eastern Europe into the EU in 2004 and 2007 was not completed with stronger federalization, or a
49 A. Berramdane, J. Rossetto, Droit de l’ Union europeenne (European Union law), LGDJ, 2 edition, Paris, 2013, 232. 50 J.-P- Jacque, Droit institutionnel de l’ Union europeenne (European Union institutional law), Dalloz collection Cours, 2 edition, Paris, 2003, 141; B. Alomar, S. Daziano, Th. Lambert, J. Sorin, Grandes questions europeennes (Big European questions), Sedes, 3 edition, Paris, 2013, 177. 51 Bruno Alomar, Sebastien Daziano, Thomas Lambert, Julien Sorin, Grandes questions europeennes (Big European questions), SEDES, 3 edition, Paris, 2013, p. 471.
147 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century substantial reform of the institutional system of the European Union. The latter was still resting on the same principles, as was the case with the Treaty on the European Economic Community from 1957, even though the number of members increased from 6 to 27, with the accession of Croatia in 2013 to 28. The absence of deepening integration has several causes. First of all, it should be noted that in spite of certain federal properties the European Union did not become federal, but remained a union of sovereign states. Although the sovereignty of the States has for decades been curtailed in various fields (editing of functioning of the internal market, monetary union, international economic relations, justice and home affairs) it seems that it has come to a certain point when they no longer accept their competences to be decreased, especially in the tacit way through the legislative activity of the European institutions. An important break with the federal supranational concept of gradual transfer of competencies the UK has made in reaching agreement on the European Union Maastricht Treaty in 199352 followed by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999.53 Bearing in mind that a gradual but steady transfer of authority was exerted from the Member States to the Community and the Union at one moment very sensitive areas closely related to national sovereignty came to light. This is, for example, the monetary competence or competences related to the oversight of national borders and migration flows.54 In this regard, the United Kingdom refused to give up its national currency and participate in creating “euro” as a common European currency under the authority of the European Central Bank as a federal authority.55 Britain has opted for “opting out“ formula when it comes to border control and the application of the Schengen acquis, which is envisaged by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999.56 That was the first time that a uniform deepening of the integration process in all Member States was given up, this also including the emergence of the practice of asymmetric integration or “multi-speed Europe. ” This decision of the United Kingdom has led to a gap in the integration between the Member States which threatens to deepen among them. In addition, one should take into account that the holder of the federalist integration process was the Paris-Berlin axis and in the last fifteen years, there has not been any impressive Franco-German initiative in the field of European
52 Les traites de Rome, Maastricht, Amsterdam et Nice – textes compares (Treaties of Rome, Amsterdam and Nice, texts compared), La documentation Francaise, Paris, 2002. 53 Georges Berthu, Dominique Souchet, Le traite d’ Amsterdam, contre la democratie (The Treaty of Amsterdam against democracy), O.E.I.L., Francois-Xavier de Guibert, Paris, 1998. 54 Michel Clapie, Manuel des institutions europeennes (The textbook of European institutions), Flammarion, 3 edition, Paris, 2010, p. 26. 55 Guy Isaac, Marc Blanquet, Droit general de l’ Union europeenne (European Union law), Sirey, 10 edition, Paris, 2012, p. 11.; Philippe Manin, L’ Union europeenne, Pedone, N 6, Paris, 2005, p. 48. 56 Jean Paul Jacque, Droit institutionnel de L’ Union europeenne (European Union institutional law), Dalloz, 5 edition, Paris, 2009, p. 174.
148 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century integration. Perhaps the reason for that lies in the fact that even for France, regarding the level of the assigned state sovereignty especially in the economic field, it has become too problematic to continue in the same direction.
2.2. Curbing the spread of competence of institutions of the European Union The Treaty of Lisbon has also shown for the first time the systematization of competences of the European Union. These are the areas in which the European Union is exclusively competent in areas where there is a division of competences between the Union and the Member States as well as those areas where the EU can only support the activity of its members. The Treaty of Lisbon, however, has limited the scope of “spillover” in the areas of competitive and divided competences between the Union and the Member States. It is by the legislative actions in these areas that the Union has gradually extinguished national competences in an irreversible manner. It was thought that as soon as the Union acted normatively in a certain area of the divided competences, it could no longer be returned to the competences of the Member States.57 The Treaty of Lisbon tends to prevent this kind of understanding that produces overflow in favour of the Union. In this context, one should bear in mind the “Protocol No.25 on the performance of divided competences, ” which specifies that when the Union launches action in a particular field, the field of application of the exercise of competences only covers elements arranged by the Act of the Union and does not cover all other areas. This narrow interpretation of the contents of the Act of the Union is used to prevent an entire area move to its competence. More importantly, the Lisbon Treaty provides for the regression and restores areas of divided competences of the European Union Member States. Thus, Article 2, Paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union predicts that in areas of divided competences “Member States shall again exercise their competences to the extent that the Union has failed or has decided to cease to perform its own.” This can happen for example in the case the Union has decided to lift the legislative act in order to respect the principle of proportionality and subsidiarity better.58 In this regard, the Council is authorized to request the Commission to submit a proposal for the abrogation of the legal act of the Union.59
57 G. Isaac, M. Blanquet, Droit general de l’ Union europeenne(European Union law), Sirey, 10 edition, Paris, 2012, 86. 58 A. Berramdane, J. Rossetto, Droit de l’ Union europeenne (European Union law), LGDJ, 2 edition, Paris, 2013, 237; G. Isaac, M. Blanquet, Droit general de l’ Union europeenne, Sirey, 10 edition, Paris, 2012, 86. 59 Article 241 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
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In this context a new interpretation of the principles of subsidiarity should be considered, which was entered into agreements establishing the European Union Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 and used to regulate the use of competences of institutions of the European Union. In the opinion of some authors, this principle has its source in the doctrine of the Catholic Church, which was guided by the presumption that it is detrimental to the social order to take away the competences of lower authorities to entrust them with a wider collectivity, or a higher, if the first could not fulfil the function itself.60 So, the principle is based on the concept that editing should be done at as closest possible level to the citizens.61 Today, according to the Treaty on European Union enacted in Lisbon 2009, Article 5, paragraph 3 states: In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, in areas that are not within its exclusive competence, the Union acts only if and to the extent to which the Member States cannot achieve the discussed goals of action in a satisfactory manner, both at the central and at the regional and local level, and if out of reasons of size and effects of the discussed action, this may be better achieved at the Union level. From the above-mentioned we see that by the Treaty of Lisbon, the ability to edit the Union in the areas of divided competences is in regression. The competence of the Member States is practically set as a rule whereas the powers of the Union are highly complex. The Union must prove that because of the size and effect of this action it is more able to achieve it in relation not only to the central but also to the regional and local levels of the government. This is declining relative to the former European Community Treaty which established a sort of competition between actions of the Community and the Member States, in the sense that the Community was empowered to regulate a particular area if its action was effective, even though the action of the Member States was sufficient.62 In the Treaty of Lisbon, the criterion of locating the exercise of power shall be construed so as not to seek the most efficient, but the lowest effective levels of governance. Finally, Article 48, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes the possibility that under a normal procedure of amendments to the Memorandum of Association, the competences of the European Union are diminished. This has brought into question the principle of federal non-refundable transfer of competences from the Member States to the
60 A. Berramdane, J. Rossetto, Droit de l’ Union europeenne (European Union law), LGDJ, 2 edition, Paris, 2013, 239; B. Alomar, S. Daziano, Th. Lambert, J. Sorin, Grandes questions europeennes, Sedes, 3 edition, Paris, 2013, 177. 61 J-L. Sauron, Comprendre le traite de Lisbonne (Understanding the Treaty of Lisbon), Gualino editeur, Paris, 2008, p. 58; J. Rideau, Droit institutionnel de L’ Union et des communautees europeennes, L.G.D.J., Paris 1994, p. 406 etc. 62 G. Isaac, M. Blanquet, Droit general de l’ Union europeenne (European Union law), Sirey, 10 edition, Paris, 2012, 92.
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European Union institutions. Finally, the Treaty of Lisbon tends to limit the opportunities of EU institutions in order to, using Article 352 of the Treaty on its functioning, adapt their competences for activities they deem necessary at any given moment. From the foregoing, we see that the reforms carried out in Lisbon in 2009 actually open up the possibility of regression of the competences of the European Union.
3.3. The crisis of European Federalism because of the lack of legitimacy of democratic institutions of the European Union The assignment of new responsibilities to EU institutions in Brussels has become controversial because it is considered that the latter have a lack of democratic legitimacy. Specifically, citizens see them as distant technocratic bodies that do not have a native support of the people. Therefore, in the context of further transfer of competences to the European Union, it is necessary to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the European authorities. In this regard, in his speech to the European Parliamentarians on 12 September 201263 on the state of the Union, President of the Commission Jose Manuel Barroso said that this had to go in a different direction and adopt a different philosophy in the future which would be adapted to the new world in the making. Globalization is seeking an increase of European unity through greater integration, but the latter is caused by strengthening of the European democracy and democratization of the institutional system of the European Union. In a world that is in full transformation in order to preserve interests of European countries, the EU needs to become a serious player on the global level. So, Barroso gives examples that reflect the speed and scope of the current transformation. In the 20th century, a state of ten to fifteen million people could be a world power, but today the largest European states seem insignificant compared to the United States or China. Historical processes are accelerated, so it took the UK one hundred and fifty-five years to double its internal gross domestic product, the United States fifty, and China only fifteen years. Therefore, Barroso believes that it is necessary to strengthen the economic union in terms of full completion of the internal European market. Also, it is necessary to reform the labour market towards a balance between flexibility and security as well as the creation of a real European labour market and opportunities for every citizen of the Union to easily find a job in another Member State. However, Barroso also believes that it is in the interests of the Member States to harmonize their tax policies. Thus, the President of the Commission points out that the EU budget should be “ambitious” – facing investments, economic growth, research and modernization of agriculture. Also, the President of the Commission
63 Internet, 17.09.2012., http://www.europa.eu, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, discours sur l’ etat de L’ Union.
151 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century believes that the EU really needs an efficient government and an adequate budget that would produce economic results emerging from the crisis. In addition, Barroso believes that the existing European institutional system should not be changed, but we should use the existing institutions, i.e. the Commission and the European Parliament and strengthen their democratic legitimacy and authority. In this sense, Barroso is committed to strengthening the European political parties, because so far, the political debate has been at the national level. Thus, in the elections for the European Parliament, there would be European political parties nominated which would in advance highlight their candidates for President of the Commission and that could be from the parliamentary elections in 2014. Finally, Barroso suggests that the EU should evolve towards democratic “federation of nation states” that would address the growing nationalism and populism in Europe. The institutions of the European Federation (the European Parliament and the Commission) would have larger and deeper competences in the economic and monetary sphere. These reforms require the adoption of a new treaty in the field of European integration that would change the existing one, which in turn, implies the consent of those Member States that oppose to the federal structure of the European Union.
3.4. The absence of federalization of the European Union in the field of foreign affairs and defence Establishing and structuring cooperation between the Member States of the European Union in the field of foreign affairs, security and defence is an undoubted success if we bear in mind that those are the fields that most interfere in the state sovereignty. This collaboration enables the Member States to coordinate their activities in the international arena and to promote the values they are devoted to, like the promotion of peace, democracy and human rights. The same cooperation enabled the conclusion of several contracts of neighbourly cooperation with the countries of North Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, Israel, and the Palestinian Authority) and the countries of Eastern Europe (Ukraine and Moldova).64 It is evident that with every change of the Memorandum of Association the cooperation in the field of foreign affairs and defence gets a stronger and more efficient form. The Treaty of Lisbon from 2009 has improved the institutional mechanisms in this field by strengthening the unified representation of the interests of the Union in the international arena by introducing the function of permanent President of the European Council and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also the Vice President of the Commission. This last feature has established
64 B. Alomar, S. Daziano, Th. Lambert, J. Sorin, Grandes questions europeennes (Big European questions), Sedes, 3 edition, Paris, 2013, p. 462.
152 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century an institutional link between the Council and the Commission in determining the areas in question. In performing the functions of the High Representative of the Union, the diplomatic service in charge of foreign policy activities provides help. The Service is made up of officials from the departments of the Secretariat of the Council and the Commission and the Member States diplomatic officials sent to the diplomatic service of the European Union.65 Office of the European Union in question operates in cooperation with diplomatic services of the Member States. In addition, the EU has been given the status of a legal entity that allows it to conclude international agreements, not only in the economic, as has been the case so far, but also in the field of foreign policy and defence. However, one should not lose sight of those modest achievements because it is the institutional mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation that exclude the possibility of establishing and maintaining a uniform policy and the efficient use of the characteristic of a federal state. Historically, the European decisions on a common approach to international problems were often pale, belated and with no impact on the foreign policy events as they reflected a compromise between various interests of the Member States.66 In crisis situations, however, it has been difficult to articulate them due to the diametrically opposed views of the Member States. Thus, for example, in the early 1990s the German government supported the secession of Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia,67 while France and Britain indicated that their premature recognition without addressing the issue of succession and the rights of minorities could have catastrophic consequences. As Germany unilaterally recognized Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991,68 France and the United Kingdom in January 1992 in the name of “European unity“, that is, in order not to have mined the establishment of the European Union, within which a common foreign and security policy was to be developed, decided to follow it, thus actually meeting the German expectations.69 In the opinion of the then Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the U.S. State Warren Christopher and France Alain Dumas, and according to the analysis of some French authors, Germany bears a major responsibility for
65 Article 27 Paragraph 3 of the Treaty on the European Union. 66 G. Berthu, D. Souchet, Le traite d’ Amsterdam contre la democratie (The Treaty of Amsterdam against democracy), Liberte politique, Paris, 1988, p. 231. 67 G. Berthu, D. Souchet, Le traite d’ Amsterdam contre la democratie (The Treaty of Amsterdam against democracy), Liberte politique, Paris, 1988, p. 221; Ph. Moreau Defarges, Les institutions europeennes, Armand Colind, 3 edition, Paris, 1998, p. 180. 68 M. Clapie, Manuel d’ institutions europeennes (The textbook of European institutions), Flammarion, 3 edtion, Paris, 2010, p. 165. 69 M. Clapie, Manuel d’ institutions europeennes (The textbook of European institutions), Flammarion, 3 edtion, Paris, 2010, p. 165.
153 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the burning wick of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia.70 On the other hand, although the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina took place on the European soil, the European Union lacked a clearly defined position towards it and the solution was found in 1995, under the auspices of the United States, on the American soil at a military base in Dayton.71 For other crisis situations however, there was no European approval and therefore, there was no possibility of adopting common positions and coordinated performance in the area of foreign policy. For example, France and Germany opposed to the military intervention of the United States in Iraq, which was launched on 20 March 2003, what was on the other hand, supported by the United Kingdom, Spain and Italy and some candidate countries for the accession to the European Union at that time such as Poland, the Czech Republic or Hungary. It is not surprising that by the European Union Treaty of Lisbon from 2009 yet another attempt was made to strengthen the joint action of the Member States in the field of foreign and security policy. In connection with the above the essential question raises – can the interest of the Union on the international level in general correspond to the sum of the interests of the Member States? If we assume that the Union has its own foreign policy interests that should be effectively represented in international relations, then it would also need federal authorities, or the president or the government that would act in accordance with the guidelines of the European Parliament. This would substantially compromise the sovereignty of the Member States in the field of foreign policy and defence and those are domains which the states consider to belong to their competences by nature. In the field of security and defence, there have undoubtedly been made steps forward. Since 2000, the European Union and their forces have participated in military and civilian operations around the world. However, one should take into account that the European Union does not have a single defence protecting their own territory, but the defence strategies are different from state to state and ultimately the security of the European continent is guaranteed by the NATO. The latter is not surprising since the EU does not have a single foreign policy on which the security policy actually depends. Besides the lack of a common concept of security and defence, the members of the European Union do not allocate sufficient funds for armament. In this regard, it should be noted that the United States has set aside 4.5 per cent of GDP for military purposes, which amounts to about half of all global spending for defence. The most important military members of the European Union, Britain and France set aside
70 Ibid; G. Berthu, D. Souchet, Le traite d’ Amsterdam contre la democratie (The Treaty of Amsterdam against democracy), Liberte politique, Paris, 1988, p. 221. 71 Ph. Moreau Defarges, Les institutions europeennes (European institutions), Armand Colind, 3 edition, Paris, 1998, p. 180.
154 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century only 2.6 and 2.3 per cent of GDP for this purpose, respectively.72 The problem is that European countries do not pool resources for the defence at the level of the Union, but develop their own national defence industries and, for example, produce a variety of combat aircraft (French Rafal British Euro fighter or Swedish Gripen) or even have twenty-three different national programmes for production of combat vehicles. The fact that the European funds do not focus on the budget of the Union leads to a lack of money to win new technologies, i.e. a technological lag in armament compared to the United States or Russia. The Treaty of Lisbon provides solving of this handicap through the action of the European Defence Agency. Common foreign, security and defence policy of the European Union is actually a victim of the lack of clear political vision for its future development. The Union is torn between applying the confederal concept of intergovernmental cooperation that is obviously not efficient to answer the challenges of the modern era and the process of federalization of these areas that are imperative of efficiency, but which at the same time threatens fundamentally the national sovereignty of its Member States.
Conclusion The process of European integration is conditioned by at first glance, two irreconcilable needs and aspirations. In order to respond to modern economic and political challenges, the EU Member States are forced to go in the direction of increasing transfer of their competencies to the European Union as well as to build up an efficient institutional system of the Union with federal characteristics. On the other hand, at the same time members of the Union seek to preserve their national identity and sovereignty. Historically, the expansion of the competences of the European Community and the European Union took place on two grounds. It had its legal form in the shape of changes in the Memorandum of Association on the one hand, but what also happened was a silent expansion of competences on the basis of the interpretation of the provisions of the Memorandum of Association or by case law of the Court of Justice, on the other hand. This process was not terminated by passing the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 if we bear in mind that they were used to make communitarisation in the field of justice and home affairs. The EU institutions were entrusted, from the regular legislative process, with harmonizing laws of the Member States in civil and criminal law. However, the Lisbon Treaty has also some other aspects. In order to prevent spreading of the competences of the
72 B. Alomar, S. Daziano, Th. Lambert, J. Sorin, Grandes questions europeennes (Big European questions), Sedes, 3 edition, Paris, 2013, p. 507.
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Union, the Treaty of Lisbon has for the first time made more precise the systematization of the areas in which the European Union is exclusively competent in the areas where there is a division of competences between the Union and the Member States as well as those areas where the EU can only support the action of its members. They also envisage that some of the areas of divided competences, in which the Union has already acted normatively, return to the competences of the Member States. The Treaty of Lisbon tends to limit the opportunities of EU institutions that by using Article 352 of the Treaty on its functioning adapt their competences for activities they deem necessary at any given moment. In addition, Article 48, paragraph 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union establishes the possibility that under the normal procedure of changing the Agreement, reduce the competences of the European Union. From the foregoing, we see that the reforms carried out in Lisbon in 2009 actually open up opportunities for the regression of the competences of the European Union. In this regard, the question is what has caused this change of direction, opposite to several decades’ long federalist enthusiasm which has been marked by the process of European integration. At the end of the twentieth and in the early twenty first century, fundamental differences in understanding of the future of the European Union have come to the fore. France and Germany are generally committed to the idea of gradually building a European federal state, while the UK wants to see the EU only as a broad area of free trade where there would also be involved the states at the rim of the continent such as Turkey and Ukraine. Despite certain federal properties that the European Union has, it has not become federal, but has remained a union of sovereign states. Although the sovereignty of the states has curtailed in various fields for decades (editing functioning of the internal market, monetary union, international economic relations, justice and home affairs), it seems that it has been arrived to a certain point when these no longer accept that their responsibilities rump, especially the tacit way through the legislative activity of the European institutions. It also should be taken into consideration that the holder of the integration process has been the Paris-Berlin federalist axis in the last fifteen years and that there are some impressive Franco-German initiatives in the field of European integration. Perhaps the reason for that is France, bearing in mind the level of the assigned state sovereignty especially in the economic field it has become too problematic to continue in the same direction. The assignment of new responsibilities to EU institutions in Brussels has become controversial, and therefore, it is considered that they have a lack of democratic legitimacy. Specifically, citizens see them as distant technocratic bodies that do not have the original support of the people. Therefore, in the context of further transfer of competences to the European Union, it is necessary
156 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century to strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the European authorities. In this regard, in his speech to the European Parliamentarians on 12 September 201273 on the state of the Union President of the Commission Jose Manuel Barroso, said that this had to go in a different direction and adopt a different philosophy in the future which would be adapted to the new world in the making. Globalization is seeking an increase of European unity through greater integration, but the latter is caused by strengthening of the European democracy and democratization of the institutional system of the European Union. In addition, Barroso thinks that the existing European institutional system should not be changed, but we should use the existing institutions, i.e. the Commission and the European Parliament and strengthen their democratic legitimacy and authority. In this sense, Barroso is committed to strengthening of European political parties, because so far, the political debate has been at the national level. Thus, in the elections for the European Parliament, there would be European political parties nominated which would highlight in advance their candidates for President of the Commission and that could be at the parliamentary elections in 2014. Finally, Barroso suggests that the EU should evolve towards democratic „federation of nation states“ that would address the growing nationalism and populism in Europe. The institutions of the European Federation (the European Parliament and the Commission) would have larger and deeper competences in the economic and monetary sphere. These reforms require the adoption of a new treaty in the field of European integration that would change the existing one, which in turn implies the consent of those Member States that oppose to the federal structure of the European Union. Institutional arrangements that should achieve the motto of the EU constitution in 2004, which read “United in Diversity” are not given in advance nor can be found on other continents. Due to the historical and cultural specificities of Europe, the above-mentioned has been and will be the result of the creative efforts of several generations.
73 Internet, 17.09.2012., http://www.europa.eu, Jose Manuel Durao Barroso, discours sur l’ etat de L’ Union.
157 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Senad GANIĆ1
EUROPE IN CONFLICT WITH “EUROPE“
Abstract: The matter of the European integrations has long not been a matter exhausted in the common economic, foreign political or internal security-related cooperation. More and more, it becomes a matter of creating a new political entity with the prerogatives of the state. And it is not so much a question of the desire of European nations, as the necessity of survival of Europe as we know in the world being shaped by giant countries. However, on the way from the Community of States to the State Union, Europe is missing something, wich seems to be becoming its biggest problem at the same time. The question is, what is actually Europe? Is it just a geographical reference that denotes the peoples who live in one continent, or is it something more substantial than that? This issue of European identity not only remains open, but becomes a serious controversy that brings phenomena, for which we believed, in modern Europe there is no place for tham. One of those is certainly xenophobia. In this paper, we would like to point out at the possible causes of its occurrence on the Continent, where, in a spectacular way, the unity in diversity is being propagated as the supreme value. But, what kind of diversity we are referring to? We still do not have a clear answer. However, in this paper we, at least refer to that question as a problem per se. Because the questions are, the only way towards finding the answers. Key words: European integrations, European identity, xenophobia.
Instead of Introduction More than a half century has passed since Europe, still vulnerable and unhealed from the consequences of World War II, has gathered strength to unite in a miraculous way around aims that are far beyond any divisions and far beyond any ideology. In this unification, it has shown that the only way to keep permanent peace and stability in the continent is to insist on communion, and its stability depends the rest of the world from. And this communion that should not and must not be inspired by any type of exclusion, but the communion that
1 Senad Ganić, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of International Public Law at State University of Novi Pazar, Serbia.
158 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century means unity of multiplicity. It has meant respecting multiplicities that, in one moment, Europe has succeeded to turn into its own advantage. And indeed, this community of different nations, nations with no borders, united for their mutual aims, has succeeded to turn the area, the continent that in its history passed through great conflicts, wars and devastations, and several times jeopardised physical survival of this part of the planet, into the space that, in a way the countries have being integrated, becomes the example to the rest of the mankind. This European idea of community, however, is not only the idea to be exhausted in cooperation, and has brought to Europe economic benefit and stability and peaceful relations developed strongly from it, of previous antagonistic nations. This community has been built on a lot stronger idea. Onto the idea, where a man with their rights is not only declared, but also risen onto a pedestal of supreme value, where European countries have been ready to sacrifice even the attributes of their own sovereignty. The idea on a man and their rights, becoming a problem of interest to the entire continent now, has not been kept only within the circle of economically strong European countries that make European Union today, but it has become the idea continuing from Ural to the Atlantic. European convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms, we can freely say, is one of the most successful documents we know about. Not only from the reasons of proclaimed rights, and before all, from the reason of mechanisms of their protection, where each right stays only an idea without it, as proclamation with no adequate realisation. It should not be mentioned how much the European system of protection of human rights being developed within the European Council, has changed the way we look at an individual, and the one can appear in the protection of the one’s rights before a super national court vis-á-vis its own country. The individual as such. As a man, as a human, independently of any religion, race or ethos. If we would, however, enumerate all accomplishments of Europe and its contribution of a civilisation we know, we would not succeed, nor is it our intention, since this contribution is immeasurable. More than anything, in this place, we are interested in what is Europe indeed? Is it only a geographical determinant or is it still something more than that? It seems, by the time, a semantic area of the meaning of a term Europe has changed, and it associates more onto a system of values that surpasses a simple geographical determinant. However, in the very place, the idea of Europe becomes blurred. Indeed, it is obvious that European integrations, whose backbone has represented famous three pillars of the European Union after the agreement in Maastricht in 1992,2
2 See: Radoslav Stojanović, Spoljna politika Evropske unije, Dosije, Beograd, 1998, pp. 143–149.
159 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century have not stopped only onto creation of a firm international community. The firmest we know. It seems that integration aims are much higher. Confederal components characterising the European Union certainly tell us onto formation of this sui generis international organisation has not been finished, yet. Not even the confederation itself as a form of a polity, under a condition that we can talk on the European Union as a confederation, is not a permanent, but “a transitional form of countries’ union“.3 If Europe wants a firmer countries’ union, it simply must build this idea onto the reasons related to the issue of a mutual “European identity”. The issue is, however, whether this searching for a particular “European identity” means breaking with values that, in one moment, have indeed made Europe so great and different from the rest of the world.
What is European identity built upon? Lisbon Agreement has tried to compensate a failure of the project of making European Constitution, clearly emphasises that there is a wish, if not among the citizens of Europe, but its greater political leadership, to create an entity provided by an undeniable prerogatives of a state. Perhaps a creation of “United European States”? However, it seems that citizens of Europe, at least according to the referendum results on the European Constitution, in the countries that mean pivots of the European Union, such as France, are not delighted with this idea. Why? The issue is not to give an entire answer to. It is possible, however, that union by itself for Europeans is not a sufficient argument, and we do not recognise in it, what Leibniz would call “sufficient reason”. Namely, countries are made in the values that surpass a simple economic calculation, and are made in a national enthusiasm driven by the ideas stronger than any rational reason.4 These are ideas and values originating from a deep conviction of belonging to a group you completely identify with, and agree to be its part by all your inner instincts. You are even ready to sacrifice yourself for it. Such ideology and the feeling of belonging, however, seem to lack to European nations. The nations that despite numerous mutual aspects still divide different languages, cultures, customs, and finally their history, being pervaded by conflicts in blood, and whose scars still leave open issues and controversies today. It seems, however, that in this lack of a statehood ideology, “European elite” turns towards something to believe to accomplish a desired effect, but whose
3 Ratko Marković, Ustavno pravo i političke institucije, Sluzbeni glasnik, Beograd, 2008, p. 365. 4 Although there are different views emphasizing that national interests of European nations are still in integration, and it still offers economic prosperity, and economy as a basic coherent tissue of European nations; See: Ivan T. Berend, Evropa posle 1980., Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2012, p 306.
160 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century consequences can be extremely harmful. It seems that European auto perception on European-Christian superiority, but also on its exclusively Christian identity that was advocated by Lorimer (James Lorimer) in his time,5 and was believed to be anachronistic and belongs to the past, is being rehabilitated. Indeed, there are more frequent voices on Europe as a community of Christian nations. More frequently, even in the countries where it could not be heard until now, such as Britain, political leadership of these countries call their countries Christian societies. One of such statements is a recent statement by the British Prime Minister David Cameron that it has not only caused disapproval of non- Christian community in the United Kingdom, but it has also been criticised by numerous intellectuals in this country.6 Having reminded that the Prime Minister certainly has his own religious convictions, this group of intellectuals still thinks that such statements do not depict the reality of what the British society is, and thus contribute alienation and divisions in the British society itself.7 On the other side, the rights of others, non-Christian communities undergo a huge issue, and very frequently, even too much, they become the issue of legislation. Such is a case with France,8 or even, the subject of referendum plea, as it is the case with Switzerland that is not a part of the European Union, but it certainly is its economic and cultural part. Thus, in this country, in its referendum that has been organised by an ultimately conservative Populist Party, 59 per cent of Swiss citizens have declared for prohibition of minarets building in the Muslim places of worship in this country.9 It seems that in all stated examples, it has been forgotten onto provisions of some significant international documents, as it is the one from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that states: “Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.“10
5 See: Milenko Kreća, Međunarodno javno pravo, Pravni fakultet u Beogradu, Beograd, 2012, p. 42; See also: J. Lorimer, Principes du droit internatonal, Bruxells, 1885, pp. 65-113. 6 Internet: http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/04/21/david- cameron-says-britain-is-a-christian-country-thats-wrong-even-if-hes-technically-right/, accessed on: 30.06. 2014. 7 Ibid. 8 Internet: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-17824132, accessed on: 01.07.2014. 9 Internet: http://www.vesti-online.com/Vesti/Svet/11023/Svajcarci-zabranili-minarete, accessed on: 20.06.2014. 10 Vidan Hadži-Vidanović i Marko Milanović, Međunarodno javno pravo-zbirka dokumenata, Beogradski centar za ljudska prava, Beograd, 2005, p. 104.
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These are phenomena that are not so harmless, and the results of elections for the European Parliament that were conducted in May in 2014, where the victory of the extreme right elsewhere in the European Union testified on, did not show a dominant mood of the European citizens. Although for some, it has been “a shock” or an “earthquake”, as such reality has been described by some French media.11 For others, it has been an expected outcome. Such an outcome, by numerous ones, is the consequence of “an identity crisis” that affects some European nations12 that believe this identity can be regained by radicalisation of a political and general social scene.
Where Is Europe Heading to? If the phenomena we have described in the previous lines have been correctly noticed, and we believe they have, then there is a rightful question to be asked: Where is Europe heading to? Does it in this the way give up of its proclaimed secularism, or is it a simple trick of the European leadership that wants to accomplish cohesion that lacks the European society, so as to realise the project of creation of the European state? And it is being done by using emotions of the majority of citizens that are mostly unquestionable. Some authors have noticed in a complete right that religion is being used very frequently in a form of religious integralism that should be an answer to instability and change.13 Has the use of religion and insisting on Christian identity by the European political elite been motivated by the reasons of “cultural defence” as one of the possible ways of religion usage, being reminded by a professor Gavrilovic,14 is not completely clear. It still seems that this process of a religion breakthrough into secular life spheres and societies, being recognised in expert literature as a deprivatisation process, as the European society has been until recently, is not good. At the very last, it functions by the principle inclusio unius est exclusio alterius and brings for its consequence xenophobia and intolerance towards everything that is different. It, again, can have devastating consequences for the very societies being characterised by extreme multiculturalism. But, judging by the last statements of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, it seems that Europe is slowly giving up of multiculturalism.15 However, it cannot be anticipated a direction where the European society can be redirected to, if this really happens.
11 Internet: http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/Svet/Izborni-uspeh-evropskih-populista.lt.html, accessed on: 21.06.2014. 12 Ibid. 13 See: Danijela Gavrilović, Doba upotrebe, religija i moral u savremenoj Srbiji, Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Nišu, Niš, 2013., p. 15. 14 Ibid., p. 19. 15 Internet: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451, accessed on: 14.01.2014.
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Instead of a Conclusion And not to be misunderstood. We do not have to see anything disputable in insisting on religious ideological base, since we do not experience religion itself negatively. On the contrary. Still, we believe that secularism is the only possible way a modern society should go. But, if it decides to use religious feelings as an ideological frame that should serve the European unification, Europe must be aware its consequences, but also its own responsibility such an approach could have. Not only in Europe, but to the rest of the world. Since, Europe has always been a paradygm, and as such, it still exists. Therefore, Martti Koskenniemiis completely right by mentioning great ancient and middle age thinkers from Cicerone to Roman jurists, over Catholic intellectuals to “protestant activists” Hugo de Groot and Johann Caspar Bluntshli, where he finds that “none of these people thought on Europe as a simple local term, but on something reflecting universality“.16 Still, if Europe, indulging populism, but also using feelings lately, more xenophobic populus, and increases religious reasons to pedestal of its official policy, then it loses its moral right to invite others to secularism, tolerance, democracy and everything it has been devoted to. We need Europe that shall react onto all forms of religious radicalism and state clericalism, but also Europe that in these issues must not and should not be selective. This problem, being seen through an optics we are looking through, can seem excessive. To numerous ones, it can be marginal. Still, we think there is a problem. We are deeply convinced that the continent, whose most bloody pages of history have been written exactly by religious wars, flirting with religion, at least this way, populist one, is not needed. It is not needed to the rest of the mankind, either. This paper, still, does not have for its aim to give an answer to the problem it is dealing with, but before all, to open the issue and emphasise onto a phenomenon threatening to jeopardise secular order and democratic values, we still deeply believe, Europe is still devoting, and shall do in the future, either.
16 Martti Koskenniemi, “International Law in Europe: between Tradition and Renewal“, European Journal of International Law, (2005), Vol. 16, No. 1, p. 114.
163 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Zoran MILIVOJEVIĆ1
EUROPE AT THE CROSSROADS
Introduction Until the First World War, Europe as the cradle of civilization in the new century was for three centuries the creator and main guarantor of the world order. It was based on the policy of balance of power at its peak in terms of political- institutional experience at the Congress of Berlin in 1815 when Germany had become united and then through the diplomacy of Bismarck2 after whose departure it experienced a crash that led to the First World War. Its completion occurs under the current theories of international relations and diplomacy, new order led by the United States and a new approach to international relations through the dominance of the values of democracy, free markets and international law. In the era of globalization and interdependence, which dominates the early 21st century, the growth of the new powers (China, India, Brazil, South Africa), the reconstruction of Russia and the establishment of a multipolar world, we are witnessing the establishment now and again of a new relationship with the characteristics of a new-old order. The values of civilization achievements: democracy, free markets, the rule of law are valid in principle, but it is an issue of respect for fundamental and applied in practice and depends on the interest of interpretation and application in specific cases under various circumstances. Europe has lost primacy in the world order after World War II. In the era of bloc division itself on ideological and political grounds after the Second World War, it lost its own political identity while remaining in geographical terms and
1 Zoran Milivojević, Ph.D., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia. 2 “Bismarck’s diplomacy created a series of intertwined battles of which some overlapped and some were contradictory to each other, but together they managed to protect Austria from the Russian aggression, Russia, the Austrian adventure and Germany from surrounding and it led England to assume the prevention of the Russian penetration to the Mediterranean.” H. Kissinger, Diplomacy, Verzalpress, Belgrade 1999, p. 130.
164 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century cultural content. It tried to regain the “waiver” of the war through the creation of the European Economic Community, now the EU and the establishment of an integrated state of the European common interest and value base. The project is managed in the Western part and after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism spread to Eastern Europe with a tendency to cover her whole. However, the forces of the old regimes that do not want to give up the primates are still strong, geopolitical circumstances have changed, recurrence of the past continue to have influence, interests and spheres of influence are divided and dislocated from Europe, so on the stage is again the model of domination, balance of power, political power and domination by force of law to challenge the cultural and civilizational values. In those conditions for Europe, the key issue is to re- open for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and the smooth development of the multi-ethnic and multicultural foundations. In this way, it is already faced with numerous risks. The nature and content of these risks and their manifestations indicates that the current integration processes in Europe without a corresponding adjustment to the existing challenges will not be enough for the future peaceful and stable development. So, comprehensive peace remains a major requirement and challenge in this context is not a coincidence marked the last period of 1914. The historical dimension of this is very important.
History New century marked by conflicts in Europe European countries until the Great War of 1914-18 after which, a new order dominated by the United States as the leading world power. Historical experiences and results of the war were dictated by the conditions and the establishment of new international relations. The condemnation of the war and securing a lasting peace in all of this had a central place. In fact, this time the United States had the main role as the biggest winner of force. The main strategy of the United States and President Wilson at the Versailles peace conference was to establish a lasting peace on a new basis and prevent the recurrence of the behavior of great powers that led to World War II3. Treaty of Versailles and the whole range of agreements that resolved the issue of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire (agreements from Saint-Germain, Trianon, Nei, etc.) were established by the Treaty of Versailles from the new countries (Soviet Union, the Kingdom of Serbs, Czechoslovakia). Established the League of Nations on the proposal of U.S. President Wilson as an international
3 “The great powers have succeeded in another Balkan crisis of secondary importance into a world war. Conflict related to Bosnia and Serbia led to the occupation of Belgium at the other side of Europe, which in turn Britain to war. Paradoxically, at a time when the western front, but managed a decisive battle, the Austrian troops have not yet taken the offensive against Serbia.“, Ibid, p. 181.
165 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century mechanism and the guarantee of peace on the basis of global consensus.4 Hereby, under the auspices of the United States and President Wilson practically replaced the old system of international relations that are based on balance of power. The League of Nations was established with great ambition, which is best confirmed by the Memorandum of Association to guarantee the security of member states and the war practically political consensus repealed.5 In order to guarantee the elimination of war and peace, and strengthen the role of the League of Nations, French Minister of Foreign Affairs Aristide Briand and his American counterpart, Kellogg proposed the signing of a treaty for Completely renunciation of war. We have such permission Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Japan, which created the conditions for his signature. The contract was signed in Paris on 27 August 1928 by the 15 states where a year later joined the 57 States and the USSR. Known as the Briand-Kellogg contract and by him the war was for the first time legally directly repealed.6 These efforts, as it is known, were unsuccessful. Peace is not saved. Upon coming to power, Hitler left the League of Nations. Germany ignored the results and commitments of the Versailles Peace Treaty began arming, conducted policy of expansionism towards its neighbors and there was a World War II with all the known consequences for Europe and the world at large. Even during the Second World War, thought about what peace is again Europe was in the first place. Conferences at Yalta and Potsdam are just what the dedicated. At the end of the war was born, and the UN Charter or the United Nations as a new mechanism for providing and guaranteeing peace based on a general global consensus. However, a key role in Europe had great powers the United States and the Soviet Union. They were practically left to determine the
4 U.S. President Wilson’s post-war American interests formulated in the famous 14 points which are basically supposed to guarantee peace, based on the experience of war. In these 14 points include the establishment of the League of Nations, then free shipping seas, general disarmament, reconstruction of the Belgian state, the autonomy of the ethnic groups in the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman Empire, the establishment of an independent Polish state, the return of Alsace and Lorraine France, and so on. 5 Article 10 of the Articles of Association Peoples says, “The members of the Company undertake to respect and to refrain from undermining the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the society.” And Article 11: “Every war, threat of war, directed to any member of the Company refer simultaneously to the whole society and the Company shall take any measures which might preserve international peace.” 6 Article 1 of the agreement states: “The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the name of their nation to condemn the use of war as a means of solving international disputes and dismiss it as a tool for guiding national policy their relationships with others.“ Article 2 states: “The High Contracting Parties agree that all conflict, regardless of the nature and causes resolved exclusively by peaceful means.”
166 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century future fate of the western borders of the USSR, Germany7 and Austria.8 The situation is resolved bloc division and the establishment of military blocs NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and the renewed principle of balance of power. International relations in Europe and maintaining peace in the basics lasted until the fall of the Berlin Wall, after the collapse of Communism, the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Hereby is destroyed and the system of balance of power, which guaranteed peace in Europe. Established the dominance of the U.S. and Europe as a reflection of unipolar international relations. For the situation in Europe is of particular importance is the definitive break- up of a large part of the Versailles system that followed the fall of the Berlin Wall. This decrease is caused by the disintegration of complex states of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, the creation of new states and borders in Europe on the basis of consensus achieved major Western powers including Russia.9 Except in the case of Czechoslovakia, break-up of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union is not passed quietly. In the former Yugoslavia, there was a civil war with consequences that even today are not fully rehabilitated. Amongst those present trauma remained open for Serbia the status question of Kosovo and Metohija. On the territory of the former USSR, too, there have been conflicts in the Caucasus and Eastern Europe where they are today frozen conflicts (Transistria, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh). Current state and the current resolution of the Ukrainian crisis shows that are in the area remained open questions. The fall of the Berlin Wall was re-established dominance of the U.S. as the world’s only superpower. Thus, the conclusions of the Badinter’s Commission and the political consensus reached at that time were not fully achieved guarantors solutions and lasting stability in Europe. Other open questions which are now a significant part of the risk of future development in Europe. However, it opened the possibility for a greater recognition of the EEC / EU on its original foundations as a pan-European project, which is period to date and marked the development of Europe through the continuation and expansion of the integration process.
7 The division of Germany, the Berlin Blockade and the construction of the Berlin Wall. 8 Austrian “State contract” from 1954, which is pending status and borders of Austria on the basis of neutrality. 9 New boundaries are established on the basis of the conclusions of the Badinter Commission, headed by a French jurist Robert Badinter. For a basic principle of the recognition of new states and borders are taken from the solution of complex constitution states that the disappearance of the territorial organization of the Republic had the right to secede. All the republics of the former Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia was so recognized as a state, and their republican borders were recognized as those of the new state in Europe.
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Integration processes in Europe After the Second World War in Europe, there is a period of block division and the supremacy of the two major powers the United States and the Soviet Union. The block division is due to the nature of blocks, and established the ideological division of Europe into two mutually irreconcilable and contradictory actions. Large European countries emerging from two wars with the loss of importance which they had. Some no longer even exist as Austria-Hungary, for example. In these circumstances, the integration processes taking place in two aspects: first within the blocks as a form of their organizational and functional structure; 2 independently of the blocks based on the desire of Europe to regain his identity and political subjectivity. 1. Apart from military-political component blocks, in the light of the ideological divide, tried and otherwise achieve maximum integration in their camp. The Western military alliance (NATO) has essentially become a guarantee of military support and integration processes in Western Europe with an impact that these processes take place in the transatlantic basis and ideological basis of the Western world of democratic institutions and a free market. On the economic front these processes was the Marshall Plan reconstruction of Western Europe Eastern bloc headed by the Soviet Union was developing its own integration process is based on the ideology of socialism / communism whose security guarantee of the Warsaw Pact. In this sense, it is in Eastern Europe under the auspices of the USSR and the “people’s democracy” figured specific integrated economic space (SEV), which operated on the principle of one-party political systems and orchestrated economy 2. Impossibility of the war to prevent the individual influence of individual states has left its mark on the political landscape of Europe. This is especially true at the beginning of the Second World War and the experience of Munich 1939th to him immediately preceded. Europe has just left for a position without its own identity and ability to affect its future development. In such circumstances, a European response to this situation was born the idea of a collective effort that would restore identity and ensure peace, development and prosperity in some form of normal conditions10. The essence of the idea, as the “European idea”, represented by integration processes as a collective European response to the current situation.11 From these ideas were originally created the Organization for
10 Even Winston Churchill after the war in 1946 spoke of the “United States of Europe.” 11 The Hague in May 1948 was held with the participation of the European Congress of different ethnic groups and prominent politicians, among whom were Robert Schumann, the “father” of the EU, Conrad Adenauer, and so on. Congress adopted a political declaration that Germany unification of European countries on the basis of appropriate political and economic common interests. This congress is considered the forerunner of the European idea materialized creating the EEC and EU.
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European Economic Cooperation (OECD) in 1948. Working implementation of the Marshall Plan and the Council of Europe in 1949. Purpose of implementing the principles of democracy, rights and the rule of law. The true essence of the integration process in Europe is a project of the European Union (EU) and its implementation in practice. It is the most successfully realized project of association state in the history of Europe, which has been based on agreed common interests and goals.
The European Union-factor of stability and growth in Europe The EU has emerged from the need to establish a mechanism of collective cooperation between the countries, the perpetrators and participants in the war, that the war would be permanently eliminated as a mechanism for resolving issues of mutual relations of states. It is no coincidence that France was the main initiator. It wanted to permanently remove the Franco-German enmity that had previously been characterized by their relationship, but the situation in Europe. Its politicians to Jean Monnet12 and Robert Schuman13 attributed the paternity of the EU, which is legally derived from the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) of 1951 and the European Economic Community (EEC) of 1957.14 Fact that the founders of these organizations France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries: Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, confirms the justification of the main ideas. The EU is determined according to the rules of international law as international governmental organizations. It has been structured by models that include the democratic principle of action and decision-making, and three branches of the branches of government: legislative, executive and judicial. The main basis for the functioning of the consensus of the member states in the most important part-renunciation of sovereignty that is legally and politically shaped by the founding agreement and any subsequent amendments thereto until the Treaty of Lisbon FROM 2009. Sacrifice degree of sovereignty of member states has been defined and determined in essentially the character of EU, as well as the content and scope of current and future internal integration processes. Integration processes in Europe under the auspices of the EU show the complexity of inter-European relations. This complexity is determined sheer volume of content and processes throughout its course. In this context, the processes were largely determined by the relations and their development based on block
12 Jean Monnet was a French commissioner for planning the proposed establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, established in 1951. 13 Robert Schuman, the French Foreign Minister, direct initiator of the contract establishing the ECSC. 14 It was formally signing of the Treaty of Rome of the EEC and Euratom in which it considered the founding treaties of the EU. The founders are France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux countries.
169 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century division in Europe until its end of the fall of the Berlin Wall. They are from the very beginning had two aspects and developments: 1. economic and 2. politic. Monitoring of these aspects reflect the essence of the main integration processes in Europe to the present day and suggests possible conclusions about their long-run. 1. Comon interest of European countries, circled around the “European idea” was first recognized in the economic sphere of their relationship. It is a logical process as a result of the need to repair the ravages of war and pave the way for development. This was the basic idea of the founders of the EU with the ECSC and EEC then, because he has found a common interest in France and Germany over the use of German coal reserves. France has had an interest in the especial economic reasons, Germany to appear as a subject of international relations after the defeat in the war. Economic interests in terms of reconstruction had a decisive force to the Treaty of Rome established the EEC Customs Union between the States Parties, which favored the destruction of trade barriers and the creation of a free trade zone, and the common market. Interest on economic grounds and principles of the free movement of people, ideas, goods and services are developed and the whole process of European integration EU. The essence of the process was and still is the provision of economic and socio-political development in conditions of peace and cooperation in the interests of member states and their populations. The main questions were: internal reform and institutional development in accordance with the process of integration of qualitative and quantitative terms; common market as a necessary common economic and monetary policy. 2. In the politically integrative processes in the EU are caused by two reasons: a/ external over themselves political processes and changes in Europe; b/ internal pace and content integration and political changes in the countries themselves members. a / the outside of the foundation in the development of integration is the post- war political changes in the countries of Europe before and after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the mutual relations in Europe on the basis of these changes. The first fundamental change and twist the fall of communism and the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and block division in the ideological and military-political sphere of relations. That created the conditions for the integration processes focus on the whole of Europe. The second is the re-unification of Germany. This unification is itself caused the contrasting attitudes bearing in mind the known historical context of the aspirations of the German people to be united. On the other side, the processes of integration to that moment created the basis for the unification of the positive treats and it then EEC and official support.15 Prevailed is a key interest of peace in
15 At an extraordinary summit of the EEC in Dublin on 28 April in 1990. Unification of Germany was formally accepted, and after the democratic elections in the former DDR.
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Europe.16 The future of the integration process is set as the basis for the reunification of Germany. Ideological and political changes in Central and Eastern Europe and the beginning of the transition process in the countries of the area are the third major change. A key motive for most of the countries in defining the national goals of change and future foreign policy priorities becomes EU. That was turning the EU process to channel the appropriate criteria.17 These changes in the externally facilitated the implementation of the pan- European ideas over the most important processes in the further development of the EU - the EU - which took place in stages by concentric circles. The criterion was the conquest of space for the application of the principles and values of the EU, based on appropriate internal transition process in the States themselves. The pace at which it grew curling, the number of member states. United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined the EU, the first in 1972. Following Greece in 1981. Following the political changes in the fall of the military dictatorship and democratization. Hereby, the EU achieved a breakthrough in the south of Europe, which continued entry of Spain and Portugal in 1986. Also after the political changes and the departure pro-fascist regime of Franco and Salazar. Austria, Sweden and Finland join the EU in 1995. Biggest breakthrough EU has made to the area of the former Eastern bloc receiving 8 new states 2004th of an earlier composition of the blocks18 with which the packet was received Cyprus and Malta. Bulgaria and Romania were admitted 2007a., And Croatia 2013th which was completed this phase of expansion. Among the candidates appear more Turkey since 1987, Montenegro and Serbia with which they began negotiations with Macedonia and the candidate that are not started. Switzerland is still in 1992. Shown interest in joining, but the referendum decision against the process is stationary. It should be noted that Norway in 1971 in a referendum decided against joining. Enlargement policy is one of the most important elements of the integration process as a whole. It is the most successful part of the EU’s foreign policy since its inception. EU since the policy does not give up though the present “enlargement fatigue” as a result of the crisis and open questions still development strategy of the EU itself. Enlargement Strategy, which was formally verified by the decisions of the competent bodies of the EU 2009th focused in three directions: to the Mediterranean and the direction of supporting members in the south of Europe, led by France; the Western Balkans; to the East of Europe as a policy of “Eastern
16 See Declaration EEC of 9 December 1989. 17 Conclusions of Copenhagen, known as acquis communautaires, who determined the criteria for admission of new members into three groups: political (democracy and democratic institutions), economic (market economy and private property), legal (acceptance of the acquis.). 18 Received are: Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania.
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Partnership”. The dynamics of a strategy to Western. Balkan (negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro) and the East, which is the case of Ukraine at greatest risk and future challenges. b/ On the inside covers the main criterion level of integration processes is the degree and scope of waiver of sovereignty of member states. What is the level of denial that they grew up and integration processes within the EU developed. Most has been in the economic sphere so that the EU has the highest degree of civilization of the sovereign states of the single market without tariffs and restrictions, the single currency at 2/3 of the area, uniform regulations and standards in economic and social sectors (agriculture, transport, environment, trade administrative procedures, etc..). In the political sphere, however, integration processes have the same dynamics as the economy. Foreign and security policy is still exclusive member states. At the institutional level, the absence of larger dynamics can best be traced in the most important areas in the development of the legislative powers of the European Parliament. EP full legislative powers never received, because the member states that dimension of power kept to himself. Implemented across the Council and the European Commission. In the EU in this regard is dominated by the executive branch over the legislative, reflecting the attitude of member states to maintain sovereignty in key areas of national and state interests. Herein lies the basis and consideration of the future of the EU as an organization of Independent States, a loose confederation or federation over which the current theory and practice by the end of divided, conflicting political tendencies of unitarists to Eurosceptic.
Issues and risks of further development The geopolitical situation in Europe in the last decade significantly changed. In the era of globalization and interdependence of Europe and the EU could not stay out of the global economic crisis, created in 2008 / 9th As well as those of 1929/30. and this leaves its mark on the situation and relations in Europe. In Europe as a whole, the crisis produced negative effects in a broad sense: in terms of pace and content of economic development, the overall political stability, investment policy and the dynamics of the overall economic relations, the stability of the economic and political systems, the activation of the outstanding issues. The EU crisis has particularly raised the issue of internal relations, the necessity of institutional changes in the area of finance and politics in general, the review of the enlargement policy and the general concept of future development. Taken together geopolitical change and the global economic crisis have caused important changes and events of special importance for the further development of Europe. The changes and events both inside and hide the main risks with consequences for its future development. For the assessment of the future development of
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Europe and the EU, and the risk for the development of the most important is this: 1.Economic crisis and reflects on Europe and the EU in particular; 2.Combeck of the Russia in the position of a great power, and change the balance of power in Europe-such as Ukraine; 3.Domination of right in Europe; 4.Question of further EU enlargement. 1. Economic crisis that began in 2008th in the United States has a global effect. Spread to Europe and caused significant consequences. She’s in some respects still is, and the consequences such as high unemployment, low GDP, the decline of most economic parameters, recession plaguing the overall economic situation and related to the continent as a whole. Especially sharpened sphere of finance, investment and social policies. EU is the locomotive of economic and political development in Europe. In this context, the consequences of the crisis in the EU are particularly important for the overall stability and development in Europe. Positive results from the 2013th to be taken for the whole EU indicate that the EU is in the process of emerging from the crisis, but with open questions of which depends on the process in the future. The crisis came to the fore three important facts, without which it is not possible consideration of further development in the EU: a/ crisis showed that Germany was the dominant economic and political force in the EU; b/ crisis has established new relations within the EU and the economic and political balance of power; c / crisis has paved new institutional needs and initiate appropriate reforms at the EU level. a/ strength of the German economy and its stability was confirmed by a crisis and put Germany in a dominant position in the EU. Survival and protection of the common currency, i.e. the functioning of the European Monetary Union in times of crisis, are provided thanks mainly in Germany. To is especially evident in the south of the EU in the Eurozone in case of repairing the consequences of the crisis in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus. German opposition to the concept of crisis, which is based on financial discipline and belt-tightening, and new fiscal policy EU imposed a general EU precisely because of the economic and political arguments Germany. On the basis of its concept was during 2012 / 13th guided actions to overcome the crisis in the euro area and the EU as a whole which gave a result and that is still going on. German concept influenced the determination of the EU budget for the current in 2014. And the same goes for his determination for the next period to the 2020th Attempts by opposition left- wing German concept formulated by the President of the French Socialist Francois Hollande after coming to power failed. The overwhelming election victory of Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) in the fall 2013th headed by Chancellor A.Merkel confirmed the current German policy and its further projection of the EU both in terms of the crisis and in strategic terms. In this context, it should be
173 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century viewed as a further development of the EU in which Germany would decisively influence. b/ depth of the crisis and its effects have produced new relations in the EU that will affect its future development. The EU is now operating three concentric circles which confirm the theory into practice on the EU to “multi-speed” and “concentric circles”.19 Within the EU operate two concentric circles: the 18 Eurozone member states, led by Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the rest of the EU member states with groupings led by the UK, Denmark, Sweden, which is not in the Eurozone and do not have a common currency. Then, inside the eurozone act two concentric circles based on the criteria of economic and political power and stability: Germany and developed, economic and financial solvent north and south problematic EU to Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Cyprus. This is also the return of the former North- South relations that have marked the international economic and political relations in the long term of the last century, especially in times of global negotiations within the World Trade Organization. This time, the North-South relationship manifests itself in Europe and the EU and is a virtually new balance of power and influence in the development within the EU and Europe as a whole. At the same time the character of the newly created positions, relationships based on them, and the difference in the approach that objectively appear based on these unequal positions, there is a risk of future political and economic and political relations in the EU, which is true for Europe as a whole. c/ crisis has imposed the need to review the institutional framework of the EU especially in the fiscal area. It turned out that the lack of policy and institutional mechanisms of control in the fiscal area contributed significantly to the negative effects of the crisis. Open the question of a unified fiscal policy to balance the single monetary policy. A unified fiscal policy is still no consensus, or the willingness of states to relinquish sovereignty in the area. That is the question that is on the agenda of the EU and that in itself is some risk of further division. In addition to the institutional dilemmas and tasks of the economic and financial crisis plan is opened and institutional issues on the political agenda. This primarily relates to the further projection of the EU as a supranational international organization. This question is closely related to the functioning of the EU and the position of the European Parliament as well as the assumed legislative powers of the EU. The question of authority EP and their development
19 The thesis of “concentric circles” and “multi-speed” advocated more French Prime Minister Eduard Baladur, as a representative of the French right in the French government in the second term of the French socialist president Mitterrand at the end of the 90s of the last century. The thesis is particularly came to the fore after the enlargement of the center and east of Europe, bearing in mind the political context of enlargement and economic realities, the pace and content of the development of the most developed in the EU.
174 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century allow some critical reviews and raises the further development of the EU and its institutions in the current internal EU integration process. Powers of the EP were significantly reduced, and he has no legislative function known by the parliaments in the political system. Is reduced to rights: assessment, control, co-decision,20 a legislative initiative21 by the EU Commission, as the main initiator does not necessarily have to accept the division of some responsibilities in the legislative sphere with the Commission and the Council whereby the last instance in the decision. This is a result of lack of will of the member states since the Treaty of Rome themselves to forego a part of sovereignty in the legislative field. In this sense, the EU is faced with a “democratic deficit” that favors the executive power in the EU at the expense of the legislative. The theory of the significantly address this issue within the dilemma of the actual position of the European Parliament22 and of the institutional functioning and development of the EU as a whole. Apart from the economic and monetary sphere, where the monetary union reached the highest level of internal integration in the EU, in the political sphere (foreign policy, security, etc.) It lags far behind. For example, resistance to the establishment of a fiscal union in the ongoing rehabilitation of the crisis suggests reluctance of member states to continue to give up sovereignty.23 When it comes to the EP and to strengthen its role as the resistance even more powerful24 and there is a willingness of some states to go beyond the resolution that was achieved by the Lisbon Treaty from 2009. Taking into account the internal and external dynamics of the EU to development and geopolitical changes that are within the EU and global scale event, the impact of the EU, the question of necessity of institutional reforms and adjustments. The content and scope of EU action to overcome the crisis and new perspectives that necessity actualize. The lack of adjustment creates space for the risks to the overall development of EU integration processes in Europe as a whole. 2. The return of Russia in the position of a great power is evident in the Putin era. The return and strengthening of other countries such as China have
20 Authority granted by the Maastricht Treaty. 21 Authorization obtained and elaborated the Treaty of Nice and Lisbon. 22 Are present in the theory of different ideas regarding the EP and evaluation of the bicameral organization and functioning of the parliamentary dimension of the EU following the example of the U.S. Congress and etc., see detail: Simon Hicks, the political system of the EU Official Journal, Belgrade 2009 and Miroslav Prokopijević, the European Union, Official Gazette, Belgrade 2005th. 23 As a concrete example is the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic who refuse to accept new responsibilities in the area of fiscal policy. 24 The UK is committed to the reforms in the field of parliamentary / legislative powers, but in favor of national parliaments and the position of performances in the ongoing negotiations within the EU in the area of institutional reform.
175 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century established a new multipolar character of international relations and announced the end of the unipolar world that dominated the United States established after the fall of the Berlin Wall. In Europe, this change is particularly prominent in case of a crisis in Ukraine. It is the worst crisis since the Second World War and the period of “cold war” during the block division, that threatens the peace and stability in Europe. For the EU, this crisis is of particular importance because it is created as a result of unrealized progress in the process of EU enlargement to Eastern Europe. The reason lies in the changed geopolitical circumstances, the strengthening of Russia and the competition of the great powers with conflicting interests. In this sense, the scene is directly competing two major powers: the United States and Russia in Europe, with elements of global competition and of the great powers interest. In such circumstances, the interests of the EU are not fully in the foreground, which is evident in the political (integration processes and policies of the EU enlargement on hold) and economic level (risk of further development of economic relations in Europe, including the EU-Russia). The crisis in Ukraine, in addition to the risk of escalation and safety threat to the whole of the EU territory and Europe, opens and other issues: the role of international law; stability of democratic institutions; use of force and non-democratic methods to solve internal issues; stability of the multicultural and multi-national values and standards; rise of extreme nationalism and xenophobia; risks of broader military conflict; and so on. Any deficiency in the EU in resolving the Ukrainian crisis and leaving the great powers arbitration and the right to decide on the final outcome, leading to the risk to the EU and Europe as a whole. Ukraine’s crisis is the most serious risk for further development in Europe due to the size of the country, its geo-strategic position, the complex ethnic, religious and cultural composition. Therefore, there must be a peaceful solution to the European cooperation between EU and Russia. 3. In the parliamentary, presidential, local elections last month in Macedonia, Hungary, Serbia, France, Slovakia, Turkey, Germany, won the party or individual right political orientation. Add to that a stable rule of right in Spain, Great Britain, Russia, Sweden, Poland, Greece, the Netherlands, the dominance of the European People’s Party group in the EP and the EU and the rise of right-wing forces in Europe, then it is undoubtedly a new cycle of ups right in Europe. This is supported by a certificate and go to the last success of the extreme right in France (National Front) and Hungary (Jobbik) which basically perform with national and ethnic and national positions. This result and the right result is prolonged crisis without serious indications of a rapid and efficient way out. Recovery that is registered in the EU is still insufficient, the crisis in southern Europe is still acute, and unemployment is generally high. The next five-year period will be marked by continued practice of finding effective mechanisms and means to overcome the crisis and substantial recovery. At the same time, the Left in Europe failed to
176 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century ideological and political level, or in the practical politics that in times of crisis offer a solution or a new concept. Remained preoccupied with maintaining their own positions at the end of the last century. Try of socialist F. Hollande after his victory in the presidential elections in France to mobilize and unite the Left out of the crisis in the EU, a platform of opposition to the German concept of financial discipline, strengthening of regulatory elements in the economy, finance and institutions of the state and the EU, and belt-tightening, very fast experienced failure. The rise of right-wing carries and its characteristics, which is in full swing: the affirmation of state-building policy and nation-states, ethnic and national origin and preservation of national identity with a more pronounced manifestation of patriotism. The dominance of the right, however, is not without its challenges: the rise of extreme nationalism and xenophobia which has been recorded on ethno-national basis according to some minority, immigrant and ethnic or specific social groups and individuals in different parts of Europe. And here is the latest example of Ukraine where current events marked and reaffirmation of extreme nationalism and neo-fascism through its sector and the Right parties of the extreme right. With such risks should be taken in the future. The economic crisis and Ukraine have opened a Pandora’s Box. New challenges are already on the scene: the upcoming referendum in Scotland and Catalonia, advertising Gagauz, Veneto, Corsica, South Tyrol, the activation of frozen conflicts in Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transistria. On the same basis risk is still referred to Islamic tendencies in the European region and the new pressures of immigration from Asia, Africa and the Middle East to Europe, which became topical due to political tensions in these areas and further tightening of economic and social issues outside Europe crisis and under pressure factors of globalization. Such risks, bearing in mind the negative experience of Ukraine in the broader context (the Crimea, the outcome in the east of the country on ethnic, national, religious, ideological and political grounds), the specific interests of the EU and the engagement of large forces affecting the overall situation in Europe, with elements new challenges and development of uncertainty. 4. Enlargement policy is one of the important strategic and development components of the EU. Until summit in Vilnius in November 2013th during Lithuania’s presidency of the EU, successfully took place according to the program set courses from accepted agenda from 2009. Defined when the three directions of the policy: Mediterranean, Western Balkans and Eastern Europe under the name “Eastern Partnership”. Mediterranean dimension of enlargement is virtually on hold due to political development in the area and the lack of consensus at the EU level. The Western Balkans is dynamic through the accession of Croatia 2013th and the opening of accession negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro.
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Based on long-term geostrategic interests focus has been given a continuity East Eastern policy after EU enlargement in 2004 and 2007, the number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and in the interests of further development of relations with Russia and Eurasia. Summit in Vilnius was supposed to be the crown of the first phase of the policy conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association agreement with Ukraine and other appropriate agreements with the other countries of the region. However, Armenia is committed to pro-Russian option, Azerbaijan, for now at rest, Ukraine at the last moment for the Russian bid. Agreements of lower importance with Georgia and Moldova were not sufficient for the success of the summit and the overall policy. To confirm the effects in Ukraine. Within Eastern politics should be noted slight more tactical than substantial progress in the accession negotiations with Turkey, primarily due to its geo-strategic and geopolitical importance for Europe and the EU. The failure of the summit in Vilnius, the crisis in Ukraine and the overall attitude in the rest of eastern Europe, the EU and its enlargement, an objective review of open question of political strategy and methodology for achieving enlargement policy defined “Eastern Partnership”. Failure in Vilnius has shown that the EU does not have a backup plan or a quick response to such situations. This led to the direct involvement of the United States to Russia and return of great power’s policies and models that are based on a balance of great power. It is obvious that the current EU enlargement strategy and mechanisms for implementation are not given the result and that the necessary adjustments and changes keeping in mind: a new balance of power in Europe, the influence of the great powers on the basis of multi-polar, economic and political context of different interests, internal political situation in countries of the area, the frozen conflicts and relapses past. For further strategy in the enlargement direct influence and political tendencies within the EU, expressed the attitude of “enlargement fatigue”. This attitude has a lot of strong political support in the structures of the EU and some member states, the arguments about the need for internal consolidation of the EU at the same level of membership, taking into account the factors of the crisis and its successful rehabilitation, reaffirming the original principles, values and criteria with emphasis on absorption. Predominant role of right wing Eurosceptics, who are politically verified through EP, plays an important role in this so forthcoming review of the EU enlargement policy after the May elections in the EU and its constitution of the new government at all levels.
Conclusion In the changed geopolitical circumstances and the economic crisis with an extended duration before Europe opens up a number of strategically important
178 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century issues. Terms of globalization and multipolar international relations these issues further actualize. Open issues in the past (the disintegration of the Versailles system, new state borders, frozen conflicts, strengthening of ethno-national tendencies with elements of vindication, etc..), Actualized in the present, further burdening relations in Europe and the weak ability of its action in ensuring peace and security. Counterbalance this weakening may be a new dynamic in the integration process. The EU, as a project that guarantees peace and development in the civilized and democratic achievements, may be the deciding factor for the future peaceful development cycle of the continent. For this, it is necessary to fully consolidate the internal occasion of economic crisis, remove doubts about its future, reaffirm the original principles, begin to act autonomously according to their own strategic interests and objectives, avoid ideological bias, determine positively towards further integration processes on the continent in the function lasting peace and development. In this context, the EU institutional adjustments necessary, because they provide additional arguments for the continuation of the overall integration process in Europe. EU could therefore affect the risk of further development in Europe as a guarantor of peace, carrier development and implementation of the mechanism of adequate models in that position. The theory is generally agreed that further development of the position of the European Parliament in a certain way and directs the further development of the EU as a whole, because the development of the content and scope of EU integration on the basis of the degree of renunciation of sovereignty of member states. The essence of its development was therefore subordinate to efforts to increase its institutional power,25 thereby strengthening and integration capacity and character of the EU as a whole. Tunnel EP powers in the legislative sphere illustrate and confirm the theory of well- known thesis of the “democratic deficit”. In the EU, there is no agreement about the harmful effects of a “democratic deficit”, but no consensus on how to overcome, and that “the only solution is to strengthen the parliament”.26 His transformation can go in different directions depending on the choice of the member states: one would strengthen its role in the direction of becoming a law the legislature (federalist concept); others to the contrary, in the direction of weakening their weak role with reduced powers (the concept of Euro-sceptics)27; third would be something in between (confederal concept) that has the most adherents declared at this time. If you overcome the current crisis and risk with positive dynamics at the institutional level, this should be reflected in favor of broader powers EP, that is, in favor of the EU as a whole. The solutions are now
25 Desmond Dinan, Ever closer Union, Official Journal, Belgrade, 2009, p. 255. 26 Ibid, p. 280. 27 Miroslav Prokopijević, European Union, Official Journal, Belgrade 2005, p. 71.
179 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century being offered to remedy the current monetary crisis and the future integration processes within the EU is no evidence of the will states in this direction. For future employment in Europe EU should not give up on the enlargement strategy, as the best and most profitable backbone foreign policy. Failures in the strategy of “Eastern Partnership” and the experience of Ukraine showed a lack of alternatives and mechanisms of reaction of the EU to the crisis phenomena, without which it is not possible because quality achievements. Need to change the methodology and adapt to new geopolitical realities and the continuation of the strategy on that basis. “Enlargement fatigue” should not be a starting position in the new strategy for expansion. It was and still is the best promotion of civilized values, norms and standards that characterized the EU. Gave her the progress achieved and the current form, character and impact of which has a global scale.
180 II – World order – between cooperation and conflict
Ljiljana NIKŠIĆ1
SERBIAN-GERMAN CULTURAL AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS AS INTANGIBLE CULTURAL HERITAGE
Honouring 825 Years of Serbian-German Diplomatic Relations (1189-2014) Abstract: Intangible cultural heritage of different provenience is subject to protection in accordance with the UNESCO Convention on Intangible Cultural Heritage. In the Serbian collective memory, there is a big potential for identification and protection of intangible heritage between Serbs and Germans. The paper presents the heritological approach to the specific characteristics of Serbian-German friendly relations which have remained in the shadows of the tragic events and hostilities caused by WW I and WW II and culture of rememberance on victims. Within the context of the development of cultural diplomacy in integrating processes worldwide, the equal emphasis is put on the development of culture of rememberance of friendly relations for the purpose of affirming tangible and intangible cultural heritage as a kind of cultural heritage which can serve as spiritus movens and as means of creating mutual respect and fostering understanding and contributing to further enhancement of friendly relations which leads to bringing the nations and their political elites closer to each other in their bilateral relations. Therefore, besides the culture of rememberance on tragic war events which hit humanity twice, so far, and enormous victims in WWI and WWII, in order to develop bilateral relations it is necessary to foster cultural diplomacy which is today one of the pillars of the development of intercultural dialogue in international relations in the integrating processes worldwide and is directed towards protection of “culture of peace”. The attempt to revise the historical facts on WWI and WWII only leads to alienation and to the “war of historical memories”, hence distance between the nations. The duty of all of member states of UN is to preserve “collective memory”. Giving priority to “culture of rememberance” public and cultural diplomacy with emphasis on reminiscence on friendly phases in relations
1 Ljiljana Nikšić, Ph.D of Political Science, Minister Counsellor in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, in 2002 finished German Diplomatic Academy Programme – MOE 20 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany.
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and to reconciliation over all other forms of diplomacy and diplomatic means in communication among modern states in the integrating world we live in is conditio sine quq non. Key words: Serbian-German relations, tangible and intangible cultural heritage, contribution to enhancement of Serbian-German friendhip, “culture of rememberance”, cultural diplomacy, jubilee of 825 years of diplomatic relations, contribution to establishment of Group of Serbian-German Friendship in Bundestag.
Establishment of First Diplomatic Relations 825 YEARS OF SERBIAN-GERMAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 825 ГОДИНА СРПСКО – НЕМАЧКИХ ДИПЛОМАТСКИХ ОДНОСА 825 JAHRE DER SERBISCH-DEUTSCHEN DIPLOMATISCHEN BEZIEHUNGEN
Friedrich I Barbarossa Stephen Nemanja
Courtesie Diplomatique is that already in Medieval times the first diplomatic relations have been established between Serbia and Germany.2 Tsar Friedrich I Barbarossa and Stefan Nemanja the founder of the most significant Serbian Medeval dynasty, have met already in 1189, after the Second Crussaider War, in
2 Details about the Serbian representative at the Tsar’s Court in Nuernberg (1188) have been preserved in Annales Coloniensis Maximi, and the meeting between Friedrich I Barbarossa and Stefan Nemanja from 1189. has been described in texts by Ansbert (Historia de Expeditione Frederici i Imperatoris), in letters of Dietpold, Bishop from Passau (sources about history of Crussaider war of Tsar Friedrich I ) and other Medeval sources.
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Serbian city of Nish (Naissus). Our ruler Nemanja payed special attention to the cooperation with German Tsar, the most powerful ruler of that time in Europe. Serbian-German relations in Nemanja’s time were the relations of two allies. From that time onwards, the relations between Serbs and Germans were sometimes going upwards, sometimes downwards, in interdependence of the interests of the superpowers and geopolitical surroundings. All of these things have contributed to the specific bilateral relations between Serbia and Germany whose jubilee of 825 years of diplomatic relations, in honour of Serbs and Germans– Friends, are to be marked in 2014, along with the Centenial of WWI – the first Grande Guerre in the history of the mankind in, in integrating Europe of today. Along with the efforts of academic associations such as Serbian German Forum (Forum Serbien Deutschland) culture of rememberance on friendly relations could contribute to the establishment of the Group of German-Serbian Friendship in Bundestag, for example. Cultural exchange could significantly contribute to creating a friendly atmosphere between Serbs and Germans as well as establishment of the Museum of Cultural Ties and Serbian-German Friendship. The fact is that the present generations of the Serbs and the Germans can not and should not forget the tragic past that was caused by the conflicts between our two peoples during the two world wars WWI and WWII in the 20th century. However, it should be overcome. The time of friendship between our two peoples has remained in the deep shadows of the terrors of World War I and World War II and in the literature and scientific research on Serbian and German side, it has not been written much about it. Reminding of the friendly relations between the Serbs and the Germans is the lighthouse that dispels the shadows of the tragic past in the relations during the two world wars. It is an instructive road sign for the improvement of the existing relations towards developing friendship and understanding between our two peoples in the future. The “unity in diversity“ principle and formula is a value and methodological matrix to which one strives with the goal of promoting the global “culture of peace”. Many political theoriticians even think that the affirmation of influences and interweaving of various civilisations and cultures, this including intercultural dialogue and intensification of cultural diplomacy, could create a qualitative basis of preventive diplomacy and prevention of future conflicts which have so far, in a large number of cases been based on cultural differences and non- understanding, thus ending consequently in hostilities. The conceptualisation of the development of our modern society and international relations under the conditions of fostering “culture of peace”, understanding and the establishment of friendly relations as the supreme intangible cultural heritage of the world and the most precious civilisational heritage of mankind is the most important task of all diplomacies in the world in the atomic era being full of everyday security
183 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century challenges. In that sense, some theoriticians regard cultural diplomacy as “the peak of diplomacy in general”.3 In the focus of researchers of cultural heritage and “culture of peace” is actually the future of that collective experience of mankind,4 which is not any more a blank testimony of the past times. It becomes the essential capital of humanity and fundamental substance for further development of diplomatic relations. Cultural heritage becomes identification code of each and every state, a standard of collective memory of its people and humanity and consciencesness about the general good of mankind and credibility of the people. Cultural Heritage and culture of rememberance thus includes the top achievements of the modern civilisational achievement and challenge - maintaining “culture of peace” in the new architecture of the world where the meaning of sovereignty is changing from geographic borders to borders of national identities and unity in diversity. The new scientific discipline – heritology deals with this. The new branding of the state in international relations can particularly be achieved by the promotion of its cultural heritage, cultural values as well as by the cultural exchange. The crisis of cultural identity in international relations where, unfortunately, most of the time supremacy prevails and which the world is facing more and more prominently every day, creates the need for defining the common “value potentials” as foundations for building a new structure of international relations. For this reason, cultural heritage is a basis which any contemporary diplomacy takes as a starting point in creating influence in the field of “soft power”. This is because diplomacy, which is directed towards intercultural dialogue and the development of friendship and understanding, being unburdened by the animosities and hostilities it has inherited from previous wars curved in mamory of the entire mankind, can be defined as preventive diplomacy that uses cultural heritage and modern technologies for achieving its aims, opting for the creation of the milieux of understanding, dignified culture of rememberance on victims and the establishment of friendship through cultural diplomacy and fostering of “culture of peace” as the basis in international relations. Taking as a starting point the fact that apart from language, script, history, customs and beliefs, tangible and intangible heritage is one of the identification codes of any nation, this including mankind, too, according to the provision of
3 Dr Nenad A. Vasić, Cultural diplomacy – A contribution to the establishment of the Serbian cultural diplomacy („Kulturna diplomatija-prilog zasnivanju srpske kulturne diplomatije“), The Collection of Papers from the International Conference Preservance and Protection of Serbian Cultural and Historical Heritage Abroad (Očuvanje i zaštita srpskog kulturnog i istorijskog nasleđa u inostranstvu),Institute for International Politics and Economy, Belgrade, june, 2009. 4 Šola, T., 2004.
184 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the Peace Charter all member states of the peace organisation – the United Nations have the obligation and duty to keep on maintaining the cultural identity through culture of rememberance and the respect of cultural and historical heritage and inheritance of our glorious ancestors and to primarily keep on maintaining “culture of peace” as the supreme achievement and heritage of our civilisation for which they unselfishly gave their lives in order to achieve freedom and to establish a lasting and sustainable peace of mankind. Serbian-German cultural relations include multidisciplinary aspect and should be the subject of thorough studies by numerous sciences and disciplines, this primarily including history, law and economics, political science, sociology and culturology. Contemporary studies in the field of heritage protection theory – heritology point to the fact that the conditions have been created for this particular science as one of the new multidisciplinary scientific fields to join the research of Serbian-German cultural relations for its unquestionable presence in the collective memories of both peoples in the way that has no its match in the European and world history.5 There are numerous possible aspects of observing their mutual relations, particularly bearing in mind that this is the phenomenon which had first occurred in the Middle Ages also taking into account the first meeting of the Serbian and German rulers in Niš in 1189. Later in the modern era, they endured and developed with some rises and falls being characterised by very fruitful intellectual and spiritual co-operation in the 19th century. Since a large number of Serbian schoolchildren and students received their education in Germany in the period before the WWI (about 110 doctorants finished studies in Germany) this had for its consequence the creation of specific cultural relations between the two peoples, spreading of the German culture and language in Serbia and exertion of its influence on art and culture. Many Serbian and German families have kept up to the present day material traces of personal histories of their ancestors on the times when some Serbian schoolchildren and students stayed and educated themselves in Germany. Heritological research of these relations show in what way friendship as a phenomenon of collective expression can be considered a non-material cultural good which survives in some other time period independently from the extent to which it has been brought into accord with official, political and states relations of the two peoples. During the history, they were tempted several times, this also including the period of the two last decades.
5 Popović-Živančević M., 2006.
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International Documents and heritological Research of Serbian-German Cultural Relations Heritological research is directed towards determining cultural heritage and protection of its values on the basis of international documents and the scientific views and values that have been set so far, which are used to interpret Serbian- German cultural relations by other sciences determining and evaluating at the same time these relations by their own methods of study. Here, one takes into consideration that culture is expressed and manifested not only in the form of material goods but also in the form of intangible ones which are transferred from generation to generation by language, oral tradition, music, dance, theatre, life philosophy (attitudes), religion, memories, actions, practice, customs, mediation and a whole range of other forms. Subjects and places where ideas and cultural practice are located are the testimony of the presence and transmission of intangible heritage, this also including documents and for example, intense correspondence between Jacob Grimm and Vuk Karadžić, which are kept in the cultural archives of the Serbian Academy of Science and Arts in Belgrade as well the works of art by artists and novelists, both being the Serbs and the Germans. Intangible heritage offers contextual information clearly confirming that no cultural group is fixed in time but keeps developing and growing. Every state is responsible for the identification of elements of non-material heritage and for making a list of national inventory – a registry of heritage which should be safeguarded. For that purpose there are two significant international documents and they are as follows: the UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage6, which was ratified by Serbia in 2010 and the Seoul Declaration of ICOM on the Intangible Heritage.7 Although the documents mentioned above are significant as a whole for this field and for determining Serbian-German cultural relations as intangible cultural heritage, it is important to emphasise several attitudes. The Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage points to the fact that in order to determine that such a good belongs to non-material heritage it is necessary to fulfil the following several preconditions: that this is a good that is being transferred from one generation to another, then, that communities and groups keep on re-building it in accordance with their own history as well as that the good concerned forms the feeling of self-importance and endurance, thus contributing to accepting cultural diversities and creative work of the man.
6 Convention for the safeguarding of the intangible cultural heritage, UNESCO, 2003. 7 Seoul Declaration, Museums and Intangible Heritage, 2004.
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The Seoul Declaration of ICOM on the Intangible Heritage encourages states to establish the Fund for the Promotion of the Intangible Heritage, to establish and efficiently implement the laws and local regulations for the protection of non- material heritage. It also introduces the obligation to be acquainted with intangible heritage as a condition to be qualified in museology. In order to verify and safeguard the cultural good belonging to non-material heritage the state should establish a body that would be responsible for this field and establish co-ordination between all ministries which are in charge for heritage as well as between the museums as institutions safeguarding intangible heritage.8 In Serbia, in 2011, the Network for the Protection and Preservation of Intangible Cultural Heritage was founded in accordance with the UNESCO rules and instructions. The Network is composed of the following bodies: 1. The National Committee for Non-Material Cultural Heritage; 2. The Working Group for the Development of Intangible Cultural Heritage; 3. The Centre for the Research of Intangible Heritage at the Ethnographic Museum within which acts the Commission for the Registration of Intangible Cultural Heritage in the National Registry and Preliminary List of Intangible Cultural Heritage; 4. The Development Educational Centre for Intangible Heritage within the “Staro selo” museum in Sirogojno. One of the most important tasks of the Network is to make a list of non- material goods which should be urgently protected as well as to make a representative list of intangible cultural heritage which should be proposed for the World Heritage List in co-ordination with the UNESCO National Commission and the Permanent Delegation of Serbia to UNESCO. Competent bodies are expected to adopt the international standards in the field of conservation of non-material heritage, to establish professional and legal frameworks for defining, identifying, evaluating and classifying non-material heritage as well as the standards for the non-material heritage protection processes and criteria. Also, by the establishment of the Network the preconditions have been created for the formulation of the national standards of identification, evaluation, labelling or marking of intangible cultural heritage and identification of safeguards and transmitters of knowledge (individuals or groups) as well as for the standardisation of the models of systematic support to transmitters. Taking into consideration the fact that in many fields of non-material heritage it is necessary to restore and resume the broken traditions, renew the environment as well as to provide support for displaying it and promoting in public, the field
8 Popović-Živančević M., 2011.
187 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of intangible heritage requires the standardisation procedures for maintaining its specific forms of document transmission and protection. A very important task of the national network is also the standardisation of conditions for the conservation of the material evidence of non-material heritage in the field of archival materials, risk and priority assessment as well as other recommendations which should help reduce the risk of disappearance, inferior presentation and maintenance of non-material goods. In that sense, it is necessary to adopt appropriate standards for working out of documentation.
Fostering of Collective Memories of Serbian-German Cultural Relations The project of exploring the possibilities to declare that Serbian-German cultural friendly relations are a non-material cultural good is of great significance for the promotion of bilateral relations between Serbia and Germany. For this reason, printing of materials, books, brochures and catalogues should be intensified as accompanying materials for exhibits and museum exhibitions at which the archival documents would be displayed providing evidence on close cultural relations between our ancestors. The project of exploring the possibilities to declare that Serbian-German cultural friendly relations are a non-material cultural good is of great significance for the promotion of bilateral relations between Serbia and Germany. For example, there is an interesting opinion of academic Gabriela Schubert, professor emeritus from the Friedrich Schiller University, which she has presented in her book emphasising “friendly relations of people of Serbia and Germany” by giving the title to the book “Serben und Deutsche – Traditionen der Gemeinsamkeit gegen Feindbilder” (The Serbs and Germans –Tradition of Togetherness against Prejudices) as well as the opinion of Jean-Christophe Buisson9 on Serbian-French friendly relations. He states, for example, that France has now re-established close relations with Serbia, which existed for centuries. “Since the Middle Ages there has been established a natural friendship that was partly broken by the bombardment of Serbia in 1999. Now, that some time has passed and wounds are healed we are finding again a direct, close and natural relateship between our two peoples. This does not include governments, because the prelateship between the peoples does not depend on the actions taken by governments”. Numerous examples which are present in personal histories of many Serbian and German families and intellectual avant-garde testify that there are specific
9 Popović, M. (2011) Buison o Beogradu, s ljubavlju (Buisson on Belgrade with love). http:// www.pecat.co.rs/tag/mira-popovic/. jun 2011.
188 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century relations and collective memories of the friendship and foe relations. Even today, they have kept the emotional contents and subjective experience of Serbian- German relations that are transmitted from generation to generation.
The monument in Niš built in memory of the establishment of the first diplomatic relations between Serbs and Germans, marked by meeting of Friedrich I Barbarossa and Stefan Nemanja in 1189.
The scientific research attempts to introduce this phenomenon in the objective reality pointing to the stereotypes of Serbian-German relations and friendship and enmity after World Wars I and II. Concerning the stereotype of the Serbian-German friendship and enmity one should determine and explain when and why it occurred and how it evolved in time. However, the knowledge of more then eight hundred years old intensive, rich and substantial Serbian-German relations, which, of course, have had their ups and downs, can be a pledge in the development of cultural diplomacy in the future for the purpose of eliminating the already established stereotypes of enmity and pointing to the possibility of relying on the periods when good relations between Serbia and Germany prevailed. There are few nations in Eastern Europe which can be proud of the extent and intensity achieved in tradition of developed relations which Serbian and German intellectual avant guarde established, for example, in the 19th century.
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The relationship of heritology to this phenomenon is that it is necessary to make a synthesis of the results which have been obtained by the testimony and documents from the public life with still unavailable documents belonging to private histories of families and individuals. Personal histories and memories from the life of families are explored in heritology without causality and are based on the statistical indicators since the phenomenon of cultural good is not related to the number of guardians (transmitters) or frequence (frequency) of the events that are being transferred, but to the quality and its duration through generations. In that sense, the research of the phenomenon of Serbian-German cultural relations includes the polls and recording of testimonies of transmitters of this good as a significant methodological concept. The research of Serbian-German relations belongs to the field of anthropological heritage which explores collective searches and experiences in social time as a temporal perspective in the way it is defined by Robert Laer as a positive or negative image of the past, presence and future, what depends on the society, social group or an individual.10 Unlike the research in the past decades, the exploration of the phenomenon of Serbian-German friendly cultural relations is today going on in culture of the digital era. In theory, the digital era is mentioned within the context of hybrid timeline or actually, the timeline where the time of remembrance and the time of oblivion co- exist11 in culture where, on one hand, time is compressed, while, on the other, it is sequently divided to past, presence and future, which appear “as if being put in a random sequence”, what is noted by Castells.12 The development of new possibilities for the heritage protection which has been achieved by the application of IT technologies enables global culture today to make personal histories and memories become a part of the public, electronic space. With written documents, audio and video records which belong to the collections of virtual museums in the new museology reality it is possible to make conservation of intangible heritage as memories and a living practice of cultural relations. In this way, it is confirmed that the culture of this era is transforming the spatial and time dimensions in the way that it eliminates the space and time distances.13 Museums which exist only as web applications are today already a part of the internationally recognised museology practice.14 Direct listening to the
10 Lauer R.H., 1981. 11 Baier L., 2000. 12 Castells M., 2001. 13 Purser R. E., 2002. 14 Polić-Radovanović S., 2011.
190 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century testimonies of the participants in some event are available,15 this also including an access to digitalised original documents16 as well as polls for personal participation in the creation of museum documentation.17 In this way, virtual museums and their documentation centres are becoming contemporary archives, multimedia portals and sites which show in what way heritological research and practice of conservation contribute to the scientific research in all other fields that attempt to explore some phenomena. Monuments in tri-dimensional, realistic surroundings or in virtual space are significant for the maintenance of identity of any nation as public places of collective recognition and collective identification. These are the places where symbolic respect is shaped towards the past events which determined history and they keep on being the centres of collective feelings and common memories, the places where respect is also shown to the victims of World War I and World War II. There sorrow turns into pride for the heritage of freedom and peace and dignified memory of lovers of freedom and innocent victims. Virtual museums are a new level in the cultural evolution. Franz Wuketis18 points out that unlike the organic evolution where it is possible to transmit information to the next generations only from living organisms, in the world of culture, information are transmitted also from the cultures which have disappeared but still exist thanks to the technical possibilities. The results of the heritological research of Serbian-German relations can be the creation of the Museum of Serbian-German Friendly Cultural Relations in e-space to be founded and maintained by the Department of Public Diplomacy or to be presented on web sites of diplomatic missions of the countries concerned or on web sites of their Ministries of Culture. This and similar other projects of cultural diplomacy could become international as a common undertaking not only carried out by institutions but also by individuals and organisations from Serbia and Germany. This could result in the establishment of Groups of Friendship for Fostering Memories of Friendly Cultural Relations between the Serbs and the Germans. The protection of Serbian-German friendly cultural relations as intangible heritage should proceed in the following several stages: identification of the intangible heritage, determining of cultural, historical and other values of the
15 Internet: http://museum.gulagmemories.eu/en/home/homepage 16 Internet: http://network.icom.museum/imd2011/imd-2011/museum-and-memory-activities/ unesco-memory-of-the-world-programme-activities.html. 17 Internet: http://network.icom.museum/imd2011/imd-2011/museum-and-memory-activities/ unesco-memory-of-the-world-programme-activities.html. 18 Wuketits F. M., 1993.
191 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century heritage, labelling of the proposed heritage as an intangible one, declaring that it is an intangible heritage on the part of competent institutions which are in charge of intangible cultural heritage, marking of the guard and transmitter of knowledge, establishment of procedures and methods of knowledge transfer, foundation of educational centres for intangible heritage. In accordance with the changes in the administration of the Republic of Serbia with the aim of establishing the intangible heritage protection system and the needs to intensify cultural diplomacy such ideas for taking cultural projects of maintaining friendly cultural relations could be a model for the creation of museums that would also deal with other phenomena of intangible cultural heritage which certainly live in the collective consciousness of the Serbs and the Germans. They would contribute to further improvement and development of bilateral relations between our two countries and to cultural exchange.
German Cultural Diplomacy The very extensive agenda of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Germany for the promotion of inter-cultural dialogue takes place twice a year gathering diplomats from all continents who attend the Diplomatic Academy of Germany where they study Germany’s culture, history, politics and diplomacy. This country has a very diversified network of its cultural centres entitled “Goethe Institute” where the German language and literature are studied and exchange student programmes are made for those who wish to study in German at top university centres. Germany has passed a long way from the destroyed, nationally humiliated and defeated country to the spiritus movens of European Union. There are forces who would deny this status to Germany afraid of its growing economic and demographic power in the EU and in the world claiming that “Great Germany” is being born again. It is an interesting fact that even today Great Britain has the attribute great in its title. There are certain international circles who “fear again” that the “German Europe” concept could overpower the “European Germany” concept. It is evident that the economic, then the political and finally, the military influence of Germany is growing day after day, but that no one can deny that it is the spirtus movens and the backbone of the United Europe. In this way, Germany today, as the fourth economic power in the world with its growing political influence is struggling to become a permanent member of the Security Council, advocating for carrying out a reform of the UN and for the establishment of a multipolar system in international relations. In the NATO, it is fighting for the division of command responsibility and pursuing of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP). Headed by Germany, European
192 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century countries would like to adapt the NATO doctrine to the newly-created changes in the world (cessation of the block division of the world) and “take a more active role with the United States of Europe in the analysis and decision-making processes concerning interventions, crisis prevention and crisis management worldwide. Thus, after more then five long decades, by its re-unification and consistent diplomatic prudence Germany just recently and finally resolved its national question, got its whole territory back, re-established its national dignity as well as its economic, political and military power. Contrary to Germany, Yugoslavia lost all this in the late 20th and the early 21st century and Serbia has a difficult task to make an offensive diplomatic strategy for the affirmation of its foreign policy orientation facing the need to mastermind efficient public and particularly cultural and economic diplomacy which would help it improve position and make the new branding in the international community.
Serbian Cultural Diplomacy Serbia is facing the urgent need to work out and adopt the National Cultural Strategy and then to define its cultural diplomacy as an important and influential aspect of its foreign policy in new branding of Serbia. Unfortunately, the Serbian diplomacy has only one cultural centre abroad which is located in Paris, although the needs are much bigger for the fact that there are 5,100,00019 Serbs in diaspora in about 100 countries in the world. Reconciliation of the Saint Sava type and “pacifism“ is a starting point and strongpoint of the Serbian cultural diplomacy which is to be restored and to be re-established.20 Taking as a starting point this fact, apart from the representatives of high aristocrats among the first “cultural” diplomats that can safely be called “Serbian ambassadors of culture” was, for example, princess Milica, who in 1389, had talks with Bayezid I and who was responsible, among other things, for transferring the relics of Saint Petka to Serbia. Among them there should also be mentioned Mateja Nenadović,21 Jovan Ristić,22
19 The total number of the Serbs in diaspora includes the Serbs living in the region and there are 2,120,982 of them. 20 Teodosije Hilandarac, Žitije svetog Save (The Life of Saint Sava), Srpska književna zadruga, Belgrade, 1990, p. 147. 21 Bogdan Lj. Popović, Istorija Ministarstva inostranih dela Srbije (History of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia), Službeni glasnik/Diplomatska akademija, Belgrade, 2005, p. 9. 22 He took part in the international negotiations at the Berlin Congress in 1878 when Serbia gained the right to statehood.
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Stojan Novaković,23 Vuk Karadžić,24 Dositej Obradović and bishop Petar Petrović Njegoš. The same applies to the top novelists and poets that were a part of the diplomatic corps of the Serbian diplomacy, the so-called “tailcoat poets“ in the late 19th and the first half of the 20th century such as Nušić, Dučić, Rakić and the only Nobel prize winner in this region, Ivo Andrić.25 In that sense, relying its origins and orientation on pacifism and maintaining of its cultural values Serbia is today facing the outstanding need for masterminding and strategic operationalisation of its cultural diplomacy which would, of course and above all, be based on the monuments of culture in the mother land and abroad, which are recognised by the UNESCO as cultural heritage of mankind or universal cultural values. This particularly includes monasteries Stari Ras with Sopoćani, Studenica, Visoki Dečani, the Patriarchate of Peć, the Bogorodica Ljeviška Church and Gračanica as well as the archaeological site of Gamzigrad-Romuliana.26 A part of the monuments in the Serbian province of Kosovo and Metohija are highly endangered, although in accordance with the Resolution 1244 of the UN Security Council they are protected by the UNMIK and EULEX in Priština. Generally, the Serbian cultural heritage and particularly 572 military memorials in about 40 foreign countries are, with few exceptions, neglected for the deficiency of financial funds and a lack of organised approach of the government bodies and diaspora regarding their location, restoration, protection and development.27
Serbs and Germans – diplomatic and cultural relations Let us underline, once again, the fact that even the present generations of the Serbs and the Germans cannot and should not forget the tragic past which was caused by the conflicts of our two peoples during the two world wars in the 20th century, but, however, we should overcome it. The time of friendship of our two peoples has remained in the deep shadow of the terror of World War I and World War II, but the literature speaks very little about that.
23 Mihailo Vojvodić, Izazovi srpske spoljne politike (1791–1918) – ogledi i rasprave (Challenges of the Serbian foreign policy (1791-1918) – essays and discussions), Istorijski institut, Beograd, 2007, p. 212. 24 He helped open the Serbian House in Vienna. 25 Miodrag Mitić, Poete u fraku (Tailcoat poets), Filip Višnjić, Beograd, 2002. Their representatives were Ivo Andrić, Jovan Dučić, Milan Rakić, Rastko Petrović, Miloš Crnjanski, Branislav Nušić, Laza Kostić, Vojislav Ilić, Vojislav M. Jovanović–Marabo, etc. 26 UNESKO, Internet, http://www.kultura.sr.gov.yu/ 27 Vladimir Grečić, „Mesto srpske dijaspore u spoljnoj politici Srbije“ (The role of the Serbian diaspora in the foreign policy of Serbia), in: Elementi strategije spoljne politike Srbije, Edita Stojić Karanović, Slobodan Janković (Eds.), Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2008, p. 364.
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Choosing this subject, I was of the opinion that reminding of all aspects of Serbian-German relations I could give my contribution to the future and the development of friendship relations between our two peoples. Without this historical consideration of the period of friendship between the Serbs and Germans, my article would not be complete. Actually, I wished to point out the exceptionally fruitful spiritual exchange that had been characteristic for the 19th century which additionally inspired me to choose this topic. This refers to one of our most important philosophers Dositej Obradović. He was a founder of the Grande Ecole, which had preceded the foundation of the Belgrade University. In the 19th century, he studied and delivered lectures in Halle and Leipzig. This also refers to Vuk Karadžić, founder of the modern Serbian written language who in 1823, was appointed honorary Ph.D. at the University of Jena. He established close connections with prominent German intellectuals of that time and they were as follows: Goethe, baron von Herder, Leopold von Ranke, Jacob Grimm and others whose works would leave significant trails in the German late classical literature and Romanticism. I also wanted to finally remind of the understanding and respect that was established between our peoples which should be fostered in the uniting Europe in the 21st century. By all this, I would emphasise that I was particularly impressed by the work of one of German most significant historians Leopold Ranke, a great admirer of the Serbs. Publishing his book on the victimization of the Serbs as well as by Victor Hugo’s proclamation „For Serbia“(Pour la Serbie) which he issued in 1876 he appealed to the European governments and intellectuals to rise against the oppression of the Serbs. In that way, they made a great contribution to the understanding of the then very difficult position of the Serbian people that suffered from the Ottoman Empire’s terror. Victor Hugo said in his article the following: “ They are killing one nation. Where? In the heart of Europe. Are there any witnesses? The witness is one. The entire world.” Leopold Ranke in his book “The Serbian Revolution”, which was published in 1829, managed to call attention of the Germans to the spirit of freedom and independence which Serbian people had shown for centuries defying the foreign rule. Bearing in mind all these academic relations between German and Serbian intellectuals which associated among themselves and showed respect to each other I hope that M.A. and Ph.D. applicants from Belgrade and Berlin that would deal with relations between Serbia and Germany will have an opportunity not only to receive their academic titles but to build, above all, bridges of friendship between our two peoples as once did – the Germans in Serbia and the Serbs in Germany: Vuk Karadžić, Grimm, Ranke, Goethe, Sturm, Baron von Herder, Felix Kanitz, baron von Richter, Dositej Obradović, Baron von Pirch, Nadežda Petrović, Dragutin Anastasijević, Đura Vajfert, Milan Grol and many others. On the occasion of publishing one of very few bilingual books (in Serbian and German) dealing with
195 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century friendly relations of our two peoples which I took as a model, academic Gabriela Schubert, a prominent Slavist and Balkanologist, continuing a tradition of academic co-operation between German and Serbian intellectuals wrote the following in the introductory note of that very book published under the following title „Srbi i Nem- ci – tradi ci ja zajed ni štva protiv predra su da“ (Serbs and Germans – Tradition of Unity against Prejudices): “Publishing of a bilingual book that would testify of numerous fruitful meetings between the Germans and the Serbs in the past was an impulse to me to make revive the climate of understanding and strengthen the cultural contacts between our two peoples in the uniting Europe”.28 Reminding of the period of the establishment of the first diplomatic and intensive cultural relations between our prominent figures in the 19th century is an instructive road sign for further enhancement of relations between the Serbs and Germans and the significant contribution to culture of rememberance of friendship and culture of peace in the 21st century.
Germans in Serbia Although one can say that Serbian-German relations were established not sooner than in the19th century, they date back to the Middle Ages. Actually, as early as in 1189 leading the crusaders Friedrich I Barbarossa had recognised Stefan Nemanja as the Serbian King and made an alliance with him against Byzantium.
It is well known that the bodyguard of Stefan Dečanski and Dušan the Mighty, Serbian tsar, was composed of German armoured soldiers. “There were 300 German mercenaries” in the guard of tsar Dušan and they were under command of Ritter Palman. For example, Article 173 of Dušan’s Code says that “among landed gentry in Serbia there are some Germans who received landed property from the ruler”.
Tsar Dušan the Mighty
28 Gabri je la Šubert, uvodnik, „Srbi i Nemci – Tradi ci ja zajed ni štva protiv predra su da”, from Introductory (Serbs and Germans – Tradition of Togetherness against Prejudices) , Col le gi um Euro pa e um Je nen se Palm & En ke, Je na und Er lan gen, 2003.
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German miners (Sassi) were coming during the rule of Uroš I (1243-1276) for the exploitation of mines in the old Serbian state. Their first well-known settlement was Breskovo. Then, among bigger mining centres they settled Rudnik, Rogozna and Novo Brdo. There is a prevailing opinion that Sassi had come from Erdelyi and “perhaps from the region near the Alps, Central Germany and from Bohemia”. Sassi exerted enormous influence on Despot Stefan Lazarević’s “Mining Law”. The legal provisions on miners and the mining terminology in general “were obviously under the German influence”.29 Sassi also exerted influence on the development of some crafts whose names are even today used in our language šuster (Schuster – shoe mender), šnajder (Schneider – tailor), etc. In the field of mining, the first experts and their workers came from Austria- Hungary and Germany. “Several hundreds of them were coming in a lump in the mid-20th century forming their mining colonies in Serbia. The first experts- Serbs were educated in German mining academies and the system of work and exploitation in mines were mostly carried out by the German model”.30 German colonists who during the period of its independence had mined ores and metals in Serbia disappeared immediately after the collapse of the Serbian state.31 As late as in 1718, when Austria occupied Serbia German colonists came to our country. Austria attempted to “colonise there as many as possible Germans with the purpose of not only increasing the number of the population but of introducing as much as possible culture, particularly the economic and trade ones and of expanding as much as possible space for Catholicism and the love to the Catholic Habsburg monarchy. Colonists were granted special exemptions... as well as privileges after their settlement”.32 In the period between 1719 and 1721, several hundred of German peasants came from Pfalz and settled Serbia near Belgrade.33 Most Germans came to Belgrade to Dorćol, so this quarter was called Deutsche Stadt (German quarter) or Donaustadt (Danube quarter), while the Serbian part of the town which was situated on the Sava was called Raizenstadt
29 N. Ra doj čić, Za kon o rud ni ci ma De spo ta Ste fa na La za re vi ća (Despot Stefan Lazarević’s Mining Law), Be o grad, pp. 34-36. 30 D. Milić, Nemač ki kapi tal u Srbi ji do 1918. godi ne (German capital in Serbia until 1918), Istorij ski ča so pis XII-XI II, 1962-1963. Be o grad 1963. pp. 338-339.; R. Lju šić, Kne že vi na Sr bi ja 1830-1839, Be - o grad, 1986, pp. 96-97. 31 F. Valje vac, Geschichte der deutschen Kultur be zi e hun gen zu Sudo ste u ro pa (The History of German Cultural Relations in South Eastern Europe), Band I, Mun chen, 1935, p. 233. 32 Tih. R. Đorđe vić, Iz Srbi je kneza Milo ša, Stanov ni štvo-Na se lja (From Prince Miloš’s Serbia, Population-Settlements), knj. II, Be o grad, 1924, p. 116. 33 J. Kal brun ner, Die Ba na ter Ko lo ni sa tion un ter Karl VII und jun ger Ma ria The re sia bis 1753 (The colonisation of Banat under Karl VII and young Maria Theresia). Mit te i lun gen der De utschen Aka de mie, Mun chen, 1936, Vi e r tes Heft, p. 555.
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(the quarter of the Serbs) or Saustadt.34 The Germans settled the following other settlements near Belgrade and they are as follows: Karistal, Mirijevo (Maria – Nebel), Slance. The Germans also settled near the Danube in Smederevo, Grocka. They also lived near the Sava in Ostružnica (Osterbah). In the provinces “it seemed that Rudnik was a big German mining settlement... of Erdelyi Sassa”. The Germans also settled Avala and Jagodina.35
Germans settling Serbia As early as in 1831, the Germans had been coming to Serbia both individually or as families. Since 1839, “30, 50, 70 and even more German families” were registered at the Prince’s Office. The only requirement was that the German immigrants were honest and neat people and they should accept the Serbin rule. In June 1838, “an important decision... was also made” prohibiting autonomous colonies“. The requests of German immigrants were usually accepted and the government also granted them exemptions: “five year tax and surtax exemption, permission to freely cut wood for building their houses and utility rooms”.36 Prof. Đorđević also mentions the names of German immigrants until the end of 1839 and they mostly lived in Belgrade and Kragujevac.37
German schools in Serbia “The German colony in Belgrade was pretty strong and it is shown by the fact that as early as in 1829, “Pavle Verner, German teacher” was granted permission to open “a private German school” in Belgrade as well as that in 1839, “primer” which was intended for use in German schools in Serbia was published by Knjaževsko-Serbske Knjigopečatanje38 (Deutsche ABC-Buch). When Prince Miloš came to Belgrade on 26 January 1836, at the big ceremony which was organised on this occasion, “both the Germans and the Jews took part in and they were coming from various German provinces and working for the public service…” They sang “songs to his honour which were written for that occasion. One group sang in German and the other in Hebrew making a harmony
34 D. M. Pa vlo vić, Austrij ska vla da vi na u se ver noj Sr bi ji (The Austrian rule in northern Serbia), Be o grad, 1901, p. 94. 35 B. Niko la je vić, Nemač ki dose lje ni ci u starom Beo gra du i Srbi ji (German immigrants in old Belgrade and Serbia), „Be o grad ske op štin ske no vi ne”, 1936, No. 12, str. 878. 36 B. Ni ko la je vić, op. cit., p. 878. 37 Tih. R. Đor đe vić, Ar hiv ska gra đa za na se lja u Sr bi ji (Archival materials on settlements in Serbia), Be o grad-Ze mun, 1926.
198 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century with a flute and a guitar.”39 As T. Đorđević points out, there were a lot of German experts of various profiles which worked for the Serbian state. Germans had been coming to Serbia up to the end of the 19th century. After the German unification (1870) or actually after the Berlin Congress (1878) when Serbia was internationally recognised, Serbian-German relations were established. Contract practice was developed, consulates were opened, trade co-operation was established, this including investment of the German capital in mining in Serbia as well other German concessions which were granted to Serbia. Along with the German capital and industrialists, German workers also came to Serbia.
German travel writers – witnesses of the Serbian history In the 16th century many German humanists passed through Serbia (as secretaries, clergymen, doctors or chemists as a part of various delegations) travelling to Constantinople: V. Curipesitz (book written in 1531 in German); Melichior Sevdlitz (in 1580 in German); St. Gorlach (in 1581 in Latin); G. Buseeg (in 1581 in Latin)... in the early 17th century the diary by S. Schvvegera (in 1609 in German); “Other texts were manuscripts while being printed afterwards during the 17th, 18th and some even in the 19th century” (diaries by Hans Dernschvvamm, Fridrich Seidel, W. Muntzer and W.A. Steinach).40 Among numerous German travel writers (G.A.Wimmer, F. Posart, H. Wendell) who visited, travelled through and described Serbia the following should be mentioned: Adam von Weingarten (1820), “captain in the imperial Austrian main apartment”, Otto Dubislaw von Pirch (1829), “lieutenant in the royal Prussian first guard regiment”, Siegmund von Herder (1835), “Saxon mining captain”, August Lange (1853), “construction engineer” who worked in Serbia from 1852-1859, Felix Kanitz (1859 and further on), A. Essewein (1869), and others.
38 Tih. R. Đorđe vić, Iz Srbi je kneza Milo ša, Stanov ni štvo-Na se lja (From Prince Miloš’s Serbia, Population-Settlements), Vol. II, Be o grad, 1924, p. 175. 39 Tih. R. Đorđe vić, Nemci u Srbi ji za vreme prve vlade kneza Milo ša (1815-1839) (Germans in Serbia during the reign of Prince Miloš (1815-1839)), „Vre me”, 1923, No. 378. 40 C. Mi ja to vić, Pre tri sta go di na. Pri log pro u ča va nju iz vo ra za isto ri ju na šeg na ro da u XVI ve ku (Three hundred years ago. A contribution to the study of the sources for the history of our people. Gla snik Srp skog uče nog dru stva, XXXVI, 1872. pp. 155-219. M. Vla ji nac, iz pu to pi sa H. Der ža va - ma 1553-1555 (From the account of H. Dernschvvamm’s travel (1553-1555), Be o grad, 1927. pp. 51-56.; M. Purko vić, Bele ška puto pi sa ca Muntze ra o mana sti ru Mile še vu, 1559 (Notes of travel writer Muntzer on the Mileševa monastery). Ju žni pre gled, Sko plje, 1937. Vol. 12. pp. 457-476.; Đ. Pja no vić, Cu ri peschisch, Pu to pis kroz Bo snu, Sr bi ju, Bu gar sku i Ru me li ju (A travel account of Bosnia, Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania), 1530. Sa ra je vo, 1950.
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German travel writers provided many valuable data on the circumstances and conditions under which Christians lived (under the Turkish rule) and perhaps a large part what the West knew about Serbia and the Serbs in the 16th century was the result of the information they presented. If we could make a single picture by using all these data, then it would certainly be a waste, uncultivated land and an enslaved and tortured people.41
Cultural monuments Within the context of Serbian-German cultural relations „the famous Serbian Psalter from the last quarter of the 14th century“ is significant and it is today kept in the State Library in Munich. As was written in Latin on the first page of the manuscript, what is explained by S. Radojčić, the Psalter had been given as a gift to the Gotteszell monastery on 9 January 1689. For a short time, the Psalter was in Regensburg in the monastery of St. Emmera, while in the early 19th century it was taken to Munich. As the Serbian records say, the Psalter had belonged to Despot Đurađ Branković (1456) and in the early 17th century, it was kept in the monastery of Pribina Glava in Srem. Three years later, between 1627 and 1630, the Psalter was found in the library of Patriarch Pajsije in neighbouring Vrdnik. The old Patriarch made a copy of the Psalter and miniatures. In this way, the copy of the Munich Psalter was made. It was an interesting manuscript which was burnt together with other books belonging to the National Library in Belgrade, on 7 April 1941 in the bombardment during World War II. The Munich Psalter is unusually mentioned as one of the most important Serbian cultural monuments from the late 14th century. It is also valuable as the largest manuscript of the Serbian miniature painting and as a work which contained many positive characteristics that made establish the last great style of the old Serbian art, the style of the Morava school (S.Ra doj - čić, Minhen ski srpski psaltir (The Munich Serbian Psalter, Zbornik, Filozofskog fa kul te ta, Be o grad, 1957.II.str. 34). Both Psalters, the Munich and its copy from the early 16th century, were published in Monuments (Dankschrifften) of the Vienna Academy by Josef Strazygowski.42
41 Z. Kon stan ti no vić, Dva pri lo ga pro u ča va nju me đu sob nih od no sa Ne ma ca i Ju go slo ve na u do ba hu ma ni zma (Two contributions to the study of relations between Germans and Yugoslavs in the period of humanism), Zbor nik Fi lo sof skog fa kul te te, 1959. Vol. IV, p. 432. 42 “From that perspective – from the internal history of the old Serbian art – the Munich Psalter is unusually mentioned as one of the most important Serbian cultural monument from the late 14th
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Strengthening of cultural relations between prominent Germans and Serbs As early as in the late 18th and especially in the early 19th century, Serbian- German cultural relations strengthened. The Serb Dositej Obradović went to Germany where he studied and delivered lectures in Halle and Leipzig. In 1737, he published the book “Život i priključenija” (The Life and Adventures of Dimitrije Obradović) in the printing firm of Christoph Breitkopf in Leipzig. Under the influence of the philosophy of German nationalism, he developed his education programme for the Serbian people “approaching to the European culture”… In 1837, Sima Milutinović Sarajlija published his “Istorija Srbije of početka 1813. do kraja 1815. godine” (The History of Serbia from the beginning of 1813 to the end of 1815) in the printing firm of Karl Tauchnitz. 43 Founder of the Serbian language Vuk Karadžić developed close relations with the greatest German writers and historians – Goethe, the Grimm Brothers, Leopold Ranke. The Serbian folk poetry was accepted by the Germans. Being excited by it Wilhelm Humboldt and Jacob Grimm “ learnt Serbo-Croatian during the Berlin Congress particularly for its beauty”. 44 Grimm’s translating of the grammar produced by Vuk Karadžić and his obvious substantial correction of Tirol’s bad translation, which was supplemented after Vuk had sent materials afterwards, his, above all, significant preface and by all this, finding of a German publisher made Grimm deeply involved in Vuk’s reformatory and collecting mission which took a lot of his time interrupting the work on his grammar.
Serbs reward Germans, Germans reward Serbs In January 1849, Jacob Grimm was appointed corresponding member of the Serbian Literary Society as a gesture of “respect” for his “learnedness and merits for the Slavic and Serbian language”. In the same way, as recommended by Griimm and supported by Humboldt the “royal decoration” was awarded to Vuk (founder of the most universal alphabet in the world where one letter denotes
41 century. It is also valuable as the largest manuscript of the Serbian miniature painting and as a work which contained many positive characteristics that made establish the last great style of the old Serbian art, the style of the Morava school”. S. Ra doj čić, Min hen ski srp ski psal tir (The Munich Serbian Psalter), Zbor nik Fi lo zof skog fa kul te ta, Be o grad, 1957, Vol. II, p. 34. 43 N. Radoj čić, O raci o na li zmu kod Srba (On rationalism of the Serbs), Novi Sad, 1939.; M. Kostić, Dosi tej Obra do vić u istorij skoj perspek ti vi XVIII I XIX veka (Dositej Obradović in the historical perspective of 18th and 19th century), Be o grad, 1909. 44 J. Skerlić, Srpska književ nost u XVIII veku (The Serbian literature in the 18th century), Beo grad, 1909.
201 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century one sound). On Grimm’s recommendation, Vuk became a member of the Goettingen Learned Society and the Prussian Academy of Sciences.45 On the invitation of Prince Miloš, but also for the “reward of a thousand tsar ducats“, Baron Siegmund August Wolfgand von Herder came to Serbia in 1835 for the “exploration of its mining wealth“. He then wrote the book “Mining travels though Serbia”.46 In 1833, Baron Herder gave Prince Miloš as a present a collection of 500 samples of minerals and rocks from all over the world. In this way, foundations of natural museum studies were laid in Serbia. His explorations were so valuable that as a sign of his recognition Prince Miloš Obrenović give Herder an honorary sabre as a gift. Baron Otto Dubislaw von Pirch (1829), (lieutenant in the royal Prussian first guard regiment). After his visit to Serbia Pirch wrote the book “Travelling through Serbia in late autumn of 1829” (translated by Dr. Dragiša Mijušković).47 When the book was published in Germany, Pirch sent it to Prince Miloš as a present. On behalf of the whole Serbia, the Prince sent a letter of gratitude on 16 (28) January 1832 saying to Mr. Richter that he was no longer a foreigner in Serbia but its honorary citizen.48 One should also mention the name of German mining engineer Wilhelm Richter who had stayed in Serbia for several years. After that, he wrote the book “Prilike u Srbiji pod knezom Milošem do njegove abdikacije 1839. godine” (Conditions in Serbia under Prince Miloš up to his abdication in 1839).49
45 Lj. Kosi jer, Kultu rel le Bezi e hun gen, Grossdeutschl and und Jugo sla wi en (Cultural relations, Greater Germany and Yugoslavia), Ber lin-Wi en, 1939, p. 120. 46 S. Her der, Berg man nische Re i se in Ser bien (Mining travels though Serbia), Pesth, 1846. 47 Oto Du bi slav fon Pirh, “Put po Sr bi ji u po znu je sen 1829” (Travelling though Serbia in late autumn of 1829), Be o grad, 1899, p. 171. 48 Miloš Obreno vić - Otu Dubi sla vu Pirhu, pismo od 16. (28.) janu a ra 1832 (Miloš Obrenović to Otto Dubislaw Pirch, a letter of 16 (28) January 1832), “No va iskra”, Be o grad, No. 6, 16.6.1900, p. 164. 49 Wilchelm Richter - V. Rih ter, “Pri li ke u Sr bi ji pod kne zom Mi lo šem do nje go ve ab di ka ci je 1839. go di ne” (Conditions in Serbia under Prince Miloš up to his abdication in 1839) , Kra gu je vac, 1984, p. 109, sa po go vo rom Z. Spa si ća.
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Strengthening of cultural relations between prominent Germans and Serbs
Vuk Karadzhich Johan Wolfgang Göthe Leopold von Ranke Stephanovich
The book had been published in Leipzig in 1840 and as late as in 1984 it was translated and published in Kragujevac, although some part of the book had been translated and published in 1932. Owing to W. Richter, the Serbs were educated in German and other European universities of that time. The most valuable books on Serbia and the Serbian people were written by Felix Kanitz. However, the most important is Das Ko e ni gre ich Ser bien und das Ser - ben volk von der Ro mer ze it bis zur Ge gen wart, Zwe i ter Band, Land und Be vol krung, Le - ip zig, 1909 (Serbia – the land and the population since the Roman times until the end of the 19th century).50 The Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts possesses the materials (books, drawings, photos and other illustrative materials) belonging to Felix Kanitz. In 1930, they were given to the Archives of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts by his nephew J. Kanitz from Budapest.
German and European intellectuals on Serbia “….The military and political events in the Balkans, which included the liberation struggle of the South Slavs that were under the rule of the Ottoman Empire also aroused interest of the European public. In the 1804-1815 period,
50 Felix Kanitz - F. Kanic, “Srbi ja - zemlja i stanov ni stvo od rimskog doba do kraja XIX veka” (Serbia – the land and the population since the Roman times until the end of the 19th century), Vol. 2, “Srp ska knji zev na za dru ga”, Be o grad, 1985, p. 169.
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Serbia was granted a partial autonomy. It was undoubtedly the nicest period in German-South Slav relations, this especially including German-Serbian relations, as well as the time of mutual exchange. Never before and after writers and philosophers have co-operated so closely and fruitfully crossing the borders of their countries…”51 Lepold von Ranke, historian, who expressed enthusiasm for “the struggle of the Serbian people for liberation” wrote the classical historian work – Die Serbishe revolution (The Serbian Revolution).52 Serbian historians regard this work as one of the most important ones in the Serbian historiography of the 19th century. “The cultural and mediation role of the journal “Das Ausland” (Foreign countries) between the Germans and the Yugoslavs is also significant”. In the 1839-1893 period, a number of articles were published on Serbia and the Serbs, on Montenegro and the Montenegrins, which were written both by German and Serbian authors.53 As early as in 1789, Johann Wolfgang Goethe translated the first Serbian folk poem – “Hasanaginica”. It was “our first folk poem that appeared in the learned Europe”.54 All articles Goethe wrote about Serbian folk poetry were translated and published in the jubilee issue of “Nova Evropa” (New Europe): Serbian poems
51 Gabri e la Schubert, Zur rezep tion serbischer Volkspo e sie und Belle tri stik in Deutschland (On the reception of the Serbian folk poetry and fiction in Germany), aus “Ser ben und De utsche - Tra di - ti o nen der Ge me in sam ke it ge gen Fe ind bil der“, Col le gi um Euro pa e um Je nen se Palm & En ke, Je - na und Er lan gen, 2003. se i te 126. 52 N.Ra doj čić, “Ran ke o va no va kon cep ci ja srp ske isto ri je, ras pra ve Znan stve nog dru štva za hu ma - ni stic ke ve de” (Ranke’s conception of the Serbian history, discussions of the Scientific Society for Humanist Studies), II, Lju blja na, 1925, p. 23. 53 A part from Ranke’s records from his diary describes in picturesque way how Vuk helped Ranke. At the time when the Berlin Congress took place and it was long after Vuk’s death, on 28 June 1878 Ranke wrote the following in his diary: “Fifty years have passed since I listened every day my unforgettable friend Vuk climbing up the stairs to my place in Vienna – he had a wooden leg – to tell me the stories about the Serbs. Today a handsome man with black beard visited me and told me that in 1851, he had attended my lectures on the history of the Middle Ages. It was Serbian Minister Ristić and we did not talk of the old history but of Serbia’s present. Quoted by Leopold von Ranke, Sämtliche Werke (Complete Works), Leipzig, 1890, Vol. 53f-54, p. 621 54 V.Karad zic - “Mala prosto na rod na slave no serb ska pjesna ri ca” (A small collection of poems of the Serbian common people) , bečko izda nje, 1846, Quoted by M.C., “Hasa na gi ni ca” u naro du (“Hasanaginica” seen by the people), „No va Evro pa”, 1932, No. 3-4, p. 121; Konstantinović says that at the scientific conference in Bonn in 1992: “At his time Goethe made the whole world become acquainted with the Serbs’ destiny. Actually, after four hundred years of isolations under the Turkish rule and with the help of the great German poet, it found again its way back to Europe. Professor Zoran Konstantinović said the following at the ”round table“ in Bonn: “Germany should offer its help on the Balkans”, „Po li ti ka”, 26.IX 1982, p. 2.
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(“Serbische Gedichte”), Serbian poetry (“Serbische Poesie”), Narodna poezija (National poetry).55 August Pohlentz and Joseph Mari Wolfram, composers, inspired by the folk poetry of the Serbian people made several compositions by using the translation done by Gerhard. Ludwing Uhland, Professor from the University of Tuebingen, often delivered lectures on the situation in Serbia. Victor Hugo, a famous French intellectual and writer who was familiar with the difficult situation in Serbia which was enslaved by Turkey. On 29 August 1876, he wrote an article that was entitled “For Serbia” in which he appealed to all European rulers to stop the terror in Serbia and Montenegro with the following words. “They are killing one people. Where? In the heart of Europe. Are there witnesses? There is only one witness - the whole world.”
Serbs – Ph.D. candidates in Germany Undoubtedly, for the history of cultural relations between Serbia and Germany it is a very significant fact that a large number of the Serbs studied or received advanced training at German universities and academies. After completing studies, advance training and even earning of Ph.D. degrees they mostly returned to their mother land where they became famous scientists, doctors, engineers, architects, painters, musicians, politicians or some other kind of public or social figures. Here are some of famous figures: Nadežda Petrović, Pravda Marković,56 Đor đe Mi lo va no vić, Dra gu tin Ana sta si je vić, Ve li mir Baj kić, Ti ho mir Đor đe vić, Ve li zar Mi tr o vić, Bo ži dar Pro kić, Bo ži dar Ni ko la je vić, Mi lan To do ro vić, Mi loš Tri vu nac, Ve se lin Čaj ka no vić, Mi lo je Va sić, Ni ko la Va sić, Mi - len ko Ve snić, La zar Mar ko vić and others. Also, Slobodan Jovanović had studied in Munich for some time continuing his studies later in Zurich and Geneva
55 The hundredth anniversary of Goethe’s birth – (J.W.Goethe). The articles on our folk poetry (from the period from 1824-1827), „No va Evro pa”, 1932, No. 3-4, pp. 133-134; V. Joj kić, Pro blem ge ni ja, i Gete (The problem of a genius and Goethe), isti časo pis, pp. 226-236; B. Popo vić, Gete po njego - vim iz re ka ma (Goethe by his sayings), Stra ni pre gled, 1933, No. 1, pp. 1-26. 56 For example, taking into consideration the sojourn registration in the Archives of the police and the data on the defence of the Ph.D. thesis entitled „Uživljavanje kod Šopenhauera” (Entering the spirit of things in Schopenhauer’s works) which had taken place in Munich on 27 July 1910 “Pravda Marković was the first woman from Serbia who earned her Ph.D. in philosophy. Another Serbian learned woman also wrote about Schopenhauer 13 years later and its was Ksenija Atanasijević who earned her Ph.D. degree as late as after World War I and who is often said to be the first Serbian woman philosopher”. See: V. Ko nji ku šić, is tra žu jući ne mač ke ar hi ve - Šta je bi lo sa Prav dom Mar ko vić (Exploring the German arches – What happened to Pravda Markovič), “Po li ti ka”, 04.VII 1998.
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(famous Serbian legal writer, historian and politician), Boginja Barjaktarević, who received her Ph.D. at the Faculty of Medicine in Munich in 1909 or Jovanka Bončić- Katerinić, who graduated from the Faculty of Technical Sciences in Darmstadt in 1912 as the first woman architect of that faculty or Mihajlo V. Vujić, member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts and Serbian Minister of Finance,57 who earned his Ph.D. in Leipzig, and many others. Exploring the archives of the German universities (15 – in Munich, Bonn, Berlin, Tuebingen…) Professor Ljubinka Trgovičević from the Faculty of Political Science concludes that in the 1885-1914 period 110 Serbs received their Ph.D. at German higher schools and universities. “The largest number of Ph.D. candidates had defended their theses between 1902 and 1905, what resulted from the earlier rise in the number of Serbian students at these universities. After that period a small decline was recorded, which was primarily caused by the political affinities, what made the number of the Serbs who decided to study at French universities grow and decrease their number at German higher schools. In the period between 1903 and 1905, out of the total number of students, every fifth of them completed his education by conferring of an academic degree, while in some years no student from Serbia defended Ph.D. thesis (1899, 1906). The biggest number of thesis were defended at faculties of philosophy, what fully corresponded to the shift in interests among other students, while there were still few works in the field of natural sciences that just started to develop in Serbia. Even at that time, there had been more than one third of doctors of law and state-law sciences (they received their Ph.D. at some special faculties in Munich and Tuebingen), what later made them work at universities or in the state administration. It is noticeable that among mentors there were a large number of professors of European reputation such as national economist Louis Brentan from Munich or byzantologist Karl Krumbacher.
57 Mihajlo V. Vujić, Ph.D. was born in Belgrade on 26 October 1953. He had attended grammar school which he had competed in 1868 and he graduated from the Faculty of Philosophy at the Higher School in 1871. After he had graduated from the Grande Ecole, he received fellowship from the state and was sent to Germany to continue his studies. ..He studied philosophy and national economy at the universities in Munich, Vienna and Berlin. In late 1875, he continued his studies in Paris where he went to work on his Ph.D. thesis. The Serbian-Turkish war broke out when he was in Paris. Immediately after the declaration of war, he returned to Serbia. During the war, in the period between 1876-1878, he served in the main military quartermaster corps and in the Red Cross. After the war was over, he went to Leipzig to complete his summer term. In 1879, he defended his Ph.D. dissertation before the assessment panel consisting of famous Professors William Rosser and William Wundt…. “Ph.D. dissertation “Ueber Substanz und Cau sa li ta et” (Above Substance and Causality). He was a regular member of the Academy of Sciences, minister of finance and an envoy of Serbia to Rome. His latest work “Naj no vi ji obrt u tr go vin skoj po li ti ci” (The Latest Turn in the Trade Policy) was famous for our economic emancipation from Austria- Hungary... ”. See M. J. Mi len ko vić, dr Mi haj lo V. Vu jić, “Eko no mist” 1913, No. 7, pp. 97-99.
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Serbian Military Commanders:
Stepa Stepanović Živojin Mišić Pavle Jurišić-Sturm
Serbs of German origin During the reign of Prince Miloš the Germans settled Serbia more intensively. “Some of them married Serbian girls, established their homes, had children and added the suffix “ić” (common in Serbian surnames) to their surnames. In this way, they already in the second and at worst in the third generation lost any connection with their former, German origin.58About hundred surnames of famous Germans can be mentioned, who mostly lived in Belgrade and gave great contribution to the development of Serbia. These are some of them: Stevan Vagner, reputable Belgrade lawyer, Đura Vajfert, industrialist, one of founders of the National Bank, Vinter, engineer, meritorious railroad constructor, the first who made a project for railroad construction in Serbia, major Gencer, founder and first director of the Pyrotechnics Factory in Kragujevac, Milan Grol, literary critic, director of the National Theatre and for some time Minister of Education, Borislav Lorenc, philosopher and university professor, Štajnlehner, Prince Mihailo’s architect, constructor of the main building of the National Theatre, Šulc.
The case of Pavle Jurišić alias Paul Sturm In Prussia, Paul Sturm had been in the same class of the military academy as was August von Mackensen and on the same day the two of them were promoted second lieutenants.
58 B. Ni ko la je vic, op. cit., p. 880.
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Coming to Serbia, he joined the Serbian army and changed his name to Pavle Jurišić. He achieved success in his career and in World War I; Jurišić was one of the most prominent Serbian commanders. He was considered to be among the three most able men in the army, although behind Mišić and Stepanović (whose strategy is even today studied at the prestigious West Point military academy). As the commander of the 3rd Serbian army, he stubbornly defended the part of the front where the German 11th army tried to make a breakthrough. Pavle Jurišić – Šturm, “Šturm, being popular among the Serbian warriors”, joined our army when he was still a young Prussian second lieutenant... General Šturm was one of those Serbian army leaders who achieved great victories, thus making a way to the creation of Greater Yugoslavia. In his family, there were several reputable men who were of great significance for our country. Among them was Momičilo Jurišić, royal Yugoslav envoy to the Bulgarian Kingdom.59
Conclusion Serbian-German friendly cultural relations as a phenomenon of collective memory have the characteristics of intangible cultural heritage in the field of anthropological heritage. In accordance with the international documents as well as with the results of studies of various sciences and disciplines, the phenomenon of Serbian- German friendly and cultural relations is also explored by heritology. By the ratification of the UNESCO Convention on Intangible Heritage as well as by the establishment of the Network for the Protection and Maintenance of Cultural Heritage the Republic of Serbia has started to create conditions for the protection of national and international intangible heritage in Serbia. The eventual establishement of Museum of Serbian-German cultural relations of friendship as a general project for the development of cultural diplomacy and the promotion of bilateral relations between the Serbs and the Germans would enable further research of this phenomenon and its protection with the purpose of maintaining one of significant dimensions of identity of Serbian and German peoples, which lives from generation to generation in their collective memories. The project of development of cultural diplomacy and the establishment of “The Museum of Serbian-German Cultural Relations of Friendship” should be an example of intensification of cultural diplomacy and considerably contribute to the promotion of bilateral relations between Serbia and Germany to the benefit of the two peoples, the Serbs and the Germans in the jubileum 825th year since the establishment of the first diplomatic relations.
59 A. Mi tro vić, Pro dor na Bal kan i Sr bi ja 1908–1918 (A Breakthrough to the Balkans and Serbia from 1908-1918), Be o grad, 181, pp. 465–466.
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Dragan ĐUKANOVIĆ1
ATTEMPTS TO “RESTORE” AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AFTER 1918 – BETWEEN AUSTRONOSTALGIA AND REALITY2
Abstract: The disappearance of Austria-Hungary in 1918 had brought about the creation of new nation states in its territory. Moreover, the course of history in the 20th century had often created new circumstances which induced reunification of these states and territories. This was particularly evident after World War II when within the Intermarium project the idea was induced to create a new state union in the territory stretching between the Baltic and the Black Sea. Similar ideas also appeared later and especially in the late 20th and the early 21st century by emphasising the need to create the Danube federation, what is also advocated by some circles in monarchist parties in Austria, the Czech Republic and in Hungary. Key words: Austria-Hungary, restoration, Intermarium, Danube federation, Habsburg monarchy.
Historical Background The disappearance of Austria-Hungary in 1918 resulted in the overall change in the geopolitical chart of Europe. Actually, the domination of Austria in the central part of Europe, this including various rules from the Habsburg dynasty which had appeared in Switzerland in the late 13th century, was ended after World War I.3 However, the disappearance of this creation had not brought the stabilisation of the situation in Central Europe because soon after new challenges
1 Dragan Đukanović, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. 2 The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period. 3 Charles W. Ingrao, The Habsburg Monarchy 1618–1815, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 1–274.
209 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century followed in this area. In the meantime, many new, independent, but territorially smaller states were created in its territory – Austria, Hungary, Bohemia (today the Czech Republic and Slovakia), former Yugoslavia (since 1991 – Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia...). Due to the concurrence of historical circumstance after World War II they were mostly within the Soviet Union’ sphere of influence remaining there until the end of the Cold War in 1989.4 A very unenviable situation which followed the escalation of ethno-national movements above all, of the Slav peoples in its territory (the Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and even the South Slavs) contributed to the destruction of Austria-Hungary.5 Most probably the “centralist” reforms from 1849 had produced the expected results for the Habsburg monarchy, while the Austrian-Hungarian agreement which was reached in 1867 actually did not provide a sufficient reformist institutional and legitimate framework for preserving the country in the long term because it did not take into consideration the specific features of a large number of ethnic communities that were populated there.6 In this way, thanks to the Austrian- Hungarian agreement the territories of the monarchy were divided between its two very influential centres Vienna and Budapest (see map No. 1). However, almost no one was content with such set-up of the state, this particularly including sovereignists who had strengthened in Budapest, the above-mentioned Slav peoples and Italians at its rims. Thus, it was primarily the Slav inhabitants in the western part of the Balkans that faced the problems related to their cultural and political rights.7 One of the attempts to rearrange Austria- Hungary was made in 1906 and it was presented by Romanian politician Aurel Constantin Popovici (1863-1917) in his study entitled “The United States of Greater Austria”8 (see map No. 2). Popovici was a very active member of the
4 The Danube region as well as the whole Central Europe was divided in this way. See Winston Churchill’s speech delivered on 5 March 1946 announcing a deep division of Europe - “Winston S. Churchill: ‘Iron Curtain Speech’”, Internet, http:// http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ mod/churchill-iron.asp, 22/07/2014. 5 Dragan Đukanović i Mina Zirojević, „Austrougarska i Balkan – uvod u krah” (Austira-Hungary and the Balkans – Introduction to collapse), u: Jovan Ćirić and Miroslav Đorđević (urs), Sto godina od početka Prvog svetskog rata, Institut za uporedno pravo, „Intermex”, Zavod za udžbenike, Beograd, 2014, pp. 147–160. 6 Robert A. Kann, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526-1918, University of California Press, Berkley, 1974, pp. 282–468. 7 Dragan Đukanović i Mina Zirojević, „Austrougarska i Balkan – uvod u krah” (Austira-Hungary and the Balkans – Introduction to collapse), u: Jovan Ćirić and Miroslav Đorđević (urs), Sto godina od početka Prvog svetskog rata, op. cit., pp. 147–160. 8 See the original work - Aurel Popovici, Die Vereinigten Staaten von Groß-Österreich. Politische Studien zur Lösung der nationalen Fragen und staatrechtlichen Krisen in Österreich-Ungarn (The United States of Greater Austria. Political studies of the solution for the national question and constitutional crisis in Austria-Hungary). Leipzig, 1906.
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Map No. 1: Austria-Hungary after 1967
Source: Internet, http://www.heritage-history.com/, 18/08/2014.
National Romanian Party which acted in Banat and Transylvania, although there were some indications that he was of Serbian origin. Actually, Popovici had an idea that Austria-Hungary should be transformed into an ethnic federation where, respecting the national principle, some unites would be created.9 Also, the constituent areas of “Greater Austria” would be created by applying the linguistic principle.10 Although by some sources these reforms were indirectly supported by Crown Prince Ferdinand, Archduke Franz Ferdinand Habsburg-Lothringen (1863–1914) they did not come to life for the strong centralist role of the Vienna Court. The Hungarian and German factors were explicitly against redefining Austria-Hungary in such a way for granting significant rights to the Slavic population. At the same time, the creation of some enclaves was provided for the
9 See: “United States of Greater Austria“, Wikipedia, Internet, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ United_States_of_Greater_Austria, 12/07/2014. 10 Ibidem.
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German population in Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, the present Vojvodina, Transylvania as well as the special status for bigger cities – Budapest, Prague, Lviv, Trieste, etc. (see map No. 2).11 However, World War I broke out soon and Aurel Popovici did not live to see its end or the collapse of Austria-Hungary because he died in 1917. However, his plan will be remembered as a very significant attempt of redefining the political system of Austria-Hungary in the early 20th century when the depth of its internal crisis was largely present as well as the gradual escalation of ethno-nationalism of discontent communities.
Map No. 2: “The United States of Great Austria” (Aurel Popovici’s proposal – 1906)
Source: Internet, http://austriaforum.org/af/Wissenssammlungen/Biographien/Popovici,_Aurel, 12/08/2014.
11 Ibidem.
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Although it was quite logical that the “dungeon of nations”, as some historiographers called Austria-Hungary, would remain in bad memory of the majority of its inhabitants and the states which defeated it – the allies (above all the United States of America, Great Britain and France) several years after the end of World War I the Soviet Union strengthened after the October Revolution (1917), there occurred some geostrategic turns. 12 Actually, they implied the restoration of this area and the establishment of a zone of united states in the central part of the continent. They were supposed to oppose to possible penetration of the USSR to Western Europe. In that sense, during a long period of time beginning immediately after World War I up to 1945 ideas on the Danube (con)federation occasionally appeared. Its aim would be to unite states south from Germany including the Balkans and Romania. Also, the German revisionism followed by National Socialism created the need to reconsider the unification of this area during World War II in order to make another “protection zone” from the potential future expansionism of Germany. The ideas and attempts mentioned above were not quite operationalized in the sense what possible “in-depth” structure of this new state creation would be established in this area. It was mostly regarded as a federal state, but there was no mention of whether it would be a republic or a monarchy, what official languages would be in use and what state symbols would be used.
Ideas on restoration of the area of former Austria-Hungary from its disappearance until the end of World War II (1918-1945) The Versailles order which was established in Europe after the end of World War I resulted in the escalation of new latent animosities among the states created in Central Europe after the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918. In a way, it gave stimulus for the appearance of the future German revisionism and the need for the rearrangement of “Mitteleuropa”.13 In 1915, the conception was worked out by German politician Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919) who, apart from Germany and Austria, included the Balkans (Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece, etc.) within
12 In 1920, Little Entente had been created on the part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Czechoslovakia and Romania as a substitute for the unification of the areas of former Austria- Hungary. It ceased to exist in 1939 and its basic goals were to restrain the expansion of the Soviet Union’s influence. 13 On the geographical determinants of the conception of Mitteleuropa see: Karl A. Sinnhuber, “Central Europe: Mitteleuropa: Europe Central: An Analysis of a Geographical Term”, Transactions and Papers, Institute of British Geographers, No. 20 (1954), pp. 15–39. On the other hand, on the meaning of this conception in the German foreign policy vision since 1915 see in the study with the same title authored by Friedrich Naumann in: Peter J. Katzenstein (Ed.), Mitteleuropa: Between Europe and Germany, Berghahn Books, Providence, 1997, pp. 1–38.
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“Mitteleuropa” as well as Switzerland, Denmark, Belgium and The Netherlands.14 Apart from what has been mentioned above, in this area and under the domination of Germany an economic union would be created as an attempt of the states in the region to resist the pressures coming from the West and the USSR.15 Only four years after the publication of the study mentioned above it completely caved in, but only temporarily. On the other hand, the “remaining” Austrian aristocracy members who had still been pretty influential, started to reshape the idea on the unification of Europe that would contribute to the establishment of the lasting peace and prosperity. In that sense, as early as in 1923, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi published his monograph entitled Pan-Europa16 which was a substantial framework for the establishment and work of the Paneuropean Union which was certainly the oldest European association advocating the unification of the old continent. After a few years, this movement was joined by Crown Prince Otto von Habsburg–Lothringen (/1912-2011). He was its promoter especially during the last stage of the Cold War (particularly in the 1980s).17 Strengthening of fascism in Europe and the de facto real crisis of parliamentary democracy in the 1930s made bigger the dream for restrengthening of the German influence. Within that context, the ideas on the restoration of the Austrian- Hungarian monarchy had no significant strongpoint in the period mentioned above. The fascist Germany imposed (it)self as a leader that did not imply the existence of any other German “mother country”, which Austria-Hungary had earlier really been. This is confirmed by the fact that during this period, Austria was a weak country and liable to what happened to it later and it was Anschluss (annexation) (1938). However, in certain parts of the former big Austrian- Hungarian empire there appeared some sentiments for making over a territorial circle between the Danube, Carpathians, Alps and the Adriatic Sea.18 This was
14 See: Milan Subotić, Na drugi pogled: Prilog studijama nacionalizma (At second sight: A contribution to studies of nationalism), Institut za filozofiju i društvenu teoriju, Beograd, IP „Filip Višnjić“, 2007, pp. 25–28. 15 Ibidem. 16 The first edition of the book - Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, Pan-Europa, Vienna, 1923. 17 See a part of the official biography of Otto von Habsburg on the official site, http://www.ottovon habsburg.org/content.asp?ID=1030&lang=en. Quotation – “Since 1989 he worked for the extension of the Paneuropean Union into the countries behind the ‘Iron Curtain’, for the independence of the Baltic States from Moscow, and of Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Macedonia from Belgrade. On 19th August 1989 he was the Patron of the ‘Paneuropean-Picnic’ in Sopron, at which nearly 700 Germans from the GDR dared to make the first great mass-escape.” 18 Bojan Baskar, “Austronostalgia and Yugonostalgia in the Western Balkans”, in: B. Jezernik, R. Mursic, A. Bartulovic (Eds.), Europe and its Other: Notes on the Balkans, Oddelek EiKA, Ljubljana, 2007, pp. 45–62.
214 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century also followed by the crisis in multi-ethnic creations between dominant communities, this including above all, the Serbs and Croats in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the Slovaks and Czechs in Czechoslovakia.19 Leaving Austria and during his stay in the United States of America from 1940 to 1944 Crown Prince Otto von Habsburg-Lothringen openly advocated the reshaping or actually, gradual restoration of Austria-Hungary, but in the form of Danube federation. Concerning this, he mentioned earlier diplomatic initiatives of the United States of America that had been made during 1919.20 In mid-1941, Otto von Habsburg delivered a special lecture on this subject in the Congress Library in Washington. On the same occasion, he met with the US State Secretary and two times with President Franklin D. Roosevelt who did not support the mentioned idea.21 According to Otto von Habsburg-Lothringen, the Danube federation should include all states that had been created in the territory of former Austria-Hungary.22 However, it should be noted that this did not a priori mean that the Habsburgs would return to power because the confederation would actually be a customs union and a community of peoples with equal rights.23 Although British Prime Minister Winston Churchill supported the idea on the creation of the Danube federation, for strengthening of the role of the Soviet Union and expansion of communism in this region no appropriate conditions were made for its establishment as a kind of an alliance of anti-communist states.24 One of the leading advisors of Crown Prince Otto, Ludwig von Mises (1881- 1973), Austrian philosopher and economist, pointed out in his memoires that the
19 On the phenomenon of “Austronostalgia” see in: Bojan Baskar, “Austronostalgia and Yugonostalgia in the Western Balkans”, in: B. Jezernik, R. Mursic, A. Bartulovic (Eds.), Europe and its Other: Notes on the Balkans, Odelek EiKA, Ljubljana, 2007, pp. 45–62. 20 See: Bela Talbot Kardos, “Problems of Federalism in the Danubian Area“, Internet, http://www. hungarianhistory.com/lib/wagner/wagner24.htm, 22/07/2014. 21 “Who is Otto von Habsburg?“, Part 3 of ELP expose of what is behind his Pan European Union, Executive Intelligence Review, April 10-16, 1979, pp. 52-57. and B. Subašić, „Tito je Stepincu nudio položaj“ (Tito offered Stepinac a position), Večernje novosti, Beograd, 7. decembar 2013, Internet, http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/reportaze/aktuelno.293.html:467426-Tito-je-Stepincu- nudio-polozaj, 25/07/2014. 22 Ibidem. Dr Dragoljub Živojinović, famous Serbian historian says – “At the lecture at the Congress Library in June 1941 Archduke Otto (Otto von Habsburg, a note by the author) said that the peoples in the Danube Basin wanted to create the Danube confederation that would include the Austrians, Bavarians, Slovaks, Hungarians, Slovenians and Croats. As he stated, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Vojvodina should declare whether they wanted to join the confederation. ” 23 Martin Mutschlechner, “Habsburgs in Exile – the Dinasty after 1918“, p. 14, Internet, http://www. habsburger.net/en/printpdf/stories/habsburgs-exile-dynasty-after-1918, 12/07/2014. 24 Hella Pick, Guilty Victims: Austria from the Holocaust to Haider, I. B. Tauris & Co Ltd, London, New York, 2000, pp. 21–22. See also: “Wartime American Plans for a New Hungary“, Internet, http://www.hungarianhistory.com/lib/romsics/w4.htm, 12/07/2014.
215 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century idea on the creation of the Danube (conf)federation was made as an initial attempt to restore Austria-Hungary. However, bearing in mind that such an idea would not be proposed on a broad basis, it was in some ways modified.25 He was of the opinion that Austria, Hungary, Slovakia, Croatia and perhaps Ukraine would join the community mentioned above, which “would place the head of the dynasty as hereditary monarch at the head of their state”.26 According to him, the restoration of the monarchy should be an original idea of all peoples and should not be imposed by some foreign country.27 Problems would arise in the Polish, Serbian and Czech parts of the former monarchy because, as Mises thought, its populations were against its restoration.28 In 1944, Henry Morgenthau Jr., US State Secretary after World War II, made a plan on the necessity of suppressing the influence of Germany in the period after the end of the war and in that sense, he provided for a possibility of creating the Danube federation.29 It would be composed of Austria, Bohemia, Slovakia and Hungary and apart from has been mentioned above, its objective would be to prevent further influence of the Soviet Union.30Also, before World War II Count Pál Teleki (1879–1941), Hungarian Prime Minister, had advocated the creation of the Danube federation. Apart from Austria, Hungary together with Transylvania from which he had come from, and Czechoslovakia, the Balkan countries would also join it.31 The conference in Tehran at which in 1943, Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill decided on the fate of the post-war Europe “cemented” in a way, the ideas on the creation of the Danube federation.32 In the last several years, a large number of monographs and scientific articles have been published on the former idea of the creation of Intermarium. Actually, the conceived Central European confederation consisting predominantly of Roman Catholic states was strongly supported during World War II, although
25 Ludwig von Mises and N. Joseph Potts, “Memo to Otto von Habsburg”, dated New York, April 20, 1942, and never before published ― Response to His Majesty’s Interrogatory”, September 15, 2009, Internet, http://mises.org/daily/3678/, 15/08/2014. 26 Ibidem. 27 Ibidem. 28 Ibidem. 29 See the following monograph: Henry Morgenthau, Germany is Our Problem, First edition, Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York, London, 1945. 30 See the map on the site, http://berlin-border-cast.tumblr.com/image/45915261462. 31 “Pronouncements on federalism in the Danubian and Central European Area: The Mid-European Research Institute“, Internet, http://www.hungarianhistory.com/lib/wagner/wagner38.htm, 12/12/2013. 32 “Danube Federation”, Internet, http://wikipedia.qwika.com/de2en/Donauf%C3%B6deration, 12/07/2014.
216 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century it had appeared immediately after the end of World War I.33 The creator of the idea of Intermarium, Polish politician Józef Piłsudski, head of the state and then Prime Minister (1918-1935) thought that in order to restrain the Soviet Union there should be created a special community of states ranging from the Black to the Baltic Sea as well as from the Adriatic Sea to the present Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia).34 This initiative was greatly supported by the Roman Catholic Church, but it was not materialised. Today, this idea on Intermarium is mentioned again also within the context of the smouldering Ukraine crisis, while political scientist Jonathan Levy is of the opinion that at this moment, it is very current for restraining the Russian Federation.35
Map No. 3: Intermarium project
Source: http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/naslovna/reportaze/aktuelno.293.html:467426-Tito-je- Stepincu-nudio-polozaj, 15/08/2014
33 See: Marek Jan Chodakiewicz, Intermarium: The Land Between the Black and Baltic Sea, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswich, New Jersey, 2012, pp. 33–94. 34 B. Subašić, „Tito je Stepincu nudio položaj“ (Tito offered Stepinac a position), op. cit. 35 Jonathan Levy, “The Ukraine Crisis ― It’s the Intermarium Plan Again”, Arutz Sheva – Israel National News, Jerusalem, February 18, 2014, http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles /Article.aspx/14598#.U_I5Y6P-67q, 14/07/2014.
217 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Development of the idea of “restoration” of Austria-Hungary after 1945 Due to the deep division in Europe in the period after 1945 and falling under the influence of the Soviet Union of a bigger part of former Austria-Hungary there was not any idea of connecting the countries in this area with each other. On the contrary, any possible connection between Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania and other countries of the former Eastern Europe was strictly controlled and watched by official Moscow. However, as the Cold War restraints gradually relaxed in 1978, the Alps- Adriatic Working Community emerged and developed. Today, it assembles regional governments in five countries and their regions –Austria, Italy, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia (see map No. 4). Within the context of the analysis of the causes and course of the break-up of former SFR Yugoslavia whose republics of Slovenia and Croatia were participants in the Community, this regional initiative often caused numerous controversies. Actually, some domestic authors pointed to the fact that the creation and development of the Alps-Adriatic Working Community coincided with the aspirations to promote the Central European identity on the old continent or actually Mitteleuropa under the strong influence of the German factor. In relation to this, as early as in 2000, Prof. Predrag Simić pointed out that “the Slovenian leadership saw its national interest (during the disappearance of former Yugoslavia – a note by the author) in joining the European integrations asking at the beginning for support from conservative and clerical circles of Central Europe that ever since 1978 had fostered close relations within the framework of the Alps-Adriatic Working Community and that in 1991 were the first to offer Slovenia their help”.36 Today, one can conclude with certainty that the mentioned multilateral imitative for co-operation in Central Europe was actually the oldest form of regional co-operation in this part of Europe after the Danube Commission.37 However, perceiving thirty five years of its work The Alps-Adriatic Working Community has not succeeded in establishing itself as a significant inter-state forum for co-operation and therefore, it is gradually losing its importance.
36 Quoted from: „Poslednji rat u XX veku: epilog propalog režima“ (The last war in XX century: The epilogue of the failed regime), Glas javnosti, Beograd, 25. oktobar 2000, http:// http://arhiva.glas- javnosti.co.yu/arhiva/2000/10/26/srpski/F00102502.shtm. The author takes a similar position in the book Tito i NATO: uspon i pad Druge Jugoslavije (Tito and NATO: Rise and fall of the second Yugoslavia), Kompanija „Novosti“, Beograd, 2008, p. 165. 37 Edita Stojić-Karanović, Dunav — reka saradnje: od principa dobrosusedstva do Regionalnog modela srednjeg Podunavlja (The Danube – River of Cooperation: From the neighbour principle to the regional model of the Middle Danube Basin), Međunarodni naučni forum „Dunav — reka saradnje“, Beograd, 2005, pp. 49–50.
218 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Map No. 4: Member states and regions of the Alps-Adriatic Working Community
Source: Internet, http://www.alpeadria.org/hrvatski/index.php?page=1515145851&f=1&i=15151 45851, 15/08/2014.
During November 1989, making of interest connections and more significant cooperation was established between Central European states and it was first through the quadrilateral forum (Italy, SFR Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria), then through the pentalateral (after joining of Czechoslovakia) and after the admittance of Poland – through the hexalateral forum.38 Then followed the international shaping of the Central European Initiative, which today assembles the countries from the Balkans to the Baltic Sea as well as from Italy to Byelorus.39 Almost at the same time in early 1991, Visegrád 4 was created as a form of co- operation between Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.40 This initiative for co-operation among Central European states acquired the establishment of a permanent structure and proved to be a significant framework for multilateral co-operation within the context of integration of these countries
38 On the emergence of contemporary forms of co-operation in Central Europe, see: Ignác Romsics, “Plans and Projects for Integration in East Central Europe in the 19th and 20th centuries: Towards a Typology”, in: Ignác Romsics and Bella Király (eds), Geopolitics in the Danube Region: Hungarian Reconciliation Efforts, Central European University Press, Budapest, 1999, pp. 1–20. 39 See web site Centralnoevropske inicijative - http://www.cei.int/. 40 See web site of Visegrad - http://www.visegradgroup.eu/.
219 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century to the European Union and NATO.41 Within it there are today International Visegrád Fund, Visegrád Battlegroup, Expert Working Group on Energy, Visegrád Scholarship Programme, etc.42 According to the European Union, this forum should serve as a model for regional co-operation with the Western Balkans or actually for South-Eastern Europe.43 The establishment of a new Danube federation is today publicly, actively and openly advocated by monarchists in Austria who are assembled in The Black- Yellow Alliance (Schwartz-Gelbe Allianz).44 According to their programme, it would be composed of Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia and Slovenia, while in the future Bosnia and Herzegovina, Vojvodina, Transylvania, South Tyrol, the Province of Trieste, Bukovina, Silesia and Galicia could join it (see map No. 5). However, since its establishment in 2004 The Black- Yellow Alliance has not won any significant support from voters in Austria, while the monarchist ideas mentioned above have not been broadly accepted in other states which should make the future Danube federation according to the presented idea. On the contrary, monarchist forces and parties in the Czech Republic45 and Hungary as well as in other states created in the territory of Austria-Hungary have almost no influence at all.
Map No. 5: Danube federation according to the idea of The Black-Yellow Alliance (Austria)
Source: Internet, http://sga.monarchisten.org/mitteleuropa/donaufoederation.html, 15/07/2014.
41 See: Aleksandar Jazić, Reforma sistema lokalne samouprave u državama Višegradske grupe (Reform of the system of local self-government in the Visegrád Group states), Institut za međunarodnu politike i privredu, Beograd, 2014, pp. 17–19. and 52–55. 42 See: Tomáš Weiss, “Visegrád Battlegroup: A Flagship That Should Not Substitute For Real Defence Cooperation“, 4 June 2012, Internet, http://visegradrevue.eu/?p=806, 12/08/2014. 43 See in: Jelica Minić, Dragan Đukanović, Jasminka Kronja, Regionalna saradnja na Zapadnom Balkanu ―kako dalje? (Regional co-operation in the Western Balkans – What should be done next?), urednik: doc. dr Filip Ejdus, Istraživački forum, Evropski pokret u Srbiji, Beograd, maj 2014, pp. 1–20. 44 “Donauföderation”, Schwartz-Gelbe Allianz (“Danube Federation”, The Black-Yellow Alliance), Wien, Internet, http://sga.monarchisten.org/mitteleuropa/donaufoederation.html, 27/07/2014. 45 On the phenomenon of “Austronostalgia” see: Bojan Baskar, “Austronostalgia and Yugonostalgia in the Western Balkans”, in: B. Jezernik, R. Mursic, A. Bartulovic (Eds.), Europe and its Other: Notes on the Balkans, op. cit., pp. 45–62.
220 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Conclusion The break-up of Austria-Hungary resulting from the end of World War I seemingly pacified the boiling nationalisms in its territory owing to the creation of a large number of new states. In the first years of their independence, the states mentioned above had had numerous problems and since 1945, most of them fell under the influence of the Soviet Union. At the same time, several years/decades later the feeling of “Austronostalgia” and strivings towards re-unification of the territory of the former Central European empire appeared.46 During the history of the world civilisation all empires exerted their influences and it that sense this includes Austria-Hungary which influenced the cultural development of numerous peoples that inhabited its territory. Apart from this, one should not underestimate the fact that the peoples in its neighbourhood were culturally, scientifically and technically closely related to Austria-Hungary. The cosmopolitan spirit of Austria-Hungary, this also including “breadth” and absorption capacities of its bigger cities was satisfactory that most of its citizens felt as if they had lived in a milieu that was thoroughly incorporated in the global developments of that time. On the other hand, the results of World War I had been such that the “German factor” saw the immediate need for hasty revisionism, what several decades later culminated in the outbreak of World War II in 1939. The Austria-Hungary of that time as the state which in the earlier period had been a dual monarchy lost its influence in the region and in Europe as well. Moreover, after the Anschluss which took place in 1938 Austria became quite insignificant for Germany – the state that had been its powerful neighbour up to that time. The very numerous German minority remained in the neighbouring and/or newly created states (South Tyrol in Italy, Erdely/Transylvania in Romania, Vojvodina and Slavonia in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians, etc.). Then followed several decades’ long dominance of the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1989, which broke up for a very long time the natural connections between the states created in the territory of former Austria-Hungary. It temporarily ceased the up-to-then reliance of this circle of countries of Central Europe on the West European cultural and civilisation circle. Within the historical context, after the end of the Cold War in 1989 it was only the present Federal Republic of Germany that has strengthened its role in Europe and as a state that was defeated both in World War I and in II, it has become the most powerful continental economic power. On the other hand, all attempts related to the “restoration” of Austria-Hungary after 1918 implied that there would actually
46 On the phenomenon of “Austronostalgia” see: Bojan Baskar, “Austronostalgia and Yugonostalgia in the Western Balkans”, in: B. Jezernik, R. Mursic, A. Bartulovic (Eds.), Europe and its Other: Notes on the Balkans, op. cit., pp. 45–62.
221 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century be no recreation of the “conditions which prevailed in the past” concerning possible establishment of an association of states on its territory. This implies that a dual conception of a potentially restored state is not desirable, but on the contrary, this involves only the establishment of a federation of various states and peoples. If one analyses all attempts of establishment of the Danube federation after 1918, the mentioned facts should imply that there would be no dominance of the “German factor” in this region. The Danube federation thus, implied full equality of its constituent parts what would be opposite to, what has already been said, the dominance of some of its parts as was the case with Austria-Hungary. Another fact that should be pointed out is that almost a century after it has been dethroned the Habsburg family has been very influential and respectable in Austria and Hungary as well as beyond them. This is primarily related to the indisputable authority of Crown Prince Otto von Habsburg who died in 2011. He was not only a promoter of the establishment of the Danube federation but of the unification of the entire continent and creation of the present European Union.47 Thanks to his engagement first in the Paneuropean Union and then in the Christian Social Union (CSU) in Germany whose member he was in the European Parliament from 1979 to 1999 Otto von Habsburg was one of the strongest voices of the idea and creation of the conditions for the unification of the old continent.48 It is similar with his sons Karl and Georg von Habsburg.49 What the future will bring to Central Europe after its full incorporation in the European Union and NATO remains to be seen. Several predictions from the early 1990s and those presented a few years ago50 provided for a possibility of a new division of Europe to three or four parts (federations).51 In any case, Central Europe or a federation that would be created on this territory appears as an idea in most of them (see map No. 6)
47 Olga S. Opfell, Royality Who Wait: The 21 Heads of Formerly Regnant House of Europe, McFarland&Company Inc. Publishers, Jefferson, 2001, pp. 127–137. 48 Ibidem. 49 Karl von Habsburg (1961- ) older son of Crown Prince Otto, who lives in Vienna, was an active member of the Austrian National Party and Paneuropean Union and he also ran a private business. His younger brother Georg von Hapsburg (1964) lives in Budapest where he was engaged in humanitarian work in the Red Cross and was ambassador-at-large as a Hungarian. 50 According to one prediction that was published in the journal Financial Times on 24 January 1990, the Central European Union would be consisted of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Slovenia and Croatia. Apart from CEU in Europe, the United States of Western Europe, Scandinavian-Baltic Union, Balkan Union, Turkic Union and Slavic (Russian) Union would also be included. See: Financial Times, 24 January 1990, p. sa. 51 See also: D. M., „CIA: Evropa puca na tri dela” (Europe will be broken to three parts), Večernje novosti, Beograd, 9. mart 2009, Internet, http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/planeta.70.html:233968- CIA-Evropa-puca-na-tri-dela, 20/07/2014.
222 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Map No. 6: Prediction of Europe in 2020 (published in 2009)
Source: Internet, http://www.srpskapolitika.com/intervjui/2009/019.html, 12/08/2014.
223 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Petar PETKOVIĆ1
CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY IN WESTERN EUROPE BETWEEN THE TWO WORLD WARS
Abstract: Although the Christian Democratic Party first became active in the political landscape of Western Europe after the Second World War, its activity, including that of the interwar period, has played an important role in determining the socio-political order of Europe. Between the two World Wars there emerged the conceptualization of the idea that the Christian Democratic and confessional movements should become a political organization. Their confessional nature of this period changed rapidly, especially after the first electoral success. The political power of the Christian Democratic Party has provided sufficient independence of their leaders to openly distance from the Catholic Church and the conservative parties. At that time, there were the first transnational contacts that would result in the international merger of Christian Democrats in Western Europe. With such actions, Christian Democrats were preparing the ground for political activism that would significantly affect the process of European integration as a new institutional order in Europe. Key words: Christian democracy, Christian Democratic parties, confessional parties, Western Europe, European integration.
Introduction Besides the fact that the Christian Democracy in Western Europe in the second half of the 20th century was formed institutionally as well as regarding its program, the previous period between the two world wars is also very important for development of Christian Democrats. The tragic experience after the First World War, profound changes in the political system and policy of Austria, Germany and
1 Petar Petković, Research Associate at Institute of International Politics and Economics in Belgrade. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period.
224 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Russia, as well as the victory position of the Allied forces, directed Europe towards building of a new social and political order. More and more pronounced transnational cooperation among the national countries, political parties, associations and individuals was one of very important characteristics of this period. League of Nations which was established after The Paris Peace Conference in 1919 was the most distinguished example of the institutional international organizing. In the years before beginning of the Second World War, activities of the confessional political parties as well as numerous Christian associations which, in a broader context, represented Christian Democratic movement in Europe changed. The cultural war which was waged in the 19th century between the Catholic Church on one side and the conservative parties and representatives of liberalism on the other side, was put on the back burner in the 20th century. The confessional and, in the later period Christian Democratic parties and associations, replaced defence of the traditional institutions with defence of the society against more and more pronounced invasion of positivist materialistic ideologies. During the process, the Democratic Christian parties were building up themselves, thus distancing from the influence of the Catholic Church. A scenic indicator of that is the fact that the political leaders of the parties of this ideological orientation, when giving names to their parties, were more willing to use the determinant “Christian” than “Catholic”. If there were any connection between the Christian Democratic parties and the Catholic Church, it was mostly reduced to Catholics as the target group which the Christian Democrats addressed. For example, Popular Democratic Party in France, as emphasized by Wolfram Kaiser “was not a Catholic party, but it was certainly a party of Catholics inspired by the Catholic social teaching and devoted to the ideals of Christian Democracy.“2 In the same time, the Catholic Church was still fully trusted by majority of the Catholic believers who, in spite of supporting Christian Democratic parties, had no need to distance from Vatican. Founding their ideology on the Catholic social doctrine and the idea of personalism, but also emphasizing their populist orientation, Christian Democratic parties were advocating democratic changes and civil rights, thus trying to gain voters from different social strata. Following the Program goals from 1922, German Centre Party characterized itself as “Christian popular party determined to implement the basic values of Christianity in the government and society, as well as in economy and culture.“3 Christian Democrats advocated a strong, but not authoritarian state which takes care of the individuals and provide
2 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European Union, University press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 51. 3 Karsten Grabow (ed), Christian Democracy: Principles and Policy-making, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Berlin, 2011, p. 16.
225 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century possibilities for its citizens to be involved in the sphere of the public state affairs and politics, especially by means of the principle of subsidiarity. The changed social and political circumstances after the First World War also referred to understanding of the role of a national state and the issue of national identity. As for Christian Democrats whose members came from a wide ideological spectrum from the left to the right, the dominating idea was the one of Catholic universalism and cultural identity. Such a position directed Christian Democratic ideology towards redefining of the traditional understanding of national state. A state which is by itself more a means than a goal is an apprehension which provided conditions for the Democrats to make a step forward towards transnational associations and supranational institutional acting.
Nature of Confessional Parties and Christian Democratic Movement As Statis N. Kalyvas said “Christian democratic parties emerged as an adverse product of the struggle of the Catholic Church against anticlerical attacks.4 Culmination of the struggle marked the 19th century and striving of the conservative forces to keep their own dominance in order to resist the wave of liberalism in Europe. Being endangered, Catholic Church decided to apply organizational strategy and engage as many Catholic associations and Catholic activists in the struggle against liberalism as possible. This Catholic decision was also acceptable for the conservative parties which thought that they would politically use engagement of the Catholic activists. Catholic Church soon disclosed participation strategy, publicly supporting entering of Catholic organizations into electoral coalitions with the conservative parties. The success at the elections which took place after that additionally strengthened new political actors who no longer wanted to be led by the Catholic Church. Their power and more pronounced independence could be seen in the number of votes they won. That is why Christian Democrats appeared as an adverse outcome because the Catholic Church no longer had control over its activists and organizations, and in the same time the conservative parties got serious political competition in them. Development and independent appearing of Christian Democrats on European political scene turned into fear of the Church “relating the danger of a new identifying of the believers, who generally represented significant electorate, with the subtle political programs of the confessional parties“.5
4 Statis N. Kalyvas, The Rise of Christian Democracy in Europe, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1996, p. 24. 5 Petar Petković, “Delovanje demohrišćana na pripremi terena za prihvatanje ideje evropskih integracija”, Međunarodna politika, god. LXII, br. 1143, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2011, p. 22.
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After the end of the First World War, the open struggle between the Catholic Church and its liberal opponents abated. The resistance of the Catholic authorities towards modern democracy was also constantly weaker. In accordance with the new circumstances in Europe, Pope Benedict XV revoked the decree brought by Pope Pius IX and supported founding of Christian political party in Italy. In accordance with Pope’s decision, Luigi Sturzo established Italian People’s Party in 1919. From the historic aspect, this moment was very important for Christian Democrats because it denoted the end of the previous hesitation of the Catholic Church to support the confessional parties. This act of the Catholic Church was not an induced one because existence of Christian \Democrats, with or without support of the Church, was reality which could no longer be avoided. After the decision made by Pope Benedict XV to support foundation of Italian People’s Party, the following important moment relating the Catholic Church in development of Christian Democracy in the period between the wars was publishing of the encyclical Quadragesimo Аnno on 15 May, 1931. Encouraged by the events which followed after the big economic depression, beginning of which marked the difficult time on Wall Street in 1929, Pope Pius XI introduced a new encyclical in the jubilee year of the encyclical Rerum Novarum which had been published 40 years ago. In this document Pope especially emphasized importance of avoiding of centralism, both in politics and economy. The author elaborated the model of the society without division into classes, but in the same time he defended private property, advocating responsibility of the fund owners for the social justice. This encyclical represented continuation of the previous one and a deeper elaboration of the subsidiarity principle, „Considering its Christian origin, primarily through the Catholic doctrine, this principle supported by the representatives of Christian democratic idea, became unavoidable in the way of creating and making the decisions on the level of EU.“6 However, the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno did not give an answer to the question in which way the basic democratic, political and economic rights could be protected. During pontificate of Pope Pius XI, an association of politically active Catholics-Catholic Action was founded, work of the Catholic labour unions was strengthened and the relation between Vatican and the Republic of France was improved. While the new Catholic parties were being created in Western Europe between the wars, the already existing Catholic parties continued to successfully gather large number of Catholics: in 1920, Christian Social Party in Austria won 41,8% of votes; in the elections in 1920, Centre Party in Germany won 13,6% and it
6 Петар Петковић и Марко Николић, „Принцип супсидијарности у проучавању европских интеграција“, Европско законодавство, No 37-38, Vol. Х, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2011, p. 10.
227 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century became an unavoidable political force in all the governments of the Weimar Republic until 1930, giving 9 chancellors; Catholic Party in Belgium had the absolute power until 1918, and in the first elections after the war it won 37% of the votes, thus getting dominating role in the government; in the national elections in 1919, Italian People’s Party became the second largest party immediately after the socialists, winning 20% of the votes the best; after the elections in 1919, Christian Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland participated in the government of the country; Dutch Catholic Party – General League became the largest party in the elections in 1918 when, for the first time in the political history of the Netherlands a Catholic, Charles Ruijs de Beerenbrouck, became the Prime Minister. Catholics all around Europe were eager to participate in political life, not only through the Catholic parties, but also through newly-founded youth organizations who often gathered around editorials of the political magazines such as Kölnische Volkszeitung, Le Petit Democrate, La Libre Belgique etc. The war period, as well as the years of economic depression, significantly influenced upon ideological orientation of young Catholics. One of the oldest international youth organizations was International Movement of Catholic Students - Pax Romana which was founded in 1921, with the aim to reconcile and build trust among nations, especially after the First World War. New ideas of the new youth Catholic movements also meant new system of social and political organizing as opposed to the party and capitalist system which was, in their opinion, inefficient and out-dated. These ideas, one of which was Christian personalism, meant a different form of unity which implied social responsibility and overcame the class division. One of the most prominent representatives of Christian personalism was Professor Emmanuel Mounier, who established the magazine Esprit in 1932, which young intellectuals were gathering around. Personalism was a Christian response to enlightenment rationalist individualism, but also to collectivism which is a characteristic of totalitarian regimes. Christian personalism also criticized the traditional idea of national state which is „oppressive within and imperialist without, however, developing a political concept of subsidiarity which potentially included the cession of national sovereignty in favour of supranational political forms, in an analogy with the Catholic Church“.7 Besides numerous youth and intellectual Catholic movements, Catholic labour associations and unions were taking more important and independent place in political life of Europe. Seriously endangered position of the workers in the period between the words, especially the industrial workers, drew the attention to the organizational activities and demands. Mostly being formed
7 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European union, op. cit., p. 56.
228 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century within the confessional parties, the Christian labour organizations were more and more popular, gathering large number of members. Cooperation between the confessional parties and the Christian labour associations was a matter of mutual interest. The aim of the labour associations was to provide the confessional parties with the strongest support of Catholics while the confessional parties would, in return, insist on the best possible legal position of the workers. In this interleaving of the political interest, the Christian labour unions and other organizations had strong influence upon development of the Catholic and confessional parties in general. Kees van Kersbergen was even more direct when he said that “without the working class or, to formulate it more precisely, without the essential support of the working class, Christian Democracy would not exist“.8 Putting the social reforms and economic development to the fore, the Catholic parties were ideologically directing towards the parties of the center as well as towards the balanced party programs. Due to their looking for wide support of different social layers, secularization of the confessional parties was partially the result of their cooperation with the labour associations. For example, it was Conederazione Italiana Lavoratori which significantly supported the social reforms advocated by Italian People’s Party. Many members of the Christian labour unions were striving for close cooperation with the confessional parties, such as The Centre Party. As for Belgium, National League of Christian Workers was striving for cooperation with the Belgium Catholic Party. “The workers’ unions and associations provided a social and ideological bridge to moderate socialists and liberals, preventing an otherwise possible orientation of the Catholic parties towards cooperation with the conservative liberals, nationalists and, later, fascists.“9 Representatives of Christian Democratic movements, who mostly represented conservative left oriented confessional parties, were trying to distance not only from the Catholic Church but also from radical conservatism which was part of the closed political Catholicism and its national and cultural struggle in the 19th century. In fact, the Christian Democrats were trying to distance from the conservative Catholic forces which did not clearly distance themselves from the national socialist ideology. “Parliamentary and Christian Democratic character of political Catholicism during 1920s began to increasingly face the militant and often anti-democratic Catholic movements.“10 Vatican’s support to Fascist Italian State and its tolerating of national-socialism called in question legitimacy of Catholic Democratic parties and endangered their transnational party
8 Kees Van Kersbergen, Social Capitalism – A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state, Routledge, London and New York, 1995, p. 207. 9 Wolfram Kaiser, Christian Democracy and the Origins of European union, op. cit., p. 48. 10 Martin Conway, Catholic Politics in Europe, 1918-1945, Routledge, London, 1997, p. 5.
229 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century cooperation. As Roberto Papini said “The Catholic Church entered the concordats with the Fascist and Nazi.11 In order to avoid the danger of the extreme ideological course which was spreading around Italy, Sturzo, among other things, insisted in his party’s program on social reforms and transfer of authorities from highly centralized state to the local government bodies, as the opposite to the state socialism and extreme nationalism. After the foray of 60,000 fascist into Rome in 1922 and Mussolini coming to power, Christian Democratic Italian People’s Party was in an extremely difficult position – Luigi Sturzo was exiled, Secretary General Alcide De Gasperi was arrested and the party was abolished in 1926. Namely, negative attitude of the middle class towards democratic political system caused by the economic depression was an excuse for increasingly stronger attacks of the extreme ideological forces on Christian Democratic parties. Terrible fate befell the German Center Party which was dismissed soon after national socialists coming to power and its members were arrested and exiled. Struggle of numerous Christian Democratic politicians and opponents of the Nazi regime, members of The Centre Party and Christian unions and associations, was paid with their lives.
Transnational Cooperation of Christian Democrats The changed picture of Europe after the First World War also influenced upon the change of till then strategic actions of Vatican in accomplishment of its universalistic goals. More tolerant attitude of the Catholic Church towards the political Catholicism and its readiness to support founding of the confessional parties additionally diminished the obstacles to achievement of transnational cooperation among the Christian Democrats in 1920s. The Catholic parties which formed their political programs by putting economic, social and security issues to the fore prioritized the transnational political topics. Those particularly leading in transnational associating were left-oriented representatives of political Catholicism who easily established the transnational cooperation, unlike the conservative Catholic politicians who were still acting from the positions of national demands. The national openness of Christian Democrats suppressed the issues of the ideological struggle and national policy in defence of the Church and its rights against the anti-cleric attacks. Besides, the havoc left in Europe by the Great War made the Christian Democrats look for an appropriate institutional form to reach a sustainable peace within the international order framework. Support to French- German conciliation was a good initial basis for finding a new European order.
11 Roberto Papini, The Christian Democrat International, Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, 1997, p. 27.
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The between-war confessional parties lead by the Italian People’s Party began to pay attention in their programs to „the Christian universalisms“ which related the wish to disarm the international system and to regulate it by the laws and common institutions. Italian People’s Party had a program with transnational orientation.12 The conditions of the transnational cooperation were the contacts of the individuals, parties and associations which were no longer either sporadic or informal. Motivated by the social and political power of the Christian inspired parties, Luigi Sturzo thought that these parties were the ones which had the capacity to provide conciliation between the belligerent nations. During the 1020s, Sturzo used to travel around Europe, especially to Germany and France, establishing contacts with the political leaders among Catholics. His idea of founding a European organization of democratic parties based on the Christian principles was result of these contacts. It was on the third congress of Italian People’s Party in Venice, 1921 that a commission for the Popular International Movement was formed and in 1923 the movement gathered all European parties which shared the values of Christian order of the international relations.13 The established contacts had already built the institutional independence and visible national political action, especially after the agreement reached in Locarno in 1925, in which the leaders of the confessional parties and associations saw the opportunity to found an organization similar to League of Nations. Having in mind that aim, the Catholic parties initiated making of mutual contacts in the beginning of 1920s, when the framework of Christian Democratic international organization was set. For many years the founded forums of Catholic politicians did not manage to reach certain level of coordinated political activities, but they did manage to establish important connections between the future European leaders who were sharing common Catholic culture. Popular Democratic Party was established in France in 1924, and it was significant because it tried to conform the political Catholicism to Republican state order. It was already in 1925 that the Secretariat of Popular Democratic Party managed to organize transnational cooperation among the Catholic parties, including the German partners, who were very important in that time. After that, the first international congress of the Christian (Catholic) national parties in Europe was held in Paris in 1925, and it was agreed then to found the International Secretariat of the Christian Democratic-oriented Parties (Secrétariat International des Partis Démocratiques d’Inspiration Chrétienne – SIPDIC). It was already in 1932 that their regular meetings resulted in designing of several documents in which the initiative was given to create European Union and common market.
12 Roberto Papini, The Christian Democrat International, p. 20. 13 Ibid., p. 23.
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Transnational cooperation among Christian Democrats in this period was not reduced only to cooperation of the parties, but it also meant a wider framework of social and political organizing, such as Pan European Union which was founded in 1923 by the Austrian Catholic Count Richard Nikolaus von Coudenhove- Kalergi. His vision of the principles of Christianity and social policy in the united Europe gathered around 2,000 participants and 24 nations at the first congress of this movement in Vienna in 1926. During 1920s and 1930s, the Catholic politician Marc Sangnier organized a number of international democratic peace conferences. His principle idea of the social Catholicism was particularly productive in transnational cooperation between Christian Democrats and Christian unions and Catholic labour associations. However, cooperation between the Christian Democratic unions and the Catholic unions was much more successful than the one among the Christian Democratic parties, since the unions had already had established institutionalized links in 1908. After the war, the unions in Western Europe organized two separated congresses. They had a meeting together in Rotterdam in February, 1920, and the result of the meeting was foundation of International Federation of Christian Trade Unions in June the same year with its Secretariat in Utrecht in the Netherlands. These transnational links were institutionalized in Köln in 1928, when the founding congress of Catholic Workers’ International was held. Numerous Catholics politicians had important roles in the process of creation of the transnational contacts, in the same time being active in the party, union and youth organizations. The evidence of that was participation of members of the International Secretariat of the Christian Democratic-oriented Parties in the work of the Inter-Parliamentary Union which had been founded at the end of the 19th century as a transnational inter-party forum for the parliamentarians. It was the congress of the International Parliamentary Union in Stockholm, 1921, at which Luigi Storzo initiated the idea to form the organizations which would gather European Popular and Christian Democratic parties. The flywheel which existed among the Catholic Democrats during 1920s was influenced by the new circumstances which appeared in 1930s. The period of the economic depression, as well as the period of radicalization of the political life all around Europe made the Christian Democratic parties face their further existence. Communism on one side, and Fascism and National Socialism on the other side, unhinged numerous Catholic politicians who gave up the moderate centre position which was, in their opinion, irrelevant for the struggle which was fast moving from the Parliament to the streets and city squares. Those Christian Democrats, who remained faithful to the idea of democracy, intensified their insisting on the Christian and Democratic vision of the social and political order. “Disastrous experience of fascism was crucial for the elimination of long-term doubts about the
232 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century need for the establishment of full democracy among parties that were advocating religious defense so that at the end of the Second World War, these parties could legitimately be called the Christian Democratic parties.“14 For that reason, defence of Christian Democratic values was, for Luigi Sturzo, an invitation to defend the shaken Christian civilization. That spirit of militancy made Sturzo again revive the Parisian Secretariat and he did that by starting foundation of the International Christian Democratic Union which began its activity during the war in 1940.
Conclusion Christian Democratic parties began their institutional development in Western Europe in the first half of the 20th century. Establishment of transnational contacts as well as busy political activities of the Christian Democratic organizations and parties was particularly pronounced between the wars. After the First World War, the changed circumstances in whole Europe did not bypass the Christian Democrats. Besides the external historic circumstances, Christian Democrats were facing the internal changes as well. The confessional parties, out of which the Christian Democratic parties would emerge, as well as numerous Christian associations and workers’ organizations, began to build up a new political identity in this period. Mass participation of the Catholic believers in political life in Europe and their election success, made the Catholic politicians become independent from the Catholic Church. Distancing from Vatican, the political Catholicism put the economic and social issues in the forefront of their struggle. Long-lasting cultural and national struggle between the Catholic Church and anti-clerical liberalism was no longer in the focus of the confessional parties. Being aware of the new circumstances, the Catholic Church only after the First World War decided to recognize Christian Democratic-oriented parties. Although in their programs they were advocating building of the social and political order based on the Christian values and Catholic social doctrine, these parties were secular in their nature. The fact that the basis of their belief was coming out of religion did not mean that the Christian Democratic parties were religious ones. The intention of the Christian Democrats was to attract as wide social layers as possible by means of their program, without limiting their interest to only the Catholics or believers in general. There were three parties worth of special attention between the wars: Italian People’s Party, German Centre Party and Popular Democratic Party in France which were the holders of Christian Democratic movement in Europe. Besides the
14 David Hanley, “Christian Democracy as a political Phenomenon”, Christian democracy in Europe: A Comparative Perspective, David Hanley (ed.), London and New York, 1994, p. 4.
233 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century parties, significant role in building of Christian Democratic idea belonged to the youth organizations, editorial boards of numerous magazines, Christian workers’ unions and the Catholic unions. Ideologically, the whole Christian Democratic movement was mostly represented by the conservative left-oriented part which advocated democratic political system. The other side of the conservatives made the rightists who remained closely connected to the Catholic Church. Certain number of the Catholic conservative right-wing parties for which the leader of Christian Democrats in Italy, Luigi Sturzo, used to say that they betrayed the principles of Christian Democracy, succumbed to the temptation of the totalitarian ideologies which were spreading in Europe after the economic depression. Conservative left-wing which, on the other side, prioritized transnational cooperation, social reforms and democratic order, was the Christian Democratic support in the struggle against the Fascist and Nazi ideologies. It was transnational cooperation among the Christian Democrats in 1930s which was trying to strengthen its institutional acting, so that it could strongly contribute to the struggle for saving of the endangered Christian civilization and its values.
234 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Zlatko IVANOVIĆ1
BALKAN PACT AND YUGOSLAVIA AFTER WORLD WAR II
After the end of World War II, the distinct military, political and economic supremacy of the United States and Soviet Union made them new star players in the constellation of global power. These two nations had emerged as the most powerful countries in the world following the de facto system of a bipolar world established after Crimea. It was a prelude to their confrontation immediately after World War II. The United States, as the most powerful capitalist state, abandoned isolationism with ambitions to lead global politics. The United States assumed the leading role in the Western World justifying it with the need to stop Soviet expansionism and communism. Great Britain, together with France, retained major power status, but they were overshadowed by American and Soviet military might. Great Britain, which had emerged from World War II as a debtor to the United States (in accordance with the Lend and Lease Act), was forced to yield to the United States and leave its traditional spheres of influence in the Mediterranean and in Greece.2 Although the world had entered the bipolar stage after World War II, the Balkans did not lose any importance. The largest areas of conflict were as follows: Iran (for oil), the Turkish Straits (which connected the Black Sea to the Mediterranean), and Greece (which was a traditional British sphere of influence and where Yugoslavia was supporting guerilla fighters against the Royal Government). Due to their lack of funds, Britain approached the United States asking it to save Greece from falling into the hands of communists.3 With the
1 Zlatko Ivanović, M.A., Faculty of Political Sciences in Podgorica, University of Montenegro. 2 Branko Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918-1988 (The history of Yugoslavia 1918-1988),Treća knjiga, Nolit Beograd, pp. 10-11. 3 Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, vol. II. Cambridge, Cambridge Univestiry Press, 1983, p. 311.
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Truman Doctrine, albeit originally devoted solely to supporting Turkey and Greece, the United States assumed the responsibility of defending the free world against Communist aggression and thus, agreed to fight against the rebels in Greece. Truman Doctrine would become one of the leading principles of the American Cold War policy. Concurrently with adopting the Marshal Plan the United States allocated funds to assist other European states who had been victims of World War II. The United States believed that, with this directed economic policy, it would restore these nations’ economies, strengthen their political cohesion, and increase their capability to defend against the threatening communist subversion.4 In order to prevent the Soviet supremacy in the region, the United States started to support the king of Greece in 1947. The United States thus, filled the vacuum that arose with the British retreat from Greece supporting Greece economically, politically and militarily. Because of this policy, the communists in Greece would suffer their second defeat. 5 During the first years after World War II, the relations between Yugoslavia and Greece were very bad, which was the result of several circumstances. One should bear in mind that the guerilla movement in Greece was particularly strong not only during World War II but also in later years. Until 1949, guerilla fighting against the monarchist regime was supported by the West, first by the British and then by the American troops. The Yugoslav regime saw the events in Greece, where it was heavily involved 6 as foreign interference by the West that could also be used against Yugoslavia. Therefore, Yugoslavia felt that it had to pay attention to the developments in its neighboring countries, to their attitudes toward Yugoslavia as well as to the treatment of the Yugoslav minority in Greece, the Macedonians, who were supposedly maltreated, persecuted, and often evicted.7 In the aftermath of the conflict with the Cominform8 and the isolation imposed by them, Yugoslavia needed to re-establish the lines of communication with Greece. The most important issue was the use of the port of Salonika. Politically
4 Walter La Feber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 1945-1984, Cornel University,1984, pp. 37-38. 5 John Iatrides, The United States and Greece 1945-1949, The Greek Civil War 1945-1950, ed. David H. Close, London 1993, pp. 190-196. 6 Branko Petranović, Sava Dautović, Jugoslavija, velike sile i balkanske zemlje 1945-1948 (Yugoslavia, great powers and Balkan countries 1945-1948), Beograd 1994, p. 135-143; Elisabeth Barker, The Yugoslavs ands the Greek Civil War of 1946-1949, Studies of the History of the Greek Civil War, 1945- 1949, Copenhagen 1997, pp. 263-309. 7 Velimir Gavranov, Momir Stojković, Međunarodni odnosi i spoljna politika Jugoslavije (International relations and Yugoslavia’s foreignpolicy). Savremena administracija, Beograd 1972, p. 215. 8 Founded in 1947, Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was a Soviet–dominated organization of Communist parties.
236 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century for Yugoslavia, it was very important to alleviate the pressure from the neighboring socialist “countries of people’s democracies” and to solve the border dispute with Italy. When Tito sealed the Yugoslav southern border with Greece in July 1949, the inflow of assistance to the Greek rebels was severed. General Papagos emerged victorious, thus ending the war in 1949, putting a stop to the tensions between Greece and Yugoslavia. Although Greece was looking for a prompt accession to the NATO, the main threat to its territorial integrity was coming from Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. Even after Greece joined the NATO, the jeopardy from the north remained prominent in the minds of the Greek people, because the expansionist policy of its neighbors might lead to a major conflict. Bearing in mind that all Balkan states in this period were satellites of one of the two superpowers, the declaration of a new and an unpredictable war was quite possible. 9 It should be underscored that abhorring any complications to relations with the West, Stalin never agreed with Belgrade’s support of the Greek Communist Party (KKE) coming to power by revolutionary means. He actually demanded that Yugoslavia should stop its support. This issue can be assumed as one of the reasons for the Tito-Stalin clash in 1948.10 Great Britain and the United States endeavored to facilitate better diplomatic relations between Yugoslavia and Greece. One of the tools of influence Washington used was the economic assistance that the United States was providing to Yugoslavia. The Truman administration made it obvious that it wanted to stop the conflict in Greece and thus, stop the communist expansion by making it clear to Yugoslavia that any further assistance would be conditional on the termination of any involvement in Greece. On June 5, 1948, Tito told Fitzroy Maclean that Yugoslavia would stop supporting the Greek People’s Liberation Army (ELAS), while Yugoslav Minister of Internal Affairs Aleksandar Ranković announced the same on July 8, 1948.11 Yugoslav and Greek relations were normalized in January 1951, after which they continued their collaboration resulting in agreements on railroad, postal services and air traffic.12
9 Dimitros Katsikostas, Postwar surrounding in the Balkan and Trilateral Agreement of 1953, in: Balkanski pakt 1953-54, Zbornik radova, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, odjeljenje za vojnu istoriju, Beograd, 2008, pp. 51-58. 10 Milovan Đilas, Pad nove klase-povest o samorazaranju komunizma, Beograd, 1994, pp. 82-83. 11 Bojan B. Dimitrijević, JNA od Staljina do NATO pakta (The Yugoslav National Army from Stalin to the NATO pact), Beograd, 2005, p. 140. 12 Miljan Milkić, Pregovori o političkoj i vojnoj saradnji FNRJ i Kraljevine Grčke do potpisivanja Ankarskog ugovora (Negotiations on political cooperation between the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and the Kingdom of Greece until the sigining of the Ankara Agreement), in: Balkanski pakt 1953-54, Proceedings, Institute for strategic research, Belgrade, 2008, pp. 111-113.
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Yugoslavia and Turkey did not have any bilateral problems or conflicts. However, their relations were underdeveloped because of the previous relationships between the two countries and the lack of any initiatives to improve them.13 Because of its efforts to become a NATO member, Turkey had different motives from Greece. The first reason or wanting to join the NATO was the Soviet threat looming on the horizon as a result of a change in the Soviet foreign policy. The Soviets breached the 1925 Turkish–Soviet Neutrality and Non-Aggression Pact thus, informing Turkey about the change in their foreign policy course. That made Turkey turn to the West and the United States in particular. The second reason was that joining the NATO would mean a significant step in the Westernization of the Turkish foreign policy, which was moving in that direction since the very moment the Turkish republic had been founded. An additional reason was to make a statement about the existence of the multi-party system in the country, which was considered a first step towards the creation of democracy.14 Nevertheless, a turning point in Balkan politics came from Yugoslavia. The impetus was Tito’s expulsion from the Cominform on June 28, 1948, resulting from Stalin’s underestimation of his opponent, a strong and charismatic leader and dictator. Tito then made his own road to socialism. Except for Macedonia, he temporarily gave up his territorial claims in the Balkans in order to ensure his survival. In November 1951, Yugoslavia joined the American Mutual Assistance Program (MAP). The next step was the establishment of joint defense relations with his two NATO member neighbors: Greece and Turkey. The visit by the American officials to Belgrade, Ankara and Athens in the summer of 1952 was the first contact that initiated such a dialogue.15 Most of the political and historical studies of the Balkan Pact, a short but important military and political alliance of Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece made between 1953 and 1954, see it as either a temporary and atypical event of Balkan politics16 or as an artificial product resulting from the Western aspirations.17 While the emergence of the Balkan Pact mainly started in early1952, the Greek leadership actually had begun to push for such an alliance much earlier. On
13 V. Garvranov, M. Stojković, p. 215. 14 Emruhan Yalcin, Razvoj događaja nakon Drugog svjetskog rata i njihov uticaj na tursku spoljnu politiku na Balkanu (The development after World War II and their impact on the Turkish foreign policy in the Balkans), in: u Balkanski pakt 1953-54, Zbornik radova, Institut za strategijska istraživanja, odjeljenje za vojnu istoriju, Beograd 2008, p. 36. 15 D. Katsikostas, op. cit., pp. 58-59. 16 Andrew Borowiec, The Mediterranean Feud, New York, Praeger Publishers, 1983. 17 John Iatrides, Balkan Triangle. Birth and Decline of an Alliance across Ideological Boundaries. The Hague, Paris Mouton, 1968.
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October 28, 1949, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs Constantin Tzaldaris delivered a memorandum to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson advocating the establishment of a defense pact comprising the countries located east of the NATO region. However, the Korean War and Turkish efforts to join the NATO took priority for the United States at the time. Still, Greece did not want to give up this idea.18 The Korean War had two additional short-term effects on the Yugoslav foreign policy. First, it forced Yugoslavia to begrudgingly consider the possibility of establishing closer military cooperation with its pro-Western neighbors. Second, Yugoslavia doubled efforts to solve its border disputes with Italy and Austria. 19 Fearing that the Korean conflict might spread during June 1950, Turkey and Greece strongly advocated for their accession to the NATO. With the victory of the Democratic Party of Adnan Menderes in Turkey, that goal became more realistic and was openly manifested through the pressure Turkey put on the United States to support its campaign for NATO accession. In Greece, the support for joining the NATO had an even greater prevalence. The U.S. State Department took advice from the American military leadership not to support the Turkish and Greek aspirations to join the NATO because it would weaken the defense of Western Europe creating implications on the American policy towards Iran. However, Greece was not discouraged by the cold reply received from the United States. Therefore, during 1950 and 1951, Greece initiated unilateral movements to rectify its relations with Turkey and Yugoslavia. While its aspirations to join the NATO prevented Turkey from considering the regional collective security a priority, it still showed interest in the Greek overtures. 20 Both Greece and Turkey suffered from communism: Greece because of the civil war and Turkey because of strong pressure from Moscow. With their accession to the NATO, the Russian colossus was prevented from gaining exit to the warm southern seas. At the same time, the central locations of Greece and Turkey were very important, providing a basis for fruitful cooperation with the West. Following the Greek accession to the NATO, the relations between Greece and the Eastern Bloc nations reached a critical point, primarily due to the Greek decision to cede its territories for use as an American military basis.21 The Truman administration always strongly supported plans to include Yugoslavia in the Western defense system. The West intended to integrate
18 David Stone, The Balkan Pact and American Policy, Yale Univesity, In: u East Euroepan Quarterly, XXVIII, No. 3, September 3, 1994, pp. 393-394. 19 Alvin Z. Rubenstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World, 1970 Princenton Univesity Press, p. 31. 20 D. Stone, op. cit., pp. 394-397. 21 D. Katsikostas, pp. 51-58.
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Yugoslavia, which was receiving a copious amount of Western assistance, into the future NATO system.22 However, several years after the expulsion from the Cominform, Tito was against formal membership in an alliance. He believed that “in the case of Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece, where all countries were under the imminent Soviet threat, written commitments were not of much use because verbal commitments were as important as written ones.”23 At the beginning of 1952, Greece and Turkey reached an agreement on cooperation that would also include Yugoslavia. The biggest hindrance to such cooperation was the Yugoslav opposition to formal cooperation with the capitalist West. Not only was Yugoslavia a Marxist country, but also Tito saw no reason to exchange Russian influence for Western one. At the beginning of 1952, Greece and Turkey pleaded with the United States to exert pressure on Yugoslavia to make a commitment to the joint defense. However, the United States rejected their pleas. Because the American negotiations with Yugoslavia over military cooperation was not progressing as planned, the United States believed that advocating military cooperation between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey would also be unproductive.24 Although the United States facilitated communication among the three Balkan countries, the American actions aimed at establishing relations among them were of secondary importance. A real initiative rested solely on the Balkan countries. Even though some historians believe that Greece and Turkey acted at the behest of the United States, the archival documents clearly show that the initiative originally came from Greece and Turkey.25 It was already in 1952 when Yugoslavia started to consider establishing closer cooperation with its Balkan neighbors. Italy made some concrete moves to win Greece over on its side in the Trieste border dispute with Yugoslavia, which was one of the reasons why Tito established closer cooperation with Greece. In that context, he did not forget the issue of Macedonia believing that a possible agreement with Greece would help solve that issue. While Stalin was still alive, the Soviet Union also posed a potential threat. In the case that Yugoslavia was attacked, Greece could help in supplying and possibly defending Macedonia from Bulgaria and Albania. At the same time, Turkey began to show more interest in closer cooperation.26
22 John C. Campbell, Oral History, Truman Library. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/ campbell.htm 23 Josip Broz Tito, Govori i članci 1.1.- 31.12.1952 (Speeches and articles from 1 January to 31 December 1952), knjiga VII, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1959, pp. 291-292. 24 D. Stone, op. cit., p. 397. 25 Ibid, pp. 397-398. 26 Paul David Lensink, Building Tito’s Separate Road, Department of History, Indiana University, March 1995, pp. 112-113.
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The American Ambassador to Greece, John Peurifoy, who was in a position to observe the progress in relations between the potential partners, informed the U.S. State Department that the Greeks and the Turks were convinced that Tito wanted a formal contact. However, because of the caution he harbored towards some of the hardcore members of the Communist Party opposing this alliance, he insisted that the initiative to build an alliance should come from the Greeks and the Turks first.27 At the time that the first steps toward the institutionalization of the tripartite military cooperation were made, the Yugoslav leadership was feeling threatened from the Soviet Union, so it was prone to strengthen relations with the West. However, the Yugoslav cooperation with the West that was becoming ever more visible always threatened to imperil the existing social and political system and thus, threatened the undisputed reign of the Communist Party. Therefore, the Yugoslav leadership found itself in an uncomfortable position requiring the need to permanently balance depending upon the current international and internal circumstances how close they might move toward the West. On the other side, Greece and Turkey saw this cooperation as an interim phase towards including Yugoslavia into the NATO’s defense program.28 In May 1952, the visit of the Greek parliamentary delegation to Belgrade gave a new tenor to the cooperation between the two countries. This positive trend continued during the second part of 1952 through a number of discussions between the military and political representatives of Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia. On September 5, 1952, the Yugoslav military delegation visited Athens and then Ankara on September 24. The military delegations of Greece and Turkey made return visits to Belgrade during November and December of the same year. In January 1953, the three countries’ foreign ministers also made exchange visits.29 It is ironic that it was Yugoslavia that advocated for some kind of mandatory military binding of the three countries. By the end of December 1953, Peurifoy informed the U.S. State Department that Yugoslavia had insisted on a formal tripartite agreement stipulating that in the case that one of the signatories were attacked, the remaining two would help. Greece was confused by the urgency that Yugoslavia insisted on in establishing military cooperation. However, it could
27 Peurifoy (U.S Ambassador to Greece) to State Department, May 6, 1952, Foreign Relation of United States (FRUS): 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, pp. 593–594. 28 Dr. Dragan Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja na putu savezništva Jugoslavije, Grčke i Turske 1952-1954. godine (Stimulating and limiting factors on the path of alliance between Yugoslavia, Greece and Turky from 1952–1954), In: Balkanski pakt 1953-54 (Balkan Pact 1953-54), Proceedings, Institute for strategic research, Department for military history, Belgrade, 2008, p. 66. 29 Ibid, p. 68.
241 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century be justified by the Yugoslav intention to strengthen their position in the Trieste dispute with Italy.30 In Belgrade, American Ambassador George Allen also noted that Italy remained a permanent factor in the Yugoslav foreign policy; however, he thought that the primary reason for Yugoslavia’s urgency was based on security concerns.31 The potential Balkan alliance could enable Tito to strengthen his regional position and his security to some extent without direct involvement of the Western military forces. Not forgetting that in 1951, Turkey and Greece became the NATO members, the very negotiations Yugoslavia had with those countries implied Yugoslavia’s desire to enhance its connection to the NATO, if not gain possible membership of in the organization. Tito generally rejected any possibility that Yugoslavia would secretly become a NATO member through the negotiations on the Balkan alliance. On the other side, many NATO members were not convinced that Yugoslavia would be a reliable candidate for membership in the organization. For example, Italy was particularly against Yugoslav membership in the NATO. It accused the United States of turning Yugoslavia into the Balkan military power by delivering it military assistance. Italy also fiercely advocated that no military agreement with Yugoslavia should be signed until the Trieste dispute was settled. Italian Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi warned Greece and Turkey about it pointing out their obligations stemming from the NATO membership. Turkey, and Greece to some extent,32 tried to mollify Italy by launching a proposal that the country should eventually join the Balkan alliance. Yugoslavia thought that the United Stated had an impact on the decisions taken by Greece and Turkey. Indeed, both Greece and Turkey wanted to reach an agreement with Yugoslavia, given that such an agreement had the Americans’ blessing.33 In order to avoid any problems among the NATO members, the new Eisenhower administration advocated for a limited alliance among Turkey, Greece and Yugoslavia. The plan entailed American support to strengthen relations among them followed by parallel, but separate, considerations of bilateral military issues.34
30 Peurifoy to State Department, December 31, 1952. FRUS: 1952-1954, VIII, pp. 601-602. 31 Alen to State Department, January 3, 1953. FRUS: 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 603. 32 In the event that the military alliance among the four countries was created, Italy would significanlty strenghten its position in the Balkans and would restore its positions lost during World War II; in that case the Balkan Pact would not strenghten the Greek position in the NATO, but would rather enable Italy to take the lead. 33 P. Lensink, p. 116. 34 Levent Isyar, Containing Tito: U.S. and Soviet policies towards Yugoslava and the Balkans, The Institute of Economics and Socil Sciences of Bilkent University, Ankara, September 2005, p. 132.
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Yugoslavs presumed that the Americans and Britons35 shrank from the formation of the Balkan Pact because it would enhance Yugoslavia’s influence in the Balkans, consolidate the position of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), and weaken the Greek and Turkish connections with the NATO. It goes without saying that the United States encouraged the creation of this alliance as a means of strengthening Yugoslav independence from Moscow, but at the same time, the United States did not see the alliance as part of its broader foreign policy.36 Also, considering that Yugoslavia would have already connected itself with the NATO through Greece and Turkey it would not be easy to further push Yugoslavia towards the NATO membership.37 Further delay of any solution to the Trieste dispute had very negative consequences to the Yugoslav economic cooperation with the West and to Yugoslavia’s efforts in establishing institutional cooperation with Greece and Turkey. The sharp political and military confrontation by Yugoslavia with the Italian and Anglo-American forces in the Trieste region during the second part of 1953 seriously shook the Yugoslav relations with the West. Conditions for the continuation of military cooperation were made only after the relaxation of tensions at the Yugoslav-Italian border and after the start of negotiations over the Trieste crisis in London. 38 After the official visit by the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs to Yugoslavia from February 3-8, 1953, the three Balkan countries endorsed a joint platform of the future alliance which envisioned an agreement based on friendship and non- aggression. The agreement was a significant deviation from the previous aspirations of Greece and particularly of Turkey to establish a tripartite military agreement that would reduce the danger of aggression from the Eastern European countries.39 Considering that the United States provided significant military assistance to Greece and Turkey, American diplomats used their significant trump cards to exert
35 Although they officially had a very positive opinion about the Balkan alliance, the Britons had lasting reservations about it, which was a consequence of their interests in Southeast Europe. To that end, the growing independence of Greece and Turkey, which would be materialized through the creation of the Balkan pact that Britain was unable to influence, did not help the British interests in the region. 36 The United States thought that the first phase of cooperation among the three countries should be defined within the framework of their friendship, but not through the military alliance which could disturb relations within the NATO or even stir predicaments with Italy. 37 P. Lensink, op. cit., pp. 118-119. 38 Dragan Bogetic, Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955 (Yugoslavia and the West from 1952-1955), Beograd 2000, p. 134. 39 D. Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori (Stimulating and limiting factors...), op. cit., p. 68.
243 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century their influence. The United States was against phrasing in the agreement which would mean formal military cooperation of mutual assistance. Because of that and accomplished by the American and British insistence, Greece and Turkey revised some of the important details of the draft agreement of the upcoming military cooperation with Yugoslavia.40 In order to make the alliance acceptable to the Western countries and Italy, Yugoslavia ultimately accepted some clauses contained in the agreement that it did not like. The agreement did not envisage the level of military cooperation that Yugoslavs had expected. They also reluctantly accepted a clause stipulating the possibility of inclusion of other countries in this alliance. The clause was included in order to make it look more flexible and less menacing, in particular to Italy. Generally speaking, the Yugoslavs expected furious reactions in the satellite countries and from the world in general.41 New U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles thought more and more that this informal alliance in the Balkans, which would bring Yugoslavia closer to the NATO, could become formal. On February 28, 1953, less than a week after Stalin’s death, Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece met in Ankara and signed the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation which included a clause on the informal consultations among the three countries’ chiefs of staff. The Americans continued with their efforts to turn the agreement into a full military alliance.42 The agreement deserved much publicity and was welcomed in most of the Western countries. By signing this agreement, Yugoslavia formally sided with the West. In the aftermath of signing of the agreement, however, institutional cooperation among the three countries stagnated. Such a situation was caused by numerous factors of which the following should be mentioned: Yugoslav expectations that the relations with the Soviet Union would soon normalize, the fact that Greece and Turkey were not ready to cooperate with Yugoslavia during the pending Trieste crisis, and the growing animosities between Greece and Turkey regarding Cyprus.43 The military provisions of the Ankara Agreement, which envisaged association of 70 Yugoslav, Greek and Turkish divisions and the creation of a joint headquarters which would be directly connected to the NATO headquarters, remained only nominal without taking any concrete action. Thanks to delays in answering the Yugoslav demands relating to concrete guarantees in
40 State Secretary to the American Embassy in Greece, February 21, 1953. FRUS: 1952-1954, Vol. VIII, p. 624. 41 P. Lensink, op. cit., pp. 119-120. 42 Dennison Rusinow, The Yugoslav Experiment 1948-1974, University of California Press, Berkley and Los Angeles, 1974, p. 45. 43 Dragan Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori... (Stimulating and limiting factors…),op. cit., p. 69.
244 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century case of an attack from the East, the West missed a chance to firmly tie Yugoslavia to its defense and perhaps, to its entire military system. As regards Yugoslavia, although the agreement did not meet all its expectations, it was a significant achievement of Tito’s diplomacy. In signing the agreement, Yugoslavia scored a significant psychological victory, strengthened its security against the East, and enhanced its position toward the West.44 Although the United States welcomed the Ankara agreement, it still continued to question the military component of the agreement, because it was binding the NATO members Greece and Turkey to pursue military cooperation with a country that was not a NATO member. The United States was also concerned that Italy might have a negative reaction to the establishment of some kind of firm alliance, which would derail pending negotiations over the Trieste dispute.45 Dulles, who visited Turkey in May 1953, told Prime Minister Adnan Menderes that the basic hurdles to the Turkish efforts to link the Ankara Agreement with NATO, besides the Trieste issue, also included the opposing stance of the Scandinavian NATO members which thought that the northern NATO flank was being neglected because of the increased attention in the south. Another reason was the American public, which needed to be appeased due to prejudices against cooperation with a communist country.46 The Anglo-Yugoslav relations reached their zenith in March 1953. Tito’s visit to Great Britain from March 16 to 21 was one of the great Yugoslav foreign policy triumphs promulgating him as a world leader.47 Tito’s biographer Vladimir Dedijer wrote that “the timing of the trip was perfect, not only because of Stalin, but also because of the fact that Tito travelled to London with the Ankara Agreement in his pocket.”48 Right after Stalin’s death, the Soviets started to send more open indications that they wanted to normalize their relations with Yugoslavia, but on their terms. On July 10, 1953, shortly after Stalin’s death and the bloody East Berlin riots of June 16, it was reported that a member of the Politburo of the Soviet Communist Party and secret police chief Lavrentiy Beria had been arrested. These events marked a surprising change in the Soviet society and foreign policy. Dedijer was surprised with the change in Edvard Kardelj’s assessment of the Soviet society. On August 14, 1953, the Government of the Soviet Union announced at the
44 Darko Bekić, Jugoslavija u hladnom ratu (Yugoslavia in the Cold War), Globus, Zagreb 1988, p. 498. 45 New York Times, April 16, 1953. 46 D. Bekić, op. cit., p. 508. 47 Ibid, p. 499. 48 Vladimir Dedijer, Izgubljena bitka Josifa Visarionoviča Staljina (The lost battle of Joseph Vissarionovic Stalin), Rad, Beograd 1978, p. 323.
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Supreme Soviet that it would start the process of normalization of relations with Yugoslavia.49 Yugoslavia had great expectations for the normalization of the relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries. Tito’s statements during the summer and autumn of 1953, expressed his believe that, following Beria’s arrest, “authentic” changes were taking place in the first socialist country and that they should be supported not only by Yugoslavia but by the whole world.50 Soviet Prime Minister Georgi Maljenkov also confirmed the changes in the Soviet policy in his speech at the Supreme Soviet: “At this moment there are no disputed or unsolved issues that cannot be solved in a peaceful manner by mutual agreement of parties concerned. This applies to our relations with all countries, including the United States of America.” Very soon, the new Soviet leadership redefined the Soviet relations with Greece, Israel and later with Yugoslavia; the Soviets renounced their claims to the Turkish territories and, most importantly, they agreed to the end of the war in Korea.51 However, the Yugoslav optimism about the improvement of the relations with the Soviet Union did not last long. The reports from the Yugoslav borders showed an undiminished level of satellite armed forces concentration and the same number of incidents as before. Moscow still continued to blame Yugoslavia for the rift in the countries’ mutual relations, and saw the Balkan alliance as an aggressive attempt of Yugoslavia’s inclusion in the NATO directly aimed at diminishing the influence of the Soviet Union.52 “Full dependence of the Yugoslav foreign policy on the American-English imperialism was strongly manifested through the establishment of the Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish bloc, which was legalized on February 28, 1953 through the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation. Irrespective of many differences among the members of the tripartite alliance, it became a reality because it suited the Anglo-American interests to create and strengthen an aggressive Soviet counterpart in the Balkans. Discussions among the heads of the three countries, exchange visits by their military delegations, and development of measures to strengthen the economic cooperation among them were pending.”53
49 Vladimir Dedijer, Novi prilozi za biografiju Josipa Broza Tita (New contributions for the biography of Josip Broz Tito), Rad, Beograd, 1984, pp. 543–549. 50 Josip Broz Tito, Govori i članci (Speeches and articles), knjiga VIII, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1959, p. 45. 51 W. LaFeber, op. cit., p. 144. 52 Dragan Bogetić, Saradnja Jugoslavije i Zapada u vreme sukoba sa Kominformom (1952-1955) (Cooperation between Yugoslavia and the West during the confrontation with the Cominform (1952-1955)), In: „Velike sile i male države u hladnom ratu 1945-1955 – slučaj Jugoslavije”, Zbornik radova sa međunarodne naučne konferencije, Beograd 3–4. novembar 2003. godine, p. 54. 53 Excerpts from the Memo prepared by the head of the 4th European Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, M.V. Zimnjanjin, sent to V.M. Molotov: “About the Situation
246 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
In their National Intelligence Estimate report of June 26, 1953, which was called “Possible Developments in Yugoslavia”, the American Central Intelligence Agency noted: “We do not believe that Yugoslavia will rejoin the Soviet Bloc as long as the Tito regime remains in power… Yugoslavia’s basic attitude toward cooperation with the West in defense against Soviet aggression is to obtain the maximum Western commitments for Yugoslavia’s defense while allowing minimum Western influence over Yugoslavia’s domestic and foreign policies. In future talks with the Tripartite Powers (the US, UK and France), Yugoslavia will probably continue to seek greater commitments from the NATO powers and may point to its membership in the Ankara Pact as justifying some form of closer Yugoslav association with the NATO powers. 54 Although the Balkan alliance was aimed at limiting the Soviet expansionism, it was more directed at Bulgaria. All three signatories to the Balkan alliance had good reasons to recoil from a potential Bulgarian attack. At the beginning of the 1950s, it had been believed that Bulgaria had the best equipped army of all Soviet satellites, keeping 900 Soviet T-34 tanks. Because of the conflict with the Cominform, Tito had to pay attention to the actions taken by the Soviet Union and its satellites. Apart from looking after the position of the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, Turkey also had to take into account its vulnerability of a possible attack, since Istanbul was less than 150 kilometers away from the Bulgarian border. Greece, which initiated the creation of the Balkan Pact and was militarily inferior to other countries concerned, had a significant percentage of the Slavic population and its basic motivation to create the Balkan Pact was inspired by its anti- Bulgarian orientation.55 In the short term, Yugoslavia continued to improve its relations with the West and with its immediate non-communist neighbors. The military negotiations between Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia continued during 1953 and 1954 with the central supposition that a Soviet/satellite attack would undoubtedly lead to the next world war. The United States welcomed those negotiations but insisted that Greece and Turkey should coordinate their proposals with the NATO beforehand and keep their planning on a “conditional basis”, so that the formal political commitments of the three countries could be endorsed later. In the spring of 1954, all three countries proposed that the negotiations advance further than the “conditional phase,” but the Eisenhower administration remained relentless
53 in Yugoslavia and the Possible Directions of Its Foreign Policy“, Moscow, May 27, 1953, (in: Radojica Luburić, Pomirenje Jugoslavije i SSSR-a 1953–1955, Podgorica 2007, pp. 140-141). 54 National Intelligence Estimate, Probable Developments in Yugoslavia, published 26 June 1953, http://books.google.me/books?id=hYzo_TJ1BM4C&pg=PA141&lpg=PA141&dq=National+Int elligence+Estimate,+Probable+Developments, pp. 143–144. 55 D. Stone, op. cit., pp. 398-399.
247 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century on its position that the concern about Italy’s participation in the European Defense Community (EDC) and the negotiations over the Trieste conflict might prevent the final arrangement.56 However, Tito’s travel to Turkey from April 12-18, 1954, gave another incentive to the Ankara Agreement. For the first time, it was publically announced that Yugoslavia took a cooperative stance regarding the EDC project, while Yugoslavia’s refusal to join the NATO was explained as the country’s determination to play a destabilizing role in relation to a group of Eastern European countries.57 Explaining the military and political cooperation with the West, Tito told journalists from the Parisian newspaper Le Monde that “my trip to Turkey means strengthening of the cooperation between Yugoslavia and Turkey, and Greece as well. At the end of the day, it means strengthening of our relations with the Western countries but without a formal effect, because Yugoslavia, due to its specific conditions and circumstances, has no intention to join NATO.”58 The results of the talks held in Turkey about the transformation of the Ankara Agreement into a military alliance were (with initial dissatisfaction) accepted by Greece59 during Tito’s visit to Athens from June 2-5, 1954. The parties agreed to form a tripartite consultative assembly that would soften the military aspect of the discussions and give them a political connotation. Prior to Tito’s travel to Athens, the Greeks developed a number of initiatives to curry favor with the NATO members for the creation of the Balkan Alliance. Greece also vigorously opposed to the Italian threat to use their veto power within NATO.60 The NATO partners were concerned that the commitments stemming from the Balkan Alliance could be in contradiction to those stemming from the NATO membership. Therefore, Greece and Turkey were requested to submit their engagement in the Balkan Alliance for the NATO’s consideration. The main issue was whether the other NATO members were obliged to take a military action if Greece or Turkey were dragged into a war because of their commitments stemming from the Balkan Pact. In its attempts to delay a formal agreement of the Balkan Pact until a solution for the Trieste crisis was found, Italy threatened
56 Lorraine Lees, Keeping Tito Afloat – The United States, Yugoslavia and Cold War, Belgrade, 2003, p. 191. 57 D. Bekić, op. cit., pp. 605-606. 58 Josip Broz Tito, Govori i članci (Speeches and articles), knjiga IX, Naprijed, Zagreb, 1959., p. 116. 59 The decision to create the alliance taken in Ankara was made without the Greeks being present. The Greek diplomats publically voiced their dissatisfaction in most of the European countries about the talks held in Ankara. However, the Greeks promptly changed their view once they were informed about the substance of the talks held in Ankara and about the positive Yugoslav stance towards the EDC. 60 Dragan Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori ograničavanja... (Stimulating and limiting factors...), op. cit., pp. 70-78.
248 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century to use a veto once the pact arrived on the NATO agenda. It is paradoxical that the American diplomats at the time were against such threats believing that any delay would enrage Tito and have a detrimental effect on a solution to the Trieste crisis. Although previously advocating a delay to the Balkan Pact, the American diplomats were now talking the Italians out of making problems for its endorsement by the NATO.61 Because of the deeply ingrained belief that the creation of the tripartite alliance would imperil a solution to the Trieste crisis, the United States, Great Britain and France undertook a number of concrete initiatives with the three signatories of the Ankara agreement to prevent them from making any public indications that would announce the signing of the Balkan Pact in Athens. After a visit by Turkish Prime Minister Menderes to Washington and strong pressure from the United States to delay negotiations on converting the Ankara Agreement into a formal alliance, the Turkish stance on the final outcome of the alliance changed. Turkey became less interested, was late with establishing its commission of experts, and several times asked for a delay of the ministerial meeting.62 The biggest problem, harmonizing the text relating to the mutual liabilities of the member countries, was solved by adopting the language that enabled the Yugoslav leadership to make an independent decision whether to join the Western side in a defensive war or not. Thus, Yugoslavia accomplished its intention to keep the Balkan Alliance as an exclusively defensive organization, completely independent from NATO. Following the Yugoslav and Greek reluctance, the amended American position, and the divisions within the Italian government about the issue, Turkey withdrew its motion for Italy to join the Balkan Alliance.63 Turkey was aware that under the current circumstances the Yugoslav membership in the NATO was not possible. However, during his visit with U.S. President Eisenhower, Turkish Prime Minister Menderes said “he would do his best to facilitate a peaceful solution for the Trieste crisis, so that Yugoslavia could be aligned, shoulder to shoulder, with Turkey, Greece and Italy. It would give an additional stamina and potential to the defense of the southern NATO flank.”64
61 P. Lensink, op. cit., p. 151. 62 The Turkish initiative was supported by the United States, which asked for a delay of the meeting until an agreement on Trieste was reached. Also, the approval by the Italian Parliament was necessary for the completion of the crucial phase of the negotiations about the creation of the EDC. With the failure of the EDC project because of the lack of the French support, the situation had significantly changed and the Yugoslav position was strengthened. 63 Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955 (Yugoslavia and the West from 1952-1955), Beograd 2000, pp. 146-147; 149-150. 64 Eisenhower to Dulles, June 4, 1954, The Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, volume 15, part 5, chapter 11, pp. 1114-1115.
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While the lack of solution for the Trieste crisis could temporarily delay the formalization of the Balkan Pact, it was not able to prevent its final creation. Thus, the time factor became more important as the parallel negotiations over the Balkan Pact and the Trieste dispute were slowly coming to an end at the same time. The Yugoslavs thought that the American opposition to the further development of the Balkan Pact was caused by the Italian claims, which argued that strengthening of the Balkan Pact would be instrumental in achieving Yugoslav goals in the Trieste dispute.65 Great Britain, France and the United States failed in their intentions to slow down the creation of the Balkan Pact. The interests of the three powers were different from those of Greece and Turkey. While the three powers wanted to retain freedom of action by keeping a safe distance from Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey had nothing to lose, but much more to gain from the alliance with Yugoslavia. Therefore, Greece and Turkey tried to expedite the negotiations on the military alliance with Yugoslavia in an effort to ensure that Yugoslavia would eventually become a NATO member. The endeavors of the big NATO countries to limit the aspirations of the smaller ones turned out to be futile. Their efforts to limit the scope of the Balkan Pact only resulted in the inclusion of the following clause into the draft agreement: “This Treaty does not affect and cannot be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of Turkey and Greece under the North Atlantic Treaty of April 4, 1949.”66 Right before the signing of the agreement in Athens, the Soviet Union took a sudden initiative to improve its relations with Yugoslavia. On June 22, 1954, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev, sent a letter to Tito proposing the normalization of the relations “with the view of restoring the friendly relations at the state and party levels”, marking a sudden turn in the Soviet policy towards Yugoslavia.67 This initiative came about as a result of the growing concern over the signing of the tripartite military agreement, which was supposedly directed against the Soviet Union and the countries of “people’s democracies”. Since Yugoslavia did not become an EDC member and its full-fledged membership in the NATO was out of the question, it became connected to the Western military structures indirectly. Following the successful negotiations during the first part of 1954, the already good relations with the two NATO members Greece and Turkey resulted in the signing of a military agreement within the already existing Balkan Pact. The Agreement on Cooperation, Alliance
65 P. Lensink, pp. 147-149. 66 D. Stone, pp. 402-403. 67 Radoica Luburić, Pomirenje Jugoslavije i SSSR-a, 1953-1955 (Reconciliation of Yugoslavia and the USSR, 1953-1955), Podgorica, 2007, pp. 307-309.
250 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century and Mutual Assistance was signed in Bled on August 9, 1954. It was the first military alliance signed between countries of such different social and political systems in modern history. The Yugoslavs managed to impose the regulation that they would go to war only in the case that Greece or Turkey were directly attacked. Thus, Yugoslavia avoided a direct connection with the NATO. The signing of the military agreement and finding a solution to the Trieste crisis68 led to an improvement in Belgrade’s relations with the West.69 The United States voiced its dissatisfaction and surprise over the creation of the alliance mainly because of its attempts to also include Italy, which would diminish the Yugoslav role and force it to become closer to the NATO. Italy accused the United States of accepting Yugoslavia’s membership in a military alliance without Rome’s consent, which, as Italy claimed, improved the Yugoslav position in the negotiations over Trieste.70 The gravity of this agreement signed for a period of 20 years received different interpretations in various countries. The U.S. Department of State thought that the duration of the Pact would depend on further normalization of the Yugoslav– Soviet relations.71 The British government considered the Balkan Pact important only if Italy was included, i.e. if the Trieste crisis was solved.72 However, the developments that marked this unusual alliance of states belonging to different sides of a bipolar community represented a political precedent of that time. The hurdles and limitations were much stronger than the motivation to continue with cooperation. After the French National Parliament finally rejected the proposal for the creation of the EDC, the actual collapse of the EDC was complete. The Balkan Pact then gained importance. The reasons for delaying the solution to the Trieste crisis were gone. The solution had been delayed for such a long time because of the fear that Italy might reject the EDC project.73
68 On May 31, 1954, following the lengthy process of reconciliation of Yugoslav conditions with the Anglo-American ones the parties agreed on all disputed issues and the United States, Great Britain and Yugoslavia finally signed an agrement on the Trieste dispute. It resulted in the adoption of the Memorandum of Consent on establishing the Free Territory of Trieste on October 5, 1954 by Italy, Great Britain, the United States and Yugoslavia (M. Stojković, Jugoslovensko-italijanska državna granica u svjetlosti međunarodnih ugovora (Yugoslav-Italian state border in the light of internatioal agreements), Socijalizam, No. 4, Beograd 1974, pp. 334-338). 69 Tvrtko Jakovina, Socijalizam na američkoj pšenici (Socialim on American wheat), Matica hrvatska, Zagreb 2002, p. 41. 70 Dr. Dragan Bogetić, Podsticajni i faktori (Stimulating and limiting factors…), p. 78. 71 The United States in World Affairs, 1954, pp. 186-7. 72 D. Bekic, op. cit., p. 648. 73 Ibid., p. 649.
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The Bled Agreement helped Yugoslavia achieve two seemingly opposing goals. On the one hand, it strengthened the Yugoslav position and provided Tito with a greater level of independence. On the other hand, it further induced Yugoslavia’s approach toward the United States and other Western countries. The Yugoslavs thought that it was their strengthened position resulting from the Balkan Pact that played a decisive role in making the Italians accept a solution to the Trieste dispute.74 The first conference of the chiefs of staff of the Balkan Pact held in Athens from September 21-27, 1954, marked the continuation of disagreements among the three allies which announced the end of the Pact. Instead of overcoming the disagreements noted during the conference held in Bled, the conference of the chiefs of staff held in Athens exacerbated the differences between Turkey and Greece on one side and Yugoslavia, on the other. While Turkey and Greece were dissatisfied with the previous joint performance and insisted on inter-state cooperation adjusted to the general NATO defense plans, Yugoslavia came up with entirely different proposals.75 At the end of 1954, Tito began a trip to India and Burma which would mark the beginning of the non-alliance movement. Yugoslavia saw the opportunity of taking a position in the Non-Allied Movement at the time when the movement was slowly shaping. The aim was to establish certain equidistance from the two confronted blocks. This opportunity might serve as an exit from isolation and the possibility to pursue an active international policy.76 Disagreements among the three partners, Yugoslavia and Greece in particular, increased in regard to the evolution of international cooperation and further development of the character of that cooperation. The rift in the three countries’ foreign policy orientation and their perceptions of the two opposing blocs was becoming more and more evident. While Yugoslav efforts were directed towards active coexistence, Turkey was fully engaged in connecting the Middle East countries with the Anglo-American bloc. Reducing the military components and emphasizing the economic, political and cultural components of the Balkan Pact Yugoslavia endeavored to confirm its allegiance to the Western defense system, while showing the Soviets the existence of a reputable military and defense alliance. Under such conditions, the three Balkan countries organized a Ministerial Conference in Ankara on February 28, 1955 which was, in compliance with the
74 P. Lensink, op. cit., pp. 152-153. 75 Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955 (Yugoslavia and the West from 1952-1955), op. cit., pp. 153-154. 76 Bojana Tadić, Nesvrstanost u praksi međunarodnih odnosa (Non-Alliance in international relations), Institute of international politics and economics, Belgrade, 1976, p. 99.
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Bled Agreement, turned into the first meeting of the Balkan Pact’s Permanent Council. The differences stated at the previous ministerial conference were now much bigger. While Yugoslavia spoke about the danger caused by the existence of the two blocs, Turkey attempted to tie all Middle East countries to the recently established pact of Turkey and Iraq. Greece was supportive of the Turkish actions. Yugoslavia, once again, rejected the Turkish initiative that the Balkan Pact plans be coordinated with the NATO. 77 The last attempt to persuade Yugoslavia to change its stance on the NATO was the visit by Turkish Prime Minister Menderes to Yugoslavia on May 4, 1955. This event can be perceived as an informal end to the Balkan Pact. The Turkish Prime Minister reiterated his proposal for connecting the Balkan Pact with the NATO. He also warned about the change in the Soviet foreign policy and criticized Tito’s trip to India and Burma. Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Kardelj rejected such statements and replied by presenting the outlines of the new Yugoslav foreign policy strategy. As the direct threat from a Soviet Bloc armed attack was passing, Yugoslavia stopped perceiving the Balkan Pact as its principal means of defense. Therefore, instead of the military dimension of the Balkan Pact, the Yugoslavs supported strengthening of the economic, political and cultural cooperation among the three countries. Kardelj, once again, refused the Turkish demand for Italy’s inclusion in the Pact. Khrushchev’s visit to Yugoslavia, only four days after Menderes’s visit, created an additional wave of the Turkish displeasure. The Turks claimed that they had not been informed of Khrushchev’s visit at all. 78 Although Yugoslavia advocated reduction of military cooperation within the Balkan Pact, the Yugoslavs arranged the visit of Greek Chief of Staff, general C. Dovas to Yugoslavia concurrently with the visit of the Soviet delegation. This move was aimed at achieving a double affect: first, to notify the Soviet leadership that in the case of need, Yugoslavia would have a respectful military defense alliance as its support; and second, to notify the West and Washington in particular, of the fact that there had been no change in the Yugoslav allegiance to the Balkan Pact or to the Western defense system.79 The West had no illusions about the future of cooperation within the Balkan Pact. The CIA’s National Intelligence Estimate of February 5, 1955 entitled “Yugoslavia and Its Future Orientation” stated that the incumbent “regime would
77 Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955 (Yugoslavia and the West from 1952-1955), op. cit., pp. 234-235. 78 Ibid, p. 742. 79 D. Bekić, op. cit., p. 743. 80 National Intelligence Estimate, number 31–55, 23 Ferbuary 1955, “Yugoslavia and its Future Orientataion“, p. 174.(http://books.google.me/books?id=hYzo_TJ1BM4C&pg=PR5&lpg=PR5 &dq=National+Intelligence+Estimate+number+31+–+55,+23+February+1955,+Yugoslavia).
253 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century prefer to remain neutral in event of a general war despite its Balkan Pact commitments. However, it (Yugoslavia) probably has little confidence that it could successfully do so, since Yugoslavia lies athwart the main invasion routes of Southern Europe. Therefore, we estimate that Yugoslavia would probably feel compelled to fight on the side of the West if its Balkan allies, Greece and Turkey, were attacked. If, however, the Balkan area were not invaded, Tito would probably elect to remain neutral as long as the international situation would permit.”80 The developments that followed could have been anticipated. The differences in the foreign policy priorities caused by the new international circumstances contributed to worsening of the relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey. The disputes between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus, which culminated with the demonstrations and unrest in Istanbul and Izmir in September 1955 also contributed to the Balkan Pact remaining nothing more than an empty promise. The crisis within the Pact resulted from the unfulfilled commitments of the agreements signed in Bled and Ankara.81 It should be stated here that Yugoslavia was not the only country that was running short of enthusiasm for the Balkan Pact. Because of the growing conflict with Greece over Cyprus, Turkey also started to slowly lose confidence in the Balkan cooperation. After Greece had brought the Cyprus dispute before the United Nations on August 16, 1954, only a week after the Balkan Pact had signed the relations between Athens and Ankara quickly started to deteriorate.82 The Turkish consulate in Salonika was bombed on September 6, 1955, which raised anti-Greek tensions in Turkey. It marked the several decades-long conflict between Greece and Turkey in which Yugoslavia tried to take a neutral position. The Yugoslav stance on the Cyprus dispute was reflected in Tito’s speech to Greek journalists: “As regards Cyprus, we believe that this issue should be observed in such a way that, on one hand, we preserve the peace and cooperation in the Balkans, and, on the other hand, that issue should be solved during the time, according to the will of the people of Cyprus.”83 Chilling of the Greek-Turkish relations was stronger than what the Yugoslavs had expected. Since 1956, the Balkan Pact has been nothing more than a dead letter.84 Former Yugoslav high official and diplomat, Leo Mates, disagreed with the thesis that Yugoslavia was to be blamed for the slow killing of the Balkan Pact. He claims that it was the Greek-Turkish dispute that caused the Pact to become
81 John Iatrides, Balkan Triangle. Birth and Decline of an Alliance across Ideological Boundaries. The Hague, Paris Mouton, 1968., str. 146; Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955 (Yugoslavia and the West from 1952-1955), op. cit., pp. 235-236. 82 D. Bekić, op. cit., p. 736. 83 Borba, Septembar 17, 1955, p. 1. 84 D. Stone, op. cit., p. 404.
254 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century passive adding that the dispute escalated to the point at which the operation of the NATO bodies dealing with the Greek-Turkish cooperation was disabled. According to Mates, membership in the Balkan Pact and maintenance of the relations with the United Sates were Yugoslav security guarantees from the unpredictable future Soviet actions.85 While the Turks and Greeks attempted to connect the Balkan Pact and the NATO, the Yugoslavs tried to maintain the illusion that the Pact continued to exist until the end of 1955. In the Balkan Pact, Yugoslavia saw a strong instrument of its foreign policy toward both the East and the West. Very soon, the cooperation within the Balkan Pact was boiled down to a bilateral component with emphasized cooperation between Yugoslavia and Greece.86 Unlike Yugoslavia, Turkey and Greece were not able to go their own ways during the Cold War. Diversification of the Yugoslav foreign policy was followed by a trend of worsening relations with its Western allies. The deterioration of relations appeared to be the result of new developments following the Soviet initiatives to normalize its relations with Yugoslavia. Since the direct threat of the Soviet military intervention was over, Yugoslavia thought that any act that could disturb the existing balance of power would be detrimental and would be understood as a provocation. The military negotiations within the Pact were gradually abandoned, while the meetings boiled down to talks about minor technical matters. Yugoslavia refused all attempts by Greece and Turkey to link the Balkan Pact with the NATO. Yugoslavia also tried to reduce the military component and urge the political, economic and cultural cooperation. These actions raised concerns by the Western countries that Yugoslavia was returning to the auspices of the Eastern Bloc. What Yugoslavia cared about was the preservation of its own political-social system without undertaking any military commitments, particularly within NATO.
Conclusion The creation of an atypical alliance composed of states of different social and political system in Europe during the mid-1950s was unprecedented during the Cold War. Therefore, its background and the real purpose can be contemplated only through the prism of interests of its members and in the general context of bipolar relations of that time. At the beginning, the Yugoslav interest was primarily to defend itself from the East and to preserve the Yugoslav communist
85 Leo Mates, Dopuna recenzije rukopisa Darka Bekića (Supplement to the review of the manuscript written by Darko Bekić), Beograd, 3.3.1988, pp. 1-2, (In: D. Bekić, p. 737). 86 Dragan Bogetić, Jugoslavija i Zapad 1952-1955 (Yugoslavia and the West from 1952-1955), op. cit., pp. 236-237.
255 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century model of the one-party system. Yugoslavia tried to ensure that it continued receiving Western assistance, while improving its position in the negotiations over the Trieste dispute. It should be mentioned here that the Yugoslav leadership was never aware enough about the difficulties the Western countries and the United States in particular, were facing from their citizens because of the cooperation and assistance provided to a communist country. As regards Turkey and Greece, their primary interest for the Pact came from the need to defend themselves and suppress the Soviet influence as well as from their narrow interests to strengthen their own positions within the NATO. In spite of its short duration, the Balkan Alliance cannot be observed as an aberration in the political history of Eastern Europe. The Balkan pact was disintegrated only when the need for its existence ceased to exist. For as long as Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia saw a clear need for cooperation, the ethnic and historical animosities were not an obstacle for their political cooperation. The states that formed the Balkan Pact succeeded in creating a military alliance that matched their needs in spite of the opposition by some senior NATO members. Such an accomplishment can by no means be perceived as the result of Western demands or of diplomatic luck.
256 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Vladimir TRAPARA1
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS AS THE KEY FACTOR IN POST-COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Abstract: The author explains why he considers Russian-American relations the key factor in international relations, even after the end of the Cold War. In spite of the Soviet collapse and Russia’s abandonment of the communist ideology, the rapprochement between the two powers has not occurred yet. The basic cause lies in the incompatibility of their identities, which is being continually reproduced. The change in distribution of power in the international system at the end of the Cold War – transformation from the bipolar into a unipolar system – made international relations less stable and predictable and therefore, more prone to the eruption of a new world conflict, especially with a relative rise of Russia’s power in the first decade of the 21st century that made it capable of confronting Washington’s hegemonic plans in a more assertive way. Nevertheless, although during the last 25 years Russian-American relations were characterized by a constant rivalry, they went through changes having both warmer and colder stages. Due to these changes, conclusions about the impact of various conditions in U.S.-Russian relations upon international relations in general (and position of Serbia in particular) can be derived as well as (relying on IR theories) predictions about what necessary is for the success of the two powers’ rapprochement in the future. Key words: United States, Russia, Cold War, rapprochement, identity, unipolarity.
1 Vladimir Trapara, Research Associate, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period.
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Introduction: the importance of research into contemporary Russian-American relations As a relatively young scientific discipline, international relations theory had its golden age during the Cold War, when all contemporary schools of thought were established. Relations between the two superpowers were an unavoidable topic of the period, being a determining factor of international relations. The development of IR theory in the United States was fueled by the Cold War efforts. In the post- Cold War era, new IR theories – not necessarily American, or Western – were formulated. However, U.S.-Russian relations were unfairly marginalized as their subject, while some other events and processes became dominant fields of interest. Recent events in the Ukrainian crisis removed any doubt that relations between United States and Russia should once again become a dominant field of IR theory research. They ought to be used as a testing ground for new theories as well. The key importance of contemporary U.S.-Russian relations for general international relations is both practical and theoretical. The practical one is derived from possibly the most important lesson that history teaches us: as long as the recent great war remains unfinished by a comprehensive political solution acceptable to all relevant actors, there can be neither a stable international system, nor world peace. The Cold War was not a war in the purest sense, but by the depth of enmity between rivals, the energy it required from them, and the consequences for broader international system – it was comparable to any great world conflict. The fact that its conclusion did not bring forth a comprehensive solution acceptable to all relevant actors (especially Russia and the United States) is devastating for contemporary international relations. Not only is international politics today burdened by the unfinished nature of the Cold War, but also by various unresolved issues from the First and the Second World War, which were kept frozen during the Cold War.2 That the Cold War remains unfinished, in the sense that there is no real rapprochement between its participants yet, we can conclude from Charles Kupchan’s definition of rapprochement. According to him, in the case of rapprochement states abandon military rivalry, agree to resolve their disputes peacefully, and establish mutual expectations of peaceful coexistence.3 Several indicators tell us that the relations between contemporary Russia and the United States do not match this definition, thus these two states still perceive one another as a geopolitical threat. There is no agreement between them on how European
2 See Sergei Karaganov, “The Magic Numbers of 2009”, Russia in Global Affairs, No 2, April-June 2009, Internet, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_13036 26/4/2014 3 Charles A. Kupchan, How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace, Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 2.
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(and global) security regime should look like: the two states are members of opposed military alliances (NATO and CSTO), while common security institutions (UN and OSCE) work with serious difficulties due to this disagreement. Russia and the U.S. face difficulties in disarmament and arms control (examples: ACFE Treaty blockade, missile defense issue), while the very fact that they negotiate these issues at all proves their rivalry – why would two countries negotiate disarmament if they do not feel threatened by one another’s arms? The two powers have different views on resolving many current “hot” and “frozen” conflicts, while at the same time they do not hesitate to use force to resolve them in their own favor, sometimes helping opposite sides in civil wars. To overcome the Russian-American rivalry and to solve disputed issues derived from the unfinished nature of the Cold War, a research into the two powers’ relations is necessary. Its theoretical importance lies in the older IR theories failure to predict and explain the end of the Cold War. Thus, the explanatory power of the new theories should be tested on contemporary U.S.- Russian relations in order not to repeat such mistake, so that the reality of contemporary international relations (the key factor of which are the U.S.-Russian relations) could be successfully captured by the theory. The absence of Russian- American rapprochement in spite of Soviet Union and communism’s disappearance is an enigma which poses a challenge to any IR scholar. There is one more reason why the research into contemporary U.S.-Russian relations is important. As most of IR theories are obsessed by types of international system and their influence upon the behavior of states and the outcomes of their interactions, the type of contemporary international system is especially interesting. In this system, both the U.S. and Russia have special places – the U.S. as a superpower, and Russia as an ordinary great power. In the following chapter we discuss this one and other theoretically significant issues connected to post- Cold War Russian-American relations.
The constants and variables in the post-Cold War U.S.-Russian relations The key constant in U.S.-Russian relations during both the Cold War and the post-Cold War period is the incompatibility of the two states’ national identities. The persistence of this incompatibility is the underlying reason for the absence of their rapprochement. Namely, Russia-U.S. identity opposition manifested itself during the Cold War as ideological contradiction between capitalism and communism only on the surface. Russia’s transition from socialism to capitalism revealed deeper foundations of this incompatibility. To discover its elements, David Campbell’s performative theory could help. According to this theory, the identity of a state is not given and fixed, but is constituted in relation to some
259 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century difference and threat: “self” is constituted in relation to “other” which is a threat to our identity because it is an “alternative mode of being”.4 Foreign policy is the central practice here, because it “draws” identity boundaries, by presenting ideational threats as exclusively external (territorial).5 Domestic actors – holders of alternative identity interpretations – are “excluded” by their linking with foreign actors capable of endangering “us” physically, so that the society is disciplined and homogenized around specific identity interpretation.6 These boundaries become fixed over time, making the identity more stable and influential to foreign policy, which reproduces it on and on.7 To Campbell, every state is an “imagined community”, for it lacks “prediscursive foundations” – there is nothing identity could be based on until foreign policy constitutes it in relation to the threat of the “other”. However, not all states are equally “imagined”, for some of them are based upon (as a replacement for prediscursive foundation) the identity of certain people (ethnic group) which formed their national state. This is not the case with the United States, for it is a completely artificial state, made of people of diverse origin who came to live on certain territory. Campbell thus says the U.S. is “imagined community par excellence”.8 A consequence of this is a very rigid identity, based on ideological homogenization, rooted in Puritan political ethos, which used to be extremely intolerant towards the different and not eager to make compromises.9 Campbell views entire U.S. history as a process of reproduction of the identity based upon individualism as the supreme value, where the Cold War is only a stage.10 According to the predictions of performative theory, the
4 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1992, p. 3. 5 Ibid, p. 8. 6 Ibid, pp. 71-75. 7 Ibid, pp. 11-12. 8 “No state possesses a prediscursive, stable identity… Yet for no state is this condition as central as it is for America. If all states are ‘imagined communities’, devoid of ontological being apart from the many and varied practices which constitute their reality, then America is the imagined community par excellence. For there never has been a country called ‘America’, nor a people known as ‘Americans’, from whom a national identity is drawn. There is a United States of America, and there are many who declare themselves to be ‘Americans’… but ‘America’ only exists by virtue of people coming to live in a particular place... more than any other state, the imprecise process of imagination is what constitutes American identity. In this context, the practices of ‘foreign policy’ come to have a special importance. If the identity of the ‘true nationals’ remains intrinsically elusive and inorganic, it can only be secured by an effective and continual ideological demarcation of those who are ‘false’ to the defining ideals”. Ibid, p. 105. 9 Ibid, p. 125. 10 Ibid, p. 145. “In the history of U.S. foreign policy – regardless of the radically different contexts in which it has operated – the formalized practices and ritualized acts of security discourse have
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Soviet Union is only represented as a security threat, while it was in fact a political one, for its model of society was opposed to the model deeply rooted in U.S. identity.11 Moreover, the famous foreign policy document from the beginning of the Cold War, NSC-68, states that the problem lies not only in the Soviet Union and communism, but in the dangers stemming from the anarchic international system.12 Thus, the United States very early undertook the mission it has been trying to accomplish in the post-Cold War period: getting rid of international anarchy and establishing a new world order based upon universal (in fact American) values. All actors whose behavior contributes to the continuation of international anarchy, and whose values are contradictory to the American model are considered as a threat to the U.S. identity and should be eliminated. Therefore, it is not unusual that post-Cold War Russia is a “pain in the neck” to Washington. Its identity is in many ways incompatible with the American one, in spite of the abandonment of the communist ideology, for it is still opposed to the project written down in NSC-68 – which the U.S. would stick to unrelated to the existence of communism and the Soviet Union. Russia is a country that is historically used to living with differences – as an imperial multiethnic state on the inside (contrary to the U.S. as a “melting pot” that denies internal differences), as well as on the outside, as a country that borders, clashes and cooperates with various great and regional powers which promote different values and visions of the order (contrary to the U.S, a country that is used to imposing order in Western hemisphere without the necessity to coexist with other great powers). In this sense, the
10 worked to produce a conception of the United States in which freedom, liberty, law, democracy, individualism, faith, order, prosperity and civilization are claimed to exist because of the constant struggle with an often violent suppression of opponents said to embody tyranny, oppression, anarchy, totalitarianism, collectivism, atheism, and barbarism”. David Campbell, “The Biopolitics of Security: Oil, Empire and the Sports Utility Vehicle”, Internet, http://www.david- campbell.org/wp-content/documents/Biopolitics_of_Security.pdf 26/4/2014 , p. 948. 11 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, op. cit, p. 159. 12 The NSC-68 document from 1950 says, among other things, that the purpose of the United States as nation is “to ensure the integrity and vitality of our free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual… There is a basic conflict between the idea of freedom… and the idea of slavery… The implacable purpose of the slave state to eliminate the challenge of freedom has placed the two great powers at opposite poles”. However, there is not only concern about the Soviet threat: “In a shrinking world, which now faces the threat of atomic warfare, it is not an adequate objective merely to seek to check Kremlin design, for the absence of order is becoming less and less tolerable… One is a policy which we would probably pursue even if there were no Soviet threat. It is a policy of attempting to develop a healthy international community. The other is the policy of ‘containing’ the Soviet system. These two policies are closely interrelated and interact with each other”. David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, op. cit., p. 25 (emphasis added).
261 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century competition of values on the world stage is something normal and desirable to Russia, which reveals the origin of its conflict with U.S. universalism.13 To protect its values’ uniqueness in this competition, having in mind its very precarious position between Europe and Asia, Russia insists on being a strong state on the inside, and on the outside one of the several great powers that together (in “concert”) participate in the management of the multi-centric world order.14 This is at odds with American endeavor to eliminate international anarchy and the independent role of any other great power in international relations. Post-Cold War conflict between the U.S, as a power aspiring to achieve a mono-centric new world order based on universal values, and Russia, that defends its value uniqueness and great power status, supporting multi-centric world order and competition among values – is not a coincidence, but the expression of deep incompatibility of the two powers’ identities, which is reproduced throughout the whole post-Cold War period, thus being a constant element in Russian-American relations.15 The key variable in these relations is
13 Lionel Ponsard says: “What Russian geography has taught us is that the immensity of the Russian territory, stretching from Europe to Asia, and the consequent heterogeneity of that territory and the people living there, has been the ground for an identity that includes the consciousness of plurality and the acceptance of differences. In other words, the Russian identity cannot be that of the Russian people in its ethnic sense only; it must embrace a dimension that is broad enough for all the inhabitants of the Russian territory to identify themselves with”. Lionel Ponsard, Russia, NATO and Cooperative Security: Bridging the Gap, Routledge, 2007, p. 31 (emphasis added) 14 Andrei Tsygankov at many places cites Russian statesmen for the recent period, who (regardless of context and their personal ideological orientation) underline the necessity of Russia’s status as a strong and independent power, treated as such by others (the West above else), in order to preserve its survival and uniqueness. Check several examples. Kozyrev: “…it appears that some Western politicians, in Washington and elsewhere, envision Russia not as an equal partner but as a junior partner. In this view a ‘good Russian’ is always a follower, never a leader”. (the article in New York Times from 1994, quoted in Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, op. cit., p. 68). Primakov: “Russia is both Europe and Asia, and this geopolitical location continues to play a tremendous role in formulation of its foreign policy… Geopolitical values are constants that cannot be abolished by historical developments” (from the first official press conference as foreign minister, p. 93). Putin: “Such a country as Russia can survive and develop within the existing borders only if it stays as a great power. During all of its times of weakness… Russia was invariably confronted with the threat of disintegration”. (addressing Federation Council in 2003, p. 129). Putin: “For Russians a strong state is not an anomaly that should be gotten rid of… they see it as a source and guarantor of order and the initiator and main driving force of any change”. (the article in Nezavisimaya gazeta from 1999, p. 131). Putin: “Russia is a country with a history that spans more than a thousand years and has practically always used the privilege to carry out an independent foreign policy. We are not going to change this tradition today”. (the Munich speech from 2007, p. 171). 15 For the summation of characteristics of this incompatibility, see: Vladimir Trapara, “National Security Strategies of Russia (2009) and the United States (2010): A New Stage in the Reproduction of Incompatible National Identities”, The Review of International Affairs, Vol. 64, No. 1149, January- March 2013, p. 18.
262 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century distribution of power between Russia and the United States, and in the international system in general. Namely, what makes the post-Cold War international system different from the Cold War one is the transformation from bipolarity to unipolarity. What are the consequences of this for Russian-American relations and international relations in general? Within realist school of thought in IR theory, there is a general agreement on the stability of bipolar system,16 while scholars disagree on unipolar system regarding this issue.17 Nevertheless, the post- Cold War unipolar system is unique in that it contains two ordinary great powers (Russia and China), besides a superpower (the United States), which makes this system similar to Randall Schweller’s tripolar system18 and John Mearsheimer’s unbalanced multipolar system,19 which are extremely unstable. Following this logic, I will treat the post-Cold War unipolar system as relatively unstable and easily transformable into something else, but also prone to the outbreak of war between the great powers. Two mentioned scholars – Schweller and Mearsheimer – belong to offensive realism. Mearsheimer is an offensive neorealist, and Schweller is an offensive neoclassical realist.20 Offensive realism’s basic assumption is that there are revisionist powers in international system (influenced by insecurity in the anarchic international environment, or by internally caused dissatisfaction with the existing order), bent on establishing (world or regional) hegemony and remaking international order according to their own designs.21 From offensive realism’s
16 For Kenneth Waltz’s arguments, see: Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory”, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, Spring 1988, pp. 620-624. Mearsheimer and Schweller mostly agree with Waltz. See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Norton, New York, 2001, pp. 337-347; Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, Columbia University Press, New York, 1998, p. 44. 17 Neoreaalists mostly see this system as unstable, because great concentration of power within it is seen as a threat by other states and forces them to take measures to restore the balance of power. However, neoclassical realist Wohlforth considers this system as the most stable one, for within it “one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced”. William C. Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World”, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1, Summer 1999, pp. 5, 9, 22. 18 Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, op. cit, pp. 41-56. 19 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, op. cit., pp. 344-346. 20 Neoclassical realism differs from neorealism in that it explains behavior of states not only by systemic level of analysis, but also by unit level (factors which belong to the state – unit of the system). See: Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1, October 1998, pp. 144-172; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, “Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited”, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter 2000-2001, pp. 128-161. 1 J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, op. cit., pp. 2, 22, 32-36; Schweller says: “Predatory states motivated by expansion and absolute gains, not security and the fear of relative
263 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century viewpoint, the continuation of U.S.-Russian rivalry after the Cold War could be easily explained. In unipolar system, the United States has a revisionist policy – it is bent on using its overwhelming power to establish global hegemony, transforming international order from anarchic to hierarchic one. This assumes the elimination of all other independent actors, especially great powers, and turning them into U.S. vassals. On the other side there is Russia, whose ordinary great power status directs it to defensive policy – a policy of status quo, in which Russia as one of several great powers wants to participate in world order management along with other centers of power. The distribution of power between Russia and the United States was also changing during post-Cold War period, leaving behind not insignificant consequences for their behavior and relations, as well as general international relations. During the nineties, Russia was too weak in comparison with the U.S, so its great power status and capability of defending it against American hegemonic designs were in question. Contrary to this, during the 21st century Russia’s economic and military power increased, shrinking the gap that separated it from U.S. power.22 This enabled it to lead a more assertive foreign policy, including greater readiness to oppose Washington’s expansion. On the other hand, the United States is also more persistent in its revisionism, trying to use its power advantage while it still has it, which makes Russian-American conflict harsher. The only exception in this sense is Obama’s “reset” initiative.
Different phases of post-Cold War U.S.-Russian relations: three unsuccessful attempts of rapprochement Influenced by the mentioned factors, the Russian-American relations during the post-Cold War period passed through different phases. Although constantly competitive, these relations had their “warmer” and “colder” moments. This dynamic can be observed in three attempts of rapprochement, each ending in failure and mutual disappointment, followed by the continuing deterioration of the two powers’ relations close to the situation which resembles the Cold War enmity. The introduction to the first rapprochement attempt was Russia’s (Soviet Union’s) unilateral decision to end the Cold War. In fact, Yeltsin’s pro-Western
21 losses, are the prime movers of neorealist theory”. Randall L. Schweller, “Neorealism’s Status Quo Bias: What Security Dilemma?”, in: Realism: Restatements and Renewal, Benjamin Frankel (ed.), Frank Cass, London and New York, 1996, p. 119. 22 Economic indicators clearly prove this. While Russia’s nominal GDP at the time of NATO’s aggression against Yugoslavia was 47 times smaller than U.S. one, at the time of Russian-Georgian War in 2008 it was “only” 8 and a half times smaller. Source: The World Bank, Internet, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 25/3/2014.
264 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century course from the beginning of nineties was nothing more than a continuation of Gorbachev’s policy of abandoning struggle against the U.S. for the world hegemony, dismantling East-European sphere of influence, and the transition from socialism to capitalism. The new leadership in Moscow appreciated the “end of history” thesis, and viewed liberal democracy as a “wave of the future” which Russia should catch in order to find its rightful place among modern civilized states.23 This elite’s disappointment followed shortly, when it realized that in the American world order designs there was no place for distinctive features of Russia’s society (which does not allow simple transplantation of American democratic model), not to mention Russia’s independent great power status – on which Moscow would insist even at the time of the most extreme pro-Western policies.24 After only several years, Moscow realized that Washington did not have an intention to treat it as an equal partner, but rather as a defeated Cold War adversary who should completely succumb to the will of the victor. The U.S. was also disappointed – it could not understand why Russia, even after the “end of history”, clings to “19th century policies”, the idea of unchallenged national sovereignty, great power concert, spheres of influence, etc.25 Its moves towards Russia – that included a delusion of an equality in the shape of Russia’s G8 admission and NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council establishment – it saw as truly benign and generous, without understanding why this was not enough for Russia.26 After his victory in the 1996 elections, for which he desperately needed Western support, Yeltsin started to change his course towards the U.S. step by step. The expression of the will to abandon the obviously unsuccessful unilateral attempt of rapprochement was the appointment of Yevgeny Primakov, a politician close to the Eurasian idea and more hard-line towards the West, for the minister of foreign affairs, and later the prime minister.27 The peak in deterioration in relations of the two powers happened in 1999, when NATO committed an aggression against Yugoslavia without UN approval and despite Russian
23 Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2014, p. 36. According to Tsygankov, the “Westernizers” dominated Yeltsin’s administration. They put an accent on Russia’s similarity to the West, seeing the West as the most advanced civilization in the world. Andrei P. Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity, op. cit., p. 4. 24 In this paper Andrei Kozyrev – former minister of foreign affairs and the most prominent Westernizer – has already been quoted. He was also the first one who called the post-Soviet area a “zone of special responsibility and interest”. (1993) Ibid, p. 84. 25 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2011, p. 91. 26 Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, op. cit., pp. 15-17. 27 Ibid, p. 26.
265 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century opposition. Since Clinton administration condemned similar Russian action in Chechnya later the same year, Yeltsin gave a very critical speech against U.S. policy at Istanbul OSCE summit.28 However, at the end of the nineties Russia could hardly use anything against American policies but words. It was not powerful enough – crippled by transition from the beginning of the decade, anyway, it was severely struck by the 1998 economic crisis, which reduced its GDP to the lowest level since the end of the Cold War. Washington used Russian weakness during nineties to advance geopolitically. It tightly embraced former Soviet East-European satellites (including the three Baltic states which were parts of the Soviet Union), intervened in the Balkan wars to impose control over post- Yugoslav space, and consolidated its presence in the Middle East using the threat from Iraq and Iran as a pretext. The newly elected president of Russia, Vladimir Putin, concluded that Russia needed a break from confrontation with the West.29 After September 11, Putin saw an opportunity for a new quality in relations with the United States. A new rapprochement attempt followed, this time in the shape of “anti-terrorist coalition”.30 Clear successes were achieved in a short period of time. Russia strongly supported American intervention against Afghanistan, notably by allowing the U.S. to establish military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. U.S.-Russian relations between 2001 and 2003 were much better than they used to be at the end of the nineties. A close personal relationship between the two presidents – Putin and George W. Bush contributed to this.31 Nevertheless, this “honeymoon” did not last long, because the real rapprochement between the two states with such a rich history of mutual enmity requires much more than the agreement regarding only one issue – struggle against terrorism. It would be revealed soon that this struggle was nothing more than Washington neoconservatives’ pretext to continue with the expansion of American sphere of influence. In the spring of 2003, the United States invaded and occupied Iraq without the authorization from the UN and despite Russian (and German and French, as well) opposition. This coincided with the consolidation of East-European sphere of influence (the admission of several new NATO members, including the Baltic States), but also an attempt of advancement deeper into the post-Soviet space, where Russia could not remain indifferent. With the “colored revolutions” in the post-Soviet space a red line was crossed, and this would be the primary cause of failure of the second Russian-American
28 Ibid, p. 45. 29 Ibid, p. 47. 30 Putin hoped this coalition could become a foundation of a new world order. Ibid, p. 69. 31 At his first meeting with Putin in Slovenia in 2001, Bush gave his famous remark about how he “looked Putin in the eyes and got a sense of his soul”. Condoleeza Rice, then U.S. National security adviser and the main architect of Bush’s policy towards Russia, assessed that Bush’s confidence in Putin, based on personal relationship, could become a problem. Ibid, pp. 60-62.
266 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century rapprochement attempt.32 In both cases of a regime change performed by a pro- Western opposition – Georgia 2003 and Ukraine 2004 (in Kyrgyzstan 2005, however, the opposition that came to power was not pro-Western) – Russia acted with a restraint, but derived some lessons that would produce much more assertive stance in its foreign policy during the second Putin’s term. This stance meant more readiness for confrontation with Washington over all issues on which the two countries disagree. This would not have been possible, if the gap in distribution of power between the U.S. and Russia had not shrunk during the first decade of the 21st century, thanks to higher economic growth rates (mostly influenced by increased fuel prices in the world markets) and internal political consolidation in Russia. Controversial moves of Bush’s administration in 2007 and 2008 would provoke a sharp Russian response, causing the deterioration in the two powers’ relations down to the lowest point since the end of the Cold War. At the beginning of 2007, Washington started formal talks with Czech Republic and Poland about stationing the elements of American missile defense system in these countries. Claimed to serve as a defense against nuclear ballistic capabilities of “rogue states” (above all, Iran), this missile defense will be viewed by Moscow as a threat to its own strategic nuclear capabilities. Geographic location of this system and U.S. unilateral approach without taking Russian concerns into account instilled fear into Putin’s administration that the system is planned against Russia, so that the success of its deployment would give Americans nuclear advantage – it would enable them to make credible threats, even to attack Russia with nuclear missiles, without the fear of retaliation.33 In February 2007, Putin gave a speech in Munich, in which he strongly attacked American expansionist policy,34 and later that year Russia withdrew from ACFE
32 Colored revolutions were part of Bush’s “Freedom agenda”, which was about exporting democracy throughout the world as the best path towards the world peace. This way roles were changed compared to the Cold War – while then the Soviet Union was the one to cling to the “limited sovereignty” doctrine, and to interfere in internal affairs of other states in the name of socialism, contemporary Russia defends principles of sovereignty and non-interference into internal affairs, opposing American policy of regime change in the name of democracy and freedom. Ibid, pp. 82-83. 33 In autumn 2007 Putin compared U.S. missile defense plans with Cuban missile crisis. “Russia compares U.S. missile plans to Cuban crisis”, RT, October 27, 2007, Internet, http://rt.com/news/ russia-compares-us-missile-plans-to-cuban-crisis/ 11/2/2014. Russia’s fear for its own nuclear capabilities comes from its military doctrine, which reacts to NATO’s conventional advantage by nuclear deterrence. On differences between Russian and U.S. nuclear strategies, see Vladimir Trapara, “Perspektive nuklearnog razoružanja u svetlu protivrečnih strategija nuklearnih sila”, Međunarodna politika, Vol. 63, No. 1145, January-March 2012, pp. 113-118. 34 Putin said: “Today we are witnessing an almost uncontained hyper use of force – military force – in international relations, force that is plunging the world into an abyss of permanent conflicts... One state and, of course, first and foremost the United States, has overstepped its national borders
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Treaty, which defined quotas for European states’ conventional weapons. In April 2008, at NATO summit in Bucharest, it was decided that Georgia and Ukraine should once become NATO members, which caused the alarm in Russia.35 A few months earlier, America and many of its allies recognized Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, won by NATO bombs in 1999, making a precedent for future recognition of territories which seceded from sovereign states, helped by a foreign military intervention. Pro-Western Georgian president Saakashvili fell into a trap in August 2008, when he tried to bring renegade province of South Ossetia back under Georgian sovereignty by force. What followed was a quick response by Russia and a short Russian-Georgian War, after which Moscow recognized independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia (another renegade Georgian province), while the U.S. and NATO just stood by and watched. This way Russia demonstrated its readiness to defend its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space against American expansion by all means, including war. This expansion was temporarily halted due to the Russian assertive response, but also because of the American overstretch in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as under the impact of world economic crisis. Newly elected President Barack Obama therefore made an assessment similar to the one Putin had made eight years ago: that it is time for a break in confrontation with Russia. He initiated the “reset” in relations between the two countries, aiming to improve them by establishing cooperation in areas of common interest.36 He found a good counterpart in Russian
in every way… It results in the fact that no one feels safe. I want to emphasize this – no one feels safe!” “Speech and the Following Discussion at the Munich Conference on Security Policy”, President of Russia, February 10, 2007, Internet, http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches /2007/02/10/0138_type82912type82914type82917type84779_118123.shtml 29/4/2014. 35 Original U.S. idea was to grant Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine, which did not happen due to German opposition. At NATO-Russia Council summit, which followed, Putin criticized the decision of NATO allies to count on Georgia and Ukraine’s membership, commenting that “Ukraine is not even a state”. Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.- Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, op. cit, pp. 163-168. After Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, there was sense in recalling this comment, which at the same time was a warning what the prospects for Ukraine are if it chooses to become a NATO member. 36 Obama firstly used an expression “reset” on December 8, 2008, in an interview on NBC television. He justified the significance of improving relations in areas where the two sides can agree (such as struggle against terrorism and nuclear non-proliferation) by the economic growth of Russia during the last few years, which enabled it to have an assertive foreign policy. “Obama wants ’to reset U.S. – Russian relations’”, RT, 8 December, 2008, Internet, http://rt.com/news/obama- wants-to-reset-us-russian-relations/ 29/4/2014. Vice President Joe Biden paraphrased him in Munich in February 2009, when he said that “…it’s time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia”. “Remarks by Vice- President Biden at 45th Munich Conference on Security Policy”, The White House – Speeches and Remarks, Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-vice-president- biden-45th-munich-conference-security-policy 29/4/2014.
268 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century president Dmitry Medvedev – personal relations between the two presidents once again became the foundation of good relations between the two states, which during the period that followed (2009-2012) reached an all-time high since the beginning of nineties.37 A positive Russia’s response to Obama’s initiative could be partly attributed to the catastrophic impact of world economic crisis upon Russia as well, so that using American problems to further deepen the confrontation against it was not a cost-effective policy choice.38 What also could be the main Russia’s motive to embrace the “reset” was an expectation that this time the U.S. is really ready to recognize Russia as an equal partner, and to build a multi-centric international order with it. The “reset” indeed had many positive accomplishments, such as signing a new treaty on strategic nuclear disarmament – New START, broadening the cooperation over Afghanistan, common approach towards the Iranian nuclear program, as well as Russia’s membership in the WTO. Above all, the “reset” brought in a new spirit of cooperation, that had been absent from the Russian-American relations for almost twenty years. However, this rapprochement attempt was also short-living and ended in failure. Although this time American side was the initiator, it was not ready for real concessions to Russia. Thus, these positive accomplishments were mostly results of Russia’s unilateral appeasement. New START was signed in April 2010 only after Russia gave up on its request for legally binding clause on the connection between offensive and defensive weapons to be included in the treaty; eventually, this clause was written in the preamble.39 Obama’s abandoning of the missile shield in Czech Republic and Poland was “rewarded” by Russia with a support to tightening sanctions against Iran, but what Russia really got from this deal was a new American missile defense plan – European Phased Adaptive Approach – which in the long run would be more effective than the old one, proving a bigger threat to Russia’s strategic capabilities.40 The missile defense issue proved itself to be an insurmountable obstacle on the path towards further U.S.-Russian rapprochement and success of the “reset”. Nevertheless, what
37 Angela E. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the Twenty-First Century, op. cit., pp. 216-217. 38 Jeffrey Mankoff, Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics, op. cit, p. 115. 39 “Twists and Turns on Way to Arms Pact with Russia”, by Peter Baker, The New York Times, March 26, 2010, Internet, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/27/world/europe/27start.html 30/4/2014. 40 This project was initially planned in four phases. In the third one already (2018), the midrange interceptors would be deployed in Poland. The fourth phase (abandoned in 2013) was especially contested by Russia, because it envisaged intercepting intercontinental ballistic missiles. On these phases, see “Fact Sheet on U.S. Missile Defense Policy: A ’Phased, Adaptive Approach’ for Missile Defense in Europe”, The White House – Statements and Releases, Internet, http://www. whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/FACT-SHEET-US-Missile-Defense-Policy-A-Phased- Adaptive-Approach-for-Missile-Defense-in-Europe/ 30/4/2014.
269 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century decisively pushed the U.S.-Russian relations down the slope were the developments in the Middle East in 2011. Russia and the U.S. failed to agree on the common approach regarding the wave of regime changes throughout the region, called the “Arab Spring”. Russia abstained from voting in the UNSC on resolution which implicitly allowed the U.S. and its allies to intervene militarily against Libya in March 2011, which was the peak of the “reset”. Harsh Russian condemnations of this intervention and forced toppling of Gaddafi, followed by a resolute resistance to a similar scenario in Syria, shattered the achieved spirit of cooperation between the two powers. Putin’s return to the presidential post in May 2012 symbolically marked the end of “reset”, given his intentions to stop appeasing Washington, as well as suspicious personal views of him in Obama administration, compared to those of Medvedev. The second Obama’s term instead of “reset 2.0” brought further decline in U.S.-Russian relations.41 It started with the “war of laws” – Magnitsky Act in the U.S. and Dima Yakovlev law in Russia, continued with “the Snowden case”, and further complicated with U.S. threats by the military intervention against Syria in the summer of 2013, with a pretext of an alleged use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government. The intervention did not happen due to Russia’s resolution not to allow it (resistance in the UNSC, deployment of warships in the Eastern Mediterranean), but also thanks to its diplomatic actions in September, when it influenced Damascus to relinquish its chemical weapons. The newly elected Iranian president, Hassan Rouhani, used this opportunity to initiate improvement in relations with the United States, which Washington could not ignore. American Middle-Eastern geopolitical offensive (against Syria and Iran) was halted, leaving northern Black Sea coast as the only area without clear boundaries between U.S. and Russia’s spheres of influence. The biggest country whose territory is completely in Europe is situated in this area – Ukraine. The Ukrainian crisis began in November 2013, when massive street protests erupted in Kiev and other bigger cities against president Yanukovich’s decision not to sign an agreement on association with the EU. As a representative of a pro- Russian Party of Regions in this over identity deeply divided country, Yanukovich won completely free and fair democratic presidential elections in 2010, moving the “Ukrainian teeter”42 further away from the pro-Western course of his predecessors from the “Orange revolution”, towards clear commitment to military neutrality of the country. Facing the prospects of ruining economic
41 See Vladimir Trapara, “Odnosi Sjedinjenih Država i Rusije u Obaminom drugom mandatu”, Međunarodna politika, Vol. 64, No. 1151, July-September 2013, pp. 55-59. 42 On the “Ukrainian teeter”, as an expression for alternating pro-Russian and pro-Western forces in power in Kiev, while both are compelled to have a balanced policy of neutrality, see Dragan Petrović, Geopolitika postsovjetskog prostora, Prometej, Novi Sad, IIPE, Belgrade, 2008, pp. 50-62.
270 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century relations with Russia, which saw this EU’s offer to Ukraine as an obvious attempt to drag this country away from Russia into the Western and anti-Russian geopolitical bloc of states, Yanukovich did not have a choice other than to refuse this offer. It initially seemed as if the situation would calm down, for Moscow promised Ukraine significant financial aid, while Yanukovich left the open door for the EU accession under more favorable conditions. However, he made a number of authoritarian mistakes (restriction of rights to protests, refusing to put on the agenda opposition constitutional reform proposals, persistent keeping of former prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko in jail…), that caused new radicalization of protests in January and February 2014. These protests resulted in dozens of victims on both sides. An agreement on premature elections, transitional government and constitutional reform was finally brokered by the officials of several European states and signed by Yanukovich and the opposition leaders, only to be brutally breached on the very next day, as the right-wing extremists took control over protests. A coup was staged in Kiev, bringing to power opposition leaders (including fascists from the Western part of the country), and compelling Yanukovich to flee to Russia. For a while, as the crisis progressed, Russia was relatively sustained. It started getting involved after the coup and certain anti-Russian measures taken by new authorities in Kiev which caused the revolt in pro-Russian Southeastern provinces of Ukraine. Moscow’s announcement that it could intervene militarily in the case of violations of her nationals’ rights was sufficient to deter Kiev from military option when Crimea, a peninsula which had been a part of Russia until 1954, decided to return to its motherland. Putin could not ignore the referendum in which an overwhelming majority of Crimean citizens voted in favor of joining Russia, so it annexed Crimea. A new crisis – the fiercest one hitherto – in U.S. (West)-Russian relations began. The West imposed some symbolic economic sanctions against Russia, and threatened with tougher ones, but was not ready to intervene militarily to stop Russia’s involvement in helping Eastern parts of the country to avoid inclusion into Western sphere of influence and achieve some kind of federalization of Ukraine. It remains to be seen whether the future developments of the crisis will bring the final demarcation between the spheres of influence by diplomatic compromise, or the violence will escalate. Putin’s speech after Crimean annexation tells us that Russia is resolute to have even more assertive policy from now on.43
43 In this speech, Putin said: “With the disappearance of bipolar system, the planet has not become more stable… Our Western partners led by the United States in their practical policies prefer not to be guided by international law, but the law of the stronger… They are convinced that they are chosen and exceptional, that they should decide the world’s fate, that only they can always be right… They constantly try to push us (Russia) into some corner because we have an independent position, because we defend it, because we call the things their right names and we are not
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From Obama’s speech that followed in Brussels, it can be concluded that the U.S. is aware of its incapability of penetrating deeper into Russia’s sphere of influence by military means, but that it believes it is on the right side of history, and that sooner or later political changes will happen in Moscow, bringing to power forces more preferable to Washington.44 It is obvious that a longer period of the U.S.-Russian confrontation is ahead of us, with no another rapprochement attempt in sight, at least until the end of Obama’s term in 2016/2017. For the real rapprochement, some conditions are necessary. The U.S. identity, as it is a stronger power and is less ready for a compromise, should change to become more compatible with the Russian one. Accordingly, a radical and permanent turn in foreign policy is needed. The factor that could cause this turn in the future is probably the growth of China, which may be seen as a threat both in the United States and Russia.
Conclusion: the consequences of the state of U.S.-Russian relations for general international relations and the position of Serbia From the history of ups and downs in the post-Cold War relations between United States and Russia it can be concluded – in fact repeated – that they were better only when Russia unilaterally appeased Washington’s demands. Nevertheless, those periods wouldn’t bring upon more stable international relations, because the real step towards equal partnership and the establishment of a more just multi-centric world order has never taken place. On the contrary, period of better U.S.-Russian relations used to be bad for general international relations. Several small countries even became victims of Russian-American harmony: Yugoslavia (sanctions) in 1992, Afghanistan (intervention) in 2001, Iran (sanctions) in 2010, and Libya (intervention) in 2011. No better were periods when Russia opposed American policy verbally, but without enough power to make
43 hypocrites. But, everything has its limits. And in the case of Ukraine, our Western partners have crossed the line, behaving roughly, irresponsibly and unprofessionally… Today it is necessary to cut with hysteria, to give up on Cold War-like rhetoric, and to admit what is obvious: Russia is an independent, active participant in international life; like other states, it has national interests which have to be taken into account and respected”. “Обращение Президента Российсской Федерации”, Президент России, March 18, 2014, Internet, http://kremlin.ru/news/20603 30/4/2014. 44 “Ukraine is not a member of NATO — in part because of its close and complex history with Russia. Nor will Russia be dislodged from Crimea or deterred from further escalation by military force. But with time, so long as we remain united, the Russian people will recognize that they cannot achieve security, prosperity and the status that they seek through brute force”. “Remarks by the President in Address to European Youth”, The White House, March 26, 2014, Internet, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/03/26/remarks-president-address- european-youth 30/4/2014.
272 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century some bolder move. This is why Yugoslavia paid the price in 1999, when it entered the war against NATO, counting on Russia’s support, only to be failed when Russia assisted NATO in pressure against Belgrade to accept the withdrawal from Kosovo. On the other hand, periods when Russia relied on its rising power to strain relations with the U.S. would bring upon some sense of balance. It was good for the small countries and territories that stood in the way of American expansionism: in 2008 South Ossetia and Abkhazia were saved, in 2013 Syria, and in 2014 Crimea, while it still remains to be seen what happens with the rest of Ukraine (in particular, it Eastern part). How the changes in state of U.S.-Russian relations affected Serbia and what could it expect of their recent deterioration? As Serbia in the observed period did not have a constant foreign policy, we can answer this question only if we take into account changes in its priorities which occurred occasionally, but also by considering identity base which made some elements of Serbia’s foreign policy constant. During the nineties, Serbia reproduced through its foreign policy the identity of a border state between the East and the West, for which predominance of the West over Russia was not a favorable condition.45 Serbia was severely punished for its attempt to keep its independent course and refuse some political demands made by the only remaining superpower which would transform it into a marginal country of a “New Europe”. Moreover, Russia was the accomplice in the punishment while it had good relations with the U.S. However, Serbia’s foreign policy during nineties had a special quality – it was assertive in defense of the country’s national interests, which encouraged the U.S. to accept some compromise solutions for the design of post-Yugoslav space. In 2000 a new elite comes to power in Belgrade, ready to make a pro-Western turn. Such move was logical in the period when Putin attempted its rapprochement with the United States. However, the new government could not give up on defense of some national interests, especially regarding Kosovo and the Republic of Srpska, which would slow down the process of Serbia’s alignment with the West. With Russia rising and its increasingly assertive stance during the second Putin’s term, the new government in Belgrade (Koštunica’s) saw the opportunity to start a gradual departure from the West in the direction of neutrality, even an openly anti-Western stance after Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence. However, Koštunica was replaced by a more conciliatory Boris Tadić, who brought Serbia back to (mildly pro-Western) neutrality, for which Obama’s “reset” was a favorable condition. In 2012 Serbian Progressive Party came to power and has been trying to keep a neutral course during the ongoing deep fall
45 See Vladimir Trapara, “Istok ili Zapad?: lažna dilema Srbije”, in: Strateški pravci razvoja i utvrđivanja položaja Srbije u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima, Marko Nikolić i Dragoljub Todić (eds.), Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2014, pp. 329-346.
273 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century in Russian-American relations. Does it have a chance of success, given that it is facing a strong pressure by the West to align with it in this increasingly severe East-West division? It does, but only under several conditions. First, Serbia’s foreign policy should again be assertive in promoting national interests, by showing both the East and the West that it would be persistent in their achievement, even if there was some price to pay for it. This is the only way Serbia could deserve foreign actors’ respect and assume the region’s central player position. Second, Serbia is in Western, not in Russian sphere of influence. Any openly anti-Western course could be perilous for it. Belgrade should do everything to present its neutrality in a way not explicitly provocative for the West – if it does not help its plans, then it should also refrain from damaging them. Third, the distribution of power has changed, and it is still changing. The United States is not anymore so dominant compared to Russia (and in the international system in general) so as to brutally treat Serbia like it did it in nineties. This leaves Serbia wider space to protect its neutrality and national interests by relying on Russia (although not too much, in order not to provoke the West). What Serbia must not allow – now that Russia has grown stronger and the East-West division sharper – is to succumb to temptation to align with the West completely (for example, to join NATO). If this happened, Serbia would voluntarily give up on its national interests which are threatened by the West and supported by Russia. It would simultaneously position itself in the first line of NATO’s (whose circle of states it belongs neither historically, nor civilizationally, nor by interest) defense in the case of deterioration in European security. Wise foreign policy with assertive promotion of national interests and a proper analysis of U.S.-Russian relations, their impact upon broader international relations and the position of Serbia in particular, could be a recipe for a success of our country on the world stage.
274 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Brano MILJUŠ1
THE OLD AND NEW WORLD ORDER – BETWEEN THE KOSOVO PRECEDENT AND CRIMEA BURDEN
Abstract: The civil war in Ukraine is not any more a mere episode of an international incident but an exceptional event which can even now be truly considered separately from the global development because of some other international incidents. This is, in fact, mostly a substantial conflict between the USA and Russia whose aim is actually the redistribution of power in the creation or restoration of the new world order. In his famous speech “Europe whole and free“ which he had delivered in West Germany in 1989 before the very break-up of the USSR George Bush pointed to the interdependence of the American value and security interests as well as on the success of the foreign policy resulting from these two interests. Next year, American President George Bush Senior announced the creation of the “New World Order“, while as the personification of the West and the East in spring of 1990 the representatives of the Warsaw Pact and the NATO met in Paris and officially announced the end of their hostilities. In this way, the Cold War remains the bsymbol in the political science literature which best presents the old order that denotes the period of political, cultural and military rivalry between “capitalist“ Western and “communist“ Eastern block, or actually between the two super powers – the USA and the USSR. The article does not aim to deal with the causes of the beginning and the end of the Cold War. However, without going into a deeper analysis of the causes it is sufficient to note by analysing the consequences that the New World Order is not, after all, based on the common respect of international norms and moral standards, but on the extended ideological conflicts and additional balance of terror and on that basis on the alignment and submission that were present during the detente and the Cold War. The most striking example is perhaps the Kosovo precedent
1 Brano Miljuš, Ph.D., Research Fellow, The Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period.
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which whether we wish to admit it or not has yielded the Crimea burden, this also including Donetsk which has followed the Crimea way. Unilateral gaining of independence is announced by the Irish, Scots, Catalans, Basques, Venetians, the Republic of Srpska and others. In some cases, opposite to the world which is controlled and well arranged, the international scene is now like the new world disorder and not the order based on international law. One cannot exclude the fact, and this is at the same time the main conclusion drawn in this paper, that the USA and the RF and the EU and China will play new roles and have different significance in the world power of the New World Order. Key words: New World Order, Cold War, USA, USSR, Kosovo, Republika Srpska, Ukraina, NATO.
Introduction The recent crash of the Malaysian airliner in the part of Ukraine where the war is waged between the pro-Russian forces and the army controlled by Kiev is getting a new meaning within the context of reviving of missile games which were characteristic for the Cold War period. Actually, in spite of accusations for this accident Washington also accuses Russia that it does not respect the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty which was signed in 1987 by American President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev. True, Washington does not present some specific examples of violation on the part of Russia of the Treaty mentioned above. This, what would experts call “leaking“ public is the introduction of the so-called cruise missiles as early as in 2008 but not for combat. Responding to such insinuations and provocations, the Russians have a simple answer which is verbal: the deployment of the US and the NATO missiles in Romania which territorially jeopardise the Russian party requires an adequate response. In this way, it turns out that there is no dilemma at all that the missile disputes between the USA and Russia are only an introduction into the additional strengthening of the overall armed forces of both countries. For this reason, we shall go back to the title of the paper which we have entitled only as a framework: The old and New World Order – between the Kosovo precedent and Crimea burden. In the atmosphere of general tension which characterises the relations between the two powers and within which the case of Ukraine looks like an episode the Kosovo precedent has been put in for which the war against Serbia commenced in 1999. Addressing the nation on 24 March 1999 President of the USA Clinton said that America was in war with Serbia in order to “protect thousands of innocent peoples in Kosovo“, to prevent “a bigger war“ and “remain united with (its) allies in the name of peace“. By doing this, Clinton said: “We confirm our values, protect our interests and strengthen peace. After a short and in my opinion, empirically problematic consideration of
276 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the development of the Kosovo crisis he legitimately explained the American interests: “It is a moral imperative to end this tragedy. It is also important for the American interests. Look at the world map. Kosovo is a small area, but it is located on the main crossroads between Europe, Asia and Middle East. This is the area where Islam meets with the Western and Orthodox branch of Christianity“. In the south of it there are the American allies Greece and Turkey and in north of it, he added, there are our new democratic allies in Central Europe. Kosovo is surrounded by small countries which fight economic and political challenges. “All elements for a big war are present“... Clinton concluded. By all this, he made a connection between the conflict of that time and the vision of the post-Cold War Europe which had been presented in 1989 by George Bush Senior. Clinton said: “If we have learnt anything during the century that is just ending is that America will be prosperous and secure only if Europe is prosperous, secure, undivided and free. “For this reason“, Clinton asserted, “I have supported the political and economic integration of Europe, had Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary admitted to the NATO, redefined the NATO mission and offered Russia and Ukraine new partnerships“. As Clinton continued, “the remaining challenges for this vision of Europe are 1. strengthening of the partnership with Russia, 2. settlement of the Greek-Turkish tensions, 3. building of bridges with the Islamic world and 4. ending of instability in the Balkans.2 After the end of the war the American President mentioned the principle characterising not only the event but also the intervention: “In spite of a large number of ethnic and religious conflicts in the world and regardless of whether they take part within the borders of some state or are spilt over the we should stop the genocide and ethnic cleansing if the international community has the power to stop them.“3 Kosovo is not the only example where the American value and security interests are supplemented and rationally adjusted. This had started in history before the very end of the Great War (World War I) when Woodrow Wilson, who is considered the first liberal internationalist among contemporary politicians of his time, declared war to Germany in 1917. Actually, by his speech he formulated liberal internationalism pointing out that “the world must be made safe for democracy adding that “Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty“ and in the future America will fight for “the rights and freedoms of small countries.4
2 Bill Clinton, “Statement on Kosovo” speech transcript, 24 March 1999, http://milercenter. org/scripps/archive/ speeches/detail|3932 3 Bill Clinton, Clinton Announces the End of the War in Kosovo, speech transcript, 10 June1999, http://australianpolitics.com/usa/Clinton/speeches/990610kosovo.shml. 4 Woodrow Wilson, Declaration of War, Michael Levy/ Political Thought in America> An Anthology, Waveland Press, Prospect Heights, Illinois, 1992, pp. 521–552.
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Today, the widely spread opinion prevails in the academic Western literature that the American foreign policy successfully suppressed the USSR and pacified the traditionally quarrelling European powers just because after World War II it did not only offer security guarantees to Western Europe but it pursed the policy of spreading its values. Europe whole and free is just a vision in the American foreign policy objectives, which after the end of the Cold War resulted from its security and value national interest. But even competing of the two powerful military powers only verbally has in the post-Cold War conditions stirred up European states. Inhabitants of the old continent have necessarily paid for every war which has been waged so far. And, in spite of the sanctions imposed to Russia and its counter-sanctions, they are still in dilemma. On one hand, Western Europe is aware that the Russian part is not a military threat. Even the dependency on Russian energy supplies is one of the factors which connect even more tightly big European states and Russia. A possible involvement of the USA on its own in this unagreed harmony, although there are some announcements that similar actions would be taken against EU non-member states, could completely break the European trust. On the other hand, it is in Russia’s interest that Europe gradually and with no traumas retrieves its sovereignty from the USA, which has been seriously damaged by the civil war in Ukraine. Moscow also believes that the sanctions which have been imposed to Russia by the European Union under the pressure of Washington will sober up the Europeans at the moment when they experience first-hand their retrieval effects (the example of full prohibition of a large number of foodstuffs from the EU and the USA and other countries which have supported the sanctions against Russia). Not even Barack Obama has brought anything new in the implementation of the American foreign policy objectives after the Cold War. According to him, the vision has not changed since 1989, but it has been shared by all American administrations. Obama said this in 2008 when he was only a presidential candidate. However, the context within which he made this statement is important for our analysis. He stated that when Ukraine expressed for first time its readiness to implement the NATO Action Membership Plan. He was explicit then: “The expansion of the NATO membership to new democracies in Europe has helped building of the zone of peace and prosperity throughout Europe“. This policy of building of Europe whole and free he regularly called Euro-Atlantic integrations even when he was elected President. However, the vision of “Europe whole and free“ was itself even more ambitious for 1989 but much less than the
5 Quoted in UNIAN (Ukrainian Independent Information Agency)), U.S. Senator Barack Obama welcomes Ukraine readiness to advance MAP with NATO http://www.unian.net//.
278 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century vision presented that same year by Francis Fukuyama in his very famous article “The End of History“.5 The thesis on “the end of history“ is the first influential consideration of the changes in the American global surroundings after the Cold War. It attempted to separate contingencies from the substantial far-reaching historical processes. Fukuyama states that apart from the political events such as the end of the Cold War, peace in many parts of the world, reforms in the USSR and China, there are some unstoppable processes which are becoming evident and visible. These are spreading of the Western culture of ad hoc consumerism in villages in China, opening of restaurants and shops in Moscow, the sound of rock music in Prague, Rangoon and Tehran. These are all indications that there is no more any sustainable systemic alternative to the idea of economic and political liberalism. The universalization of the market economy and liberal democracy has taken place as a final form of the rule. Consequently, he concludes, the history of conflicts caused by ideological differences has come to its end. The Western idea of liberalism has triumphed.6 Fukuyama does not say that there will be no more wars. According to him, wars will keep on being waged but the conflicts will be smaller because smaller states will fight against one another. In this way, we see that the vision of Europe “whole and free“ and the thesis on “the end of history“ have some very strong points of contact not because they were created at the same time, but above all, because for the achievement of both liberal values the prerequisite is the lasting peace. And, unfortunately, there is still no lasting peace. On the contrary, it seems that after Ukraine not only small states will those that will come into conflict. Therefore, classical realism in international relations brings us more knowledge into the contemporary age. It is because one of the basic assumptions of realism is caution. “Realism, as states Hans Morgentahu, the most famous theoretician of realism in the 20th century, considers caution – measuring of the consequences of alternative political actions“ – the top political virtue.7 For this reason, as late as today after the adoption of the Geneva agreements on Kosovo and Ukraine by doing moderate analyses we can see more objectively the triumphalism and implicit determinism which permeates the Fukuyama’s thesis and Morgenthau’s anti-thesis. This triumphalism, which was not based on science, was not specific only for Fukuyama. At that time, it had been he who saw before everybody else the American victory. He did not thoroughly express optimism based on facts which soon after was shared by the American political class. Taken by this exaggerated enthusiasm Clinton tried to introduce humanitarian intervention in international relations. By that principle, sovereignty of states and even opposition of permanent members of the UN Security Council with veto power must not be an obstacle to military interventions
6 Francis Fukuyama, The End of History, New York, introduction, 1989. 7 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, New York, 1985, p. 12.
279 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century that would stop the violation of human rights. The war against Serbia was the first that initiated the debate on humanitarian interventions of this kind and it is taken as the first example of humanitarian intervention which places human rights above state sovereignty. And, when by applying the same principle in 2003 the war against Iraq was initiated in 2003 which George Bush Junior also partly justified as a humanitarian intervention, then he made even some proponents of humanitarian interventions rightly re-examine their positions on the validity of this principle.8 At the end of the war the American administration expressed its hope that the new “principle“ would be accepted by the international community, what confirms that it was aware that it had taken an action that was against standards of international law not foreseeing that the war against Serbia would make a precedent by applying this principle.
A parallel with the Kosovo precedent and the crisis in Ukraine What most makes us make such a parallel is the challenge caused by the crisis that has kept on being present even after the adoption of the Geneva Agreements, after which the post-Cold War rhetoric has culminated. Actually, the crisis has not stopped after the agreement was reached in Geneva between Russia, Ukraine, the USA and the European Union. Therefore, any deeper analysis of the most complex post-Cold War crisis necessarily requires an analysis of the agreement that was achieved and the oversights that were made. According to this agreement, the adoption of the Constitution in Ukraine as the first and most important thing implied “a broad national dialogue“ in which all areas and political election units should participate. This is what Russia peacefully advocated in order to ensure greater rights in the future Constitution for the Ukrainians of the Russian origin that were discontent with their existing states and whose appetites grew after Crimea. The second important issue included the disarmament of illegal military forces, evacuation of the occupied public places and buildings and sending of an observer mission of the Organisation of Security and Cooperation in Europe to Ukraine that would observe this peace process. Unfortunately, the Agreement did not specify what these forces were and that is the weakest part of the agreement because it opened possibilities for every party to interpret on its own what had been agreed in Geneva. Finally, in the Agreement there was no mention of Crimea or the demands which American President Barack Obama made afterwards that Russia should withdraw its troops from the border with Ukraine and to commit it to enter into
8 See Michael Ignitief, New York Magazine, 5 January 2003.
280 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century direct negotiations with Kiev. This resulted from the fact that for Western countries it was important to achieve an agreement with Russia in Geneva at any cost because they did not want to break up their economic relations with Russia and even less to protect Ukraine by entering into war. Of course, this was a painful compromise for Ukraine in Geneva, too, but according to it, this country is obliged to respect the existing law on its military-political neutrality. For an objective observer at least two things were missing in the Geneva Agreement to be a basis for resolving the most difficult crisis after the Cold War. First, it lacked the deadline within which the Ukrainian Constitution should be changed and second, the OSCE mission was not defined, which should play a much more important role than mere observing and watching the developments. In the Geneva Agreement, there is no mention of the political demands concerning the federalisation of the country, what had been confirmed by the referendum or actually, whether a final solution will be reached by negotiations or the solution will be made by the authorities in Kiev. Under such circumstances, the newly elected President of Ukraine made a new plan after he had stated that he would fight for Crimea before international courts. However, he also ordered a punitive expedition to Donetsk, what was a reserve plan. This only makes us conclude that the crisis will take a long time, that it will have various turns and that the tensions among great powers could keep on being more intensive and escalate even more. Even Brussels that imposed sanctions to Russia for Ukraine did not stay silent concerning its own interests and position. The first that voiced his opinion was Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement. He made a statement for Free Europe in Prague saying that the European Union had not contributed to resolving of the current conflict in Ukraine because it had failed to understand the statement of Russian President Vladimir Putin on the dissolution of former USSR. Putin claimed that the break- up of the USSR had been the biggest disaster in the 20th century. This statement had been made at the NATO summit in Bucharest in 2008.“I was in the room when Putin said that “Ukraine is an artificial state“, said Füle and added: “Half of us laughed and half of us did not understand it. But, now we understand and do not feel like laughing“.“ I am terrified by possible consequences“, said Füle in his interview for Radio Free Europe.9 After Schreder, who also voiced his opinion, even more concrete criticism was expressed by the most popular German Chancellor of all times, Helmut Schmidt, who also made a statement. By the public polls, he is far more popular than big Kohl and powerful Angela Merkel. His criticism began with self-criticism of Berlin for its involvement in the Western
9 Free Europe, http//www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/.
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Balkans in the 1990s: “What we as the most powerful country of the EU did in Kosovo was the brutal violation of the provisions of international law“, said Schmidt, who succeeded legendary Willy Brandt as the president of Social Democrats in Germany and who is even today the greatest left-winger in this powerful state. Following the basic theme of our paper in his opinion and analysis of a broader picture of international relations and the current crisis in the world is caused by the mistake made by Brussels and its bureaucracy, which is personified by the European Commission that directly caused the crisis demanding from Kiev to take sides either with Europe or with Russia. According to him, it was an attempt of annexion of Ukraine on the part of the European Union under the mask of democratisation. In his analysis of the dramatic events in Ukraine Helmut Schmidt subtly noticed what we had known in the 1990s: not even today in Ukraine or in former Yugoslavia in the past the cause of the crisis is envy and belligerency of pro- Western and pro-Russian inhabitants that cannot live together any more, but a deeper crisis between the East and the West. He compared it with the events on the eve of World War I and the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo that was only a reason for the great war in 1914. In his opinion, more and more often immature politicians and European bureaucrats create “scenarios for confrontation and the EU, the USA and Russia are losing sight of the fact that the Ukrainian crisis is acquiring forms similar to those that had appeared before World War I“. According to Schmidt, the only solution is to organise a new Helsinki conference with representatives of the EU on one side and representatives of Russia, Ukraine and Byelorus on the other. Instead of such subtle mediation and step-by-step diplomacy which implies overcoming of differences and searching for points of contact the consideration went the other way by finding a parallel between the Kosovo and Metohija precedent and the Crimea burden. At first, recently at the security conference US President Barack Obama made an assertion on the referendum in Kosovo which did not take place at all. “Kosovo deserted Serbia after the referendum organised in co-operation with the UN“. If this had really occurred, the UN SC would not have adopted the Resolution No. 1244 in 1999 according to which Kosovo is a part of Serbia. Vladimir Putin, President of the RF responded to Obama gently: “Fifteen years ago you illegally bombed Kosovo. “Well, why don’t you try to attack us and take Crimea away from us?“ In this way, in spite of the Geneva Agreement, which only appeared to prevent the worst to happen, the Cold War rhetoric was reopened. In order to avoid such big misunderstandings it would be necessary to avoid different defining of the same concepts. Unfortunately, when such big problems are concerned as is the crisis stage in foreign policy and in international relations,
282 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century then defining of problems by different parts is not accepted even as a methodology, although it, at least, enables easier communication and acceptance of definitions. Neither in political science nor, after all, in majority of social sciences there are too many generally accepted definitions. For example, interests and objectives are different analytical categories. All states including the USA and the RF have the same national interests that can be classified in four categories: a) physical security, b) economic prosperity, c) maintaining of social values – such as political system, culture, national values – from violent one or influence imposed in some other way from abroad, and d) projecting of social values beyond the state borders. In the Cold War period, in the USSR, it was socialist ideology and in the American case, it was the market economy, democratic pluralist ideology and human rights. Humanitarian interventions are also included in this category of national interests. For example, it is the national interest of all states to be secure or economically prosperous regardless of the fact whether such an interest is achievable in the near or distant future. It is in Serbia’s interest to be physically secure, but it cannot become fully secure after the Kosovo precedent until its territorial integrity is endangered because there can appear some other forms of applications regardless of the master piece of diplomatic activity – the Geneva Agreement. This certainly does not mean that physical security of Serbia should not keep being its national interest. National interests are interdependent. They belong to a general category and must be made specific in such a way that they will be turned into immediate objectives. Objective is a concept of less generality, a more specific and immediate category than a national interest. Actually, the objective results from interests and interests are achieved by fulfilment of specific objectives. As independent Kosovo is not an American national interest but only an objective which helps by one part achieve a specific national interest then one can assume that the USA has given up that objective if there have occurred some changes in America or in the international surroundings that would make that objective worthless or too expensive. The national interest of the RF is to join Crimea to the RF and the objective is to make a buffer zone on Russia’s borders to prevent the NATO from expanding what would make Ukraine, Byelorus and Moldova remain “the countries in between“. If Ukraine remained outside of the NATO, the political objective of Russia could change. In this way, it turns out that considering it from the aspect of political objectives the conflict in Ukraine is much more than it is the conflict for the European fate of Kiev. It is usually thought that there is a hierarchy of interests where security values take the first place, economic the second and value the third place. For the topic of this paper, it is extenuating that the projection of social values beyond the state takes the most ambiguous last place in the hierarchy of national interests. The fact that states are sometimes even ready to go to war in order to project their values
283 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century can result from the satisfaction with other interests. The way interests are ranked can depend on their true value, but also on how much any of the four interests mentioned above has been achieved. During the 1990s the USA was military superior and economically prosperous. Today, both the USA and the RF have been weakened, although it is easy to define the RF’s objective concerning Serbia, while the trade war with sanctions and counter-sanctions which Russia has commenced offers Serbia a big chance, this especially concerning its agriculture. Although for half of a year Moscow did not react waiting for the EU and the USA to change their minds and stop pursing the policy of punishment, it has now taken the measure that will seriously shake the European business of the 21st century which traditionally meets with excellent conditions and even a better market in Russia. And if the provision that all countries which have imposed sanctions against Russia are “aggressor states“ is adopted within the law and it is realistic to expect that this will happen since this law is proposed by all parties in the RF Parliament, then the way for projecting social values will be facilitated for humanitarian interventions if Donetsk is attacked by the model which the USA applied in Kosovo in the past.
Concluding remarks After the crisis in Syria, the Americans and the Russians, when in the opinion of many analysts, last summer Moscow stopped the announced American attack against Damascus proposing that the Syrian chemical weapons should be destroyed under international control, have no such diplomatic patience now in Ukraine and between the Kosovo precedent and the Crimea burden they enter the biggest crisis after the Cold War. They have reset their relations in such a wrong way that considering the Russian annexion of Crimea, imposing of American and European sanctions, counter-sanctions and actually, the trade war that will be solved in court and the potential for further escalation of the conflicts in Ukraine many analysts are of the opinion that we have already entered the second world Cold War. After the suspension of Russia from G-8 there are possible various forms of conflicts between the East and the West that may bring unpredictable implications for the security of Europe, stability of Russia, the future of the EU and the NATO as well as national interests considering the global energy markets. However, this is not yet a cold war not only because Russia lacks the military capability of the USSR it could use to demonstrate the Cold War power but also because China has no political will to become its anti-Western ally although it has signed significant economic agreements with Russia. In this way, pursuing its smart policy China has most profited from the crisis in Ukraine, but concerning their power in the new Cold War order the roles and significance of other actors are changing.
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After only several casual cause-effect reactions, it can be concluded that by the end of the ideological Cold War the great powers have started to react in the same way when their interests are concerned. It is not possible to find a difference between imposing of sanctions against Russia and vice versa counter-sanctions to those who advocated them publicly for a limited time. It is clear to both of them that these are big mistakes which finally do harm to other countries; however, they are trying to remain neutral. The situation in which the countries are brings about the arrogant, selfish and cruel behaviour toward those which are less powerful and unprotected. In pursuing its foreign policy, Serbia should clearly inform all that our strategy is defined by the Platform which was adopted by our Parliament. It precisely says the following: We have political and economic interests with the European Union. The European Commission’s European policy is not flawless but by pursuing an active policy Serbia that would chair the OSCE must find peaceful solutions and not run away into neutrality which finally is not what it used to be. It is not disputable at all that Serbia should develop diversified and good relations with Russia. But, the Russian political model is not compatible with the EU political model, which is officially our priority in the integration policy. It not only means that Russia cannot dominate over Serbia’s foreign policy objectives but it should open an open debate in order to help itself and Russia overcome the stalemate not sacrificing good relations and the protection we have been offered all this time over Kosovo. If Serbia’s foreign policy is not capable of equally defending its position in Washington, Moscow and Brussels that its future is secure within the European Union, then it will end as country of secondary importance in the Union courtyard or as a Balkan enclave of Russia. This, however, is not provided by the Platform which the Republic of Serbia adopted as its strategy. Actually, the events not coinciding with our wishes more and more determine the positions between the Kosovo precedent and the Crimea burden. Thus, we shall probably be assigned with another task after the elections there. It is likely to be the Brussels Agreement 2 in the way that we should follow more consistently the EU Ukrainian crisis policy which enters an ominous ending whose actors are becoming less and less tolerant. This increasingly decreases tolerance for a neutral position which Serbia managed to take by the concurrence of the favourable circumstances so far: different positions of the EU member states over the recognition of Kosovo as well as the hesitation and avoiding taking a single position on the part of the EU under the American pressures to squeeze Vladimir Putin. However, Putin is neither inactive nor idle. He is completely aware that the influence of smaller countries decreases and that alliances are being made. Thus, through the creation of the Euroasian alliance in projecting social values beyond
285 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century state borders and in accordance with the market economy and capitalist business operations Russia will advocate the following new matrices: one of them will be Orthodox – Slavic and the other will be Euroasian. In the first case, the Balkan countries will play an exceptionally important role and Serbia in particular because their spiritual, cultural and economic denominators are compatible. For this reason, Russia pays more attention to Serbia. For this reason, Serbia was granted the most favourable terms for the “South Stream“… For this reason, Russia will agree to change the contract for purchasing of the Oil and Gas Company of Serbia (NIS) or annexes to the contract provided that Serbia proposes them. Unlike the previous government that had to choose between Kosovo and Europe, the current one has to choose between the EU membership in a summary manner or such a partnership with Russia. Brussels first “expected“, but now it “demands“ from Serbia to support the position on Ukraine. That is a part of our obligations provided for by the Charter 31. Of course, there is the third way implying searching as an EU member state for a world movement that will be aligned but not neutral. The Serbian OSCE chairmanship is our advantage. But, for such a movement – of aligned courtiers committed to achieving peace we need an agreement from Washington and Berlin as after all, Broz had one when he created the Non-Aligned Movement.
286 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Miloš JONČIĆ1 Aleksandar JAZIĆ
THE NEW WORLD ORDER BETWEEN UNIPOLARISM AND MULTIPOLARISM
Abstract: At the end of the eighties, there was a collapse of bipolarity and the world entered the post-Cold War era. It was a milestone of the twentieth century. The symbolic moment of the milestone was the demolition of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. The collapse of the Eastern bloc, which was a mainstay of the Warsaw Pact balance of power in the world ceased to exist, which was reflected in the possession and superiority of nuclear weapons and the Eastern and Western powers. After such a collapse of the East, especially the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Western powers emerged from the Cold War as victors. As there were no strong opponents, the Western powers were led by the U.S that was becoming the world center of power with the advantage in terms of economic and military power, political and ideological influence. In a number of other consequences this collapse was another very important result, which is reflected in the transition from a bipolar world to unipolarism, because only America remains the superpower as there is no more Soviet Union. Only the U.S. keeps on having all attributes of a superpower (military and economic power and great political influence). This state of the world in which America has the final word is best seen in international relations. At the United Nations, the only worldwide organization that is entitled to approve the use of force based on the decisions of the Security Council, the United States plays the leading role. In terms of crises in the world the United States is the main arbiter in many of them that it often initiated itself interfering there and in order to solve them and thus establish control over these states. The primary position of America in NATO shows that the organization largely depends on it,
1 Milos Jončić, Research Associate at Institute for International Politics and Economics. Aleksandar Jazić, Research Fellow at Institute for International Politics and Economics. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011–2015 period.
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especially in economic terms. Of course, it should be noted that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact raised the question of justification of the existence and survival of NATO. All countries that play a significant role on the world stage have good relations with the United States or are its allies and develop partner relations with it. There are only few states that are in open conflict with the United States. The recent events of the “Arab Spring“ have certainly proved that up to date the world military and political scene is changing. After the toppling of the legitimate regime by violent means initiated by both the Western powers and multinational companies that have multiple parties interested in the states of the former “Third World“, discernible forces in different ways slowly get in the way of such arbitrariness. The leader of this new power is certainly the Russian Federation. For the first time since the breakup of the Soviet Union it opposed to the arbitrariness of the West in the events in Syria. Recent developments in Ukraine and Crimea clearly show that the Russian Federation returns to the international scene as a force that can compete in all areas with the United States. In particular, it should be noted that despite the existence of the armed forces of both states and private multinationals special civil protection forces are created to provide assistance to the civilian population in emergency situations as those caused by armed conflicts and by natural disasters (earthquakes, floods, tsunamis, hurricanes). Key words: New World Order, unipolarism, multipolarism, terrorism, Arab Spring, BRIC state, civil protection, civil protection system, EU, civil defense, developing countries.
Introduction At the end of the 1980s, the bipolarity collapsed and the world entered the post-Cold War era, which represented a turning point of the twentieth century. The demolition of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 could represent a symbol of this turning point. With the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, which relied on the Warsaw Pact, a balance of power in the world ceased to exist, and this balance reflected in the possession of nuclear weapons by both the Eastern and Western powers. After this collapse of the East, especially the collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the Western powers came out of the Cold War as winners. As there were no more strong opponents, the Western powers, headed by America, became the world’s centre of power, superior in terms of economic and military power, and political and ideological influence. In addition to a series of others, this collapse had another very important consequence, which was reflected in the transition from a bipolar world into unipolarity, because only America remained a superpower, as Soviet Union no longer existed.2 Only the United
2 D. Petrović, „Ka multipolarnom svetskom poretku“, Centar za razvoj međunarodne saradnje, Beograd, 2010, p. 64.
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States continue to have all the attributes of a super power (military and economic power and great political influence). This situation in the world, in which America calls the shots, is best seen in international relations. In the United Nations, the only worldwide organization that is entitled to the use of force based on the decisions of the Security Council, the United States has the final word. As regards the crises in the world, the United States is the main arbiter in many crises, which it often initiates, and later gets involved in their resolution, thus establishing control over these countries. The primary position of America in NATO shows that North Atlantic Alliance largely depends on it, above all in economic terms. Of course, it should be emphasized that the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact raised the question regarding the justification of the existence and survival of NATO. All countries that play a significant role on the world stage have good relations with the United States or are ally and partners with US. Few are those who are in open conflict with the United States.
The Idea and Concept of the New World Order After the end of the Cold War, the idea of creating a New World Order that was to be built on the foundations of the old emerged. The first to use this idea in one of his speeches was George Bush Sr. He justified the Gulf War with the need for a New World Order, in which, of course, Iraq did not fit with its policy of human rights violations and threats to the security of America. Bush said that at stake was “a New World Order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law”.3 Basically, “the New World Order”, according to Chomsky, means that people of rich societies rule the world, and compete with each other for a greater share of the wealth and power, ruthlessly oppressing all those who get in their way. They have enormous help from rich people of starving nations, while the role of others is to serve and suffer. It is certain that the old world order was based on bipolarity, and after such relations in the world ceased to exist, there was a needed to establish a New World Order. According to some opinions, the New World Order is an instrument in the hands of today’s leading world powers and, above all, United States, aiming at destroying all those who do not respect and obey the new system of humanity. Thus, the idea of creating a New World Order arose primarily as America’s justification of doing what they want, all in order to achieve the New World Order that promises peace and undisturbed development to all the countries that do not get in America’s way, and destroy those which oppose. The United
3 Quoted from “Svetski poredak, stari i novi”, N. Čomski. SKC 1996.
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States used the events surrounding Iraq to show what happens to those who do not fit into their conception of the New World Order, as well as to justify their attack, which also contained a hidden agenda. This agenda could have been discerned even back then. Now, after another attack on Iraq, which was also launched by George Bush, but Junior, that is, the son of only chief of state who has been convicted by the International Court of Justice for “unlawful use of force” (in condemning the attacks on Nicaragua), it is clear that America’s goal is to achieve a total control over Iraq. The reasons for this are clear – to gain control over a vast territory, control oil resources and get closer to the greatest dangers that can hinder America on its way to create a New World Order. Thus, America would play a dominant role and control the entire world. The greatest dangers are certainly Russia, which is recovering, if not even fully recovered after the collapse of the USSR, and China, which already represents a world power, if not even the only super power which, along with Russia, and at least economically, can compete with America. The New World Order can be observed from several aspects. One usually starts from the military-political aspect, as the most important and comprehensive one. And what is with other dimensions and aspects? Many of these dimensions are related to various aspects of human interest. The dilemma of the status, role and influence on religion imposes itself. What will be the relation of the New World Order towards present religions, will they be suppressed by a new “planetary religion”? The answer to this question is given by the movement called “New Age”, which sees itself as the religion of the “New World Order”.4 The goal of this movement, in addition to what the creators of the New World Order aimed at (the existence of global taxation system, world court, world army, world central bank with a common currency, forced world economic planning, the abolition of the right to own weapons, control of education, birth, etc.) is to impose a new religion that would be a link, bonding material of the New World Order. Of course, the creation of such a religion would mean abolishment of the existing traditional religions. According to some researches, the most suitable ground for the development of such religion is Europe, especially Central and Western Europe. Reason for this is the decline of the influence and participation of religion in the lives of citizens of this area. Thus, for example, an increasing number of Europeans believe in reincarnation, religious documents, Buddha, etc. In addition, church and religious teachings are mixing up together, as well as the influence of new sects, arising as fractions of various religions and new ideological concepts.5 This
4 Zoran Milošević, „Novo doba” – „religija Novog svetskog poretka”, Vojno delo, br. 3–4, Beograd, 1994. 5 Ibid.
290 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century movement carries out its activity through all areas of human activities, and through all human interests: science, culture, art,6 religion, medicine. Therefore, the conclusion is that the “New World Order” will also change the views on this segment of life. Besides religion, there is a new ideology based on the new value system as the result of the synthesis of different value systems rooted in Western culture. It “amalgamates” with a set of various other cultural values under one name – “globalism”.
Constitution, features and processes of globalization When it comes to globalization and the “New World Order”, controversies often occur among scientists. Some believe that globalization is more significant and that the “New World Order” is only a postulate of globalization, while others think the opposite. What they all agree in is that globalization and the New World Order supplement each other and that the existence of one without the other is impossible. Globalization is a process that represents a new stage in the creation of a “world system”. If one looks at the world at the beginning and at the end of the twentieth century, one sees two completely different pictures – the first picture where societies are completely separated, and the second one, where the world is connected by thousands of threads that permeate all aspects of life. The basic features of the world system, that is, of global order, are the connectivity of the world, interdependence of countries on the planet, increased number and influence of supranational organizations (United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union, etc.), and the transition process.7 The globalization process is determined by one of the following factors: global market and associated corporations system, global media and new communication system, regional integration process and strengthening of supranational organizations, and thus creation of the global legal order. The world market and associated corporations system are conditioned by technological and economic connectivity of the world that became regularity at the end of the XX century. The world’s largest corporations have long since
6 Primarily relating to film, theatre, literature, comic books that are promoting the ideas of the movement to all ages, with a particular attention to children and youths. 7 The transition process encompasses the transition from a single-party system to a multy-party one, from state ownership to a prevailng private property, with princiles and rules of free market economy, with the aim of joining the former real-socialism areas to a western model of society and making the world united and uniform.
291 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century ceased to be national, they have become multinational – their headquarters are in one country, their production branches are located in a number of other countries, they report their office and pay taxes in third countries, hence it is difficult to determine their actual nationality. In addition, trans-nationality is their desire and goal. In this way, through economy, one can control the world. Those who have control over the means of production and who make decisions on primary and secondary distribution, are the real rulers of the world; after all, it is the very goal of the “New World Order”. Control over locations of major world strategic resources and energy sources are also one of the goals of the protagonists of the New World Order. Raw materials and energy represent the basis of the means of production. Workforce is also necessary for the production process. Inclusion of Eastern European, Asian and African countries and nations is essential for obtaining cheap labour. The main global sources of energy (oil and big rivers suitable for hydropower) and deposits of strategic raw materials (iron, copper, silicon, tungsten, bauxite, petroleum, titanium, uranium, etc.) are located in these regions. Major geo-strategic routes go across some of the countries in aforementioned continents, thus, this is also one of the reasons why the protagonists of the “New World Order” are interested in them. By putting under control the strategic routes and points, one controls the whole continent, that is, the world is placed under control.
The steps achieved to date in the implementation of the New World Order The most evident steps in the implementation of the idea of the “new order” are military interventions and economic subjugation of small countries. The first under attack by the greatest protagonist of the “New Order” – USA, were countries of Latin America. The first step was the use of a method of special war, followed by various police actions, and finally, military action in the form of military intervention, if previous measures fail. The police are very important because they can detect discontent early and eliminate it before “major surgery”.8 The second step is to use the army, usually in order to eliminate unfavourable elements that defy the New World Order and America as its creator. First the US tries to use the military in that particular country, and if that fails, it uses military interventions in coalition with allies, or alone. The use of the military of a particular country is done through officers loyal to those that will carry out the coup. Examples of such actions are the overthrowing of the
8 This title holds measures and procedure od principal planners for taking measures against the “unresponsives” in their documents. (N. Čomski, “What uncle Sam realy wants”, Čigoja, pp. 34–35. (N. Čomski, “Šta to u stvari hoće Amerika”, Čigoja, pp. 34–35).
292 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century legally elected president of Chile, Salvador Allende in 1973, and the military coup in Indonesia in 1965. During the John Kennedy administration, the task of Latin American armies, which were controlled by the USA, was no longer a “hemispheric defence”, but was shifted to maintaining the “internal security”, which sometimes means a war against your own population. Military regimes established after the “disciplining” of the people, most frequently caused economic collapse of the country. Then, as a rule, the military junta hand over power to civilians to solve problems. When they finish with the “cleaning”, with controlled pressure by dissatisfied masses, “democratic elections” are organized and civilian government is established. Similar things are also happening today – changes of regimes in Africa. A perfect example is the situation in Libya and support that America provides to rebels. Of course, new means are available nowadays, such as control through the International Monetary Fund (which, same as the World Bank, finances underdeveloped countries, mainly with money of industrial powers). In exchange for the loans, the IMF imposes a “liberal market”, opens up economies for foreign interference and control, causes great reduction of social services and programs, etc. IMF sets different requirements for the credit arrangements and thus, indirectly, interferes in the internal affairs of a country, for example Greece. There is not a single reference to the fundamental principle of international law regarding the prohibition of interference in the internal affairs of a country. These measures place power in the hands of the richest classes and foreign investors and establish a double- layered society – a layer of rich and vast layer of the poor, unemployed, struggling people. Proof for this are the countries that are the richest in natural resources – instead of being countries of prosperity, they are practically the poorest. Examples are Brazil, Chile, Argentina, India, Nicaragua, Congo, Iran, Iraq, Indochina, Indonesia, the Middle and Far East, etc. The initiator of the new order is the USA, along with some traditional friends. The United States began the campaign in the early 1950s with a series of military actions towards certain countries that were either on the verge of interest spheres during the Cold War, or within the America’s zone of interest. Under the pretext of the Cold War conflicts, the USA was undertaking military actions on American continent, and later in Asia and Africa.9 The last year of the twentieth century, 1999, with the military intervention against FR Yugoslavia, will mark the beginning of the invasion of Eastern Europe and the end of the security system established after the World War II. The beginning of
9 “Disciplining” certain states in Central and South America began as early as 1954 in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador, in 1963 in the Dominican Republic, 1965 in Brazil, 1975 in Chile, etc., as well in Asia with the attempts to stop the spread of communism in 1950-1952 in Korea, 1964- 1973 in Vietnam, also meddling in the Middle East, and others.
293 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the new millennium (XXI century) will be remembered for ruthless war against Iraq without the UN’s decision, and the beginning of the uncontrolled behaviour of the sole remaining superpower – USA. Also, without international approval of the Security Council, the United States has carried out aggression against Libya. This intervention resulted in the overthrow and murder of the legally elected leader Muammar al-Gaddafi. Allegedly, the whole campaign was carried out in order to help the people who wanted a change of government. What exactly the reason for this overthrow of Gaddafi by the USA and NATO is will be proven by facts. It is evident that the “New World Order” has entered a new stage with unforeseeable consequences. Current analysis of international relations does not pay enough attention to some traditionally strong countries – Russia, China, Japan and Muslim countries. After the collapse of institutionalized socialism in Eastern European countries, many former socialist realist countries have hastily rushed to join the alliance with their yesterday’s ideological enemies and join the military-political alliance against which they were preparing for almost fifty years – NATO. The inclusion of these Eastern European countries in the Atlantic-European integration processes and their “transition” of socio-economic system, are only one indicator of new international relations. Russia, after many years of staggering, is trying to find its way in the new international circumstances. It remained a world power, not only as a military force, but also increasingly as a major economic factor that fast recovered t from current global economic crisis, and continued economic growth. In recent years, Russia has been trying to make a diplomatic breakthrough towards western European countries.10 It can be considered that to some extent Russia succeeded in events preceding American intervention in Iraq, when EU member states and Russia were on the same side against the United States. In the new developments regarding Libya, Russia again was left alone in condemning the ruthless attacks on a sovereign state. The situation in Syria has brought again the Russian Federation in confrontation with the United States – while Russia wants to ensure the implementation of reforms, America specifically wants to overthrow the existing regime. In these events related to Syria, Turkey has an active role, as a regional power with the increasing role in the international community. Nowadays, Japan is one of the economically most developed countries. It is the only colony in the last two hundred years that managed to resist the colonial conquest of the Western world and join the club of the most developed countries of the world at the beginning of the XXI century. Perhaps the success of its development and independence lies precisely in the rejection of the “development” recipe, prescribed by Western powers.11 Today, Japan is at the
10 Hentigton, S., „Sukob civilizacija”, CID, ROMANOV, 2000, pp. 182–184. 11 Čomski, N., „Svetski poredak”, Beograd, 1996, pp. 19–20.
294 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century door of permanent members of the UN Security Council. Whether it will succeed depends on many factors. One thing is for sure, the first UN reform to come will inevitably lead to changes in the structure of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Huntington also indicated this in “The Clash of Civilizations”.12 Japan is shaken by humanitarian disaster related to the Fukushima nuclear plant; however, it slowly manages to overcome this crisis too. The global economic crisis has dealt a blow to the Japanese economy, but their government manages to overcome it. Important factors in international relations of late twentieth and early twenty-first century that significantly affect (and will continue to affect) the further development of the world, are religion, especially Islam, and local conflicts, which are precursors of the “clash of civilizations”. After all, Islam emerges in many local conflicts as an element and cause of conflict. In the second half of the XX century, Islam experienced a real “resurrection”.13 “Islam is not a religion, but a way of life”, say the Muslims; according to them, Islamic fundamentalism is political Islam, only one component in a variety of Islamic ideas. Their intention is to restore Islamic law, increase the use of religious language and symbolism, spread Islamic education, increase adherence to Islamic codes of social behaviour and increase international solidarity among Islamic states and societies. During the 1970s and 1980s, the wave of democratization spread across the world. This wave also had an impact on Muslim society. While democratic movements were strengthening and coming to power in the world, Islamic movements grew stronger in Muslim countries. Islamism was a functional substitute for the democratic opposition to authoritarian regimes in Christian countries, and was largely a consequence of similar causes: social mobilization, loss of legitimacy of authoritarian regimes and volatile international environment, including increase in oil prices, which in the Muslim world, instead of democratic, encouraged Islamic tendencies. If the Pope was the main person who put an end to communism in Poland, the Ayatollah was the one who brought down the Shah in Iran. As a result of the “resurrection”, the future will bring a network of Islamic social, cultural, economic and political organizations within societies, and transcend them. It will turn out that Islam is the “solution” for the accumulated world problems, such as issues of morality, identity, sense of faith, but not problems related to social injustice, political repression, economic underdevelopment, and military weakness. Problems that occur in the Islamic world and stand in way of the success of “Islamic resurrection” are cohesion of the Islamic world and religious factions within the unity of the faith and issue
12 Hantington, S., op. cit., pp. 353–356. 13 See more in: Hantigton, S., op.cit., pp. 121–135.
295 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of prestige among some Islamic leaders – which country will be the leader of Islam. The weakness of religion with such a great number of members and countries that rely on religious grounds is disunity and poor cohesion within this civilization. On the one hand, the Muslim unity is reflected in the actions of some Muslim countries and international organizations, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Morocco, Iran, Tunisia and Turkey, which have organized the first Islamic summit in Rabat, when the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was established. Today, almost all Muslim countries belong to this Conference. Other international organizations were established as well, such as the World Muslim League (Pakistan’s creation) and the World Muslim League (Saudi’s formation). After the Gulf War in 1991, Saudi leader Hassan al-Turabi created the Popular Arab and Islamic Conference (PAIC) as a counterweight to the OIC, dominated by Saudi Arabia. In addition to these aspirants, there are also Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and until recently Iraq. In order for some of them to become the most important Islamic state, they would have to have the economic resources, military power, organizational competence, Islamic identity and commitment, and thus provide the Muslims political and religious leadership. None of these states have all the attributes to become a leader and a cohesive factor in the Muslim world. One thing is sure though, that the countries where the Islamic religion is influential, represent a civilization entity that can be the backbone of the future conflicts. An example that the clash of civilization has already begun, according to some theorists, is a civil war in the former republic of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – Bosnia, in 1991.14 With the dissolution of SFR Yugoslavia, questions relating to the re-shaping of that region opened up. The “New World Order” was at work. Changes of the political map of the Balkans inevitably influenced changes in the relationships in the international community. In a complex, confusing and war situation, the territory of the former Yugoslavia has become ground where clash of civilizations begun. Violent secession of Slovenia and Croatia was opposed by the rest of Yugoslavia at first and later Serbia, which appeared as the protector of the Serbs in one part of Croatia (Kninska Krajina, Slavonia, Western Srem and Banija). With the beginning of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the strengthening of disintegrative factors was opposed by Serbs who wanted to stay within SFR Yugoslavia. At this point begins a mass siding begins. Western European Catholic countries sided with Slovenes, Croats and Bosnian Croats. Serbia, Russia, Greece and other Orthodox countries sided with Bosnian Serbs. Assistance to Bosnian Muslims was generously provided by Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran, Libya, Islamic International and other Islamic countries. Testing of the “new order” started in this region, with full force.
14 This position is shared with the mentioned Huntington, S., in “Clash of civilizations”.
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Models of provoking, using and exploiting of crises were about to be checked in practice, and through crises shape the world and international relations in the new constellation of forces. The question whether the “New World Order” is really new, or it already existed in some other form, imposes itself. Chomsky in “World Order, Old and New” concludes that it is not really a new order, but modified forms of already used methods, means and power structures, aimed at preserving strategic position by the strongest and most developed countries of the world15 The epoch of monopolarism slowly ends, and gives way to multipolarism.16 This process is not over, it continues especially due to apparent declining of power of the United States and strengthening of the other world and regional powers, primarily referring to the countries of the so-called BRIC (Russia, China, Brazil, India).17
Terrorism and Its Place in the “New World Order” Accurate, comprehensive and universally accepted definition of terrorism does not exist. The reasons are many, ranging from those that terrorism has many forms, to the fact that it is always changing and thus is difficult to determine all the elements that define it. One of the accepted definitions is that terrorism is illegal systematic use of violence and fear to achieve political goals.18 Some of important characteristics of terrorism are: the use of force, political connotation, diversity of victims and objects of attack (usually innocent people); threat, intimidation and causing insecurity, publicity, demands and ultimatums.19 After the attacks on New York and Washington on September 11, terrorism became a major threat to America, and the American administration started the hunt on terrorist leaders around the world. Whether it was just an excuse for launching military operations and putting countries under control, or a real determination of military super power to deal with the current highest threat, the history will show, but it is certain that terrorism is present in the New World Order. A new chapter on terrorism opens with the killing of the
15 See: Čomski, N., „Svetski poredak, stari i novi“, SKC, Beograd, 1996, p. 404. 16 For the most important events showing the transition from a unipolar to a multipolar world see D. Petrović, „Ka multipolarnom svetskom poretku“, Centar za razvoj međunarodne saradnje, Beograd, 2010, pp. 73–80. 17 D. Petrović, „Ka multipolarnom svetskom poretku“, Centar za razvoj međunarodne saradnje, Beograd, 2010, p. 74. 18 Krivikapić B., „Enciklopedijski rečnik međunarodnog prava i međunarodni odnosa“, Službeni glasnik, 2010. p. 1062. 19 Ibid.
297 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century leader of al-Qaeda,20 Osama bin Laden. Many questions remained open, and we shall yet see whether and how the terrorist organizations will keep their place in the world order. However, one thing is for sure – they have a sufficient degree of organization and sufficient technical and personal capacities, and therefore represent an important factor in international relations and threat to the existing order. Is it on the anniversary of the attacks on New York and Washington, the Obama administration launched a new war against “Islamic state” from the true intention to finish with terrorism, or is it an attempt to gain control over some states times will show and events in the near future. Indications that the aim of curbing the terrorist organizations to cooperate with the opposition in Syria but not with non- democratic regimes, which was legally elected on the elections, gives us a degree of skepticism about the desire to defeat terrorism. There is much more believe that United States wants to establish control and dominance over the Middle East. Of course this is the preparation for fight of domination with The Russian Federation.
The Arab Spring and Path to Multilateral World Order The term “Arab Spring” means a revolutionary wave of protests initiated in December 2010, which have spread from Tunisia and Egypt, through the civil war in Libya, the uprising in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, Iraq, Algeria, and Amman. There were also low-intensity protests in Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and Western Sahara. Democratic revolution is a difficult task. Its outcome is often changes that are not revolutionary, and policies that are not democratic.21 The increase in food price and high unemployment rate are some of the causes that were portrayed as the reasons for the protests of people from Morocco to Oman.
20 Al-Qaeda (“the base’ in Arab) is a name given to an international alliance of Islamic terrorist groups loosely connected in a organizational-hierarchical sense, but nurturing an identical system of political beliefs in the need of returning to a “fundamentalist” interpretation of the Qur’an and a choice of violent methods to achieve their goals. It was founded by mujahedeen volunteers that went to Afghanistan in the 1980s to fight the forces of the USSR. The most prominent leaders of this global organization are the Saudi national Osama bin Laden and the Egyptian national Ayman al Zawahiri, but in a theoretical sense, as well as in practical terms should be considered the Palestinian Sheikh Abdullah Yusuf Azam. 21 Richard Haass President, Council of Foreign Relations, “How to Read the Second Arab Awakening”, Financial Times, March 8, 2011, Internet: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/6ea2c8b0- 49bd-11e0-acf0-00144feab49a,Authorised=false.html?_i_location=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ft.com %2Fcms%2Fs%2F0%2F6ea2c8b0-49bd-11e0-acf0 00144feab49a.html&_i_referer=http%3A%2F% 2Fwww.cfr.org%2Fmiddle-east%2Fread-second-arab-awakening%2Fp24326#axzz1Y6Yd8FPv, 20.07.2011.
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Also, reasoning that dissatisfaction with the closed, corrupt and irresponsible policy led to the fall of legitimately elected regimes in Tunisia and Egypt, is somewhat false.22 According to some authors, the Arab world protests against “sultanistic regimes” that appeal to no ideology and have no purpose other than maintaining their personal authority.23 However, current developments lead us to be cautious in presenting these conclusions, primarily because the United States, through such staged rebellions and demonstrations, seeks to appoint regimes that will be obedient, or tend to destabilize certain regions and thus easily control them. By comparing it with the end of the Cold War, the Arab Spring has been ranked as an event that has significantly affected the world order and international relations.24 For the USA, the democratization of Arab societies was desirable and necessary process, in accordance with a scenario that would imply slow, safer transitions led by autocratic rule in the Arab countries that enjoyed the full support of the USA.25 The USA certainly seeks to build a new world order in the Middle East in order to ensure that space for approaching Russia. It the period to come, it is important to monitor whom the United States will choose to be the new dominant regional power. The selection of this new “regional leader” is an important task for the USA, however, there are some new factors influencing this selection. It is completely unclear who will take the key role and dominance in shaping of the Middle East.26 The recent events, since the “Arab Spring“ to date, clearly indicate that the world’s military and political scene is changing. After toppling legitimate regimes by violent means initiated by both the Western powers and multinational companies interested in countries of the former Third World, forces that in different ways oppose such arbitrariness slowly emerge. The leader of this new power is definitely the Russian Federation, which for the first time since the dissolution of the Soviet Union opposed the despotism of the West in Syria. Recent developments in Ukraine and the Crimea clearly show that the Russian
22 Jack A. Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, Volume 90, Number 3, pp. 8-16. 23 Ibidem. 24 Martin Flecher, “Rebelinos Spread as “Arab Spring“ Takes Hold“, Times, 19.02.2011, Internet: http://www.timesplus.co.uk/tto/news/?login=false&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.thetimes.co.u k%2Ftto%2Fnews%2Fworld%2Fmiddleeast%2Farticle2919436.ece, 20.08.2011. 25 Obrad Kesić, „Bliski istok, SAD i Balkan”, Politika, 22.02.2011, http://www.politika.rs/rubrike/ Pogledi-sa-strane/Bliski-istok-SAD-i-Balkan.sr.html, 13.07.2011. 26 Michael Scott Doran, “The Heirs of Nasser”, Foreign Affairs, May/June 2011, Volume 90 Number 3, pp. 17-25.
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Federation is returning to the international scene as a force that can compete with the United States in all areas. The establishment of the Eurasian Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) lead to America’s inability to make decisions on behalf of the entire international community. CSTO is a primary response to the activities of NATO. The newly formed organizations are advocating restoration of the principles of the UN Charter and international law, which during the period of unipolarism were many times violated.
Conclusion The “New World Order” is a continuation of the established rules of world order, those rules that previously existed – the rule of law for the weak and the rule of power for the strong. The only new thing is the suit, as Chomsky stated in “New World Order, Old and New”. However, there are some significant developments (this is probably new), such as the internationalization of the economy, with all its consequences, including the class stratification at the global level. Same as it was in the past, privilege and power are not voluntarily subjected to social control, law, discipline, but they rather seek the ways to undermine democracy and adapt market principles to their specific needs. The culture remains with the traditional tasks: to modify the past and current history in the interests of power and authority, and to elevate the “high principles” to which the protagonists of “world order” are dedicated. In terms of globalization and the “New World Order”, it can be concluded that globalization is a process that represents a new stage in the creation of a “world system”. If one looks at the world at the beginning and at the end of the twentieth century, one sees two completely different pictures – the first picture where societies are completely separated, and the second one, where the world is connected by thousands of threads that permeate all aspects of life. The basic features of the world system, or global order, are the connectivity of the world, interdependence of countries on the planet, increased number and influence of supranational organizations (such as the United Nations, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, European Union, etc...), and the transition process. The “New World Order” and globalization are mutually connected and interdependent. In the “New World Order”, globalization is a process that sets the foundations of the new order. This world order is based on establishing new rules of behaviour for all countries and nations of the world in all spheres of social life: political, economic, military, cultural, religious, ideological, etc. The process of implementation of the “New World Order” began in the 1950s. The most evident steps in the implementation of the idea of the “new order” are
300 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century military interventions and economic subjugation of small countries. The first under attack by the greatest protagonist of the “new order” – USA, were countries of Latin America. By using various forms of military coups, “law and order” were established and “democracy was rescued” from various dictators, “non- democratic regimes”, autocrats and others. In the last decade of the twentieth century, in addition to military interventions, other forms of force were increasingly often used: economic (damping rates, economic blockades, the pressures of international economic organizations, customs, etc.) and methods of the special war (subversion, intelligence, political pressures, causing crises in some “disobedient countries”, etc.). Major religions, especially Islam, have special place and role in the further process of establishing of the “world order”. The “resurrection” of Islam is closely related to the establishment of “world order”. It can be concluded that the rapid march of the “new order” has caused rampant spread of Islamic fundamentalism and its intolerant behaviour in recent decades. This conflict contains the embryo of the clash of civilizations and the creation of new gaps, in addition to the existing ones, such as the conflict of North – South (developed – undeveloped), religious (Christianity – Islam). In addition to the aforementioned antagonisms, obstacle to the “New World Order” is the process of multilateralism, that is, multipolarity of world centres of power. Instead of two superpowers that existed in the mid-twentieth century, one remained, but the number of great powers that tend to be a decisive factor in international relations increased. The fact that the number of countries that have or will have nuclear weapons is increasing, contributed to the aforementioned. In addition to the United States, the Russian Federation, Great Britain, France and China – the traditionally great powers, Germany, Japan, India, Pakistan, Brazil, Israel and South African Republic ascended. The future of the world is determined by the antagonism between the “New World Order” and the free world, that is, between the path to the clash of civilizations and path to establish coexistence between different civilizations. What will prevail depends on progressive forces and their skillfulness to cope with the forces of the “New World Order”. “Which prevails will determine whether there will be a world in which a decent person would want to live.”27 Re-awakening of the “sleeping bear of East” and its opposition to the USA’s autocracy has greatly changed the landscape of the world and the international community. The struggle to establish order in accordance with the UN Charter has begun and there is a balance of power again. It needs to be emphasized that without the balance of power, system of collective security will be difficult to operate, and this threatens the entire international order.
27 Čomski, N., „Svetski poredak, stari i novi”, p. 404.
301 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Miloš TODOROVIĆ1
DOMINANT FORCES AND SMALL COUNTRIES IN CONTEMPORARY GLOBAL PROCESSES
Abstract: The end of the Cold War brought the reign of one ideology to the world, one acceptable social economic system and maximal liberalization of international economic flows. Yet, from the beginning of the 21st century, the world has entered the multi-polar world phase with four dominant economic and political forces: USA, China, European Union and Russia. Each of these dominant participants in the world processes has its own characteristics, advantages and problems. Global relations drastically change. This article analyses possible development of economic and political relations between the dominant participants in global processes as well as the position of small countries in the new world economic and political order. Key words: global processes, dominant forces, small countries.
Introduction The anniversary commemorations of important events provide us with opportunities to review the previous period objectively along with the historical distance. The same case is with the anniversary of World War I which not only was the biggest warfare in the history of mankind, but also it did change the global economic and political relations in the 20th century. What usually stays in the shadow of military activities is the biggest change in overall international economic relations and the moving of the economic power centre across the Atlantic. Economic chroniclers harshly estimated that the 19th century with Victorian England was the century of Europe; 20th century can be described as the century of America, while 21st century can be considered to be the century of Asia, according to many predictions.The dominant forces predominantly put the basis of their overtaking on the technological superiority and the spreading of economic
1 Miloš Todorović, Ph.D., Full Professor, Faculty of Economics, University of Niš.
302 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century influence. That is the way British swing starts with the first technological revolution and spreading of British Empire, the USA dominance starts with the second and third technological revolution, at the same time it gets the crucial role in solving the economic and political problems of the world. World War I definitely stands for the breakpoint between the dominance periods of Great Britain and USA. One century later, what is talked about a lot is the ever increasing influence of China, as well as its ever increasing economic power. This paper should serve to estimate the perspective of relations between the dominant economic forces at the beginning of 21st century, as well as the chances for the economic development of small countries.
The Multi-polar structure of international economic and political relations Almost the whole 20th century, the world was based on bipolar conformation of international relations. Two forces, which were ideologically opposed, imposed two concepts of socio-economic development, two different attitudes towards international trade and world’s market and, generally speaking, two systems of values. What extremely opposed the rational West in economic point of view, whose functioning was based on trading principles, was the social equality of socialistic countries which were organized in egalitarian way. Once the Cold War was finished at the end of the ninth decade of 20th century, there was the predominance of a particular paradigm. That is the reason socialism is called ‘the period of transition from capitalism to capitalism’. Right from the bipolar conformation, the world entered the mono-polar phase with the super dominance of USA. Therefore, at the end of 20th century, the law conformation, based on the Charter of United Nations, didn’t correspond to the factual state. The defeated one in the Cold War (The Soviet Union) was disintegrated at first, while the political and economic influence of the heiress Russia was marginalized from the aspect of economic and political issues. The group of the seven most developed countries (G 7) didn’t summon Russia to the summit meeting, so this hostile attitude was alleviated by G7 + Russia formulation. However, the mono-polar world phase lasted relatively shortly, because ten years later the multi-polar conformation could be discussed. It is clear there are four dominant economic and political forces: The USA, China, the European Union and Russia. The fact that G7 group turned to G8 (Russia is considered the seventh economic world force) also refers to it. By the rule, the dominance is considered to refer to economic supremacy shown in GDP, the growth rates, participation in world trade etc. However, we shouldn’t forget the political and military power which substantially influences the position of the country in global relations, more particularly when the most economically-
303 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century powerful countries are considered. The basis of supremacy definitely consists of economic power which intertwines with the military one, the link of which further intertwines with the political power. However, there are also exceptions. During the major part of the second half of 20th century, Germany was the economic giant, yet a political dwarf. It could be discerned best in the United Nations Security Council, Germany still not being the member. It has no right to veto. On the other hand, China was an economic dwarf for a long time, even the China representative in United Nations was the representative of Chan Kai Shek’s refugee government, yet this crowded country was politically acknowledged at the global level. That state and the conformation of United Nations refer to the flaws of global law order, which will continue in mono-polar world and cause pressures and need for the reform of United Nations organization. However, there is another power dimension, and that is the population power. In this case, China is superior and, speaking of a long-term period, it will be population-dominant country. The population power has its economic dimension, especially when the size of the internal market is concerned. What will be analyzed in this paper is the relation of economic powers and partly the population power. After the ending of Cold War, USA has the dominant economic, political and military power in the world. Although the European Union as a whole has larger gross domestic product, we will first compare USA and China for the reason which will be explained later. In 2012, USA’s GDP amounted 16, 245 billion dollars. However, in comparison to other economic partners, the position according to this parameter is changing rapidly. In 2004, USA’s GDP was 6.35 times bigger than China’s one, while in 2012 that relation amounted only 1.97 (16 245 billion dollars compared to 8227). The situation is clearer if the GDP growth rates are compared. In the period from 1989 to 2003, the average growth rate in China is larger than 9%. That trend was continued afterwards, so the lowest growth rate in China was recorded in 2012 and amounted 7.8%, while in 2007 it was 14.20%.Of course, we shouldn’t forget the relatively lower base of China’s
Table 1. The absolute value of leading economic forces’ GDPs In billion dollars Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 China 1,932 2,257 2,713 3,494 4,522 4,991 5,930 7,322 8,227 Russia 591 764 990 1,300 1,661 1,223 1,525 1,899 2,015 EU 1,3246 1,3851 1,4771 1,7081 1,8376 1,6410 1,6330 1,7687 1,6660 USA 1,2270 1,3095 1,3858 1,4480 1,4720 1,4418 1,4958 1,5534 1,6245 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator; http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.
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GDP. In the period from 2004 to 2012, the highest recorded growth rate in USA amounted 3.8% (in 2004), while in 2008 it was only 0.30%. The average growth rate in the period from 2004-2008 in China amounts 10.51%, while in USA 2.43%. It can be concluded, with the extrapolation of these data, that in 2021, China will overtake USA according to GDP. Of course, this data should not be taken for granted. As a matter of fact, the USA rates will probably have the increasing trend because the rates mostly refer to the period of global economic crisis. Even more important is the fact that China feeds 1. 351 billion people so the major part of income will be eaten, while 314 million people live in USA. Moreover, the annual population growth in China is much bigger in absolute amount (around 0.5% per 1.351 billion citizens), while in USA the average growth is 0.9%, yet per 314 million citizens. However, the export data speak more of the economic vitality and potential. China realizes much bigger part of its GDP on world’s market, because the coefficient of export dependence is averagely above 34 %, while the same parameter for USA is between 13 and 14%.
Table 2. Growth rate of leading world economies’ GDP In %
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 China 10.10 11.30 12.70 14.20 9.60 9.20 10.40 9.30 7.80 Russia 7.20 6.40 8.20 8.50 5.20 7.80 4.50 4.30 3.40 EU 2.60 2.20 3.40 3.20 0.40 4.50 2.00 1.60 0.40 USA 3.80 3.40 2.70 1.80 0.30 2.80 2.50 1.80 2.80 Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator ; http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu
It is clear that the relations between the two leading economic world forces change rapidly, so one hundred years after World War I the change in global leader position can happen again. However, we should not forget another really important fact. By far the biggest investments in research and development still take place in USA so that this raw projection can crucially change in favour of USA, where there are by far the biggest investments in research and development, which further increases the chances for another technological revolution in USA. Competitor’s advantage of China in world’s market is still based on the low cost of working force and imitative development strategy. Today, there is almost no original Chinese product that dominates world’s market. This civilization, tracing back its origin many millenniums ago, provided the world with four technological inventions (paper, compass, gunpowder and silk), yet it was many centuries ago.
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The most important flywheel to dominant forces gives new technological invention, which makes economy much more perspective and leads it to the centre of global economic movements. The leading position involves the strengthening of military and political power. When following the segment of relations of the two dominant forces, the serious shifts can be traced in China’s investment on military plan. China is the biggest purchaser of Russian war-planes, it has been launching artificial satellites in the orbit for a long time, some of which are of military importance, it has made the first aero carrier which by itself defines the serious ambitions and presence not only in the territory of China etc. On a political plan, the most important cooperation is the one with Russia and other increasing crowded world economies gathered in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). Like a bomb echoed the news that these countries could start using the new currency in a mutual trade, which would deliberately threaten the dominant position of American dollar in international finances. The breaking news is the building of gas pipeline from Russia to China worth 65 billion dollars, which will connect these two economies even more tightly. However, China is burdened by the list of specific problems which are a counterbalance to the incredible results on the economic plan. The social economic organization of China which resists the trend of communistic parties’ loss of position, GDP per capita which is still extremely low (predominantly because of crowdedness), big pressure on the fixed currency of yuan, political tensions concerning Tibet etc. All of the above mentioned point to the fact that the changes on a global plan will not happen so rapidly, in other words they will have more of evolutionary features than of revolutionary ones. Russian economy is said to be based on natural resources only, more particularly on oil and natural gas. The cynics would say that kind of economic structure refers more to 19th century than to 21st century. Nevertheless, economic analysis can offer a different view on Russian economy. The growth rates of the biggest country in the world are not as high as the Chinese ones, yet they are way higher than the growth rates in USA and EU. Before the crisis breakout, the growth rates surpassed 8%, while the lowest one was recorded in 2012 and amounted 3.4%, which is slightly lower when compared to the highest growth rate in USA in the period from 2004 to 2012. On the other hand, the difference in GDP with regard to EU and USA is drastically decreasing. In 2004, Russian GDP was 22.4 times less than the EU’s GDP, and 20.7 less than USA’s GDP. That ratio drastically decreased in 2012 and amounts 8.2 times with regards to EU, and 8.06 with regards to USA. As far as the exporting vitality is concerned, coefficient of Russian dependence constantly amounts around 30%. Of course, what can be objected about is the fact that energy flows are mostly exported, that the GDP is
306 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century by far the lowest when compared to GDPs of other dominant forces, yet Russia temporarily has products which are accepted by world’s market, even the raw material and energy flows. We should not forget that Russia even formed a stabilization fund which is estimated at over 500 billion dollars which are left to future generations as the part of the income earned by the use of natural resources. Nonetheless, Russian action on several other fronts is very interesting. The first one is the more and more intensive cooperation with China. The plane exportation, the building of gas pipelines in the direction of China as well as European Union (Southern Course) and cooperation within BRICS – all of these can geographically redirect the courses of Russian international trade. The building of gas and oil pipelines in European direction, and in the close future in China’s direction noticeably improved the strategic position of Russia. Although Ukrainian crisis deteriorated Russian relations with Western countries and brought them to the lowest point the first time after the end of Cold War, the oil and gas exportation are the obstacle for European Union to take more drastic measures towards Russia. Yet, in any case this crisis doesn’t correspond to Russia economically speaking, first of all because it has been lasting long. On a political plan, some authors see the advantages of Russia in the personality of Vladimir Putin. The Russian president’s authorizations, his political profile of ‘De Gaul’ type and the concentration of political power provide this country with particular advantage with regards to other partners, especially European Union. It is best seen in the message of Henry Kissinger who does not know whom to summon when he has to agree on something with the European Union (the European Community then). The global issue Russia should not be underestimated for in any case is its military power. That power should not be identified only with its nuclear potential, but also with the results of the research in military industry which selectively started to commercially distribute on the world’s market. The biggest controversies are about the position of European Union and its future in global courses. EU has the biggest GDP with the regards to other dominant forces, its market is the third in the world when regarding the numbers (after the Chinese and Indian one), in 2012 GDP of European Union amounted 16 660 billion dollars, while 505 million people lived in 28 member countries. Nevertheless, EU relative indicators are troublesome. The average rate in period from 2004 to 2012 amounted 2.24%. In that way, the differences between China and Russia’s integrations with a view on economic power are rapidly decreasing. The encouraging data for EU is the crucial role of export in GDP which is around 40%. It amounted even 43% in 2011 and 2012. However, the counterbalance to this data is the role of export in GDP which moved from 35% to even 42% in period from 2004 to 2012. For the sake of comparison, this parameter in China moves from 22% to 32% and has a decreasing trend, in Russia
307 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century it has a constant value of around 22%, while in USA it moves from 14% to 17%. It is of great importance to mention that the energy flows from Russia have the crucial role in the import of EU countries, the goods which are not so easily substituted, especially when natural gas is put into question. One of the most serious problems of EU is its disintegration, no matter at what extent it represents the united entity. This problem could be best discerned when France and the Netherlands (the founders of European Union) declined the Constitution of European Union by referendum. If the traditionally reserved attitude of Great Britain wasn’t a surprise, French opinion expressed at the referendum was absolutely unexpected. It should be also added to all the things mentioned above that EU has had a zero growth rate of population for a long time. The relations among the dominant forces definitely change more rapidly at the beginning of 21st century than in the second half of 20th century. However, the question that is now imposed should not seek the answer in political relations but in the economic ones. Only six years later after the biggest warfare (World War II), France and Germany formed European Community for coal and steel and permanently linked their economic future even on a political level. Contrary to that, a quarter of a century after the end of Cold War, the relations between European Union and Russia (with the exception of pipe lines for energy flows) is tense in many segments. Ukrainian crisis brought about even the mutual economic sanctions of EU and Russia. That is why Russia was forced to relate its economic future to China as the biggest increasing market and country of BRICS. The eventual alliance of EU and Russia of any profile would noticeably change the picture of global relations among the dominant forces.
The chances of little economies on the global market under the conditions of dynamic global changes The only option which is there for small countries at times of intensive changes is to adapt to new conditions and relations on world’s market. Globalization opened their markets for foreign dominant producers, multinational companies which took over their economies and markets, while the country space for protecting the national and economic interests became less. The happy coincidence is that the small country can abound in some natural resource which can be launched on world’s market. The typical example of that is tourism in Croatia and Montenegro. In that context, Serbian natural potential lies in agriculture and transitive road, rail road and river transport. Another option is to fit in the horizontal and vertical productive chains of multinational companies. That kind of option is actually a necessity and it is not decided on by small countries but multinational companies. Globalization pre-
308 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century structured world’s economy in which multinational companies became the dominant factors. With the regard to the companies which are within the national markets restricted by anti-monopole laws, there are no such restrictions on world’s market. Small countries are powerless to protect the destroying action of the monopolized and oligo-polized ambitions of multinational companies, for they are economically more superior to most countries whose market is conquered. The country’s entrance to economic integrations can be analyzed in the similar way. The suppression of trade barriers offers the opportunities for presentation on other countries’ markets, as well as it opens the national market for, by rule, economically more powerful firms. It can be concluded though that the development of economic relations in the world at the beginning of 21st century threatens economic, as well as the national interests of small countries. The only thing that can be recommended is the favouring of the very sectors, with which particular competing advantages can be achieved on world’s market, without ambitions of small countries to have a more crucial role in creating economic relations in the world. For this kind of countries, the good position in some market’s part would be a satisfying result which needs cherishing, maintenance and improvement. Because of that, the liberalization of international economic courses, globalization, the spreading of international economic integration, uncontrolled action of multinational companies are the least suitable scenario for economic, as well as national interests of small and insufficiently developed countries.
Conclusion The rapid change of relative power of dominant economic forces gives seals the beginning of 21st century. The drastic changes in growth rates, the coefficients of import and export dependence etc. lead to conclusion that the leading position in world’s economy can be easily changed. Nonetheless, there are factors which decelerate that process or make it more uncertain and give a completely new dimension to already started processes. That is especially seen if the changes on economic plan, as well as military, political and population power of dominant forces are followed. By the rule, these tectonic changes negatively influence the positions and perspectives of small and insufficiently developed countries. The lack of opportunity to participate in the creation of new relations forces them to adapt to new changes. The key to their success in the protection of economic, as well as to national interests is the level of adaptability.
309 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Jovan MANASIJEVSKI1
THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY AND FORMATTING OF THE EU AS A FUNCTIONAL GLOBAL ACTOR – BETWEEN AMBITIONS AND LIMITATIONS
Abstract: The paper analyses the European Security Strategy and its implementation as a part of the building process of the European Union as a functional and distinctive global actor. The transformation of the international order towards multipolarity and the growth of the global interdependence have decisive influence on the position and the status of the European Union on the global stage. In these conditions, the European Security Strategy has been designed as a framework which should provide directions how EU can most optimally articulate and protect its interests and values in this changed international constellation. This also includes the appropriate, timely and legitimate way in which it should face the challenges and threats to its interests and values, i.e. their detection, understanding and proper addressing. The last ten years, since the adoption of the European Security Strategy, have been marked by efforts of the Union to accommodate to the new complex international circumstances, to avoid the growing threat of its global irrelevance, to enable its global visibility and recognition and to position itself as a global actor in a sustainable manner. The paper addresses the main features of the European Security Strategy, their dynamics and transformations through this ten-year period as well as their most important limitations. Key words: European Security Strategy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, European/Common Security and Defence Policy, global actor, strategic culture. It has been ten years since the European Security Strategy (ESS) was passed, which is a good cause for evaluation of its importance and its role in the integration processes within the sensitive areas of foreign policy, security and defence as well as in building the EU’s profile in international relations. The ESS
1 Jovan Manasijevski, M.A., Department of Sociology, Faculty of Sv. Cyril and Methodius University in Skopje, Macedonia.
310 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century was passed by the European Council in December 2003, and since then it has become the most referent document of the Union in the domain of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Four years later, in December 2007, in the context of the experiences gained by the application of the ESS, the lessons learned by the operations which were carried out by applying the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) as well as the dynamic of the new security threats and overall security environment, the European Council made a decision to update the ESS. Therefore, in December 2008, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy (RIESS) was adopted in Brussels. The key issue addressed by the ESS is how the EU can provide timely, appropriate and legitimate dealing with the challenges and threats upon its interests and values, i.e. their accurate detection, proper understanding and appropriate treatment. Also, how can the EU, in the changed international constellation, in terms of emerging a new multipolar order and growth of global interdependence, find the most optimal way to articulate and protect its interests and values?
New security threats and changed security environment The security environment is becoming more and more complex due to the growing interdependence. The number of actors, especially non-state ones, is increasing because of the fragmentation and dispersion of power, the number of interactions as well, which makes the predictability and management of the security much more difficult. For the first time in the history of the EU, the ESS gives a more comprehensive definition of threats to the European security and sets its priorities. With that, a classic “large-scale aggression against any member state is now improbable“ (European Council, 2003:9). But, at the same time, it is noted that “in an era of globalization, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand” (European Council, 2003:15). The strategy refers to the changed characteristics of the threats which make them more diverse, less visible and less predictable. The defined key threats to the European security are the following: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime (European Council, 2003:9-13). Five years later, the RIESS decided to enlarge and nuance the list of threats to the European security. Thus, beside previously defined ones, the new key threats to the European security are added and they are as follows: cyber security, energy security and climate change (European Council, 2008:456). It is interesting that this document has enabled different formulation and prioritizing of the previously defined threats. The RIESS puts more attention to long-term threats, such as energy security and climate changes as global threats with far-reaching potential.
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This poses two important questions: whether and at what dynamics did EU recognize the intensive changes in the nature and character of the threats to the regional and global security and whether and at what dynamics did it adapt to them? In the part of recognition and definition of the most important global security threats, the analyses unambiguously confirm that there is a good understanding of the threats. Global and regional security threats are well defined, carefully monitored, updated and nuanced. Their recognition and definition proceed autonomously, but still in a process of productive and double dialogue: firstly, among EU member states because of the intergovernmental character of the area, and secondly, with relevant documents of that status of the other global actors. Regarding the EU’s adaptation to new security threats, it can be noted that it proceeded slower and with variable dynamics. Thus, in the initial period, immediately after the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the conflicts in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, misconception and disorientation of the Union was obvious. In that period, it was noticeable that the EU had neither the appropriate institutions nor the appropriate capabilities to resolve the problems in its yard. But, after these bitter experiences, the EU has developed and consolidated the CFSP, founded the ESDP/CSDP, adopted the ESS, prepared two separate targeted strategies to combat terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, launched totally 31 missions and operations (15 of them have already been finished and 16 are still going on). All this shows that in the EU, there is a process of serious, systematic and continuous building and adaptation to its own strategy, its policies and its capabilities to the new security threats. Yet, despite all results achieved, the adaptation is still far from it should be. Certainly, there have been more reasons for this, but the intergovernmental character of the CFSP and the CSDP itself can be identified as the most important structural reason. The activities in this domain are still under strong national influence, and consequently, they are quite fragmentized, but, on the other hand, they are unnecessarily doubled.
Key parameters of the EU’s distinctive approach in dealing with threats From its very beginning, the ESS has not left any room for doubt in the status of the EU as a global player. Thus, it is said: “As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product, and with a wide range of instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player”, whereas, of course, such status involves some obligations, too – “Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world” (European Council, 2003:6). Let us see what those EU’s key features are in its approach towards security threats.
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Prevention The strategy itself clearly shows that security is no longer a matter of preparations for defence against possible invasion, but it is more a question of timely anticipation and stoppage of the violence outside Europe before it spills over the continent through conflict prevention, intervention in conflicts that have already started, in a function of establishment and maintenance of the peace, helping the consolidation and rebuilding of the failed states and dysfunctional societies. “This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs” (European Council, 2003:16). As we have stated above, the distance of threats is becoming less and less important, and as it is explicitly said in the Strategy ‘‘with the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad” (European Council, 2003:16). A key prerequisite of an effective preventive approach is the comprehensive understanding of security.
Comprehensiveness None of the identified threats in the ESS is not of purely military character. Therefore, their answer could not be provided only by military means, but it requires a combination of several different instruments (European Council, 2003:16). A new and distinctive valuation and use of military instruments in dealing with threats has already been codified in the ESS, i.e. putting the military response in a broader, comprehensive and balanced approach to managing the crisis. The approach is a novelty in two ways: first, it is a novelty regarding the former informal doctrine of the EU as a civilian power; second, a novelty regarding the current valid dominant model of strategic response to security threats - primarily by military means present in strategic documents of the USA and the NATO. So, an essential rebalancing of military and civilian instruments takes part. The EU aspires not only towards coordination of military and civilian resources, but towards the creation of an integrated military-civilian strategy (Drent and Zandee, 2010). The ESS clearly states that “the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked” (European Council, 2003:7). In the Strategy of Internal Security of the EU adopted in 2010 (Council, 2010), the key identified internal security priorities such as prevention of the criminal illegal immigration, organized crime and terrorism have clear external dimension (Drent and Landman, 2012). Talking about the most effective ways for addressing the basic reasons of the present security threats, the Union underlines the importance of developing instruments, referring to “security and development nexus” (European Council, 2008:458).
International legitimacy The EU’s approach in dealing with security threats is closely related to the question of legitimacy, i.e. providing broader international legitimacy for its
313 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century efforts. It means dedication to operate with international institutions and in accordance with the procedures of those international institutions, in the first place with UN. “Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority” (European Council, 2003:20). Furthermore, it means strict observance of the international laws and continuous efforts for its further development and enlargement and solving the problems through cooperation and implementation of commonly settled rules and standards. In that context, the coordination is, of course, more important than doubling and rivalry in solving of regional and global issues. For the purpose of strengthening the capacities for global governance, the EU explicitly opens the question of representative misbalance in the institutions of the current international order stating the following: “Representation in the international institutions has come under question. Legitimacy and effectiveness need to be improved” (European Council, 2008:461).
Effective multilateralism It is said in the ESS that today “in a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system” (European Council, 2003:19). Effective multilateralism is a vital concept of distinctive European approach to international relations. Effective multilateralism is placed as an antipode of unilateralism, especially in the light of the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the American Security Strategy from 2002 as a document with a prominently unilateral character. Therefore, the ESS begins with the conclusion that although the end of the Cold War left the US in a position of dominant military power, neither this nor any other country is capable to deal with the current complex issues independently (European Council, 2003:5-6). In this context, the understanding of such a European orientation towards multilateralism is important. It actually comes from the majority of tragic European experiences based on the usage and reliance on unilateralism and the politics of power. The EU is founded as a project which should actually impede the policy of force and threats in Western Europe. Multilateralism that the EU advocates is inherent by its foundation. Its integrative model is itself highly developed form of multilateralism. The aspiration to expand such an approach outside the EU‘s borders, in the rest of the world, is quite understandable. In this way, the EU becomes a model for other continental integrative processes as well, mainly in Africa and South America. Its internal innovative organization makes it an attractive partner for other regions in their efforts to confront the challenges of globalization through the European model of regional organization. Leaving the politics of power has brought great benefits to the EU. But, unfortunately, it has created some illusions, such as for example, that the peace
314 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century can be secured only by declarative pledge and reference to the international norms. The EU has learned its lesson quickly, above all, through the tragic experiences of the new Balkan wars, realizing that behind its political declaration there must be a real military force, ready to be used (Cooper, 2009). If the multilateralism is to be effective, it must be supported by credible military forces and determination to use them in a function of declared policy and values. Therefore, further building and developing the EU’s military capacities and abilities is vital for strengthening the EU’s foreign policy – because it is quite clear that the declarations which are not supported, i.e. behind which there is no threat of force-usage, unfortunately have small, insignificant weight. It is the fact that the realization of the concept of the EU’s effective multilateralism needs partners, both from the already established global actors as well as from the emerging ones. Although in the period when the ESS launched this concept, it seemed that it would be hard for the EU to find strategic partners interested in pursuing this direction, the things are changing. Above all, the continuous unilateral trend of the US is stopped. With the failure in Iraq and the advent of Obama on the administration’s head, the shifting of the US towards multilateralism is visible (Hutchings, 2009). On one hand, it is a critical understanding of the effects of their own unilateral approach, but, on the other hand, it is a clear recognition of the values of the European multilateral approach, above all, its orientation towards finding more long-term, sustainable solutions for global and regional issues. Among the other actors aspiring for its place in the new emerging multipolar order, Brazil is most devoted to multilateralism. China, Russia and India are more inclined to traditional, sovereign approach, which consequently means a preference for the bilateral arrangements and one, basically, more conservative view of multilateralism (Vasconcelos, 2008). But, at the same time, all global actors are already highly aware about the limitations of the state sovereignty. It becomes quite evident that the traditionally understood sovereignty cannot be the basis on which the states will cope with the current global and regional threats in a way that will be sustainable for a long term. Today’s most crucial global issues highly overweigh the state borders and individual state capacities in dealing with them. Hence, with the all existing and rising global actors a mood for more expressional multilateral cooperation can be detected. Of course, based on their defined national interests, but with a clear understanding that the best way to protect their national interests is actually through more intensive multilateral cooperation. Since 2008, the RIESS has once more underlined the strong multilateral orientation of the EU. At the same time, it is concluded that now it is the right moment for a renewal of global multilateralism with the participation of the US, referring to the change of the American administration that has just been made. Even with the expressed self-confidence, it is pointed out that “at a global level, Europe must lead a renewal of the multilateral order” (European Council, 2008:454).
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Strategic partnerships However, in the emerging new multipolar order the effective multilateralism is not sufficient. Specifically, the path to the achievement of the strategic objective of building a global order based on effective multilateralism cannot be passed just directly, but it should be passed indirectly, by the use of advanced and more complex bilateral arrangements between the EU and other established and emerging centres of power. Thus, in the ESS it is said that “We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organizations and through partnerships with key actors” (European Council, 2003:28). Therefore, the strategic partnerships are created as a flexible instrument which should protect and promote the key interests of the Union, simultaneously building a wider framework for long- term and sustainable cooperation that should result in a system of responsible global management. They are quite heterogeneous by its form and contents and offer broad opportunities for continuous adaptation and a better range of priorities of the partners and changes in the global scene. So far, the EU has developed ten strategic partnerships with third countries, i.e. with all established and emerging centres of global influence as well as another five strategic partnerships with other regional organizations or groups of countries. In the ESS, the most important is considered the transatlantic partnership which is qualified as irreplaceable, but, at the same time, it is noted that the objective is to have “an effective and balanced” strategic partnership with the US. Russia is also considered explicitly and it is said that the Union should continue developing closer relationships with Russia which is “a major factor in our security and stability”. Also, the need of developing strategic partnerships with Japan, China, Canada and India is particularly pointed out (European Council, 2003:28). Five years later, the RIESS places special attention on strategic partnerships with other international organizations. UN is set on the first place as a basis of the system of international relations, referring to the particular EU support and participation in every current UN peacekeeping operation and it is pointed out that “everything the EU has done in the field of security has been linked to UN objectives“ (European Council, 2008:461). Furthermore, the need for further strengthening of the strategic partnership with the NATO is concluded “with better operational cooperation, in full respect of the decision-making autonomy of each organization” (European Council, 2008:461). Also, the progress in deepening the relationships with OSCE is emphasized. The Treaty of Lisbon, Articles 21 and 22, establishes strategic partnerships as an instrument of CFSP and they gain bigger importance (European Union, 2010).
Building the EU’s strategic culture – between classical and new narrative The ESS is the first completed effort for building a common European strategic culture. Namely, among EU member states there has still been heterogeneity with
316 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century respect to their national security cultures and military doctrines. Those numerous divergences are precisely catalogued on multiple levels (Howorth, 2002). In the light of very different historical experiences, traditions and cultures, the attempt for developing a common strategic culture is a real challenge. Especially because of their own tragic historical experiences, a large number of member states featured national strategic cultures that actually reflect the security environment characteristic for the first half of the last century rather than the strategic context of modern times (Hyde-Price, 2004). But, developing a common strategic culture is necessary if the EU wants to position itself as a real global actor and that capital knowledge is clearly stated in the ESS, where it is said that ‘‘we need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention” (European Council, 2003:23). Not only that, but also “we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously“ (European Council, 2003:24). Hence, the strategy projects a more active engagement of the Union. Such an engagement requires larger capacities and bigger capabilities, too. Therefore, the strategy requires transformation of military forces towards greater flexibility, mobility and ability to deal with the new threats. It requires the improvement of the intelligence cooperation as well as civilian and diplomatic capacities. The ESS projects greater coherence between different instruments and capacities, such as, for example, aid programs, development funds, trade policies, diplomatic efforts, civilian and military capacities of its member states (European Council, 2003:26-27). In the process of following the development of a common European strategic culture, particularly interesting are the analyses done upon the work of the central institution of the CFSP, the Political and Security Committee (Meyer, 2006; Howorth, 2010а; Biava, 2011). These empirical analyses show the key role of this body in the convergence of the strategic cultures of EU member states and its role as a multiplier in the integration processes of this sensitive area (Meyer, 2006). This is confirmed by the research which proves that the process of institutional socialization within the Political and Security Committee creates common standards, common expectations and common visions, which is essential for the emergence of the European strategic culture (Biava, 2011). In this way, “they have used intergovernmental procedures to achieve supranational outcomes”, i.e. as it is concluded, “a supranational culture is emerging from an intergovernmental process” (Howorth, 2010а:1,20). For building and developing the European strategic culture, the EU missions and operations which have been carried out, their character, scope and engaged resources have big importance. They actually, constitute it in the most direct, experiential way. On the other hand, in order to perform their operation in the field successfully and suitably, the EU must have a strategic framework which will appropriately explain and set the perspectives of its missions and operations. In a way, by adopting the ESS, the EU tries to codify the existing strategic culture and experiences gained so far (Biscop, 2007).
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The influence of the NATO on the EU military operations is of great importance. Through the implementation of the Berlin Plus agreement, the first EU’s military operations – Concordia and Althea – a strong NATO stamp is more than just visible. Both military operations were performed by the EU literally by copying the existing NATO operational procedures. Even the next EU’s military mission – Artemis – which was the first autonomously performed EU operation outside of the Berlin Plus Agreement and without any support from the NATO, was carried out according to the NATO’s operative procedures and standards. So, it can be concluded that the numerous lessons learned from the NATO has helped the CSDP become autonomous and to emancipate from the NATO. Two experiential knowledges are capital: first, by performing military missions, the EU has exceeded the limitations of a “civilian” actor; second, by the approach of integrating civilian and military instruments, while performing its missions, the EU has created the basis for formulation and implementation of a new, comprehensive and integrated approach, a model which is becoming more and more attractive. In the RIESS, the evolution towards a new, more comprehensive concept of security is already anticipated. It is said: “We have worked to build human security, by reducing poverty and inequality, promoting good governance and human rights, assisting development, and addressing the root causes of conflict and insecurity” (European Council, 2008:453). Namely, for the purpose of thorough analyses of the major challenges of the European security and successful implementation of the ESS, High Representative Solana formed a special team led by Professor Kaldor. The team prepared a report entitled “A human security doctrine for Europe“, which advocated a thorough transformation of understanding of the European security by suggesting that it should be based on the principle of human security. ‘‘A human security approach for the EU means that it should contribute to the protection of every individual human being and not focus only on the defence of the Union’s borders, as was the security approach of nation-states”, says the report (Study Group, 2004:9). For this effect , the report proposed the EU to adopt the Doctrine of Human Security which would contain defined principles for conducting the EU’s operations, both in terms of the objectives of these operations and in terms of the means used, where the focus would be placed on the protection of human rights, then the formation of special forces for establishing human security as well as a new normative framework, which will regulate the process of decision-making for intervention and performing of the operations themselves in the field (Study Group, 2004:5). Three years later the team prepared another report which required the EU to operationalize the doctrine, which means that the principles of human security are be transformed into concrete and practical actions in the field (The Madrid Report, 2007:7). Otherwise, for the purpose of further codification, standardization, building and expanding the EU’s strategic culture, among other things, several important
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European organizations have already been established - European Security and Defence College, European Defence Agency, EU Institute for Security Studies.
European Security Strategy in comparative context The ESS is designed and formulated through an agreement with the most relevant similar documents in the relevant period – primarily the US National Security Strategy of 2002 as well as the NATO Strategic Concept of 1999.
European Security Strategy and US National Security Strategy We can build a solid argumentation in the line that, in many ways, the ESS represents a response to the National Security Strategy of the USA, brought in September 2002 (The White House, 2002). In terms of detection, identification and understanding of the key security threats between these two documents there was no substantive differences. However, the analysis indicates some serious discrepancies in the security strategies in the domain of dealing with security threats. The greatest focus is on the differences between the American unilateral approach and the European multilateral approach identifying exactly that as a key distinctive point, this including other differences which were derived from there, primarily the capital differences were related to international legal norms. Despite the European insistence on the validity of international law, there is the American ignoring or a selective use of international law. Closely related with what has been previously said is the understanding of the place and role of the UN and all practical implications deriving from it. The differences are evident in terms of preferred instruments for dealing with security threats. In the American strategy, the dominant place is put on military instruments in dealing with security threats effectively. In the European strategy, the things are different. The military instruments are put as a part of a wider and more comprehensive approach in dealing with security threats. On the other hand, we can talk about a kind of a retroactive impact of the ESS on the document of strategic security of the US. It is clearly shown in the analysis of the new US National Security Strategy that was adopted in May 2010. Indeed, the new rhetoric in the American strategy resulted from a lot of negative implications of the unilateral military approach of the US and the change of the American administration itself. However, the influence of the European style is clearly legible in some parts of this document. Thus, in the new American Strategy it is clearly stated that the US pays equal importance to the foreign development assistance and to the partnerships with other countries as well as to military security. Also, the central place of the UN is promoted and it is accepted that the USA is part of a multipolar world. It is clearly said that ‘‘US relations with China, India and Russia will be critical to building broader cooperation on areas of mutual
319 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century interest”, referring to these countries as “21st century centres of influence” (The White House, 2010:43). However, it shouldn’t be forgotten that the US have always approached the multilateralism in an instrumental way and that such retention is of a tactical character, because, despite quite soften rhetoric, the US, for instance, has not given up the doctrine of pre-emptive strike.
European Security Strategy and NATO Strategic Concept There was no alternative for the old status of the institutional division of labour between the two organizations – the NATO in charge of the European security in military terms and the EU, as a civilian institution for economic prosperity - until there was a serious common threat. With the departure of that threat from the historical stage, the need for such a division of labour was abandoned, too, and a process of redefining the old statutory arrangements began. By launching the ESDP, the Union transforms itself from a discourse of a civilian force into understanding the military means as part of the total set of instruments necessary for conduction of its foreign policy. The NATO’s influence on the CSDP, especially in its constitutional period, is multi-layer and large. Such influence can be clearly detected in the institutional design of the CSDP, in its policies, as well as in its operations of crisis management. The institutional design of the CSDP and its key bodies are completely modelled by the NATO and they represent almost a replica of its institutional structure. Also, the basic military culture of the EU and a standard of multinational military cooperation were de facto taken over from the several decades’ long NATO practice and were transferred in the CSDP by internalized long-years experiences of the military personnel. Multinational headquarters and command structures that were set in the CSDP were already a well-accepted norm by the past NATO’s practice as well as exceptionally important policies of interoperability. In such an institutional and operative context, as expected, the NATO Strategic Concept exerted big influence on the ESS, primarily in terms of identification of security threats. However, the approach in dealing with threats is fundamentally different, what is quite understandable because it comes from essentially different nature of the two organizations and their primary objectives – the NATO as a defence alliance and the EU as a comprehensive economic, political and security entity.
Concluding remarks The ESS is designed to format the EU as an actor with comprehensive capacities and capabilities for global power projection. By pacification and
320 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century democratic consolidation on the European ground, the focus of activities with respect to security and defence of European countries is moved towards the edges of the continent, in the hot spots of close European neighbourhood, as well as in some remote areas that could represent sources of danger to the security of the European countries. In order to intercept, manage and achieve post-conflict consolidation of these areas of danger to the European security effectively, the EU must possess a wide range of well-designed and properly organized operative civilian and military instruments. The ESS provides a comprehensive and referential framework for functioning of the EU at the global level in a changed international constellation. The ESS faithfully reflects the new reality of international relationships. The end of the Cold War and bipolar order as well as the brief unipolar period, the five-decade long situation in Europe as a security protectorate of the USA ended. European countries start their emancipation in terms of security and defence. In a situation when they already have an advanced integration process in almost all other areas, it is quite “natural” to situate security and defence cooperation in the already existing integration framework. The evolution of the strategic considerations in the European security can be quickly and immediately noticed. It was done under the decisive influence of the external shocks. First, it was done under the influence of the European failure and frustration to prevent or restrict the bloody wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Then, it was done under the influence of the terrorist attacks against the US and the American response to them. And of course, it was done under the influence of the terrorist attacks on the European ground, in Madrid and London. With the adoption of the ESS, the development of the CSDP and especially with the operations that were undertaken, the European Union showed that it cleared up with its self-perception as an exclusively civilian, soft power starting to profile itself as a global actor with all necessary sets of instruments. The building and developing of the EU’s military capacities and capabilities serves to strengthen the EU’s foreign policy in order to protect its interests and values – because it is quite clear that the declarations which are not supported, i.e. which are not followed by threats of force-usage, unfortunately, have insignificant weight. The processes of the EU’s adaptation to the emergence and development of new security threats and changed security environment are evident. New security threats were accurately identified, defined and understood. What is more important, starting from the anticipations that new security threats are changing and transforming very fast, it is obvious that the adaptation to them must be very dynamic. It is clearly evident from the updating of the ESS, where in a period of five years the list of security threats was additionally enlarged and nuanced by the newest generation of global security threats. The EU’s adaptation to effective
321 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century facing with these threats is also evident, although quite lowlier, by building and developing the necessary capacities and capabilities as well as setting up a more coherent, integrated civilian-military crisis management model. The distinctiveness of the EU as a global actor is derived from its character as a sui generis entity. The Union tries to present its distinctive character and impose it through the ESS in the area of international relations, too. The EU demonstrates that it is in a situation to produce and implement the strategic framework for its presence and behaviour in the international order, a framework that is understandable for the rest of actors in the international order and a framework that leads towards greater cohesion and integration within the Union. However, although the framework is traditional, in its approach it is distinctive and unique, primarily by its multilateral and holistic approach towards the security issues. The key feature of the EU’s distinctive approach in dealing with threats - the effective multilateralism – is authentic and firmly set against unilateralism. It brings a unique identity mark of the EU and in that sense, such an approach is self-understood, typical for the EU, derived from its constitutive and developing experience. It can be said that it faithfully reflects the character of the EU. The EU shows enough capacity to adapt it, suitably balance it with other approaches, mainly with the strategic partnerships. It further remains valid, although with serious limitations. The ESS should be seen as a document which provides clear directions for further development of a common European action in terms that, so far, it has been a subject of the exclusive intergovernmental regulation. The analyses so far have shown that the compromise between member states is a crucial element of the CFSP and the CSDP. This results from the intergovernmental character in this area. The effective decision-making in such circumstances, in an area of strict intergovernmental cooperation, is exceptionally complex and difficult. The system of a possible veto from any other member state slows down and impedes the rapid action which is of great importance in the area of security and defence. But, although it is an area which exclusively belongs to intergovernmental regulation, a series of relevant steps has been made. In the past ten years, the member states have continually and systematically concentrated resources and expertise in Brussels in order to create a critical mass that is needed to achieve the objectives within this area, which has led to the significant increase of the capacities and capabilities to undertake actions. The processes of depillarisation announced by the ESS and formalized by the Treaty of Lisbon lead to further transition of intergovernmental arrangements into supranational arrangements. However, basically, the different interests of the EU member states were and are expected to be a key catalyst of the volume and pace of the development of the CFSP and the CSDP.
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With the emergence of the ESS, a process of development of a common strategic culture has begun. The performance of over thirty missions and operations represents a major, concrete achievement. Although in the beginning, the operations followed the NATO form, they are gaining greater autonomy and distinctiveness as time goes on. The amendments of the Lisbon Treaty open even bigger opportunities for further consolidation and development of the common strategic culture, especially through the mechanism of Permanent Structured Cooperation, which should bring faster development, greater interoperability and bigger effectiveness in perspective. For a complete realization of the projected objective – the EU as a functional global actor, further strengthening of the CFSP and the CSDP institutions is necessary as well as greater coherence through more essential, not only mechanical integration of the entire available instruments. In summary, it can be concluded that, while the development of the CFSP and the CSDP institutions and structures proceeds in a satisfactory manner, the development of the European military and civilian capabilities as well as gaining of coherence proceeds slowly, below expectations and responsibilities undertaken by the member states. Despite numerous initiatives for a more extensive revision or creation of a new European Security Strategy, we believe that the ESS remains a solid and sufficient framework for the functional and distinctive EU presence and action on the global scene, provided that the Europeans seriously perceive the obligations they impose themselves by the establishment of the CFSP and the CSDP, and thus, to impose themselves as a credible actor in the emerging multipolar world. Of course, it does not exclude the need of periodical updating, even with some more essential elements, as it was done with the RIESS in 2008. The Lisbon Treaty has set the required normative basis for conducting a more coherent common foreign, security and defence policy. Therefore, in the forthcoming period it can be expected that the Union will continue to develop its civilian and military capacities for the purpose of its foreign policy strengthening its profile as a global actor and a unique organization which possesses a whole spectrum of necessary resources and instruments for the effective managing of complex crises.
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NATO /1999/,”The Alliance’s Strategic Concept (1999)”, Washington, DC, 24 April 1999, available online at http://www.NATO.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm. NATO /2010/, “Strategic Concept”, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Brussels. Silvestri S. /2008/, “Revising the European Security Strategy: Arguments for Discussion”, Instituto Affari Internazionali, Roma. Shapiro J. and Witney N. /2009/, “Towards a Post-American Europe: a Power Audit of EU-US Relations”, European Council on Foreign Relations, London. Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities /2004/, “A human security doctrine for Europe: The Barcelona report”, Barcelona. The Madrid Report of the Human Security Study Group /2007/, “A European Way of Security”, Madrid. The White House /2002/, “The National Security Strategy of the USA”, available online at http://nssarchive.us/NSSR/2002.pdf. The White House /2010/, “National Security Strategy”, available online at http://www.whitehouse. gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. Toje A. /2010/, “The EU Security Strategy Revised: Europe Hedging Its Bets”, European Foreign Affairs Review 15, pp. 171–190. Vasconcelos A. /2008/, “’Multilateralising’ multipolarity”, in Grevi G. and Vasconcelos A. (eds.), “Partnerships for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia”, EUISS, Paris.
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Mina NIKOLIĆ1
EUROPEAN UNION’S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY AND NEW THREATS
Abstract: Along with the territorial expansion of the European Union as an international regional organization, the need for the adjustment of reactions and political activities has increased among its member states in foreign affairs. The very idea of common foreign policy was even proclaimed in the Treaty on European Union in 1992 as one of the goals and three postulates on which the Union is based, and through which it reinforces its international identity. Originally, this adjustment was accomplished in an informal, non-instutionalised way, practically by daily adjustments of foreign and political attitudes of member states, whereas the Single European Act was signed in 1986 as the first document establishing the legal basis for European political cooperation, whereby it provides its accreditation. During its relatively short history, foreign and security policy of the European Union has been developed and improved through numerous acts, and one of the latest acts is the Treaty of Lisbon, which took effect on December 1, 2009, and introduced significant innovations in this area, above all to increase the ability for the Union to act with a single attitude towards foreign international entities. The author of this article aims to analyse the legal frame of the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union since its beginning up to today, future threats which member states may encounter, as well as the obstacles set before those states aspiring the EU membership. Key words: European Union, Common Foreign Policy, Treaty on European Union, Single European Act, Treaty of Lisbon, legal framework, future obstacles and threats.
1 Mina Nikolić, Student of the Law Sciences, Faculty of Law, University of Belgrade.
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From informal consultations to legal subjectivity of the European Union For The Republic of Serbia, the issue of the accession to the European Union (EU) has become one of the most current and important questions for future and development of the state, hence in almost every single document, the issue of the accession to the European Union is defined as a strategic goal of Foreign Policy. For that reason, it is necessary to pay certain attention to the analysis of institutions of EU foreign and security policy, from historical, legal and practical aspect. Naturally, political aspect cannot also be negligible, especially when taken into account the fact that very economic and political motives served as a guiding force for sectorial integration of then European states in the European Communities, when they were established in the early 1950s, as well as the circumstances that daily foreign policy interests of the most powerful European and world countries can largely influence the future development courses of European Foreign and Security Policy. In order to have better understanding of a degree in the development of the institutions of Common Foreign and Security Policy, it is necessary to offer a brief historical review of the acts passed on within the European Communities and the European Union, from their beginning until today, which provisions regulate even the questions referring to Common Foreign and Security Policy. The decision on the authority transfer from member states to the European Communities, and then to the European Union, was neither immediate nor without problems.2 This was preceded by years of negotiations and attempts to harmonise different attitudes and ideas. About forty years passed when the European Community, as the first pillar, and joint effort in the legal field and interior affairs, as the third pillar, were added the second pillar–the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Integration moved from economic (the European Coal and Steel Community) towards foreign, political and security policy integration3 Essential reason for this gradual integration is the fact that areas of
2 The European (Economic) Community represents integrated community in which member states irrevocably gave a part of their sovereign rights and within this framework making the EEC both national and autonomous organization. These notions were even confirmed by the European Court of Justice in cases Van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 26/62 [1963] ECR 1 and Commission v United Kingdom, 804/79 [1981] ECR 1045. 3 The Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community was signed in Paris on April 18, 1951 and is known as the Treaty of Paris. It came into effect on July 23, 1952. It was one of three treaties which paved the way for gradual economic integration of European states. This Treaty is primarily significant because its enforcement represented a certain test for member states in examining real possibilities and endurance of the ambition of accomplishing mutual cooperation. Since the Treaty provided a positive experience, two new treaties establishing the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community were signed in 1957, which came into force on January 1, 1958.
327 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century foreign and security policy were traditionally considered to be a segment of sovereignty of states and member states were not willing to disclaim their control and complete influence on decision making in this area. Namely, since the attempts for political integration in the 1950s, when the Treaty establishing the European Defence Community was signed and so-called the Pleven Plan, which conceived the creation of common military under single command, was formulated and which was not successful since it was rejected in the French National Assembly in 1954, as the French were not convinced that forming such Union would be beneficial to their interests, particularly since at the time the idea was very much avant-garde, through Fouchet’s attempt to create a plan for member states cooperation in the area of foreign and security policy, estimated as premature, and which also fell through in 1962, it can be said that the first real predecessor for the Common Foreign and Security Policy was the European Political Cooperation, established by EC member states governments in the 1970s. Actually, the European Political Cooperation represented informal process and uninstitutionalised aspect of member states cooperation in this area by regular consultations of member states’ ministers of foreign affairs and harmonising of their attitudes to certain foreign policy issues, aiming to create a single approach. The Single European Act, signed in 1987, is the first document establishing legal grounds for the European Political Cooperation, making it official.4 This cooperation exclusively referred to political issues, without any mentioning of security and defence policy of the European Communities. Since the European security and defence were dealt with within NATO, where the USA exercised the greatest influence, and since international situation in Europe became more complex, it was felt that the European Community could not be just a spectator of the events occurring on its territory, but that it is necessary for it to actively participate in resolving accumulated matters. The unification of Germany, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the fall of Communism, the incoming Cold War, the start of the dissolution of SFRY and new threats of international terrorism and crimes and increased ethnic conflicts presented the main incentive for the European Community member states to form the European Union by the Maastricht Treaty on February 7, 1992, which work scope included the Common Foreign and Security Policy, adding the second pillar of cooperation.5 One of new political aims in the Treaty included the confirmation
4 The Preamble of the Act states that the task of the European Economic Community is to work on relations transformations between member states and the European Union, through the European Political Cooperation, but later it was proven that these transformations were ended only by the Maastricht Treaty. 5 For the analysis of the EU legal frame established by the Maastricht Treaty, see: Florika Fink-Hooijer, “The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union”. EJIL (1994), pp. 173–198.
328 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of its identity on international field, especially enforcing the Common Foreign and Security Policy, covering gradual creation of common defence policy, which can lead to common defence. Thus the European Union became the umbrella covering these pillars, and their content was different depending on the issues which were being resolved, as well as on the manner of decision. The Western European Union by the Maastricht Treaty became a military wing of the European Union which the EU can entrust the enforcement of certain activities with possible military consequences. To this end, the Western European Union adopted the so- called Petersberg tasks, which purported the participation in humanitarian actions and rescue activities; however, the Western European Union did not have the necessary capacity to perform those activities. For that reason, on the 1996 NATO Summit, it was decided that the Western European Union could use the so-called combined forces for common NATO operations for the needs of european states, if the USA did not want to participate in some action. Nevertheless, it was proved in practice that security and defence policy was in many ways dependent on the USA and that it was still necessary to develop the EU capabilities to perform independent military operations in which NATO did not want to participate. For that reason, at the meeting of the European Council in Helsinki in December 1999, the decision was made to develop security and defence policy which would provide the European Union stronger and more independent position within NATO, as well as within the Western European Union.6 As the Maastricht Treaty left numerous insufficiently defined issues, the Treaty proposed that at the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference its revision should be done in several segments, including the segment of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. In its conclusions in Turin, the European Council stated, as one of the aims of the next Intergovernmental Conference, the necessity of strengthening its international role, efficiency of Union performance through redefining the manner of decision making within the second pillar of cooperation, reconsidering the new position of the Western European Union, and promoting new cooperation bodies. Despite the conflicting attitudes of member states at the conference regarding planned reforms, the Treaty of Amsterdam includes certain novelties in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP): 1. More efficient procedure was proposed for decision making using common strategy which is determined by consensus of the European Council in those areas where member states have significant common interests. 2. The manner of conducting foreign policy was improved by naming the Secretary-General of the Council, who also performs the function of the High
6 The Western European Union, established in 1948, had also agreed duration of 50 years. The Treaty of Nice from 2001 officially abolished the mechanisms for using the Western European Union for the needs of the European Union.
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Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and who is elected for a period of five years.7 The aim for the introduction of this institution was to provide continuity and recognition for foreign representation of the Union. The basic function was to help the Council and the Presidency in creating and enforcement of decisions in areas from the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and by their request, the Representative is obliged to conduct political dialogue on behalf of the Union with third countries. The Council is given the right to adopt actions and attitudes implementing the common strategy of the European Council, to make decisions using qualified majority, as well as for making decisions for conducting its own attitudes and actions. In order to facilitate decision making and to prevent blocking the decision making, it is suggested to use a kind of ad hoc principle of flexibility, the possibility of so-called constructive abstaining from voting, which means that if a state does not want to participate in voting, it can abstain from it. Thus, that state shall not prevent decision making, but if abstaining is followed by formal statement, the state in question does not have to apply that decision. However, it has to accept that decision is binding for the Union and has to abstain from performing activities which would jeopardise the activities of the European Union based on this decision. Majority voting is provided under certain terms, as well as so-called safe brake, so that a member state can prevent decision making by majority voting, if it regards that its national interests are jeopardised. Then the Council can decide using qualified majority to transfer the issue to the European Council, which will provide unanimous vote. 3. It is proposed to use strengthened cooperation between the European Union and the Western European Union by the Act 17 of the Treaty on European Union. By this Act, the Western European Union makes an integral part of the development of the Union, providing it operative capacity. Although, formally speaking, the Western European Union remains organizationally separated from the European Union, the Union gains the right to use it for accomplishing decisions related to defence and within so-called Petersberg tasks. Still as a subsidiary body, the Treaty of Amsterdam, ie the declaration added to it, defined the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which is formed within the General Secretariat of the Council. The Unit is comprised of Secretariat officials, member states, the Commission and the Western European Union. The High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy monitors its work, and its duty is to help formulating strategic priorities of the European Union, determining choices and positions at the Union’s disposal referring to the CFSP.
7 Javier Solana was appointed as the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy from 1999 to 2009.
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Provisions of the Acts 11 and 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam, within the CFSP, include all areas of foreign and security policy, as well as gradual defining of common defence policy in order to: 1. Protect common values, basic interests, independence and integrity of the Union according to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 2. Strenghtening the security of the Union in all its forms; 3. Keeping peace and strengthening of international security, according to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the Helsinki Final Act and the goals of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to borders; 4. Advancement of internantional cooperation; 5. Development and strengthening of democracy and state rights, as well as respecting human rights and basic liberties. Nonetheless, the work on security component, and especially on defence component of the CFSP, was intensified only after the agreement between France and the United Kingdom in 1998, at the meeting in Saint-Malo. The significance of more serious and more independent dealing with security issues was notably emphasised by experiences with bombing of Yugoslavia, terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001 and war in Iraq. Only a year and a half after the Treaty of Amsterdam came into effect, a new Intergovernmental conference was concluded at which heads of states and governments made an agreement on further reforms of the European Communities and the European Union. Since the Treaty of Amsterdam did not solve some key issues related to the further development of the Communities, the Treaty planned calling new intergovernmental conference in order to comprehensively examine certain provisions of the Treaty.8 Political agreement was reached in Nice, on September 11, 2000. Following the repeated referendum in Ireland, the agreement came into effect on January 1, 2003, which reformed the Communities for the fourth time in 13-year period. It was agreed at the Conference to expand close cooperation to the area of the second pillar – the Common Foreign and Security Policy, in order to perform common actions and attitudes.9 However, close cooperation cannot cover the matters with military and defence consequences. Also, the request was established that at least 8 states would be included in close cooperation in three pillars, and veto mechanism was abolished, but with the right of every state to speak in front
8 Examined provisions related to the content of bodies, especially that of the Commission, the manner of decision making and vote distribution in the Council, as well as new issues which will be solved by reaching a decision by majority voting. 9 The institute of close cooperation was formed from member states’ practice which wanted, outside institutionalised frames planned by the Founding Treaty in certain areas, such as social works and border control elimination, to establish between themselves a cooperation closer than the planned one. Various instruments were used to achieve that, such as the Agreement on Social Policy or the Schengen Protocol.
331 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of the European Council. This possibility is not affected by the fact that the decision on approval was made by the qualified majority of the Council. The final decision in the second pillar is made unanimously by the European Council, whereas within the issues related to the first pillar, close cooperation can be initiated only with the agreement of the European Parliament. When the Treaty of Nice came into effect, it left the impression that adopted solutions did not fully meet first expectations. Certain authors even noted that it was better for the Treaty not to ever come into effect and that it was necessary to call new conference as soon as possible in order to correct mistakes made in Nice.10 However, it is significant that the Treaty of Nice through declaration proclaimed the start of creating the European Constitution as a next phase in integration process and continued reforms of the European Community and the European Union. The European Constitution Project, also known as a Constitution of European Union was adopted by the European Council in Brussels on June 17-18, 2004, and was ceremonially signed in Rome on October 29. It was followed by ratification process which was unsuccessful.11 Therefore, the European Council temporarily put the ratification process on hold and decided to commence negotiations on reforms treaty instead of the Treaty on Constitution. The majority of solutions from the above mentioned Constitution with certain alterations entered the text of the Treaty of Lisbon, changing and amending the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, and it was signed by the EU member states representatives on December 13, 2007, when Portugal presided over the European Council.12 Prior to coming into force on December 1, 2009, and after ratification of all member states according to their internal procedure, the European Union functioned by the Treaty of Nice.
The institutional framework and novelties introduced by the treaty of Lisbon Prior to the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the key problem regarding the Common Foreign and Security Policy was that the European Union did not have
10 See the opinion of Jacques Delors, former president of the Commission, at http://euobserver. com/; the proposal for calling a new conference was rejected by the Council of Ministers at a regular meeting held in Luxembourg, after Irish referendum. 11 During 2005, the proposal of the Constitution was ratified by 9 member states. The German Parliament verified the ratification, but the attempt of the adoption of the Constitution was unsuccessful, because the Constitution text was met with negative opinion at the referendums held in France and the Netherlands. This was followed by a phase of insecurity regarding the fate and development of the European Union, and some comments even anticipated its dissolution. 12 For analysis of basic differences between Constitution of European Union and the Treaty of Lisbon, see the decision of the German Constitutional Court on constitutionality of the Treaty of Lisbon on June 30, 2009: BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08.
332 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the role of legal entity, but it functioned through its three pillars.13 The Treaty of Lisbon abolished pillars and created formally legal presumptions that the European Union acts as a legal subject and that in foreign and security policy it can make international treaties and be an international organisations member. Thus, academic debate and theoretic dilemma were concluded regarding the legal subjectivity of the Union.14 In some ways, this completes the process started in the 1950s which formed a specific political entity establishing the values and aims concerning law, liberties, solidarity and security and the reason why member states accepted to transfer a part of their sovereignty regarding certain issues to a common organisation which would be able to achieve their common interests in a more efficient way by its functioning. The Treaty of Lisbon is the last in a series of attempts to strengthen the identity of the Union, its abilities and institutional capacities to perform as an international agent. It is considered as the treaty which represents the greatest reform of the Founding Treaties of the European Union since the Maastricht Treaty until the present times, and which decisions can have far reaching consequences. In fact, the Treaty with its novelties represents a set of instruments which in future period will be at the disposal of the Union and its member states. With the abolition of the European Union structure, which prior to the Treaty of Lisbon functioned through the pillars, this Treaty, at the first glance, revokes the
13 It cannot be found, in any version of the Founding Treaty of the European Union, regardless of amendments from Maastricht to Nice, that there are provisions on confirming the legal subjectivity of the Union as an entity. On the other hand, the provision of the Act 28, the Founding Treaty of the European Communities, the Communities have explicitly confirmed role of this character. Nevertheless, there is a room for different interpretations for certain acts of the Founding Treaty (2,6,24,38), which set tasks before the Union or give certain authority to it, and by which nature, they implicitly give the attributes of legal entity to the Union. The authority of the Union to make treaties is derived from functional relations of given tasks and measures need to be taken for their accomplishment. That practically means that the Union’s ability to make treaties can be extended to the acts and activities for which it does not have explicit authority by the Founding Act, but they are implied by the set tasks. Certain authors derived the legal subjectivity of the European Union from existence of those intentions of member states which do not have to be explicitly stated. Since this intention regarding the European Union cannot be proved with certainty, the relation and legal unity of the European Union are established with the European Communities, which undoubtedly have verified legal subjectivity by the Founding Treaty through the provisions of the Act 3(1). According to this Act, the Union borrows unique institution of the European Communities, so by this reason it can be concluded that member states have intention to accept the legal subjectivity of the European Union. In any case, the question of the legal subjectivity of the Union led to numerous debates and divided opinions on legal theory; a group of authors accepted the legal subjectivity only of the European Communities, whereas another group also accepted the legal subjectivity of the European Union, regarding it as a unique international organisation which incorporates the established European communities and relation mechanisms covered by the second and the third pillar. It can be concluded that its own legal subjectivity results from its three levels of organisation. 14 See Act 47, the Treaty on European Union.
333 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century difference regarding the authorisation of the European Union institutions in various operating areas. General provisions of foreign activities of the Union and special provision of the CFSP are regulated by the Title V of the Treaty on European Union. The area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is included within wider area - foreign activities of the Union (the fifth part of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union), which also covers common trade policy, relations with third countries and humanitarian aid. However, only the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is regulated by the Treaty on European Union (and not by Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union) in order to emphasise that the European Union authority in this area and other segments of foreign activities is still significantly different in its content. As the Treaty on EU states, the CFSP is subject to special rules and procedures. The provisions on the CFSP remain the subject of specific and separate set of provision in the Treaty on EU, which are not much different from earlier ones, leaving the impression that, substantially, the CFSP still has the status of a pillar.15 The Treaty of Lisbon confirmed Community method and voting by qualified majority, but for the decision within the CFSP, a method of intergovernmental decision making and the consensus condition of member states remained.16 The Common Foreign and Security Policy is still defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council on the unanimity principle, except in cases set differently by the Treaty.17 Implementation of these bodies is performed by defining general courses of activities and adopting the decisions which consolidate the European Union actions, attitudes and manners of their administration, whereas the possibility of adoption of legal acts in this area is still explicitly left out.18 Instead,
18 Previously, the Founding Treaty of the European Union planned that the Council adopts principles and general guidelines, common actions, attitudes and strategies. Compare: Article 12 Title V, Founding Treaty of the EU and Article 25, Treaty on the EU. 19 For instance, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy appointed and suspended by the European Council with the consent of the Commission. 15 This also opens a question whether, in accordance with the new Treaty on European Union, it will be possible to make international agreements related both to the area of foreign affairs and trade policy. Presently, it appears that such inter-pillars agreements are excluded and it is not clear whether the Treaty of Lisbon introduces some changes in this regard. See: European Court of Justice’s decision in Case C-91/05 Commission v Council (Small Arms and Light Weapons) [2008] ECR I–3651, paras 76–77. 16 Intergovernmental work method is characterised by the request for unanimity when making decisions, explicit ban on adopting legal acts, supremacy of bodies in which member states are presented (the European Council and the Council) related to the Commission and the Parliament as communitarian bodies, as well as non-existence of judicial control of the European Union. 17 See Article 24 (3), the Treaty of Lisbon. 18 Previously, the Founding Treaty of the European Union planned that the Council adopts principles and general guidelines, common actions, attitudes and strategies. Compare: Article 12 Title V, Founding Treaty of the EU and Article 25, Treaty on the EU.
334 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the European Council has the authority to pass acts of binding nature for those subjects to which these acts are directly addressed.19 Additionally, from the introduction of the function of permanent President of the European Council instead of former Chairman, it appears the position of the European Council has been reinforced, regardless that the authority of the President largely remained of procedural and representative character. An important novelty is the authority with almost no limits regarding “all areas of foreign policy and all questions related to security, also including definition of common defence policy which can progressively lead to common defence”.20 The authority is also without limits regarding the judicial control of the European Union activities, since the provisions of the CFSP still explicitly exclude the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice.21 General responsibility belongs to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In order to increase the level of cooperation of European foreign policy and the possibility for the Union to act on foreign plan, the Treaty of Lisbon as a new form of institutionalised operation establishes the function of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.22 The High Representative represents the Union in the CFSP affairs, conducts political dialogue with third parties on behalf of the Union and expresses attitudes of the Union in international organisations and at the international conferences. Novelty is that the High Representative simultaneously performs three functions – High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Vice-President of the European Commission, and permanently presides over the Foreign Affairs Council.23 The High Representative performs his duties from the authority of the European Council, at which meeting he/she also takes part in. The incorporation of these functions in the jurisdiction of the High Representative practically personifies foreign political activities of the Union in a single person upon the established relations with foreign participants.24
19 For instance, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy appointed and suspended by the European Council with the consent of the Commission. 20 Article 24, Treaty on the EU. 21 There is an exception from this solution regarding the monitoring of the set Act 40, the Treaty on European Union, and of the legality of decisions which introduce limited measures for physical and legal entities based on the provisions of the CFSP (Article 24.1, Treaty on the EU and Article 275, Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union). 22 The Treaty of Lisbon rejects the title of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as it was planned by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. 23 The Council for Foreign Affairs elaborates foreign activities of the Union based on the European Council guidelines for establishing consistency in the activities of the Union on international plan. 24 Since its establishment by the Treaty of Lisbon, the function of the High Representative is performed by Catherine Ashton, who came to position from the previous position of the Commissioner for Trade. Since Catherine Ashton’s term expires in October 2014, it has already been speculated in diplomatic circles who will be her successor. Some of the possible candidates are Swedish Minister
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The relations with the Political and Security Committee are reinforced since the High Representative gains the right to appoint a permanent member of this Committee and therefore it reinforces the positions of the High Representative.25 If the Committee becomes the puppet in the hands of the High Representative, it can lead to the requests by member states which tend to reinforce their prerogatives to conduct a dialogue about certain issues within the Committee of the permanent representatives where intergovernmental decision method is consistently conducted. Such requests can represent a barrier for further institutionalisation of the European Union foreign policy. It can be expected that, amidst increased needs for practical dealing, there will be an increase in the role and the influence of the High Representative who has the initiative related to certain topics and proposals which are dealt with within the Committee and the Foreign Affairs Council and from which a clear supremacy of the Union body representative is visible over the member states representatives.26 The Treaty of Lisbon represents a legal framework for plans establishing European External Action Service (EEAS) which have already been developed for a longer period within the European Commission, and which will contribute to the reinforcement of common foreign policy and actions of the European Union.27 The Council’s decision on the establishing of the European External Action Service (EEAS) was made on July 26, 2010.28 The decision was added three additional acts which were adopted by the European Parliament, and which refer to the budget of the EEAS and the employment of officers. The European Parliament succeeded in accomplishing a certain level of influence over the EEAS work through parliamentary budget control, rights to be informed of the CFSP and the Common Security and Defence Policy and rights to be consulted when making decisions on launching military and civil missions.
of Foreign Affairs Carl Bildt, Élisabeth Guigou, a representative of Social Party in French Parliament, as well as Italian Federica Mogherini (as stated at www.telegraph.co.uk). For Serbia, the issue of a person who will serve as a High Representative is of particular importance, regarding that it can greatly influence the future course of negotiations between Belgrade and Pristina, as well the speed of accepting new member states into the European Union. 25 The Political and Security Committee was formed during 2001 and was formalised based on the Treaty of Nice. Its tasks, provided for under the Treaty of Lisbon, are set under the Article 38. 26 The importance that member states determine foreign affairs of the Union was even emphasised by the Director of the Institute for Strategic Studies of the European Union, Alvaro de Vasconcelos, noting that opposite decision could lead to its annulment. Alvaro de Vasconcelos, After Lisbon: The States of the Union, EUISS Issues, no. 31, 2010, p. 2. 27 See: Joint Progress Report by the Secretary-General/High Representative and the Commission on the European External Action Service, 9956/05, Brussels, 9 June 2005; and Presidency Report to the European Council on the European External Action Service, 14930/09, 23 October 2009. 28 The Council decision 2010/427/EU, Official Journal of the European Union, L201, pp. 30-40.
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The Service performs activities from its jurisdiction since January 1, 2011, as a functional and autonomous body, separated from the General Secretariat, Council and the Commission, but under the jurisdiction of the High Representative, whom it helps with the accomplishment of duties during his/her term by cooperation with diplomatic services of member states and creating long- term strategies.29 The Service structure consists of the Central Administration and delegation of the European Union in third countries and international organisations, and it is administered by the General Secretary, along with two deputies. The seat of the Central Administration is in Brussels, while the directorates are divided using geographical principle, with some directorates performing thematic and multilateral duties. The European Union delegations represent a new way of diplomatic service of the European Union which incorporates the delegations of the European Commission and revolving presidency. Since officers of the European Union institutions and member states diplomats also make the structure of the EEAS, major states, while forming the Service, attempted to take more central positions, whereas smaller states tried to achieve proportional representation in order to prevent the largest states to have a dominant influence.30 Soon after the establishment of the Service, a problem of acting of its representatives on behalf of the Union appeared, although it was the original idea. The United Kingdom demanded that, prior to any statements with invocation of member states, the European Council should make a decision on that matter. In accordance with that, a special procedure was created, which in practice caused numerous problems and “enraged“ the European Union. Since the EEAS structure has a relation of two European institutions in the area of foreign policy – the Commission and the Council, it also creates a risk of overlapping the services of the Commission, the High Representative, the President of the Commission and the President of the European Council. It is especially doubtful and practically delicate to determine the jurisdiction of the EEAS and member states’ Ministries of Foreign Affairs. Despite the EEAS not having the right to create document of legally binding character and the fact that it has an inferior position to the EU institutions which it directly or indirectly serves, the Service has much broader working area compared to the national diplomatic bodies, since almost every strategy of the European Union has external political dimension, so it can enter within the EAAS framework. It is still unknown how great practical success it can have, but it largely depends on whether it is willing to employ qualified human resources, as well as the readiness to bring its
29 For now, operational directions has been partially determined, and a good example of it is the 2003 European Security Strategy and its revised 2008 version. 30 See: Maxime Lefebvre and Christophe Hilton, “The European Action Service: towards a common diplomacy?”, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Issue 6, June 2010.
337 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century suggestions to life. Certainly, its role is significant because it represents the relation between institutions and the expert analysis resources. When referring to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), by the Treaty of Lisbon, it becomes an integral part of the CFSP, and also includes gradual forming of the Union’s Common Defence Policy, which will lead to common defence, when the Council make an unanimous decison on it, at the suggestion of the High Representative or member states, and its adoptions will be recommended to member states, in accordance with their constitutional procedures.31 The formulation of Act 42, Treaty on EU, indicates the strategic directiveness of the Union to become a single defence community in the future, in which member states will give their military and civil capacities at its disposal for the CSDP application. Still, member states will have a choice not to participate in forming of common multinational forces, but it can be done if and when member states find that participation is needed and worthwhile. This does not mean that it will lead to overlapping of the functions with NATO, since even the CFSP and the Treaty of Lisbon identify NATO as an institution responsible for territorial defence and peacekeeping. It appears to be an attempt to take a part of responsibility for security, with definite cooperation with NATO. Security cooperation is now determined as common instead of European nature, which makes this project more ambitious. The sense is that the EU gains operative capabilities for performing civil and military missions, even outside EU territory (for peacekeeping, conflict prevention, international security reinforcement, help and rescue missions, crisis management of common disarmament, anti-terrorist operations, as well as humanitarian mission (in accordance with the EU Charter principles), enabled by the extended list of the Petersberg tasks. This definitely means that the participation in missions based on the EU membership will be regarded as both needed and frequently compulsory contribution of member states, which can vary from one state to another. In 2004, member states formed the European Defence Agency (EDA), but is normative regulation was performed not until the Treaty of Lisbon. The Agency takes important tasks of the development of member states’ capabilities, based on their assessment.32 What remains vague is how the Agency need to execute given tasks and how member states will accomplish consent regarding the criteria needed to be implemented during the capabilities assessment of certain state, in this case. A significant novelty of the Treaty of Lisbon is also the introduction of a mutual defence clause – binding member states to mutually help in case of terrorist attacks or natural catastrophes, as well as a solidarity clause – binding member state to
31 The Common Security and Defence Policy is regulated by Title V, Article 42. Treaty on European Union, while tasks within The Common Security and Defence Policy are regulated by Article 43. 32 Tasks given to the Agency are regulated by Act 45, Treaty on EU.
338 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century offer help in case of armed aggression/attack on any of member states.33 “Voluntarily” character of clauses appears from the fact that the Treaty strictly stipulates that clauses do not influence national defence policy of member states, their neutrality or affiliation to any alliances, particularly NATO, as well as the fact that the decision on help selection is in this case left to member states. By this clauses, the European Union gains characteristics of a state federation for common self-defence, but the problem is that their scope is insufficiently precise, so they could be filled with various contents, and there is danger to be misused by wrong interpretation in order to prove certain actions which left unclear whether there is a real need for military measures. Such actions may not be in the interest of the Union, as a whole, but are certainly in their most powerful states’ interests.34 The novelty which sparked the most fierceful debates, more referring to future direction of its development and consequences than in the manner how it was formulated, is the concept of continuous structural cooperation.35 The concept leaves open an opportunity for closer cooperation of smaller group of countries which desire and meet the criteria to take greater efforts in military capacities, so that they could enhance EU operative capabilities.36 Launching a mission from the CSDP area is conditioned by unanimous decision of the Council. It appears that the concept of continuous structural cooperation is the next phase in the development of closer cooperation institute which was planned by the Treaty of Amsterdam, and then by the Treaty of Nice. The Treaty of Nice expanded the area of closer cooperation to the second pillar with a request that at least 8 member states should be covered, whereas the Treaty of Lisbon does not precisely state the number of states, but the formulation of Acts 42 and 46, Treaty on the European Union, gives a conclusion that it is a smaller number of states which would be able to meet set requests. In accordance with rapid development of security challenges for the European Union, the latest EU documents emphasise the concept of responsibility for protection of people from war crimes, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing and genocide.37 It seems that this concept, although presented as of exceptional nature and ultima ratio, is actually the successor of humanity intervention concept which by arbitrarily usage can lead to further limitations of state sovereignty and
33 Article 222. Treaty on EU Functioning, and Article 42.7, Treaty on EU. 34 For clauses contents, see: Report on the EU’s mutual defence and solidarity clauses: political and operational dimensions [2012/2223(INI)], European Parliament 2009-2014, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Plenary sitting 30.10.2012, Rapporteur: Ioan Mircea Pascu, pp. 7–8, p. 13. 35 Article 46 Treaty on the EU and Protocol number 15. 36 Ibidem. 37 Report with a proposal for a European Parliament recommendation to the Council on the UN principle of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (‘R2P’), A7-0130/2013, Committee of Foreign Affairs, Rapporteur: Franziska Katharina Brantner, (2012/2143(INI)), 2013.
339 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century perhaps even massive violation of human rights, but hidden under the protection veil of this concept.
Challenges and threats for the common foreign and security policy of the European Union The idea of the European Union as a normative force is established in acts, but further institutionalisation and practical operations are hindered by problems characteristic not only for Europe, but those of global measures. Nowadays, European surroundings is characterised by grave instability caused by financial crisis, increase in security threats and tendency for accelerated globalisation, setting numerous and complex tasks for the European Union. First and foremost, it is economic crisis, creating tendency for a sort of security integration mode through pool and share and budget cutting through sharing of member states’ capacities, supply community and generally division of roles and tasks.38 For practice of European countries regarding the reduction of budget cuts intended for the CSDP, it is prevalent to accomplish cost cuts at the expense of human resources, by decrease in salary and room capacity, and not in production and procurement of arms. In fact, EU military budget is nowadays bigger than in 2001, and in its size it is the second, behind the USA, an absolute leader in this sector.39 If we observe NATO budget structure, we will see that during the Cold War the Americans and the Europeans spent equally on defence, but in recent times the USA share is around 75%. NATO members should spend on defence at least 2% of gross domestic product, but a great majority no longer adhere to this rule and for defence needs, they spend less than 1%. It foreign affairs area, fiscal limitations create a need for sharing existent resources and lead to further approach to diplomatic body of the Union and member states by creating common delegation seats of the European Union and member states embassies in certain countries.40 Creating common jurisdictions in consular service area could be a solution to this financing problem. Furthermore, there are international conflicts in Libya, Mali, Syria, Ukraine, and also in Serbia, where the Union was unable to act as a single entity, as well as
38 P7_TA (2011)0574, Impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector, European Parliament resolution of 14 December 2011 on the impact of the financial crisis on the defence sector in the EU Member States (2011/2177(INI)), 2013/C 168 E/03, Official Journal of European Union , C 168E, , pp. 9–20. 39 More at http://www.eda.europa.eu. 40 For instance, British ambassador to Morocco has a rank of chargé d’affaires in Mauritania, and while paying a visit to Mauritania he/she uses the EU building in Nouakchott. British, Dutch and German embassies along with EU delegation share the building of former British Mandate Administration in Tanzania.
340 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century obvious lack of sustainable strategy amidst severely contradictory attitudes of member states. Germany refrained from voting for the Resolution in the UN Security Council approving military action in Libya. Although Germany itself used formal right not to agree with suggested direction of action, it actually showed how delicate is the process of decision, especially in unanimous voting. During crisis in Mali, the European Union reacted by sending 200 military instructors to Mali, but it was preceded by 2 meeting of foreign affairs ministers of member states and the approval of national parliaments. Paradoxically, France itself, since early 2013, has sent to Mali around 4000 soldiers, which resulted in suppression of rebels from Timbuktu.41 The conclusion arises that the main characteristic of the European Union contribution in security sector is its slow materialisation.42 It also opens a room for criticism of some institutional solutions of the Treaty of Lisbon and questions the possibility of further integration when the Union itself is divided and ununited over numerous issues. The European Union, such as it is, should be a unique counterpart to NATO, and then the USA, as well as means for balance setting, but it still largely depends on NATO. At the same time, EU members are also NATO members, and European countries are obliged by the North Atlantic Treaty to have defence measures. In case of launching a mission, national military capacities are given at NATO disposal, when needed, and clause of collective defence explicitly puts the EU in inferior position to NATO. NATO is confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon as a base of collective defence and an instance for conducting activities in this domain. This again emphasises NATO role as a European base for global American intervention strategy. One cannot also neglect the series of other agreements signed from 1996 to 2002, the so-called Berlin Plus, which enables the EU to use NATO resources in peace operations, with respect to certain procedures.43 Current crisis in Ukraine led relations between the USA and NATO, on one side, and Russia and its allies, on the other side, to a much heated conflict. US Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel, when talking about Ukraine crisis at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars, stated that the actions on
41 Rik Coolsaet, Sven Biscop and Jo Coelmont, “Mali: Another European Intervention without the EU?”, Security Policy Brief, Policy Paper, 2013, No. 42, January 2013. 42 See more: Report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (based on the Annual Report from the Council to the European Parliament on the Common Foreign and Security Policy), 14605/1/2012-C7-0000/2013 – 2013/2015(INI), Committee on Foreign Affairs, Rapporteur: Maria Eleni Koppa. 43 The Berlin Plus agreements refer to the exchange of confidential operations with mutual obligation of secrecy, access to NATO plan resources in crisis management mission, use of NATO relations and pillars for mission purposes, procedures of use and withdrawal of NATO resources, participation of European mission in NATO defence plans, consultation mechanism of the European Union and NATO.
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Russian part again confirmed the importance of NATO existence, as well as the necessity to increase defence costs because of the distribution of Russian forces at eastern borders of NATO Alliance. The USA uses Ukraine crisis and civil war as an ideal excuse to make Europe increase military costs and to invest more in its defence. Although it is not in Europe’s interest, the Americans make pressure in order to reinforce transatlantic relation. Eastern European countries which joined NATO not so long ago have a special role, but they also have an understanding that they are special US allies. These countries make an effort to compensate its small political and economic authority, at the expense of strengthening military relations with the USA. It is questioned whether Europe should follow the USA in NATO strategic adaptation tending to create a new clash between east and west, which is neither less dangerous nor less costly than the Cold War. The only sign coming from the EU is that the European Commission decided not to count costs of arming in costs column while calculating gross domestic product, but in investments column for state security. The Secretary General of NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, in mid-May 2014, expressed hope that the NATO Wales Summit will mark the return of NATO to its original mission – defence of the North Atlantic region. NATO troops will be, from now on, permanently distributed in Eastern European countries – Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Romania. NATO military presence in Europe is needed in order to prevent Russian threats and to assure its allies that they have obligations towards the Alliance. It can be stated that the USA is taking advantage of Ukraine crisis, since they also caused it, so that they could, at all costs, present Russia as both new and old European enemy, and also to find an opponent for NATO on European soil. European attitude, seen from the major EU state’s actions – Germany – is not to make conflicts and wage war against Russia. Who shall win, the incoming new Cold War and confrontation between east and west, or prosperity, cooperation, remains to be seen in the following years. If we also add rapid expansion of international terrorism and organised crime, piracy and cyber crime, and even climate changes, we can see that the EU is actually affected by multiplied crisis posing as a threat to security of European states and with unknown outcome, largely depending on the ability of new institutions to deal with them in practice. In that regard, some institutions cannot be justified.44
43 44 Key security threats for Europe were defined in 2003 by Javier Solana in the Strategy of security titled A Secure Europe in a Better World; it states terrorism, proliferation of weapons for mass destruction, regional conflicts, organised crime, and later on, by the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy. - Providing Security in a Changing World, additional threats, such as piracy, energy security and climate changes, were mentioned; Javier Solana, A Secure Europe in a Better World, The European Security Strategy, European Council (15895/03, PESC787), Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 13.
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The foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia and mandatory adjustment with the Common Foreign and Security policy of the European Union In the EU accession process, a key role belongs to the foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia, regarding that the manner of its conduct and priorities on which it is based can influence future directions of this process and establishing a stable position of a state communicating with EU member states representatives.45 Although the European Union chiefly insists on economic integration, it expects from future members to be adjusted with the CFSP and the CSDP, based not only on political standards and criteria, but also on regional and international agreements and conventions. Adjustment with CSDP represents for the EU a way for establishing confidence in a candidate state as a future partner. Adjustment with the Declaration on European Union expresses the attitude of state claiming EU membership that process of EU integrations and adoption of European Union postulates is regarded as its foreign political priorities. Certain obligations arising from the CFSP must be adopted and enforced in prior stages of integration, mainly concerning political criteria and principles of democratic and civil control of security sector, whereas the other group of obligations can be fulfilled in later stages of accession, having in mind their complexity, needed deadlines for implementation and economic power or lack of it. On one side, adjustment is created by reforming services in a state in order to be harmonised with the system of European Union member states and thus enabling efficient cooperation within the CFSP in some future; on the other side, by accepting attitudes and regulations of the European Union and their implementations through passing reforming laws, strategies and adjustment with declarations and common foreign policy attitudes of the European Union. Since at the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit a political dialogue was established within the Process of Stabilisation and Accession, the Republic of Serbia has been officially accepted as a potential candidate for EU accession, followed by constant invitations for Serbia to join European Union declarations referring to political and security situation, adopted under the European Council, OSCE and the UN. The first set of requests is related to political criteria, while the second establishes direct obligations in security and defence area. Within the first group of tasks, the strongest emphasis in set on civil and democratic control of security forces which is legally founded in Serbia by provisions of the Constitution stating that the Serbian Armed Forces are under democratic and civil control and that their use outside borders can be approved by the National Assembly.46 Additional
45 For more about the Republic of Serbia Foreign Policy, see: Dragan Djukanović, Dragan Petrović, Stubovi spoljne politike Srbije - EU, Rusija, SAD i Kina [ Pillars of the Republic of Serbia Foreign Policy – EU, Russia, USA and China ], Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade, 2012. 46 Republic of Serbia Constitution, Articles 140 and 141.
343 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century control is secured by a set of laws and strategic documents.47 The second group is related to weapons and military equipment trade, ban on proliferation of weapons for massive destruction and contribution to European Union missions. In order to define standards of import, export and trafficking of arms, the European Union is working on creation of a set of agreements which shall construct legislation on international level in this field.48 The issue of public procurements in security and defence area, regulated by the Directive of the European Parliament and the Council from 2009, also refers to weapons and military equipment trade.49 Under this Directive, member states became obliged to invite a tender for all procurement contracts or services exceeding 412.000,00 Euros and 5 million Euros for works contracts within the European Union, with the possibility of aberration if a state can prove that it can jeopardise its vital security interests.50 Obligation for public competition is directly connected to a need to protect classified information.51 Serbia took responsibilities in this area with the conclusion of the Agreement on participation in EU security and defence missions.52 However, for fulfillment of this obligation, particularly with participation in peace keeping missions of the European Union, it is necessary for an adequate structure to exist. For that reason, until the establishment of that structure, the classified information protection is being accomplished in every particular case by engaging human resources in these EU missions in accordance with the Agreement between the Republic of Serbia and the European Union on Security Procedures for Exchanging and Protecting Classified Information. The European Council also adopted the Strategy of the European Union against Proliferation of Weapons for Mass Destruction, and responsibilities for Serbia arise from the conclusion of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement which in Act 3 names this responsibility as a crucial element. During 2006, Serbia also joined the Initiative for fight against proliferation of weapons for mass destruction. A good indicator of Serbian orientation towards the process of security integration is also the adoption of the most important act dedicated to fight against illegal possession and trafficking of light and firing arms – the European Union Strategy for fight against illegal possession and trafficking of firearms, light arms and ammunition. It is particularly important that Serbia also adheres to control over
47 Law on Army, Law on Defence, Law on Military Use and Other Defence Forces in Multinational Operations Outside the Republic of Serbia, Defence Strategy of the Republic of Serbia, Strategy of National Security of the Republic of Serbia, Decision on Abolition of Compulsory Military Service. 48 http://eur-lex.europa.eu 49 Directive of the European Parliament and the Council 2009/81/EC, July 13 2009 50 This decision is verified by the Treaty of Lisbon, Article 346. 51 Decision of the Council 2011/292/EU. 52 Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Serbia in the European Union crisis management operations, Act 4.
344 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century production and transfer of weapons and control of surplus stock and its destruction. Even the European Commission praised these actions of Serbia. As a final goal of common activities for every state which claims EU membership, it is planned to also join operations and missions of crisis management, fighting groups of Union, integrated military and civil missions (permanent structured cooperation), which give Serbia an open opportunity to sign so-called Framework Agreement and the Agreement on Security Procedures for Exchanging and Protecting Classified Information.53 Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that for now Serbia still does not have necessary operative capacities and financial potentials for participation in such missions. It does not exclude the possibility for its contribution through participation in other sectors – administration of justice, health and school administration. Obviously, in a few recent years, Serbia speeded up the adjustment with the declarations of the EU Council, which was in the first place motivated by expectations to be given a status of a candidate state for membership. On the other hand, Serbia missed numerous chances to join certain declarations. A stated reason for it was their thematic concern over issues of the dissolution of SFRY, one-sided declaration of Kosovo independence, as well as extremely short deadlines for some declarations. These arguments can be met with certain remarks which question their sustainability. Firstly, a number of declarations directly dealing with issues related to Kosovo and its specific position of Serbia after the dissolution of SFRY is almost negligible compared to total number of adopted declarations where Serbia was not one of the undersigned parties. When mentioning deadlines, not even this justification can be supported since majority of other states and potential candidates, and even those states not having real chances to become EU members in near future, succeeded in meeting given deadlines and adjusting with majority of these declarations.54 This left a bad impression on Serbian relation to value orientation of the European Union in foreign affairs, which somewhat blurred positive results accomplished in adjustment process. When speaking of further taking of responsibilities in this area, one must bear in mind their complexity, and especially political connotation and concept of military neutrality of the Republic of Serbia towards NATO and dependency on safe surroundings. Surely, Serbia will meet numerous obstacles and challenges in further adjustment process, which will not be an easy task for its institutions and qualified services, but undoubtedly the burden must be carried if Serbia desires to become one of the wheels in EU mechanism and, based on that, gain certain benefits.
53 Framework Agreement on the participation of the Republic of Serbia in the European Union crisis management operations. 54 Refers to other countries of the Western Balkans - Albania, FYROM, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and so-called GUAM countries - Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Moldova.
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Final observations Despite ambitious goals set by the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU, globally observed, remains dependent on powerful world leaders, as well as on its member states which independently make decisions on how and in which part will give their capacities at the disposal of the Union, when needed. In order to create further reinforcement of the EU as an entity, it is necessary for member states to accept the decrease in individual influence and that certain interests be changed with collective ones expressing their common value directions. Apart from this element of value, a major structural limit of the Treaty of Lisbon to common appearance of the Union in relations to other international subjects is confirming intergovernmental method of decision making in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. Requirement of request for unanimous vote while making decisions in this domain seems more like an illusion than reality, chiefly for discord of member states’ attitudes regarding current issues – accession of Turkey to the European Union, policy towards Russia and Ukraine, the future status of Kosovo, strategies for solution for economic crisis, and, on the other hand, for the fact that neither the Treaty of Lisbon nor other acts stipulate any formal sanctions for actions of member states which do not operate in accordance with directions set in Brussels. In overcoming these problems, great confidence is set in the European External Action Service as an institution for negotiation administration, expected to be given an initiative by major states to take crucial diplomatic steps, although, for now, its future operation directions remain unknown. The function of the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy does not give any less importance, although his/her ability to successfully coordinate given tasks largely depend on personality of official taking this function when Catherine Ashton steps down. For Serbia and other states aspiring for EU membership, the Treaty of Lisbon and its coming into forced is of crucial significance, because it removes formal obstacles for increase in the number of member states over 27, changing the rule of structure of certain bodies.55 Although procedural obstacles are minimal in number, it does not solve problems regarding the adjustment of national legislations of candidate states with legal framework of the European Union and fulfillment of other criteria for EU membership, which requests, especially following the status of legal entity, become more serious. The Common Foreign and Security Policy is current international tendency aiming to establish coherency and complementarity for addition and development of member states’ foreign policy and their adjustment, rather than replacement, but also simultaneously leads to a situation when all weaknesses of European national states come to light.
55 Number of full members is now 28, after the accession of the Republic of Croatia, on July 1, 2013.
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Žaklina NOVIČIĆ1
SURVEILLANCE AND INTERNET CONTROL: TOWARD GLOBAL TOTALITARIANISM?
Abstract: The paper discusses a question of whether we are entering a new era of global totalitarianism with recent power changes related to mass global communications via the Internet and modern technologies, and with an existence of the (global) ability of their masive control and misuse. The text consists of theoretical elaboration of the mere term „totalitarianism“ and of an empirical review of the development of a modern surveillance state. Also, current findings in surveillance studies are exposed, as well as most recent global surveillance revelations. The author draws conclusions on current totalitarian tendencies in a „post-Orwellian“ global surveillance state. Key words: totalitarianism, surveillance, Internet, power, privacy.
Introduction Whether we are entering a new era of global totalitarianism with recent power challenges related to mass global communication via modern technology, in the first place the Internet? The ability to survey everyone on the planet is almost there, convincingly argues these days Julian Assange from an asylum in the Ecuadorian embassy in London.2 Like other prominent public figures and intellectuals, he warns that it has been led to a huge transfer of power from the people who are surveyed upon to those who control the surveillance complex, and that the purpose of the Internet, perceived as perhaps the greatest tool of human creation, now is being transformed toward the the creation of the most aggressive form of state surveillance the world has ever seen. Before we focus on this interesting, postmodern version of a power theory,
1 Žaklina Novičić, Ph.D., Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period. 2 Julian Assange, “US annexed the whole world through global spying“, Russia Today, April 07, 2014, http://rt.com/news/us-global-spying-assange-761; 10.04.2014.
347 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century we consider the term “totalitarianism“, and an empirical development of a modern surveillance state. Besides, current findings in surveillance studies are exposed, as well as most recent global surveillance revelations.
Totalitarianism The term “totalitarianism” has derived from the Latin word totus, which means whole, entire, complete. Completeness related to a degree of dominance or control over society established in a particular type of political system. That means the complete domination, or subordination of society to state or another organization. A totalitarian state is a comprehensive one, because every human action, ultimately, is the state’s action.3 The term “totalitarianism” has been used for the first time in 1922 by the opponents of Benito Mussolini as a goal of the Italian Fascists. The movement related the term “totalitarianism” not only to a particular type of political system or government, but also to certain political party or ideology. The opponents of fascism have underlined with the term “totalitarian”, its distinctiveness in comparison to previously existing political philosophies particularly liberal one and related political institutions. Totalitarianism includes an idea of totalitarian state, based on anti-liberal principles of unity and totality.4 In a similar way, the term has been used by Spanish fascists and by fascist movements in France, Romania, Japan and Germany. In this regard, the concept of “total state” was most developed by Carl Schmitt, one of the most important figures in 20th century legal and political theory associated with Nazism. For him a total state was necessary for correction of major shortcomings in liberalism and parliamentarism, and hence he supported an emergence of totalitarian power structures.5 The term “totalitarianism“ is as a synonym for a type of political system contrary to democracy, distinguished by a comprehensive subordination and subjugation of society to state (or other organizations, i.e. political parties, religious movements, etc). Lacking a broader explanation, the meaning of the term has negative value for it implies a negation of the basic principles of liberal democracy (rule of law, respect for fundamental human and political rights and freedoms, separation of powers and a principle that power is limited, controlled and replaceable.6
3 Cf. Jovica Teokarevic, “Totalitarizam”, in Enciklopedija politicke kulture, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1993, pp. 1195-6. 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, MIT Press, 1988 (german original: Carl Schmitt, Die geistesgeschichtliche Lage des heutigen Parlamentarismus, Kapitel I-II, Auflage Duncker & Humblot, Berlin, 1926). 6 Ibid.
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In the West, a birthplace od liberal democracy, the term “totalitarianism” has been used for a description of not only Fascist and Nazi regimes, but also for the Soviet communist regime under Stalin.7 Anyway, almost all authors who wrote on totalitarianism have considered the political system for a new and unique phenomenon relating to the 20th century. After World War II, prominent Western thinker Hannah Arendt offered one of the first systematic analysis of totalitarianism (1951).8 She singled out the terror, which was practiced by authoritarian regimes, as a characteristic feature of the totalitariaism. Its difference in comparison with the earlier despotism and totalitarianism of the 20th century she saw in a qualitatively higher domination over subordinated by the new regimes. In both cases, subordinated are equal in being powerless, but in other types of nondemocratic systems some non-political relationships still survive (family, cultural relations, etc), while totalitarianism ruled out any autonomous activity of the people. A total control and domination over people was provided, in Arendt’s words, by an application of the terror in conditions of modern mass society. Thus, mass society was a precondition, and terror was the core of a totalitarian domination. These two factors compounded resulted in totalitarianism as a new historical phenomenon.9 Very similar meaning of a totalitarian regime, and almost at the same time (1949), has been exposed in George Orwell’s dystopian fable, a novel Nineteen Eighty- Four.10 The British writer presented a dystopia of future, which is actually a hyperbole of totalitarianism as a mixture of Nazism and Stalinism. The main feature of the futuristic projection was laid down in complete control of totalitarian regime over people. Orwell also offered an image of the modern state in which privacy — as a civil virtue and a crucial liberal right, was “no longer valued as a measure of the robust strength of a healthy and thriving democracy”. Orwell was clear that the right to privacy in liberal democracy had come “under egregious assault“, in an “an emerging totalitarian state”.11 The book had a strong and long-lasting influence and importance as warning on the horrors of the mid-20th century totalitarianism and the endless regimes of state spying imposed on citizens. The text serves “as a brilliant but limited metaphor for mapping the expansive trajectory of global surveillance and authoritarianism now characteristic of the first decades of the new millennium.”12
7 The three political regimes became ideal types of totalitarianism also in East-European countries, after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 8 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Harcourt Braće Jovanovich, New York, 1951. 9 Cf. Jovica Teokarevic, “Totalitarizam”, op. cit., p. 1197. 10 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four: A Novel, Penguin Group, 1949. 11 Henry A. Giroux, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State“, Truthout, 10. 02. 2014, Internet: http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia- in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state; 20. 02. 2014. 12 Ibid.
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Aldous Huxley, a creator of one other dystopia, noted that the Orwell’s image did not in general apply. The creator of one other dystopia, Huxley, wrote (in 1948) that within the next generation “the world’s rulers“ will discover that “the nightmare of ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’ is destined to modulate into the nightmare of a world having more resemblance to that imagined in ‘Brave New World’“, in which “infant conditioning and narco-hypnosis are more efficient, as instruments of government, than clubs and prisons, and that the lust for power can be just as completely satisfied by suggesting people into loving their servitude as by flogging and kicking them into obedience.“13 These changes have been brought about as a result of a felt need for increased efficiency. What was going on from the mid-1980s was the arrival of ever more powerful and “seemingly omniscient, omnipresent knowledge machines“: video cameras; drug testing; computer documentation, discoveries, predictions and networks; location and communication monitoring; DNA analysis, etc. This increased an importance of non-violent forms of social control. Threats to privacy and liberty are not limited to the use of force, or to state power, and indeed they may appear in the service of benign ends. “Over recent decades subtle, seemingly less coercive, forms of control have emerged within societies that have not become less democratic and in which the state makes less use of domestic violence.“14 The new millenium was foreshadowed by another popular dystopia, Wachowski brothers’ film, The Matrix. The film is about the rapidly proliferating surveillance capabilities of our “Thought Police”, watching telescreens fed by images accumulated from millions of closed-circuit cameras, that eavesdrop on hundreds of millions of phone calls, and who pore over billions of electronic transactions on a daily basis. The Matrix addresses “a classical liberal conundrum, the tensions between ‘liberty’ and ‘security’, between freedom and safety (...).”15
13 Huxley letter to Orwell 1949, http://www.lettersofnote.com/2012/03/1984-v-brave-new- world.html, 6 March 2012. Brave New World is a novel written in 1931 and published in 1932. set in London of AD 2540 (632 A.F. – “After Ford” – in the book), the novel anticipates developments in reproductive technology, sleep-learning, psychological manipulation, and classical conditioning that combine profoundly to change society. Huxley answered this book with a reassessment in an essay, and his final novel. Aldous Huxley, Brave New World, Harper Perennial, New York, 1998 (first published 1932); Aldous Huxley, Brave New World Revisited, Harper Perennial, New York, 2006 (first published 1958); Aldous Huxley, Island , Harper Perennial, 2002 (first published 1962). 14 Gary T. Marx,“‘Your Papers please’: personal and professional encounters with surveillance”, Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies, Kirstie Ball, Kevin D. Haggerty and David Lyon (eds); Routledge, 2012, Preface, pp. xxi, xiii. 15 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, What Comes after Liberalism?, More Liberalism!, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2010, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. Id., pp. 547-8.
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This development has showed that democratic orders were “indeed fragile and abusive”, and that surveillance was “hardly restricted to authoritarian and totalitarian states”.16 At the very least, one can say that surveillance created with computerization and other new surveillance and communication tools “was neither good nor bad, but context and comportment made it so“. Using surveillance against “a suspected corrupt politician, fraudulent contractor, or rapist was very different from using it against nuns who were peace activists or blacks demanding the right to vote or sit at a lunch counter.“ Surveillance by government could be, clearly, necessary when „legitimated and limited by policy, law and ethics“, and “it could be as irresponsible not to use it, as to use it wrongly — even as the obvious risk of government abuses remained.“17
Emergence of surveillance state Information gathering and intelligence have long been part of the history and powerful instruments of the state. But it was not until industrialization that states began to collect information on their citizens with any regularity, and that proccess became more organized, structured, rational and centralized and evolved into what we recognize as the modern bureaucratic surveillance system.18 The proccess was developed out of necessity and requirement of Western industrialization, modern transportation and communication, and revolutions in economic, technological and processing control. As a response emerged modern bureaucracy which made much more efficient collection and ordering of information. Bureaucracy thus had become professionalized, with government officials dedicated to the collection and management of information on citizens. The very idea of the surveillance state is, for some authors, a defining characteristic of modernity itself, irrevocably linked with industrialization and the rise of the nation-state.19 A modern information state began routinely to develop and enforce bureaucracy, and created central repositories and formal
16 Gary T. Marx,“‘Your Papers please’: personal and professional encounters with surveillance”, op. cit., p. xii. 17 Ibid. 18 Cf. Toni Weller, “The information state: An historical perspective on surveillance”, in Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies, op. cit., pp. 57-8. 19 Anthony Giddens argued that during the nineteenth century the emergence of the industrialized nation state necessitated a change in the way the central state considered its citizens, since “no pre-modern states were able even to approach the level of administrative co-ordination developed in the nation-state”, and “such administrative concentration depends in turn upon the development of surveillance capacities well beyond those characteristic of traditional civilisations”. Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Cambridge: Polity, 1990, p. 57.
351 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century procedures of centralized surveillance for the purposes of welfare provision. Bureaucracy had become “a major new control technology“.20 State surveillance on citizens is justified as a means which benefits the citizen through the application of social welfare.21 The growth of bureaucrats and information collectors led to growing state collections of statistics (on citizens finances, personal income, jobs and family situation, social insurance, old age pensions, disability payments, fingerprinting, etc). The collection of information on citizens is not limited to the role of the central state but is increasingly a function of other bodies as well. The growth of modern capitalist and consumer society introduced a new form of rationalized surveillance on workers as well as on consumers’ behavior (for advertising and marketing purposes, for example). This created huge flows of information and the elaboration of ever more sophisticated and anonymous systems for their storage and manipulation. This led to the emergence of the information, or surveillance, state, in which the degree of control is greatly enhanced. Thus, welfare surveillance was often a two-edged sword, where the second edge was motivated by a state desire to keep a check on potential deviants, i.e. to monitor and collect information on dissenting citizens and potential threats. This threat could come from an external force (an enemy country, overseas terrorism) or it could be internal (prisoners, law- breakers, domestic terrorism, domestic dissention). This phenomenon has been described as the “dual factors of welfare and warfare”, unique to the modern period.22 So surveillance, as a fundamental social process characteristic of all societies, became both functional and risky.23 There may be identified one historical paradox: Whilst from the mid-nineteenth century citizens began to demand greater state assistance, accountability and reform, they also resented and often feared what was perceived as intrusive, centralized and increasingly commonplace surveillance practices. This has raised citizen’s concerns over the acceptability of central information collection. The fact is that information was not always accurate and often was disseminated with uncorrected mistakes. The issue of misrepresentation and inaccuracy has been one of the most powerful factors in the development of late twentieth-century legislation in privacy, data protection and freedom of information.24
20 Cf. Toni Weller, “The information state“, op. cit., pp. 57-8. 21 Ibid, pp. 58-9. 22 Ibid., p. 59. 23 Gary T. Marx,“‘Your Papers please’: personal and professional encounters with surveillance”, op. cit., p. xxi. 24 Toni Weller, “The information state“, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
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The development intensified debates that had already been ongoing for two centuries, and indeed the accessibility of digital media meant that the debates have fully entered the public consciousness, particularly in relation to social surveillance through digital technologies themselves. Digital technologies and the internet have dramatically accelerated the role of state surveillance during the late 20th and early 21st century making the sharing and dissemination of information instantaneous and without restriction across geographical borders.25 The described development was accompanied by theoretical attempts to explain the process of surveillance and control, and its significance for politics, power and society, from which eventually have been developed so called surveillance studies.
Surveillance studies Surveillance studies developed as “a transdisciplinary field that draws from sociology, psihology, organization studies, science and technology studies, information science, criminology, law, political science and geography”.26 The dominant founding father of surveillance studies is a Franch philosopher Michel Foucault, and other relevant sociologists and philosophers are Gilles Deleuze, Jean Baudrillard, Antony Giddens, etc. Further in the background of studies of surveillance, as a forerunner was considered an English philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the original creator of the so called panopticon model, which has overwhelmingly served as a common theoretical and polemical point of departure for surveillance studies.27 Important insights for surveillance studies were found in works of many other classical philosophers (Weber, Nietzsche, Marx, Rousseau, Hobbes). Today the studies of surveillance represent a “growing epistemic community”.28
Jeremy Bentham’s Victorian panopticon The panopticon is a derivative concept stemming from letters of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), and it often served as an introductory footnote for surveillance studies.29 The panopticon is a name given to a design of the prison
25 Ibid., pp. 58-9. 26 David Murkami Wood, “Beyond Panopticon? Foucault and Surveillance Studies”, in Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and Geography, Jeremy W. Crampton and Stuart Elden (eds), Ashgate, 2007, p. 245. 27 Toni Weller, “The information state“, op. cit., p. 58. 28 Gary T. Marx,“‘Your Papers please’: personal and professional encounters with surveillance”, op. cit., p. xxviii. 29 Bentham’s panoptic writings were developed and subsequently published as a series of letters written from Russia in 1787, and two Postscripts written in 1790 and 1791, printed in 1791. Bentham, Jeremy, The Panopticon Writings, Miran Bozovic (ed.), London: Verso, 1995.
353 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century consisting of a circular structure, in which a supervisor (or a manager or staff of the institution) sits in a central place – an “inspection house”, able to potentially observe every individual in their cells, who are stationed around the perimeter and cannot see each other nor the central supervisor. It is physically impossible for the single watchman to observe all cells at once, but the fact that inmates cannot know when they are being watched – means that they all must act as though are being watched at all times, effectively controlling their own behaviour. Bentham considered the panopticon as nothing more then “a simple idea in architecture”, never realized, describing “a new mode of obtaining power of mind over mind, in a quantity hitherto without example” – the possessor of which is “the inspector” with his invisible omnipresence, “an utterly dark spot” in the all-transparent, light-flooded universe of the panopticon.30 In short, Bentham elaborated “a patriarchal regime of surveillance at the center of his panopticon, one that emphasized the intransigence and immobility of the inspector and his family, as much if not more than that of the prisoners themselves. In Bentham’s panopticon the inspector and family are themselves effectively isolated, segregated or, ironically, jailed. For the family in the tower there is seemingly little else to do but watch. Watching for Bentham is automated.”31 The logic of panopticon is a simple explanation for the most important effect of gazing a behavior of people in a society that is under surveillance: the entire society is transformed into an invisible prison in which all citizens are actually suspected as potential offenders. The main purpose of such an object is that prisoners create an awareness about a constant surveillance. Knowing that at any time someone may watch on them, prisoners in the panopticon, ie. citizens in a society are forced to “inhibit, normalized and uniform their behavior”, and, metaphorically speaking, “that sticking a last nail in the coffin in which the ideal of a free society was laid down.”32
Michel Foucault modern “panoptic” surveillance Michel Foucault (1926-1984) takes, much later, the panopticon as a metaphor for disciplining repression of modern society against individuals. He wrote about the historical rise of a distinctively modern form of “panoptic” surveillance, in which the panopticon is a machine which rationalizes, classifies and homogenizes — “terminology which sits comfortably with the discourse of bureaucratic growth
30 Miran Bozovic, “An utterly dark spot”, in Bentham, Jeremy, The Panopticon Writings, Introduction, p. I. 31 Greg Elmer, “Panopticon—discipline—control“, in Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies, op. cit., p. 23. 32 Filip Ejdus, “I Bog stvori građanska prava: Srpski otpor uvođenju biometrijske lične karte”, Bezbednost Zapadnog Balkana, br. 4, januar/mart 2007, str. 66-7.
354 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century and administrative rationality”.33 Foucault uses Bentham’s panopticon as a metaphor for a modern “disciplinary society”, demonstrating how it separated right from wrong, good from bad, sick from healthy through surveillance and regulation.34 What distinguishes Foucault’s and Bentham’s definition of the panopticon is perspective, meaning that the view outward from the residence, the tower — in Bentham’s terms is a site and mode of “seeing without being seen”; conversely, for Foucault the panopticon could not be reduced or framed by an unidirectional gaze from the centre, tower or singular managerial gaze. Conceptually, for Foucault, the prisoners, not the tower, are at the centre of the panopticon. Contra Bentham, it was not to be coupled with — or reliant upon — the very act of watching, it was to be viewed as a logic and process. Foucault employed a definition of surveillance that extended right to the “top” of Bentham’s hierarchy with the inspector also under surveillance.35 Foucauldian inverted panopticon “sought to establish the potential political effects of a ubiquitous form of institutional power, not an all-seeing or all-registering eye, but a landscape that could at any time impart in an individual a likelihood of surveillance”.36 Foucauldian “disciplinary society” raises important question of subtle power – discipline relationship. A discipline may be identified “neither with an institution nor with an apparatus; it is a type of power, a modality for its exercise, comprising a whole set of instruments, techniques, procedures, levels of application, targets, it is a ‘physics’ or an ‘anatomy’ of power, a technology”.37 Foucault dubbed the panopticon a “laboratory of power”, “diagram of a mechanism of power reduced to its ideal form.” For Foucault, the panoptic prison “first and foremost served to explicate a logic that could be seen at work in the spatial design of a series of key social, medical, educational and psychological institutions.”38 Foucault’s work introduces a rich array of various ideas pertaining to history, relations of governing, rationales of government, but also of “the possibility of resistance, which might help think through complex notions of security and insecurity.”39 Foucault’s central theses on disciplinary power consist of implicitly
33 Toni Weller, “The information state“, op. cit., p. 58. See Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, translated from the French by Alan Sheridan, London: Penguin, 1991 (first published 1977). 34 Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish, op. cit., p. 198. 35 Greg Elmer, “Panopticon—discipline—control“, op. cit., pp. 22-3. (See Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish, op. cit., p. 204.) 36 Ibid., p. 21. 37 Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish, op. cit., p. 215. 38 Ibid., pp. 204-5. 39 Inga Kroener and Daniel Neyland, “New technologies, security and surveillance“, in Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies, op. cit., p. 141.
355 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century important critiques of liberalism, and Foucaultian-inspired critiques of contemporary forms of liberalism (or neo-liberalism) have particular importance in the context of a governmental regime and set of policies that have sought to “liberalize” markets, societies and individuals in an effort to increase efficiencies.40 A concept like “panopticon” has continued popularity and utility, although it has raised considerable controversy and has been questioned by specialists. The model of power and surveillance had a huge impact on how we, as (post)modernists, tend to understand the notions of control, in particular social control. The idea of being constantly observed “constrain[s] the convict to good behaviour (...), the worker to work, (...), the patient to the observation of the regulations, (...) he who is subjected to a field of visibility ... becomes the principle of his own subjection”.41 The newest literature on video surveillance argues that “the increasing number and sophistication of cameras acts as an example of the expansion of disciplinary mechanisms”, confirming a role of the “panopticon” prison within modernity.42
Postmodern totalitarian surveillance Under the previous headings we discussed the emergence of the modern, bureaucratic state, and its transformation into an information state, or a surveillance state. We also considered classical theoretical explanations of dangers accompanied with this process, i.e. the panopticon model of prison, where individual freedom was limited by subtle, non-violent methods changing individual behavior. Now it is time to look back on the most recent events related to surveillance revelations and to draw conclusions on resulting global totalitarian tendencies. The current wave of global surveillance disclosures by Edward Snowden, a former CIA officer and whistleblower, as of June 2013, consists of thousands of leaked classified documents from the US National Security Agency (NSA). The documents have revealed many global surveillance programs, mostly run by the NSA with the cooperation of European governments and telecommunication companies.43 The Snowden disclosures have exposed practices of mass surveillance of internet networks, emails and phone calls of
40 Greg Elmer, “Panopticon—discipline—control“, op. cit., p. 28. 41 Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish, op. cit. Quoted in: Inga Kroener and Daniel Neyland, New technologies, security and surveillance, op. cit., p. 144. 42 Ibid., p. 145. 43 See: Chandra Steele, The 10 Most Disturbing Snowden Revelations, PC Magazine, February 11, 2014; http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2453128,00.asp, 15. 04. 2014; Trevor Timm, Four ways Edward Snowden changed the world – and why the fight’s not over, The Guardian, Thursday 5 June 2014; http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/ jun/05/what- snowden-revealed-changed-nsa-reform, 10. 06. 2014.
356 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century millions of ordinary citizens and political leaders around the world. Thanks to Snowden, we know that unknown volumes of information are being extracted from Internet and computer companies, including Microsoft, Yahoo, Google, Facebook, PalTalk, AOL, Skype, YouTube and Apple. All that triggered a new debate over mass surveillance, government secrecy, national security and information privacy.44 The revelations of USA “government lawlessness and corporate spying provide a new meaning if not a revitalized urgency and relevance” to George Orwell: “Orwell never could have imagined that the National Security Agency (NSA) would amass metadata on billions of our phone calls and 200 million of our text messages every day. Orwell could not have foreseen that our government would read the content of our emails, file transfers, and live chats from the social media we use.”45 The current global internet surveillance stretches over the whole world, but from the perspective of American citizens it looks as described in the next paragraph: “The first thing to note about these data is that a mere generation ago, they did not exist. They are a new power in our midst, flowing from new technology, waiting to be picked up; and power, as always, creates temptation, especially for the already powerful. Our cellphones track our whereabouts. Our communications pass through centralized servers and are saved and kept for a potential eternity in storage banks, from which they can be recovered and examined. Our purchases and contacts and illnesses and entertainments are tracked and agglomerated. If we are arrested, even our DNA can be taken and stored by the state. Today, alongside each one of us, there exists a second, electronic self, created in part by us, in part by others. This other self has become de facto public property, owned chiefly by immense data-crunching corporations, which use it for commercial purposes. Now government is reaching its hand into those corporations for its own purposes, creating a brand- new domain of the state-corporate complex.”46 On totalitarianism in a form of the Internet providing technology to spy speaks Julian Assange, Australian journalist and the founder of “WikiLeaks”, a website
44 See: Glenn Greenwald, “Should Twitter, Facebook and Google Executives be the Arbiters of What We See and Read?“, The Intercept, August 23, 2014, http://www.opednews.com/articles/ Should -Twitter-Facebook-a-by-Glenn-Greenwald-Censorship_Executive-Privilege_Facebook_Google- 140823-175.html, 25. 08. 2014. Glen Greenwald, “Collect It All”: Glenn Greenwald on NSA Bugging Tech Hardware, Economic Espionage & Spying on U.N.“, Democracy Now!, May 13, 2014, http://www.democracynow.org/2014/5/13/collect_it_all_ glenn_greenwald_on 45 Marjorie Cohn, “Beyond Orwell’s Worst Nightmare“, Marjorie Cohn’s Blog, January 31, 2014; Quoted in: Henry A. Giroux, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State“, op. cit. 46 Jonathan Schell, “America’s Surveillance Net“, The Nation, June 19, 2013; Quoted in: Henry A. Giroux, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State“, op. cit.
357 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century specialized for publishing of leaked U.S. military and diplomatic documents. From the political asylum in Ecuadorian Embassy in London, Assange demonstrates that totalitarian threat today really does exist. He warns on the current system “totalitarian dystopia” – meaning that “surveillance is total, so that no one exists outside the state”.47 He defines the change in power over the last couple of years as “a huge transfer of power from the people who are surveyed upon to those who control the surveillance complex”. Assange says that the United States “annexed” the whole world as a result of “annexing the computer systems and communications technology that is used to run the modern world”. He warned that the ability to survey everyone on the planet is almost there, and arguably will be there in a few years.48 Assange advocates a need for independent internet infrastructure for countries to maintain sovereignty to resist US control over the majority of communications: “To a degree this is a matter of national sovereignty. If there is not at least some national network that can be maintained in a moment of economic or political conflict with the United States, then there is simply too much leverage on nation states to be able to effectively defend the interests of their peoples.”49 Assange’s interesting postmodern version of power theory has raised a serious question of how the Internet, upon which everyone looked as perhaps the greatest tool of human creation that ever existed, has in fact been “co-opted” and is now involved in the “most aggressive form of state surveillance the world has ever seen”.50 Some opponents have pejoratively called his theory “a leftist paranoia”,51 but evidences presented by Snowden cannot be ignored. Indeed, evidences have shown that it is more appropriate to call the actual state of affairs as a “totalitarian paranoia in the post-Orwellian surveillance state”.52 Thus this situation cannot be disregarded in relation to the ruling neoliberal ideology, as explained by radical theories on its current crisis and its need “to ensure the security of the economy, and the threats posed to the social order by individuals with potentially threatening capabilities”, that requires “more and more surveillance of our everyday lives and more and more of our participation
47 Julian Assange, “US annexed the whole world through global spying“, op. cit. Victoria Wagner Ross, Julian Assange speaks at SXSW about the new definition of power, March 9, 2014, http:// www.examiner.com/article/julian-assange-speaks-at-sxsw-about-the-new-definition-of-power. 48 Ibid. The US and the NSA will soon have the ability to spy on the entire planet, as their capabilities double every 18 months. said Assange. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Cf. Nick Cohen, “Definition of paranoia: supporters of Julian Assange”, The Guardian, Commments, 24 June 2012, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jun/24/ nick-cohen-julian-assange-paranoia, 30. 07. 2012. 52 Henry A. Giroux, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State“, op. cit.
358 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century in those processes of ‘keeping an eye out’ for anonymous parcels, suspicious behaviours, provocative speech and dangerous thoughts. We will all be enlisted in the Army of Observation, free to choose but self-regulating in our choices. Everyone will watch everyone, and the new age of opto-liberalism will have dawned.”53 The specific relationship between totalitarian regimes and their ideologies was observed earlier in mid-20th century. A French philosopher Raymond Aron wrote that an ideology is not the tool of totalitarianism, but rather totalitarianism is a political consequence, or an embodiment of an ideology in social life, in regimes that he called “ideocraties“.54 The relationship between neoliberalism and totalitarian surveillance, in form of “opto-liberalism”, has yet to be well explained, but evidences on global totalitarian tendencies are well exposed by most recent revelations. Their harmfulness for individual freedom, societies and power relations is, as it seems, so far well explained.
53 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, “What Comes after Liberalism?”, op. cit., p. 545. 54 Reymond Aron, Democratie et totalitarisme, Gallimard, Paris, 1965.
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Jelena MATIJAŠEVIĆ-OBRADOVIĆ1 Darko GOLIĆ2
THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION SOCIETY IN THE PROCESS OF GLOBALIZATION – A HISTORICAL CONTINUITY AS A CHALLENGE TO THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Abstract: Globalization, as a form of comprehensive modernization and connectivity at the world level, is constantly attracting a lot of attention. Research of the globalization process reveals that we are faced with the phenomenon which has multiple dimensions - economic, social, political, cultural, religious and legal – and they are all interrelated in a complex way. The expansive development of information technology has radically changed almost every aspect of life and work of the modern man, which has subsequently accelerated the process of globalization in all its aspects. The changes caused by the information technology have highlighted the new strategic resources of modern society: knowledge and information, as the primary basis for the creation of new values of the Information Age. The expansion of the Internet has established a new environment – Cyber environment. Information society, because of its technology, but also because of its sociological characteristics strives towards globalization in all fields. In the context of the foregoing, the focus of this paper is the relationship between information technology and the society as well as the relationship between information society and the globalization process. This is a very topical issue, given that the Internet is a form of global technology which previously did not exist on the media scene that completely negates the spatial and temporal dimension. However, a number of features that have placed ICT in front of their customers have also caused numerous opportunities for its misuse. These are a kind of
1 Dr. Jelena Matijašević-Obradović, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law for Commerce and Judiciary in Novi Sad, Business Academy University, Novi Sad. 2 Dr. Darko Golić, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law for Commerce and Judiciary in Novi Sad, Business Academy University, Novi Sad.
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challenges the modern society faces every day. In this context, however, part of this paper was dedicated to the effects of the existence and operations of information and communication technology in the globalization process involving the European Union, the challenges that this regional integration is facing in its development as well as solutions and views on relevant issues. Key words: Globalization, Information and Communication Technology, information society, European Union.
Introduction Globalization, which has a long forehistory, is an embodiment of a distinctive anthropological and civilization code and is an aspect of fascinating evolution leading from the first isolated groups of humanoids over archaic empires to the modern world order. The expansion of great religions and civilizations, military conquests and giant empires are an archaic form of connecting the world and uniting humanity. Despite all deep abrupt differences among its modern and pre- modern forms (protoglobalization), one universal and permanent aspiration of mankind is in effect. Globalization, however, does not have the form of a continuous evolutionary line. On the contrary, its turbulent and dramatic history has been interspersed with the periods of expansion and contraction, rises and brutal interruptions – launched by the irrepressible forces of the industrial revolution and colonial expansion it had experienced an unprecedented upswing that lasted from the fifties of the 19th century until World War I. Two great world wars and the Cold War, however, led to a brutal interruption and reflux. The breakdown of the world blocs and the triumph of the West marked the era of its vertiginous acceleration, the era of turbo globalization. The trajectory of the world, though, remains open and uncertain – it may range from environmental or nuclear cataclysm through a new division of the world into giant regional blocs to the unique democratic and Orwellian “world order”.3 The notion of globalization has been used intensively only in recent times. It implies the global process of rapid modernization, comprehensive connectivity and establishing of interdependence at the political, economic, traffic, cultural, media and other levels. The expansive development of information technology has radically changed almost every aspect of life and work of the modern man, which has subsequently accelerated the process of globalization in all its aspects.
3 Pečujlić, Miroslav: „Globalizacija – dva lika sveta” (Globalization – two images of the world), Monografija “Aspekti globalizacije”, prir. Ivana Pantelić, Vlado Pavićević, Vladimir Petrović i Goran Milovanović, Beogradska otvorena škola, 8–19, Beograd, 2003, p. 11.
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As a consequence of technological revolution, our era is the era of “electronic global village”, as described by Canadian professor Marshall McLuhan. News are not being sent faster and faster; they are simultaneously everywhere. This implies that geographical distance is now outdated. It seems that satellites, global television networks and the Internet are increasingly developing the awareness of the indivisibility of the world. The awareness is that the world is one.4 The process of European integration has emerged, developed and evolved during several decades into a kind of a “golden cage”, i.e. in the international order secured by the United States and the NATO as well as the balance of power between the Western and Eastern bloc (until the beginning of the ninth decade of the twentieth century), and then by the inviolable and dominant position of the United States in the world. With the objective changes and disturbances in international relations in the new century marked by a relative decline of the global hegemony of the US, the rise of new or old major forces such as China, Russia, and the process of further globalization in multipolar terms presented the problem of adaptation to new international conditions before the European Union and its member states.5 It seems that in the first decade of the 21st century, member states of the European Union did not manage to respond to all the challenges associated with global changes. According to Lopandić, the main political projects of the EU – since the creation of the monetary union and the Euro, through the „Lisbon Strategy” on information society and strengthening the competitiveness of the economy, to the policy of expanding to the East – did not lead to the crisis resolution in the first decade of the 21st century and had sometimes opposite effects.6 Bearing in mind how the aspect of development of information society is significant to the process of globalization in general, and then how the development tendencies of member states of the European Union are associated with global changes, this work primarily involves the analysis of importance of the existence and development of ICT in modern social frameworks and in the process of globalization in general. The evaluation of what has been said above raises the question of relationship of the European Union with the challenges imposed by
4 Jović, Nikola: „Kultura i globalizacija – suprotstavljena tumačenja” (Culture and globalization – opposite interpretations), Godišnjak 2013, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Vol. VII, No. 9, 2013, p. 66. 5 Lopandić, Duško: „Evropska unija u novom međunarodnom okruženju” (European Union in new international surroundings), Medjunarodni problem, Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu, Vol. LX, No. 2-3, 2008, p. 201. 6 Lopandić, Duško: „Reforma Evropske unije, Zapadni Balkan i Srbija - zakasnela integracija” (Reform of the European Union, the Western Balkans and Serbia – Late integration), Evropski centar za mir i razvoj (ECPD), 2007, p. 25.
362 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the existence and, without a doubt, a large impact of information society in the era of constant global changes. This work shall discuss this issue as well.
The concept of globalization – evolutionary context and significance to modern society The past decade has been interlaced with the process of liberalization in the economies of countries around the world. Liberalization within national economies and in the international context is the choice of state bodies. It is associated with the privatization of public companies, an increase in the role of the private sector and the alleged reduction in state interference in the economy. In contrast to the liberalization that is a political choice of state bodies, globalization is a fact. It is the outcome of the behavior of companies, mostly transnational corporations, their organization and control, changes in technology of production and distribution, economy of production scale, and also the management of their finances. The process of globalization is partly a consequence, on the one hand, of changes in the behavior of certain consumers that have shown reduced loyalty to domestic products and domestic manufacturers, and on the other hand, it is a consequence of liberalization that opens the door to increased international trade, production, foreign investment and financial flows.7 The emergence of the process of globalization was facilitated by the situation that followed the World War II, especially in Europe. European countries, some of them being completely demolished back then, but also financially aided by the US, commenced the process of interconnection. One of the goals of such an interconnection was to avoid further mutual hostility and create a Europe in which all countries would mutually cooperate and provide help to each other. Such a European policy was subsequently an initiator of similar processes elsewhere in the world. This eventually led to the creation of the world as it is today.8 The term globalization was first used in the 1960s and ever since has been used both in professional and in popular literature with various meanings: as a process, as a state, as a system, power or era. Also, this term refers to various phenomena: from innovation in communication technology, transnational interaction of production systems and financial transfers, to media dissemination
7 Jovanović, Miroslav: „Globalizacija i evropske vrednosti” (Globlisation and European values), Godišnjak 2013, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Godina VII, No. 9, 2013, p. 35. 8 See more in: Krešić, Ivan: „Značenje globalizacije u suvremenom prostornom razvitku svjetske privrede i politike” (The meaning of globalization in contemporary development of the world economy and politics), Ekonomski pregled, Hrvatsko društvo ekonomista, Zagreb, 1996, Vol. 47, No. 1–2, pp. 81–88.
363 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of information or mass movements of people (tourists, migrants, refugees) throughout the world.9 There are several different views of authors that describe the concept of globalization, its historical development and classification criteria. In order to reconcile the opposing views in defining the process of globalization, Steger has identified four main characteristics of globalization: 1. Creation of new and multiplication of the existing social networks and interaction greatly exceed traditional, political, economic, cultural and geographic boundaries; 2. Expansion of social relationships, activities and interactions (e.g. financial markets, shopping malls, electronics stores), 3. Intensification and acceleration of social exchanges and activities (e.g. the Internet, which offers a variety of information in a matter of seconds, and satellite dishes). In other words, the processes of globalization and localization imply one another. Not all three of the aforementioned characteristics exist only at a material level, but also at the subjective level of human self-consciousness as a part of the global whole.10 Research of the globalization process reveals that we are faced with the phenomenon which has multiple dimensions - economic, social, political, cultural, religious and legal - and they are all interrelated in a complex way. This means that unambiguous interpretations and explanations that take into account only one side of the issue are inappropriate.11 In the course of the evolutionary progress of globalization, the authors have dealt with the importance of this phenomenon for the society, but also with its importance for the state as a unitary constituent element. In the early eighties of the 20th century, Froebel, Heinrichs and Kreye were probably the first to speak of the emergence of a new international division of labor based on globalization of production, whose creators were multinational companies that gradually developed into the main actors of the new global economy. The main features of the new global economy are: domination of financial system and investment on a global level, flexible and multilocal
9 Đurić Kuzmanović, Tatjana: „Raznovrsnost pristupa i otpora globalizaciji” (Diversity of approaches and resistance to globalization), Škola biznisa, No. 2/2008, p. 14. 10 Ibid., p. 16. 11 Santos Boaventura de Soza: “Los processos da Globalização” (Processes of globalization), Revista Crítica de Ciências Sociais, Portuguese, 2002, Eurozine articles, www.eurozine.com (28.03.2014); Text in Serbian: Santos Boaventura de Soza : „Procesi globalizacije”, Reč no. 68/14, 2002, p. 6.
364 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century production processes, low transport costs, revolution in communication and information technology, deregulation of national economies, giving priority to multilateral financial agencies and creation of three major transnational economies: American, relying on the United States and special relationships this country has with Canada, Mexico and Latin America; Japanese, relying on Japan and its special relationships with the “four tigers” and the rest of Asia; and European, relying on the European Union and its special relationships with Eastern Europe and Northern Africa.12 The creation of a transnational capitalist class, whose main institutional form are the aforementioned multinational companies, is reflected in the other dimensions of the globalization process, especially in the political, social and cultural ones. The views of authors on the impact of globalization on national economies vary and often include consideration of both good and bad sides. Therefore, Jovanović believes that globalization is associated with a change in structure of international production and consumption since it reduces the importance of proximity between production, raw materials and markets. Globalization expands the boundaries for locating companies in the area due to reduction of costs and increase in speed of delivery of raw materials and finished products. Significant increase in foreign investments in economies worldwide is the main ingredient of this process. The liberalization of capital market and increased international mobility of capital significantly reduce the impact of governments on domestic monetary policy. In case of any doubt that devaluation will occur, the capital can “escape” from the country within a few hours, so the governments must take this possibility into account in their economic policies. Although national governments have lost a part of the administration over monetary policy, they have increased their monitoring ability on the other side. The existence of computers and new technologies in data processing has enabled public bodies to increase supervision over companies and citizens which are said to be significant for determination and collection of taxes.13 Globalization brings both good and bad sides. On the one hand, it may link national economies, expand the market and provide access to modern technology in production, distribution, communications and data processing. On the other hand, it increases the vulnerability of economically weaker actors and accelerates the requirements for adjustment and modernization of economy and services. Due to globalization, some companies may create at certain levels a global monopolistic position. For example, such is the case of Microsoft and its computer
12 Ibid., p. 8–9. 13 Jovanović, Miroslav: „Globalizacija i evropske vrednosti” (Globalization and European values), op. cit., p. 35.
365 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century programs, but the dominance of this company at a global level is based on its strong local concentration in Seattle. However, globalization has also resulted in the creation of a worldwide vast number of small and medium enterprises that may penetrate the mainstream market. Under such conditions of rapid and easy international mobility of companies, educated, professional and skilled work force is a major advantage that a national economy could have.14 The dangers that arise due to globalization are unpredictable capital flows, speculative attacks on the national currency, financial crisis and unpredictable shifts of production and employment from one country to another. All this increases economic and social vulnerability of many countries, especially those that are small and developing.15 Summing up the impressions of globalization, Santos believes that, being seemingly transparent and simple, it conceals more than it reveals what actually is happening in the world. When viewed from a different perspective, what is masked or hidden is so important that the transparency and simplicity of the idea of globalization are not harmless but should be considered as an ideological and political tool that has specific goals. Two of such targets should be specifically emphasized.16 The first one is the creation of the so-called deterministic error. It is about the placement of the idea that globalization is a spontaneous, automatic, inevitable and irreversible process that strengthens and advances according to an internal logic and dynamics, whose power is such that it can resist to any outside interference. Most careful scholars as well as ambassadors of globalization embrace this misapprehension. Manuel Castells stands out among the scholars who observe globalization as an inevitable consequence of revolution in information technology. According to him, the new economy is “informational, since the productivity and competitiveness of parts or agents of this economy are fundamentally dependent on their ability to create, process and efficiently apply knowledge based on information. It is global because its core activities of production, consumption and transport (…) are organized at a global level (...).”17 The misconception lies in the fact that the causes of globalization transform into its consequences. Globalization is, in fact, the result of a series of political decisions, whose authors and time of occurrence cannot be determined.18
14 Ibid., p. 36. 15 Ibid. 16 Santos Boaventura de Soza, „Procesi globalizacije” (Processes of globalization), op. cit., p. 25. 17 Castells, Manuel, “The Rise of the Network Society”, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996, p. 66; cit. prema: Santos Boaventura de Soza, „Procesi globalizacije” (Processes of globalization), op. cit., p. 26. 18 Santos Boaventura de Soza, „Procesi globalizacije”, op. cit., p. 26.
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Another political objective that lies behind the assertion that globalization has no political character is the creation of a misapprehension that the South has disappeared from the global scene. According to this misapprehension, the North and South have never been in real conflict, but for quite some time the only difference between them is that the North offers industrial products, and the South provides raw materials. (…) Today, the world is integrated into a global economy at the financial, production and even consumer level; considering the multiple interdependencies, there is no point of making distinctions between the North and the South, not even between the central, peripheral and semi- peripheral parts of the global system. The more successful globalization becomes, the less visible the South and hierarchical relations in the global system are. It is argued, therefore, that globalization has an identical effect in all regions of the world and in all sectors of activity and that its constructors – multinational companies – are infinitely innovative and able to organize transformation of the new global economy into an unprecedented chance.19 Despite the existence of various views regarding the evolutionary context, the role and importance of globalization in the contemporary social frameworks, there is no doubt that the development of information and communication technologies is a very important segment of the radical changes that the process of globalization has brought.
Information technology and society – political, economic, social and cultural significance Although the seed of information era had been sown thousands of years ago, it was only the 20th century that clearly marked the birth of this era – the era in which we were exposed to the most significant changes which were ever experienced in the history of the human civilization.20 Back in 1936, Konrad Zuse assembled the first binary computer. Since the advent of the first computer, until today, there has been a rapid expansion in the usage of computers in practically all areas of life and work. One of the first computers called ENIAC had been put into experimental operation in February 1944, only to be finally completed in 1946. Its main function was to calculate trajectories of artillery grenades for war purposes and its development had cost around 400,000 dollars of that time, which was a significant amount then, but now, some fifty years after that event, it is quite certain that the money was
19 Ibid., pp. 26-27 20 Strackbein, Ray: “Survive the Transition: Industrial Age to Information Age”, http://www. strackbein.com/html/articles.html (09.11.2010.)
367 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century invested remarkably, because the progress that followed along with the wide usage of computers, was fantastic.21 In 1953, the International Business Machines company, later more commonly known by the acronym of its name IBM, had created a modern computer, and in the following year the first computer programming language. In 1964, the first prototype of the Windows operating system was created and in 1970, the American company Intel created the first computer using the revolutionary technology of the microchip. Arpanet, the forerunner of the Internet that we all know and use today, had been created a year ago. Ever since those days, things have started to grow in geometrical progression: 1973 – Ethernet appeared, 1974-1976 the first IBM, Apple and Commodore PCs, 1981 – the first home computer with MS DOS system; finally, the year 1985 marked the appearance of the Windows system which has survived various versions until today, of course with the emergence of many other operating systems and continuous improvement of computers.22 Computer networks have developed simultaneously with the development of computers and the best-known global computer network is certainly the Internet. The first computers were autonomous, isolated from other computers. However, computer networks were designed within a very short period of time after the commencement of mass production of computers primarily for sharing and distribution of data stored on different computers to some or all users of a particular network. Because of the manner of operation, computers and computer networks have, thanks to user programs, become simpler and more accessible to the largest number of people who can be trained for using basic computer skills within a few days, without any problems. The progress of telecommunications and computer technology has launched an information revolution, whose impact can be at least as wide and deep as was the impact of the industrial revolution of the 19th century. The transformation from industrial to information (post-industrial) society that commenced in the mid-20th century and still lasts has shifted the social focus from the production of tangible goods to the provision of services. The key symbols of this era are communications and computers with an open question: who will be the most successful in this new era?23
21 Aleksić, Živojin i Škulić, Milan: „Kriminalistika” (Criminal science), Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu and Javno preduzeće „Službeni glasnik”, Beograd, 2007, p. 384. 22 Matijašević, Jelena: „Krivičnoprava regulativa računarskog kriminaliteta” (Cybercrime legislation), Pravni fakultet za privredu i pravosuđe u Novom Sadu, Univerzitet Privredna akademija u Novom Sadu, 2013, p. 3. 23 Huitt G. William: „Success in the Information Age: A Paradigm Shift“, Valdosta State University, Valdosta, Georgia, http://www.edpsycinteractive.org/papers/infoage.pdf (03.04.2014.).
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When it comes to the latest changes caused by the information revolution, it is important to point out that they are based primarily on information technology - technology that introduces us in a big way to the new information era.24 The changes caused by the information technology have highlighted the new strategic resources of the modern society: knowledge and information as the primary basis for the creation of new values of the information era in which the underlying technology is a very powerful tool in shifting work from physical to mental. Historically speaking, the impact of information technology on the society was obvious. Consequently, its influence played a significant role in shaping the political, economic, social and cultural milieu of the human society. The period after the Second World War showed that the information revolution successfully carried out its main task to reduce the impact of distance, time and location on human communication, but it has not stopped there, but has also spread its impact on workplaces and economic affairs, culture and society, and military affairs and international relations. The observed period allows easy identification of such impacts. The economy was gradually switching from economy based on industry to the one based on services. During this time, the number of workers in service industries in the United States had grown very rapidly and at the end of the 1960, it exceeded the number of blue-collar workers. Information became a commodity and its handling and distribution became the main economic factor. The development of new industry was based on technologies that met those needs. This phenomenon quickly became important on a global scale, since information and its collection, management and distribution became a trademark of advanced industrial societies throughout the world.25 Information technology has also found a prominent place in homes around the world, since television and then computers have entered the mainstream of the global society. Since the new technology has expanded throughout the entire society, its influence has begun to change cultural relations and values. In many homes, television has become a central focus of family life changing the way people interact with each other and the way they spend their time. It has often introduced new values that have competed with the traditional way of observing the world and performing activities. However, this technology is not limited to workplaces and home. Military affairs and international relations are also strongly
24 Petrović, Slobodan: „O informacionoj revoluciji u kontekstu zloupotrebe informacione tehnologije” (On information revolution within the context of abuse of information technology), p. 3; http://www.itvestak.org.rs/ziteh_04/radovi/ziteh-20.pdf (01.04.2014.) 25 Petrović, Slobodan: „Izazovi informacionog društva – lice i naličje” (Challenges of information society – both sides), Uvodno izlaganje, IV savetovanje: Zloupotreba informacionih tehnologija i zaštitta (ZITEH-10), Zbornik radova (CD-ROM), Beograd, 2012, pp. 3–4.
369 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century affected by this technology and investments in research in the field of telecommunications, computers and satellites have augmented considerably. Thanks to the aforementioned, computers, computer networks and satellites that expand the global communication infrastructure to a large extent offer to individuals and organizations much broader opportunities for collection, analysis and use of information and those opportunities keep expanding constantly.26 Multinational corporations are probably the type of such international actors that have mostly felt the benefits of new technologies. They have significantly altered their actions and structures as a result of the use of information technologies (…). In this regard, we will mention that international finances and banking have been transformed due to the ability to electronically transfer funds around the world. Some observers believe that the world has become a single banking and financial market. Many other utility services are becoming more and more internationalized.27 When it comes to states as international actors, it should be noted that they, too, have accepted information technology, but not to the same extent and in the same way. In fact, some states have actively sought to maintain their sovereignty by attempting to control information and communication flows. In other cases, states have positioned themselves to take advantage of these technologies in order to increase the economic activity and to position themselves for future prosperity. In some cases, such as, for example, the case of the European Union, such a response opens the possibility of moving to a post-state international era in which grouped states cede a significant part of their decision-making ability to transnational actors.28 Information technologies have also had an impact on the role that NGOs play in international affairs. Technologies have led to the formation of networks among some non-governmental organizations and thus, their power and influence have increased significantly. At the same time, the ability of international media to provide information in real time –virtually to any major media distributor in the world – creates a sense of global connection, if not a community that has never existed before. This has led to changes in attitudes of some individuals about their role and the role of their countries in the world, but nothing much is left to say that for many individuals, international media are changing the way they observe themselves and the world. At the regional level, information technology has also had an obvious impact. The aforementioned, virtually unlimited data transfer and information flow across state borders has strengthened the momentum towards greater European integration and transformation of the European
26 Ibid., p. 4 27 Ibid. 28 Ibid.
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Community into the European Union. To some extent, it can be argued that a similar sequence of events led to the creation of Asia Pacific Economic Co- operation Zone and free trade zone in America, although it was not even close to such development of organization such as the European Union.29
Information society and globalization The expansion of the Internet has established a new environment - Cyber environment. Information society, because of its technology, but also because of its sociological characteristics tends towards globalization in all fields. From being a luxury and abstract experiment unknown to most people the most common global computer network has become a necessity and means of information and communication, entertainment and education used by one and a half billion people around the world on a daily basis. The Internet reached its age of majority in 2008, with around one billion users and 100 million websites. On average, 100,000 new users join the network every day.30 The Internet is the embodiment of an economy without limits emerging from globalization. Personal presence in a particular geographic point is no longer necessary. In cyberspace which is, in simple words, the space created by a network that connects computers in all geographic areas, Internet users are “everywhere and nowhere” at the same time! Regardless of this, one should not give general support to the values and benefits of globalization. Although globalization has picked up certain momentum, densely concentrated production in one location for certain products and services still has its full significance and value. Companies that have gone the furthest in the process of globalization and electronic communication state that there have been an increase and not a decrease in personal contacts, which remain of paramount importance for smooth organization of operations within the company (which may have plants throughout the world), but also for marketing beyond its boundaries.31 According to the conclusions of the Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, as part of the preparatory activities of the WSIS 2003, information society is the one which: – using highly developed ICT networks, – equitable and widespread access to information,
29 Ibid., p. 5. 30 Kešetović, Želimir: „Internet kao oruđe terorista” (Internet as a terrorist tool), Revija za bezbednost, Centar za bezbednosne studije, Vol II, No. 4/2008, Beograd, p. 37. 31 Jovanović, Miroslav: „Globalizacija i evropske vrednosti” (Globalization and European values), op. cit., p. 36.
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– making presentation of appropriate content in appropriate formats and – establishing effective communication enables people to achieve their potentials, promote sustainable economic and social development, improves the quality of life for all, suppresses poverty and hunger and promotes participation in decision-making.32 If we consider all mentioned above, taking into account the significance and the role of globalization in the modern society, but also the extremely the vast impact of ICT, primarily of the Internet as the basic global communication computer network, we can derive the following observations. Technological innovations in the area of ICT that are mainly a result of coupling of financial capital and military industrial complex, today play a decisive role in shaping the global economy. The development of global information and telecommunication infrastructure has enabled the integration of global financial markets, reorganization of business of multinational companies, expansion of the effective range of the market – in other words, it has stimulated the process of globalization. ICT eliminates the defects that are traditionally attributed to large organizations and in this sense, they contribute to the increase of concentration and centralization of financial capital which, on the other hand, encourages innovations that enable its faster circulation. Under the direct influence of centralized financial capital that used to be dressed in the attire of a “collective capitalist” and that is slowly taking control over all levers of power, a new phase of capitalism development arises – networked or digital capitalism – which uses new technology for re-imposition of mechanisms of rigidity, authority and domination. Today, about a hundred of giant, primarily financial companies, manage not only the economy but also education, politics, culture… Activities that have long been outside of profit-motivated market economy are now set on a profit basis. A new redistribution of wealth is being performed to the detriment of workforce: e.g. 1% of Americans today owns 21.4% of American wealth.33
European Union and the effects of the development of information society in the process of globalization The most powerful of contemporary supranational integrations, the European Union has made the most significant progress towards a supranational state. It
32 WSIS, Asia-Pacific Regional Conference, The Tokyo Declaration, 13–15th January 2003, cit. according to: Milovanović, Goran: „Internet i globalizacija: zavojite staze ka informatičkom društvu” (Internet and globalization: Winding paths to information society), Godišnjak 2013, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Vol. VII, No. 9, 2013, p. 61 33 Radovanović, Predrag : „Informaciono-komunikacione tehnologije i globalizacija” (Information and communication technologies and globalization), Zbornik radova Tehnološkog fakulteta, Leskovac, 2007, No. 17, p. 63.
372 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century originates from a number of European regional integrations conceived to settle the important, but partial issues that arose at the beginning of the Cold War. Such integrations were an attempt of a specific European response to the new challenges. Their consolidation (European Coal and Steel Community and Euratom) in 1957, i.e. the signing of the Treaty of Rome led to the creation of the European Community. It initially had comprised France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the then Federal Republic of Germany. The United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark joined in 1973, Greece in 1981, Spain and Portugal in 1986, and Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1994. In addition to the admission of new member states, the Union has deepened over time – in 1992, a single European market without internal barriers was created based on the Maastricht Treaty, and in early 2002, out of 15 member states, 12 of them entered a monetary union by accepting a common currency – the Euro. Along with the preparations for the creation of a stronger international structure and admission of 10 new member states in early 2004 (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Malta and Cyprus), the European Union has been attempting to act on the global stage as independently as possible emancipating primarily from the, until recently, undisputed patronage of the United States.34 In making reference to several important facts related to the European Union, one should mention the relationship between regionalization and globalization. This is of particular importance since the European Union is, as has already been mentioned, the most important representative of regional integrations, which plays a role in the process of globalization. Namely, under the conditions of increased globalization, regional and sub- regional cooperation based on mutual interests and needs of regional partners is gaining more and more importance. Basically, it reflects the need for countries with similar or even identical conditions for development or problems in the achievement of their reform objectives to join forces and assets in response to global challenges. However, this is not enough for successful cooperation, if there is no political will to cooperate. In this context, regional economic integrations are presented, regardless of some of their indisputable autonomous determinants as an integral part of the process of globalization of the world economy. Today, regional integration is a process that involves not only the formation of security alliances and trade agreements, but also affects numerous other areas of economic and social life, political structures, internal security, environmental protection, culture and others. It is a complex and multidimensional process of connecting that implies establishing relationships between the states and national
34 Pojmovnik globalizacije – Evropska unija (Globalization list of notions – European Union), Godišnjak 2013, Fakultet političkih nauka, Univerzitet u Beogradu, Beograd, Vol. VII, No. 9, 2013, pp. 99–100.
373 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century administrations, but also between many other social actors, such as representatives of the business world, politics, civil society, local communities, etc. Regionalization and globalization are presented as complementary and not as divergent processes.35 Considering the context of the effects of development of information society in the process of globalization in relation to the European Union one should first address the position of the President of the European Commission on the future of Europe: “Europe sees its future as striking a balance between competition and cooperation, collectively trying to steer the destiny of the men and women who live in it. Is this easily done? No. Market forces are powerful. If we left things to their own devices, industry would be concentrated in the north and leisure pursuits in the south. But, these market forces, powerful though they may seem, do not always pull in the same direction. Man’s endeavor and political aspiration is to try to develop a balanced territory.”36 This position is a clear confirmation of the opinions of many authors that EU membership is a desirable step in the process of development of national economies. Therefore, “membership in the European Union is not a goal in itself, but a means to achieve long term national strategy of efficient economic development in order to improve the living conditions of the entire population…”37 According to the Lisbon agenda for growth and jobs, innovation and development of information technology are the two most important components of economic growth of the EU. Information technology has a fundamental importance for the improvement of productivity and the development of sophisticated products and services.38 The research conducted by the research organization Empirica from Bonn, with the support of the European Commission, indicates that the demand for IT
35 Karić, Dušica, Zečević, Radoje, Karić, Dragomir: „Ekonomske integracije – posledica procesa globalizacije i ekonomskog razvoja (Economic integrations – effects of the globalization and economic development processes), Socioeconomica – The Scientific Journal for Theory and Practice of Socioeconomic Development, Vol. 1, N° 2, 2012, p. 250 36 Statement of Jacques Delors, President of the European Union (1985-1995) from 1989. Cit. according to: Mirić, Ognjen: „Regionalna politika Evropske unije kao motor ekonomskog razvoja” (European Union regional policy as a driving force of economic development), Evropski pokret u Srbiji, Beograd, 2009, p. 11 37 Ibid. 38 Živić, Marina, Gavrilović, Jelena i Njeguš, Angelina: „Informatička znanja i veštine kao resurs ekonomskog rasta i konkurentnosti Evropske unije” (Information knowledge and skills as a resource of economic growth and competitiveness of European Union), Računarstvo i informatika, Univerzitet Singidunum, 2011, p. 155.
374 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century professionals could be greater than the supply in the labor market of the European Union by as much as 384,000 workers by 2015. In this sense, it is expected that in 2015, there will be between 4.95 and 5.26 million IT experts employed in the European Union. It is believed that around 4.2 million IT experts are currently employed in the European Union and that almost 180 million people use information technology in performing their daily activities.39 The challenges in this area are the lack of standardization of IT qualifications at the level of EU and its member states, but also a serious degree of computer illiteracy that Europe still faces. According to Eurostat, 37% of the population of the EU does not use a computer, while 60% of the population with primary and secondary education does not have any computer skills. This undermines the perspective of the European economy as an economy based on knowledge, specifically the inability of widespread use of electronic commerce, electronic government and implementation of the lifelong learning concept.40 If, however, the object of attention is the relationship between information society and the European Union, the following may be said. The European Union has recognized the importance and role of information society in the development of the modern social framework. On the other hand, it has taken into account all potential risks that the use of ICT may encompass. In the light of all the positive developments, but also the risks that the use of ICT brings, the European Union has placed information society at the center of its strategy for the 21st century. Among other things, it has launched a number of support and promotion actions (eEurope, i2010) and adopted measures aimed at controlling and limiting the risks associated with the development of information society such as the plan of action to promote the safe use of the Internet and combat illegal and harmful messages. The European Union has also made a contribution in the area of prevention of activities related to the abuse of ICT, whose phenomenological structure is varied becoming richer every day. Apart from the fact that it recommends signing and adoption of the conventions and conclusions of the Council of Europe to its member states, the European Union also adopts acts aimed at effectively countering abuse in the area of ICT. In September 1990, the European Community Commission published a decision in the area of information security, which consisted of six sections related to personal data protection and information security. This decision upheld, for a period of two years, the activity plan that did not involve criminal legal assistance explicitly, but included the following activities: development of strategic order of information security, analysis of needs for information security, solutions for
39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., p. 156.
375 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century emergency and temporary needs, specification, standardization and verification of information security, integration of technological and operational achievements within the information security, through general strategy and integration of reliable security functions in the information system.41 In 2000, the European Union adopted the Directive on Electronic Commerce,42 in which special attention was paid to the problem of malice, but also numerous other acts, from the Decision of the Council of Europe on the Prevention of Child Pornography on the Internet, to the recommendations and strategies for the new millennium on the protection and control of computer crime. Each of these acts is an act of construction of a safer information society by improving the security of information infrastructure and combating computer crime. In the area of combat against misuse of ICT, the following Directives are also considered significant: 1. Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs,43 containing provisions pursuant to which the member states use copyright to protect computer programs as literary works in terms of the provisions of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and the concept of a computer program includes the preparatory material for program design. It also determines the concept of the computer program author, whereas legal protection is provided to any natural or legal person falling under the provisions of national legislations in the area of copyright law applicable to literary works. This Directive also provides for the obligation to sanction precisely specified behavior, duration of protection provided for computer programs and also prescribes the obligation of seizure of any illegal copy of a computer program pursuant to the procedure laid down by procedural rules of national legislations, and 2. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks,44 whose main objective is to harmonize the provisions of the member
41 Sieber, Ulrich: “The International Emergence of Criminal Information Law”, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, Köln, 1992, p. 80 42 Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (‘Directive on electronic commerce’), Official Journal of the European Communities, L 178, 17.07.2000. 43 Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, Official Journal L 122/42, Brussels, 17/05/1991, pp. 42–46. 44 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC, Official Journal L 105, 13/04/2006, pp. 54–63.
376 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century states concerning the obligations of any provider of publicly available electronic communication services and public communication networks to store certain data received or processed in order to ensure that such data are available for the purpose of investigation, detection and prosecution of serious criminal works. It should be noted that this Directive is applied only to the data on traffic and location of natural and legal persons and the related data necessary for the identification of the subscriber or registered user.
Conclusion Globalization, as a form of comprehensive modernization and connection at the global level is constantly attracting a lot of attention, both in terms of critical views regarding the role of the state in the process of globalization and in terms of the success of individual manifestations of the process of globalization itself (economic, scientific-technological, geopolitical, civilizational, environmental, traffic and other forms of globalization). Critical views on the role of the state in the process of globalization are primarily related to the extent to which the states are perpetrators of the interests of multinational companies, economic integrations, political alliances, and others. Regardless of the weight of the word globalization, this process is still geographically limited to the developed countries and some developing countries. Large parts of the world have not yet been included in this process, while in certain ones that are included there is some resentment. Despite all good and bad sides of globalization, there will still be a need for both domestic and international economic policies. National policies still hold their places. Domestic education plays a crucial role in this process, because it may aid in the preservation and enhancement of local values and at the same time, it may prepare the next generation for dealing with new challenges in science, technique and management of companies and production. If a company or an industry branch intends to be strong at the global level, it must primarily become strong at the local level.45 The focus of this paper is the relationship between information technology and society as well as the relationship between information society and globalization process. This is a very topical issue, given that the Internet is a form of global technology which previously did not exist on the media scene, which completely negates the spatial and temporal dimension. Communication has ceased to be limited by distance and boundaries and its perfectly harmonious flow requires only a few fractions of a second. This is due to the fact that the
45 Jovanović, Miroslav: „Globalizacija i evropske vrednosti” (Globalization and European values), op. cit., p. 42.
377 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century communication through internet technology takes place in a specific environment – cyber space. A number of features that ICT have placed in front of their customers have also created numerous opportunities for its misuse. In its relatively short and rapid development, the Internet has brought a lot of controversy. In addition to numerous positive sides, there are many negative ones as well. These are challenges the modern society faces every day. In this context, a part of this paper is dedicated to the effects of the existence and operations of information and communication technology in the globalization process involving the European Union, the challenges that this regional integration is facing in its development as well as solutions and views on relevant issues. Namely, the European Union is the most progressive example of creating a successful regional economic integration, which was created more than fifty years ago and has since then continuously developed and expanded. It was a specific role model for many economic regional integrations that were later created in other regions of the world (NAFTA, MERCOSUL, ASEAN, etc.).46 Today, the Internet is one of the most regulating fields of social actions. In the European Union, there are at least 15 directives, proposals and recommendations that attempt to regulate all issues related to the use of the Internet, especially for e-business. In the field of existence and promotion of information society and the application of ICT, the European Union is trying to create a legal framework which shall be incorporated by each state, partially or completely, into its national legislation.
46 Karić, Dušica, Zečević, Radoje, Karić, Dragomir: „Ekonomske integracije – posledica procesa globalizacije i ekonomskog razvoja (Economic integrations – effects of the globalization and economic development processes), op. cit., p. 253.
378 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Dragoljub TODIĆ1
THE OLD AND NEW WORLD ORDER – THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Abstract: The paper emphasizes the importance of understanding the problem of climate change from the standpoint of the impact of the state in this area on certain elements of the relations in the contemporary international community. The paper provides a review of the great powers’ state policies highlighting the issue of the developing countries’ positions. The position and role of the European Union have been especially considered. The main thesis that the author considers is that the changes in international relations on a global scale are, in its crucial part, determined by the policies of the big emitters of greenhouse gases and their lack of agreement on the goals of global politics. The agreement on the global goals and implementation of the appropriate instruments are conditioned by the new grouping of the states. This influences the creation of the presumptions for constituting new criteria in the modern world order, including the new role of the European Union. The author discusses the argument that the constitution of the new world order can be linked to the criteria of the policy defining in the field of climate change, the relation to the causes and consequences of climate change and the specific modalities of interweaving traditional elements of power in the world order with the possibilities of adaptation to climate change. Key words: world order, climate change, European Union, developing countries, greenhouse gases emissions, adaptation to climate change.
Introduction It is estimated that various changes in the international community during XX century (especially at the end of XX century) have resulted in a redefinition of what is considered to be traditional understanding of international relations and the role
1 Professor Dragoljub Todić, Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period.
379 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of each state in those.2 Debates on this topic are predominantly focused on economic, military, political-security and many other aspects. The analysis is focused both on the impact of global changes in international relations as well as on the possible implications of these changes on the individual processes and statehoods. It seems that there is a mutual consensus about the general conclusion that the world will radically change in the upcoming decades as well as on the possible outlook of these changes. Some feel that none of the currently large countries (including the United States, China or any other big country) will have a hegemonic power.3 One of the common determinants of the many-sided explanations of the events from recent history, among others, is the strengthening of the “transgovernmentalism” which became widespread model of international governance, i.e. strengthening of the globalization processes through contradistinct definition of their content and importance.4 One of the very sensitive widely discussed issues, the issue of regional aspects of the globalization processes, i.e. the issue of deepening division between developed and non-developed world, the consequences resulting therefrom and methods of controlling them.5 At the same time there have been given different explanations on the contribution of globalization to the present condition.6
2 Grinin E. L., New Basics of State Order or Why do States Lose Their Sovereignty in the Age of Globalization, Journal of Globalization Studies, Vol. 3, Num. 1, May 2012, pp. 3–38. 3 In addition to the strengthening of the position of the individual and the “diffusion of the state power”, it is estimated that two other “megatrends” will have decisive influence in shaping the world. These are demographic models and especially accelerated aging and an increase in demand for resources, where in the case of food and water can lead to the significant shortages. Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds, a publication of the National Intelligence Council, December 2012, NIC 2012-001, p. III. http://globaltrends2030.files.wordpress.com/2012/11/global-trends-2030- november2012.pdf. (16/03/2014). 4 Slaughter, A.M. The real new world order, Foreign Affairs; New York; Vol. 76, No. 5, Sep/Oct 1997, pp. 183-197. 5 For some views related to the regional dimensions see, for example: Habib B. Climate Change and International Relations Theory: Northeast Asia as a Case Study, Paper presented at the World International Studies Committee Third Global International Studies Conference, 17th – 20th, August 2011, University of Porto, Portugal. http://drbenjaminhabib.files.wordpress.com/2011/09/habib- b_wisc2011_climate-change-ir-theory-northeast-asia-case-study.pdf (9.4.2014). Happaerts S., Bruzninckx H., De Man A., Langens J., Vandamme L., Van Dyck L., Wintmolders T. Rising power in global climate governance. Negotiating in the new world order, Working Paper No. 124 – October 2013, Leuven Centre for Global Governance Studies. https://ghum.kuleuven.be/ggs/publications /working_papers/new_series/wp121-130/wp124-happaerts-bruyninckx-finaal.pdf (16.4.2014). 6 Proponents of the globalization often talk about how it contributes to the growth of the economic activities from which the consumers can benefit, while critics state arguments relating to the facts how it serves to the rich for the increase of the inequalities at the expense of the poor. Globalization and World Order, London Conference on Globalization and World Order, Conference Papers May 2014. Chatham House, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, p. 6. See also: Lindert H. P., Williamson G.J. Does Globalization Make the World More Unequal?, in Bordo D. M., Taylor M. A., Williamson G. J. (Eds), Globalization in Historical Perspective, University of Chicago Press, 2003.
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In this context, the debate on issues relating to various environmental aspects (regardless of their specific definitions) reveals overlapping with the influence of other determinants of international relations, especially in the part referring to the debate on globalization characteristics of the “new order”. Development of contemporary global politics in the field of environment has its roots in the sixties of XX century, during the time of strong divisions in relations between East and West. However, the rapid development of international legal instruments in the field of environment starts a little bit later and, to some extent, coincides with the trends associated with the fall of the Berlin Wall.7
Climate change and international relations: contradictions of the interests a) The first question which opens a discussion on certain doubts in the classic division be-tween the old and the new order arises from the possible answers to the question of who are the great powers, and what is their policy on climate change. Traditional schools of international relations that have been determining the position of the country depending on the ranking considering the criteria such as the size of population and territory, state resources, military strength, political stability, etc.,8 conceptualized completely different type of international relations established in the second half of the twentieth century. Due to its abilities the great powers have tended to behave differently from other countries and that is why some of the authors distinguish great powers according to criteria such as: the high level of military capability that makes them relatively and strategically self- sufficient and able to project power beyond its borders; broad concept of security that allows them to deal with issues related to regional and/or global balance of powers; greater reliability in defining and defending their interests.9 Some attempts to redefine the notion of great powers had for its basis different criteria (“soft” power, which is linked to the “socio-cultural and ideological appeal of” USA, “global civilian power” of Japan and Germany, etc.).10 Layne points out also the example of Germany in the early twentieth century in which it is proven that factors related to the environment can affect the attempts of a state that has the prerequisites to be a great power to actually becomes one.11
7 Such a view deserves to be separately elaborated, especially in relation to the social processes which enabled it. 8 See, for ex: Waltz N.K. Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 131. Taken from: Layne C. The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), pp. 5–51. 9 Levy, J. War and the Modern Great Power System, 1495-1975 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1983), pp. 11–19. 10 Layne C. The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring, 1993), p. 9. 11 Ibid, p. 23.
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b) The case of climate changes as one of the most important global issues reveals different theoretical and methodological problems.12 The debate on how climate change will affect the change of powers in international relations is part of the broader strategic discussion and evaluation. Although some authors estimate that climate change, per se, will not result with a change in power relations, the consequences of climate change “can lead to increasing vulnerability of the states” which could be a prerequisite for change in the international balance of power. Climate change will remodel the functions and conditions under which states operate and thus act as a catalyst for change in the diplomatic and security relations.13 Literature dealing with the climate change abounds with arguments (or “arguments”) in favor of discussions about the unfairness (or “unfairness”) of the current state in international relations. The controversy in the state of relations between the developed and non-developed part of the country seems to have largely a manifestation exactly in the causes and consequences of contemporary global politics of climate change.14 Hence, it is not surprising that certain climate change issues present cause and general framework for the interpretation of the changes in global relations. This includes also the formation of the outline of the “new order” based on power and powerlessness of the leaders in the present world order to deal with these problems and increasing importance of some other countries.15 Particular dimension in contemporary international relations is consisted out of the relations between the state’s largest GHG emitters, as well as contradictions that emerge from these relationships or are associated with those. At the same
12 Problems of implementation of the basic theoretical approaches in international relations onto climate change area and methodological problems are also emphasized in Sprinz & Luterbacher. Sprinz D., Luterbacher U. International Relations and Global Climate Change (second, revised & updated version), Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Potsdam / Germany, 1996. pp. 31–68. https://www.pik-potsdam.de/research/publications/pikreports/.files/pr21.pdf (9.3.2014). 13 Rogate C., Ferrara M. Climate Change and Power Shifts in the Arctic Region, Bologna Center Journal of International Affairs, Johns Hopkins University, 15/2012, pp. 60–69. 14 Bradley C.P., Timmons J.R. Inequality and the global climate regime: breaking the north-south impasse, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Volume 21, Number 4, December 2008, pp. 621–648. 15 For more see for ex: Hurrell A., Sengupta S. Emerging powers, North–South relations and global climate politics, International Affairs, 88: 3/2012, pp. 463–484, ftp://ftp.unccd.int/disk1/ Library/Full%20Text%202011-2012%20Full%20Text%20Publications/Article_ 3hurrellsengupta.pdf (9.6.2014). Never B. Regional Power Shifts and Climate Knowledge Systems: South Africa as a Climate Power?, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Leibniz�Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien, March 2010, http://www.die- gdi.de/uploads/media/Never_GIGA_WP_125.pdf (10.5.2014).
382 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century time, the differences in the policy’s two most developed subjects of contemporary international relations (EU and U.S.) could be considered particularly significant.16 Although the basis of conflicting interests are interests associated with the development objectives, the unique geographical location, the condition of natural resources, the structure of the dominant economic activities, participation in international trade, cultural models, the level of economic development, and so on, these societies decisively determine their attitude towards the issue of climate change both internally and international.17
Leadership role of the EU The European Union as a (regional) superpower, leader in the contemporary politics of climate change and the representative of the developed part of the globe, has a special significance in profiling of the elements of the new system and the possible relations between developed and non-developed countries.18 EU
16 Schreurs considers decision of EU to: “go forward with ratification despite American refusal of the Kyoto protocol” a historical landmark. „ Schreurs, A.M. The Climate Change Divide: The European Union, the United States, and the Future of the Kyoto Protocol, in Vig, N.J., Faure, M.G. (Eds). Green Giants?: Environmental Policies of the United States and the European Union. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press, 2004. p 208. Dreher and Pulver elaborate on the differences between EU and USA politics in the field of the dangerous waste trade with two key factors: internal factors in the existing institutions and different leadership value concepts in the environmental field on international level. Dreher K., Pulver S. Environment as ‘High Politics’? Explaining Divergence in US and EU Hazardous Waste Export Policies, Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law, Vol. 17, No. 3/2008. pp. 306–318. 17 Author is sure that detailed analysis, for which it is needed much more space, could prove direct influence of each of these particular factors on the politics formation way in the field of environment, proclaimed goals, implemented instruments, overall results that are achieved, etc. In the other direction, there could be explored the state of the environment and contribution of such a situation on one part of the factors that are mentioned here. Everything could be associated with the analysis of the impact of these factors on the possibilities and directions of development of the legal regulation of certain issues in the field of climate change and the rights of the science of climate change, including improvement of institutional forms of organization in this area. 18 Here the use of the term “leader” should be understood only conditionally taking into account the fact that it is often used in an imprecise way. The literature on climate change most often associates it with the country’s ambitions to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases. Andresen S., Agrawala S. Leaders, pushers and laggards in the making of the climate regime, Global Environmental Change, 12/2002, pp. 41-51. https://ethree.com/downloads/Climate%20Change% 20Readings/International%20Climate%20Policy/Andresen%20-%20Leaders%20Pushers% 20Laggards%20Climate.pdf (4.6.2014). See also: Torney, D., Assessing EU Leadership on Climate Change: The Limits of Diffusion in EU Relations with China and India, KFG Working Paper Series, No. 46, September 2012, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) “TheTransformative Power of Europe“ Freie Universität Berlin. http://userpage.fu-berlin.de/kfgeu/kfgwp/wpseries/WorkingPaperKFG_4 6.pdf (9.4.2014).
383 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century leadership position in the international environmental politics has different explanations.19 Some authors relate this leadership EU position to binding international agreements in the field of the environment,20 while other authors with the organization’s efforts to manage globalization processes and the impact of the regulation on certain issues and the strengthening of international institutions and interests.21 This is primarily due to the fact that globalization is usually seen as a process that represents a double threat to the environmental policy in the EU.22 In the first case, it is claimed that the trade liberalization puts pressure on EU member states to lower their standards to the lowest common denominator in order to maintain competitiveness. Another threat comes from international institutions responsible for the promotion of economic liberalization, and in particular the World Trade Organization. Fear is much higher as EU efforts to maintain stringent standards in the field of environment can be reversed by the WTO through the illegal non-tariff trade barriers. Regardless of whether these fears are real or not they initiated reaction of decision makers in the EU who have tried and are still trying to manage some aspects of globalization processes by promoting its standards around the world by supporting the implementation of multilateral agreements and strengthening the EU normative and market power.23 However, climate change as a matter of interest and activities of the EU should be perceived in the overall context of the role that the EU has in contemporary international relations, taking into account the activities that the organization conducts in environmental, energy, agriculture and other relevant sectors, including also foreign policy. Usually, share of EU GHG emissions in total global emissions and emission trends since 1990 (as a base year) is taken as one of the initial indicators in the analysis of EU policy and regulations regarding climate change. It is estimated that around 11% of total GHG emissions emitted
19 This part of the paper devoted to the leadership position of the EU is taken from Todić, D. Klimatske promene u pravu i reforma sistema upravljanja, [Climate change in the law and the reform of the government system], Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2014. pp. 143–161. 20 Jordan, A., ‘An ever more environmental union amongst the peoples of Europe?’, Environmental Politics, No. 3/2008, pp. 485–491. Schlosberg, D., Rinfret, S., Ecological modernisation, American style, Environmental Politics, No. 2/2008, pp. 254–275. 21 See for ex: Van Schaik, L., Schunz, S. Explaining EU Activism and Impact in Global Climate Politics: Is the Union a Norm- or Interest-Driven Actor?, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 50. No. 1/2012, pp. 169–186. 22 This leaves aside the debate about other aspects of the problem in the field of environment and their impact on the EU. For security concerns, see, e.g. Robins N. Greening European Foreign Policy, European Environment, Vol. 6/1996, pp. 173–182. 23 Kelemen R. D., Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy, Paper presented at The European Union Studies Assocation, 11th Biennial International Conference, Marina Del Rey, California, April 23rd-25th, 2009. http://aei.pitt.edu/33075/1/kelemen._r._daniel.pdf. (16.5.2012) pp. 4-5.
384 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century in the world are the emissions coming from the EU.24 At the same time it is estimated that the reduction of GHG emissions from the EU-15, after the acceptance of the obligations prescribed by KP compared to 1990 (reduction of 8%), is significantly achieved while at the same time ensuring economic growth. In 2011, GHG emissions from the EU-15 were reduced by 14.9% compared to the base level of in 1990.
Modern politics objectives in the area of climate change a) Various documents and international agreements contain certain elements of importance for understanding the goals of contemporary politics in the area of climate change. However, this discussion in the context of the need for clarification of new tendencies in international relations has the character of the preceding question: could the agreement on common goals (and goals themselves) constitute a criterion for defining the elements of the “new” world order in terms of conflicting interests that were previously indicated. Of course, the debate on the objectives and opportunities of global emissions limits is associated with the level and reliability of existing scientific knowledge about the causes of climate change and the pattern of answers in part related to the anthropogenic emissions of GHG. However, one of the most critical parts of the debate on the politics of climate change is the issue of the level of emission limitation that is needed to stabilize global temperatures. Thus, the question of “safe” level of emissions remains open in a similar context as it could be seen as an open question of “safe” levels of pollution in the environment in general. Grist considers these ideas about the limits of GHG emissions in the context of the idea of ”ecological limits” that are associated with sustainable development in two ways. In the basis of these are neo-Malthusian theories of the limits of the resources of the Earth and its population. “Reformists” use them for establishing rational limits of burdening the environment, and “radical” access to this debate uses this as an argument to set much stricter criteria.25 It is believed that the determination limit of 2°C, as a limit beyond which an increase in the average global temperature (in relation to the pre-industrial period) could have serious consequences, is so far the most successful attempt to make goals from Article 2 of the UNFCCC operational. In this sense there should also been considered the goals on which agreement was
24 See: http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/g-gas/index_en.htm. (12.3.2013). 25 Grist N. Positioning climate change in sustainable development discourse, Journal of international development, No. 20/2008, pp. 783-803. For the historical overview of the discussions on the needs (possibilities) of the limitation of the CO2 emissions with aim of limiting the temperature rise for 2°C see Shaw, C. The dangerous limits of dangerous limits: climate change and the precautionary principle, op. cit. pp. 103–123.
385 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century reached in Copenhagen, Cancun and other conferences of member states of the international agreement.26 Surely, conclusions of the last Conference of the Parties (Warsaw, end of 2013) which “opened the way for a new climate agreement”,27 have its impact as well. b) The objectives of the EU in the field of climate change have been defined in a number of key strategic documents of the organization.28 The basic elements of policy in this area could be considered those formulated in the General Programme of Action of the Union in the field of environmental protection until 2020: “Living well within the limits of our planet”,29 Roadmap to a competitive low-carbon economy for the period until 2050,30 the Policy Proposals in the area of climate change and energy for the period from 2020 to 2030,31 the strategy “Europe 2020: a strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”,32 and so on.
26 See decisions COP 15. i COP 16: Decision 2/CP.15, Copenhagen Accord (UN Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1, 30 March 2010), at paragraph 2. Decision 1/CP.16, n. 20 above, at 3. However, the thesis that real origins and foundation of this goal are not entirely known seems interesting. Geden, O., Modifiying tghe 2°C Target, Climate Policy Objectives in the Contested Terrain of Scentific Policy Advice, Political Preferences, and Rising Emissions, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2013. pp. 7–8. 27 Report of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenth session, held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013, FCCC/CP/2013/10, 31 January 2014. 28 Part of the text relating to the EU goals is taken from the document prepared for the National convent on EU: Todić, D., Klimatske promene: između ciljeva Evropske unije i nacionalnih prioriteta i mogućnosti, Nacionalni konvent o Evropskoj uniji, Radna grupa „Životna sredina“ (Beograd, Narodna skupština Republike Srbije, 5. maj 2014. godine). 29 Decision No 1386/2013/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 November 2013 on a General Union Environment Action Programme to 2020 ‘Living well, within the limits of our planet’, OJ L 354, 28/12/2013, pp. 171–200, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/ PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013D1386&from=EN (21.4.2014). 30 A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European Commission, COM(2011) 112 final, Brussels, 8.3.2011. 31 See: A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, {SWD(2014) 15 final}, {SWD(2014) 16 final}, European Commission, COM(2014) 15 final Brussels, 22.1.2014. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal- content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0015&from=EN (20.4.2014). It has been planned that not later than October 2014 the decision is made in relation to this plan. For more see also: Green paper, A 2030 framework for climate and energy policies, European Commission, COM(2013) 169 final, Brussels, 27.3.2013. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= CELEX:52013DC0169&from=EN (20.4.2014). 32 For more see also: Todić, D., Klimatske promene, u Kronja, J. (ur) Vodič kroz Strategiju EU 2020, Evropski pokret u Srbiji, 2011. str. 64–80.
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Three formulated purposes of the EU in the field of climate change (reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by at least 20% compared to the level of in 1990,33 the 20% share of renewable energy in electricity consumption and improving energy efficiency through the reduction of primary energy consumption 20% compared to projected levels) strongly emphasized the fundamental character of the energy sector and the need for an integrated approach to the objectives and instruments in the different sectoral areas of importance to the field of climate change. Therefore in order to understand the implications of such defined goals there must be taken into account the overall EU policies in the field of sustainable development,34 environment,35 natural resources,36 industrial sector, followed by agriculture, transport, civil protection, etc. which require much more detailed analysis. A number of different instruments to achieve the objectives, embroidered in other broader objectives are divided into two major groups that are entitled “Industrial policy for the globalization era”37 and “Resource efficient Europe”.38
33 Increasing emission reductions to 30% by 2020th year is proposed under the condition that the other, both developed and developing countries commit to a fair share of future global climate agreement after the expiry of the first commitment period on the Kyoto Protocol. In May 2010, the European Commission issued a statement containing an analysis of the implications of different levels of ambition (target of 20% and 30%) and assessment of the risk of carbon leakage. European Commission, 2010. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage, {SEC(2010) 650}, Brussels, 26.5.2010, COM(2010) 265 final. For more details on GHG emissions see: Annual European Community greenhouse gas inventory 1990–2004 and inventory report 2006, Submission to the UNFCCC Secretariat, European Environment Agency, 2006; Report of the review of the initial report of the European Community, FCCC/IRR/2007/EC, 15 February 2008. 34 For more see: Todić, D., Ekološka politika EU u svetlu strateških opredelenja u oblasti održivog razvoja, Pravni život, str. 53–66. 35 For more see: Decision No 1600/2002/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 July 2002 laying down the Sixth Community Environment Action Programme, (OJ L 242, 10.09.2002, pp. 1–15). 36 For more see: Todić, D. Strategija Evropske unije o održivom korišćenju prirodnih resursa, Evropsko zakonodavstvo, br. 29-30. 2009. str. 104–113. 37 An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, {SEC(2010) 1272}, {SEC(2010) 1276}, European Commissions, Brussels, COM(2010) 614. 38 A resource-efficient Europe – Flagship initiative under the Europe 2020 Strategy, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, European Commission, Brussels, 26.1.2011, COM(2011) 21 final.
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Conclusion The need to revise the purpose and character of the discussion about the “old” and “new” world order, so to include in this discussion the criteria in the area of climate change, stems from the growing importance of these issues in contemporary international relations and the interests of the major contradictions subjects of international relations. “Injustice” of the existing system of international relations is considered as one of the key characteristics of the world order in the area of climate change, and it has different dimensions (developed- undeveloped, contradictions within the group of most developed, within the group of not developed, the contradictions at the level of individual states, etc.). Redefining goals and agreement on the instruments of global policy on climate change means (mostly) different defining of key terms and relations between states which are large emitters of greenhouse gas emissions, i.e. developing countries. In this context, the leading position of the European Union has a special significance, regardless of the possible limitations that such a role can have. The emergence of the “new” world order could be tied to an agreement on the global objectives of the international community in the field of climate change, if such objectives and instruments for their realization would lead to the creation of conditions for solving the problem of climate change. Such a conclusion can be derived from the consideration of the causes and consequences of climate change, as well as the depth and nature of the change that agreement on solving the problem of climate change could have on relations in the international community. EU targets include certain elements whose development and application may support constitution of a new approach in defining the terms “old” and “new” world order.
388 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Jędrzej CZEREP1
KRAJOWCY MOVEMENT REVIVED
Abstract: The krajowcy movement, which evolved on the Polish-Lithuanian- Belarusian borderland since the early XX century until the Second World War, remains a largely forgotten phenomenon. In the time of growth of nationalisms and conflicts between nations, it proposed an alternative concept of identity for the peoples of the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania – unity in diversity, understanding of each other’s aspirations, rejection of being split along the ethnic lines and in fact, rejection of recognising these very lines. Despite its failure to take roots as a vivid local identity and to create any political project, ideas of krajowcy re-discovered in the context of the Eastern Europe’s situation in the early XXI century seem surprisingly accurate and inspiring. Their perceptions could be applicable both to the post-Schengen borderlands and to the regions where nationalisms and separatisms remain destabilising driving forces. Key words: krajowcy movement, Polish-Lithuanian-Belarusian borderland, nationalism, identity.
Introduction In Eastern Europe, decades before the IWW were marked by the rapid growth of nationalisms, often in the situation of lack of one’s own statehood. These processes took very peculiar shape in the Russian domain, on the territories of former GDL – where unique identity was created: on one side it referred to the Noblemen’s heritage of full citizenship and patriotism derived from freedoms, on the other: to the historical belonging of different ethnic groups which absorbed “Lithuanity” - Ruthenians (later Belarusians), Poles, Lithuanians, Tatars, Karaims, Jews. Period between the partition of Polish and Lithuanian statehood (late XVIII century) and the I World war dramatically changed context of the narration about the identity in historic and by-the-time-present-day terms. Nationalism became language of the day with language as its defining factor. What was specific about
1 Jędrzej Czerep, Ph.D., Student of the Political Science, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, Warsaw, Analyst at the Amicus Europae Foundation Fundacji.
389 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the Lithuanian nationalism by the time was the requirement of rejecting the Polish heritage in the situation of widespread use of Polish language and culture – in other words, to become real Lithuanian one had to reject any Polish trace on one’s personal history. The trend was less vital among Belarusians – here the calls for social change were more vocal than nationalism, but still the feeling of being different grew. In this circumstances, most of the Polish people, especially those who had little connection with the local peculiarities started to look at the former Grand Duchy of Lithuania (or. “the historic Lithuania”) as at the Polish cultural frontline, where ones feelings of being Polish were endangered by the hostile indigenous peoples of different languages.
A different view The krajowcy movement looked at the question of identity in a completely different way. First of all – it did not consider other nationalities to be enemies, but partners. It did not accept the logic of putting one group before the other, and of rejecting anybody’s right to feel being part of the heritage of GDL. On one hand, the movement seemed to be a relict of the past, of times when there was no notion of nationality in its modern sense, something calling back to the mythical past. On the other hand, its voice was, at the time, not only modern, but revolutionary – and out-distanced nationalisms by its down-to-earth perspective. One of the founding fathers of the movement, the Nobleman and landowner Michał Römer2 wrote: “I never considered the Belarusian or Lithuanian peoples as something separate from me. I have always seen everything that the country contained – Lithuanians here, Belarusians in the east of the historic Lithuania, the Polish in their mansions and in the cities – as one entity, no matter it was multilingual”. In this passage, one can find a notion that laid foundations of the krajowcy movement – very intuitionist, natural rejection of the division between “ours” and “the stranger”. One of the younger, radically democratic theoreticians of the movement, Stanisław Swianiewicz, who derived his thought from call for equality of nations’ rights in the same territory, formed on its basis a postulate of radical political transformation. In the founding article of the periodical “Nasza Krajowość” he defined his understanding of the ideas of the movement: “If the relations between the nations in the former GDL, and the bordering Polish and Ukrainian lands are organized as in Switzerland, we could bring an important input to the Western civilization”3 He also pointed to the need of mobilizing the masses for the movement, to open it to other circles than the intellectuals: “The new social reality requires bringing these new ideas to wide masses”.
2 M. Römer, Wspomnienia, cyt. za J.Sawicki, Michał Römer a problemy narodowościowe na ziemiach byłego Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, Toruń 1998. 3 S.Swianiewicz, Nasza krajowość, Włóczęga , nr 1/1932.
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Römer’s ideas crystallised during the era before the independent states were recreated in the Central and Eastern Europe. When project of restoring the Grand Duchy of Lithuania within its historical borders was still on the table, Swianewicz came with his ideas much later, in a different context – his kraj (land) was already divided between the new states (mostly Poland and Lithuania) whose policies towards minorities were largely unfriendly, often without proper understanding of the dynamics. There were different background than, different experiences, impulses and influences that led the two men to similar conclusions. The common ground was the sense of attachment to the best traditions of the multicultural Grand Duchy, not understood to the majority of the people in their times. There is no doubt that founders and the later continuators of the krajowcy movement failed – they were unable to stop the course of events that led the nations of the former Grand Duchy towards collision, not to influence the decision-makers to think about multiculturalism positively. Policies of the new states were effective in breaking the ties that kept its populations together. Decades later, in the wake of unifying Europe and erasing the borders on one hand and revival of the separatism on another that heritage of the crazy-men from the first half of the XX century seems to be surprisingly fresh. In many aspects, they were beyond their times. The basic difficulty krajowcy faced ware differences in perception of the Grand Duchy. To Poles it was the mythologised Kresy (The Peripheries), meaning the borderland which was to be constantly re-conquered and polonised. Lithuanians understood it as the heartland of their statehood, which came under foreign occupation, and which they needed to retake. Also, many Belarusians considered the ownership of the former Grand Duchy as their historical living space. The main axis of the conflict was the question of ownership of Vilnius, old capital of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which was claimed by both Polish and Lithuanians. As a result, the natural self-penetration and equivalence of the terms “Lithuanian”, “Polish”, “Belarusian”, still widespread by the late XIX, early XX century, ceased to exist. The flagship example of this disappearing tradition was the history of the family of Iwanowski from the area of Lida (in modern-day Belarus). Members of this family, which naturally absorbed influences from different traditions of the former Grand Duchy, took different identities without seeing any contradiction in such choices. Jerzy Iwanowski went after the Polish option, he was a prominent activist of the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), later became minister of industry of the reborn Republic of Poland; his brother Wacław (Belarusian: Vacłaŭ Ivanoŭski) became a leading activist of the Belarusian national renaissance, organiser of Belarusian schools, and in the short-lived Belarusian Peoples Republic its minister of education; their third brother Tadeusz (lit: Tadas Ivanauskas) accepted Lithuanian identity, was involved in the Lithuanian national movement, later became professor at the University of Kaunas. The family’s story reflects krajowcy’s point of view. They considered identities of
391 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century people who grew from the tradition of the Grand Duchy to be composed of Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian components. For nationalists, who kept hostility towards other nations, such an attitude was weird, suspicious and incomprehensible.
Conflicting traditions: “Kresy” versus “krajowość” In Poland, difficulty in identifying and appreciating the cultural richness of “Kresy” partially originated in mistake of “sleeping-over” the moment when Lithuanian and (to smaller extend) Belarusian nations became mature. Lithuanians blamed Polish for their feeling of being above. As J.A.Herbaczewski noted, Lithuanian president Antanas Smetona explained failure to achieve compromise with the Polish: “I proposed them (…) posts in the government, but they refused. They rejected them with badly masked contempt for my peasant origin... (…) They hate us as peasants and that’s it… If the was a prince Radziwiłł [famous aristocratic family – J.C.], there would be a full room of the same Poles… Prince Radziwiłł is not the same as some Mr Smetona, whose grand-grandfather might have been beaten with a stick by his master, ancestor of Radziwiłłs”.4 What was also sensitive and caused bad emotions in Lithuania was a nuance of the Polish language which used the term “na Litwie” to say “in Lithuania”. It sounded as if it described another Polish province and not an independent country- equally as “na Kujawach” [in the Kuyavian province], “na Mazowszu” [in Mazovia] which sounded like “on one’s own backyard” and not like “w Niemczech” [in Germany] or “w Rosji” [in Russia], therefore, “abroad”. Poles often considered the Lithuanian renaissance movement as something artificial, part of some opaque intrigue, likely inspired by the Russian Tsarist authorities to rebel (Lithuanian) peasants against Poles. It was not an isolated way of thinking in Europe by late XIX, early XX century. As historian Kazimierz Buchowski noted, Baltic Germans also tended to think Russia supports the Latvian and Estonian movements. Hungarians blamed Austria, and then Russia to be behind Slovakian, Ukrainian, Romanian and Serbian movements; Russians blamed Austria for inspiring Ukrainians; Bulgarians, Greeks and Serbians accused each other of using the Macedonian case instrumentally; in Belgium, it was Germany to be blamed for the Flemish separatism.5 Krajowcy did not repeat the same mistake and understood it perfectly well that they have to treat Lithuanians and Belarusians as equal partners to build a common future, at least in the Vilnius voivodeship.
4 J. A. Herbaczewski, Litwa a Polska. Rozważania na czasie, Wilno 1921. 5 K.Buchowski, Litwomani i polonizatorzy. Mity, wzajemne postrzeganie i stereotypy w stosunkach polsko-litewskich w pierwszej połowie XX wieku, Białystok 2006.
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Krajowcy consequently protested against the policy of polonisation of minorities in the Vilnius voivodeship and other regions of the East. The central and local authorities expected that at least fellow Slavs (Ukrainians, Belarusians, and undecided “locals” from Polesia), if dominated, would soon adopt Polish identity. The writer Ziemowit Szczerek described the process by recalling that in the memorial book issued [in 1928 – J.C.] for the X anniversary of Polish independence, the double morality was exposed in the full swing. Those authors who presented achievements of 10 years of the Polish authority in the provinces regained from Germany cried after the harms caused by Germanisation. But these authors, who wrote about the Eastern regions [“Kresy”], were excited about the soon-to-come day when all the Slavic minorities would be fully polonised. (…) In that way, after more than a century of imprisonment [Partitions of Poland and foreign rule – J.C.], we took the role of the oppressors and proved that history did not teach us anything. The truth is on the side of the stronger – Poland only seemed to have learned such an uncomplicated lesson from the times of Partitions and foreign rule.6 Krajowcy refused such logic in favour of drive to get to know one another. It was not accident that a strong centre of the movement’s thought was born from the student Academic Vagabond Club, an informal group that spent free time on walking tours around the Vilnius voivodeship. Exploring their kraj, they discovered its real, unideologised face and learned how to appreciate differences. Many famous personalities were close to this circle, including prominent Polish historian of the Tatar origin, Lech Beynar (better known as Paweł Jasienica), and a Noble Prize winner, poet Czesław Miłosz, who considered himself both Polish and Lithuanian. One of the leaders of the later mutation of the Club, Seweryn Wysłouch, commenting the Polish administration’s policies regarding “Kresy” wrote: “Who is unable to show respect and goodwill to Belarusian, Lithuanian, Jew or Ukrainian, doesn’t have the [moral] right to represent Polish state on the territories inhabited by those peoples”.7 He went further with this attitude publishing numerous articles in the Belarusian language. Other supporter of the krajowcy’s ideas, Polish writer Józef Mackiewicz manifested his solidarity with the minorities in the wake of the army’s action of destroying Ukrainian Orthodox churches in 1938, changed confession and declared himself an Orthodox. The very term of “Kresy” undergone an interesting evolution and played a role in deepening those divisions that krajowcy tried to prevent. The word for first used by the writer Wincenty Pol in his rhapsody “Mohort” from 1854, when Polish statehood did not exist. He invented this word to describe an imagined Polish arcadia, located somewhere far away in the East.8 The name was originally
6 Z.Szczerek, Koniec pewnej Polski, http://fakty.interia.pl/tylko_u_nas/news/koniec-pewnej- polski,1369130,3439. 7 Zaczarowane koło, “Włóczęga”, nr7/1933. 8 K.Buchowski, Litwomani i polonizatorzy…
393 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century attributed to Ukraine only, but later was accepted as a joint name for all the territories to the east of the Polish Kingdom (the Polish autonomy within the Russian Empire), which largely corresponded with the nowadays eastern borders of Poland. Only by the late XIX century, in the time when historic novels of Henryk Sienkiewicz, describing great Polish victories in the wars of the XVII century, were published with intention to boost the patriotic feelings (they had a great impact on the mass consciousness), the notion of “Kresy” merged with the notion of the war in defence of Polishness, threatened by the invaders. In the period between the First and the Second World Wars, when independent Polish state was rebuilt, the outside enemy (from whom independence was regained) was replaced by the enemy from the within (the minorities) in the drive to realise the ideal of “real Poland”.9 In this situation, the eastern voivodeships started to be perceived as the area to be re-conquered again, a hostile, polluted land, inhabited by the uncertain element. This was the point of view passed on to the soldiers of the Border Protection Corps, whose members were only recruited in the central and western provinces, who were than taken to the “territory of the enemy”.10 Later many of them settled there with their families, on preferential terms, to strengthen the Polish ownership and to weaken the minorities. This was exactly the way of thinking that krajowcy were opposing. They did not want to look at their local homeland as a territory to be transformed, but as a land which one need to learn about and appreciate the way it is (the way it was, to be precise). For people from the central Poland, “Kresy” meant peripheries, end of the known, civilised world. Krajowcy saw it as centre of their living space, their family “kraj”, with Vilnius as its historic capital. This difference in perceptions created enormous tension with those professing mythology of “Kresy”.
Krajowcy’s ideas revived? The modern-day continuation of the krajowcy’s way of thinking can be found in the processes of familiarising and accepting the “German” past by the citizens of Wrocław or Gdańsk, which was long ousted and ignored. Polish inhabitants who moved into these cities after the Second World War (replacing Germans who were driven out with the fall of Nazis) originally looked at the German remains as at something foreign, unwanted. It stared to change only in the 70s and 80s of the XX century with the success of the novels by Gunter Grass (“The Tin Drum”) and Paweł Huelle (“Weised Dawidek”), which raised interest in the everyday life of the Gdańsk’s Germans. The process was completed with the enormous success
9 J. Tomaszewski, Stereotyp mniejszości narodowych w II Rzeczpospolitej, w: Mity i stereotypy w dziejach Polski, Warszawa 1991. 10 M. Henzler, Od słupów Chrobrego do Schengen, Polityka, 4.11.2009.
394 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of the photo-albums “Był Sobie Gdańsk” (“once upon a time, there was Gdańsk”) which documented the past of the German town – in result some kind of a fashion to discover the non-Polish past of the town and to include it into the city’s identity. Germanness was accepted as part of the bigger entity – analogically as when krajowcy called for preserving non-Polish elements of the local heritage. The Centre “Borderland of Arts, Cultures and Nations” which was established in the 90s in Sejny (on the present-day Polish-Lithuanian border) often refers to the krajowcy thought in its publications and considers itself their direct successor. The original concept of the “man of the borderlands” (which is being developed by the Centre), enriched by various influences, for whom multiculturalism is natural, corresponds perfectly with works of krajowcy. Also, Lithuanian and Belarusian historiography started to discover the krajowcy’s heritage – which is its biggest posthumous achievement of the movement. Despite krajowcy’s attempts to attract attention and find partners among other nationalities, they remained almost exclusively a Polish intellectual movement until the Second World War. With the efforts of the Lithuanian historians gathered around the “Lietuvių Atgimimo Istorijos Studijos” (Studies on the Rebirth of the Lithuanian Nation)11 series from the 90s, a new, non- ethnocentric notion of Lithuanianhood was accepted into the nation’s intellectual circuit. These historians popularised the idea of accepting members of other nationalities to carry the Lithuanian identity. In Belarus the historian, Aleksander Smalańczuk researches the history of the movement. In his book „Pamiż krajovaściu i nacyjanalnaj idejaj” (“Between krajowość and the national idea”), based on more than 500 positions in the bibliography, mostly Polish and Belarusian literature, he analyses influence of the krajowcy movement in Belarus and Lithuania until 1917.12 Also, a popular Belarusian songwriter Wiktar Szałkiewicz admits his fascination with the movement’s ideas – in his songs he switches between the languages and topics attributed with the different nationalities of the former Grand Duchy. There are also reflections of the krajowcy’s assumptions in the grassroots initiatives such as project Lithuania,13 which promotes resurrection of the “Litvin” (“Lithuanian”) nationality in its historic sense. Authors of the website www.litvania.org explain how they understand the modernised “Litvin” term which in their sense does not mean Lithuanian speaking: Litvins is a nation which
11 D. Staliūnas, From ethnocentric to civic history: changes in contemporary Lithuanian historical studies, Emerging Meso-Areas in the Former Socialist Countries: Histories Revived or Improvised? Hokkaido, 2006. 12 A. Smalańczuk, Pamiż krajovaściu i nacyjanalnaj idejaj. Polski ruch na biełaruskich i litoŭskich ziemiach, Grodno 2001. 13 http://www.litvania.org.
395 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century is being developed on the basis of the openness – “open nation”. (…) Everyone who feels such a need, may become Litvin. This is almost a repetition of what Swianiewicz proposed in 1932 when he wrote about krajowcy’s ideas and their relation to the former Grand Duchy: One doesn’t have to be from the lands of the former Grand Duchy [to become follower of the krajowcy’s ideology]. It is open to everyone who understands it and supports such an idea14. It is fair to say krajowcy were the pioneers of the non- ethnic understanding of the nationality (which was familiar to many Western Europeans, for example French). Also, a Lithuanian writer Tomas Venclova takes a lot from the krajowcy’s heritage. In his book “To Describe Vilnius”15 recalls its multicultural aura in a balances way. In 1998 in Poznań (Poland), first international conference entirely dedicated to the krajowcy movement was held.16 Polish, Lithuanian and Belarusian historians analysed the present-day dimension and potential of the krajowcy’s heritage. The Centre “Borderland of Arts, Cultures and Nations” issued a monumental “The Book of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania”, 4-language compilation of essays whose authors derive their inspirations from the multi-dimensional traditions of the Grand Duchy and of krajowcy.
Conclusion Conditions for resurrection of the krajowcy’s ideas seem to be promising. They find acceptance among the circles who does not accept aggressive nationalism and who consider cultural variety as an asset. Heritage of krajowcy is on the slow return mode as a source of inspiration and an original input into the European thought.
14 S. Swianiewicz, Nasza krajowość... 15 T. Venclova, Opisać Wilno, 2006. 16„Krajowość - tradycje zgody narodów w dobie nacjonalizmu”.
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Milorad ĐOKOVIĆ1
DEFINITION OF STATE AND ANARCHISM IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Abstract: As the theoretical determination of the contemporary state complex and contradictory question often reduced to a formal, legal aspects and analysis of its institutions there is a more complex definition of modern anarchism, antipodes state and government in the changed socio-historical circumstances in which the New World Order is establishing planetary domination of the United States and NATO pact. The author performs „unbundling” of the state and anarchism through a comparative analysis of its classic and contemporary definitions with emphasis on the causal link of these terms to the changed geopolitical relations, “the world that is changing.” Man of socialism and capitalism, especially economically underdeveloped countries and countries in transition, the beginning of the third millennium, I feel frustrated, because the ideas of democracy, economic prosperity, and equality have lost their vitality, despite the apparent strengthening of liberalism and social justice. Economically developed countries, organized in transnational associations are trying at all costs to maintain and strengthen its dominance in the creation and imposition of unique patterns in the fields of politics, economy, military doctrine and human rights in terms of globalization and the New World Order. In response to the crisis of the modern state in the New World Order, re-occurring anarchist ideas through a number of anti-globalization movements and authors whose theoretical debates anticipate the society in which it affirm man’s freedom, equality and social justice based on a utopian organization of the human community. Key words: state, power, anarchism, globalization, New World Order, inclusive democracy, casino-capitalism, precariat.
1 Milorad Đoković, Ph.D., Singidunum University, Faculty of Business Valjevo.
397 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Introduction The demolition of the old world order, bringing into question the idea of socialist development of society, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the world blocks, the expansion of globalization, it seemed that there was a creation of the New World Order (NWO) as the optimal framework for the international geo-political harmony, economic and political stability of the world. Social sciences in theirs messianic role to systematize and analyze social phenomena often tend to their categorical apparatus, and unilateral methodological observations introduce concepts that are not adequately and objectively seeing what is said. One such social phenomenon is the New World Order, which primarily involves the arrangement of the world according to rules which can be managed as an attempt to create such international mechanisms that will be applicable to all countries, regardless of their ideological, organizational, economic and institutional arrangement. On the other hand, any concrete discussion and theoretical observations on the concepts, such as the New World Order, state and anarchism, must come from the identification of a specific type of society and the state, their relocating from one historical context to another. Many Western political analysts believe that the creation of the New World Order really is a triumph of “free market” and the liberal concept of social development of the idea of development of socialist society. However, the fate of all the major projects is to have a utopian mission and, as such, eventually, experience a downfall, much faster than expected. When it seemed that the man found a desirable path of social development, declaring the liberal concept of the salvific Demiurge survival of modern civilization in the third millennium, in 2007 there was a major economic crisis and downturn of neoliberalism, that is their salvation sought by state intervention in economic and financial flows, the same weapons that toppled Soviet socialist empire. It turned out that the temporary triumph of liberalism over Marxism, capitalism over socialism does not mean the achievement of earthly paradise on earth. As noted by Eric Hobsbawm, world that broke the eighties of the 20th century was shaped by the consequences of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917.2 Moreover, the world is shaped by the consequences of liberalism, the New World Order, so the scholars of different ideological orientations were confused when, in many developed economies, has been a mass protest, and the movement “Occupy Wall Street” with a demand to break the corporate greed and corruption, reduce unemployment and provide more social rights of all citizens. New world order turned into a new world chaos in the company risk. Pandora’s Box of uncertainty,
2 Erik Hobsbom, „Doba ekstrema”, Dereta, Beograd, 2002.
398 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century fear and despair is open and the idea of a modern state, democracy, justice, solidarity and human rights is questioned. Promising neoliberal dream, based on private property, competition, knowledge and ideas, not available to most people on the planet. On the contrary, the gap between rich and poor countries is constantly expanding, as illustrated by the fact that ten percent of the political and economic elite have about 70 percent of the world’s wealth. As a reaction to the strengthening of the modern state in the New World Order, a re-occurring anarchist idea of learning with their new forms adapted to the spirit of the times. In the 21st century, as well as resistance to militaristic and economically strong states that their power is based on economic exploitation of raw materials and energy poor countries and conducting so-called democratic processes, there are anti-globalization movements whose main feature is anarchism, and many intellectuals who, through art, science and propaganda present their messages, especially the U.S. imperial order. Contemporary anarchism in relation to the classic had its metamorphosis, becoming not just an idea that is fighting against the government and the state, but also a movement that offers alternative forms of social organization and life of the people in the community.
The New World Order - between the rise and crisis Each order is referred to as “stable and predictable patterns of behavior”3, in collusion with the political power and the right to manage the powerful principle of hierarchy and cooperation, on a voluntary basis. Referring to the historical development of the international system, some authors point out that it is important to know the answer to the question “which way?”4 to accordingly determine the nature of “world order and global society”,5 Avramov directly link led globalization, the impact of the political elite to achieve global interests of multinationals and the role Trilateral Commission in establishing the New World Order, by traditional international institutions.6 Dealing with the relationship between the NWO and the nation-state by Simeunovic notes, “Under the New World Order means the establishment of indisputable political, economic and military dominance of the United States and a group high-developed Western countries, gathered in or around some of the international organization of
3 Endrju Hejvud, Politika, Clio, Beograd, 2004, p. 717. 4 Dragan R. Simić, Uzburkanost u globalnoj politici, Srpska politička misao, No. 4/2008, Beograd, p. 27. 5 Ibid, p. 27. 6 Smilja Avramov, Trilaterarna komisija, Idij, Veternik, 1998.
399 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century economic, political or military nature over almost all other countries of the world. This dominance is manifested by the formation of the realization of its strategic military, political and economic interests and the interests of their allies, the conduct of foreign policy, mainly from a position of strength…”7 At the same time modern imperialism is doing everything to force other states” that the interests of the dominant countries NWO experience and recognized as its own”,8 as seen in the example of Serbia, which has fifteen years of transition and economic nightmare of hopelessness. Historically, new world order in the early 20th century had a contradictory meaning, to be instrumentalized by different theoretical approaches and author who gave him some enlightenment and renaissance role. After the Second World War, the name was instilled hope and fear that there will be established a new world government, based on the balance of power between the United States and the USSR, as a barrier to future wars and regional conflicts. On the other hand, this phrase is associated with a negative ideological connotation, based on the theory of conspiracy. Left felt during the Cold War that the aim of the West to establish a global system based on capitalist organization and the liberal market, “right-wing forces” amounted to a conspiracy theory Moscow to establish a new world order of communist rule. This term was first used non-governmental South Commission led by Julius Nyerere with leading economists “Third World”.9 In a study published in 1990, examines the relationship between North – South, in order to highlight the devastating effect of the market on the widening gap between rich and poor countries. In public and among developed countries work of this committee has not met with corresponding positive reaction. Theoretical determination of the wider development of the New World Order received after the end of the Cold War between East and West, the destruction of the Berlin Wall on 9 November 1989, the disintegration of the USSR and in many individual countries and the defeat of socialism as a world process. The New World Order is a utopian mission to establish a harmonious society between countries and prevent conflicts, religious and international conflicts. This order, which was created as a result of a new global power between the United States and the “rest of the world”, according to Haywood, “was to be based on mutual respect for international norms and moral standards, not on ideological conflict and the balance of fear”,10 opposition to aggression, reduction the scope of the
7 Dragan Simeunović, Novi svetski poredak i nacionalna država, Ferko, Beograd, 2000, pp. 7–8. 8 Ibid, p. 19. 9 Noam Čomski, Svetski poredak - stari i novi, Studentski kulturni centar, Beograd, 1998. 10 Endrju Hejvud, Politika, Clio, Beograd, 2004, p. 260.
400 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century military’s arsenal, addressing international conflicts through peaceful means and full respect for human rights. Soon, it was clear that the goal of establishing a New World Order was not directed toward the creation of a “harmonious world community”, but he had a political dimension to the establishment and expansion of American imperial power.11 Neutralizing the Russian imperial power and the establishment of new geopolitical relationships in international relations, the West believed that the new world shaped under his baton, using different forms of pressure, of blackmail, economic sanctions, to overt military intervention by international law. The main proponent of American foreign policy, Zbigniew Brzezinski new global policy expressed by the words: “The new century will belong to America, so that the basic American mission to shape it.”12 The strategic objective of American foreign policy is to fulfill three basic missions: managing power relations and their forms in the world; closing out the conflicts and terrorism, and weapons of mass destruction, promoting collective peacekeeping and reduction of inequality in the world and the environmental threats to global prosperity. Soon it turned out that the United States playing the role of “world gendarme”, applying all forms of political and military power was not able to manage crises and conflicts in international relations. At the end of the 20th century, in 1999, 19 members of NATO pact, by international law, bombed Yugoslavia, and in 2007 led to the declaration of independence of Kosovo, with the support of the West. In response to the militaristic expansionism of the United States in the Islamic world terrorist organization “Al Qaeda” on September 11, 2001, successfully carried out the attack on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon building in Washington. Citing a variety of motives and reasons for military intervention around the world, the United States, with the help of its allies on military aggression against Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya, justifying their actions combating terrorism, banning the use of chemical weapons and the destruction of non-democratic regimes. Supporting national protests called. “Arab Spring”, and the rebellion in the Ukraine, the United States openly participate in the destruction of the legally elected representatives around the world. In many European countries at the beginning of the third millennium, Protestants hold their government for
11 In a speech to a joint sitting of Congress on September 11, 1990, George Bush Army has used the term “new world order”, saying: “A new form of cooperation between nations began, and today we are witnessing a unique and extraordinary moment ... For these turbulent times ( ... ) can create a new world order ( ... ) under which the nations of the world, North and South, will be able to live a prosperous and harmony“. 12 Zbignjev Bžežinski, Druga šansa Amerike, Službeni glasnik – Fakultet bezbednosti, Beograd, 2009, p. 7.
401 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century mismanagement of foreign policy and the loss of basic social rights, from employment to social protection. It turned out that the New World Order, in which “the United States chosen by God” and engaged by history to be a model for the world (George W. Bush), they were able to contribute to the creation of a harmonious society among the states, or to contribute to the promotion of democracy and transform Islamized society into a modern secular state, but, on the contrary, become a destabilizing factor in the geopolitical map of the world. Fearing that there would be a decline in America’s global role in the world, Brzezinski rightly warned: “The global political awakening is historically anti-imperialist, anti-Western political and emotionally extremely anti-American”,13 bringing this trend to the historical destiny of imperialist powers.14 On the other hand, the great economic crisis has shown that the neo-liberal concept of social development is not able to resolve many conflicts and social unrest within economically developed countries. In these historical circumstances have become legitimate claims which seek to revise the existing values of modern states, as well as many anti-globalization movements around the world in which anarchist thought has an important role.
Theoretical determination of the contemporary state The modern world that is rapidly changing is impossible without the existence of a state, which is in symbiosis with social and environmental interests of the citizens. From ancient times to the present, there are two opposing theoretical views on the importance of the state – for one it’s a passing historical category and the other condition for the survival of civilization and organized the lives of people and communities. According to prof. Dr. Jovan Djordjević “without determining the essence of the state there is no scientific explanation of this institution: unable to find either its origin or its history or its role, nor his place, even its emergence lawfully monitor every socially conditioned by a political organization.”15 In the modern sense of the word state is a recent phenomenon and was created during the Renaissance in the 15th century, the term was first used by the state Niccolo Machiavelli (Niccolo Machiavelli). The encyclopedic literature is characterized by the following explanation: “The name of the state is derived from the Latin status (in the context of the status word Romanae). This is the root of the French word etat, Italian stato, the English state, estado Spanish, German Staat,
13 Ibid, p. 117. 14 Pol Kenedi, Uspon i pad velikih sila, CID – Službeni list, Podgorica – Beograd, 2003. 15 Jovan Đorđević, Socijalizam i demokratija, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1962, pp. 111–112.
402 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century etc.”16 In the Serbian language, the word comes from the old Slavic state term hold. That is the territory, with the population that ruler holds a under his rule, as his property, his inheritance. In this sense, the word is used in the country, “Dusan’s Code.” Only since the sixteenth century, these terms express a clear distinction between state organization of feudal possession or of society in a broader sense. A state appropriation to the idea of time, comes with the creation of the modern state of the organization in the form of absolute monarchy. There are different methodological approaches in explaining the concept of the state, depending on the historical development of society, the degree of participation of institutions in the regulation of social relations among people, economic, political and military power of the state, its geopolitical position in international relations, as well as the intellectual affinity authors dealing with its study. Marxist theorists argue that learning is the creation of the state associated with the emergence of class society and that it is the creation of a historical, transitory category. Friedrich Engels wrote that a historically existed society without states, but it is time for a split society into classes state became a necessity. Nevertheless, with the disappearance of the class division of society disappear and states: “A society that will re-organize production on the basis of free and equal association of the producers, will move the whole machinery of state where it will then be place in a museum of antiquities, next to the spinning wheel and the iron axe.”17 Marx explicitly emphasizes the aggressive essence of the state, saying “the state coverage, control, punish, control and tutoring civil society, starting from the most insignificant of his life phenomena, from his most general form of existence to the existence of private individuals ...”.18 Noting that the state is primarily a class body and guardian of the social whole, Marxist theorists emphasize that the latter, in addition to enforcement mechanisms has spiritual hegemony, so that the order of the political system maintain the ideology, binding norms of behavior and values the patterns, which gives legitimacy to the government and justifies the established order. A basic property of the state, irrespective of its different forms, its repressive role, applied for protection of certain territories, a social whole, the class interests or multinational company. Emphasizing that the legitimate use of force is a fundamental feature of any state other Najdan Pasic emphasizes: “The right to exercise physical force is a
16 Politička enciklopedija, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1975, p. 213. 17 Fridrih Engels, Poreklo porodice, privatne svojine i države, Kultura, Beograd, 1950, pp. 177-178. 18 Karl Marks, Osamnaesti brimer Luja Bonaparte, Kultura, Beograd, 1949, p. 27. 19 Najdan Pašić, Osnovi nauke o društvu, Rad, Beograd, 1981, p. 312.
403 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century monopoly that it denies all other groups and organizations”,19 without which it would not be able to achieve its role in the regulation of relations between people. Depending on the dominance of the interests of the ruling class advocates of Marxism, according to the class learning different basic types of state: slavery, feudal, capitalist and socialist, as a transitional form of communism, a classless society, in which the historical disappear country. At the end of the second and beginning of the third millennium, there have been dramatic changes in the world, the collapse of socialism as a world historical process, the formation of new states, local wars and the rise of terrorism, the Great Depression. Re-examines the basic theoretical assumptions of Machiavelli, Bodin, Hobbes, Montesquieu, Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Tocqueville, Marx, Weber in dealing with the theoretical determination of the state. Noting the complexity of the notion of state Andrew Vincent (Andrew Vincent) is considered to be continuously critically re-examined, especially in relation to other concepts, such as communities, nations, power crown.20 He believed that, depending on the form of government, its ethics and constitutionality, all the theories of the state can be divided into: absolutist, constitutional, ethical, class and pluralist theory of the state. In his opinion, the main goal of the state is to achieve a good life for all citizens, mutual recognition of other countries. In order to constitute each state must have a minimum of three conditions: it has a territory with boundaries, population and sovereignty.21 Some authors believe that in the period after the Second World War in Europe was established models of the state: the social democratic model that rested on the forefront of solidarity and redistribution of income in favor of the employees and the poor; neo-liberal model of the state as a reaction to the welfare state, whose protagonists were Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan; ethnically homogeneous state models, created after the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia; model state security, which is based on distrust of foreigners and its own citizens, whether as a result of terrorism and state interventionist model that directly interferes with the resolution of conflicts and economic crises.22
20 Endrju Vinsent, Teorije države, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2009. 21 Pojmovnik liberalne demokratije, Službeni glasnik – CLDS, Beograd, 2008. 22 Savremena država: struktura i socijalne funkcije, Z. Stojiljković, Karakter i funkcije države, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung – FPN, Beograd, 2010. 23 Addressing the 6th of March 1986, participants XXVII Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev has launched a “strategy of acceleration” that was supposed to overtake capitalism in the economic sphere until 2000 . Only a few years later there was a collapse of the USSR.
404 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Soviet-style socialism with a strictly controlled way of managing the economic system, with five-year plans that have had great results in the industrialization of the country, for decades was a global alternative to the Western model of free markets.23 The official Soviet policy, as part of the world blocks, represented the so- called. Brezhnev’s doctrine of “limited sovereignty” that allowed the use of military force in the event of threats to the socialist system in the “Soviet bloc”. Entropy of the Soviet Union created 15 new countries. Czechoslovakia split into two countries and Yugoslavia after the crisis, conflicts and civil wars in seven states. All post- communist states have adopted the liberal concept of development, becoming a member of the European Union and NATO pact or are on their way to becoming (Serbia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina). In the period after the Second World War, the greatest progress has been made in the formation of the European Union, which has created a zone free of boundaries within which people, goods, services and money can move freely.24 End of the Cold War and the disappearance of competition between the socialist and capitalist systems (1917–1991), despite the existence of many international associations, there have been a fragmentation of states and conflict on religious grounds, as well as the increased use of military force in international relations of the United States and NATO pact. In order to adapt to the liberal concept of development, many modern states have voluntarily transferred part of its economic and national sovereignty of the powerful international institutions in which they saw the defenders of their interests. By the opinion of Wallerstein, the disintegration of socialism, as a world process, refutes liberalism that was aimed at “taming dangerous classes offering triple program of political reforms: the right to vote, the welfare state, and national identity.”25 Part of this process was the propaganda slogans - Human rights, freedom, and of democracy. Pointing out that the liberal state was created to promote democracy, illustrating the example of the people of Northern Europe terrified of the idea of open borders, Wallerstein is the end debunked hypocrisy of modern Europe, “self-referential incoherence of liberal ideology is complete. If all people and all nations have equal rights, we cannot maintain the kind of nee inegalitarian system such that the capitalist world economy has been and always
24 Robert Schuman, the then Minister of Foreign Affairs of France , in his famous speech on 9 May 1950, put forward a proposal for European integration as a way to secure the peace and make progress in postwar Europe. His speech laid the foundations for the development of the European Union, so that 9 May is celebrated every year as the anniversary of the EU. 25 Imanuel Valerštajn, Posle liberalizma, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2005, str. 131. 26 Ibid, p. 138. 27 Ibid, p. 144. 28 Ibid, p. 144.
405 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century will be. However, if it is openly acknowledged, then the capitalist world economy will have no legitimacy in the eyes of dangerous (that is, the disenfranchised) class. If the system does not have legitimacy, it will not survive.”26 Disappointed in the state as a “channel of reform”27 and “a bulwark of personal security”,28 without being able to exercise their democratic rights, minorities in modern states (blacks in the United States, Turks in Germany, the Kurds in Turkey, Koreans in Japan, etc.) frustrated by the inability of the realization of traditional values ”are turning to groups – ethnic, religious, racial”,29 which leads to new conflicts and fear of further disintegration of the country. In modern states also leads to stagnation of democratic processes and its moral assumptions, freedom and equality, the primary interest of multinationals and the political elites to pursue their interests. In the example of Serbia in transition about two decades, can be seen the inability of the liberal concept of social development to meet the challenges facing the state of Serbia as “incomplete” and “poor” countries in transition. Despite advocating privatization, free market economy and multiparty system, as well as other values of liberalism in Serbia has achieved democratic and economic progress in the interest of the welfare and higher standards of most citizens. In the opinion of most authors who analyze Serbia in transition, “was established unscrupulous historically low class capitalism, which is far below the relatively socialized capitalism in Western Europe. It corresponds to a primitive, largely criminalized state, which is likewise, too far from the modern liberal democratic state …”30 In explaining the complexity of the modern state, many authors point to the concept of globalization, which is used in the popular and scientific literature to describe the state of the process and the development trends of modern society. Political scientists agree in their assessment that globalization, which is a product of the New World Order, extremely ambivalent phenomenon: on the one hand, it opens up new vistas of freedom, strengthens the connection between the state and civil society, on the other hand, multiplying forms of domination over the people and the superiority of the state over individual. In most manuals and dictionaries, the term globalization is defined as superficial and fragmentary way, as a process of “economic, but also cultural and political integration of the modern world”,31 without considering its “derivative” aspects. Globalization in relation to other social processes characterized by the following features: first, it creates new social networks that go beyond the traditional economic, political, informational and cultural boundaries; Secondly, it leads to the strengthening of
29 Ibid, p. 144. 30 Zoran Vidojević, Regresivni kapitalizam, država i demokratija, SO Kikinda i NB „Jovan Popović“, Kikinda, 2004, p. 33. 31 Group of authors, Pojmovnik liberane demokratije, Službeni glasnik – CLDS, Beograd, 2008, p. 31.
406 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century international social relations that temporally and spatially associated distant places to treat them shape local developments, third, to corporate management in manufacturing, services and financial markets and the fourth, the influence on the ideas and shaping of consciousness on a planetary scale. According to the definition given by Manfred Steger: “Globalization refers to a multidimensional set of social processes that create, multiply, expand and enhance interdependence and sharing around the world while at the same time fostering in people a growing awareness of deepening connections between the local and remote.” 32 Globalization, with democratic and authoritarian states faces multiple links at the transnational level, destroying their sovereignty and the ability to manage crises at the national and global level. Numerous geopolitical analyses warn that globalization reduces the sovereignty, autonomy and capacity of modern states.33 The opponents of the autonomy of nation states believe that the world’s most dangerous globalization of multinational corporations that affect all spheres of social life, from production, culture, media, to increase awareness and ideas. The dark side of globalization arises when one tries to impose a value system most states force, which speaks convincingly Noam Chomsky in his actions, accusing the United States around the world to apply military force under various pretexts, and without respect for international law, which objectively leads to the collapse of its imperial power.34 The world is increasingly divided on the polarization of the “weak” and “strong” states, those that can manage both internal and international crises and the ones that do not even have borders and sovereignty on its territory.
Theoretical determination of anarchism In a letter to Lenin on 4 March 1920, dissatisfied with the development of socialist society after the October Revolution, Kropotkin writes: “If, however, the current situation continues and the word socialism will become a curse.”35 In the classic sense of anarchism, as a political and social theory, “is based on a radical critique and rejection of the state and all forms of institutional organization imposed by man and his nature”,36 with numerous modalities, from individualistic, collectivistic to Universal. The word anarchy comes from two ancient Greek words and it means a lack of authority or power (Gr. Aan Archie
32 Manfred B. Steger, Globalizacija, Šahinpašić, Sarajevo, 2005, p. 13. 33 Petar Matić, Državni kapacitet u uslovima globalizacije, Politička revija No. 2/2013, Beograd. 34 Noam Čomski, Promašene države, Naklada Ljevak, Zagreb, 2008. 35 Petar Kropotkin, Anarhizam i moral, Prosveta, Beograd, 1984, p. 232. 36 Milorad Đoković, Ruski anarhizam, Dosije, Beograd, 2007, p. 24.
407 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Eng. Anarchy, Ger. Die Anarchie, Fr. L’anarchie). The word anarchism derives from the Latin version of the original Greek term that is still used Homer in the sense of absence of government, the rule of law. In the pejorative sense of the word anarchy was used in the Middle Ages and early modern times the French and political theory.37 Pejorative meaning anarchy had at the time of the French revolution in 1789, as well as many works of literature, but today all over the world, when this idea should be consciously disqualified as a kind of heresy. Anarchist thought has for decades been anathematized by the positivist and Marxist science, because it is reduced to a mere utopia or terrorism, but her serious scholars have never been able to deny its vitality and utopian vision. Daniel Guerin (Daniel Guérin) argued that anarchist ideas have not disappeared, “but, on the contrary, is constantly present in the entire previous history of the labor movement, to present what the movement stronger, more dramatic and more sterile in the struggle to achieve their revolutionary slogans.”38 Founders of anarchism are William Godwin, Max Stirner and Joseph Proudhon. In his book “The study of political justice and its impact on the common morality and happiness,” published in 1793, Godwin was conceived anarchism, advocating the abolition of property rights, law and the state. Max Stirner, German philosopher (1806–1856), in his famous work “only his property” (1845) denies the state, law, and the very notion of community, advocating individualist anarchism. His opinion: “Who’s got the power that is right; if you have no power - you have no rights”,39 not at all lost by their relevance. That the anarchists for the first time publicly pleaded French philosopher Proudhon (1809–1869) in the paper “What is the ownership or analysis of law and governance” (1840) arguing that each property is a theft. Proudhon and Stirner belong to the Individualist anarchism, which founded the basic economic and political terms of this idea. The biggest influence on anarchism achieved Aleksandovic Mikhail Bakunin (1814–1876) who argued: “No one but Socrates and maybe Christ, made greater contribution to political thought with less writing.”40 Born into a noble family in Tver Gubernia, son of a noble and highly educated man, Bakunin entered the military school and nineteen became an artillery lieutenant, but he was not interested in a military career. In Moscow is facing the famous philosopher Stankevich, Bjelinski and Herzen. In the early stages, he studied Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel Resides in Switzerland, Belgium and France, learning about work of
37 Enciklopedija političke kulture, Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1993, p. 17. 38 Danijel Gerin, Anarhizam (od doktrine do akcije), Naprijed, Zagreb, 1980, p. VII 39 Georgij V. Plehanov, Izabrana dela – Alarziham i socijalizam, Kultura, Beograd, 1968, p. 199. 40 Milorad Ekmečić, Bakunjin kao pobunjeni intelektualac, Filozofija, Beograd, 1971, p. 71.
408 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Kabe, Vajlinga, Proudhon, Marx and Engels. He conflicts with Marx in 1848 when the “Neue Rheinische Zeitung” which was edited by Marx accused Bakunin that an imperial agent. After the uprising in Dresden, authorities arrested him twice condemned to death, but his sentence was replaced with life imprisonment. He is being extradited to Russia, where conducts twelve years in prison and exile in Siberia. Bakunin managed to escape in 1861 from Siberian exile in Japan, from there to the United States and Western Europe. In London collaborates with Herzen and Ogarjov, where it is connected with the secret organization of Russian revolutionaries “Earth and will”. Spreading anarchist ideas and actively participating in riots, Bakunin from 1964 to 1867, residing in Italy. In Lyons uprising, participate in 1870. A year earlier, with his secret organization “Alliance of Socialist Democracy”, has the First International, from which is excluded due to a conflict with Marx. He died in Bern in 1876. In his works of Bakunin provides that “modern history is moving toward establishing pseudo-socialist and capitalist managerial bureaucracy”41 emphasizing its repressive function, authoritarian and occupational role. For the state to say that it is “the most flagrant, the most cynical and complete negation of humanity”42 and that will be more and more totalitarian. Its nature is to continually increase its power, “she was a federal regulated or not, every state, if you do not want to fail, must, therefore, strive to become as powerful. It has to devour to avoid being devoured, conquering not to be conquered, enslave not to be enslaved, because two forces are similar in strength and at the same time someone else one another cannot co-exist, and that they do not destroy each other.”43 Bakunin was first introduced notion of the political class, which is a synonym for the citizens, and when the real difference between the ruling and an oppressed class, he states that “no state, no ancient or modern”44 will not be able to exist without those who would “have to work for each other”45 and those who “will live by the labor of others”.46 Speaking about the inevitability of the existence of different national interests, adding “humanity divides into a number of mutually others, hostile and threatening state”,47 the Russian anarchist’s vision suggested the formation of different forms of international associations. Bakunin points out that the constituent factors of the state “world politics” and “public
41 Milorad Đoković, Anarhizam, Utopija, Beograd, 2007, p. 100. 42 Mihail Bakunjin, Država i sloboda, Globus, Zagreb, 1979, p. 256. 43 Ibid, 256. 44 Ibid, p. 260. 45 Ibid, p. 260. 46 Ibid, p. 257. 47 Ibid, p. 256. 48 Ibid, p. 257.
409 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century interest” and that they statehood factors which justify any crime, “Integrity, honor, justice, law, even self-pitting stops, and with logic and common sense: black becomes white, black and white, it becomes an abomination of humanity, a most coward treachery and bloodiest crimes become meritorious works”.48 Bakunin prophetically anticipates that the state will be more totalitarian. Strength of world counter-revolution, he said, will be based on a rich budget, the standing army, the extensive bureaucracy, stocked by all means; they provide a modern centralized state with unlimited power. Peter Alexandrovich Kropotkin (1842–1921) was a Russian anarchist who tried to anarchism that theoretical foundation and justification, as well as categorical apparatus to distinguish certain anarchist phenomenon. The concept of anarchism incorporates the principle of solidarity and experience when it came to living in Siberia when in 1902 he published the book “Mutual assistance in the animal and human world.” In the preface to the book “Notes of a revolutionary,” Zoran Djindjic (1953–2003), points out that the main objective of Kropotkin was to demonstrate the possibility of scientific foundation of anarchism.49
Challenges of new or contemporary anarchism Anarchism in many papers interpreted as a political ideology and a political movement directed against the state and government and their forceful ways of organizing society in human society. As learning, anarchism is divided into a collectivist (anarcho-syndicalism and anarcho-communism) and individualist (libertarian and anarcho-capitalism) direction, which is not an adequate framework for this idea. When investigating the sources of anarchism, its predecessors, and the area in which it developed, this idea cannot be denied its Universalist and cosmopolitan essence. On the objective “reading” of anarchism influenced the state and church stigma, which he attributed to the “conspiracy theory” and the nihilistic-utopian mission directed against God and country. Anarchism is not a “closed” theory of the Messianic responses to the crisis of modern society, but the critical point to the shortcomings of the previous forms of social organization and human communities. What is the appeal of anarchist thought, which are becoming more common among philosophers of the Left, critics of the New World Order and the disenfranchised? Its utopian power motivates people to look for the ideal form of harmonious social order in which man will be happy. Psychological need of man
49 Petar Kropotkin, Zapisi jednog revolucionara (Z. Đinđić, Beleška o P.A. Kropotkinu), Mladost, Beograd.
410 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century is to preserve its freedom and identity with a “human face” by his own Community organization and autonomous and voluntary actions. Basic features of the new anarchism are the product of changed social and historical circumstances in society and between countries, in relation to the time when they appeared anarchist ideas. Noting that it is impossible to identify all “future moral concepts of humanity”,50 Kropotkin says it will change the concepts of good and evil, justice and injustice. Lose the old and new social concepts occur in the political, economic, technological, cultural, informational and media connecting modern states in the context of globalization, the New World Order and the formation above-national institutions. The capitalist state is multiplied their institutional authority. Class division of society is by many segments transformed into new, competing stakeholders. At the end of the 20th century, capitalism is increasingly referred to as a “turbo-” “IT” and “casino-capitalism”. The first time the term casino capitalism is mentioned in 1997, the British economist Susan Strange (1923–1998) after analyzing the financial market crisis in Southeast Asia. Casino capitalism has become synonymous with fraud in the banking and financial system, is destroying the illusion of omnipotence and the “invisible hand of the market”. With the development of globalization in highly developed capitalist countries, working class is destroyed, because millions of people in developing countries offered their work for nothing. English Professor Guy Standing (1948) pointed to the emergence of Prokaryote, people with insecure status who work part-time, low-wage, credit incompetent, living in fear and uncertainty about their future. Those workers who come from different lifestyles are “new dangerous class”, unhappy with their economic status and the distribution of justice. Such workers he targeted the extreme right-wing and left-wing, although still not aware of their power, they would be united in common action, because among them there is no solidarity, given that members of different ethnic and religious groups. Among the social phenomena that are reviewed are: democracy, voting rights, human rights, parliamentary system and others. In an attempt to respond to the crisis of representative democracy, a political philosopher and economist, Takis Fotopoulos (Takis Fotopoulos, 1940) introduced the concept of inclusive democracy, which involves a broader political project, aimed at the reconstruction of politics, economy and society, using the best achievements of socialism and the tradition of a democratic society. Reform of a democratic society includes four aspects: political or direct democracy, economic democracy, social democracy, and ecological democracy with elaborate concepts of this unique project.
50 Petar Kropotkin, Anarhizam i moral, Prosveta, Beograd, 1984, p. 35.
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Mass media as highly productive industry awareness have turned the world into a global village. Internet and global social networks are linked together millions of people tearing down borders between countries, ideologies and religions. Denying state socialism, the values of neoliberalism, multinational companies and new world order, new or modern anarchism anticipates a society without government, based on the autonomous actions of free people and their voluntary organization working to achieve human needs that classical states cannot answer. Affirming the traditional doctrine and its founders, anarchist thought has once again become available to the public and the subject of study of social sciences. New anarchism, as a heterogeneous and dynamic theory, the pragmatic movement, uses subversive forms and methods of work: the propaganda work, peaceful demonstrations and protests (“direct action”,51 “Immanant activism”, etc.), national and global connectivity, extreme leftism that supports violence and terrorism. The weakness of most anarchist currents is used as the source symbols, and programs of action arising during the 19th century, instead of to adapt them to the paradigm of the “new times”. Anarchist organizations act independently and jointly in the anti-globalization movements around the world using their logistics dissatisfaction of young people and theoretical thought leftist intellectuals.52 The unmasking power of multinationals and imperialism involved many artists and self-conscious intellectuals (Michael Moore, Julian Assange, Edward Snowden, etc.) that arguably show that many individuals are under the control of the powerful security services of the USA and its allies, which are the mutual spying. One of the self-conscious intellectuals is Indian writer Arundhati Roy (Arundhati Roy, 1961), an active participant in many anti-globalization rallies. Referring to the use of force is the main feature of American government, she says, “Our strategy should be just that conflict with the Empire, but she set the siege. That is depriving oxygen. That is a shame. Ridiculed. Yes, we do our art, our music, literature, persistence, our joy, our ultimate relentless.”53 The contributions of resistance to neoliberal invasion in “warning lights”, Pierre Bourdieu (Pierre Bourdieu 1930–2002) shows the hypocrisy of Western governments state that does not respect human rights and democratic heritage, criticized intellectuals who act without moral authority and intellectual competence. Similarly Bourdieu’s attitude of intellectuals wrote and Bakunin who argued that social science is always and necessarily imperfect, a “powerful
51 Emil Puže, Direktna akcija, CLS, Beograd, 2004. 52 Naomi Klajn, Doktrina šoka, Samizdat B92, Beorgad, 2007. 53 Specijalni dodatak NIN, Globalizacija, lice i naličje, Suočavanje s imperijom – Govor indijske književnice Arundati Roj u južnobrazilskom gradu Porto Alegre, 2003, pp. 16–17. 54 Mihail Bakunjin, Šta je autoritet, Vidici, 5/82, Beograd, 1982, pp. 10–11.
412 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century scientific authorities inevitably become weaklings when academics become officially certified experts.”54 No matter that new or contemporary anarchism has utopian elements within, with the crisis of the neoliberal state and the strengthening of multinational companies, it will become more and more important and have supporters all over the world.
Conclusion With the fall of the Berlin Wall, the disintegration of the USSR, the disappearance of the Cold War, many theorists and political leaders of the United States argued that the disappearance of the bipolar division of the world, and the formation of new supranational institutions, lead to the creation of conflict and harmonious society in the interests of the majority of countries of the planet. They believed that globalization and unification of political, economic, and informational values lead to the creation of the New World Order (NWO), which will be established undisputed dominance of the United States and its allies. Optimistic predictions were soon proved wrong, because there was chaos and disharmony in the international political arena, caused by growing contradictions between the states. In the changed socio-historical circumstances, transform the basic conceptual categories related to state that it cannot respond to the challenges of the modern world. The global economic crisis has demonstrated the impotence of modern states that the logic of liberalism and market economy overcome the problems. The gap between rich and poor is increasing conflicts on religious grounds is dramatic, and the threat of international terrorism and new wars multiply. Modern capitalist state and supranational institutions in preservation of their interest applicable state interventionism, to economic sanctions and military force. There are fewer states that have institutional mechanisms to manage internal crisis without the help of so-called international community and other developed countries. As a counterweight to the process of strengthening the modern state and the New World Order, again appearing anarchist ideas, underground stream, in its classical and modern form. Anticipating the arrangement of the “new world”, anarchism becomes striking force anti-globalization movement, pointing to alternative forms of social organization and cooperation among people.
413 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Borislav DEKIĆ1
ECONOMIC CRISIS, GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL EXTREMISM
Abstract: This paper analyses the impact of economic crisis on political extremism (right and left), on the example of the early 20th century, during the rise of Nazism, fascism and communism as well as the beginning of the 21st century at the time of the crisis of globalized economy. Extreme ideologies arise in economically and politically unstable systems, as was the case in Germany or Russia at the beginning of the 20th century: Russia was losing WWI, there was hunger and discontent among the population, what communists took this as an advantage and carried out the revolution. Hitler used the discontent of the German people for the loss of the WWI as well as the hyperinflation that caused the difficult financial situation in Germany. On the other hand, the current economic crisis is seen as a crisis of the global economy. When it comes to the value system that is characteristic for extremism, it is not homogeneous. It is divided to different ideologies, but what is always characteristic for it is the group identity and globalization has its first opponents in the nation and tradition that are being undermined and marginalized by its universalism. The contemporary economic crisis has somehow awakened the dormant political left which stood up to defend the rights of workers, since the era of secure jobs, free education and health care are destroyed in the ruins of communism. Key words: Extremism, crisis, globalization, ideology.
1. Introduction Political extremists whether they are left or right are opposed to globalization. Although there are at the opposite ends of the ideological bases, the left -and right- wing extremism touch on several important points. First of all, the political violence is their primary method of achieving political goals. And the left and
1 Borislav Dekić, Ph.D., Agency for Education, Branch Office in Osijek, Croatia.
414 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century right wing extremism can be determined as a tendency of the specific group or individuals to implement an idea to the legal limit by using illegal means and methods and with a tendency to exceed the mentioned limit and undermine the generally accepted norms of political and social system. Simeunović points out that extremism in politics usually manifests in two forms: as advocating extreme political goals by using normal methods, or as advocating or attempting of the realization of socially acceptable normal political goals using drastic and socially unacceptable methods. The extremist are mostly disappointed, unhappy individuals who have a smaller circle of supporters. Extremism has always been a marginal phenomenon, but it compensated its limited number with fanaticism of its members. The goals of globalization and extremism mutually contradict. While the globalization is heading towards to create a “global village” for the accumulation of profits, the extremism is fighting to preserve the identity and particularities, which are the main obstacles to the subjects of globalization. So the left-wing extremists accuse globalization for impoverishment of the already poor, while the right-wing extremists accuse globalization for the destruction of the national spirit and of the state sovereignty. Globalization, against which the extremist ideologies fight, shows its weakness in times of economic crisis, giving them a reason and a space for action. When we talk about globalization, which gives a modern framework for crisis disorders it can be argued if it is actually an entirely new phenomenon. The process that can be followed since the second half of the 19th century, marked by the expansion of the capitalist system dominated by the United Kingdom and roughly stopped by the outbreak of the First World War, and which, in the period between the two wars creates a large gap between the permanent technological progress on the one hand and absence of liberal framework for international economic flows on the other. At the beginning of the 21st century, it gets its full affirmation thanks to the growing productive forces that are marked by the particular technical progress in the field of information technology, transportation, and new socio - economic trends.
2. Ideology and Globalization The term globalization refers to a range of economic, political and cultural trends in the contemporary society. The term globalization usually implies social processes that reinforce social relationships and strengthen mutual dependence. But, although it has broad consequences, it is still a local phenomenon – which affects all of us in everyday life. Although perceived as a purely economic phenomenon, the globalization has spread to other segments of life. With the
415 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century process of globalization, a series of questions can be asked that so far have not been significantly observed. The dilemma that stands out as a key in the discussions about the phenomenon of globalization is as follows: Does the globalization lead to increasing inequality among countries around the world, or, on the contrary, it contributes to the reduction of inequalities among countries in their economic development? While at one side are those who believe that this process is desirable and useful because of growing competition, creating the prerequisites for creating a healthier market and a possible reduction of the gap between rich and poor countries, on the other side are those who believe that the globalization deepens inequalities and leads to permanent marginalization of the poorer parts of our planet. In addition to the issues of economic inequality of the countries in the world, the globalization bears other challenges and dilemmas. The need to create conditions for faster economic development, the need to preserve the environment and social stability, efficient maintenance of international peace, narrowing the technological and social gap between the rich and the poor, the role and the influence of multinational companies in the modern world, providing a higher standard of health, common understanding of the human rights and the preservation of cultural identity in the more homogenized world are just some of the topics that follow the discussions on the process of globalization. The significance of this process has led to a sharp polarization of the advocates and critics of globalization. Proponents see the globalization as a new process, which can be measured by the spreading of the Internet; they find that it is the only ideology that should be preached and that it represents the triumph of the market. On the other side are critics who loudly protest because of all the bad things that are attributed to the globalization. They believe that globalization is not an entirely new process; it exists for centuries, constantly advancing with the occasional big setback. They think that every country, not just the USA, observes the market as a means, not an ideology, which is the home field customized to the system of distribution of earnings and moral values determined by certain local social norms. The very term ideology represents a few points of view. They represent the science of all possible ideas in the broadest sense. This too broad definition is largely discarded. Another definition says that the ideology is spiritual upgrade and that includes a religion, art, morality, politics, law, etc. This point of view is the now mostly not taken seriously, because it is considered to be insufficiently accurate. The next interpretation of the term ideology is that the ideology means a systematized rounded picture of the world as a whole and the position of a man in it. Finally, the narrow concept of politics could signify either the system of understanding, perceptions and concepts, which express a general view of some social group to the events that surround it, that is, the system of basic attitudes toward the world, which are usually developed in some religious or scientific
416 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century systems or a false or wrong sense and understandings that exceed the socio- historical and class determinateness and limitations of their holders. The first view inherits the sociological approaches of positivism, functionalism and structuralism, and the second the critical approach to Marxism. Ideologies and their heterogeneity indicate at least two sides that they possess. One side is personified by the objectives, i.e. how society should be governed, how it ought to operate. The other side concerns the ideology that has a shallower paradigm, and propagates only the (political) way of how this consensual goal, the ideal order of things, is to be achieved.
3. The economic crisis and the totalitarian ideologies of the 20th century The first totalitarian regimes were created in Russia (communists), Italy (fascists) and Germany (Nazis). These regimes are created in the economically and politically unstable states like the three listed above. Russia was losing the WWI, the country was ruled by hunger and discontent and the Communists took advantage of the situation and carried out the revolution. Hitler took advantage of the discontent of the German people because of the loss of the First World War as well as the hyperinflation that put Germany in a difficult financial situation. All communist systems have in common that they were all established through revolution, unlike the Nazis who come to power in a legal way. State and party in a totalitarian regime controls entire domestic economy and industry. To stop hyperinflation and revive the economy and industry, Hitler had to hire citizens. He began to develop the military industry and by doing so, he broke the Versailles Peace Treaty. Thousands of people have found work in the armouries. Hitler used his story of the Jews as a lower race to get hold of their finances because the German Jews had a greater share of the industrial capital. During the war, Hitler’s war prisoners were used for the slave labour in factories and mines, while the entire economy was subordinated to the Führer and used for military purposes. At a time the World War I began the countries of Western Europe, in spite of the rapid development of industry in the United States, held the world primacy in terms of scope and level of the industrial production. Western Europe, and especially its middle and northern parts, was still one of the most important industrial areas of the world. Industrially most developed countries in Europe were Germany, the United Kingdom and France, which were in whole possessing 70 per cent of the industrial capacity of the old continent. They produced about 80 per cent of the total European production of steel, machinery and chemicals, and 93 per cent of the European production of coal. Outside this area, industries in other European countries were relatively fragmented and scattered in smaller
417 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century centres without major quantitative importance. This distinct superiority in terms of industrial development was providing large western European countries the dominant position in the international trade. In the year 1913 about 60 per cent of the entire world exports belonged to the UK, Germany and France. In this expansion until the World War I, the absolute primacy was held by the United Kingdom, followed by the old colonial powers: France, Holland and Belgium. The newer, younger industrial and military-political superpowers rushed to take their “place under the sun”. This primarily applies to Germany, which was already prepared to use every, even the most brutal mean to obtain the right for the redivision of the world. In the most belligerent countries, the World War I led to great exhaustion. This especially applies to the European countries that spent a huge part of their national wealth in the war. The First World War destroyed the economic primacy of Western Europe; it moved the main centres of economic power to the United States and, to a lesser extent, to Japan and other overseas countries. One political change that led to the World War I, which had an impact on the economic life, was the new political map of Europe. It has led to a slightly different distribution of natural sources of raw materials and energy, to a different arrangement of industrial markets and regions and to this new map and new state borders with the changed arrangement of the population the future economic initiatives had to be adapted. The First World War accelerated the technical development in a number of important industries. It has made the production process more efficient, it has created many new products and influenced that, once initiated; some technical discoveries continue to develop in the post war period. In addition to the aforementioned, the First World War had some other economic consequences: monetary instability, slow recovery of European agriculture and reducing crop yields, change of the structure of the raw material and the change of importance of industries, etc. All these changes will have direct or indirect consequences on the social and political situation in many countries and through them on the international relations. In countries where the economy had more serious consequences (Germany, Austria, Hungary, France) severe inflation occurs as well, which lasts until 1923, and somewhere even longer. With the destruction of large empires (Russia, Germany, Turkey and Austria-Hungary), the World War I and the revolutionary events that followed it blew the last fatal stroke to this social class in the most parts of Europe. The most obvious consequence of the First World War was a new territorial division of Europe. All members of the Central Powers lost their territory and new states were created. The German Empire lost its colonies, was declared responsible for the war and forced to pay a huge indemnity. No war before that changed the map of Europe so dramatically. The war had profound economic consequences as well. In addition to this, the great flu epidemic, which began in
418 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the last months of the war, killed millions of people in Europe and spread around the world. The epidemic of Spanish flu killed about 50 million people in the world. The end of the First World War set the stage for other conflicts in the world, some of which continue into the 21st century. The Bolsheviks, led by Vladimir Lenin performed socialist revolution. Adolf Hitler used the German dissatisfaction with the Versailles Peace to gain popularity and power. The World War II was in part a continuation of the battle for power that was never resolved in the First World War; Nazis justified their actions during the 1930s and 1940s with the injustice that was inflicted by the winners at the end of the war. After the war, the Allies imposed series of peace treaties to the Central Powers. Armistice, signed on 11th November 1918, and then the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1919, which Germany signed after it was blocked, ended the war. The Peace Treaty marked Germany as responsible for the war and demanded from Germany to pay enormous war reparations and hand their colonies to the winners. Unable to pay the reparations (which were a consequence of territorial losses and post-war recession) Germany has taken loans from the United States, until the payment of compensation was not completed in 1931. The Versailles Peace Treaty caused great indignation in Germany and was used by the German nationalists, especially the Nazis, for the conspiracy theory called the Legend of the stab in the back. It also contributed to the economic collapse of the Weimar Republic causing uncontrolled inflation during the 1920s. By the signing of the peace treaty, the European territories were redesigned without much regard for the wishes and the composition of the population that lived in them. It has sown the seeds of future conflicts. However, probably the most important consequences of the contract were the great frustration of Italy, which has not received the promised territories, as well as Germany upon which the Versailles Peace Treaty imposed unrealistic war reparations, confiscated all the colonies and fleets and blocked their army because of the use of chemical weapons. The population was diminished because of fights and diseases, and the country almost facing bankruptcy due to the enormous costs because of the investments in war industries. It was clear that Europe after World War I was a very turbulent area, which was not promising a lasting peace, but on the contrary, new conflicts. Faced with the recent brutal scenes and difficult living conditions, European population has become sceptical about the achievements that were in constant development from the time of the French Revolution up to that point, and these were primarily non-confidence in the absolute power: the commitment to the constitutional rule, the freedom of speech, the written word and the right to assembly. These values have become threatened in the era of universal violence and insecurity, the citizens no longer believed in them, and liberalism was in decline, which was reflected in the chain dissolve of the legislative assemblies of the 20s and 30s.
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None of the old government held, everywhere there were riots in the streets, where left-wing parties demanded a different social order, and the right extremists expressed dissatisfaction with the new state borders. The unstable situation threatened the recovery and survival to the landlords, who needed a stable government, not too interested in improving the position of the lowest classes, which would raise the price of labour, for their financial recovery. For this reason, and because of the idea of solidarity and equalization of property, the abolition of private property, confiscation and similar items that were popular in the left-wing parties programs, the magnates have always been willing to support conservative or right options. This economic interest will prove to be a very important factor for the rise of the extreme right to power. The key question that has emerged from numerous studies is: Would the fascism become so important in the world history, would it ever reach that weight and significance that it reached during the thirties, if there was no Great World Economic Crisis or the Great Depression, as the crisis 1929 was popularly called? It should be born in mind that the outbreak of the crisis had nothing to do with the emergence of this movement, but it certainly contributed dramatically to its development and multiplication, especially in Germany. As highlighted by Vesna Aleksić, the First World War was the turning point in this regard. It was a turning point in world history, and thus in economic terms. Liberal economy that is based on a system of laissez faire or the policy of not influencing the market found itself in a serious crisis for the first time during the First World War. As a natural consequence of nationalism in stride, which essentially equated the independence of self-defence often with economic self- sufficiency, the war economy demanded one regulated economic system for the first time in world history - the system that is dictated, but also funded by the state. And unlike the United Kingdom, the United States and France, which, of course, had some form of regulated economy during the First World War, the German war economy was far more complex and more centralized. The countries at war financed their participation in the war for the most part by loans, except of course, the United States and a part of Britain. These two states have even tried to pay a part of their expenses during the war by raising taxes. All European allies were indebted to the United Kingdom, to a lesser extent to France, and these two great powers were, so to speak, enormously indebted to the United States. So it is quite logical that Europe, in those early post war years, was marked by the years of full economic decline. One of the most terrifying phenomenon was uncontrolled inflation as a result of the war economy and as a result of the accumulation of huge debts, a drastic decline of agricultural and industrial production, but also because of the burden of reconstruction of the winner countries, and on the other hand because of the burden of payment of compensation when it comes to Germany.
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Germany paid the reparations to the Allies using the U.S. short-term loans. The stock market crash on Wall Street in 1929 sealed every attempt to restore liberal economy on the basis of the period before 1914. The crash of the stock exchange has led to the fact that more than 400 million dollars in shares lost its value. Therefore, there has been a withdrawal of U.S. short-term loans from Europe, which had disastrous consequences for European and certainly German economy. The fall in the price of a large number of primary products went up to forty, fifty per cent, the fall in the value of shares of leading industrial companies and cooperation as well as a decline in bonds and bills with a fixed interest rate, resulted in a severe banking crisis in Germany. Administrative mechanisms of the country after the outbreak of the Depression were no longer able to function and disappointed, disoriented and unhappy citizens, no longer knew to whom to be loyal. Therefore, it is not surprising that at that time even then most apolitical Germans remembered the empire and its most important values, economic, political and cultural, which were related to Old German Empire. The First World War taught Germany that managed economy is the key to the highest military and economic achievements. At that time, at the beginning of the thirties, senior military and economic circles were again looking for more radical, more controlled and more binding economic system. However, such an economic regime would not have been possible without the dictatorial political system, and they recognized in Adolf Hitler a perfect leader of the nation, especially as the omnipotent role of the state was the central element of his political program.
4. Extremist ideologies and means of fight against economic globalization The biggest disadvantage of the globalization is creating a growing gap between rich and poor. This is a perpetual ethical topic dealt by scholars from all eras, and that Marx simply presented as the ratio of the exploiters and the exploited. Connecting the globe in the “global village” is certainly good for the big capital, but whether it is the happiest version for the social needs of humanity? The markets often stumble and fall in their “self-regulation and it can be seen by the recent global economic crisis that has become our social reality”. No ideology or any orders were not accepted by all social groups. Since the period after the civil revolution, there were many ideologies that represent a particular view of the world, but personify the ways in which direction should political power be established in order to meet the interests of different social groups: classes and strata. Social ideologies increasingly replace particular or political ideology (ideology in the strict sense). Political ideologies represent a particular collection of ethical ideals, principles, doctrines, myths or symbols of a social movement, institution of the classes or large groups that explain how society
421 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century should function, and provide a certain political and cultural blueprint for a certain social order. Among the key ones are: liberalism, conservatism, clericalism, nationalism, socialism, anarchism, feminism, environmentalism, etc. In the extreme left wing are all those groups that use extreme means and methods of struggle for the realization of the rights of certain social groups. The right wing, on the other hand, is often closer to the state and its institutions than the left wing, as it is predominantly engaged in order to protect the state and its order. What makes the precise definition of the extreme right difficult is the heterogeneity of its ideology and membership, as well as the fact that it is not always on the side of the existing government. Modern economic crisis has awakened somewhat dormant left who stood up to defend the rights of workers, since the era of secure jobs, free education and health care disappeared long ago in the ruins of communism. Protests of workers and fear for their existence have proven that Bloch was right when he said that the insurgency, (and dreams), come from an empty stomach. Economic crisis, starting with those in 1929, when the New York Stock Exchange collapsed, to the latest in the twenty-first century, suggest that the market cannot be fully self-regulating. For Siskin, the globalization does not favour the poor, but he points out that “the problem is not globalization, but how you managed it so far”. The point is that the World Bank and the IMF, as the most important financial institutions of globalization, primarily protect the interests of the richest countries in the world. In the recent years, the anarchism as an ideology increasingly arouses the interest of young people around the world, basically members of national organizations, movements and associations, usually based on the ultra-right, rather than the leftist conception of reality. This does not mean that there are no left-wing groups and movements. There are, but in much smaller numbers than the right wing, because the anarchy is an attempt to reach the historical aspiration for equality and equality, to realize the desire for a better life and, finally, to create a community in which everyone will be happy and satisfied in a complex and studious manner. However, one should not forget that society is changing and transforming in accordance with the socio - historical circumstances. It remains an open question whether the anarchist society can meet the expectations of the modern era and those who advocate for his introduction. The existence of many social movements and groups who oppose certain system and society as a whole is indisputable. What characterizes most of these are ideas that rely on anarchism as an ideology or Marxism, or some of its forms. Despite the impact and the admixture of each, there are essentially individual groups, movements and organizations which operate independently and do not promote a coherent ideology and philosophical system of values. Economic and social developments in the vast extent determine the future development and survival of the community, and the notion of a society without
422 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the state and its apparatus is a utopian dream then a concept that is at all possible. Uncompromising attitude that anarchists fiery advocate against the authority and political activism is appealing to young people most often during the crisis because they find certain moral grounds, which are largely of permanent character that define their future life. Especially to the extremists who are ready to diverse forms of opposition and actions. The perpetual need for social equality is the basis, but the pathways of development and survival vary depending on the milieu in which they occur and on specific socio – political communities and orders to which they belong. The direct action and the possibility of an individual action, supported by the idea of a complete denial of the state and its values, with insisting on the complete human freedom come to the fore in various aspects of the struggle for the realization of their ideas and attitudes.
5. The rise of the extreme right in the former Yugoslavia The disintegration of Yugoslavia caused more long-term social and economic crisis that enabled the strengthening of the extreme right, both at the level of political parties, as well as at the level of informal organizations. At the end of the 1980s, SFR Yugoslavia fell into a deep social, political and constitutional crisis. After the death of Josip Broz 1980, the problems that existed before, began to be more clearly noticeable. The country consisted of six republics and two autonomous provinces within Serbia (Kosovo and Vojvodina). In 1980 the conflicts between government and provincial political structures began, which were initiated by Serbia, dissatisfied with the existing system and the intention to exercise the constitutional changes. The struggle culminated between the 1987 and 1989 in the series of protests organized by the Serbian government led by Slobodan Milosevic, directed against the provincial government in Kosovo and Vojvodina. The intention was to take control of the two provinces. After the goals were successfully implemented, the Serbian authorities tried to apply the same pattern in other Yugoslav republics. Serbia took control in Montenegro, but the project failed in other republics, above all in Slovenia. We come to the nineties where the aforementioned disasters occur and the whole nation under the banner of defence of Yugoslavia, among other things – ‘against the fascist Ustasha tendency’, was being manipulated, and imbued with nationalism. One part of the people from the alternative cultural scene begins, more or less openly, to support some right ideas. Later, a good part of them veered into nationalism. In the states created after the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, there are a number of neo-Nazi groups, but when they are viewed as a single group, they remain on the social margins, because each has a relatively small number of
423 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century members. However, this fact does not make them less dangerous and should not in any case be underestimated. In some major cities of Slovenia (Ljubljana and Maribor), Croatian (Zagreb, Osijek, Split, Zadar) and Serbia (Belgrade, Novi Sad, Niš), there are neo-Nazi groups that belong to the international movement of “Blood and Honour”. Somehow more influential and more numerous are clerical- fascist groups, which connect elements of fascist ideology and religious fundamentalism: in Croatia and Croatian parts of Bosnia rises Catholic Ustasha and in Serbia Orthodox fascist offspring. In Bosnia, Sandžak and Kosovo there are tendencies towards Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. The transformation of the social and economic system that took place during the nineties in Serbia marked by wars, international pressure and strong ideologisation, was based on the breakdown of existing institutions, moral and economic order according to the interests of narrow groups. Transition in Serbia lacked a clear concept, as well as awareness of the realities of international realignment caused by the disappearance of communism. Opportunism and economical, namely criminal interests of the political „elite“groups and the groups that supported them were legitimized by the strengthening of nationalist ideology subordinated to the authoritarian rule. The choice of a new identity took place in no clear guidelines in the chaotic interfering of socialism and capitalism, one and multiparty system, populism and the new civic “ethos”. This situation is favourable to the strengthening of the imaginary that offered “support” and “interpretation” to the mythical- ritual consciousness in which the Serbian society found itself. Disharmonic, incoherent and ineffective states such as Serbia, due to the small political, civic and economic potential of the major social and political hardship stretched the transition to a long period of time with huge delays and problems. Biological, financial, infrastructural and moral resources were destroyed and lifted the negative values such as chauvinism, authoritarianism and isolation to the world. Only a minority was open for the (new) democratic and liberal values. The new government in the former Yugoslav republics continued its nationalist politics and war propaganda in different ways, although it is not as destructive as the politics during the nineties of the last century was. Nationalism is now used as a valve for social discontent. Serbia can be taken as the most typical example. The political leadership is using Kosovo as a justification for keeping the destructive social policies – whenever the social discontent increases or population requires changes, Serbian authorities encourage anti-Balkan hysteria and create problems around Kosovo. A similar model works in Croatia as well. Here, the Croatian politicians stir up social unrest directed against the Serbian minority and the European Union. A regular target of the attack is the Roma population; it was discriminated and socially isolated in all the former Yugoslav Republic. It is right to argue that nationalism, xenophobia and racism (including
424 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century anti-Semitism) “normalized” and deeply rooted in the opinion of the majority in all countries of the former Yugoslavia.
6. Conclusion The globalization against the extremist ideologies fight shows its weakness in periods of economic crisis, giving them a reason and a space for action. Looking at the situation after the First World War, it should be noted that it had large economic consequences, and in countries where the economy was heavily damaged (Germany, Austria, Hungary, France) severe inflation occurs along with the crisis. The outbreak of the crisis had nothing to do with the emergence of right- wing extremism, but it has certainly contributed dramatically to its development and multiplication, especially in Germany. The administrative mechanisms of the state were no longer able to function after the outbreak of the Depression, so the disappointed and dissatisfied citizens nostalgically remembered the empire and those most important values, such as economic, political and cultural, which were related to the Old German Empire. People were looking for a more radical, more controlled and more binding economic system, and that economic system would not have been possible without the dictatorial political system. Today, for the opponents of the “new world order”, the globalization is the unification of politics, economy, culture, values, and even the very ideas of what we see in a universal ideology – neoliberalism. Not everybody is ready to accept such unification, especially those who do not benefit from it, and the economic crisis show that the market cannot be fully self-regulatory, which can give rise to the spread of the ideology of nationalism and the left-wing anarchism as well. On the other hand, the extremists, well organized in their fight against the “new world order”, are connected on the international level. It is interesting that these extremists have adopted many of the benefits of globalization, such as the Internet, which helps them create a connection with each other and exchange ideas, often organizing joint actions. We can conclude that the development of the globalization in any direction will be followed by the political extremism as its main opponent.
425
III – World order and the Balkans
Duško DIMITRIJEVIĆ1
“THE NEW INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER” AND NEW STATES IN THE BALKANS
Abstract: In this study the author attaches a great importance to the theoretical examination of the concept of the New International Legal Order that was embodied in the last decades of the 20th century. The starting point for that reflection is observations of dissolution of the SFR Yugoslavia which illustrates one of the fundamental legal precedents. Reminding that the basic principle for the post-modern State behaviour must be the one that includes minimal disturbance of the existing international legal relations, author stresses that “the Yugoslav case” was customized on the way to respond to the new reality where the principle of effectiveness played an essential role in valuation of the statehood and which could be one of the greatest catalysts for all further ‘development rules’ of international law.
The expanding scope of international law The contemporary political transformation of the international community occurring in the last decade of the twentieth century necessarily affects the role and contents of international law, and gives the subject a new and more practical importance. Political situations formed on traditional institutions, and philosophical systems whose momentum has been largely spent, would never repeat again. After the historical periods of the “Cold War” and disintegration of the communist societies, we witness nowadays one of the phenomena in the modern international law history that could be qualified as the New International Legal Order. The current law system that arose from the new social structure has
1 Duško Dimitrijević, Ph.D., Director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics, Belgrade. This paper in somewhat different form was published for the first time in the Institute’s journal International Problems, 2006. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period.
427 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century an important task to legitimate the new political status quo after the outstanding territorial changes have occurred. The traditional rules included in the universal legal order do not, however, lose their validity for the lack of support of the ideological. The existence of the international law system is becoming more dependent on the efficiency of the international community power whose functions of distribution and delegation of the State competences are applied constructively on the new situation and on the new realistic ground. Since its beginning till the present days international law has appeared to be constantly in need of justification. The present development in international law goes to its very foundations. The theoretical examination of the New International Legal Order is not based on the a priori way, but it is in a conjugation with the general theory of the State and law. In conformity with the ontology that everything is changed but nothing lost (omni mutantur, nihil interit), international law has anticipated the existing norms that are developing new legal solutions connected with the State as a subject of international law. The history shows that the essential changes have taken place in the sphere of regulation of the process of “the birth and dying of States”. Having stated that the attitude of States towards international law is a very actual problem of global relations is an answer to the question what international law criteria of statehood shape, as a part of the New International Legal Order, what makes it appear highly significant. International relations of “new States” and “old States” are still in the phase of development, and it is very difficult to ascertain with precision what changes have a quantitative as well as a qualitative character. One of the reasons is emergence of the post-modern State based on behaviour that changes the traditional State sovereignty. In positive international law based upon the a priori and a posteriori judgments on “the succession of the State sovereignty”, the ground for an ideal importance of the State and legal order in space is certainly establishment or extension of a State sovereignty with the timely conditioned exclusion of another State sovereignty (expulsion). This logical explanation follows the conclusion that sovereignty gets changed in legally formulated modalities, but it does not get transferred. International law as an advanced legal order is in conformity with the concept of a relative effect of the State sovereignty that regulates indirectly the division of competences and executes the supervision of their State performed realization. The fundamental reason for that divisibility is a wide range of international actors from States to international organizations, legal persons or individual entities who articulate an emerging consensus relating to the new international law principles and rules. In many instances, particularly in the United Nations (UN), pragmatism as well as political and economic factors plays an increasingly important role. The present international
428 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century law is governed by the idea of a higher law order, and it is primarily the result of acceptance of commonly agreed rules of conduct.2 Reflecting the political changes in Europe and the Soviet Union in early 1990s, we can see that the traditional international law criteria could not promote attainment of statehood through its operative norms. Focusing its greater attention to the new States that emerged with the break-up of the SFR Yugoslavia after 1991, the international community has faced many legal problems resulting from the new legal approach. Reopening of the questions of self–determination, secession, recognition, succession of States and boundaries resulted from the State dissolution. The Yugoslav case became a decision point of a series of pragmatical novelties and served as a catalyst for its further development in international law. A comprehensive analysis of the new attitude goes far beyond the scope of the present study and I could here only recall the next conclusions.
“Development rules” of recognition of the new Balkan states When the succession of SFR Yugoslavia occurred, five new States were established – Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and FR Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The central question that arouse, was whether the legal effects following the new factual situation immediately affected other States, or whether they depended on an act of recognition. In assessing the mechanism of State recognition in public international law, I have to stress that recognition played an important role in the process of acquisition of statehood. In the context of creation of statehood, recognition perhaps appeared as constitutive or declaratory, what depends on the fact whether it is an act of international law or an act of political character.3 The comparative analysis of latest State practice, particularly in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe has been complicated by the fact that recognition is often used as a political instrument to express approval or disapproval of a new State,
2 “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”, Report of the High-level Panel on ‘Threats, Challenges and Change’, United Nations Document A/59/565, 2 December 2004; “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights”, Report of Secretary General, United Nations Document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, pp. 35, etc. 3 Hersch Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 1948, pp. 26- 38; James Crawford, “The Criteria for Statehood in International Law”, British Year Book of International Law, 1976-1977, pp. 93–182; The Creation of States in International Law, Oxford Clarendon Press, 1979, pp. 215, etc; Christian Hillgruber, “The Admission of New States to the International Community”, European Journal of International Law, 1998, vol. 9, pp. 491–509; Jochen A. Frowein, “Recognition”, Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Rudolf Bernhardt (ed.), Amsterdam, 2000, pp. 33–40.
429 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century government or legality of the territorial changes. On the other side, recognition keeps an average position that conforms to the general principles of international law. Evidently, the problem presupposes existence or disappearance of the State, what remains the matter of fact. The legal status of the State extends beyond the sphere of the internal legal order, it extends to the political and social spheres of international existence. Hence, recognition by other States has a purely declaratory character and means acknowledgment of a factual situation that is bound to fulfilling the basic conditions of statehood. Those conditions were very simple from the traditional point of view. The State had to have a defined territory, a permanent population and effective control over the territory and population.4 The nature of conditions was not the same and somewhere and sometimes third States claimed one additional condition tie with capacity to enter inter-State relations. All these “criteria” are in present times subject to the State interpretation in the light of facts and according to the factual situation.5 The recent practice in the Yugoslav case could not lead to clear and unequivocal answers. The notion of recognition of the new Balkan States has political and legal aspects.6 International law played the primary role in the legal evolution of the process and the principles of international law serve to define the conditions upon which an entity constitutes a State. Therefore, the question is, if recognition of new States in the territory of the former SFR Yugoslavia was a legal act and, as such, produced certain legal effects, what could these effects be other than fulfilment of a final condition of statehood? The practice of recognition of the new Balkan States was a prerequisite act that conferred statehood and at the same time it was a presumption for establishment of complete and normal international relations with other States. In legal sense, it was not in conformity with the constitution, but it had an affirmative role for their political existence. After the recognition, it was clear that all rules and principles of general international law governing the relations between sovereign States in international community were applicable ipso jure to the new Balkan States.7 Today, recognition by means of an international decision is peculiar for the United Nations (UN) as the universal organization with an objective
4 “Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States”, League of Nations Treaty Series, 1933, vol. 165, p. 19. 5 Joe Verhoeven, “La reconnaissance internationale: déclin ou renouveau”, Annuaire Française de Droit International, 1993, pp. 7–40. 6 Milan Šahović, “La reconnaissance mutuelle entre les Républiques de l’ex-Yougoslavie”, Annuaire Français de Droit International, 1996, pp. 228–33; 7 Ronald Rich, Danilo Turk, “Symposium: Recent Developments in the Practice of State Recognition”, European Journal of International Law, 1992, vol. 4, pp. 74–91.
430 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century international personality. UN plays an important role in matters of recognition. It has a sole authority to determine with a binding effect for the international community as a whole, whether the conditions of statehood are fulfilled in each specific case. It can make a preliminary decision concerning the admission of a new member States (Article 4(1) of the UN Charter). In this collective way, State recognition substitutes the process of admission to the UN. More precisely, such an admission is a tantamount to collective recognition of new States.8 However, regarding international organizations in general, a final decision of recognition of new States is vested in the existing sovereign States and it may be motivated by considerations that have nothing to do with the conditions of statehood. The recent practice of recognition demonstrates that every State makes a decision for itself or it does collectively through international institutions of the international community. When the former Yugoslav Republics emerged as new States, the international community tested their ability to respect the positive international law standards. The European Community member states made a decision to mediate in the conflicts and did not recognize any entity that resulted from the forcible acts of aggression. On 27 August 1991 EC established the Conference on SFR Yugoslavia with the purpose of aiding the parties to the conflicts to achieve a peaceful solution. Its Member States took account of the effect of recognition of other States. The matter of recognition of the new Balkan States was discussed by the Yugoslav Arbitration Commission that was constituted as a consultative body of the Conference on the former Yugoslavia.9 In its Opinion n° 1, dated 29 November 1991 the Commission confirmed that existence or disappearance of the State was a question of fact and that the effect of State recognition by other States was purely declaratory. In the Opinion n° 8, of 4 July 1991 the Commission underlined that such a recognition along with membership in international organizations, bore witness to these States conviction that the political entity so recognized was a reality and conferred on it certain rights and obligations under international law. Further position of the Commission’s Opinion n° 10 of the same date purported attitude that recognition was a discretionary act that other States might perform when they choose and in a manner of their own choosing, subject only to compliance with the imperatives of general international law. Extraordinary significance for “development rules” of international law has requirements for recognition made by the European Community in the Guidelines on Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union on 16
8 “Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on Conditions of Membership in the United Nations”, International Court of Justice Reports, 1948, p. 57. 9 “Conference of Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinions, no. 1–10”, International Legal Materials, American Society of International Law (ASIL), Washington, 1993, vol. 92, pp. 162–208.
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December 1991.10 Member States of the European Community co-ordinate their actions of recognition of those new States in the Balkans that seek independence. The Guidelines applicable standards include the following requirements for recognition: • respect of the UN Charter and the commitments subscribed to in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe,11 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe,12 especially with regard to the “rule of law, human rights and democracy”; • guarantees for the rights of minorities in accordance with commitments subscribed to in the framework of CSCE; • respect for the inviolability of all frontiers which can only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement; • respect for all relevant commitments with regard to disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation as well as to security and regional stability; • anticipation of commitment to settle by agreements, including where appropriate by recourse to arbitration, all questions concerning State succession and regional disputes. With the Declaration of Yugoslavia adopted on the same date, EC invited all former Yugoslav Republics to state by 23 December whether they wished to be recognized as independent States and whether they accepted the obligations contained in the Guidelines.13 The application for recognition with additional commitments elaborated within the framework of The Hague Peace Conference was to be submitted to the Arbitration Commission for legal advice. After the Commission’s affirmative Opinions n° 4, 5, 6, and 7, all of 11 January 1992,14 EC Member States recognized former Yugoslav Republics as independent States.15
10 “Declaration on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union”, UN Security Council Document S/23293, 17 December 1991, Annex II (1992), International Legal Materials, vol. 31, pp. 1486–87. 11 International Legal Materials, vol. 14, p. 1292. 12 International Legal Materials, vol. 30, p. 190. 13 “Declaration on Yugoslavia”, UN Security Council Document S/23293, 17 December 1991, Annex I (1992); reprinted in European Journal of International Law, 1992, vol. 4, p. 73. 14 “Conference of Yugoslavia, Arbitration Commission Opinions n° 4–10”, Annex III to the Symposium: ‘Recent Development in the Practice of State Recognition’, European Journal of International Law, 1993, vol. 4, pp. 74–91. 15 “State Practice regarding State Succession and Issues of Recognition: The Pilot project of the Council of Europe”, Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1999, pp. 60-74; Brigitte Stern, Dissolution, Continuation and Succession in Eastern Europe, General Concluding Remarks, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1998, pp. 197–208.
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That was the crucial deviation from the customary practice regarding recognition of States. Essentially, for this novelty the New International Legal Order built additional criteria for Statehood reserving the right to supervise new States with regard to fulfilment of particular international law obligations necessary for the full legal partnership in global relations. This practice is consistent with the predominantly voluntary character of the New International Legal Order, and accordingly, two traditionally divided institutions of international relations— recognition of States and establishment of statehood became more interconnected. From this premises we could deduce that the principle of effectively controlled territory by the government of the new State is becoming less important for the State being than recognition of the existing States or State members through some of the international organizations. In spite of the fact that all conditional collective or individual recognitions lead to the constitutive conception, a declarative character of the State recognition that was primordial for the accession of the new Balkan States to the international community, cannot be put in question. With regard to the adopted EC principles, the Guidelines will surely become a mechanism in shaping the future international practice. At last, in comparison with the traditional criteria for existence of the State, the new approach only fixes the existing practice and instigates high evaluation of general international law.
New tactics in the law of state succession Explication of the legal nature of State succession is directly conditioned by explanations that concern the very State and its sovereignty. In the New International Legal Order a ground for an ideal substance of the State is surely establishment or extension of the State sovereignty with the timely conditioned exclusion of another State sovereignty. In legal and logical sense, the succession of States is also a substitution of States and the continuity of rights and liabilities. A logical explanation of the State succession leads to justification that sovereignty is changed in legally formulated modalities. The State succession means legal succession, what proves that territorial changes must constitute a base for a certain legal norm (iusta causa). Pursuant to various types of territorial transformation, international law contains rules for dissolution, cession, secession and unification of the State. The rules embrace the principles of justice and they can evolve. Convinced of the need to identify de lege ferenda rules after the disintegration process in Europe and Soviet Union, the international community developed new legal regime in this domain in turn to provide better guarantees for the legal certainty in
433 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century global relations.16 It was oblivious that the case of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) was a model for the future international rehearsal. With gradual expulsion of its sovereignty, produced mostly through violent practice, the former Yugoslavia was cracked by a progressive separation of its Republics. In the first phase of the dissolution process of the Predecessor State, the Republics of Croatia and Slovenia announced their declarations of independence on 25 May and 25 June 1991, respectively, but their independence was postponed by the Brioni declaration for three months. The independence was confirmed on 8 October 1991. Macedonia asserted its right to sovereignty on 25 January 1991. Proclamation of independence was suspended until referendum took place in September 1991, and was finally declared on 17 November 1991. The Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Parliament adopted a resolution of independence in October of the same year that was contested by the Serbian people of that constituent Republic of the former Yugoslavia. After the referendum, Bosnia and Herzegovina declared its independence on 6 March 1992. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) adopted a new Constitutional Act with additional declaration on 26 April 1992, that emphasized the claim for political and international legal continuity with the former SFRY. The other Yugoslav Republics opposed to this claim because they were of the opinion that the former federation had ceased to exist. The western States, mainly the EC member states and the United States denied FRY the claim for continuity, too. This situation remained uncertain and the international community had to confront with various legal problems for a long time. For the reason that succession and continuity are not obligatory exclusive conceptions, the legal effects of the Yugoslav succession case become the central issue for which the Arbitration Commission of the EC Conference on Yugoslavia had to be counselled. In its Opinion n° 1, the Arbitration Commission expressed the view that the situation in SFRY was the one involving the dissolution of States. The Commission admitted that the consequent emergence of the constituent Yugoslav Republics as independent States had not yet been complete. The process was regarded completed in the Commission’s Opinion n° 8. For the Commission dissolution of SFRY meant that the State had no longer international legal personality. It found that the existence of the federal State, made up of a number of separate entities, was seriously compromised when a majority of these entities, embracing a greater part of the territory and population, constituted themselves as sovereign States with the result that federal authority might no longer be effectively exercised. After admission of
16 “Institut de Droit International Résolution adoptee lors de la Session de Vancouver 2000-2001”, Annuaire de l’ Institut de Droit International, A. Pedone, Paris, 2001, vol. 69, pp. 712–41.
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Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina to UN on 22 May 1992 (UN General Assembly resolutions—46/236; 46/237; 46/238), the Arbitration Commission reached the conclusion that the process of dissolution had been completed, and, that SFRY no longer existed.17 UN and other international organizations took an immediate action to purport these legal opinions. In its resolutions 756 and 777 (1992) the UN Security Council denied FRY’s claim for the former Yugoslav seat in UN, considering that the State formerly known as the SFRY had ceased to exist and that FRY could not automatically continue the membership of the former Yugoslavia in the United Nations. The resolution of the General Assembly A/47/1 of 22 September 1992 followed the recommendation of the Security Council and it was decided that FRY should apply for membership. At the same time FRY was excluded from participation in its work. This conclusion was the ground for anticipation of the next General Assembly resolution A/48/88 (1993) that brought it to the end- the confused status of FRY in that organization. Afterwards, the same standpoint was reiterated in the resolution 1022 (1995) that suspended the application by imposing the sanctions against FRY. Most other international organizations, especially financial organizations like IMF and the World Bank, insisted on FRY application for admission as a new member.18 Some others suspended FRY’s membership punishing its unlawful actions in the territory of the former SFRY. The determination on inexistence of the predecessor State identity leads towards its succession, that is to say, it leads towards transition of its international rights and liabilities to the State successor, so the inexistence of the State identity is formulated as a conditio sine qua non for the succession of States. The succession of SFRY involves a change of the territorial sovereignty and replacement of the Predecessor State by five new States in responsibility for the international relations of the territory of the former Yugoslavia. Because of the fact that the emerging States were equal successors to the former State, a redefinition of the inherited legal relations between the successor States and
17 Yehuda Blum, “UN Membership of the ‘New’ Yugoslavia: Continuity or Break”, American Journal of International Law, 1992, vol. 8, pp. 830–33; Milenko Kreća, “Succession and Continuity of Yugoslavia: A Commentary from the Aspects of International Law”, Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo, Beograd, 1992, br. 39, pp. 178–94; The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia was admitted to UN on 8 April 1993 (Security Council Resolution 817). UN has postponed FRY admission in that organization until 1 November 2000 (General Assembly Resolution A/55/12). 18 “IMF Decision on 14 December 1992”, Press Release, no. 92/92, December 15, 1992; “World Bank Decision on 25 February 1993”, Press Release, no. 93/S43, February 26, 1993; Paul R. Williams, “State Succession and the International Financial Institutions: Political Criteria v. Protection of Outstanding Financial Obligations”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1994, vol. 42, p. 787.
435 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century other members of the international community was necessary. The Arbitration Commission stressed that and recommended to all successor States to settle all aspects of succession by an agreement, and in accordance with the principles and rules of general international law. For the most part they are included in the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties and, 1983 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts.19 Hence, the successor States of SFRY are obliged to regulate on an equitable manner all the consequences that have emerged from the State succession in correlation with other international law subjects. In main cases, they accepted rules that reflected reliance on the persuaded principles of the Vienna Conventions,20 and extensive influence of international organizations in profiling the law on State succession, especially in the matter of allocation, division and distribution of the State property and debts. Finally, it resulted from the concept of “universal succession”, a different issue of international law, which may have relevance in the future practice.21
Self-determination vs. the principle of territorial integrity The question of SFRY’s dissolution and establishment of new States is directly connected with the exercise of the right of nations to self-determination, taking account of the right to secession. As a part of the New International Legal Order the States have to some degree a duty to promote creation of new States based on the principle of self- determination. This principle had been noted before in the UN Charter and emphasized in the General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) 1960 (the Colonial
19 “Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978)”, United Nations Document A/CONF. 80/31, International Legal Materials, vol. 17, pp. 1488–1517; “Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of State Property, Archives and Debts (1983)”, United Nations Document A/CONF. 117/14, International Legal Materials, vol. 22, pp. 306, etc. 20 Duško Dimitrijević, The State Succession in Respect of Treaties of the SFR Yugoslavia, Foreign Legal Life, Institute of Comparative Law, Belgrade, 2005, no. 1-2, pp. 1–40. With regard to succession of treaties of the former SFR Yugoslavia it appears that it does not provide any great difference of that customary international law codificated in the Vienna Convention. Our case study shows that all successor States of the former SFRY have benefited from the “fast track” method of participating in international treaties through general declarations of succession in which they declared that they were bound as successors by the entire body of treaty law in force in respect of the State territory to which the succession relates. 21 Carsten Stahn, “The Agreement on Succession Issues of the Former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”, American Journal of International Law, 2002, vol. 96, pp. 392, etc.
436 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Declaration), 1966 International Convents on Human Rights and the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations (resolution 2625 (XXV). It can be observed as a rule of international law in the glow of the number of UN declarations and resolutions and real State practice in the process of decolonisation. The fundamental issue today relates to the significance of self-determination beyond the decolonisation course of action. Self-determination does have a continuing function in circumstances related to human rights inside the territorial structure of autonomous States. The open question is what human rights do fall within self-determination? Only true is that the principle of self-determination cannot be used as a legal means for destruction of state sovereignty. The principle of territorial integrity preserves territorial sovereignty of independent States. Various international instruments exclude actions to disrupt the national unity and territorial integrity of the States. However, not any of them does prohibit creation of new States. The State creation continues to be the question of fact and would be justified in law by application of the principles that serve to define the conditions upon which an entity constitutes a State. It is well established in positive international law. Not any possibility is excluded that the territorial integrity can be destabilized by virtue of imperative standards of international law or the actual situation. In this respect, application of the principle of effectiveness, with or without consent of the Predecessor State plays of decisive role. The question whether the criteria of statehood comply with the given situation becomes a matter of evaluation by other States as well by international organizations. One of the principal issues following the relevance of self-determination of the peoples of the former constitutive Republics of SFRY was that no consent was given by all actors in this process. At the beginning of the process of origination of the new States in the territory of the SFRY, FRY denied other former Yugoslav Republics the right to secession. On the other side, for Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, self-determination was a basic title for independence. Insisting on the peremptory character of the commitment to respect the right to self-determination (jus cognes), they maintained the approach that secession was their constitutional right. FRY had a traditional law attitude that secession represented an illegal act and flagrant violation of the internal and international law order to which the Predecessor State had a full right to oppose by all lawful means. The EC Arbitration Commission was called to resolve this open legal question. It adopted opinion on the merit of this issue. That is to say, the Commission, acting within the framework of rules and principles of international public law, ‘redefined’ the factual situation pertaining to the territorial status and status of borders of the republics of SFRY in a novel
437 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century manner.22 In connection with the current situation and on the basis of the principle of protection of the territorial integrity of the new State, the Arbitration Commission adopted Opinion n° 2, and strictly limited the scope of right to self-determination in the context of unstable and unclear situation. It noted that international law as it currently stood, did not spell out all the implications of the right to self-determination. The Commission stressed that self- determination could not be carried out in such a way as to change borders existing immediately prior independence. In accordance with this, in its Opinion n° 3 the Arbitration Commission insisted on recognition of internal administrative borders as international borders. The principle of preservation of borders that had existed at the moment when the new States gained independence thus became a general ground for demarcation between the new Balkan States (uti possidetis juris).23 The arrangement for the above mentioned borders was derived from the fact that they represented “lines of demarcation that may be altered on the basis of free and mutual agreement”, and, a contrario, those borders thus became international frontiers “protected by international public law”. Merely, the effect of the principle uti possidetis is to “freeze” the legal title for possession of the territory at the moment when a new State has achieved independence. This interpretation may have been substantiated by the idea that the principle of respecting the territorial status quo may have also derived from the 1974 Constitution of SFRY (paragraph 2 and 4 of Article 5). The above mentioned Constitutional clauses prescribed irreversibility of borders of the Yugoslav Republics, unless the consent for change of borders was freely expressed. Thus, the formerly recognized principle of delimitation of the new States after the decolonisation in America and Africa, uti possidetis juris qui, has become a universal legal principle on the territorial delimitation that may be applicable to SFRY, too. Accepting the de facto situation, the Arbitration Commission stressed the security function of this principle under the circumstances that
22 Marc Craven, “’The European Communities’ Arbitration Commission on Yugoslavia”, British Year Book of International Law, 1995, vol. 66, p. 333; Alain Pellet, “La Commission d’Arbitrage de la Conférence Européenne pour la Paix en Yougoslavie”, Annuaire Française de Droit International, 1991-1993, pp. 329, 220, 286. 23 “Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Republic of Mali)”, Judgement of the International Court of Justice of 22 December 1986, International Court of Justice Reports, New York: United Nations, p. 565; Constantin Antonopoulos, “The Principle of Uti Possidetis Iuris in Contemporary International Law”, Revue Hellénique de Droit International, Institut Hellénique de Droit Internationa Étranger, Athènes, 1996, pp. 29–88; Malcolm N. Shaw, Peoples, “Territorialism and Boundaries”, European Journal of International Law, 1997, vol. 3, pp. 478–507; “The Heritage of States: ‘The Principle of Uti Possidetis Juris Today’”, British Year Book of International Law, 1997, vol. 67, pp. 75, etc.
438 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century might lead to “fratricidal fights and endanger the stability and recently acquired independence of the new States”. While the collapse of SFRY was going on, the Arbitration Commission explicitly declared itself in favour of the attempt of seceding a part of the population in the former Yugoslav Republics. It pointed out that all ethnic, religious and language groups in a State had the right to recognition of their identity under international law. The application of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia for recognition as independent States should be granted, subject to the conditions, first, by full consultation of its people by a referendum, and second, by passing of amendments to the Croatian Constitution of the incorporation of more fully certain guarantees of human rights and the rights of minorities. Provided for as the primary principle of the territorial integrity, by applying the method of argumentum a contrario the Arbitration Commission failed to reconsider all aspects of self-determination, this especially concerning the constituent Serbian population in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. The scope of minority rights remains in line with the territorial boundaries of the new Balkan States. Logically, they cannot interpret it a way that implies the right to secession. As an individual and collective human right, self-determination entails overall framework for consideration of the principles relating to democratic governance within the framework of independent States.24 With regard to the international borders of the former Yugoslavia that became external borders of the new States, the Arbitration Commission maintained that those borders should enjoy protection of international public law, in accordance with the principle embodied in the UN Charter. The protection of the above mentioned borders can be also derived from the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the UN Charter. Finally, international protection of the borders of the new States can be derived from the Helsinki Final Act that had inspired the Article 11 of the 1978 Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect to Treaties. When analysing this part of the Commission’s opinion, one should concentrate on the concrete research of the rules of international public law that the Commission stated as the basis for the opinion on inviolability of international borders of SFRY after the succession. Namely, Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on State Succession in Respect to Treaties has approved the principle of international public law prescribing that the succession of States
24 Thomas Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance”, American Journal of International Law, 1992, vol. 86, pp. 46, etc.
439 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century does not include the issues of borders that had been determined by treaties, nor the rights and duties pertaining to border regime that had been determined by treaties. This principle is derived from the legal practice and the theory of international public law and is essentially based on the principle of sovereign equality of States that also prescribes for States’ obligation to refrain from threats and use of force in their relationship (Article 2 of the UN Charter). The 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the Declaration of CSCE also covered up the principle of inviolability of borders. Since the international community is based on prohibition of interventionism aimed against the territorial integrity of States, it prescribed that the internationally recognized borders might be altered exclusively in a peaceful manner, on the basis of mutual consent of the interested parties. The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States repeated the same principle affecting to the “lines of demarcation”. The 1990 Paris Charter for New Europe confirmed the rule on immutability of borders. Furthermore, it coincided with the collective consensus on recognition of new States that had been formed in the territory of SFRY. The EC Guidelines on Criteria for Recognition of States in Eastern Europe and Soviet Union and Declaration on Yugoslavia adopted on16 December 1991, conditioning recognition of new States with their acceptance of the basic principles of international public law, amongst other obligations to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of State borders. In accordance with the valid provisions of international public law that was subject to a particular political test in case of Yugoslavia, one may assume that all former Yugoslav Republics of the SFRY acquired internationally recognized borders, once they had gained independence. Via facti, the internal administrative borders were transformed into the international frontiers, while the international borders had remained the same, in accordance with the provisions of international public law on immutability of international borders. However, the first case represents the particular legal presumption that may be generally applicable to the situations at the moment when the new States gained independence. Still, this presumption does not have an absolute effect ratione temporis, as, in itself, it functionally suspends the effect of legal title until the moment the title has been confirmed. The confirmation of the legal title, on the other hand, always depends on the concrete capability of the particular party to prove the validity of the facts it had based its claims on.25 On foundations of the above mentioned historic and legal facts that have been presented, the New International Legal Order encourages the particular legal
25 Gerald Fitzmaurice, “The General Principles of International Law”, Recueil de Cours, Academié de Droit International, The Hague, 1957, vol. 92, p. 148.
440 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century discrepancy at the moment of the State succession that is linked with achievement of the right to self-determination. One should evaluate the affectivity at the moment when a State gained independence, and after that time, not merely in the light of social causes, but in the light of real events that should verify, inter alias the existence of a specific right. For this reasons, the New International Legal Order bends over factual situation and slowly but surely justifies effectiveness.
441 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Miloš ŠOLAJA1
TRANSITION AND TRADITION IN THE BALKANS BETWEEN DEMOCRACY BUILDING AND STATE BUILDING
Abstract: The Balkan countries were forced to accept the so-called ’unwilling transition’ as the tail of transitional processes after the fall of the Cold War. The strategic concept of the “cold war winners” was targeted to transition to liberal democracy societies attracting former socialist bloc countries in Central and Eastern Europe to the international society of Western values and Western liberal values much faster. The preconditions for such transformation were founded on tradition and history of economic and political development before the Second World War as well as on the attempts to change the bureaucratic socialism in 1953, 1956, 1968, 1980, and later on. On the other hand, Western human, political and financial investments in the “civil society” and preparations were concentrated on the countries that were directly matched with them during the Cold War. The Balkan countries were surviving more as the periphery of the Cold War than the real belligerent arena. They were confused and stuck with the post-socialist changes implementing quite a different “model of transition”. Until today that transition has not yet been finished. The purpose of this work is to show consequences of different approaches to the changes in the Balkan states and societies where traditional internal and external diversities have promoted territorial and ethnic questions as the dominant problems of transition. Keeping traditional “vertical structures” of authoritarian and autocratic political systems almost all of them reflect that they are not ready to more intensively move towards transformation of institutions, values and goals in the direction of liberal values. That is visible through missing of really democratic environments and a functional state system. Key words: Balkans, state, transition, political system, society.
Contemporary global processes provoked changes in practical and theoretical approach of behavior of states in terms of stabilization, security providing and basic development in different regional or sub-regional state societies. Structure
1 Miloš Šolaja, Ph.D., University of Banja Luka, Faculty of Political Science, Republic of Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
442 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of international system has been as dramatically changed after the Cold War was ended as the dismissing of ideologically profounded communist values on the Central, East and South East Europe. Accommodation to the new international environment primarily understood internal transformation of former one-party over-bureaucratized regimes deeply rooted in the values of collectivism to the society of deliberate liberal democracy established as the values of individuality and freedoms. Process, theoretically named as the ‘transition’, affected firstly by changes in internal structures through accepting ‘new constitutions for a new society’ was followed by building of a political system convenient in terms of creating and conveying political and legal framework appropriate to transformational goals imposed by rejection of ‘old values’ and accepting something new. Secondly, transitional foreign policy thus became extension of internal transformation and should have to be considered as transitional participation of newly changed countries in the international politics. Relations between actors in the international theatre became radically changed. Disappearing of global bipolar confrontation imposed necessity of re-examining international relations by the most numerous countries as from the ‘third world’ as particularly by either new emerged or re-emerged countries on the territory of former federal states such were the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Majority of the ‘third world’ countries until the time of post-Cold War changes predominantly did not success to achieve stabile and consequently built political systems because of general undeveloped societies based on traditional structures and missing social, political and institutional democracy insufficiency. The fact they were influenced by former colonial centers regardless their orientation to the world-wide “non-alignment movement” guided them to move further in political plagiarism of former metropoles in socially-political development. Political system building process was permanently framed in circumstances that majority of neo-colonial countries had been conveying their state building they could have been taken even as a something ‘normal’. Two things featured their approach to international relations: first, their polities were turned to political systems founded on the values and principles of liberal democracy similar to their formally former colonial rulers. Second, they had realized and gained lot of experience of majority of state institutions related to foreign affairs build in the process of a state-building after gaining independence inheriting related internal infrastructure, skills and styles, relatively consequent and educated diplomacy service, membership in international multilateral framework as well as bilateral relations with former metropoles, for them the most important world countries, and neighbors and others that have been expressing interests. The Cold War end enabled majority members of the community of non- developed countries to turn themselves to accommodating, taking position and
443 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century trying to realize as much as possible benefits in the process of liberalization of the global markets led by unipolar world build by leadership of the United States America. Released of necessity of taking one side in bipolar world they oriented themselves to build own security in the changed security environment and to economy growth in formally liberalized post-Cold War global market assigned by deliberate political and economy transition. As the part of these processes there is regional and sub-regional international institutionalization in order to turn countries to greater efficiency and to realize greater better international position and influence through international organizations and cooperation with other international actors. Participating in the process of international dynamics of the unilateral post-Cold War ‘new world order’ based on the American indispensable power emerging immediately on the global scene after the breakup of bipolar confrontation, the ‘third world countries’ based their policies on exhausting some of techniques of regulating elements of international order. Regardless global ‘balance of power’ was reduced from bipolar global confrontation to more ‘regional balances’; some other mechanisms come to the surface: bandwagoning, international law, diplomacy and other including building regional institutions as unavoidable elements of changed international politics environment. Post-Cold War changes in the South East Europe affected all former socialist countries belonged to the three different types of socialist collective values: first, the Soviet Union model of the centralized ‘hard state socialism’; second, special and independent ‘self-management Yugoslav model’ of limited market and political freedoms; third, peculiar Albanian course of changing patrons such Are the Soviet Union, China and even North Korea until the end of the Cold War. Addition to this colorful types of socialism-states were Greece and Turkey already the members of Western EU and Euro-Atlantic community. All together accomplish regional Balkan order in the space usually taken as the part of European geopolitical space. Regional stability had been labeled due to the famous traditional “Balkans Formula” mathematically expressed as “two (former Soviet Bloc countries) plus two (self-declared neutralistic socialist countries) plus two (euro-Atlantic countries)”. This was the last stabile regional order fixed before the fall of the Berlin Wall and came to the end of historical development which created essential diversities. The Greek polis divisions, border between East and west Roman Empires, boundary between Slavic tribes, the division line between Catholic and Orthodox churches and flexible border between Ottoman and Habsburg empires. The development of the Region was characterized by its Eastern dimension because of few centuries of predominance of Ottoman Empire. National movements enlarged and strengthened with rise of nationalism in Western and Central Europe. “The liberal and national ideology of the European revolutionaries influenced Balkans leaders so strongly because it was
444 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century immediately applicable to local conditions... The national idea became of political organization and the principle of constitutional representative government”. (Jelavich, 440.) Processes of national strengthening and identification overlapped with the decline of Ottoman Empire and its central strategic position since 18th century that attracted interests of France, Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, Russia, Great Britain, France but also Germany and Italy after their unifications. As the matter of fact Russia contributed to Balkan deliberation of Ottoman control by permanent international interference that became as the policies of local Balkan governments as a part of policies of international actors. On the ruins of Turks governing emerged the modern Balkans which was at the same period formed parallel on the basis of disintegration of Ottoman Empire and of Austro- Hungarian dual Monarchy. In these processes of national revoking of international interests lays possibility for figuring out political roots of actual problems of regional relations and basements of a regional order – nationalism as the core of state-centric thinking and geopolitical divisions as well as dependence of interference and involvement of foreign powers in regional problems until regulating longer stabile sub-regional order from the 18th century when the Balkans was shared between these two medieval pillars of European order and reviving national peoples movements. From a beginning of the Serb national revolution 1804, Greek independence and emerging Wallachia semi-state and Berlin Congress the history of the Balkans shows itself as a history of divisions. During the period of approaching to the WWI Balkans could have been recognized by the image of ‘Balkan wars’ which could be circumscribed due to failed attempts to create some sort of regional order. The world politics at the beginning of the 20th century that brought Balkans in the focus 1914, fast pushed Region to the global limbo. Nations not mature enough and newly independent states did not have sufficient time to fix their national and state interests as well as to build firm political and economy system and create a stabile regionally oriented cooperation on order to figure out ways to response to political and security challenges by abroad. Unfortunately, regardless intentions to try to provide outside support, Balkan countries unwillingly became helpless victims of political and war goals of the ‘great powers’. Even worse, some of newborn countries forced their aggressive purposes and were willingly used by foreign powers to realize some local goals in order to use shift of war coalitions. “Their irredentist wars against Ottoman rule and the resultant borders were closely supervised by foreign patrons and regulated by the principles than governed European relations” (Veremis 2000:22) The end of the WWI brought redefinition of regional order dominantly because of emerging new states and redefining already existing. The new regional composition was as the result of disintegration of two empires that
445 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century shared peninsula century earlier as the result of tensions of the Balkans nations to realize interests defined until the WWI. Border changes after the War halted any idea of closer regional cooperation and became the one of the cornerstones of specific regional ‘balance of powers’ and regional instability that could have been circumscribed by surviving of weak countries in the region. Between two world wars the Balkans was contended of six states – Kingdom of Yugoslavia as the multinational state and five other more-less national states each of them having specific development and state-building. Regardless specificities in their state-building processes Austrian and Ottoman imperial traditions captured in obsolete policies and administrations as the key influential factor essentially shaped internal structures of Balkans countries and moreover their social environments and values. Although both based on different political philosophies the ‘redline’ that separate new from old societies was a hundred years building ‘vertical structure of power’. The main characteristic of this type of polity is state-centric spatial geopolitics build on anarchic realistic environment featured by the role of the military thus maintaining regional defense balance. In this stage of history there were no local ideas of aggression they were existing only in allying with big powers. Hierarchic top-down polity sourcing from ethno-centric cultural primordial myths was the main characteristic. Immanent nature of this type of political system is “ethnical collectivity conception of centralism” as the basement for supporting clientelistic and clandestine politics and economy. Regardless absolutely undeveloped dominantly agrarian economy and peasant majority societies ruling over new nationally stabilized countries were in hands of pretty narrow middle class elite groups which shaped constitutional parliamentary representation on relatively different political interests. These groups sublimated those who joined to government institutions, army, business, universities and other professions linked in order express political diversities. In this frame, all new Balkan countries led by national leadership do not take care adequately to the countryside and interests shaped by dominantly agrarian economy. Approaching to the WWII the Balkan political situation had been drastically worsening particularly after the Great Depression 1929 when weak parliamentarian systems were not able to maintain themselves as the dominant political paradigm. With closing of international danger at that time almost all Balkan states felt in hands of autocratic monarchy ruling. “The main aim of each of these governments was the assurance of international order and the maintenance of the existing social structure… Once again warfare among the great powers led to major changes in the peninsula”. (Jelavich, 442-443.) The another stage of the developing of the Balkans international position came with defeat of fascism and emerging bipolar world with the United states and Soviet Union as the only two after-war ‘great powers’. Both were not
446 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century involved in regional policies in the period before WWII. After the war United States and Great Britain engagement was focused to Greece and Turkey and Soviet Union was turned to direct involvement to Bulgaria, Romania and Albania until 1960, and its divorcing with. They lost control over Yugoslavia after rejecting Stalin’s politics 1948. As the Balkans halted to be a part of the priorities of politics of great powers they preferred the line of direct East-West confrontation in the Central Europe and secondly post-colonial spaces in Asia and Africa. Inter-bloc relations were overshadowed by firming internal bloc economies and collective defense communities in order to approve and defense their ideological, political and military positions as confronting sides. The West was occupied with ‘German Question’ notably re-unification. The East was occupied with its own sustainability after Soviet Union joined militarily occupied Central, East and South East European countries. Protests in Eastern Germany 1953, and Hungary 1956, were socially motivated; Czechoslovakian Communist Party ‘silent coup’ tried 1968 to impose more liberal model of socialism which provoked Soviet Union to create ally’s collective actions against attempts of liberalization. The Balkans, particularly former Yugoslavia and Albania were squeezed between two military-political blocks creating specific ‘buffer zone’ without direct confrontation but potentially ally of any of sides. International order leverage in the peninsula was assigned by shifting strategic position of the Balkans characterized by two mayor features – regional countries posed themselves as active participants in international politics and the fact that there was no possibility of the Balkans countries and even nations to draw in big powers in a war because of any local reason. In the internal frame, international order was affected by handed over the ruling apparatuses after the World War II. Pre-war national leaderships based on liberal values of individualism were not dedicated to mass gatherings of people so they left open way for communist parties to impose their type of governance, state-building and society-institutionalizing. Backed by the Soviet Union and armies emerged from the World War they soon got rid of political opposition and suppressed any open voice against authorities. They were occupied by building ‘leading role of the (one) party’, ‘central planning economy’, ‘non-sleeping enemy’, ‘one party conscience’ ‘one party conscience’ and other mechanisms of society which were not as turned to individual liberties as more to social equality and radical changes of traditional model of decision making and executive based on collective ideological values. The governance was based on the Soviet Union influence and directions. Self- imposed political elites realized their power by armies backed coercion and full party control of entire state institutions. The socialist Balkans states build their political philosophy on modernization and social equality which served as the pacification tools of population masses using material and social benefits they
447 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century did not enjoy before. These benefits served as a specific way of “anti-Western political corruption” based on Marxist doctrine. Regardless multi-decade efforts on the fall of communism 1989, political actors in former socialist countries as well as in the West were surprised and not prepared for upcoming processes. “Overnight democratic rights and freedoms replaced censorship and dictatorship. But throughout Eastern Europe, the outgoing communist bureaucracies devised ways of adapting the new condition preserving their privileges against challenge of political or economic competition”. (Glenny, 1999:634). The changes in East and Central Eastern Europe more-less were posed on compiled ideas of old communist and new capitalist forces which determined the model and dynamics. Poland and Hungary went fast to capitalist environment, in Romania and Bulgaria renamed communist had been keeping political power until fixing a new order. Yugoslavia became the soil of expressing of aggressive nationalism and designing new states and new established international relations between them based on. The Balkan wars the first time in history became the point that “the great powers (under the blend new title, international community) did not cause the wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo”. (Glenny, 636). Whatever happened became obvious the federal Yugoslavia could have not survived and the process of breaking up would have brought the crisis to become of international dimensions. A few processes interfered through peace-making attempts. First, geopolitical intention for the prevailing influence in the Balkans, the region previously known of traditional Russian national interests and strategic domination as well as strategic area. Second, as the extension of historical defeat of the communist ideology build through intentions on ideology of social equality and collectivist values, western industrially developed countries begun with the process of post-socialist transformation to the society of liberal democracy values through orientation on multiparty democracy, market economy and imposing rule of law principles. Third, new actors came into the regional embroilment. United States of America managed ending the conflicts, NATO joined to the region in order to the first time show possibility to unilaterally act “out of area” and clearly assign moving balance to the west side. “It was clear break with the morality of the Cold War”. (Glenny, 660). Imposing principles of humanitarian interventions as the practice of western community through the Balkans wars, there was posed a principal question of sovereignty. Fourth, through peace making and peace keeping operations western powers, USA and EU before all, realized direct military and political presence forcing international enlargement to all countries in the region in order to frame the territorial presence. The Balkan Wars frozen the process of economy and political side of post- socialist transformation intended “foreign intervention demonstrates how the
448 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century chaos of transition can force external concern and involvement” (Pridham, 17.) Military pressure and military actions became of utmost importance of forcing transition in the South East Europe simply forcing and imposing peace. The Balkans ’war adventure’ could not have been resolved without external actors and armed force. International arrangements and direct international involvement in the beginning not intentional became the inseparable part of peace-keeping but also of transition in the Region. ’Unwilling transition’ mutated to the ’forced’ or ’stipulated’ transition’ which is conceptualized, managed, executed and controlled by international institutions either directly or simply using local actors as participants in the process. Both processes have been targeting to the one goal – creating stable and secure regional environments and finishing transformation of values in every single country in order do to join to the integrations of „of all European powers in a liberal order – embodied in NATO and the EU – in which rule of law, pooled sovereignty and interdependence would gradually replace military conflict, the balance of power and spheres of influence“ (Krastev&Leonard, 1) Immediate after the war ended 1995 international community invested a lot of finances in reconstruction and development programs in order to overcome the gap. Unfortunately the dynamics of changes in the ex-Yugoslav countries in particular countries did not follow a general mainstream. Slovenia was settled the first, few were lagging because of war while Serbia and Montenegro started more than ten years later. EU Zagreb Summit 2000 opened the door for EU integration while Thessaloniki Summit 2003 definitely confirmed orientation of EU for enlargement to the Western Balkans. “In this regard both the requirements and the consequences of EU membership can do most to transform the Balkan polities, by fostering ’horizontally structured’ civil societies and civil economies based the rule of law, equal civil rights for all permanent residents, and the equality of all the individuals before the law, for the first time after 2000 years of unbroken ’verticality of power”. (Bidelaux, 583) Dismantling old ’vertical’ structures of power through subsequential transformations requested clear concepts and their realization. Firstly stabilization of peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina brought presence more than 62.000 ground troops and it was the greatest peace operation in the world history gathering NATO, Western European Union, UN or overseas countries soldiers such are Argentina, Australia, New Zeeland, even Chile. Dimensions of military presence reflected dimensions of efforts enterprised to end the regional wars 1995. Similar happened after the 1999 FR Yugoslavia NATO bombing. Thousands of ground troops deployed in Kosovo because of two reasons – peace keeping including separating Serbian Army and Kosovo rebellion units and organizing international institutions as the legislative and executive power. As Bosnia and Herzegovina was directly ruled by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) as the steering body and Office of the High
449 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century representative (OHR) based on subsidiarity principle to local authorities in executive as United Nations Mission to Kosovo (UNMIC) has been governing fully on Kosovo. In addition the first EU Mission was “Concordia” in Macedonia as well as UNROFOR, later UNCRO in Croatia, had been keeping the peace. Regardless non directly initiation for open Balkans conflicts, once intervention of peace-keeping efforts of the international community the Balkans countries created atmosphere as interfering and advising as direct involving and even ruling by processes in the Region. These direct engagements initiated overspill affecting on Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Albania as well as other Balkan countries in term of realizing international influence in entire region. Both international influence for enlargement and voluntarily expression for an accession of the post-socialist Balkans states to integrations are the main pillars of the ‘new international presence in South East Europe’. A common denominator for two-way politics should be found out in the ‘Copenhagen criteria’ defined 1993 as the basement for measuring transitional changes of the each single country. These criteria supplemented by the necessity for efficient administration with so called ‘Madrid criterion’ 1995 insisted on the vast internal transformation of traditional or classic verticality of power structures of direct ruling due top-down model and create environment of values of individual society and liberal democracy. The goal was posed by all new states – former socialist ex-Yugoslav republics through serial of ‘democracy’ elections in the beginning of 90’s. All without exception got rid of communism accepting values of individual society but without real willing to transfer it and ingrade principles of liberal society in political systems enable to realize political and economic principles of the new society and achieve truly liberal democracy and liberal capitalism. “In this regard both the requirements and the consequences of EU membership can do most to transform the Balkan polities, by fostering ‘horizontally structured’ civil societies and civil economies based the rule of law, equal civil rights for all permanent residents, and the equality of all the individuals before the law, for the first time after 2000 years of unbroken ‘verticality of power”. (Bidelaux, 583) In order to transcend liberal values EU initiated few mechanisms. Some of them were started even in the time predeceasing Cold War through developing the first wave of systematic developing regional cooperation institutions such are Central European Initiative (CEI), Black Sea Economy Cooperation (BSEC), and Alps-Adriatic Cooperation. The second wave was launched immediately after the Balkan wars in the first half of nineties of 20th century. The one of the first started in Royamont Castle (Paris) Initiative oriented to political and social development and improvement of democracy. Another is, for instance sparkled by USA, named as South East Cooperation Initiative (SECI). This period was
450 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century convenient to set out South East Cooperation Process (SEECP) as the one of ‘regional ownerships’ in the Balkans cooperation. This was the first time after the Balkans war that regional countries more-less initiated regional initiatives on their own. The most important initiative in this wave might be initiating Stability Pact 1999, and Stabilization and Association Process build on. As the cornerstone of the systematically initialized accession to EU was ‘Zagreb declaration’ 2000 and two way recognition of enlargement of ‘Western Balkans’: on the one hand European Union declared its decisiveness to attract Western Balkans Countries to membership and on the other hand real declaration of the Balkans Countries to join to EU. EU rapprochement was confirmed at the “Thessaloniki Summit” 2003. As the financial instruments of the accommodation of the Western Balkan countries to European members values were long term CARDS and IPA funds. Finally, third wave, came to the spot much later on are EU macro-regional policies as the specific combination of cooperation between EU and non-EU aspiring countries. At the moment Danube Macro-Region is in the phase of broad developing and Adriatic-Ionian institutionalization is emerging. Another type of a regional institutionalization is security. For difference EU which became the ultimate goal of all the Balkans countries as the old and new members as actually aspiring, security arrangements have been showing up differently. Regional countries joined to Partnership for peace (PfP) as very lately as by different speeds. From Croatia 2000 until Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia 2006, they were recognizing as the partners in the Program. But this was the cross-roads point. Making liberal environment poses a question of regional security. Combination of influence, access, resources and specifically appealing ideologies make it difficult for relatively inexperienced authorities to mount sustained processes. Taking account that new regional states emerged at the time when Doyle’s theory of ’democratic peace’ was widely discussed the dilemma was about sufficiency of building political system liberal democracy and possibility to start a war. Following Doyle’s theory underlined with Fukuyama’s claims that “democracies don’t go to war against each other” the question relates to the Balkans peninsula is about readiness of countries to get rid of any possibility to sparkle some new war. Following Waltz’s theory of the ‘structural realism’ one must not neglect possibility of blowing up a new war between states. “The democratic peace thesis will hold only if all of the causes of war les inside of states” (Waltz, 32) The main cleavage on this question was between Serbs and non-Serbs (Kasapović, 128). Serbs were dominant nation or significant majority in four of six former Yugoslav republics. As the ‘international community’ consent with Robert Badinter Commission the question of national borders became the question of state borders. “Republic boundaries were declared inviolable declared inviolable, open to change through peaceful negotiation… the EC saw
451 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the solution to the crisis on Yugoslavia in the “Europeanization” of the republics. Recognition was tided to compliance with European norms of behavior which implied that each republic would be considered for recognition on its own merits.” (Burg&Shoup, 86). Regardless new defined and accepted standards the Balkans sank in the plenty of internal divisions based on created sub-state political entities emerged from traditional Balkans divisions based on traditional national and ethnic divisions. Almost all of them raised requests for territorially ethnically based autonomy and way to independence and state sovereignty. “The region contains a number of questions located at the societal and political, i.e. ethno-territorial conflicts: whether Bosnia-Herzegovina stays as one state or splits into two or three; Montenegro’s fate as one or as member of the remaining Yugoslavia whether Kosovo will in the future be independent, a part of Serbia/ or eventually part of greater Albania; the place of Albanians in southern Serbia; the relationship between the large Albanian minority and the Slavic majority in Macedonia that caused open violence 2001; Cyprus; Hungarian minority in all neighboring state; the large ‘Turkic’ minority in Bulgaria; the Turks Greece and the competing interpretations of ‘Macedonian’ nationality and statehood among Serbs, Bulgarians, Greeks, Albanians and existing ‘FYROM’ state. These questions of potential secession blend into generally unstable situations in Albania and possibly Serbia itself”. (Buzan and Weaver, 2003:384-385). Buzan and Weaver did not mention the ‘Serbian question’ in Croatia and interim existing of ‘Republika Srpska Krajina’ (Republic of Serb Krajina) as well as creation of territorially political unit of Autonomna Pokrajina Zapadna Bosna (Autonomous Region of the Western Bosnia” in the Bosniak (Muslim) controlled space in BH. The majority of these state-shaped entities more-less organized their forces either as army or some sort of militia and stepped into military operations intending to gain as much as possible state-centric political control over their ‘state imagination’. The regional environment in the first half of 90-s has to be assigned by ambiguous polarity gathered about two cores characterized due to national, territorial and ethnic interests and goals. The first core conditionally might be named as the ‘axis of Western Balkans’ which attracts Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks and appropriate state carriers of political process. The second core as Misha Glenny named the ‘South Balkans’ is equipped around Macedonia involving Albania, Bulgaria, Greece (Glenny 1999), added by Turkey profounded on their interest and traditional presence and self-declared independent Kosovo too. Regional order had become typical anarchic society which was not contended only by ‘old’ or ‘new’ internationally recognized sovereign states but also by sub-states that predominantly were linked with some of neighbor or regional countries. The Balkans environment was absolutely realistic but without main characteristic of realism: self-help, survival. Aforementioned foreign influences
452 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century were not key factor of the regional security and stability because conflicts between regional countries are indigenous. Western world led by unipolar power of USA and new EU integration energy were not interested to change relations between countries eventually emerging poles, their dominant concerns were transition of post-socialist societies into the countries based on values of the liberal democracy in order to joint to the “community of free nations”. On the other hand the main goal was the regional peace in order to avoid overspill conflicts to neighboring countries and further to continent wide. The point of non-interests and non-intervention of external powers did not mean they were absolutely neutral – their interventions in the conflict did complicate solutions by interfering and anticipating regional political solutions. A question posed here is how to define state and reasons lay inside? Robert Keohane claims that new actors have come into the world political theatre. “Liberal institutionalists take for granted the state as a legitimate representation of society. Although emphasizing the importance of non-state actors in his early pluralist work, Robert Keohane’s understanding of neo-liberal institutionalism admits that non-state actors are subordinate to states (Baylis& Smith, 176). It is ambiguous what means ‘subordination’? Some of these actors can be classified as stronger and their metropolitan countries which in opposite could have been sorted as the ‘quasi state’. The first type is sorted as ‘de facto states’, ‘states-within- states’ or some other type of political entities which is common characteristic absence of recognized independency. Most frequently they share basic values of ‘primordial state’ except national interests and goals. Post-socialist space notice few different cases that might be observed of such kind of sub-state political entities. In the focus of attention are four post-Soviet de facto states: Transnistria (Moldavia), Nagorno Kharabakh (Armenian entity in the territory of Azerbaijan), Abkhazia and South Osetia (both in Georgia). In the Balkans there are few precisely sustained and sustainable sub-state entities of seven state-shaped were more-less existing after the break-up of former Yugoslavia. At the moment we might talk about the Republic of Srpska and the Federation of BH in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo as the really ‘de facto states’ and likely relatively self- ruled ethnic-Albanians community in West Macedonia as the part of two-nations consociation state in the South Balkans. Recent past mention three disappearing entities that were existing during wars in the space of ex-Yugoslavia: the Republic of Serb Krajina in Croatia; the Croat Republic of Herceg-Bosna (Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna) and Autonomous Region of western Bosnia (Autonomna Pokrajina Zapadna Bosna) founded by famous pre-war politician Fikret Abdić, both latter actually on the territory of the another still live ‘de facto state’ – the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Additionally here are not considered ten regions cantons (županije on Croatian) the main constitutive actors in the Federation BH, each having constitution, parliament and
453 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century government. Considering that five of them are with Bosniak majority, but two of them are with pure Croatian majority and three ‘mixed’ dominantly overlaps with area of former phantom parastate Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna (HRHB) which still has huge impact of the collective conscience of Croatians living in BH. Such a type of ‘de facto states’ would not be discussed here and they will be considered as undividable parts of the Federation BH entity. International community created specific regional order after the Balkan Wars. Considering some other models of constituting ‘de facto states’ world- wide the ‘Balkan model’ of international community went in the two directions: either supported as the constitutive part of recognized states or insisted to disappearing of during the war existing parastates. Moreover, both contribute to the regional security on its own combined, of course, with international arrangements and presence. The reason for analyze is an impact of ‘de facto states’ in the Balkans on the regional security and stability. Due to Scot Pegg analyze ‘de facto states’ are active participants in international relations and international law. “In essence, a ‘de facto state’ exists where there is an organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability; receives popular support; and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area, over which effective control in a defined territorial arena, over which effective control is maintained for an extended period of time. The ‘de facto state’ views itself as capable of entering into relations with other states and seeks full constitutional independence and widespread international recognition as a sovereign state. It is, however, unable to achieve any degree of substantive recognition and therefore remains illegitimate in the eyes of international society” (Pegg, 1.) The Balkans ‘de facto states’ absolutely fit in these criteria. Moreover, Pegg in this definition does not touch the one important side of statehood – national defense and national security. Talking about ‘de facto states’ in the region we must recognize that they were founded as the result of different views on an institutionalization of national interests in relations to metropolitan states which usually could have been characterized as a ‘quasi state’. The first step was forming of the armed-forces as the axes of forming of unrecognized ethnical based state entities in the first half of 90-es of 20th century. It was not only armed protection of territory and population but in the political experience of the Balkans nations it is a symbol of sate too. In the public awareness almost all ‘de facto states’ internally functions as the fully internationally recognized states. On the other hand, authorities draw their legitimacy by the popular political support based on national interests and opposition to “others”. It produces internal sense of independency and might in international relations. State
454 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century building was not left to metropolitan ‘quasi state’ but kidnapped only on behalf of a ‘de facto state’. “The result is more ambiguous leading to an uneasy coexistence and symbiosis between state and “substate” (Kingston and Spears, 7.) Trying to resolve dilemma between “statehood” and “stateness” it is necessary to define that “Weberian notion of the state – defined in minimal terms as a compulsory association with a territorial base claiming a monopoly over the legitimate use of force” (Weber, 45.) This ‘de facto states’ did not appear without international consent. Mary Kaldor claims that “new ‘globalized war, given their dependence on predation and external support, their low levels of participation, and their targeting of civilians , tend to the fragmentation rather than consolidation of political authority” (Kaldor, 90). Considering aforementioned definition of ‘de facto state’ it is important to mention that such a systemic state-shaped political entities have better control of processes on a territory they control than a weak ‘patron’ state. Robert Jackson claims that ‘quasi-states’ possess all the trapping and formal qualities of sovereign states. “They are deficient in political will, institutional authority and power to protect human rights or to provide socio-economic welfare”. (Jackson, 21) Coexistence ‘de facto states’ with either states or ‘quasi-states’ ion the Balkans inevitably poses question of a state building after the Cold War and re-defining order in the Region. It is obvious that ambiguous assumptions do not create a constructive atmosphere for providing security as well as economy, political and social stability. All transitional states are instable and weak with unfinished constitutional arrangements and critical political system. Considering that a model of transition in the Western Countries is dominantly called as “stipulated” which enforce compilation of old-fashioned, even some personally still existing for the previous times, politicians and ‘new economy’ class considering tycoons and other ready to get rich based on ‘deal’ with state but not making business really. Ambiguities in the state-building shared between ‘quasi –states’ and ‘de facto states’ is fruitful soil for ‘power-sharing’ based on national consensus linked exclusively to national elites apart of populations and their enjoying in national “protection” based on fear and “threat” from “others”. In war experience and “threats from others” considering a fact that parts of national groups after break-up of Yugoslavia remained in neighbor countries and did create state-shaped ‘de facto states’ which organized their own armed forces. Bosnia and Herzegovina particularly expressed these relations on the warfare in 90-es shared between three armies.’
Conclusions A Balkans order after the fall of Cold War still stays really open question. Internationally enforced peace did not brought stabile security policies because
455 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century it was more unwilling reception of necessity to end violent conflict by local actors then essential assumption that peace means possibility for development and certain future. Regional countries elites did not sincerely accept transition so it could have been characterized as ‘unwilling’. Nurturing criminal syndicates and corrupted structures of authority and powers transition in the Balkans countries is very slow. The fact is that democratization process has not been efficient enough and that at the same time process of state building guided to uncontested sovereignty and questionable capacities to fulfill criteria for EU membership. As in the meantime geopolitical situation started changing due to changed presence of other European emerging poles of power which reinforced some ideas of regional balancing similar but not similar to the Cold War time because of increasing of number of actors. In the analyze it is necessary to take account that not only state but sub-state and non-state actors are involved but all on the basis of classic state-centric logic of state-building. In that logic security is posed on military and ‘vertical’ structure of authorities. In an ‘unfinished business’ due to democracy, state building and security the final exit is usually seen in the possibility of sparkling new violent conflicts. Considering security processes in the region it is possible to conclude that regional ‘balance of power’ is the basement for further political, social and economy development. There are few level of balancing flexible in the post-Cold War history and for the providing as sovereignty and independent of recognized states as state-shaped ‘de facto states’ or former ‘phantom states’ which will work to gain independency or to enhance political and security role in the region. First, ‘balance of power’ in the Region was provided by ‘international community’ or ‘great powers’ in order to achieve pace and stop war violence and atrocities. Regional and local actors unwillingly ended wars and had to be oriented to liberal democracy transition based on reconstruction and forced development. The part of this process was of internationally recognition of ‘de facto states’ and their balancing role in combination with neighboring actors: Second, after achieving peace settlements regional security was balancing in relations to Euro-Atlantic and European integrations. In that period, a significance of ‘de facto states’ was diminished which guided even to changing regional settlements due to conventional arms and raising decisiveness to Euro- Atlantic integrations. Third, emerging European multipolarity through raising Russian and Turkey influence in the region empowered some of ‘de facto states’ and even some ideas of ‘phantom raising entities’ with ‘state idea’ based on general geopolitical re- positioning as in European Union as in Europe and Euro-Asia as whole.
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Literature Burg, Steven L; Shoup, Paul. S (2000), The War in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention, Me Sharpe, Armonk – London. Buzzan, Barry; Waver Ole (2003), Regions and Power: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge University Press. Bideleux, Robert; Jeffries, Ian (2007), The Balkans, Routlage, London. Glenny, Misha (2012), The Balkans: Nationalism, War, Great Powers 1804–2011, Penguin Books London. Glenny, Misha (1999), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50976/misha-glenny/ heading-off-war-in-the-southern-balkans. Jackson, R. H. (1990), Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Jelavich, Barbara (1983), History of the Balkans: Twentieth History, Cambridge University Press, New York – Port Chester – Melbourne Sidney. Kaldor, Mary (2001), New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, Stanford University Press, Stanford. Kasapović Mirjana (1996), Demokratska tranzicija i političke stranke, Fakultet političkih znanosti, Zagreb. Kingston, Paul; Spears, Ian (2004), States within States: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives, States within States: Incipient Political Entities in the Post –Cold War Era, edited by Paul Kingston and Ian Spears, Palgrave Macmillan, New York. Krastev, Ivan; Leonard Mark (2010), The Spectre of Multipolar Europe, European Council on Foreign Relations, London. Pegg, Scott (1998), De Facto States in the International System, Working paper No. 21, Institute of International Relations The University of British Columbia. Pridham, Geofrrey (1994), The International Dimension of Democratisation: practice and Interregional Comparisons, Collection of Works “Building Democracy: The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe”, edited by Geoffrey Pridham, Eric Herring and George Sanford, St. Martins Press, New York. Smith, Steve & Bailies, John (2000), The Globalization of World Politics, 6xforniversity Press, London. Veremis, T. & Daianu, D. (editors) (2001) Balkan Reconstruction, London, Frank Cass. Waltz, Kenneth (2002), Structural Realism after the Cold War, “America Unrivalled: the Future of the Balance of Power”, edited by John Ikenberry, Cornel University Press, Ithaca and London. Weber, Max (1947), The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, Oxford University Press, New York.
457 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Jelena TRIVIĆ1 Saša PETKOVIĆ2
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT IN CANDIDATE AND POTENTIAL CANDIDATES – HOW FAR ARE WE?
1. Introduction Institutions or institutional environment in this study are defined according to the postulates of the New Institutional Economics. It assumes Nobel laureate Douglas North’s concept of institutions and institutional environment. He explained institutions in his capital work “Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance” in 1990 pursuant for which he won Nobel Prize in Economics. In defining the concept of institutions it is important to distinguish institutions from organizations. North (1990, p. 3) and other authors of the New Institutional Economics define institutions as the rules of the game, or as rules, regulations (humanly devised constraints) which structure political, economic and social relations; they consist of two factors: the formal rules (constitution, laws, private property right) and informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions and codes of conduct). The purpose of the rules and conventions of behavior is to define the rules by which the game is played, monitored and enforced. Organizations or individuals are only entities which devise and implement these institutions. There are several data sources and indicators by which it is possible to empiricaly measure quality of institutions: World Governance Indicators, International Country Risk Guide, Index of Economic Freedom, Economic Freedom of the World, Corruption Perception Index. In this paper institutions are measured by World Governance Indicators Database (2014) developed by Kaufman et al. (2010) which indicates quality of Governance in certain country. This indicator is composed of six components: voice and accountability, political stability,
1 Jelena Trivić, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics University of Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina. 2 Saša Petković, Assistant Professor, Faculty of Economics University of Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
458 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. Each variable of six indicators goes from -2.5 to 2.5 where higher value indicates higher result. Empirical analysis of the quality of institutional environment in this paper is done for candidate and potential candidate countries of the Western Balkans. Quality of institutional environment in these countries is compared with the quality of institutional environment in their closest neighbors – Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia as well as with the quality in the countries of “New Europe” (Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia) in order to show how far the Western Balkan countries are from the similar countries of EU. Empirical analysis includes also assessment of the relationship between quality of institutions and business environment and relationship between institutions and economic development which is done by method of correlation. Inadequate institutional environment defined as the “rules of the game” has negative implications for the overall business environment, entrepreneurship, attraction of foreign and domestic investments, and so on. Thus, at the end of the paper we stress again importance of institutions for the overall economic performances which is sometimes neglected.
2. What are institutions and institutional environment? The word institution has a diversity of meanings (Tešić, 2010, p. 103). Institutions and Institutional Environment in this paper are defined according to postulates of New Institutional Economics. This school of thought folows definition of institution given by Nobel Prize winner Douglas North who defined institutions in his capital work „Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performanses” from 1990 on the basis of which he won Nobel Prize in Economics. Douglass North’s concept of institutions is the most used definition of institutions used by many authors. North’s concept of institutions defines institutions as the formal and informal “rules of the game” in society. According to North (1990, p. 3) institutions are the rules, regulations (humanly devised constraints) that structure political, economic and social interaction; they consist of both: formal rules (constitution, laws, property rights) and informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, tradition and codes of conducts). The purpose of the rules and conventions is to define the rules by which the game is played, monitored and enforced. Organization or individuals are entities which devise and implement these institutions. Institutional environment in that sense comprises institutions (formal and informal ones) and an enforcement mechanism (Tešić, 2010, p. 103).
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Similarly, using the definition within New Institutional Economics (NIE), World Bank (1998, p. 11) defines institutions as formal and informal rules and their enforcement mechanisms that shape the behavior of individuals and organizations in the society. “Deeper” determinants of economic growth, beside physical and human capital accumulation and technological change, also include institutions (Rodrik et al., 2002, p. 2). Many other authors, based primarily on the North’s definition of institutions, explored their role in economic performances and proved positive relationship between institutional development and growth (Acemoglu et al., 2004; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2010; Eicher and Leucher; 2009; Knack and Keefer, 2005; Hall and Jones, 1998; Dollar and Kraay, 2003; La Porta et al., 1998). While exploring the role of institutions in economic development, Hall and Jones (1998, p. 2) coined a new term – social infrastructure, which includes institutions and government policies that determine economic environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and firms accumulate capital and produce output. Especially interesting issue could be an analysis of institutional environment in transitional economies as they moved (or still are moving) from one form of society to another changing thus their institutional environment. The main aspects of transition process which more or less prevailed in all transition countries are liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization, privatization and legal and institutional reforms. Especially the last element of transition process – institutional reforms lacked in many aspects in most transition economies.
3. How to measure institutions? There are several data sources and indicators used in empirical work as measures of institutions: 1. Aggregate index of governance called World Governance Indicators, developed by Kaufmann et al. (2010) which is composed by six sub indices: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. The last publication by World Bank includes variables for 215 economies and measures the quality of institutions from 1996 to 2012. 2. International Country Risk Guide developed by Political Risk Service in 1980 which monitors political, economic and financial risk. Some of the variables include measures of institutional quality such as Government Repudiation of Contracts, Risk of Expropriation, Corruption, Law and Order, and Bureaucratic Quality.
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3. Index of Economic Freedom developed by Heritage Foundation; composite index comprise of several indices such as property rights, freedom from corruption, business freedom, monetary freedom, trade freedom, labor freedom, financial freedom, investment freedom, fiscal freedom and government spending; authors while exploring institutional quality usually use some of the components (freedom from corruption or property rights) of composite index. 4. Economic Freedom of the World by Fraser Institute; index comprise several sub indices – size of government, legal structure and property rights, sound money, freedom to trade internationally and regulation; in its latest issue index covered 152 economies. 5. Corruption Perception Index developed by Transparency International; corruption is regarded as one of the main informal institutions, especially in transition economies. For measuring institutional change in transition economies, authors usually use EBRD’s Transition Reform indicators which measure structural and institutional reform compared to developed market economies (Efendic et al. 2010). According to them, Transition Indicators are the best proxies of institutional change in these economies as transition in its essence is a process of transformation from centrally planned towards market oriented economies. Campos (2000), World Bank (1994, 1998) and Streeten (1996) in analysis of institutional quality put emphasize on one of its elements and that is governance. Kaufman et al. (2010: 4) define Governance as traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised which includes 1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, 2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and 3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.
4. Institutional quality in transition countries
4.1. Unit of analysis – three samples of comparison Our sample includes three different groups of countries: 1. Four Western Balkan countries – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia and Serbia (WB). Except Bosnia and Herzegovina which has the status of potential candidate in the process of stabilization and association, other three countries have the status of candidate countries for membership in EU.
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2. Three newest members of EU – Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia (BRC). Bulgaria and Romania joined EU in 2007, while Croatia became a member in July 2013. 3. Three Central European Economies (CEE) of “New Europe” – Slovenia, Slovakia and Czech Republic which joined EU in 2004. We choose three samples of culturally and geographically close countries which all belong to European continent and all aspire to become members of EU or they already are. The ideas is to asses and compare the quality of institutions and institutional environment in these three samples and to see how much Western Balkan countries lack behind their closest neighbors – Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, and how much they lack behind countries which joined EU already 10 year ago. The countries of Central Europe could not be regarded anymore as transition countries as they finished their path from centrally planned to market economies.3 Moreover, we will determine the nature and strength of relationship between quality of institutions and business environment in these countries by method of correlation in all three samples. Quality of institutions will also be put in relation with economic development measured by Gross Domestic Product per capita in PPP.4 Institutions are measured by World Governance Indicators which indicate quality of Governance in certain country. Kaufman et al. (2010, p. 4) define Governance as traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised which includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them. Each variable of six indicators goes from -2.5 to 2.5 where lower value indicates lower result.
4.2. Comparative analysis of institutional quality in three samples of countries Comparative anlysis of institutional framework in these three samples is done for each variable of governance: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption, as well as for the average of all six averages for the time period from 1996 to 2012.
3 We excluded Poland and Hungary from the analysis due to their size and some specificities in economic structure even thus results would not be much different. 4 PPP stands for Purchasing Power Parity.
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Voice and Accountability (VACC) The first component of Governance by which we measure quality of institutional framework, Voice and Accountability (VACC) “captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” (World Governance Indicators, 2014). The first figure shows averaged movement of the Voice and Accountability in three samples for the period from 1996 to 2012.
Fig. 1: Comparison of Voice and Accountability between avarages in WB, BRC and CE countries
Source: World Governance Indicators Database, 2014.
Four countries of Western Balkans in average lag behind their closest neighbors while this lag is much bigger compared to average of three CE countries. But, closing of averages through time is evident. The difference in 1996 between WB and CE countries was around 1.67 points in absolute value while in 2012 it was around 0.95.
Political Stability (PS) Second element of institutional framework called Political Stability (PS) “measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically- motivated violence and terrorism” (World Governance Indicators, 2014). The next figure shows averaged movement of Political Stability in three samples for the period from 1996 to 2012.
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Fig. 2: Comparison of Political Stability between avarages in WB, BRC and CE countries
Source: World Governance Indicators Database, 2014.
Similarly to the first indicator, the difference between average in three samples is substantive. It is interesting that the difference between WB and BRC is higher then between averages between BRC and CE countries. The closing tendency through time is again evident. Government Effectiveness (GE) The third figure shows averaged movements of the third element of institutional framework Government Effectiveness (GE) which “captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies” (World Governance Indicators, 2014).
Fig. 3: Comparison of Government Effectiveness between avarages in WB, BRC and CE countries
Source: World Governance Indicators Database, 2014.
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As we can observe from the Figure 3, the gap in this indicator is significant especialy between CE countries and other two sample of countries – WB and BRC, while there is a small difference between WB and BRC which is closing troughout time. In 2012 the absolute difference is around 0.15 points. Regulatory Quality (RQ) The fourth figure shows averaged movement of the next element of institutional framework called Regulatory Quality (RQ) which “captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development” (World Governance Indicators, 2014).
Fig. 4: Comparison of Regulatory Quality (RQ) between avarages in WB, BRC and CE countries
Source: World Governance Indicators Database, 2014.
Like for the first and second parameter, the difference between averages of samples is substantive but again, with closing tendency. WB still lag behind BRC and BRC lag behind CE countries.
Rule of Law (ROL) The fifth element of institutional framework – Rule of Law (ROL) “captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence” (World Governance Indicators, 2014). The next figure shows averaged movement of Rule of Law in three samples for the period from 1996 to 2012.
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Fig. 5: Comparison of Rule of Law (ROL) between avarages in WB, BRC and CE countries
Source: World Governance Indicators Database, 2014.
Rule of Law is maybe the most important variable of instituional quality. As for the previous variable, there is significant gap between Rule of Law in WB, BRC and CE countries. The gap between WB and BRC is smaller then the gap between BRC and CE countries as we can see from the previous figure.
Control of Corruption (COC) The sixth figure shows averaged movement of the last element of institutional framework called Control of Corruption (COC). This variable “reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as capture of the state by elites and private interests” (World Governance Indicators, 2014).
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Fig. 6: Comparison of Control of Corruption (COC) between avarages in WB, BRC and CE countries
Source: World Governance Indicators Database, 2014.
Corruption is regarded as the most important informal institution. We can see again that WB and BRC lag significantly behind CE countries, while WB countries lag also behind BRC but the difference is not so high measured by this variable. Overall Institutional Environment: Average of All Six Average Indicators In the next figure we show average of all six indicators of institutional quality measured by World Governance Indicators from 1996 to 2012 for four WB countries, BRC and three CEE countries in average.
Fig. 7: Comparison of average of six indicators of governance between averages in three sample of anlysis
Source: World Governance Indicators Database, 2014.
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In average, WB countries lag significantly behind CE countries while the difference compared to their closest neighbors is smaller. It is also evident that WB are approaching to BRC but the difference compared to CE countries is still significant – in 2012 in absolute value it was 0.96 on the scale from -2.5 to 2.5.
4.3. Implications on business environment and standard of living As we saw from the analysis, the countries of the Western Balkans in general lag behind the countries that have recently joined EU, and even more from the countries that have become members much earlier. It is certain that the functioning of the institutions has negative socio-economic implications. Thus, we are now interested in evaluating the relationship between institutional quality and quality of business environment in all ten countries of our interest. We asses this relationship by method of correlation where quality of institutions is measured as three years average in each country (from 2010 to 2012) and data for quality of business environment are taken from Doing Business Report 2014 which is produced by the World Bank. On the left size we present correlation diagram between institutions and rank of countries in the Doing Business Report where higher rank means worse result. Diagram on the right side presents relationship between institutions and business environment measured in percentage points where higher result means better result in Ease of Doing Business.
Diagram 1: Relation between institutional quality and ease of doing business: left size Doing Business Rank and right size Ease of Doing Business in % points
Source: World Governance Indicators Database, 2014 and Ding Business Report 2014.
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Correlation coefficient for the left diagram is -0.60 which shows strong and negative relationship between these two variables in last three years. We used average from last three years for institutional quality in order to avoid some extremes that could happen in one year. The results shown in this diagram are expected. Moreover, with exclusion of Macedonia which progressed extremely on Doing Business scale in few last years, correlation coefficient is -0.78. For the right hand diagram results are also expected – correlation coefficient of 0.64 shows strong and positive correlation between institutional quality and quality of business environment measured in % points on the scale from 0 to 100. Again, with exclusion of Macedonia from the sample, correlation coefficient is much higher: 0.87. An interesting analysis using the same method of correlation can be done for the relationship between institutional quality measured in the same way as for previous diagram and economic development in all ten countries of our sample. The rationale behind this is to evaluate importance of institutions for standard of living of the citizens. Correlation between quality of institutions estimated by average of six World Governance Indicators and Economic Development measured by GDP per capita in PPP in international dollars is shown in Diagram 2. Variables of institutional quality include average in three years period from 2010 to 2012 while GDP/pc is average in three years with one year in advance (from 2011 to 2013) in each country. The rationale for this is the assumption that institutions will have the impact on economic development in subsequent time.
Diagram 2: Relation between institutional quality and standard of living measured by GDP/pc in PPP
Source: World Governance Indicators Database, 2014 and International Monetary Fund Statistic Database, WEO April 2014.
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Correlation coefficient of 0.98 shows strong and positive relationship between these two variables in last three years. We used average from last three years in order to avoid some extremes that could happen in one year for both indicators. The results shown in this diagram are expected as institutional quality and economic development are interrelated and influence each other. It is logical to expect that more developed countries will have better institutional quality, and vice versa, but the strength of relationship is astonishing. For correlation of 0.98 we can say that it shows very strong correlation which means that these two variables move together almost perfectly in each country.
Conclusions Our analysis showed that the quality of institutions in the Western Balkan countries lag behind their closest neighbors – Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, and that this lag is much bigger when they are compared with the former transition countries of Central Europe – Czech Republik, Slovakia and Slovenia. Also, by method of correlation we found that there is a strong correlation between poor institutional environment and ease of doing business what was expected. Adequate institutional environment provides a framework in which companies, individuals and organizations can operate freely and in which transaction costs are kept to a minimum. The interesting fact was also to conclude that there is strong and positive, almost perfect correlation between quality of institutions and the standard of living measured by GDP per capita. This implies that institutions, defined as the rules of the game, create essential framework for economic growth and development of any nation especially in transition economies. The pure reform of the market in transition economies without building of institutional environment is meaningless.
Literature Acemoglu, D. and Robinson, J. (2010). The Role of Institutions in Growth and Development. Review of Economics and Institutions, Vol. 1 No. 2, ISSN 2038-1379 DOI10.5202/rei.v1i2.1 Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, J. (2004). Institutions as the fundamentals cause of long-run growth. NBER Working Paper 10481, Cambridge Campos, N. (2000). Context is everything: Measuring institutional change in transition economies. Policy Research Working Paper 2269. World Bank. Dollar, D. and Kraay, A. (2003). Institutions, Trade, and Growth. Policy Research Working Paper. The World Bank Development Research Group.
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Efendic, A., Pugh, G., and Adnett, N. (2010). Institutions and economic performance: System GMM modelling of institutional effects in transition. On-line publication: AAB-RIINVEST University in Pristina, Kosovo. Hall, R. and Jones, C. (1998). Why do some countries produce so much more output per worker than others. NBER Working Paper 6564, Cambridge. Kaufman, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2010.) The Worldwide Governance Indicators Methodology and Analytical Issues. Policy Research Working Papers 5430, World Bank. Knack, S. and Keefer, P. (1995). Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross Country Test Using Alternative Institutional Measures. Economics and Politics, Vol. 7 (3), pp. 208-227. La Porta, R., de Silanes, F.L., Schleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1998). The Quality of Government. NBER Working Paper 6727, Cambridge. North, D. (1990). Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F. (2002). Institutions Rule: The primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Developmen. NBER Workin Paper 9305, Cambridge. Streeten, Paul (1996). Governance. in: Quibria, M. G. and Dowling, J. M. (eds.), Current Issues in Economic Development. An Asian Perspective. Oxford University Press, pp. 27-66. Tešić, J. (2010). Institutional Environment and Foreign direct investment in the Western Balkans. in Milford and Tarosy (eds) “The Western Balkans – Lessons from the Past and Future Prospects: A View from the Danube Region“, Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe and IDResearch Ltd. World Bank. (1994). Governance. The World Bank’s Experience, Washington DC. World Bank. (1998). Beyond the Washington Consensus: Institutions Matter, Washington DC.
Data sources World Bank, Doing Business Report 2014 – Rankings and Economy Profiles, http:// www.doingbusiness.org/rankings# World Governance Indicators Database, February 2014, Official web page, http:// info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund, http://www.imf. org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/02/weodata/index.aspx
471 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Branko KRGA1
MILITARY-SECURITY DETERMINANTS OF SERBIA’S POSITION IN CONTEMPORARY EUROPE
Abstract: In the twentieth century, Serbia was approximately every seventeen years in some kind of conflict with foreign big powers. It was due to many external and internal factors. One of the reasons for such a difficult fate of the country is the fact that it had not a clear national strategy. At this time, the relevant political parties have clearly oriented itself towards the European Union. However, the public is still in a dilemma: the East or the West. Regardless of how these processes are further developing, it is essential for Serbia to have well developed security system. Lately, a lot it has been done regarding this matter, but there is still a need to improve the system by improving the existing and developing new features.
Introduction At the current position of Serbia in Europe today, beyond any doubt, a great influence has its past, especially in the last hundred years. This period was marked by many turbulences, crises and wars. Serbia has not skipped a single regional war and also had its own conflicts and wars. In order to consider the military and security determinants of Serbia’s position in contemporary Europe, it would be necessary to analyze at least the following areas: first, the establishing of strategic and doctrinal documents as the basis for resolving the military – security issues; second, the orientation of Serbia to the European Union: the solution or extension of security concerns; and third, the correlation between the Serbia’s security capacities and its position in modern Europe.
1 Prof. Branko Krga, a retired general was twice in the military - diplomatic service abroad. He served as Chief of Military Intelligence, Deputy and Chief of General staff. Now, he teaches at the School of Diplomacy and Security, Belgrade.
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Problem of establishing of strategic – doctrinal documents as the basis of solving military – security concerns The position of some countries in the region to which it belongs depends on many historical, geopolitical, geostrategic, economic and other factors. Fate and status of the state may be manifested spontaneously, due to various, mostly external circumstances, or planned by internal political factors. The practice of many countries indicates that it is absolutely desirable that there is a realistic vision and development strategy for the next few decades. Otherwise, the country is wandering as a “ship without a helmsman.” In recent decades, Serbia has had several attempts towards foundation of something that should be associated with the modern national strategy. This applies primarily to Načertanije by Ilija Garašanin of 1844 and The Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts (SANU) of 1986, as well as some recent attempts. Načertanije is among the first to document a serious analysis and vision. Preparation of this document was initiated in European circles. At that time there were attempts to position Serbia between the Habsburg Empire, the Ottoman Empire, and in a certain sense, the goal was the suppression of Russian influence in the Balkans. Englishman David Urquhart, a Polish prince from Paris Adam Czartoryski and especially the Czech Frantisek Zech were involved in the creation of this document. The document was signed by Ilija Garašanin in 1844. It was first published in 1906. Serbs are then rated as the most important factor in the Balkans and a possible meeting point of South Slavs who lived in the two empires. The document indicated the interest of Serbia to liberate their compatriots who lived under Ottoman rule, then create a state that would incorporate space covering the current Serbia, without Vojvodina, Old Serbia, to pay attention to the parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Dalmatia, Srem, Banat and Bačka, where Serbs lived and to have good relations with Montenegro. Probably some of these views are the basis for the charges related to the idea of so-called Greater Serbia. However, it should be noted that there is no evidence that it was ever official policy of Serbia. In the meantime, different opinions appeared regarding this document: Until 1918 it was claimed to be the Serbian national program; from 1918 until 1941 it was said to be a South Slavic program; after 1945 it was considered the Greater Serbia program. It is interesting that this document has been taken by The Hague tribunal as the basis for prosecution of the alleged idea of creating a “Greater Serbia.” The document was predominantly of (geo)political character, and it did not even mention the other elements, such as the economy, culture and security.
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SANU Memorandum from 1986 has sparked many controversial reviews, but was never completed and approved. The draft started from the criticisms of Yugoslav society, the weakness resulting from the application of the Constitution in 1974, with the statement that the society is affected by moral crisis. With regard to the position of Serbia, it in particular highlighted the processes of disintegration due to the position of the provinces, especially Kosovo and Metohija, as well as the unfavorable position of the Serbs in other parts of Yugoslavia. Although it was suggested that the inner turmoil is possible, SANU document did not stress the necessity for the security system preparations to respond to these types of challenges, risks and threats. In addition to the strategic – doctrinal documents with predominantly political contents, in this period, also, were developed ideas and documents with mostly military and security concerns. This concerns, above all, the Concept of National Defense and Self-defense, Strategy of Defense of State Union Serbia and Montenegro and the current National Security Strategy. Concept of National Defense and Self-defense, created in the 1970s and developed in the 1980s, was based on two major assumptions: a non-aligned foreign policy orientation and internal self-management socialist society. With the emergence of the internal crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s, it was soon shown that this concept was not at all organized to prevent the outbreak of internal civil war, but was focused on defense against external military threats. However, when external threat came (war 1999.) the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had already collapsed and Concept was abandoned in what was left of the former state – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Defense Strategy of the State Union Serbia and Montenegro, was the first document of this nature since the breakup of the country, war and the NATO aggression on Yugoslavia. This means that the country was going through military – security turbulences, wars in the region and on its own territory without strategic – doctrinal documents that provide a good basis for organized activities of the state and the military – security structures.2 Initiative and drafting of this document came from the then Chief of Staff and the Ministry of Defence. An important feature of the document was that the country (State Union Serbia and Montenegro) in the future could opt for “European and Euro-
2 It should be noted that after the Dayton former Yugoslav Army initiated the development of a strategic – doctrinal document, which would indicate national interests and objectives, define the security environment, resolve the question of allies, the basis of the Yugoslav Army and other elements of the security system. However, this initiative was not accepted by the political structure. In the meantime, there were other similar attempts within the highest military structure, but they were continually postponed with different explanations.
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Atlantic integration,” which, in addition to the European Union, implies orientation towards NATO. With the dissolution of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro in 2006 the Defense Strategy ceased to exist. By restoring the status of an independent state, after 88 years, the Republic of Serbia, in addition to the Constitution, adopted many laws that were related primarily to the defense or the military. In 2007 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia adopted the Declaration of “military neutrality”. It was a departure from the ideas expressed in the Strategy of Defence of Serbia and Montenegro. This approach was probably a kind of response to the relation of NATO countries to the events in Kosovo, especially to the already openly announced declaration of independence. The provisions of this Declaration are still valid. However, in talks with representatives of NATO countries, representatives of the previous government, stressed that “Serbia cannot remain permanently outside the organization.” (according to Wikileaks). On the other hand, representatives of the current government have repeatedly publicly confirmed that Serbia retains its status as a military neutral country and will not become a member of NATO. There are public discussions on the issue with active protagonists of the idea that Serbia should become a member of NATO, despite the mood of the population which is in a large percentage against it. The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Serbia was adopted in October 2009, more than three years after obtaining the status of an independent state. The adoption of such a document, for the first time in Serbian history, is very important for the military – security organization and its determination to its position in contemporary Europe and in the world. This document contains standard elements for this type of material: the security environment; challenges, risks and threats; national interests in the field of security; national security policy; and the national security system. When analyzing the security of the Republic of Serbia it is stated that it still faces significant challenges, risks and threats that endanger its security. The main threat to security is attempted secession of the territory of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija.3 Here is an attempt made to define “primary threat”, which has a significant impact on the position of Serbia in the international community. Although it was stated that the threat of armed aggression was significantly reduced that main threat is still placed in the first place. In a sense, this confirms a certain distrust regarding events that, in certain circumstances, can occur in the environment.
3 Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije, Službeni glasnik, Beograd, 2009, p. 7.
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In the National Security Strategy those values are considered as basic: “independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, freedom, equality, peace building and peacekeeping...”4 The basic orientation of national security policy is that: “In the protection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity the Republic of Serbia is determined to use diplomatic, legal and all other legitimate means in accordance with the firm and constitutional determination to never recognize the decision of the Provisional Institutions of the Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Metohija of the unilateral declaration of independence.”5 This formulation basically determines the method of protection of national values, where it stresses diplomacy, but also “all other legitimate means.” The national security system is articulated attitude of the state on how to organize the protection of its values and how to achieve its interests and goals. Practice has shown that there is a need to upgrade some elements of the national security system.6 The National Security Strategy is so far one of the most complete strategic – doctrinal documents, with a lot of important provisions. However, the document is not perfect, and one of the complaints relates to not clearly taken position regarding the commitment of the country to the security integration. Even though two years earlier a declaration of military neutrality was issued, that fact is not mentioned at all. On the contrary, the text suggests that security is indivisible, broader cooperation in this field is needed and so on. This, as well as some practical moves in recent years, may suggest that the country is in a “soft” approach to NATO, although it is not clearly stated, although the latest statements of leading officials reaffirm commitment to military neutrality. It is essential that these provisions are in the National Security Strategy. Many of them are derived from the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia. However, if there was a strategic document at higher level, such as national (general) strategy, these formulations could be contained in that document. Regarding this issue (the establishment of appropriate strategic documents in Serbia); Serbian Academy of Sciences and Belgrade University Rector’s Office organized a debate in November 2013. It is expected that soon some useful
4 Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije, op. cit., p. 13. 5 Ibid., p. 15. 6 Branko Krga: „Dogradnja sistema bezbednosti Srbije u funkciji poboljšanja njenog položaja u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima“, Zbornik radova: „Strateški pravci razvoja i utvrđivanja položaja Srbije u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima“, Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu, Mala knjiga, Novi Sad, 2014, pp. 873–883.
476 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century progress could be made in this important area, what would certainly positively affect the position of Serbia in the international community.7
Orientation of Serbia to the European Union: The solution or extension of security problems Part of the Strategy, “Security Environment”, has this particularly important formulation: “The progress made in the implementation of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy and the inclusion of European defense forces in solving security problems suggests an increasingly important role of the EU in harmonization of relations and interests of European countries and taking part in the creation of a joint responsibility of the European and global security.”8 Analyzing regional security, the Strategy emphasizes: “Due to the complex nature of security in the region, the countries of Southeast Europe have increasingly addressed joint efforts in suppressing the negative processes that threaten their security.”9 These provisions undoubtedly suggest that accelerated EU accession would have a positive impact on the security of the country and the region. In fact, in recent years there occurred a rare historic circumstance that all countries in the same region tend to EU integration. Is it a guarantee that it will lead to consolidation of peace and stability, remains to be seen. The experience of current members of the EU certainly suggests that this can be expected. It is true that in the Balkans there are still a lot of contradictions, which can threaten stability, but it may be realistic to assume that by using EU standards in problem solving by all countries in the region, conflicts could be avoided.
The correlation between the capacity of the security of Serbia and its position in contemporary Europe Theoretically and practically, in the case of Serbia, it would be easy to prove that there is a clear correlation between system capacity and security status of the country in modern Europe and the world in general.
7 Currently in Serbia there is around 106 strategic documents, with many not deserve the status and name. Many of them have opposing views on some important issues. It is therefore an obligation to try to create a “roof” (national, general) strategy, which would define the basic national values, interests and goals and decisions regarding the development of Serbian society and the political system, foreign policy, economy, defense and security, culture, education, health and so on. Relying on these basic attitudes individual strategies should be developed. 8 Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije, op. cit., p. 5. 9 Ibid., p. 7.
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The capacity of the security system is the ability of a country to adequately confront challenges, risks and threats. Even the biggest countries are starting from this hypothesis and they put great attention to strengthening its military and other security resources. In defining national values, it is emphasized that, “The protection of national interests is general purpose and meaning of existence and functioning of the national security.”10 This clearly indicates that the national values and interests practically cannot be protected without serious functioning of the national security. Potential threats to the national values and interests in the areas of security, would threat all other values, interests, and even the survival of Serbian society and the state. This is indicated by the following formulation: “The national security is part of an overall government policy... Its implementation creates the preconditions for political, economic, social, cultural and the social development of the Republic of Serbia.”11 The Strategy states that the objectives of national security are “in the area of foreign policy, economic policy, defense policy, internal security policy...”12 This establishes a direct correlation between foreign policy and achieving the goals of national security. If there was a foreign policy strategy of the Republic of Serbia, it would be necessary to specify in such document other similar correlations. From the above fact arises correlation between the capacity of the national security and the position of Serbia in modern Europe and even in the world. In practice, this means that any ambitions for a decent position of Serbia in contemporary Europe can hardly be realized without adequately conceived and reliable national security system. However, in our political practice, there were different approaches to this issue, by favoring certain elements of security (police), the elimination of the very important parts of the system (Department for Information and Documentation – SID at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), to the assertion that all problems could be solved only by diplomacy. Of course, it would be the best if all the misunderstandings and problems with the environment can be solved by diplomacy. However, the practice of Serbia and many other countries shows that sometimes a situation is created, against the will of local politics, and the country is drawn into an armed conflict.
Conclusion Military – political position of Serbia (and other state formations, which it was part of), was always important. There is almost no country in the
10 Strategija nacionalne bezbednosti Republike Srbije, op. cit., p. 13. 11 Ibid., p. 15. 12 Ibid., p. 17.
478 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century immediate and wider environment that in twentieth century was forced to oppose the foreign armed forces approximately every seventeen years. Participation in numerous armed conflicts, to a large extent helped the attitude of the world towards our country and thus its foreign policy position. However, depending on the circumstances, the Serbian armed opposition is interpreted differently from heroic feats, to the barbaric act. There is a big influence of politics, science, the media and the general public on armed conflicts realistic assessment. There is no doubt that it is important for Serbia to have a strong system of national security in the “hard” and the “soft” form, at least for three reasons: first, in the region there are many unresolved issues, almost no problem in the nineties was fully resolved and it is not clear how this could affect the future, for example, the core values – independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity; Second, for any integration processes or other aspects of relations with the world, the country will have a better “specific gravity” with developed and reliable security system, among other things, as a pillar of foreign policy; and thirdly, an adequate capacity of the security system is necessary not go to war, but on the contrary, to avoid being drawn into any new armed conflict. Unlike other countries in the region, Serbia has the additional responsibility to devise a way to explain that its declared neutrality is compatible with the aspirations of EU membership. An important segment of the struggle of Serbia for a proper place in modern civilized Europe, is the effort to refute various stereotypes, such as: “Serbia is guilty of a First World War”, “Serbia has caused and lost four wars in 1990s “, “Serbia is responsible for the breakup of Yugoslavia, because it wanted to create a Greater Serbia”, “Serbia had the intention to expel all Albanians from Kosovo and Metohija”, and so on. It is clear that many of these stereotypes are created to justify the measures taken against our country; however, they still have impact not only on public opinion, but also on the political structures in some countries. It is a good circumstance that more and more foreign factors far more realistically assess what happened in the past, but Serbia should itself make additional efforts to reject these malicious stereotypes. Serbia can further build its military and security reputation if it continues its commitment in the field of disarmament, participation in peacekeeping missions, coordinating activities with neighboring and other countries in the fight against terrorism, weapons proliferation, the prevention and elimination of consequences of natural disasters and more. It is essential that our representatives who communicate with foreign factors do it in a dignified manner, always building trust and telling facts, thus pursuing the interests of our country in appropriate way and demonstrating a code of high moral values.
479 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Goran NIKOLIĆ1
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF RELATIVE ECONOMIC DECLINE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON SERBIA
Apstract: Rapid growth of the most populous emerging economies, especially China, has led to a relative decline of the traditional Western powers, especially those in Western Europe. A quantitative analysis of the current economic trends points to a relative economic decline of the EU. The peak of economic power and influence of the EU in the 1990s is definitely a thing of the past, while the crisis at the end of the 2000s has accelerated the process of its relative economic decline. The EU is faced with increasingly intense competition and is dependent on imported energy; its aging population is pressing a social model of the welfare state, along with the enlargement fatigue. These long-lasting processes have a negative impact on the economy of Serbia, which is predominantly dependent on investment capital flows from the Western Europe. In addition, nearly two-thirds of the Serbian merchandise exports as well as the dominant part of modern technology imports comes from the E, indicating that the potential stagnation of the EU economy has a negative impact on the Serbian foreign trade performance. Any move of abandonment the EU integration process would constitute a severe blow for the domestic economy. Key words: relative decline, EU, Serbia, trade, investment.
State and prospects of the European Union’ economy According to the IMF’ April Report (2014) the slow recovery of the global economy continues as incentives for growth are shifted to developed economies. Financial instability in emerging markets was increased, while inflation is lower than desirable in developed economies. According to the World Economic Outlook (2014), the global economy will accelerate growth to 3.6% in 2014 and 3.9 in 2015 in respect to the 3% in 2013. Recovery, which since
1 Goran Nikolić, Ph.D., Research Associate, Institute of European Studies, Belgrade. This paper is a part of the project of Institute of European Studies entitled Serbia in the process of European integration: global context, institutions, identity, financed by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of Republic of Serbia No. ON179014.
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October 2013 has become stronger, now become broader based. Although the world economy is still far from full recovery, normalization of monetary policy i.e. reducing its expansiveness, is certain. The main risks are excessive public debt in many countries as well as high unemployment. IMF (2014) estimated the recovery of EU economy, at the same time pointing to the risks in the form of unfinished reforms and low inflation. GDP growth of 28 EU member states is forecasted at 1.6% for 2014 and 1.8% for 2015 following a modest growth of only 0.2% in 2013 (growth in the Eurozone will be 1.2% in 2014 and 1.5% in 2015). In the Eurozone countries, large reduction in the pace of fiscal tightening should encourage growth. In the peripheral countries of the Eurozone, contribution to growth should come from net exports and stabilization of domestic demand which is still expected to remain relatively weak, due to the financial fragmentation, relatively weak lending activity and the company’s high debt. According to the IMF (2014) the low inflation, particularly in the Eurozone is a big problem, and it is projected to remain below target. The risks of lower than expected inflation or even deflation will increase because interest rates are already near zero and there are only limited opportunities for further manoeuvring with monetary policy. The result will be an increase in borrowing costs and higher real debt burden. In order to stimulate economic activity, as well as achieving the objective of ECB price (2% inflation), the IMF recommended further easing of monetary policy, including unconventional measures (e.g. purchase of bonds by the ECB). The authors of the new IMF study (2014b) expect that real interest rates will slightly increase with the normalization of global economic conditions (maintenance of low interest rates allow cheaper borrowing but also limits the monetary policy). The very low real interest rates mean that ECB loses a key lever of monetary policy through interest rates manipulation in order to stimulate economic growth. As in the Eurozone there is a risk that very slow growth continues, this limitation can be easily materialized. Despite these positive developments, it is not impossible that the political, economic and financial instability persists during the period 2014-15. The national differences over austerity measures could be intensified; the ECB faces new pressure to loosen monetary policy, while the banking sector is the subject of active consideration of quality (stress test). However, structural reforms and austerity measures in peripheral EU countries should support the economic activities of the private sector in the medium-term. The positive thing is that unit labor costs have fallen significantly in Greece, Portugal and Spain, but not in Italy (until they grew in Germany, which is a positive development), which increased the competitiveness of these countries (Chart 1). However, unemployment is still
481 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century high; painful deleveraging continues in the public and private sectors; credit conditions are weak, and the extended period of economic stagnation remains a real risk. Dramatic decline in the inflation rate at the beginning of 2014 reflects a number of factors, but the weakness of demand conditions is certainly one of them (Economic Intelligence Unit, 2014).
Chart 1. Tendencies of unit labour costs in selected countries (2009=100)
Source: http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1791711563&Country=Ireland&topic= Economy.
The fall in the rate of investment in developed economies, which is result of the global financial crisis, will probably be reversed in recent times. Generally, since the early 1980s interest rates or yields on assets of all maturities have been globally in decline provoking a drop in inflationary expectations. Real interest rates, i.e. rates paid by borrowers corrected for expected inflation, have consequently fallen. Namely, ten-year real interest rates (which were in average 5.5% in 1980s) have fallen to average 3.5% in 1990s. After that, real interest rates have fallen to 2% in the period 2001-2008 and to only 0.33% in the period from 2008 to 2012. With increasing global economic and financial integration in the past three decades, real interest rates, especially long-term, are now largely certain common global factors. Improved fiscal policy in developed economies is the main factor that caused the decline in real interest rates during the second half of the 1990s. The decline in real interest rates since the mid-2000s is often attributed to the effects of two factors: super saturation with savings resulting inflows of liquidity from emerging markets (especially China) and changes in the preferences of investors towards fixed income, such as bonds (rather than returns on capital, such as action).
482 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
A significant increase in the savings in emerging markets from the middle of the first decade of the 21st century was responsible for more than half of the decline in the real interest rate (this is only partially compensated by reducing saving in developed economies). Thus, more than half of the reduction in real interest rates in the first decade of the 21st century can be attributed to an increase in the relative demand for bonds, which led to strong growth in foreign exchange reserves in developing countries, especially China. One of consequences of the global financial crisis is sharp and a steady decline in investment in developed economies, which was significantly contributed to the decline in interest rates. It is estimated that the effects of the global financial crisis is likely to last for the next five years, when indicators of investment and GDP in many developed economies will switch to pre-crisis levels (IMF, 2014). World Bank (2014) indicators point that after five years from the start of the Great Recession, level of GDP per capita is significantly increased only in developing countries (24% from the third quarter of 2008, ended with the third quarter of 2013), while growth in the U.S. and Germany were marginal (1% and 2%, respectively). The euro-zone GDP per capita decreased by 5%, while in Spain and Italy fall were 9% (in Greece GDP per capita is lower by 24%).
The dynamics of the EU’ relative economic decline The relative weakening of the EU economy started from the end of the last decade of the 20th century. The Great Recession has just revealed the scale of the problem, especially in EU countries with a high deficit of balance of payments. In the years prior to 2008, cheap and imprudent lending had concealed the weakness, reducing the competitiveness of European industry. Currently, most EU’ countries have high public debt and large fiscal deficits, but the basic problem of a large number of EU countries is high trade deficit. Decline in the share of EU in estimated global GDP (Gross Domestic Product) has lasted for a decade and a half. According to the April forecasts (IMF, 2014) we can see declining pace of EU’ share in global GDP since 2000, which is estimated to continue to the end of observed period (Chart 2). At the expense of the EU, and the West in general, the share of China and most other developing countries in the global GDP increase. As many as two -thirds of the growth in world GDP over the past decade has generated through an increase in production in developing countries,2 primarily China, which beginning of
2 GDP growth of emerging markets is projected to rise from 4.7% in 2013 to 4.9% in 2014 and 5.3% in 2015, while economic growth in China will be the 7.5% in 2014 and the same in 2015.
483 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
2010 accounted for a third of the growth of the global economy (The Economist, 2014). Calculated at market exchange rates, according to IMF (2014), the EU’ share in the global economy decrease from 26.1% (2000) to 24% (2014) and 23.2% (forecast for 2019). If we look at GDP by Purchasing Power Parity (GDP PPP) in 2013, for the first time in two and a half centuries, developing countries generate more than half of the global GDP (Djankov and Agtmael, 2013). Already 2019th China’s GDP by Purchasing Power Parity will be the largest in the world (IMF, 2014), while according to new estimates by the World Bank (2014), based on corrected data, China became world No. 1 next year (2015). Regarding the PPP GDP decline was drastic for the EU which share in global economy decrease from 24.8% (2000) to 18.4% (2014) and 16.7% (forecast for 2019), while decline of the United States’ global economic share was somewhat more moderate than the EU: 24% (2000), 19.2% (2014), 18.2% (2019).4
4 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx
484 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Most important economic indicators related to dynamics of the EU’ GDP are evident in Table 1. Among other things, we can see projected modest real economic growth in the coming five-year period, and a slight continuous growth of GDP calculated at market exchange rates (in current dollars), as well as growth of GDP by Purchasing Power Parity methodology (both, total and per capita expression).
Table 1: The main indicators of the EU’ economy from 2000 to 2019 2000 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 GDP, real 4.0 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 growth rate GDP, millions of 8,539.934 18,451.080 19,369.449 20,264.166 21,277.083 22,328.827 23,433.043 current dollars
GDP, millions of 10,630.057 16,773.339 17,375.683 18,032.727 18,735.855 19,472.027 20,245.686 current dollars (PPP) GDP (PPP) per capita in 21,897 33,083 34,192 35,407 36,712 38,078 39,513 current dollars % of global 24.8 18.4 18.0 17.7 17.3 17.0 16.7 GDP (PPP ) Source: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx.
The average growth of the global economy (at market exchange rates) in the period 2001-2013 was 3.6%. The U.S. economy grew at an average 1.9% over the same period China’s economy growth was 9.2%, while the economy of the euro- zone was increased by 1%, on average. The period 2000-2013 can be divided into two very distinct periods; first lasts until the beginning of the crisis (2000-2007) and is characterized by rapid growth, especially in developing countries (emerging markets). In the second period, which began with the so-called Great Recession, growth was mild or negative. The consequences of Great Recession are still felt, among other things, by the fact that most developed countries have not yet reached pre-crisis level of GDP per capita. Euro-zone and EU have particularly slow average growth in the period 2000-2013. The structural trends in the EU were weak since the mid-1990s, which is best evidenced by the slowdown in TFP (Total Factor Productivity). In addition, the credit boom that began in the early 2000s led to misallocation of investment and resources.
485 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Structural changes have begun, but the redistribution of resources continues to slow, given the deleveraging which was necessary due to structural rigidities, the remaining weaknesses in the banking sector, and the negative impact of population aging on economic growth. The euro-zone economy in 2014 has managed to stabilize, but the growth in the periphery was difficult due to low availability of credit. After the recession in 2013, which was practically a continuation of the 2009 crisis, it is expected to have modest growth of 1%-1.2% in 2014. EU officials predict that, due to mild growth, unemployment will remain a record during 2015, due to cost’ reduction in the private sector and fiscal austerity measures (Hannon & Brittain, 2013). In a study of the European Commission (2013) first was presented the “do- nothing” scenario, which would mean an average growth rate of just below 1% on average in the period 2014-2023 (which is twice slower than the estimated rate of growth in the U.S.). In the second scenario the structural reforms that would primarily encourage the growth of TFP, GDP growth would have been much more. Namely, in that scenario it is estimated that the average GDP growth would be 1.4% in the period 2014-2023, after negative growth from 2008 to 2013 (-0.3% on average) and relatively strong growth from 1998 to 2007 (2.3%). However, the potential growth in the euro area over the next 10 years it is still significantly lower than that one estimated for the U.S. (2.5%). Comparison between the euro-zone and the U.S. in the period 1998-2023, having in mind the potential GDP growth rate, shows that the United States was less affected by the financial crisis and that the U.S. will emerge from the crisis in a better position than the euro-zone. The study indicates that living standards in the euro- zone in 2023, compare to the U.S. will be lower than in the mid-1960s. If this is achieved, the standard of living in the euro area (potential GDP per capita) will be only about 60% of the U.S. level in 2023.5 In the Report of Itau BBA and Itau Unibanco (2012), we have the global economic projections for the period 2014-2020. It is estimated that the euro-zone will achieve an average growth rate of 1.1% (due to the growth of the capital stock of 1.8% per annum and growth of TFP of 0.6% per year due to major investments).6 The volume of relative decline of the EU is evident from comparative data which shows decreasing share of the EU in global FDI flows, world trade, as well as the significant decline of the EU’ share in the global industrial production.
5 Nearly 2/3 of the gap in living standards will be due to lower levels of productivity, while the remaining third will be due to differences in the use of labor (i.e. differences in the number of working hours per worker and employment rates). 6 Kenneth Rapoza, 26 March 2012, Global Growth Forecast 2020. http://www.forbes.com/sites/ kenrapoza/2012/03/26/global-growth-forecast-2020
486 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
E.g. in the first decade of the 21st century an increase in industrial production in Germany was only 3%, while in France, Britain and Italy was noted a decrease of 1%, 10% and 15%, respectively (in the U.S. growth was a modest: 11%). At the same time, industrial growth in China was fantastic 181%. While the EU27 and the U.S. 2000th accounted for 27% and 26% of the global industry respectively (China only 7%), already in 2012, the EU has created only fifth, the U.S. only sixth, and China whole 21% of the global industrial production. In the same time, the share of industry in GDP amounted 12% in the United States, in Germany 19%, in France only 10% and whole 29% in the China. In 2013 industrial production in the EU was on average 0.5% lower than the level of the 2012th, while at the same time in China an increase was 9.8%. According to a survey by the Economist Intelligence Unit in November 2013 on business expectations for 2014, it can be concluded that 2014 would be the year when the EU auto industry will return to growth, ending his prolonged decline. When it comes to energy in 2014 will be the year of the revolution, activism and environmental protection and rapid growth.7 The declining importance of EU is evident when the issue of FDI is concerned. In recent years, especially since the financial crisis, EU’ share in global FDI inflows is strongly reduced (from 43.2% in 2007 to 16.6% of global FDI in 2013), while the outflow of foreign direct investment from the EU halved (EU share were up 58% in 2007), although the EU remained a net investor as in previous years. At the global level, FDI grew strongly in 2013 (11%, to 1461 estimated billion dollars, according to UNCTAD). However, developed countries have a 39% share which was the historical minimum, for the second year in a row. Foreign direct investment to the EU has increased and has reached 286 billion dollars in 2013 (after 207 billion in 2012), an increase of 37.7%. However, a key contribution to the growth of FDI in the EU in recent years has come from four relatively small economies: Belgium, Ireland, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, which have very favourable tax conditions (inflow in these four countries accounted for more than 100 billion dollars in 2013). Otherwise, UNCTAD predicts that, with the acceleration of economic growth, which would encourage investors to put money into new investments, FDI flows will rise gradually in 2014 and 2015 to 1600 and 1800 billion dollars.8 Finally, EU’ share of global trade has declined. The nominal value of the total EU28 trade in goods grew by 69% in the period 2001-2013 (in 2013 the total EU28 exports amounted to 4561 billion euros, while imports was 4436 billion euros). In the same period, there was a trend of continuous decline in the share of the
7 Industries in 2014. A special report from The Economist Intelligence Unit. www.eiu.com /industry. 8 http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/webdiaeia2014d1_en.pdf.
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EU in world merchandise exports and imports, which will certainly continue. In fact, counting the value of the ‘internal‘ trade of EU member states, the share of EU28 in the total global merchandise exports decrease from 39.5% (2001) to 36.4% (2008), while 2013 was only 30.8% (‘external’ EU’ exports was around two and a half times smaller share). A similar trend was evident with merchandise imports, which fell from 38.4% to 37.3% and 30% respectively in 2001, 2008 and 2013. Declining tendency in the global exchange of goods had the United States (exports declined from 11.9% to 8.1% and 8%, while imports of goods decreased from 18.7% to 13.2% and 11.9% of the total global merchandise imports in 2000, 2008 and 2013 respectively). On the other hand, China has recorded a dramatic increase in the share of world merchandise trade in the same period (exports increased from 4.4% to 9% and 11.2%, and imports from 3.9% to 6.9% and to 9.9% in 2000, 2008 and 2013 respectively9). Thus, while the EU share of global trade declined steadily, China for the first time in the modern history in the 2013th was the largest partner in the international exchange of goods. The global crisis has acted as a tectonic shift in the bipolar core of the world economy, which was located in the U.S. and the EU, so as to promote China as the world’s new economic centre. The crisis has only accelerated this process because of the economic downturn that occurred in the U.S., EU and Japan (Zdravković, 2014). In 2008 Germany was the world’s largest exporter of goods, but 2009th China ranks first (in the 2013 China had 54.5% greater the dollar value of exports then 2008, the U.S. for 22.6%, and Germany practically same). Otherwise, global trade was the main instigator of GDP growth in 2013, while domestic demand remained relatively weak, except in China. It is expected that after the moderate growth of the volume of world trade in 2013 (2.7%), came to an acceleration of growth in 2014 and 2015 (4.5% and 5.2%, respectively).10
The global importance of euro The euro’s share in allocated global foreign exchange reserves increased from 17.5% to 23.8% in the period from 2000 to 2013, while the share of dollars fell from 72% to 61,9 (COFER-IMF, 2013). This indicates that the most serious challenger to the dollar since the 1930s became the euro, currency in which was usually denominated the bulk of the world’s bond. Third place in the next decade will became Chinese renminbi (RMB), which for now undeniably become a regional currency. According to BIS Report (2013) euro holds 16.8% of all ‘foreign-exchange’ transactions (dollar holds 43.5% of all ‘foreign-exchange’
9 Counted by using the data basis TradeMap.org, http://www.trademap.org/Country_Sel Product_TS.aspx?nvpm=1||14719|||TOTAL|||2|1|1|1|2|1|3|1|1 10 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/update/01/
488 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century transactions, RMB only 1.1%; it were daily averages for April 201311). However, according to assessment of the experts of the British bank HSBC currency of the euro-zone have not an encouraging future. Namely, around 50% of China’s foreign trade with countries whose economies are developing rapidly was calculated in RMB. It is indicative that in late March of 2014. Central bank of China and the Bundesbank reach agreement on cooperation regarding clearing and billing when paying in RMB (thanks to this Sino-German arrangement financial stock market in Frankfurt will get their share of the off-shore RMB’ market). Central Bank of England signed a similar agreement in late March. Despite these indications, the euro was at most of the other parameters held at another place (e.g. the cumulative cross-border loans and deposits, etc.).12 Forthcoming changes do not mean that the dollar will completely lose international status, but the U.S. currency could be became “one of the few currencies that will share the international role”, among which will be the euro (Eichengreen, 2011). In any case, we can expect in medium-term the construction of complex system of global reserve currencies will be constituted by the dollar, euro and RMB, among others with little impacts.
Expected further weakening of the global position of the EU Although the Great Recession accelerated the relative economic decline of the EU, it has also contributed to significant progress in the euro-integration. In last years were created new institutions or instruments: Stability Pact, European Fund for Financial Stability, European Stability Mechanism and European Debt Agency. In addition, majority of EU’ members have achieved agreement about the banking union. What is perhaps most important, it is aggressive action of the European Central Bank, that is it’s decisive intervention in the government bond market (‘defense euro at all costs’’) which was creating conditions for fiscal stabilization, starting from August 2012. In early April of 2014 ECB has sent a strong signal that (like the American’ FED) is ready for action to stimulate the economy of the euro area, in spite to numerous criticisms. Stronger activation of the so-called quantitative easing, i.e. buying government or corporate bonds in large amounts, can be seen as a way to reduce market interest rates. Base rate remains at a record low of 0.25%, while the March year-on-year inflation (0.5%) was at the lowest level since 2009. ECB projection shows that inflation will reach the target (2%) only in 2016th. Very low inflation affects credit borrowers because they pay higher interest rates in real terms, and this is especially painful for the heavily indebted countries of
11 http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx13fx.pdf 12 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/tasks/international/euro/html/index.en.html
489 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century peripheral Europe (Ewing, 2014). Additional problem is the strong euro. Economist Intelligence Unit (2014b) has revised upward estimate of the average value of the euro in 2014 to 1.34 dollar (from 1.29 previously estimated). Finalizing the Trans-Atlantic Trade Pact between the U.S. and EU would mean opening the closed agricultural markets of the EU, abolition of customs duties, limiting regulation, reducing restrictions on procurement of the U.S. government, which would stimulate trade and mutual investment. EU officials see finalization of Trans-Atlantic Trade Pact as the preferred generator of growth for the region, particularly because of the recession. The main benefit of the deal would be the elimination of many regulations and non-tariff barriers that restrict trade (Dalton & Fidler, 2013). From the standpoint of the United States, this is an attempt by rival compared to the Asian free trade zone (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership), which would impact the U.S. in the region through the increased competitiveness of China. For the EU’s planned trade agreement with the United States a way to avoid irrelevance on the global stage. It is indicative that China managed to prevent a trade war on the occasion of the famous solar panels virtually through separate agreement with Berlin (Stephens, 2013). Regarding global position of the EU the best modality is one which was introduced by Giovanni Grevi (2009): inter-polarity. Inter-polarity is an edited version of multi-polarity with an emphasis on interdependence in the economic sense which globalization has brought in the last two to three decades. Although it predicts the coexistence of the three forms of multi-polarity - a cooperative, competitive and confrontational, Grevi insists that the cooperative form is one to whom the EU has to strive and create it. Noting all the complexity of current changes, he agrees that there are no quick solutions and there is no problem with a single causative agent and a valid ideology. However, the complexity of the phenomena that academics may explain in part; politicians still cannot. They need to identify the primary factors, the main cause and the mainstream, the nodal points through which the process is controlled and directed in their own favor. While recognizing that the power dispersed, Grevi argues that the states are still relatively stronger than previously thought (in the period before the crisis). According to him, government’ intervention in the financial sector, state’ energy control and protectionist tendencies, as well as possibilities for their implementation clearly talking about it (Grevi have treated the EU as one country i.e. as a state structure). Inter-polarity differs from non-polarity in this segment that claims that there are still no centers of power strong enough to have the same impact as a state (e.g. multinational companies, NGOs, terrorist groups, media conglomerates, etc.). Inter-polarity differs from multi-polarity differs because it insists on the preservation of connections created by globalization, which would be used to solve common or individual issues. Grevi believes that, because of their experience, the EU is in a very good position to act in such system. His assumption
490 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century is that the achievements of peaceful development and the gradual democratization of the entire European continent were built into all EU institutional mechanisms and that EU’ bureaucracy is persistent enough and flexible enough to overcome the problems of different nature and intensity. However, Grevi’ vision depends on too many variables to be able to say that is quite unlikely. The main question is why would other global actors accept arguments that the EU is just its normative discourse suited for all? Developments in the last few years really, especially public debt crisis, do not support such position of EU. From a geopolitical point of view, the key question is whether the relative economic decline of EU made the EU less willing to support U.S. foreign policy actions, for what became hints during the Second Iraq War (which the ‘’ Old Europe ‘’ strongly opposed). A casual lack of foreign policy or military support to America’s actions is the result of public opinion to the lives of soldiers, not readiness for radical change in the political relations of the ‘’North Atlantic’’ that connects identical civilizations and a similar look to the rest of the world. Conditionally other geopolitical concept, EU enlargement, slowed only temporarily, since the expansion is strategic interest of the leading EU countries and the U.S. EU attempts to change the global management system is reduced to systematically co-opt “revisionist” actors (China, Russia, Iran...). The financial crisis has provided the perfect (and perhaps unconscious) pronunciation for EU countries to reduce defense expenditures, time and obligations under the NATO alliance, and the self-emancipation of foreign (and defense) policy. Currently the EU is ‘available’ as merely an economic partner (who loses its relative economic power), which participates in a game where the only means of his game is slowly slipping from his hands. In this way, the EU reduces the significance of one of its main roles: the proclamation and implementation of standards that is considered the essence of its existence, but also a valuable contribution to the preferred global liberal order. Simplified to the world as a marketplace of ideas, the EU is in a unique position to offer a vision of solving current problems and ways of managing the world, practically without no negative image (unlike the U.S.). Experience the preservation of cultural identity, promotion of economic interdependence, the existence of viable political forum for resolving a wide variety of issues, combating multinational crime - these are all issues where the EU now leads. Its overall success in the world of the future will largely depend on whether EU will be able these issues to set as primary issues of world governance (Nikolic & Igrutinović, 2012).
The effects of the relative weakening of the EU on Serbia Changes in the geopolitical stage, especially the relative economic decline of the EU and other developed countries, as well as the slightly strengthening densely fast growing economies, peculiarly China, are not without consequences
491 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century to Serbia. However, it seems that their importance is geopolitical rather than economical. Namely, Serbia relies on Russia and China, especially in the Security Council of United Nations, in order to push through their own strategic interests, primarily to protect territorial sovereignty. Serbia is trying to balancing its policy, giving much more importance to these two countries, comparing to countries in the region, strengthen its bargaining position with the West, according to some strategic political issues. How about European integration process slowed down, or whether there are alternative policies that would better reflect the real interests of the country and its dignity, it is not easy to assess. In any case, Serbia suffers because the weakening of the EU in several ways. First, the factual stagnation in the EU has a negative impact on the growth of import demand in Italy and Germany (with these countries Serbia have the largest trade), which affects our export industry. Capital inflows which predominantly come from Western Europe decreased due to the slow growth or stagnation in these countries. Increasing geo-economic importance of the BRICS’ countries with a slight decline in influence of yet dominant West, to some extent shape the foreign policy of Serbia (e.g. initiatives in the United Nations which was opposed the implicit requirements of the EU). At the same time, the idea of joining the EU practically dominates in Serbian political elite as a strategic priority for the country. Beginning the negotiations on membership in the EU further limiting the scope for foreign policy since the part of the powers in this area actually moves to Brussels. Specifically, the candidate status of Serbia implies some kind of (possibly delayed) obligation to coordinate its foreign policy with the EU, that is, as much as possible to find the same course of EU policy towards third countries. Trade with five BRICS’ countries makes a relatively modest part of the total trade of Serbia. The share of these countries is relatively low when it comes to exports (about one twelfth), while BRIKC’ countries make up a significant portion of imports of Serbia (about a fifth). It seems that there is significant room for domestic exports growth to Russia. The recently signed a strategic treaty between Serbia and China should allow the increase (for now minor) exports to that country. The expansion of Chinese products on the Serbian market is not specific to our country having in mind that China in last two decades strongly increasing total exports around the world. Exchange with the other three BRICS’ countries is very small and it is hard to believe that it is primarily due to the spatial distance, but also due to significant similarities in merchandise production. When it comes to the movement of capital from BRICS’ countries, Russia is most present in the Serbian market and some estimates suggest that the real volume of Russian investments is about billion euros. It is almost certain that there will be a further influx of Russian capital, through investment for NIS’ modernization, and the entry of Russia’s financial capital through the expansion
492 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of banking and insurance networks. The largest Chinese investments in Serbia are loans for bridge Zemun-Borča, ‘Corridor 11’ and thermo-power plant in Kostolac. However, the volume of investments from non-Western countries is modest (just over dozens), while is a similar case with the trade. Regularly credit arrangements with China and Russia have so much scope to reduce dominant reliance on cross-border loans from Western European’ countries. In fact, nearly two-thirds of Serbian merchandise exports as well as the dominant part of modern technology import comes from the EU, indicating that the potential stagnation of the EU economy has a negative impact on Serbian foreign trade performance. In addition, practically the entire amount of remittances and foreign pensions (average close to three billion euros a year), and grants (about 200 million euros a year on average) comes from the EU’ countries. Any move of abandonment the EU integration process would constitute a severe blow for domestic economy. Estimates of the IMF (April 2014), indicating that economic growth in Serbia in 2014 and 2015 been modest and that the unemployment rate will remain high implicitly suggest that the country does not have much room to manoeuvre for a more active, and more independent economic policy. Namely, the unemployment rate in Serbia is in 2014 forecasted at 21.6%, while in 2015 it is expect to be 22%. The average rise in consumer prices in 2014 and 2015 was forecasted to be 4%; a current account deficit of balance of payments should amount to a still high 4.8% of GDP in 2014 and 4.6% of GDP in 2015. Expected recovery of the EU, after year and a half of recession, is certainly good news for Serbia. However, medium-term forecasts of growth rates of EU economies are moderate, which does not promise a significant increase in imports which would be supportive to domestic exports. In addition, it implies that it is not realistic to expect stronger capital inflow (FDI and portfolio investment) since the dominant part of it, due to geography, is coming from EU countries. These long-lasting processes have negative impact on the economy of Serbia, which is predominantly dependent on investment climate and real economic tendencies in the Western Europe.
493 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Dušan DABOVIĆ1
PROSPECTS AND CHALLENGES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA IN THE FIELD OF AGRICULTURE IN 21ST CENTURY
Abstract: The Republic of Serbia has committed itself to harmonize its policies with the EU policies in the process of joining the Community. One of the most important policies in the process of harmonization is the agricultural policy, given that agriculture is a strategic economic sector, both for the EU and for Serbia. However, since its inception the agricultural policy of the EU is in a continuous process of transformation, in accordance with the international and the European financial, commercial, rural, environmental and technological conditions. Therefore, our obligation in the accession period is to align the development of domestic agricultural policy with the development of the agricultural policy of the EU. In doing so, Serbia should be able to get rid of the specific loads inherited from the past, which represent a dam for the smooth integration of its agricultural market in the EU agricultural market. The Common Agricultural Policy of the EU (CAP) includes sectoral agricultural policies or the legislations on production and trade of major agricultural products in the Community as well as the issues of rural development and food safety. Since its inception in 1962, The CAP has gone through several phases, which have been marked by the different approaches. The current phase of development of the CAP is based on the document “The CAP towards 2020.” According to this strategy, the CAP is based on two pillars, namely: direct payments and other market measures in agriculture; and multi- annual rural development measures. On the other side, food safety, climate changes and other aspects of environmental protection as well as regional leveling are defined as the challenges of implementation of the CAP. According to the Strategy on Development of Agriculture of the Republic of Serbia, which was brought in 2005, for a validity period of 10 years the three most important elements of the domestic agriculture were: the completion of the transition from a socialist economy to a full market economy; integration
1 Dušan Dabović, Ph.D., Senior Advisor, Ministry of Agriculture and Environmental Protection, Republic of Serbia.
494 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
and accession to the European Union; radical reconstruction and modernization of the entire agricultural sector. Problems inherited from the past related to the undeveloped agriculture and insufficiently developed market economy are recognized as the most significant challenges to further development of our agricultural policy and they can be classified into four groups: market, financial, infrastructural and legal problems. Key words: Common Agricultural Policy, agriculture, rural development, food safety, European Union.
Introduction The Republic of Serbia committed itself to harmonize its sectoral policies with the EU policies, in the process of joining the Community, concerning the fact that the Article 1, paragraph 2, points from d) to f) of the Stabilization and Association Agreement, state that the aims of this association are: “to support the efforts of Serbia to develop its economic and international cooperation, including through the approximation of its legislation to that of the Community; to support the efforts of Serbia to complete the transition into a functioning market economy; to promote harmonious economic relations and gradually develop a free trade area between the Community and Serbia.”2 One of the most important policies in the process of harmonization is the agricultural policy, given that agriculture is a strategic economic sector, both for the EU and for Serbia. In fact, agriculture is allocated 37.8 percent of the budget of the Community, of which about 26.8 percent, or 313 billion Euros, are used directly for the agriculture, and the other part, or about 96 billion Euros, for the rural development.3 In addition, with an annual turnover of around 177 billion Euros of the total value of the trade of agricultural products, the EU is the largest market for agricultural products in the world.4 On the other hand, Serbia is traditionally an agricultural country, where agriculture has been the only economic sector that has regularly recorded a positive foreign trade balance in the last decade. However, since its inception, the agricultural policy of the EU has been in a continuous process of transformation, in accordance with the international and the European financial, commercial, rural, environmental and technological
2 „Sporazum o stabilizaciji i pridruživanju između zemalja članica Evropske unije s jedne strane i Republike Srbije s druge strane”, Internet, http://www.srbija.gov.rs/vesti/dokumenti_ sekcija.php?id=173712, 22.04.2014. 3 “Overview of CAP Reform 2014-2020”, European Commission, December 2013, p. 3. 4 Eurostat, Internet, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/, 23.04.2014.
495 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century conditions. Therefore, our obligation in the accession period is to align the development of the domestic agricultural policy with the development of the agricultural policy of the EU. In doing so, our country should be able to get rid of the specific loads inherited from the past, which represent a dam for a smooth integration of our agricultural market in the EU agricultural market.
Common agricultural policy towards 2020 The Common Agricultural Policy of the European Union has its roots in the Western Europe after the Second World War, when the region was devastated and when the agriculture was reduced to a minimum, so that the food supply was not sufficient to feed the population. Therefore, the basic idea of the CAP was to encourage productivity in the food chain, stabilize the market and to ensure proper supply of agricultural products with reasonable prices. At a conference in Stressa, Italy, a decision was made to start with creating a common platform in the field of agriculture. Decisions of the Council, in 1962, established the six common markets (wheat, pork, eggs, chicken meat, fruit and vegetables and wine), introduced the competition rules, established programs for dairy products, beef, sugar and other measures for editing of the internal market and founded the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund as well as the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. Also, the system of support to the agricultural production was established.5 During the 1970s the reform of the agricultural sector began, in terms of reducing the production, in the form of penalties for overdue production plan in the field of milk and milk products (Mansholt¢s plan - by the then Commissioner of Agriculture Sicco Mansholt). In the early 1980s, there was a problem of large surpluses of basic agricultural products, which were therefore exported. During the 1985, the European Commission conducted a public debate on the prospects of the CAP, formulating conclusions in counseling document entitled “The Green Paper”.6 Then, in 1988, limitations of the production which was subject to financing were brought. In addition, a new strategy to support disadvantaged areas and rural development was promoted. It was followed by MacSherry¢s reform of the 1992, which has shifted the focus from the product support to the producers. In doing so, direct payments were introduced in order to compensate the reduction of support to the production.
5 “History of the CAP”, European Commission, Internet, http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/cap- history/crisis-years-1970s/index_en.htm, 07.05.2014. 6 “A future for Community agriculture – Commission guidelines following the consultations in connection with the Green Paper”, Commission Communication, Internet, http://ec.europa.eu /agriculture/cap-history/crisis-years-1980s/com85-750_en.pdf, 07.05.2014.
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In the next stage, which was formulated by Agenda 2000, social, economic and environmental objectives of the CAP were determined, in accordance with the Treaty of Amsterdam.7 In the previous period, the EU has faced a number of challenges in the field of agriculture, which led to the amendments of the CAP for the next period, from 2013 to 2020. According to this plan, the expenditure on agriculture for the entire period freezes on an annual basis from 2013. The main contribution of the new reform reflects in the territorial and environmental leveling. In doing so, the new strategic objectives were determined, as follows: Protection of the food production potential on a sustainable basis throughout the EU, so as it could guarantee long-term food security for European citizens and could contribute to growing global food demand, expected by the FAO to increase by 70% to 2050. Therefore, Europe’s capacity to deliver food security is an important long-term choice for Europe which cannot be taken for granted. Supporting farming communities that provide the European citizens with quality and various foods produced sustainably, in line with environmental, water, animal health and welfare, plant health and public health requirements. Also, the active management of natural resources by farming is an important tool to maintain the rural landscape, which could combat biodiversity loss and climate change. Sustainability of rural communities, because agriculture provides local employment, which leads to various advantages, such as: economic, social, environmental, etc. In addition, the decrease in agricultural production, based on the increased allocations for rural development, contributes to reduction of the effects of “greenhouse gases” (GHG).8 These strategic goals are set with regard to agriculture as an integral part of the European economy and society. Therefore, the reduction of the activities in the agriculture is directly reflected in the GDP and the employment rate in the EU member states. Also, the new measures will impact the rural activities, such as tourism, transport and local services. The new reform of the CAP should increase competition, efficient use of the budget, taking into account food safety, environmental protection, climate change and social and territorial balance. This would achieve sustainable growth of the rural Europe. To make this possible, it is necessary that the CAP contains “greener” and equitable
7 “History of the CAP”, ibid. 8 “The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources and territorial challenges of the future”, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the regions, Brussels, 2010, COM(2010) 672 final, pp. 2-3.
497 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century distributed the first pillar, while the second pillar should be focused more on competition and innovation, climate change and environmental protection. In this way, the EU agriculture could release its hidden production potential, particularly in the new member states, and respond to the general objectives of the EU towards the 2020.9
Perspectives of the Common Agricultural Policy Sustainable agricultural production, as the first main goal of the new CAP reform, should, first of all, to contribute to the increase of farm income, given that farm incomes are exposed to market conditions and natural risks, more than in other sectors of the EU economy. In addition, it should promote competition in the agricultural sector, as well as to increase the value share in the food chain, because the other sectors are better organized and have higher value shares in agriculture. Also, the European farmers will face competition in the global market, while having to fulfill high standards in environmental protection, food safety, quality and animal welfare. At the same time, the CAP has to compensate for production difficulties in the areas with the specific natural constraints.10 Sustainable management of the natural resources and activities related to climate change, as one of the basic objectives of the CAP reform, refers, inter alia, to sustainable production practices, and improving of the protection of environment, concerning the fact that this aspect of agriculture cannot be regulated exclusively by market conditions. In addition, the need to encourage innovation in the field of environmental protection requires the adoption of the new technologies, developing new products, changing production processes and supporting the new requirements, particularly in the context of bioeconomics. Also, the CAP reform should achieve a reduction of the negative effects of climate change. Enabling the sector to better adapt to the effects of extreme weather fluctuations, can also reduce the negative effects of climate change.11 Balanced development of the territory, as one of the main objectives should maintain: support to rural employment and social development of rural areas; improving of the rural economy and promoting diversification of local entities in order to release their potential and optimize the use of additional local resources; structural diversification of the system of agricultural production; improving conditions for small farms and the development of local markets.12
9 “The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources and territorial challenges of the future”, op. cit., p. 3. 10 Ibid., p. 7. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., p. 8.
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Achieving all of these objectives requires public support to agriculture and rural development. The EU policies allow the setting of common objectives, principles and rules in all member states. In fact, agricultural policy at the EU level requires more efficient use of the budgetary resources than the coexistence of the national policies. In addition, at the international level is easier to achieve certain objectives, such as environmental protection, water management, biodiversity, protection of animal health and welfare, food safety, plant protection, protection of public health and protection of consumer rights.
Challenges to the Common Agricultural Policy for the period 2013-2020 Taking into account the fact that the worldwide demand for food will continue rising in the future, the EU has to be ready to contribute to the demand. Therefore, it is essential that the EU maintains its production capacity and to improves it, while respecting the requirements of the international food trade. The agricultural sector is the basis of the very profitable food industry, as the EU is the global largest exporter of the processed agricultural products. On the other hand, citizens of the EU member states demand high quality and wide choice of agricultural products, including product safety, quality standards and animal welfare, as well as local products. In this context, issues on food safety and nutritional efficiency become increasingly important. In addition, the new CAP is realized during the great global crisis which reflects on the EU agriculture, given that the average income of producers has declined by 40 percent in comparison to other industries, while the income from the agriculture in rural areas declined by 50 percent of the agriculture in urban areas.13 The scientific community has an understanding that the CAP with its support to production of agricultural products that are intended for export contributes to dependence of developing countries on food imports. This trend began in the mid- 1980s, and since then has been in the constant development. At the same time, the trade deficit in the area of agricultural products in these countries has been on the increase as compared to developed countries from the northern hemisphere, especially the EU, as the world¢s largest exporter of food. Specifically, to the 1985, a surplus in international trade in agricultural products of developing countries amounted to more than $ 10 billion, and in the next two decades, reaching minus 30 billion dollars. The new CAP with a reduction in direct support to farmers moves in the direction of improving the position of developing countries in the global food market, by reducing their dependence on food imports.14
13 Ibid., p. 4. 14 Thomas Fritz, “Globalizing hunger: Food security and the EU�s Agricultural Policy (CAP)”, Internet, http://www.tni.org/files/download/CAPpaper-draft_0.pdf, 06.05.2014.
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In addition, one of the main challenges of the EU agriculture is the impact that agriculture affects climate change. Namely, agriculture with forestry in addition, is one of the basic factors of environmental protection, as it prevents natural disasters such as floods, fires and landslides. On the other hand, agricultural production can threaten environment, creating large amounts of harmful gases that create a greenhouse effect emissions, high fuel consumption and pollution of water, as well as reduction of wild flora and fauna, and loss of biodiversity. Although the EU had reduced emissions of greenhouse gases from agriculture to about 20 percent in the period from 1990 to 2005, there are new efforts to reduce emissions of these gases.15 A large number of the rural areas become dependent on the factors of outside of agriculture, but agriculture remains the vital factor for rural areas, for the most part of the EU. Therefore, the development of rural areas depends largely on the competitiveness and dynamism of the agricultural sector, due mainly to the young farmers for whom agriculture means existence. In addition, agriculture generates additional economic activities, which are associated with food processing, tourism and trade. Also, in many areas, agriculture is part of tradition and social identity. Thus, the new CAP has suffered the changes, but the further changes are necessary in the future, in accordance with the upcoming challenges, primarily in the area of growing concern about global food security. Also, the EU has to establish the sustainable management of the natural resources such as water, air, biodiversity and land.
Prospects and challenges of agriculture of the Republic of Serbia According to the Law on Agriculture and Rural Development16 long-term directions of the agricultural development are determined by the Strategy for Agriculture and Rural Development of the Republic of Serbia (hereinafter: the Strategy).17 The strategic directions of agriculture involve the establishment of the market economy, increasing the profitability of agriculture and concern about the development of rural areas. The Strategy was adopted for a period of ten years, while the specific strategic documents – the National Program of Agriculture and the National Rural Development Program, were brought for a period of seven years. The National Program of Agriculture is determined by the medium and the short-term goals of the agricultural policy, method,
15 “The CAP towards 2020”, op. cit., p. 5. 16 „Zakon o poljoprivredi i ruralnom razvoju” (Sl. glasnik RS, br. 41/09, 10/13 - dr. zakon). 17 „Strategija razvoja poljoprivrede Srbije” (Sl. glasnik RS, br. 78/05).
500 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century sequence and the deadlines for achieving the stated objectives, expected results, as well as the shape, type, purpose and scope of the individual incentives, while the National Rural Development Program contains measures and other activities, as well as expected results, shapes, types, purpose and scope of certain measures of incentives.18
Prospects for the development of agriculture of the Republic of Serbia According to the Strategy, the changes that need to be made in the agricultural sector include three main elements, namely: completion of the establishment of the market economy; integration and accession to the European Union; radical reconstruction and modernization of the agricultural sector. The establishment of market economy in the field of agriculture is primarily based on the reduction of the role of government in managing the sector, as well as the relationship between agricultural producers and the state. The government in the country in transition, from a socialist economy to market economy, has to leave the management functions, such as management of agricultural combines and social enterprises in this field. At the same time, the government has to take and to strengthen many other functions that are necessary to market functioning. In this way, all who participate in the agricultural market have access to the information and resources necessary for successful business operations, such as construction market information system, strengthening and reorganization of the education system, training and advising, as well as the new legislation. The legislation has to ensure the conditions for free and fair exchange and competition but at the same time to prevent monopolistic behavior in the market and to correct any market errors.19 In addition to establishing a market economy, one of the main strategic objectives in the field of agriculture in the way of accession to the European Union is raising the standards of quality and safety of agricultural products. It means that before joining the EU, Serbia has to provide appropriate quality of agricultural products, not only the acceptable price. Moreover, our country has committed itself to align its legislation with the acquis communautaire, i.e. the set of regulations, procedures and legal practices underpinning the EU, until the moment of accession. In agriculture, the acquis relates to agricultural standards, the CAP, and to the so-called “Structural funds”. Legal standards relating to agriculture are extensive, from animal health, plant health and food safety to product labeling and consumer protection. Some of these standards
18 „Zakon o poljoprivredi”, op. cit., articals 4-6. 19 „Strategija razvoja poljoprivrede Srbije”, ibid.
501 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century are necessary to implement in the pre-approach period, such as standards that must be met for butcheries or phytosanitary standards, because these standards allow export to the EU, while some, such as those pertaining to the field of export of seafood will not be implemented.20
Challenges of agriculture of the Republic of Serbia in the coming period The challenges plaguing agricultural development in Serbia can be divided into four groups: commercial, financial, infrastructural and legal. Besides, it should be borne in mind that all of these factors are more or less interconnected, and that they interact, which increase their negative effects. Among the market challenges the most important are: existence of unofficial and uncontrolled trade channels, lack of cost-effectiveness, difference between price and quality, efficiency and lack of price competition. Namely, according to some data, the majority of the most important agricultural products such as potatoes, apples, milk and pork are produced and sold through unofficial channels. In doing so, producers cannot implement the necessary international standards of food safety and hygiene, which leads to increased risk of diseases of plants and animals, as well as to avoiding of paying taxes and fees and to unfair competition in relation to the controlled channels. Therefore, in the future almost all production should be sold through official controlled channels, regardless of whether it is sold by traders, processors, or as the direct sale to consumers through the fresh market. The lack of cost-effectiveness is the result, primarily, of fragmentation of farms, given that 94.5% of households possess less than 10 ha of agricultural land. It has resulted in a large number of very small quantities produced and sold; therefore, it generates the uneconomical market and production. In the long term, the functioning of the land market, economic growth, healthy rural development policies and programs of land consolidation will lead to the realization of farms which will avoid this uneconomical production. In addition, the grouping is necessary to form market associations or companies.21 Classification of agricultural products by quality, which corresponds to a scale of prices, in general, except for some products, does not exist in Serbia. The introduction of such a system in agricultural production could stimulate manufacturers to raise product quality. Therefore, market organizations should be encouraged to develop systems for sorting and classification of their products, such as HACCP, EUROGAP, organic certification, Halal, Kosher, etc.22
20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.
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Prices should be efficient, i.e. to reflect the relationship between supply and demand, which in Serbia in this area is not always in the practice. One source of inefficient price setting comes from barter trade. Therefore, it is necessary as a priority for Serbia to create the conditions to stop the exchange of goods and barter trade. This could be done in the best way through the development of credit market and producers’ organizations, but in the first phase through a transparent expression of the prices in contracts.23 Typically for agricultural markets in all developing countries, small rural businesses and manufacturers sell their products to larger companies that have much greater market power. However, if large business organizations agree to set price levels over the cartel arrangements, it could be a threat for free competition, and leads to the formation of monopolies. Departments for processing oil, milk and other sectors in Serbia, have traits that indicate the cartel conduct. However, with the establishment of the international competition the domestic monopolies should be canceled.24 The agricultural sector needs short-term loans to cover the financial needs of production, term loans for fixed assets and long-term loans for land purchase. Therefore, in the coming period Serbia has to build the credit market available to all participants in the supply chain. Since 2004, the Ministry of Agriculture initiated a program to provide short-term and medium-term loans to farmers and legal entities in order to speed up the process of linking the banking sector with the manufacturers and to improve production through the provision of cheap credits. Since there is a general lack of credits in agriculture, Serbia has to create conditions for commercial credit and financial sectors which could meet the needs of farmers.25 In addition, one of the major financial challenges that should be overcome in the field of agriculture is the problem of warrants, because the majority of farmers have their land as an ideal vehicle for warrant. Often, however, banks are reluctant to accept land as warrant because the property cannot be proved because of the legacy of cadastral system. In addition, payment of the loan in case of default is a long and expensive task that can take several years. Therefore, Serbia has to create a legal and institutional basis for implementation of the receivables. Also, this question applies to the storage, i.e. warehouse use. In this regard, it is necessary to have a number of licensed warehouses which are depositories for commodity values such as depositary banks for the cash value.26
23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid.
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Due to the lack of lending, banks do not have enough trained personnel, who would be able to make an assessment of credit worthiness and the quality of the business plan for potential clients. This deficiency is gradually removed through training programs, given that the existing rural banking network is not well developed to be able to meet the demands of farmers, especially in the regions which are mainly privately owned. The introduction of microfinance institutions in rural areas would close banking services to farmers. Therefore, Serbia has to develop training programs for bank employees in order to help producers in developing business plans and requirements for commercial bank loans.27 The separate financial challenge in the field of agriculture, at the time of accession, would be predicted cancellation of all bilateral trade agreements concluded by Serbia as an independent state, which would also apply to the free trade agreement with the Russian Federation. This agreement is extremely beneficial to our country, because of the size of the Russian market, and because it provides us with favorable treatment and long-term sale of large quantities of agricultural products. The loss of the contract would have a negative impact on the foreign trade balance of the domestic agriculture, which would be difficult to compensate for the increased sharing of the internal market of the Community or with the third countries. Therefore, Serbia, in the process of accession to the EU, should insist on the respect of its economic specifics of which the agreement with the Russian Federation is certainly the most important. Infrastructural problems are reflected in the lack of organized wholesale markets for agricultural products, which would supply supermarkets, and small traders and caterers. In these wholesale markets, the delivery and shipping of goods carry out in an organized manner, which shortens the time of purchase, and by supplying the large quantities of goods, it lowers the costs which affects the final price of the product. At the places the organized control of food safety of the products is enabled, which is also in the favor of the end-consumers, as well as the state (to indirectly reduce the costs of medical treatments of the population). In addition, infrastructural problems are reflected in retail, or in under-developed network of hypermarkets, which can offer a greater choice at lower prices than small retail shops. Also, our country does not rely on the experiences of developed countries that provide retail to open shopping malls, mainly in the city center, on the movable stands that are removed after working hours, which solves communal problems and leaves space for other facilities. Therefore, the sector of wholesale and retail of agricultural products should modernize and harmonize with the experiences of the developed countries. In the field of agriculture, participants in the production and trade, in addition to legislation on various matters of agriculture, apply legislation on economic
27 Ibid.
504 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century and financial subjects, especially on commercial contracts, organization of companies, securities and labor contracts. However, agriculture is a very specific field, therefore legal operations should be done by specially trained lawyers, which would enable faster and more efficient procedures, and avoid lengthy disputes. In Serbia, there is a lack of scientific literature that deal with the legal aspects of agriculture. Also, agricultural law is not taught at the Serbian law faculties, although this legal discipline has been significantly developing in the developed countries. Therefore, in this field Serbia should also get closer to the developed countries and their legal systems, and take special attention to the legal aspect of agriculture.
Closing remarks The perspectives, as well as the challenges of the agriculture of the European Union are determined by the strategic document “The Common Agricultural Policy towards 2020”, which was adopted for the period 2013- 2020. On the other hand, the current strategic plan for agriculture of the Republic of Serbia was adopted in 2005, with a validity of 10 years, which is specified by special programs for agriculture and rural development. Due to our country’s European integration as the main political objective, strategic documents in the field of agriculture, as in other areas, must be harmonized with the relevant documents of the European Union, in order to facilitate the integration of our agricultural market in the Community market. The main objectives of the Common Agricultural Policy are sustainable management of natural resources and activities on climate change. In doing so, it established a new strategic goal: the sustainable development of agriculture, providing assistance to individual producers and the viability of the rural areas. As the main challenges, it identified: increasing food security, reducing negative impacts on developing countries, reducing the impact on climate change and leveling of territorial development. According to the Serbian strategy of agriculture, the main strategic objectives are: the completion of the market economy; integration and accession to the European Union; reconstruction and modernization of the agricultural sector. As the most important challenges in this area have been identified four sets of issues: market, financial, infrastructural and legal.
505 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Nano RUŽIN1
THE ORBANIZATION OF THE BALKANS – POPULISM BETWEEN ZDANOVISM AND DISNEYLAND
Abstract: The New World Order is the title of the book from the famous author H.G. Wells (1866-1946) published in 1940 in which the author emphasizes the creation of one world government. Based upon the thoughts of historian Carroll Quigley, capitalist financial elites from the period of 1850 to 1932 ambitiously sought to control a system based on the private sector which would dominate all political systems of the world. In the after-war period, the New World Order has been connected for a long time to the triple entente between Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill from Yalta (1945) which fell with the end of communism in 1989. In his talk at the Congress, the President of the USA George H.W.Bush (1990) expressed the term “New World Order” as a metaphor for novelties in American diplomacy, but also referring to the changes in the world order through the affirmation of the American Global Empire. This philosophy has been supported from philosopher Francis Fukuyama and political expert Zbignew Bzezinski. Between the fall of the Yugoslav federation, the air intervention on the SR Yugoslavia by NATO, the terrorist attacks in 2001 to the proclamation of independence of Kosovo and the Ukrainian crisis, the Eastern Balkans has witnessed the signing of three peace agreements (Dayton, Kumanovo, Ohrid), several integrations of the Balkan states in the EU and NATO, electoral cycles and governments with numerous political utopias and anti-utopias led by the ruling political elites. The mentioned phenomena were the result of the transformation of the old international system and the establishment of the new world order. Populism and democracy have taken place in some Balkan states and the method of Hungarian president Orban was taken as a model by the leaders of the states and their respective parties- candidates to the EU admission. This model of “democrature” and populism in Macedonia resembles the archetypical mixture between modern Zdanovism and Utopian Disneyland. Similar trends have taken place in neighboring countries of the Western
1 Professor Nano Ružin, FON University of Skopje, Macedonia.
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Balkans. Aspirants to membership in the EU are still focused on history and modern imperatives for europeization in a similar manner as Europe is focused on examples from the past and modern trends of integration. Key terms: ORBAN-isation, European Union, circulation-iconography, democrature, politics, manipulation, populism
What is happening with the Balkans 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall? During the last days of communism, writer Arpad Goncz who later became chairman of Hungary, along with other dissidents who thought that the destruction of communism, one hardly attainable goal as opposed to the establishment and building of democracy which is considered the easier task. Today it is already evident that building democracy is a much more complex process that is full of contradictions, missed illusion and disorientation. In the diverse Balkan region, divided among the new member states of the European Union and those aspirants, between people filled the social frustrations and high unemployment, political sets between Hungary and Romania over the Croatian, Serbia and Macedonia to Greece are burdened by the phenomenon of populism. Populist Party in the West like the FN Marinne Le Pen, Berluskoni’s Forza Italia, Swiss UDC, the Belgian Vlaams, Alterantive Districts of Turkey (AFD), the Austrian FPO Franz Obermayer or the Dutch PVV Geert Wilders showed great popularity and power ... In Central and Eastern Europe, the most important leader of populism is to PM of Hungary, Viktor Orban. Viktor Orban is a man from Europe, recently told the Paris Match. His critics in Europe were already using more metaphors about him and about the state of democracy in Hungary: Orbanistan, democracy, goulash archipelago. When in its history, you are dealing with the Ottoman Empire, Hitler or Stalin dictatorship soldiery, criticized by Daniel Cohn-Benedito look like scratching soles, said Orban. Hungarians have no need of Europe to be free. Hungarians are free because they like the price of democracy. And they chose me because I am a Democrat. Do we talk about the softer varieties of intimidation or representation of the world in the mirror and manipulations like Disneyland? Provided that the method Orban who performed in one EU member state has proved successful for his political background. When such media control spaces and institutions that can afford it the Prime Minister of the state- members European Union are generally not ask the leaders of countries in the EU-aspirant who gradually compressed democracy and its basic levers and institutions. In such circumstances loses the authority and discipline of the European Union and countries aspiring to respect Copenhagen’s a Criteria for EU membership. Do you blame the university that the phenomenon of populism? How many know this old-new phenomenon in politics is treated as an ideology or attitude of certain political movements which are called a nation to oppose the ruling elite, big businesses, privileged, or any
507 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century minority that is gaining power and that egoistic interests of the people. (La Toupie-vocabulary, Toupictionaire)
Populism – history The term political populism takes us back to the U.S. in 1892 when it was formed Populist Party, whose aim was to battle against the supremacy of big business, representing the policy of cheap credit, creating cooperatives regarding the use of agricultural materials in the introduction of one plebiscite democracy. This game was very well received among farmers in the Middle West USA. A similar movement was developed by Imperial Russia in the late nineteenth century to combat Tsarism, supportive hay on the people and advocating the transformation of traditional agricultural communities. In the early 20th century in Eastern and Central Europe were created more populist movement of peasants whose ideology was very close to the fascist ideology that would later to create a certain basis of its revival after the fall of communism in 1989 and the democratization of the country . During the 30- ies of the 20th century, various urban-populist indicators for Latin America as Getulio Dornelles Vargas (1883–1954) or the self-styled father poverty in Brazil or Domingo Peron Sosa (1895–1974) in Argentina. Latin American populism primarily is imposed as one policy of redistribution in favor of the poor social class. In Western Europe only during the 80-term populism becomes a political category that has been precisely defined, but in contrast to the U.S., one in Europe has exclusively negative vocation. Does this mean that there are multiple types of populism? And if there is their common denominator? In this context, the authors divided the term is used in different situations. (Rensmann 2006: 61). Some authors try to populism are reduced to a mere rhetorical figure, a kind of political style. This hypothesis is unacceptable for Frank DEKERLE populism that believes it can gain and ideological character, the PRESENT as an ideology without a vision of the world (Decker 2006: 11) Further considerations of populism lead us to a common solid ideological core. Constitutive feature of populism is identity politics. In the center of the populist ideology of the nation -Populist politician looking at people as one homogeneous entity with moralistic stereotypes as a humble, patient and work Macedonian, Serb deceived and exploited by the rich tycoons, young and smart and capable untapped EXPERTS, or statements as our nation is always right, our farmer is the best in the Balkans ... Contrasts are very sharp condemnation at the expense of competing elites, political rivals, incompetent opposition, which treat the corrupt, incompetent, and thirsty for power.
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Populist ideology is supported on the vertical dichotomy between the people and the elite among us down and makes you worse. In parallel to the horizontal distance, the level of demarcation is done in relation to the other. In this area, it is through the affirmation of its own identity based on negation. Viktor Orban, Hungary’s controversial Premier most criticized, one of the leaders of the European Union in Brussels and Washington. The European capitals find it the largest anti-liberal populist and largest conservative nationalist autocrat and EU. Intellectuals perceive as authoritarian democratic and national-populist government that all public, political and economic freedom 10 hundreds of millions of Hungary. He is one who seeks to statist politics is managed, but the economy of mediums and with all executive, judicial and legislative authority. Minded intellectuals method and regimen Orban called democracy coins democracy and dictatorship. Similarly to large demagogues, Orban likes medals and that they realized many of his alter ego as the leading politicians in Macedonia and beyond. Rupnik writes: When I first met him during the eighties was e youth leader of the liberal movement FIDESZ. As a liberal in the nineties, he was not removed from the mouth to say the European Union. Today, this phrase is scarcely pronounced. At one of the last briefings for ambassadors in Budapest before the parliamentary elections in 2014, he never again mentioned the European Union. At the same time on all TV performances carefully removes symbols and flag of the EU. Former modern centrist gradually inclined toward nationalism and extremism. Such orientation is often given with advices by German Helmut Kohl: if you are resolved to build a party to German Christian Democrat model, then do not bother to leave any serious party of yours. During his first term from 1998-2002, Viktora Orban has revived demons Greater Hungary constituted by appointment from TRIANON 1920g. He instantly realized that for most Hungarians, history and myths have much greater significance than presently, the Euro-Atlantic values. In accordance with the Balkan learned Stiv Orban animates and minorities in neighboring countries. What we did not do in his first term he made in 2010 when he attributed 500,000 passports Hungarians from Slovakia, Romania, and in part from the Serbian and Croatian. According to Orban, it was kind of spiritual audit Trijanse’s agreement. He valorized true Hungarians, both in Hungary and abroad. He turned to the romance and times of the Great Hungarian twenties and forties year when Hungarian regents entered into a coalition with Nazi Adolf Hitler. The desire for a greater consumption of the past even in the community with the SS troops and Himmler’s Holocaust restored many forgotten traditions of the Nazi past of Hungary. The neck is the same medals from the time Hori, the great Hungarian quislings. Then, in his opinion, did one of the most patriotic
509 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century moves when he moved the world crown St.Etiena first Hungarian king from the National Museum. All its major political actions and the only argument were persuasive posture national dignity and nationalism. This charismatic tribune, a former sportsman who thinks of herself as a policy learned football players in the locker room, and who openly says he comes from the village, with red cheeks and a strong jaw enjoys using sentences with double meaning where finding and conservatives and extremists. After the 2006 election defeat of the Hungarian left, is crossed rhetoric has become more extreme and anti-communist. In 2010, he was imposed with a thesis on the new national revolution - a revolution of souls, a revolution in the electoral urns and the renaissance of the nation! In his new ideology emphasized the basic principles of his right-wing obsession namely: work, home, family, health, order and above all discipline. In Economics, and social domain Orban has pleaded for favoring the middle class versus the poor social classes. In this way duplicated the social inequality, indebtedness of citizens to Stram banks, and increased internal public debt at 80% of GDP. With these tendencies, Orban excluded social dialogue with trade unions and practically forbade the union strikes. Former premier pointed out that during the communism he was a young and brave democrat. Today it has turned into a despot. His election slogan during the previous elections was a hair Next-Hungary, as reminiscent to Berluskoni’s Forza Italia. Orban advocated a Christian Hungary and its slogan Soli part Gloria-only glory of God was used in election campaigns. He massively helped Hungary church and the symbols and iconography were raised to the level of the most important elements of its policy. As a former semi-professional footballer and formed a government of 11 ministers, such as a soccer team in which he made the head of the cabinet become spokesman- Prime Minister Orban declared himself captain of the team. Orban’s political culture plays and the internal split between urban planners who are facing Western democracies, liberalism and social democracy and populists who constantly emphasize the size of the Hungarian people and the Hungarian peasants primarily where there are true values of eternal Hungary. Described the dichotomy Orban has managed to slip in the Preamble of the new Constitution of Hungary. His political party is amenable to all kinds of extremism. The strongest among them is Jobik whose leaders believe that with Orban at the helm of the state of things began to implement their ideology. Also Orban attributed decorations Ferenc Chanichiu known for its anti-Jewish and anti-Romani attitudes in his writings of this minority were compared with monkeys. Then he decorated the famous archaeologist Bakav Cornell, who
510 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century condemned the Jews that were the organizers of medieval slavery as they considered the German Nazis. Finally honored and Artist Janosh Petras, artist extreme right Jobik and its paramilitary forces responsible for a number of racist murders and expulsions of Roma. At the same time, this party is openly calling for Heritage Hungarian Nazis and their choir Swastika, who organized the deportation and elimination of Hungarian Jews and Gypsies during World War II. In the 2014 parliamentary elections, the Orban’s triumphed and received an absolute majority in parliament. First of all, it has transformed the electoral system in favor of is crossed-party Fidesz, which has continued with the right wing and nationalist populism. Then the scalpel precision modeled constituency that would effectively isolate the voters of the Left and decided that instead of as in the previous period when it was voted in two rounds, this time to vote in an election. In this electoral system, government policy: it is important to be the first without the need to collect 50% of the vote. Orban is in fact generated a new unseen optional rule among European democracies and it is an absolute bonus for the party, which is headed. In the opinion of many researchers with such tools would Orban won in all previous multiparty elections in Hungary after the 1989th.Politician Gabor Torok believes that the width of the victory of the right wing is not an expression of the desire of Hungarian voters. Today Viktor Orban of Hungary remains the most popular politician and charismatic leader of the right electorate. With the talent of good orators and successful political career, playing in parallel with patriotic emotions of the Hungarians, it also represents a great populist defense counsel against the arbitrariness of banks and the EU and calls on the ancestors’ wars against the arbitrariness of the Habsburgs until 1918. On these anomalies were addressed attention and Brussels and Washington and intellectuals of Budapest, but Orban is like Erdogan in Turkey still empathetic Orban has a great verb in its Star, he is identified with the nation. A nation, that is he. Hungary is Orban, says philosopher G.M.Tamas. But Orban attaches great importance to political communications and works under the supervision of the advisory team of the American guru Arthur J. Filkensteina former adviser to President Richard Nixon. Filkenstein it specializes in negative campaigns against U.S. Democrats and homosexuals. The consultant is working on the prejudices that unite people. Orban has participated in several local debates to repeal the laws that protected the homeless. Also, his government was compelled beneficiaries of social assistance mainly Roma on public works in order to get social assistance. These measures, as well as giving Hungarian citizenship to citizens outside of Hungary was part of the program-fascist Jobbik party, whose name usually means: more to the right and we are the best.
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Analyzing the populism Orban and other leaders, the impression is given that populists do not believe in globalization and consider the limits of the best form of protection of the national economy and free trade. They do not accept the termination of the society with its cultural and traditional value of such persistently seek the dominant European elite. In this context, Jean-Yves Le Gallo (Europe: le temps joue pour le populisme-Club de l’Horlogie) argues that populism is essentially a revolt against the people revolt against the elites or her relationship to break with tradition and to bring modernity. Although each populism is special, though there are several common characteristics such as: reduction of upcoming economic immigration, Islam smaller, less taxes, more and more independent identity. Populist demagogue like trying to prove that he transforms people into absolute sovereign, and that power belongs to the one who possesses the gift that is effective charms and manipulates people. The political action populists art belongs to PRESENT surreal dimension with promises phantasmagoric projects.
Populism in Europe young Populism in Eastern Europe is not patented Viktor Orban. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, more marginal groups with dubious political orientation filled the ideological gap series of nationalist and populist positions. In Slovakia, populist Vladimir Meciar reigned for years supporting the anti-European and anti-Hungarian slogans. National Movement Simeon II, which is the foundation of the Bulgarian throne Crown Prince Simeon Saksobugarski who ruled between 2001 and 2005, incarnates the mix of historical nostalgia, nationalism and populism. In the Czech Republic, the extreme right of the early nineties was unable to enter Parliament. In Poland, the populists have not got into power or institution but as a populist Tadeusy Rydzyk carried out a large impact on euro reserved in Poland. Populism is alerted and among minority movements of Russians in the Baltic states, with the Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania. In the former Yugoslavia, populism was present in all the emerging countries that have sought to consolidate their power. But the great defenders of the people are still present in the political systems of the Western Balkans. Democratic principles of religion subjugate people such as culture of popular sovereignty, universal elections, the majority principle, the right of peoples to dispose of him. The people behind the foreground and a large populists and demagogues to successfully use. Vox Populi Vox Dei-. But in the name of higher goals and values, populists subordinated mentioned in the principle of democratic values and principles and individual rights. How many of our politicians declared that people are always right, the populist dressed, went to the rescue and financial assistance to the victims of
512 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the fire, the weather conditions, floods and snow. What is the specificity of the Macedonian populism? What similarities and differences exist between the Hungarian and Macedonian populism? What kind of perspective?
Macedonian model of populism Macedonia is located in a specific political situation due to internal inter- ethnic crisis in 2001 whose epilogue was Ohrid agreement, and because of the name dispute with Greece, whose epilogue series blockade in its Euro-Atlantic integration. The state is disturbed by the high rate of unemployment about 30% of the active population and the high rate of poverty of about 32%. Since 2006, the right-wing coalition of VMRO-DPMNE, the Albanian party DUI consisting of boric former KLA-UCK received early parliamentary elections in 2008.2011 and 2014, followed by elections and the city of Skopje in 2009 and 2014, as well as elections in 2009 and of 2014. How does this explain the electoral success of right wing in continuation of nearly nine years?
The government controls all forms of check in Macedonia First of all, the right-wing government of VMRO-DPMNE Nikola Gruevski, like Viktor Orban was established by the complete control of the government arising from the triple Monteskie’s classical division of power. From the arrival of the head of state, under the pretext of the fight against corruption were initiated several criminal process solely against former officials and business community of the Left. This process is extended to the present day. In this way, the war against corruption and organized crime, which was initially promised to unmask the various forms of organized crime whose purpose was hired Monika Makovej former justice minister known for its anti-corruption battle, later it was turned into a campaign against political opponents. For this entire period of almost nine years rule of the Prime Minister Gruevski, where according to the Report, Freedom House rates of corruption reached a maximum of 4 7-index points, any official of the current government nor was he arrested or prosecuted in spite of the evidence offered by the opposition on corruption scandals, high government officials. This process is completely disembody authority of the judicial authorities, which began to condemn journalists and politicians from the opposition for libel but never accepted the criminal charges on account of some officials from the government. Macedonia is experiencing what Adam Mikhnik diagnosed as Bolshevik or Communist anticommunism. In this context were made and staffing of the Supreme Judicial Council, and even in the Constitutional Court, which has long possessed certain autonomy in 2013 when the composition was changed in favor of the pro-judge. One of the items that have irritated the
513 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century government’s proposal was the law on the introduction of a compulsory religious teaching in elementary schools. This law was passed in a secret ballot Assembly despite the clear provisions of the Constitution of the RM that the Republic of Macedonia secular state. Constitutional Court to appeal the Liberal Democratic Party overturned this bill because it was unconstitutional. However, since the dysfunctional relationship between the independent and pro-constitutional judge, already no decision that is unconstitutional to be found on daily order of the Constitutional Court. The second case is a conviction Ljube Boshkovski president of the political party United Macedonians under the pretext that it is not reported origin of money for the campaign and in his testimony, police threw purse with 100,000 euros in a restaurant where he sat for which he was sentenced to seven years in prison. Chase against all who think differently extends the high monetary judgments imposed for defamation opposition and journalists. One of the most dramatic process was one in which he was sentenced journalist Kezharovski who is still under house arrest because he did not want to give away the source of information about a protected witness. In order to increase sowing fear, all suspects remain up to a year in detention, and that the suspects were constantly under pressure, basic courts and appellate courts mutually canceled and the lower level, the final decision to the suspect was still under pressure from the courts and thus ruling party. In this case, the Administrative Court annulled the election all the places where the opposition won, but none where he won the ruling party. Except of judicial, legislative and executive branch understandable, Nikola Gruevski’s government is similar to its counterpart Orban, placed under the control and other mechanisms under the Constitution should be made to control the government and that the expression marking check and balances as well as intellectuals, NGOs organizations, media and opposition. That party intellectuals have received all kinds of fine and coarse privileges of ambassadorial positions, paid through engagement in various mediums or snowboarders and public companies. Part of them is urgently obtaining a place at a state university and in addition diplomas and questionable scientific papers and titles and part is included in the ranks of the party VMRO. Particularly interesting is the bigger part of artists, musicians, actors, writers have become open to supporting the VMRO-DPMNE as at events and in-show broadcasts. They even organized a protest march against the opposition because of the refusal of the opposition to vote proper budget for state 2013th a medium dark. A special chapter of the Macedonian democracy represents control media. This public broadcasting administering the enterprise Macedonian Radio and Television and other local and private television, but one whose bosses from Austria are under strict control of the ruling party responsible official. A media
514 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century freedom and the right to information are completely vulnerable and introduced a great control and censorship of journalistic Fela and the stair international non- governmental organization Reporters Without Borders, Macedonia in the last seven years fell to 87 seats and the infamous 123 occupies the place along with several African countries. (Reporters without borders-for press freedom, Report 2014). In the broadcasting, similar to Hungary, most of the members make the representatives of the ruling party. In this regard, the Authority has pointed to quite incompetent and party oriented, despite the major infractions such as complete opposition’s absence, in the public and private major mediums, breach of electoral silence and other irregularities. At the same journalists who were open-minded and critical thinking quickly lost their jobs. By contrast to the expression of the reporters-cronies, mercenaries or journalists-reporters cheap show hosts like for example “Eat burek” where periodically a guest and premier and head of state. On these television shows never a guest opposition-minded people and intellectuals. At the same time Premier Gruevski regular briefings and avoid awkward questions from journalists or outputs on the TV duels. But they are four striking television regimes that carry all major sporting and cultural events and always pause promoting government policy; the best are being paid by the regime for all projects and services. One of the most mysterious affairs in the field of journalism is unexplained death in an automobile accident the owner of the opposition weekly Focus, Nikola Mladenov. The ruling political party VMRO-DPMNE pays special attention to one of the largest opposition party SDSM. Ruling party emphasized ‘constant negative campaigning by the leading opposition officials with a lot of fantasy and fiction. On several occasions, he has organized a rally in front of the headquarters of the opposition party self-proclaimed victims of transition or people gathered in the street to protest for the sandwich, Coke and 10 euros. The largest incident that has occurred in Macedonia 24.12.2012 regarding delays in opposition to adopt a proper budget, the violent expulsion of opposition MPs and journalists present using specifically police forces from the sale Assembly. Such an incident has not occurred in any parliament loadings and Central Europe, and it was a direct attack on democracy. However, a leading journalist and public intellectuals to condemn this act opposition.
The manipulation of the electoral process Similarly, Orban and Gruevski and his team devote special attention to access the electoral campaign and the election process. Macedonia is officially a state with about 2.1 million inhabitants and 1.8 million voters. And when it comes to the electoral process that takes place on a proportional basis in six
515 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century constituencies and one round of voting for the 123 parliamentary seats, from the very beginning is not uniform which entitles the opposition to challenge the legitimacy and legality of the electoral process. First, a sum of money at the disposal of the ruling party over the opposition is four to five times larger. Then the representation of mediums is ten times greater in favor of the ruling party. This gave the arguments and the OSCE in the notes accretion state and party structure in Macedonia and their use in an election procedure. From populist reasons, VMRO-DPMNE voted a law, participation in the electoral process. So even at the beginning of the nationalist VMRO-DPMNE gets all three parliamentary seats in the United States, Australia and Western Europe. The government is engaged in massive corruption and blackmail as well as the electorate. For small steam corrupt the vulnerable social strata who vote via the system of the Bulgarian driver, then thanks very thoroughly detailed lists of citizens who voted in the last elections, the ruling party takes a careful record of each voter at every polling place. Those who were hired in the public administration are obliged das and make them at least three new voice from their building or closer environment. Thanks to detailed lists of local party leaders know whether these three new voices cast their vote for them. There are cases when the whole village blackmailed to vote for the ruling sets, otherwise it will not get the promised economic subsidies. When we add a media campaign strong, populist demagoguery and the entire state mechanism in the function of the ruling party are clear advantages of the ruling VMRO-DPMNE.
Manipulation public space With all the previous elements analyzed populist behavior of the ruling sets a significant factor is the use of public space for populist indoctrination and manipulation of the masses. So in 2011 it was announced project Skopje 2014, which has been trying to start around 80 million euros to three years later, this project has reached the figure of 500-700 million euros fantastic. This project represents a large workshop and construction site downtown Skopje with numerous monuments among which dominates the 35-meter monument of ancient soldier, who represents Alexander of Macedon. In contrast, although the country gained its independence as part of Tito’s Yugoslavia AVNOJ few places in this epoch. Mentioned architecture complements the process of Macedonia. Changing toponyms with ancient names for the price irritation southern neighbors but also popularize among Macedonian citizens especially those from rural areas. In terms of social and economic crisis, the crisis of identity and social values, this populist architectural product that hardly finds its DNA into Macedonian Slovenian cultural and historical heritage in the public arena and among the populist mass successfully finds its own consumers
516 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century and lovers-patriots and nationalists. He simply longs for the successful manipulation of being cheated in order to have what he hoped. It is easy to convince the poor and the marginalized, unemployed and tormented Macedonian that he believes that he carries the DNA of Alexander and Philip, Cyril and Methodius, St. Clement and Tsar Samuil, he wears a biblical name for the consolation that he was a member of the mythical peoples as emphasized by Serge Moskovisi (1997: 26). The crowd is ready to bring his own emotions, to express too much enthusiasm or panic. Such citizen and selector would always vote for populist politicians and that he keeps repeating that phrase. When it comes to presenting arguments, one of the best ways is the most abundant: constant repetition of the same ideas, the same fantasy… And information resources are a critical factor in it… Highlights G. Tarde (1899: 236)
Conclusion In recent years, a new populism swept the country in Eastern Europe, an EU member, populism, which penetrates even the highest peaks of the ruling political and government sets. Often times this term was being used to help qualify it as a populist, a Polish political party Law and Justice, brothers Kačinski, or SERMs Slovak populists Robert Fico. In the West, this term was Party of Jorg Haider in Austria, the extreme right Flemish party Vlaams Belang, PV Le Pen and Forza Italy Berluskoni. In the Balkans, more present in the opposition bloc, although modeled on the biggest populist Balkans, Viktor Orban, motives and other politicians especially from all Western Balkan countries. The impression is that the intellectual and political circles of Europe very casually treated the phenomenon of populism in the EU and beyond. Populism is a political and electoral position that puts on voters to be inclined towards national identity and that in the name of “national” interest insists on division, marginalization and condemnation of all those citizens who think differently. The comparative analysis between the Hungarian and Macedonian model of populism has shown that simply by fact that Hungary is a member of the EU and its leader Orban has introduced implements a strict form of populism over which generates complete control of all the mechanisms of government control, stimulates the other leaders of states aspiring to such a degradation of democracy. In this context, a common populist, two parallel systems are: – complete control of all and tools known as cheks and balances – the control include: intimidation, pressure and blackmail intellectuals, public administration, political opponents, a medium dark and controllers and self- censorship of journalists, discourage government sector. On the other hand, are forced to populist journalists through demagoguery and Zhdanovism praise the populist leader and sharply criticize political opponents
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– strict electoral process: that is, during the entire electoral process all the activities of the ruling party and the state apparatus as a function of the election victory by using all permissible and impermissible means as: strict party employment, giving tender sole business close to the party in power, abuse of all segments of society from pensioners and students to artists, public figures and spots. In public appearances, both leaders of populism, central place occupied by people. Populi’Vox Vox Dei. He was from the West or the East, all inviting people and playing on people. They are emanations of the people, posit their DNA, are identified with mass, develop dreams masses, and even create new Macedonian who is the opposite of the stereotype fearful, patient and humble who have for centuries, but it is a clever, unscrupulous mighty Macedonian who crashes old barriers and stereotypes like their ancient ancestors in the absence of ideology, populism is turning to more recent past, as is the case with Hungary Trijanos 20-ies of XX century or distant past as Macedonia and it was the epoch of Philip of Macedon and Alexander IV BC – Operational prior to the nostalgic history, public space is used as a space for mass manipulation of the people by building spectacular monuments or buildings neoclassical style (Macedonia) or the spectacular procession when it transferred the crown of the first Hungarian king Saint. Ethical. – Ordinary people or people under the influence of base populism has chances to increase their reserves or animosity towards political elites that populist values. Common people, people classes have fancied those revolts against superior neighbors, the EU and other world-class hype. United people or a sovereign nation does not have fancied that accepts permanent criticism and self-importance of the EU as well as to expand and animosity against all domestic mediums. – The economic crisis is treated as a phenomenon that has not hit the economy as a populist leader thanks to his strokes country was saved from economic collapse. After all electoral manipulation, pressure, blackmail, illegal elections and electoral process, the opposition in Macedonia has decided to boycott Parliament after the elections in April of 2014. Time will tell whether this decision was realistic.
Reference Antoine Vitkine-Hongrie: Victor Orban est un modele,08.04.2014, Le huffington post. Daniel Bastion/Massimo Prandi: Viktor Orban, l’infrequentable, Les Echos,N.21104 18.01.2012.
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Pascal Davidovic, Le populisme europeen et les medias, Tribun Juive 13.04.2014. Paris Match, Victor Orban l’homme qui fait peur a l’Europe. Serž Moskovisi, Doba gomile, Beograd, Čigoja štampa. Gabriel Tarde, Les Transformations du pouvoir, 1899, 236. Lars Rensmann, Quoted from Werner T. Bauera, str. 3. Izveštaj OBSE za predvremene parlamentarne i redovne predsedničke izbore u Republici u Republici Makedonij, 29.04.2014. MK news, Makdonija ne go odbelezuva denot na slobodata na mediumite, 03.05.2014. Frederik Reinfeldt, Quoted from Werner T. Bauer, str. 4. Anton Pelinka, The Haider Phenomenon New Brunswick (NY) 2002. Florence La Bruyere, Viktor Orban, l’homme qui a betonne son pouvoir, Le Temps, 08.04.2014. Yves Roucaute, Les demagogues, Paris, Plon, 1999. Jean-Zves Le Gallou, Europe: le temps joue pour le populisme – “Le populisme: une solution pour l’Europe en crise”, Communication a la XXIV universitaire annuelle du Club de l’Horloge. Marie la Douaran, Populisme en Europe: on assiste a une forme d’internationale du nationalisme, 13.02.2014, L’express. Nano Ružin, Populizmot na metodot Gruevski, Utrinski Vesnik, Skopje, 6 septembar 2013. La Toupie-Toupictionaire: le dictionnaire de politique, Populisme/Clientelisme/ Opportunisme. Quentin Raverdy-Hongrie> l’Etat de grace de Victor Orban, Le Point, fr, 05.04.2014. Viktor Orban, Biographie, Wikipedia. Vox Politique, Victoire de Viktor Orban: pourquoi les populistes ont-ils tant de succes?, 08.04.2014. Werner Bauer, Populisme de droite en Europe: Phenomene passager ou transition vers un courant politique dominant, Paris: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, april 2011, www.fesparis.org.
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IV – World order and economic-social development
Svetla BONEVA1
NEW MOMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION MACROECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE EUROPEAN SEMESTER
Abstract: The paper reviews the possibilities for better economic governance in the EU and its member states in the post-crisis period (2011–2014). The procedures for coordination of the economic policies of the EU member states and their harmonization in regard to the budget, growth and employment policies and according to each member state’s macroeconomic objectives have been presented. The areas of coordination and monitoring of the macroeconomic policies have been outlined, the essence, objectives and schedule of the European semester have been explained, while the basic documents of the European semester have been analyzed. The paper explains the essence of the Annual Growth Strategy, the Alert Mechanism Report, the Stability and Convergence Programmes, the National Reform Programmes and the necessity of the Country Specific Recommendations. Finally, the paper summarizes the lessons learnt from the work of the European semester to date and formulates some recommendations for the improvement of its work. Key words: European frame, status of Bulgaria, objectives, policies.
The necessity of the establishment of the European Semester The economic crisis in the European Union2 (2009-2011) showed the necessity of better economic governance and improved coordination of the EU economic policies. A Union of highly integrated national economies should provide policy coordination to prevent differences and to support convergence and stability throughout the Union and its member states. The procedures for coordination of the national economic policies of the EU member states have been applied independently until 2010. Later, the member states realized the necessity to synchronize the time schedule and the
1 Assoc. Prof. Svetla Boneva Ph.D., Department International Economic Relations and Business, UNWE – Sofia, Bulgaria. 2 Angelov, I., The Economy of and the EU. A strategy for catching-up economic development, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences – Economic Institute, Sofia, 2003.
521 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century requirements concerning their economic coordination procedures as well as to harmonize better their national budgetary,3 economic growth4,5 and employment6 policies, taking into account both their national objectives and the EU common objectives. Also, it has been necessary to enlarge the scopes of supervision and coordination in order to encompass a larger scope of macroeconomic policies. All these reasons have led to a long waited large-scale reform of the EU macroeconomic governance that took place in 2010 with the launch of the so- called European semester.
The Essence and Structure of the European semester The European semester represents a cycle of coordination of the economic and fiscal policies of the EU. Its’ name comes from the period of coordination which is six months and starts with the beginning of each year. During the European semester, the EU member states harmonise their economic and budget policies in accordance with the objectives and rules agreed at EU level. Thus, the European semester has three basic objectives: • To ensure solid public finances; • To stimulate the economic growth, and • To prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances in the EU. The European semester is based on three elements of coordination of the economic policies: • Structural reforms, aimed to stimulate economic growth and employment in accordance with the “Europe 2020”strategy; • Fiscal policies providing sustainable public finances in accordance with the Stability and Growth Pact, and; • To prevent excessive macroeconomic imbalances.
3 Vassileva, A., The Debate for Reform of the EU budget and the Bulgarian contribution to this debate, in: collection of articles on “The reform of the EU budget and the future financing of the EU policies”, Mirazh – 96 Publishing house, 2009, pp. 3-20. 4 Barroso, J., Joint Raliamentary Meeting on the Future of Europe, 9th May, 2006. 5 Stoytchev, I., The EU budget reform – management of the diversity for growth in in: collection of articles on “The reform of the EU budget and the future financing of the EU policies”, Mirazh – 96 Publishing house, 2009, pp. 31-38. 6 Boneva, S., The EU Financial Framework for the period 2014 -2020 and the priorities for development of the enlarged EU, in: collection of articles on “The membership in the EU and NATO – lessons for Bulgaria” UNWE publishing complex, Sofia, 2013, pp. 157-163.
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The European semester has two new aspects in comparison with the existing cycles of coordination of the economic policies: 1) The introduction of a strict schedule of the economic policy coordination procedures, and 2) The introduction of a new component of coordination of macroeconomic policies. As far as the first new aspect is concerned, the European semester synchronizes the schedules of reporting and evaluation of economic and financial performance of the EU member states. Each April, the member states present their National Reform Programs (and respectively the Structural Reforms Plans, included in their National Reform Programs) as well as their Stability and Convergence Programs (fiscal plans). The European Commission evaluates both documents simultaneously. An evaluation of the macroeconomic imbalances is done in parallel. Thus, the EU member states aim to achieve two objectives: • Better harmonization of their common objective sin both structural reforms and fiscal stability fields, and • Enhanced effectiveness in achieving their common goals at EU level. As far as the second new aspect is concerned, the European semester changed the character of coordination of national economic policies of the EU member states. The European semester requires the member states to present their national budget plans and national reform plans to the EU at a very early stage of their national budget process. The Council formulates recommendations on the EU member states’ national plans before their discussion in the national parliaments. Thus, the coordination of the national policies at EU level has become preliminary, not post-factum. Before the implementation of the European semester the EU member states coordinated their national policies plans in the beginning of each budget year, after they have had already adopted their national budgets. The changed schedule of coordination of the macroeconomic policies provides the member states with adequate and timely information that should be used at the early stages of their national policies planning. The new component in macroeconomic policies coordination is the monitoring and analysis of the macroeconomic imbalances of the EU member states. In 2011, the so-called “procedure of macroeconomic imbalances” has been introduced, together with a legislative package of six acts aiming to: – identify the risks of unsustainable macroeconomic phenomena an early stage – to prevent the appearance of these risks
523 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
– to correct the macroeconomic process in a quick and adequate way in case the risks have been materialized.
Figure 1: Responsibilities of the participants in the European semester
Source: Council of the European Union, Special reports, The European Semester, http://www. consilium.europa.eu/special-reports/european-semester?lang=en
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The European semester provides a clear schedule according to which the member states receive consultations and guidelines at EU level and after that, they present their nationalpolicy plans (National Reform Programs and Stability Programs or Convergence programs) which are assessed at EU level. After their assessment each member state is given specific recommendations on its’ national budget policies and national reforms policies. In case of necessity, the EU member states receive recommendations for correcting their macroeconomic imbalances. The objective of this process is the member states to take into account the EU recommendations in the preparation of their annual budget for the next year.
Table 1: Schedule of the European Semester work
PREPARATORY PHASE: ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION AND ACTIONS FOLLOWING-UP TO THE PREVIOUS YEAR RESULTS
The preparations for the European Semester start when the Commission publishes its Annual Growth Survey and Alert Mechanism Report already in November of each preceding year. The Annual Growth Survey presents the Commission’s view of EU policy priorities for the next year. The member states are invited to take them into account when designing their economic policies for the coming year. November The Alert Mechanism Report reviews macroeconomic and December developments in individual EU countries. Based on the Report, the European Commission may decide to conduct in-depth review of the situation in the countries where the risk of potential macroeconomic imbalances is deemed high. Such reviews help to identify whether potential macro- economic imbalance exist, and if they exist, their exact nature and scope. They furthermore enable the Commission to suggest policy recommendations to the member states.
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FIRST PHASE: POLICY GUIDANCE AT THE EU LEVEL The Council of the European Union debates the Annual Growth Survey formulates orientations (guidelines) and adopts conclusions. As the European Semester has implications for a range of policies, therefore the Council of the EU discusses it in its various configurations. For example, in the Employment, Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs Council, the Economic and Financial Affairs Council, etc... January The European Parliament also discusses the Annual and February Growth Survey and may publish an own initiative report. It issues an opinion on employment guidelines. It is furthermore involved in the process through the Economic Dialogue. The European Parliament may invite the President of the Council, the Commission and, where appropriate, the President of European Council or the President of the Eurogroup to discuss issues related to the European Semester. Individual member states may also be offered the opportunity to participate in an exchange of views.
Based on the Annual Growth Survey and the Council of the EU analysis and conclusions, the European Council (the heads of state and government) provides policy orientations (guidelines). The member states are invited to take into account these orientations when preparing their national stability or convergence programmes and national reform programmes which outline their budget policies and policies promoting growth and competitiveness. March The Commission publishes in-depth reviews of macroeconomic imbalances which are conducted in those member states where the risk of such imbalances was perceived to be high. Based on these reviews, the European Commission may draft recommendations aimed at the countries concerned for the purpose of correcting the imbalances. This can be done at the same time as the in-depth review is released or later in the process, together with other country-specific recommendations.
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SECOND PHASE: COUNTRY-SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES, POLICIES AND PLANS The member states submit their policy plans by 15 April (or at the latest by the end of April): • stability and convergence programmes outlining the April member states’ medium-term budgetary strategy and • national reform programmes outlining member states’ structural reform plans, focused on promoting growth and employment.
The European Commission evaluates national policy May plans and presents draft country-specific recommendations.
The Council of the EU discusses the draft and agrees on June final country-specific recommendations. They are then presented to the European Council for endorsement.
The Council of the EU adopts the country-specific July recommendations, and the member states are invited to implement them.
THIRD PHASE: IMPLEMENTATION
Countries take into account the recommendations in the process of national decision-making on the next year’s July national budget which will enable them to carry out policies as envisaged. Source: Council of the European Union, Special reports, The European Semester, http://www. consilium.europa.eu/special-reports/european-semester?lang=en
The cycle starts again towards the end of the year, when the Commission gives an overview of the economic situation in its Annual Growth Survey for the coming year. The Commission already starts taking into account the progress achieved by individual countries in implementing the recommendations. Member states that benefit from financial assistance that is coupled with an economic adjustment programmes are not required to submit stability programmes, and are not subject to a possible in-depth review on macroeconomic
527 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century imbalances. The condition for receiving financial assistance is a diligent implementation of the adjustment programme, which already covers all these policy areas.
3. Basic Documents of the European Semester
3.1. The Annual Growth Survey The Annual Growth Survey7 presents the Commission’s view of policy priorities that member states should take into account when designing their economic policies for the coming year. The Commission issues it already in November. The purpose of the Annual Growth Survey is to feed into a debate on overall priorities agreed at EU level and consequently national economic and budgetary decisions. Member states set out the latter in their stability or convergence programmes (under the Stability and Growth Pact) and national reform programmes (under the Europe 2020 strategy) in April. The Annual Growth Survey is based on: • progress achieved on Europe 2020 targets in the areas of employment, education, social inclusion, innovation, and climate /energy use • the Macroeconomic Report which gives an overview of the economic situation in the EU • the Joint Employment Report, which analyses the employment and social situation in the EU
Text box 1 Council conclusions on the Annual Growth Survey for 2014 In its conclusions, the Council broadly shares the Commission’s analysis of the economic situation and policy challenges in the EU. It recalls the conclusions of the December 2013 European Council on the main areas for coordination of economic policies and reform. The Commission’s Annual Growth Survey 2014 takes stock of the economic and social situation in Europe and sets out broad policy priorities for the EU and its member states. The Survey marks the starting point of the 2014 European Semester.
7 http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/europe-2020-in-a-nutshell/priorities/sustainable-growth/ index_en.htm.
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The Annual Growth Survey identifies the following five broad policy priorities for 2014: • pursuing differentiated growth-friendly fiscal consolidation and ensuring long-term sustainability of public finances • restoring lending to the economy • promoting sustainable and inclusive growth and jobs and competitiveness • tackling unemployment and the social consequences of the crisis • modernising public administration. The Council conclusions will feed into the policy guidelines for the member states, to be adopted by the March European Council. The member states will take these guidelines into account when drafting their stability or convergence programmes and their national reform programmes. Source: Council of the EU, Annual Growth Survey 2014: Guidance on the implementation of priorities agreed at the December European Council on macroeconomic and fiscal Matters, Council conclusions, Brussels, 7 February 2014, 6145/14.
3.2. Alert Mechanism Report The Alert Mechanism Report by the European Commission identifies in which member states the macroeconomic situation may warrant a further in- depth review. The review helps to determine the nature and the scope of potential imbalances. It is issued in November, before the European Semester process begins. It is part of the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure, designed to monitor and prevent macro-economic imbalances across the EU. The Alert Mechanism Report is based on a scoreboard of 11 indicators. They focus on the developments in member states’: • competitiveness • indebtedness • asset prices • adjustment and • links with the financial sector. The risk of imbalances is evaluated by combining the scoreboard data with additional information and taking due account of each country’s circumstances. If some of these indicators in a given country exceed the agreed ranges, this is the first signal of potential macroeconomic imbalances and it helps the Commission to decide whether to conduct an in-depth review.
529 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Text box 2 Council conclusions on the Alert Mechanism Report The Council welcomes the progress made by member states in correcting both internal and external macroeconomic imbalances, in particular in relation to current account deficits, competitiveness, fiscal deficits and the financial sector, thus contributing to rebalancing within both the EU and the euro area. Further progress is needed, however, to address imbalances that raise concerns about sustainability, including high public and private indebtedness, as well as high external debt levels. The Commission’s Alert Mechanism Report for 2014 calls for in-depth reviews of the macroeconomic situation in the following countries: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Source: Council of the EU, Alert Mechanism Report 2014 = Council conclusions, Brussels, 7 February 2014, 6146/14
The subsequent in-depth reviews provide a detailed analysis of the situation in member states where the risk of macroeconomic imbalances is deemed high. On the basis of these in-depth reviews, the Commission presents draft policy recommendations.
Text box 3 Macroeconomic imbalance procedure:8 Commission concludes in-depth reviews of 17 member states for macroeconomic imbalances The Commission carried out in-depth reviews in Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
8 The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) is a surveillance mechanism that aims to identify potential risks early on, prevent the emergence of harmful macroeconomic imbalances and correct the imbalances that are already in place. The annual starting point of the MIP is the Alert Mechanism Report: Based on a scoreboard of indicators, it is a filter to identify countries and issues for which a closer analysis (in-depth review) is deemed necessary. The outcome of these in-depth reviews forms the basis for further steps under the MIP whereby a graduated approach is followed reflecting the gravity of imbalances.
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It has identified imbalances in all of those countries, and concluded that Croatia, Italy and Slovenia have built up excessive imbalances. Spain has achieved a significant adjustment over the past year, which allows the Commission to conclude that its imbalances are no longer excessive, although substantial risks remain. Main cross-country findings The analysis shows that macroeconomic imbalances, which have been built up over many years, are gradually receding. Economic recovery is gaining ground, although challenges remain. Among the challenges and vulnerabilities that are common to a number of member states, the Commission underlines the impact of deleveraging on medium-term growth; the sustainability of private and public debt and of external liabilities in a context of very low inflation; the need to ensure inadequate flow of credit to viable activities in the vulnerable economies in a fragmented financial system; and the very high level of unemployment in a number of countries. Next steps The member states are expected to take the findings of the in-depth reviews and the fiscal forecasts into account in their national reform programmes and their stability and convergence programmes. The member states where excessive imbalances have been identified are expected to set out a comprehensive and detailed policy response. The programmes of the member states will be assessed in June 2014 in the context of the European semester to determine whether they provide an adequate response to the challenges identified. Source: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, http://ec.europa.eu/economy _finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/ index_en.htm
3.3. Stability and Convergence Programmes A Stability or Convergence Programme presents a member state’s medium- term budgetary strategy, i.e. how it intends to achieve or safeguard a sound fiscal position in the medium term, in accordance with the requirements of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Pact aims at maintaining fiscal discipline in the EU. It applies reference values to limit annual national budget deficits (3% of GDP) and public debt (60% of GDP).
The MIP has a preventive and a corrective arm. The latter is made operational by the Excessive Imbalance Procedure, which can eventually lead to sanctions for euro area Member States if they repeatedly fail to meet their obligations.
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Convergence programmes are prepared by countries that do not use the euro as their currency. The Pact’s requirements serve as a key criterion for achieving the fiscal sustainability that must be met by every country before joining the euro area (hence “convergence programmes”). This requirement applies to all member states that do not have a permanent exemption from the euro adoption. Stability programmes are prepared by countries whose currency is the euro. The requirements are the minimum that is needed to ensure fiscal stability within the single currency area (hence “stability programmes”). The stability or convergence programmes are the main elements of the preventive arm of the Pact. An important part of the assessment under the Semester addresses compliance with the minimum annual benchmark figure set for each individual country’s structural budget balance. This benchmark figure is called the medium-term budgetary objective (MTO). The MTO refers to the budgetary balance (between government revenue and government expenditure) that an individual country should achieve within a given time frame in order to comply with the reference value for public debt established in the Pact. The progress that countries should make every year towards this objective is called the adjustment path towards the MTO and is specified for each individual country. The stability or convergence programmes show how individual countries follow this adjustment path. If there is a breach of the Pact’s rules, the excessive deficit procedure is opened - this is the corrective arm of the Pact. Countries receive deadlines for correcting their policies in order to comply with the Pact’s reference values. If euro area countries do not follow these recommendations, sanctions may be imposed on them.
3.4. National Reform Programmes The National Reform Programme is a document in which a member state outlines its structural reform plan, focused on promoting growth and employment in line with the Europe 2020 strategy. The strategy aims to create the conditions for smart, more sustainable and more inclusive economic growth in the EU. It sets out five EU objectives to be achieved by 2020 in the areas of employment, education, social inclusion, innovation, and climate /energy use. Based on these objectives, the member states have adopted their own national targets in each of the five areas.
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These targets and measures for their achievement are outlined in the member states’ yearly National Reform Programmes which they submit for coordination and evaluation under the European Semester.
3.5. Country-specific recommendations The country-specific recommendations are documents issued by the European Commission for each member state. They provide an analysis of each state’s economic situation and recommend measures that each country should take over the coming 12 months. The Commission issues them in May, after it finishes evaluating member states’ policy plans, i.e. national reform programmes and stability or convergence programmes. The country-specific recommendations are tailored to the circumstances of each member state. They may address areas such as the state of public finances, reforms of pension systems, measures to create jobs and to fight unemployment, education and innovation challenges, etc. The member states are invited to implement these recommendations after they are endorsed by the national leaders in the European Council (in June) and adopted by the Council of the EU (in July).
Conclusions The EU member states and the EU institutions realized the necessity of improving the macroeconomic governance and planning at both EU and national levels. The EU semester gave its first positive results. Notwithstanding the fact that on the surface it looks like a mere scheduled plan for synchronizing the macroeconomic policies at EU level, its’ effect is much more important: it is a set of requirements, paving the way for deepening the European economic integration.
533 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Bogdan STOYANOV1
STRATEGY FOR GROWTH IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THE EUROPE 2020
Abstract: The article provides an insight into the program 2020 and its main objective- to remedy the shortcomings of the current model of growth and to create conditions for different types of growth - smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive. It is shown that the EU needs to achieve before the end of the decade good results in employment, education, research and innovation, social inclusion and poverty, reduction and climate / energy.
Europe 2020 is European Union’s ten-year growth and jobs strategy that was launched in 2010. It is about more than just overcoming the crisis from which our economies are now gradually recovering. It is also about addressing the shortcomings of our growth model and creating the conditions for a smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. Five headline targets have been set for the EU to achieve by the end of 2020. These cover employment; research and development;2 climate/ energy;3, 4, 5 education;6 social inclusion and poverty reduction. 1. Employment -75% of the 20-64 year-olds to be employed
1 Assoc. Prof. Bogdan Stoyanov, Ph.D., University “Prof. Dr Asen Zlatarov”, Burgas, Bulgaria. 2 Boneva S., European Guidelines for Innovation in “Islands” tourism, Int. Conf. “Business as a positive force in society”, NBU, Bulgaria, p. 501-517. 3 Boneva S., Green Energy: Pros and Cons, Academic journal “Management and Education”, Vol. VIII (1) 2012, p. 198-204. 4 Boneva S., Energy Security and Energy Dependency of the European Union: The Problem of Energy Supply, “Sustainable Development”, Ravda, Bulgaria, Publishing complex, Sofia, 2012, p. 127-136. 5 Boneva S., Enhancing Energy Efficiency in the European Union: a Challenge for the Next Decade, Proceedings “Challenges for the European Union in The Next Decade a View From the Danube Region”, Pecs, Hungary, 2013, pp. 87-106. 6 Boneva S., Development of European Integration Process in Higher Education, Economic Studies, XX, 1, 2011, pp. 3-40.
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2. R&D – 3% of the EU’s GDP to be invested in R&D 3. Climate change and energy sustainability – greenhouse gas emissions 20% (or even 30%, if the conditions are right) lower than 1990 20% of energy from renewables 20% increase in energy efficiency 4. Education – Reducing the rates of early school leaving below 10% at least 40% of 30-34–year-olds completing third level education 5. Fighting poverty and social exclusion at least 20 million fewer people in or at risk of poverty and social exclusion The objectives of the strategy are also supported by seven ‘flagship initiatives’ providing a framework through which the EU and national authorities mutually reinforce their efforts in areas supporting the Europe 2020 priorities such as innovation, the digital economy, employment, youth, industrial policy, poverty, and resource efficiency. Other EU levers such as the European single market, the EU budget and the EU external agenda also contribute to the achievement of the goals of the Europe 2020 strategy. The Europe 2020 strategy is implemented and monitored in the context of the European Semester, the yearly cycle of coordination of economic and budgetary policies. The Commission published a Communication taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy in March 2014, four years after its launch. This in turn paves the way for a thorough review of the Europe 2020 strategy.
Priorities The European Union has been working hard to move decisively beyond the crisis and create the conditions for a more competitive economy7 with higher employment. The Europe 2020 strategy is about delivering growth that is: smart, through more effective investments in education, research and innovation; sustainable, thanks to a decisive move towards a low-carbon economy8,9; and inclusive, with a strong emphasis on job creation and poverty reduction. The
7 Boneva S., The Place of Food Processing Industry in Bulgaria Within the Frames of EU – Present Status and Prospects, Management and Education, vol. VIII (1) 2012 pp. 181-198. 8 Boneva S., Desertec Solar Park – as a Step towards Enhancing the Energy security of the EU, proc. Int. Sc. Conf. UNWE Sofia, 2014, pp. 142-153. 9 Boneva S., Bulgaria and EU: Power Security the Policy of EU and Bulgaria in the Sphere of Power Security, “Management and Education”, Vol. IX (1) 2013, pp. 132-138.
535 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century strategy is focused on five ambitious goals in the areas of employment, innovation, education, poverty reduction and climate/energy. To ensure that the Europe 2020 strategy delivers, a strong and effective system of economic has been set up to coordinate policy actions between the EU and national levels.
EU action plan to harvest renewable energy10, 11 from Europe’s seas The EU is aiming to develop a reliable and secure source of renewable energy by setting up an Ocean Energy Forum. The European Commission has unveiled an action plan to help harvest more renewable energy from Europe’s seas and oceans. The plan aims to boost this emerging “blue energy” sector – which includes technologies that can capture the energy from waves, tides and temperature variations in the water – by bringing together knowledge and expertise under a new Ocean Energy Forum.
Great potential The aim is to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and make Europe’s energy supplies more secure by creating a stable source of renewable energy in the region. This could be used in conjunction with other renewable sources such as wind and solar power.12 According to the European Commission, oceans and seas globally have sufficient energy potential to cover our current and projected energy needs. There are significant challenges in harnessing this potential, however, such as high technology costs and complex licensing rules.
Many benefits The Ocean Energy Forum will aim to address some of these challenges. It is hoped that supporting the blue energy sector could not only provide a
10 Offshore Wind Energy: Action needed to deliver on the Energy Policy Objectives for 2020 and beyond, Brussels, 13.11.2008, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=COM:2008:0768:FIN:EN:PDF 11 SET Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/energy/technology/set_plan/set_planen.htm 12 Kolev G., “Solar Renewable Energy: Importance And Potential, proc.” Management and Sustainable Development”, vol. 1, 2013, pp. 240-248.
536 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century secure source of power, but also benefit the environment, create jobs – particularly in coastal areas – and generate economic growth.
Climate change & energy targets post-2020 Public consultation to inform future EU energy and climate change polices (2020-2030). The EU already has climate and energy targets13 to achieve for 2020 – cutting greenhouse gas emissions, reducing energy use and boosting renewable energy. But, to maintain momentum after 2020, it needs to start consulting and thinking now. Planning ahead will encourage early investment in new infrastructure and stimulate innovation in low-carbon technologies. The Commission is launching the process through an online consultation, which runs until 2 July 2014. Everyone is invited to give your opinion on: • what type (and level) of climate and energy targets should be set for 2030 • how to achieve a fair plan which takes into account each EU country’s specific energy needs and resources • how the EU’s energy strategy can improve the competitiveness of its economy. The proposals will seek to improve the current strategy and take into account changes in the EU energy mix, the economic situation and new technologies. The objectives remain the same – reduce greenhouse gas emissions, secure the EU’s energy supply and support growth, competitiveness and job creation. As another part of its strategy to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, the Commission is also asking for opinions on how to encourage the development of technologies to capture and store CO2. Binding renewables targets14,15 create growth. A report on the EU’s progress in developing renewable energy shows that current policy with binding targets has led to strong growth of the sector.
13 Intelligent Energy Europe Programme (IEE) - http://ec.europa.eu/cip/iee/index_en.htm 14 Report from The Commission To the Council and The European Parliament on the implementation of the European Energy Programme for Recovery, Brussels, 27.4.2010 - http://www.parliament.bg/pub/ECD/90365COM_2010_191_BG2_ACTE_f.pdf 15 http://www.ccsnetwork.eu
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More households and businesses would turn to renewable energy if it involved less red tape, if renewables were better integrated into the energy market, and if subsidy programmes were clearer and more stable.
Blueprint for energy security16, 17 Energy 2020 is a plan to cut consumption, boost market competitiveness, secure supplies, meet the EU’s climate change goals and coordinate negotiations with suppliers. As energy demand is expected to rise quickly once the recession ends, the strategy aims to prevent shortages and support economic growth. Consumers will benefit from more competitive prices for oil, gas and electricity. The commission plans to propose new laws and other measures over the next 18 months to advance the following priorities.
Cutting consumption The EU would promote more energy efficiency in the transport sector and in buildings – the two areas where consumption can be cut the most. Homeowners, landlords and tenants would get incentives for renovations and other energy-saving measures. Local and national governments would consider energy efficiency when buying products and services. Better energy labeling would push manufacturers to develop more efficient products.
Creating a single market by 2015 Current barriers to opening up national markets for energy would be dismantled. Investment of about €1 trillion is needed to complete a modern pan-European electrical grid connecting all countries, allowing them to distribute supply wherever needed. Projects and funding to upgrade and extend the grid would be fast-tracked. Offshore wind and solar sources would be better connected to the grid, encouraging more investment in renewable energy.
16 COM(2011) 109 от 8.3.2011 г. 17 Report from The Commission To the Council and The European Parliament on the implementation of the European Energy Programme for Recovery, Brussels, 27.4.2010.
538 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Bargaining as a bloc Rising imports and lower domestic production mean EU countries face tougher competition overseas for oil, gas and coal supplies. Recent disruptions to supplies from Eastern Europe demonstrated the need for coordinated action. The EU would join together in bargaining with suppliers, giving its members more negotiating power on international markets than if they acted alone.
Innovating The EU would launch projects to promote energy efficiency in urban areas, better electricity storage technologies, new types of biofuels and smart grids that are able to distribute electricity according to consumption patterns.
Informing consumers Consumers would be empowered to make price comparisons and to easily switch suppliers, who would have to provide them with clear details about their bills.
Connecting Europe The EU will invest €50bn in infrastructure – connecting Europe, boosting competitiveness and creating jobs. Smart, sustainable and interconnected transport, energy and digital networks are priorities for Europe’s economic future. However, the financial crisis has diminished the flow of private and public funding to infrastructure projects. As a result, the Commission is proposing a new funding plan to speed up long-term investments in roads, railways, energy grids, pipelines and high-speed broadband networks. The €50bn fund would be used to encourage investors from the private and public sectors to help finance such projects, some of which would otherwise not be built. It would also promote cleaner transport modes and renewable energy – in line with Europe 2020, the EU’s growth and jobs strategy.
Improving transport links – €31.7bn Transport systems in Europe have traditionally developed as discrete networks within individual countries. The EU plays an important role in
539 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century helping countries work together when planning, managing and funding cross-border transport links. The fund would back up such efforts by investing in infrastructure projects that make it easier for people to travel and exchange goods, especially between western and eastern EU countries. Investments would focus on green and sustainable transport modes.
Connecting energy grids – €9.1bn Funding would encourage more connections between EU countries, making it easier to transfer both traditional forms of energy and renewables. A better trans-European infrastructure would lead to more secure supplies at affordable prices, while helping the EU reach its climate change objectives.
Supporting high-speed digital networks – €9.2bn Investment would focus on establishing broadband networks and pan- European digital services. EU financing of network infrastructure could attract further investment of €50bn from other sources, the Commission estimates. The fund would also provide grants to build the infrastructure needed for the rollout of digital identification, procurement, health care, justice and customs-related services. The money would ensure interoperability and meet the costs of linking up national services.
Next steps The fund would use innovative market instruments such as guarantees and project bonds to mobilise more private financing. It would be part of the EU budget proposals for 2014 to 2020. The proposal now needs approval from national governments and the European Parliament. At the conclusion of the Europe 2020 can be said that: 1. Priority for Europe’s economic future is to create smart, sustainable and interconnected transport, energy and digital networks. 2. Then create a single market will drop the existing barriers to opening up national markets for energy. 3. Proposed policy for the EU’s progress in the development of renewable energy sources will lead to stronger growth.
540 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Jelena ŠUPUT1
ENLARGEMENT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND PROTECTION OF ITS FINANCIAL INTERESTS
Abstract: The idea of establishing the European Union had emerged before the First World War, when Dimitrije Mitrinović drafted a platform on unification of Europe. The then goal of unification was to prevent war in the European region through mutual dialogue and cooperation. After the Second World War, it was realized that the goal of establishing of such a community should not only be political, but also economic interests. In the beginning, the European Community members had been economically stronger countries, however, in the following years, economically weaker countries also joined; hence, it was necessary to build mechanisms to maintain its fiscal stability. Countries that want to join the European Union must meet certain criteria defined in 1993, which are known as the Copenhagen criteria. Two years later, the criteria were expanded, thus the obligation of all EU membership aspiring countries is to harmonize their institutions and legislation with the EU acquis contained in regulations adopted at the level of the said community. During the accession process, countries receive technical and financial assistance through the pre-accession funds. In order to protect itself from misuse of its funds, the European Union passed several regulations in 1990s. Financial stability is of crucial importance for the functioning of the Community, but it is quite certain that it has been threatened by the access of less economically developed countries. However, countries in the process of stabilization and accession to the European Union should not only implement the regulations of the said community related to the protection of its financial interests, but should also create an institutional framework that would allow for such protection as well as implement regulations that would allow for efficient fight against corruption at the national level. Fulfilment of the requirements for membership is a test of the ability of future member states to protect the interests of the European Union and to adapt to new challenges. Key words: accession, European Union, protection of financial interests, national legislation, challenges.
1 Jelena Šuput, MA, Institute of Comparative Law, Belgrade.
541 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Introduction According to the Treaty of Rome, the European Economic Community had had mainly economic goals. These included the establishment of a common market and the gradual harmonization of economic policies of the member states. The common market, which was later expanded to the inner market, was defined through the four basic freedoms: free movement of goods, free movement of persons, free movement of services and free movement of capital.2 Nevertheless, the most radical reform of goals and partly of the structure of the very communities was implemented through the Treaty on European Union, which entered into force on 1 November 1993. This treaty is known as the Maastricht Treaty. The said Treaty established the European Union, while the European Economic Community, in accordance with the changed goals, was renamed into the European Union.3 The European Union is, in fact, a community of European states. This is corroborated by the treaty on its establishment as a legal basis for its foundation and existence. The first one had been the Treaty of Paris signed in 1951, pursuant to which the European Coal and Steel Community was established. It was followed by the signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. The founders and the first members of the European Community had been economically stronger countries.4 Over time, the number of European Union member states has gradually increased. The first enlargement of the European Union membership happened in 1973 and the last one in 2013. Today, the new challenges to the EU financial system primarily result from a desire to expand the European Union to the East. Costs related to the integration of less wealthy groups and states intensify conflicts over the allocation of costs among stakeholders and states within the old Community.5 Taking into account the possibility of financial destabilization resulting from the accession of new states, which, compared to the existing member states have far less economic power, the EU member states have felt the need to protect the financial interests of the said community and their own interests.
2 R. Vukadinović, Osnovni pojmovi o institucijama i pravnom poretku Evropske unije (Basic conceptions of institutions and legal order of the European Union), Komisija za harmonizaciju pravnog sistema SRJ sa regulativom Evropske unije i Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu Beograd, Belgrade 1998, p. 9. 3 Ibid., p. 10. 4 These countries are Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. 5 Verner Vajdenfeld, Volfgang Besels, Evropa od A do Š (Europe from A to Z), Fondacija Konrad Adenauer, Belgrade, 2003, p. 49.
542 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
The need for the protection of financial interests of the European Union had emerged long before the first enlargement of the Community, but eventually it grew stronger as the EU membership expanded. However, the adequate protection of its financial interests happened in 1990s, when the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests was adopted6 as well as the Regulation on the protection the European Communities’ financial interests.7 However, one should also bear in mind the fact that the financial interests of the European Union are also protected by taking anti- corruption measures in member states, since committing corruption offenses may also jeopardize the financial interests of the European Union. Accordingly, the EU membership candidate countries are required to ratify and harmonize
6 Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (Official Journal C 316 of 27/11/1995). The text of the Convention in English language can be accessed on the following website: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ.do?uri, 5/6/2014. 7 Regulation on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, which defines measures and procedures of administrative control over the spending of the EU funds was passed in 1995 (Council Regulation (EC, Euroatom) No 2988/95 of 18 December 1995 on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests, Official Journal of the European Communities, 23/12/1995. No L312/1). The text of the Regulation in English language can be accessed on the following website: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do? Uri=OJ:L:1995:312:0001:0004:EN:PDF, 5/6/2014. The said Regulation was amended in 1996 by the Regulation concerning on the spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in the order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities (Council Regulation (EROATOM, EC No 2185/96 of 11 November 1996 concerning on the spot checks and inspections carried out by the Commission in the order to protect the European Communities’ financial interests against fraud and other irregularities, Official Journal on the European Communities No L292/2, 15/11/1996). The Regulation stipulates the mandatory cooperation of the member states in criminal law matters in order to protect the financial interests of the European Union, as well as liabilities of administrative authorities of the member states regarding the cooperation with the Commission when carrying out spot checks and inspections relating to the spending of the EU funds. The text of the Regulation in English language can be accessed on the following website: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1996:292:0002:0005: EN:PDF, 5/6/2014. In addition to the aforementioned regulations, it is important to mention the Regulation of the Council of 1997, which regulates the mutual cooperation of the competent authorities of the member states and cooperation of the competent authorities with the Commission in order to ensure proper implementation of regulations in the field of customs and agriculture, and to protect the financial interests of the European Union (Council Regulation (EC Regulation) No 515/97 (Official Journal L82, 22/3/1997). This Regulation was amended by the Council Regulation No. 807 of 2003 (Official Journal L122, 16/5/2003) and the Council Regulation No. 766 of 2008 (Official Journal L218, 13/8/2008). The text of the Regulation with changes and amendments can be accessed on the following website: http://ec.europa.eu/anti-fraud/documents/legal_framework_documents_consolidated/ 515_97_en.pdf, 5/6/2014.
543 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century their national legislations with the EU Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, which was also adopted in 1990s.8 Protection of the financial interests of the European Union is not an exclusive obligation of the member states, but also of the EU membership candidate countries, since in the period of acquiring the status of a candidate country, potential EU members use its funds through IPA9 funds. To protect the financial interests of the European Union, it is not enough to harmonize national regulations with the EU acquis contained in the Conventions and other legal documents. Considering that the implementation of the budget of the European Union is decentralized, it is necessary that countries, not only member states, but also candidate states, establish an efficient systems of internal control and liability mechanisms to ensure the effective protection of the financial interests of the European Union.10
8 The EU Criminal Law Convention on Corruption was adopted in Strasbourg in 1999. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, whose legal successor is the Republic of Serbia, adopted the said Convention by the Law on Ratification of the European Union’s Criminal Law Convention on Corruption in 2002 (“Službeni list Savezne Republike Jugoslavije – Međunarodni ugovori“, No. 2/2002 and “Službeni list Srbije i Crne Gore – Međunarodni ugovori“, No. 18/2005. 9 Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance represents a mechanism of financial assistance to potential candidate countries and candidate countries for EU membership in the EU accession process for the purpose of developing their institutional capacity, cross-border cooperation, economic, social and agricultural development. The new Regulation establishing Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance for the period 2014-2020 was passed in 2014 (Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council of 11 March 2014 establishing Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (Official Journal L77/11, 15/3/2014). The text of the Regulation in English language can be accessed on the following website: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/ pdf/financial_assistance/ipa/2014/231_2014_ipa_2_reg.pdf, 5/6/2014. The Regulation No. 236 of 2014 is important for the use of the EU pre-accession funds, which regulates common rules and procedures for the use of these funds in the EU membership potential candidate and candidate countries (Regulation (EU) No 236/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2014 laying down common rules and procedures for the implementation of the Union’s instruments for financing external action). The text of the Regulation can be accessed on the following website: http://europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance /ipa/2014/236_2014_cir.pdf, 5/6/2014. It is also important to mention the Regulation on the specific rules for implementing Regulation No. 231/2014 establishing an Instrument for Pre- accession assistance for the period 2014-2020 (Commission implementing Regulation /EU) No 447/2014 of 2 May 2014 on the specific rules for implementing Regulation (EU) No 231/2014 of the European Parliament and the Council establishing an Instrument for Pre-accession assistance (IPA II) Official Journal of the European Union L 132/32, 3/5/2014. The text of the Regulation in English language can be accessed on the following website: http://ec.assistance/ ipa/2014/20140502_commission_implementing_reulation_ipa2_en.pdf , 5/6/2014. 10 See more in: A. Rabrenović, Odgovornost za trošenje finansijskih sredstava Evropske unije (Responsibility for spending of European Union funds), in: 50 godina Evropske unije, Institut za uporedno pravo, Vlada Srbije, Kancelarija za pridruživanje EU, Belgrade, 2007, p. 187.
544 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Enlargement of the EU Membership The European Community has gradually expanded its membership. For the first time it had been on 1 January 1973 by joining of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom. After the first enlargement, Greece joined on 1 January 1981 and five years later, on 1 January 1986, Spain and Portugal. The next enlargement was on 1 January 1995, when the European Community received Austria, Finland and Sweden.11 We have witnessed the greatest enlargement of the European Union so far – admission to the membership of ten countries on 1 May 2004. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia became members of the European Union then. This enlargement followed after many years of negotiations and comprehensive reforms in certain areas. There is no doubt that the fulfilment of the legal requirement relating to the harmonization of national legislation with the EU acquis was the most difficult task for these countries, especially in the part concerning the adoption and implementation of economic measures necessary to transform the planned economy to market economy.12 The Republic of Croatia, which joined the European Union in 2013, had to fulfil the same requirements. The admission of Central and Eastern European countries was preceded by the signing of the so-called European treaties on 16 December 1991, when the treaties with Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland had been signed. Similar treaties were signed in 1993 with Bulgaria and Romania, and several years later, in 1995 and 1996, with the Baltic countries and Slovenia. Directions and specific measures for further development of relations with the countries of this region were identified at several European Council summits. Among them, it is necessary to mention the summits in Copenhagen, Essen, Cannes, Madrid, Luxembourg, Berlin, Helsinki, Nice, and a document entitled Agenda 2000.13 The criteria or requirements to be met by candidate countries in order to be admitted to the European Union are set out in the conclusions of the Council of the European Union adopted in Copenhagen in 1993. In formal terms, the conclusions of the Council and thus, the criteria contained therein represent the unilateral statement of will of the EU member states, which determines the basis on which negotiations on the accession of the new EU countries will be led.14
11 R. Vukadinović, Osnovni pojmovi o institucijama i pravnom poretku Evropske unije (Basic conceptions of institutions and legal order of the European Union) op. cit. p. 11. 12 A. Čavoški, Preduslovi i postupak uključivanja Državne zajednice Srbije i Crne Gore u Evropsku zajednicu (Prerequisites and procedure for the accession of the State Union of Serbia and Montenegro to the European Community), Institut za uporedno pravo, Belgrade, 2005, p. 25. 13 Ibid. p. 27. 14 P. Vukasović, Kopenhageški kriterijumi (Copenhagen criteria), in: Pristupanje Državne zajednice Srbija i Crna Gora Evropskoj uniji, Institut za uporedno pravo, Belgrade, 2005, p. 7.
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The Copenhagen criteria and subsequent annual European Commission reports on their fulfilment can be considered legal and institutional guarantees that candidate countries will be able to meet the obligations arising from their membership in the European Union. These criteria are general: they bind all candidate countries and their contents are non-negotiable.15 A country that seeks membership in the European Union must achieve the following: stability of institutions ensuring democracy, the rule of law as well as respect and protection of human and minority rights, the existence of a functioning market economy able to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the European Union, ability to meet the obligations arising from the membership in the Union, which includes the acceptance of goals of political, economic and monetary unity.16 The third one of the above-mentioned requirements is actually a general requirement set by every international organization. It concerns the acceptance of the organization’s goals and capability of a potential member to carry out the obligations that the membership implies. In majority of the older classic international organizations, it has been assumed that each sovereign state, by the very fact of its own sovereignty, acquires the ability to meet the obligations arising from membership. In the case of the European Union, such an assumption does not apply. Obligations imposed to a country by the EU membership are so numerous, comprehensive, complex and demanding that the ability of sovereign states to execute them cannot be assumed in advance. Such ability must be determined for each candidate individually. Protection mechanisms elaborated in detail that will prevent any threat to the values embodied in the requirements for the EU accession must be incorporated in the very institutional solutions. The EU Council monitors progress that each candidate country achieves in meeting the criteria, and adopts the corresponding conclusions.17 One of the common economic goals of the member states is the protection of the financial interests of the European Union, which actually does not protect the financial interests of some supranational organization, but the financial interests of the member states. Therefore, the protection of the financial interests of the Union should be understood not only as a condition for membership, but also as a prerequisite for its survival.
The Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Union The need to protect the financial interests of the European Union has been a priority for the governments and parliaments of the member states since
15 Ibid. p. 8. 16 Ibidem. 17 Ibid. p. 9.
546 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
1960s. In August 1976, the Commission filed an application for the amendment to the Treaty establishing the European Community in order to facilitate the adoption of common rules in relation to the criminal law protection of the financial interests of the European Union as well as methods of detecting and prosecuting violations of these provisions. Subsequently, in 1983, the commission formed by the European Community prepared a draft agreement in relation to the criminal law protection of the financial interests of the Community. After many debates, it was not adopted. However, the EU member states realized how important the protection of its financial interests was and in 1988, a special unit for coordination of the protection of the financial interests was established – UCLAF (Anti-Fraud Coordination Unit) as a Community institution responsible for preventing and combating activities harmful for the financial interests of the European Community.18 In 1994, the European Parliament adopted a resolution that represented the starting point for the Commission to adopt specific rules relating to the harmonization of national legislation and the protection of the financial interests of the European Union as well as for prescribing sanctions for behaviour that threatens them. The basis for the adoption of a legal act, which protects the financial interests of the Union was created by the enactment of the new statute of the unit for fight against financial fraud and horizontal legislation regarding sanctions, i.e. harmonization of criminal codes. The Commission compiled the Handbook for the Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Union and the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests was adopted in 1995 with two additional protocols and it is known as PIF Convention.19 It envisaged harmonization of legal acts of the member states regarding methods of preventing criminal offences committed to the detriment of the financial interests of the European Community. The first protocol of the Convention stipulated the corruption offences committed by or against the officials of the European Community,20 while the second protocol provided for anti-money laundering, the liability of legal person and
18 By the Decision of the Commission of 1999, instead of the Anti-Fraud Coordination Unit (UCLAF), the European Anti-Fraud Office was established (OLAF). Commission decision establishing the European Anti fraud Office (OLAF) 1999/532/EC,ECSC, Euroatom (Official Journal of the European Communities L 136/20, 31/5/999). The text of the Decision can be accessed on the following website: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri =OJ:l:1999:136:0020:0022:EN:PDF, 5/6/2014. 19 Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (Official Journal C 316 of 27/11/1995). 20 The Protocol to the Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ financial interests (Official Journal C 313, 23/10/1996). The Protocol can be accessed on the following website: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri, 5/6/2014.
547 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century procedural provisions.21 The European Commission, through specialized agencies, such as OLAF,22 become a very important body for coordination between member states in relation to cases of crime prevention and combating. Principles regarding the financial interests of the European Union are set out in the Council Regulation of 1995 and 1997. They are related to the cooperation of administrative bodies in order to prevent unlawful behaviour that threatens the financial interests of the European Community.23 As it can be concluded, the need to protect the financial interests of the European Union had emerged a few years prior to its first enlargement. Responsibility for the spending of the EU funds is the issue that is on the list of priorities of both of its institutions and member states, which provide substantial funds to its budget.24 Although there is no doubt that the responsibility for spending the EU funds belongs primary to the EU institutions, the fact that almost 80% of the EU budget is spent by national administrations speaks of complexity of the problem and the need to strengthen the overall accountability for the expenditure of its funds. In this regard, in the past decade, the European Union took a series of measures to strengthen accountability mechanisms, both within its institutions and national administrations that use its funds.25
The EU Budget and Obligations of the Member States and Candidate Countries In general, it can be said that the current financial and budgetary system of the European Union is laid on relatively stable grounds; however, they still get “shaky” every time there is an enlargement. The reason for this is that new members have significantly less economic power in relation to the oldest members of the Union. In addition, they mainly base their economic activity on agricultural production, which in most cases is much ruined due to the consequences of
22 European Anti-Fraud Office. Founded in 1999 as a specific independent body carrying out investigations concerning financial frauds to the detriment of the European Union. For more information on this body, visit the following website: http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/index_ en.htm, 5/6/2014. 23 Quoted from: A. Lungu, F. Nastase, C. Botan, I.Cospanaru, E. Calistru, M.M.Manea, Guide to the Protection of the Financial Interests of the European Union, Revised and completed edition, Transparency International Romania, OLAF, Lupta Antifrauda (DLAF) Fight Against Fraud, 2010. The text can be accessed on the following website: www.transparency.org.ro/ proiecte/proiecte_incheiate/2010/proiect/2010/proiect_3/Guide%20to%20the%protection%2 0of%20EU%20financial%%20interests.pdf, 5/6/2014. 24 A. Rabrenović, Odgovornost za trošenje finansijskih sredstava Evropske unije (Responsibility for spending of European Union funds), op. cit., p. 186. 25 See more in: A. Rabrenović, Ibid., p. 193.
548 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century former implementation of the command economy, but also due to some natural factors. That is why great resources are allocated from the EU budget, primarily from the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, which are provided to assist the development and promotion of agriculture in the new EU member states. All this represents an additional burden to the EU budget and consequently to the budgets of the oldest and economically most stable European economies.26 It is therefore necessary that in their national regulations all EU member states provide for measures to protect the financial interests of this community. Countries seeking membership in the EU are expected to harmonize their legislation with the EU acquis during the pre-accession negotiations. This is especially important for the possibility of using the pre-accession funds of the European Union, which provide assistance to the candidate countries in the accession process. The European Union has its own income and expenditures. Its revenues are used for financing of the EU administration, activities to reduce inequalities in the economic development of the member countries and investment in the development of agricultural areas. Revenues are collected by the member states on behalf of the European Union. The source of its revenues is 0.73% of gross national income of all member states, which makes 2/3 of the total EU budget. The contribution of a state is calculated according to solidarity and paying capacity. Besides, the Union’s revenues are also traditional own resources, which mainly include the import duty paid on products from countries outside the European Union as well as a percentage of harmonized revenues from the value- added tax, which are collected in the member states. The Union budget revenues also include taxes from the salaries of employees employed in its institutions and contributions from countries outside the European Union paid within certain programmes as well as fines charged to companies that do not abide by the rules and regulations of the European Union in their business operations.27 The EU budget finances various activities such as rural development and environmental protection, protection of external borders, human rights, as well as the work of the European Union agencies. The Commission and the member states are responsible for the implementation of the budget. The Commission carries out the budget allocation, while the member states manage the EU funds in the amount of 76% of the budget. Most of the EU budget is spent to stimulate economic growth and job creation as well as to reduce economic inequalities between regions, on agriculture, rural development, fishery and the environmental protection, fight
26 S. R. Stojanović, Finansiranje Evropske unije (Financing of the European Union), Službeni glasnik, Belgrade, 2008, p. 32. 27 For more information visit the following website: http://europa.eu/about-eu/basic- information/money/revenue-income/, 12/06/2014.
549 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century against terrorism, organized crime and illegal immigration.28 Countries with the official status of candidate for membership in the European Union use its pre- accession funds and upon joining the Union, they have the ability to manage other funds. It is therefore, essential that countries seeking EU membership, in the process of pre-accession negotiations, harmonize their national legislation with the EU acquis contained in its regulations. The protection of the financial interests of the European Union also represents one of the requirements for membership in the said community. Therefore, the national legislations of the countries seeking EU membership should be harmonized with the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests and its accompanying protocols, the Regulation on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests and the EU Criminal Law Convention on Corruption and other regulations adopted at the Union level, which also protect its financial interests such as regulations regulating the cooperation between administrative authorities of the member states in the value added tax matters.29
Conclusion The need for protection of the financial interests of the European Union had first emerged in the 1960s. However, over time, this need has been growing stronger. The reason for this has been primarily the EU’s gradual enlargement. The European Community had been first enlarged in 1973, when Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined. Although economically developed countries became the EU members that year, the need to protect the financial interests still existed. Three years after the first enlargement, the Commission submitted a request for the amendment to the Treaty establishing the European Community in order to enable the member states to adopt common rules relating to the protection of its financial interests. It was only after the adoption of the Resolution of 1994 by the European Parliament that the starting point was created for the Commission to adopt regulations with which national regulations would be harmonized and which would regulate sanctions in order to effectively protect the financial interests of the European Union. Subsequently, in 1995, the Convention on the protection of the European Communities’ financial interests was adopted with two additional
28 Ibidem. 29 The EU Council Regulation on administrative cooperation of member states in the field of value added tax No. 1798/2003 of 7 October 2003 is important for this field, which regulates the mandatory cooperation of the member states in the fight against tax offences. There are also the Regulation (EC) No 1798/2003 of 7 October 2003 on administrative cooperation in the field of value added tax and repealing Regulation (ECC) No 218/92 (Official Journal L 264, 15/10/2003). The text in English language can be accessed on the following website: http:// eur-lex.europa.eu(LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R1798:EN:HTML 6/5/2014.
550 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century protocols. It regulates the obligation of harmonization of legal acts of the member states regarding the methods of preventing criminal offences committed to the detriment of the financial interests of the European Community. Nevertheless, it should be taken into account that countries seeking the EU membership, which have the status of a candidate, in accordance with the Copenhagen criteria and stabilization and accession agreements signed with the European Union are required to harmonize their national legislations with the EU acquis contained in its legal documents. That is why candidates for membership in the European Union must demonstrate a certain level of preparedness at the national level to provide adequate protection of the financial interests of the European Union before the accession. However, harmonization of national legislation with the legislation of the European Union is not only a requirement for membership in the European Union. The protection of the financial interests of this community is primarily a requirement for its survival. The EU budget is also composed of revenues collected on the territory of the member states (a part of the gross national income and value added tax). Because of the responsibilities towards their own citizens, the member states should pay more attention to the protection of the financial interests of the European Union. However, one should be careful not to exhaust this protection by prescribing criminal sanctions and cooperation between the competent authorities in criminal matters. Efficient protection is also reflected in the establishment of mechanisms of internal and external financial control at the national level, which will deal exclusively with the allocation of funds from the European Union. Given that the EU membership candidate countries are using funds from pre-accession (IPA) funds, they should establish an effective system of protection of the financial interests of the Union at the very beginning of the use of these funds. The fact that the financial stability of the Union gets disrupted whenever new member states join it, which are usually economically weaker countries, should be a sufficient reason for the member states to jointly contribute to its strengthening.
551 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Uroš ZDRAVKOVIĆ1
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION’S MEMBERSHIP IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
Abstract: The European Union (EU) is a single customs union with a single trade policy and tariff. Therefore, the EU trade policy is made exclusively at the EU level. From the other side, the world trade is founded on rules laid down by the World Trade Organization (WTO) that help ensure that trade agreements and obligations between countries are open and fair. The EU (until 30 November 2009 known officially in the WTO as the European Communities) has been the WTO member since 1 January 1995. The 28 member States of the EU are also WTO members in their own right. Nevertheless, the EU “speaks” as a single entity inside the WTO. At the very beginning of the WTO, the question of relationship of its law and EU law arose. The main concern deals with granting the direct effect to the WTO norms in the EU law order. The EU Council Decision generally excludes the possibility of the direct effect of the WTO norms in EU law. Moreover, the European Court of Justice has long been criticized for consistently holding that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) does not have a direct effect in the EU law system. These circumstances have led to the need for the mutual “understanding” of the two big and composite law systems. Key words: European Union, Common Commercial Policy, World Trade Organization, WTO law, EU law, direct effect.
Introduction Ever since the Treaty of Rome and creation of the Custom Union, the European Community (EC), and later the European Union (EU), have been considered as one of the few, and even the most important entities in the global market. Today, the EU is a custom union with integral market and common commercial and single trade policy. That supranational regional organization encompasses 28 European states with over 500 million people. That makes it a biggest world trader, not just in good, but in services as well.
1 Uroš Zdravković, University of Niš, Faculty of Law.
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From the other side, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is multilateral and universal organization which governs trade among sovereign trade and custom entities. It provides a complex set of rules, principles and effective dispute settlement mechanism to make multilateral trading system secure and predictable. Today, about 97 per cent of the world trade is related to the WTO. The EU has been the WTO member since its founding in 1995 and today represents the “biggest” WTO member. From the other side, its complex and sui generis nature, together with its economic strength, makes the need for a better understanding of the EU’s membership into the WTO. Therefore, this article discusses basic characteristics of the EU’s membership in the WTO, dealing in particularly with the following issues: a) What are the main characteristics of the EU as a player in the global trade; b) How do the EU’s Custom Union and Common Commercial Policy work in the light of the WTO issues; c) How to understand the position of the EU in the WTO; d) Why, and how does the EU act as a single entity in the WTO; e) How strong impact the EU has on decision-making process in the WTO and; f) The relationship between WTO law and the EU law.
1. The EU and its Single Trade Policy – Basic Considerations The EU is the world’s biggest trader, accounting for 16.5 per cent of the world’s imports and exports. Free trade among its members was one of the EU’s founding principles, and it is committed to liberalising world trade as well. The EU is the world’s biggest exporter of manufactured goods and services, and it is the biggest import market for over 100 countries. It is also the world’s largest single market area.2 The EU belongs to the group of the few strongest economies in the world and plays very important role in the global market. Thus, its influence on the “legal order” of the global market is significant as well. According to Dür and Elsig, “ever since its creation, the EU economic weight has made it an influential player in the global economy. Among all regional integration schemes currently in existence, the EU is the entity that by far has made most progress in integrating its members’ foreign economic policies.”3 Dür and Elsig further note:
2 See official EU Internet site: http://europa.eu/pol/comm/index_en.htm. 3 Dür, A. Elsig, M. (2011) Principals, agents, and the European Union’s foreign economic policies, Journal of European Public Policy, 18:3, pp. 323, 325, etc.
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“The EU is the largest exporter and importer of both goods and services, and is one of the largest hosts and sources of foreign direct investments. The euro is second only to the United States (US) dollar as an international currency.”4 In addition, Damro states that “in terms of market size, the EU can be understood as one of the ‘Great Powers’ in the international system, a large single market that is capable of externalising its internal policies, in particular its regulatory standards. It exercises this power specifically through the relative size of its market.”5 In trade policy, the EU has had exclusive competence since the Treaty of Rome 1957. As Gstöhl argues, the Common Commercial Policy (CCP) was “one of the first areas where the member states granted the European Economic Community (EEC) exclusive competence.”6 Uniformity of import conditions was finally achieved with the completion of the internal market by the Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in 1993. Since then, national measures are only possible on non-economic grounds such as public health or security. 7 In addition, Crombez and Van Gestel contend that bringing trade policy into the exclusive competence of the EU arguably increases its effectiveness, since member states weigh more on international negotiations if they act as one.8 The EU is a custom union with a single custom and trade policy towards third states. The custom union and CCP are now provided by the articles 28-32 and 206-207 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (referred also as TFEU - second part of the Lisbon Treaty). The Lisbon Treaty stipulates in Art. 206 of the TFEU that the Union shall contribute, in the common interest, to the harmonious development of world trade, the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade and on foreign direct investment, and the lowering of customs and other barriers.
4 Ibidem, p. 323. 5 Damro, C. (2011), Market Power Europe, Paper prepared for EUSA Biennial Conference Boston, Massachusetts, USA 3-5 March 2011, p. 8. 6 Gstöhl, S. (2013) The European Union’s Trade Policy, RITSUMEIKAN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS Vol. 11, pp. 1-22, p. 2. 7 Ibidem. Gstöhl explains that the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT, Art. XXIV), to which the six founding members of the EEC were contracting parties, requires a customs union to have a common external tariff and some other common provisions vis-à-vis non- members. The decision to set up a customs union, with the further aim of building a common market, is at the origin of the Common Commercial Policy (See page 2 of cited Article). 8 Crombez, C. Gestel, W. V. (2011) The Treaty of Lisbon and European Union trade policy: A political- economic analysis, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Faculty of Business and Economics, p. 3.
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Therefore, the EU trade policy is made exclusively at the EU level. After the Lisbon Treaty all new aspects of the CCP finally became exclusive competence of the Union, its scope was further clarified, and foreign direct investment (FDI) was added. Moreover, external trade became the exclusive competence of the EU, and, as a result, trade agreements no longer need to be ratified by national parliaments.9 According to Woolcock, the Lisbon Treaty brings a number of changes in the field of EU external trade policymaking and more exclusive EU competence can be expected to strengthen the EU presence in trade as will the extension to include FDI.10 In relation with that, Gstöhl explains: “This means that there is no longer a need for mixed agreements encompassing (only) these fields and that ratification by the national parliaments is no longer required. At the same time, the European Parliament acquired new powers in the implementation of trade policy and in the conclusion of international trade agreements […] After decades of no substantial changes, the legal provisions on the Common Commercial Policy thus evolved substantially within a few years. The policy now covers all current WTO matters as exclusive competence: trade in goods, trade in services (except for transport), commercial aspects of intellectual property rights and foreign direct investment. The national competences of the EU member states are largely restricted to the organization of trade fairs, the promotion of national exports and inward investments or the provision of trading advice.”11 Even though the Lisbon Treaty provides more competence to the Parliament in creating and conducting CCP, for the most part, however, the Commission remains a central policy manager in trade-related questions.12 Like Nugent and Rhinrad observe, “on the issue of international negotiations, the Commission ‘wins’ rights to negotiate on behalf of the EU in most trade-related areas, now that CCP has been clarified as including services, commercial aspects of intellectual property, and even foreign direct investment.”13 In addition, Gstöhl again notes: “As the CCP is an exclusive competence of the EU, the European Commission has the sole right of initiative in this field. It proposes new
9 Woolcock, S. (2010) EU trade and investment policymaking after the Lisbon treaty, Intereconomics, Springer, Heidelberg, Vol. 45, Iss. 1, p. 25. 10 Ibidem. 11 Gstöhl, S. again cited, p. 6. 12 Nugent, N. Rhinard, M. (2011) The European Commission and the European Union’s external relations after the Lisbon Treaty. Paper prepared for the Twelfth Biennial Conference of the European Union Studies Association, Boston, March 3-5 2011, p. 23. 13 Ibidem, p. 24.
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trade agreements and negotiates on behalf of the member states. The Commission also proposes regulations to implement the CCP, and it issues decisions when applying EU trade policy instruments.”14 The CCP is a pillar for the external relations of the EU. It is based on a set of uniform rules under the Customs Union and the Common Customs Tariff15 and it governs the commercial relations of the Member States with Non-EU countries. Although in both trade and competition policy, the EU has been able to speak with “one voice” in dealing with third countries since the 1960s16 (after Treaty of Rome when the CCP was established), the CCP is still the strongest “pillar” of the EU’s foreign policy and still represents the most integrated common policy within the EU. It is based on very clear competence and high capacity of the EU institutions to act in the name of all EU Member States regarding trade or custom issues. The other “pillars” of EU foreign policy are still in the process to become stronger. Finally, the completion of the internal market triggered a series of EU trade agreements with third countries.17 The EU negotiated and concluded various trade agreements with third countries and custom territories, like the European Economic Area (EEA) with the EFTA countries, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership with the Southern Mediterranean countries, Europe Agreements with the Central and Eastern European countries, Stabilisation and Association Agreements with Western Balkan states, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements with the republics of the Commonwealth of Independent States, a customs union agreement with Turkey and bilateral free trade agreements with non-European emerging markets.
2. World Trade Organization The World Trade Organization (WTO) was founded after the 1986–94 negotiations called the Uruguay Round and earlier negotiations under the
14 Gstöhl, S. op. cit., p. 7. 15 The EU’s Common Customs Tariff consists of uniform customs duties applied to products imported from third countries, irrespective of the member state of destination. Most common external tariff rates are those negotiated in the WTO. There are, however, many derogations from the application of these rates, either through preferential trade agreements or through autonomous trade preferences for certain countries. For instance, through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) the EU grants to developing countries non-reciprocal, duty-free access or, for so-called sensitive products, tariff reductions. The primary objective of the GSP is to contribute to the reduction of poverty and the promotion of sustainable development in the beneficiary countries. See, Sieglinde Gstöhl, op. cit., p. 15. 16 Dür, A. Elsig, M. op. cit., p. 323. 17 Gstöhl, S. op. cit., p. 5.
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General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 47). The basic function of the WTO is establishing the rules that provide secure and predictable multilateral trading system and ensuring compliance with those rules. Essentially, there are several main characteristics of the WTO: a) It is an organization for trade opening; b) It is a forum for governments to negotiate trade agreements; c) It is a forum for settling trade disputes and d) It operates a system of trade rules. The WTO is based on clear rules that all members have to comply with when they create and conduct their trade policy. The fundamental aim of the WTO is trade liberalization at the global level in order to achieve better living standard in the world. Both the EU and the WTO were created as a result of the need for removing obstacles for movement of economic values in order to achieve faster economic growth and appropriate political aims. The WTO has strong integrative function, which is reflected by decision making rules, where some elements of supranationalism can be found. The other element of supranationalism is effective dispute settlement mechanism where independent experts act as a “judges” and where adopted reports have obligatory effect to the members in dispute. Still, the integrative function of the WTO does not have so strong extent like the EU’s. The WTO does not establish custom union between the members. It does not establish even free trade area. It just establishes effective set of norms which ensures secure and predictable multilateral trading system. But, from the other side, the WTO has much stronger integrative competence comparing with other universal organizations.
3. The EU as the WTO Member
3.1. Divided Competence in the Pre-Lisbon era and Mixed Agreements The European Union (until 30 November 2009 known officially in the WTO as the European Communities) has been a WTO member since its formation on 1 January 1995. Therefore, the EU can be considered as one of the founding members. Even though the EU is not a state, that fact does not prevent it to be a single member of the WTO, because it is a single custom territory. According to the WTO rules, any state or customs territory having full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies may become a member of the WTO. The 28 Member States of the EU are also WTO members in their own right. Nevertheless, the EU “speaks” with one voice and acts as a single entity inside the WTO. While the Member States coordinate their position in Brussels and
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Geneva, the European Commission alone speaks for the EU at almost all WTO meetings. But, in decision making process within WTO meetings, the EU has as much number of voices as it has member states. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU did not have exclusive competence for all trade aspects covered by the WTO agreements. At the time of negotiating WTO agreement, the CCP had narrower scope. Gstöhl points that the scope of the CCP faced a major challenge when the GATT contracting parties launched the Uruguay Round in 1986 which resulted in the establishment of the WTO.18 The Uruguay Round included new aspects of trade such as trade in services, trade- related intellectual property rights and trade related investment measures. When the WTO agreement had to be signed in 1994, “in is spirit of compromise, the Commission suggested that the Member States should become contracting parties in the WTO, provided that they accepted the principle of unitary EC representation and thus reaffirmed exclusive competence. To achieve this goal, the Commission linked the two controversies, going so far as to suggest that the WTO agreement be agreed to by a unanimous Council and approved by European Parliament, when neither was required by law.”19 Finally, this subject came before European Court of Justice (ECJ). The Court of Justice ruled in Opinion 1/9420 that the WTO agreements on trade in goods (like the GATT and related agreements) came within the exclusive scope of the CCP. From the other side, it held that the Member States and the Community shared competence in dealing with non-gods trade.21 Regarding General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Court identified four modes of supply of services. It was of the opinion that the Community generally had external competence over cross-border services not involving the movement of (natural and legal) persons, while the Member States retained competence over the other modes of supplying services. The Court also concluded that, apart from the provisions on the prohibition of circulating counterfeit goods, the Agreement on Trade-related Property Rights (TRIPs) did not fall within the scope of the CCP. As a result, the Community was competent to conclude alone the WTO agreements on trade in goods, while the Community and the Member States were jointly competent to conclude both the GATS and the TRIPs Agreement.22
18 Gstöhl, S. op. cit., p. 3. 19 Meunier, S. Nicolaïdis, K. (1999) Who Speaks for Europe? The Delegation of Trade Authority in the EU, Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 37, No. 3 pp. 477-501, p. 484. 20 Opinion 1/94 WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-5267. 21 Meunier, S. Nicolaïdis, K. op. cit., p. 488. 22 Gstöhl, S. op. cit., p. 4.
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Nevertheless, in that time some academics criticized the Court’s approach. Hilf observed that “the Court could have chosen another approach, again on the basis of the TEU (Treaty of Maastricht, author’s remark) and the international awareness of the unitary and important role of the EU. The Preamble and Article B TEU mention the European identity as well as the international identity of the EU. In addition the TEU highlights the fundamental principle of coherence (Articles A and C TEU), aiming at unitary action combining policies under the EC Treaty and under the cooperation amongst Member States.”23 Hilf also remarked: “In addition, the other contracting parties within GATT and now within the WTO, by accepting the EC as a contracting party in Article XI seem to be more and more willing to accept unitary representation of European interests. They would even have accepted the EC taking over the unitary representation of all its Member States within the WTO on the basis of exclusive competences recognized by its Court. It was the EC which had successfully pleaded for consideration of the entire WTO and all its agreements as a ‘single undertaking’. In this context it seems unusual that only the EC itself, i.e. through the Opinion of its Court, states a situation of mixity of competences and thus will have the Member States alongside with the EC as contracting parties in the framework of the WTO. A missed opportunity?“24 At the intergovernmental conference drafting the Treaty of Amsterdam, which began in 1995, the Commission tried to have the provisions on the CCP modified so they would cover all WTO matters, but without great success.25 Gstöhl explains that Community competence was “excluded for the politically sensitive areas of trade in cultural and audiovisual services, educational services, and social and human health services. These areas required so-called mixed agreements, that is agreements between the EU and third countries which concern issues of Union and member state competence and therefore have to be signed, concluded and ratified by both.”26 Nevertheless, like it was mentioned above, after the Lisbon Treaty, all aspects of trade, including trade in services and trade related intellectual property rights, finally became exclusive competence of the Union and trade agreements no longer need to be ratified by national parliaments. If the WTO agreement was negotiated after the Lisbon Treaty, the EU institutions would have had sole competence to negotiate and conclude WTO agreement with all its annexes.
23 Hilf, M. (1995) The ECJ ‘s Opinion 1/94 on the WTO, European Journal of International Law, Vol. 6, pp. 245-259, p. 258. 24 Ibidem. 25 Gstöhl, S. op. cit., p. 4. 26 Ibidem, pp. 5-6.
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3.2. EU’s Impact on the Multilateral Trading System from the GATT-era to the WTO The multilateral system is far more powerful in the area of trade than in any other policy area.27 Today, the multilateral system of rules is centered on the WTO, imposing rules that apply to all states and thereby create order. Before the WTO, the central role in creating multilateral trading rules belonged to the GATT 47 and its forums. From its start, the EU has been a central actor in international trade governance.28 According to Sbragia, in the area of trade policy the EU became a force in writing the rules of globalization as soon as the Treaty of Rome came into force: “It was empowered to operate as a unitary actor within the GATT with the European Commission (at least formally) acting as the sole negotiator. The initial commitment by the Six to a unitary trade policy was partially due to their wish to be more effective within the GATT than each had been when operating individually.”29 During the GATT era, “the EU (along with the US) has played a key role in delaying, launching, and closing multilateral trade rounds.”30 Sbragia notes that the EU and the US, when collaborating, were able to wield enormous power during the Uruguay Round.31 Barton et al. explained that the two “agreed in October 1990 to use their market power to close the Uruguay Round on terms they favored”. They both “withdrew from the GATT 1947 obligations (including its MFN guarantee) to countries that did not accept the Final Act and join the WTO.”32 In that sense Sbragia adds: “Not surprisingly, most states decided to join the WTO to ensure that the two largest markets in the world would not exclude them from the benefits of the Most Favored Nation (MFN) guarantee.”33 The EU’s key role continued after the establishment of the WTO. It is one of the few most developed economies among WTO members. At the same time
27 Sbragia, A. (2009) The EU, the US, and Trade Policy: Competitive Interdependence In the Management of Globalization. European Union Studies Association 11th Biennial Conference, Marina Del Rey, California, April 23-25, 2009, p. 3. 28 Dür, A. Elsig, M. op. cit., p. 326. 29 Sbragia, A. op. cit., p. 4. 30 Ibidem. 31 Ibidem, p. 5. 32 Barton, J. H., Goldstein, J., Josling, T.E., and Steinberg, R.H. (2006) The Evolution of the Trade Regime: Politics, Law, and Economics of the GATT and the WTO, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 65-66. 33 Sbragia, A. op. cit., p. 5.
560 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the EU is the largest and most comprehensive “group” in the WTO. Therefore, it has strong impact on decision-making through the WTO institutions and organs. The EU also belongs to the so-called “Quadrilateral group” or the “Quad” which is an informal group of “major members” including also the United States, Japan and Canada. That Group has the strongest influence in creating and conducting the WTO policy, and almost each decision within WTO institutions is primarily drafted by that Group.34 Even the Doha Round, the first multilateral trade negotiations round in the WTO, was largely proposed by the EU.35 How important “player” the EU in the WTO is, can be ascertained through the number of disputes which the EU has been involved in. Namely, from 478 disputes that have been brought to the WTO dispute settlement procedure, the EU participated, or participate, in 312 (in 91 as a complaint, in 78 as a respondent and in 143 as a third party), which amounts to 65 per cent of all disputes within WTO. One of the reasons why the EU has been complained against by other members so often was that it has not implemented all obligations it entered into under WTO agreements. Dür and Elsig indicate the fact that between 1995 and mid-2010, 70 cases were brought against the EU under the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism. On the other hand, the EU continues to use trade remedies to restrict imports of certain goods (a practice that is consistent with WTO law).36
3.3. Тhe First Big Challenge for the EU in the WTO The WTO which the EU had so strongly supported could clearly be used to constrain the EU itself.37 The WTO was used by other members, backed by
34 Since the turn of the century and the launch of the Doha Round, developing countries’ voices have increased considerably, bringing in and — and as a representative of the Cairns Group. remains in the picture not only in its own right, but also as a member of the G-10 group in agriculture. Since 2005, four, five or six of the following have got together to try to break deadlocks, particularly in agriculture: Australia, Brazil, European Union, India, Japan, United States. They have been called “the new Quad”, the “Four/Five Interested Parties” (FIPS), the “Quint” and the “G-6.” The Doha Round was suspended in July 2006 because the six could not agree. Afterwards an alternative group of six, sometimes called the “non-G-6” or the “Oslo Group” tried their hand at compromise, sometimes listed in reverse order to emphasize their “alternative” nature — Norway, New Zealand, Kenya, Indonesia, Chile, Canada. 35 See: Kerremans, B. (2004) What went wrong in ? A principal-agent view on the EU’s rationale towards the Doha Development Round, European Foreign Affairs Review 9(3) pp. 63-393, p. 371. 36 Dür, A. Elsig, M. op. cit., p. 326. 37 Sbragia, A. op. cit., p. 10.
561 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the US, to challenge the EU’s long standing preferential trade relationships with the ACP countries (The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States). That happened in the famous Bananas Case38 before the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism. In February 1996, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and the United States filed a legal complaint against the European Union’s banana import regime, which had been in force since July 1993, claiming that it unfairly restricted the entry of their bananas to the EU. The US defended the interests of the US company Chiquita Brands and joined the legal battle. The complainants argued that the EU’s banana import regime was inconsistent with the WTO rules, particularly with non-discrimination principle (most favored nation and national treatment). “The non-reciprocal preferences that the EU granted the ACP states had already been controversial during the Tokyo Round, and the WTO provided a forum within which they could be successfully questioned. Imported bananas provided the material for such a challenge, as they were imported into the EU both from ACP countries and from Latin American producers. The preferences granted to ACP bananas as opposed to bananas from all developing countries were open to litigation.”39 In September 1997, the WTO ruled that the EU’s banana import regime was inconsistent with the WTO rules. As Sbragia observes: “Non-reciprocal preferences were no longer legitimate; preferential trade relations with selected developing countries were no longer acceptable.”40
4. The Relationship Between the WTO law and the EU law Basic Observations The WTO law and the EU law both represent complex and autonomous legal systems with significant heritage. They both developed in the same period of time (from the 1950s) and evolved from certain predecessors (GATT 47 and European Communities). According to Cvetković, law of the WTO, which was established with the principal aim to define and build the universally acceptable and applicable regulatory framework for international trade, inevitably had to come into interaction with the rules of other legal systems, especially with those which
38 Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Regime for the Importation, and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R, adopted 25 September 1997, DSR 1997:II, 591. 39 Sbragia, A. op. cit., p. 9. 40 Ibidem, p. 9.
562 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century had the similar ratio beyond their foundation.41 The example of such system is the system of the EU law. The central question with relationship between WTO law and EU law is attached to the issue of “direct effect“ of WTO rules in the EU legal system. In that part, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has played important role by its doctrine. According to Cottier and Schefert “direct effect” is used to mean “that a private person in a state (or Union, respectively) may base a claim in, and be granted relief from, the domestic courts of that state against another private person or the state on the basis of the state’s obligations under an international treaty. Such claims can be made without a transformation of the obligation by national or regional rule-makers. They may equally be made against implementing legislation on grounds that such legislation is not compatible with international law.”42
4.1. The GATT Dilemma According to Berkey, whether the ECJ should permit enforcement of the GATT provisions within the EU legal system is a difficult question to answer.43 Nevertheless, even from the GATT 47 era, the ECJ has been refusing to do so. Cottier and Schefert point to the two main arguments that the Court has consistently used for denying the direct effect of the GATT: (i) the GATT has been considered to be an instrument of negotiations, rather than adjudication; and (ii) the GATT’s provisions are not considered to be sufficiently precise for the purpose of direct effect.44 The first situation where the ECJ dealt with the issue of the enforcement of the GATT 47 provisions was in the case International Fruit Company45 which dates from 1970s. The ECJ held that individuals could not enforce GATT 47 provisions because the agreement lacked direct effect and is based on reciprocal and mutually concessions. The Court reached this conclusion based on a
41 Cvetković, P. (2009) Odnos komunitarnog prava i prava Svetske trgovinske oraganizacije: osnovna razmatranja. Međunarodna konferencija Regionalna saradnja u oblasti građanskog sudskog postupka sa međunarodnim elementom, Banja Luka, Pravni fakultet, p. 251-252. 42 Cottier, T. Schefert, K. N. (1998) The relationship between World Trade Organization Law, National and Regional Law, Journal of International Economic Law, Volume 1, 1998, p. 91. 43 Berkey, J. O. (1998), The European Court of Justice and Direct Effect for the GATT: A Question Worth Revisiting, European Journal of International Law 9, p. 626. 44 Cottier, T. Schefert, K. N. again cited, p. 102. See: Case C-469/93, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Chiquita Italia SpA [1995], ECR 1-4558. 45 Joined Cases 21-24/72, International Fruit Company NV and Others v. Produktschap voor Groenten en Fruit, [1972] ECR 1219.
563 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century consideration of the spirit, general scheme and the terms of the General Agreement.46 The Court held: “This agreement (GATT) which, according to its preamble, is based on the principle of negotiations undertaken on the basis of ‘reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements’ is characterized by the great flexibility of its provisions, in particular those conferring the possibility of derogation, the measures to be taken when confronted with exceptional difficulties and the settlement of conflicts between the contracting parties.”47 The ECJ used International Fruit Company as a precedent48 and ruled that both individuals and Member States cannot challenge the Community’s act in regard to its non-compliance with the GATT provisions. It concluded that “those features of GATT, from which the Court concluded that an individual within the Community cannot invoke it in a court to, also preclude the Court from taking provisions of GATT into consideration to assess the lawfulness of a regulation in an action brought by a Member State.”49 According to Berkey, the Court “consistently held that the nature and structure of the GATT 47 precluded any of its provisions from having direct effect.”50
4.2. Exceptions from the principle of non-recognizing the direct effect Although the ECJ denied direct effect to the GATT 47, it did allow some of the agreement’s provisions to have legal significance within the Community.51 First, GATT 47 provisions could be used to interpret the meaning of Community legislation which expressly referred to those provisions. The ECJ held in Fediol III52 that the GATT 47 Article 3 prohibition against discriminatory taxes could be used to interpret the meaning of illicit commercial practices under the Community’s New Commercial Policy Instrument Regulation because this regulation required the Community to comply with its international obligations. The Court stated that “the GATT provisions have an
46 Ibidem, p. 1227. 47 Ibidem. 48 Berkey, J. O. op. cit., p. 628. 49 Case G-280/93, Federal Republic of Germany v. Council of the European Union, [1994] I ECR 4973 at 5073. 50 Berkey, J. O. op. cit., p. 628. 51 Ibidem. 52 Case 70/87, EEC Seed Crushers’ and Oil Processors’ Federation (FEDIOL III) v. EC Commission, [1989] ECR 1781.
564 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century independent meaning which for the purposes of their application in specific cases, is to be determined by way of interpretation”.53 Second, the GATT 47 provisions can be used to interpret Community’s legislation when that legislation implemented a specific GATT 47 provision. In Nakajima54 the Court held that the “GATT 47 Anti-dumping Code could be used as grounds for reviewing the legality of an anti-dumping margin determined under the Community’s Basic Anti-dumping Regulation.”55 The Court held that this was possible because the regulation “was adopted in accordance with existing international obligations; in particular those arising from Article VI of the GATT and from the Anti-Dumping Code”.56
4.3. The question of direct effect in the WTO era The relationship between the WTO law and the EU law is to some extent continuation of the GATT-EEC legal dialogue which had been established prior to the WTO agreement entering into force (GATT 47 era).57 Such (rather negative) position is confirmed in the Preamble of the Council Decision concerning the conclusion of WTO agreement and its annexes.58 Namely, it was declared that the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization, including the Annexes thereto, is not susceptible to being directly invoked in Community or Member State courts. Politically, the courts have been discouraged from reassessing the situation under the WTO Agreements by the Council Decision.59 In respect with the ECJ doctrine in the WTO era, according to Berkey, the decisions in the GATT 47 era constitute the Court’s doctrine towards the GATT 94: “The current ECJ doctrine continues to hold that the GATT 94 lacks direct effect and only has legal significance when Community legislation expressly refers to, or is intended to implement, specific GATT 94 provisions.“60 The same holds for other WTO agreements as well.
53 Ibidem, at 1831. 54 Case 69/89, Nakajima All Precision Co Ltd v. Council of the European Communities, [1991] I ECR 2069. 55 Berkey, J. O. op. cit., p. 628. 56 Nakajima Case at 2178. 57 Cvetković, P. op. cit., p. 253. 58 Council Decision 94/800/EC concerning the conclusion on behalf of the European Community, as regards matters within its competence, of the agreements reached in the Uruguay Round multilateral negotiations (1986-1994). 59 Cottier, T. Schefert, K. N. op. cit., p. 106. 60 Berkey, J. O. again cited, p. 628. See for example: Case C-280/93, Germany v. Council (1994), ECR-14973, para. 109; Case C-53/96 Hermés International v. FHT Marketing Choice BV [1998] ECR I-3603 para. 35.
565 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
The ECJ’s GATT direct effect doctrine has been criticized on many grounds.61 Kuilwijk claims that it is “one of its most seriously criticized doctrines ever” and concludes that the Court should grant direct effect to the GATT 94.62 Nevertheless, the acceptance of certain norms’ direct effect in the EU law order is always the result of the political decision.63 We must have in mind that the GATT 94 is specifically designed to manage trade relations between sovereign entities, and not to protect individual rights. That is one more reason why the concept of direct effect should not be applied to that agreement, even though it is true that the effects of the world trade rules are felt by individuals. In that regard, Berkey contends that the question of whether the GATT 94 should have direct effect is complex and observes: “The GATT 94 is a constitutional agreement [...] However, it adopts a different set of economic goals [...] The GATT 94 is also an international agreement of the Community. However it establishes a regulatory structure which is different from that established by the other international agreements into which the Community has entered. [...] On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that the agreement does contain clear and precise obligations to which all the members have agreed. The GATT 94 has introduced a dispute resolution system which mandates the resolution of conflicts between members in a rule-based manner. And, in the end, it is true that the effects of the world trade rules are felt by individuals. However, the fact that individuals are ultimately affected by seemingly clear rules should not be enough by itself to conclude that there should be individual rights of enforcement.”64 In addition, critics of direct effect also rely upon arguments and concerns of reciprocity in the light of the fact that direct effect is not available in most members of the WTO, and in particular the USA.65 As Bogdandy observes, “In cases of unilateral direct effect, the European legal order would often find itself in the position of unilaterally applying the more liberal WTO provisions to an imported product while the equivalent domestic product was subject to more stringent national rules.”66 Finally, the WTO is international organization par excellence, which is based on the principle of concessions and reciprocity, whereas the EU is supranational
61 Ibidem, p. 629. 62 Kuilwijk, K. J. (1996), The European Court of Justice and the GATT Dilemma. 63 Cvetković, P. op. cit., p. 251. 64 Berkey, J. O. op. cit., p. 656. 65 Cottier, T. Schefert, K. N. op. cit., p. 99. 66 Bogdandy, A. von (2008), Pluralism, direct effect, and the ultimate say: On the relationship between international and domestic constitutional law, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Vol. 6, Issue 3-4, 2008, p. 410.
566 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century regional sui generis organization where concessions and reciprocity are overcome as a concepts long time ago.
Conclusion Both the EU and the WTO are specific organizations with specific law systems. The EU represents regional supranational organization with the highest level of interstate integration comparing with other regional organizations. From the other side, the basic function of the WTO is establishing the rules that provide secure and predictable multilateral trade system and ensuring compliance with those rules. The European Union has been a WTO member since its formation on 1 January 1995. Even though the EU is not a state, that fact does not prevent it to be a single member of the WTO, because it is a single custom territory. Before the Lisbon Treaty, the EU did not have exclusive competence for all trade aspects covered by the WTO agreements. At the time of negotiating WTO agreement, the CCP had narrower scope. After the Lisbon Treaty, all aspects of trade finally became exclusive competence of the EU. The EU is economic and trade “giant” which possesses important power in creating world trade and economy. As such, the EU is one of the “key players” in the WTO. Both the EU and the WTO law represent complex and autonomous law systems with similar evolutive history and rich heritage. It caused inevitable “overlapping” of those legal systems. The central question with relationship between WTO law and EU law is related to the issue of “direct effect“ of WTO rules in the EU legal system. The ECJ denied direct effect to the GATT 47. Such negative position is later confirmed in the Preamble of Council Decision concerning the conclusion of the WTO agreement and its annexes as well. Nevertheless, the acceptance of certain norms’ direct effect in the Community order is always the result of the political decision. The main argument of opponents for granting the WTO norms direct effect is that the WTO is international organization par excellence, which is based on the principle of concessions and reciprocity, together with the argument that the GATT 94 is not designed to protect individual rights.
567 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Mikhail M. LOBANOV1 Jelena ZVEZDANOVIĆ LOBANOVA2
NEW WORLD ORDER AND POST-SOVIET BORDER ISSUES: AN ECONOMIC POTENTIAL OF THE RUSSIAN- UKRAINIAN BORDER REGION
Abstract: The dissolution of the USSR resulted in the formation of a new system of interrelations in the post-Soviet space. Among the most crucial problems were border issues between the republics of the former USSR, including the development of local cooperation and economic revitalization of the border areas. Since internal boundaries became external the border regions of the newly independent states transformed their functions from contact to barrier ones. Bilateral relations concerning border issues are still strained in some cases, but the major territory of border zones could be considered potentially favorable for cooperation. The present article is focused on the problems of the economic development of the frontier Russian and Ukrainian regions which were separated by the border in the early of 1990s as well as on the specificity of mutual investments and industrial organization located in the proximity of the common border. The economic potential of the border region is investigated taking into account the events of the Ukraine crisis and the recent developments in the Russian-Ukrainian relations that have radically influenced the prospective of bilateral cooperation. Key words: New World Order, post-Soviet borders, Russia, Ukraina.
1. Transformation of the world order concept and its projection on the Ukraine crisis The contemporary world order should be considered (in spite of its formal definition) changeable and unsustainable system of multi-scale interrelations between different actors or their groupings. Recently, the number of various
1 Mikhail M. Lobanov, Ph.D., Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. 2 Jelena Zvezdanović Lobanova, MA, Research Assistant, Institute of Social Sciences, Belgrade.
568 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century challenges for global political architecture has significantly increased, including of those in the regions of latent conflicts. Experts say that the concept of world order has to be modernized on the basis of modern geopolitical situation. For instance, former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believes that concept of world order has been exclusively defined by the West since World War II. The global leadership of America helped to reach the main aim of international order – to spread the Western system of values.3 Thus, the second half of XX century could be considered as a period of initial formation of global world order.4 Professor of international law Eric Posner believes that U.S. did not use a chance to preserve its legal norms “during its brief period of global hegemony” – since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The period of enthusiasm concerning the replacement of the former bipolar system by new world order is coming to the end. Posner writes that this order is breaking down due to weakening of U.S. global hegemony.5 The weak point of the model of world order designed by the West is underestimation of the variety of geopolitical codes and the extent of other regions inclusion in the proposed political architecture. Kissinger assumes that Ukraine crisis, in particular, reveals the fact that Western concept of order is not accepted worldwide.6 Posner reckons that most of non-West countries traditionally rejected the norms of proposed international legal system, as, for example, China and Russia did. More to say, this rejection may stemmed from the fact that in the post-Cold War period the sole superpower forced these countries to obey international law. According to Posner, “the rules were Western rules” not reflected “universal human values”, so the liberal world order “rested on a fiction”. Confrontation between states could also be the result of balance-of-power principles prevail (as it happens, for example, between present and potential great powers in Asia). In the current world order great powers have no effective mechanisms to cooperate (even at international forums) in order to avoid tensions. According to Kissinger, common purpose that underpins world order
3 Kissinger, Henry. World Order. The Penguin Press, 2014. 4 Huntington, Samuel P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York, Simon & Schuster, 1996. 5 Posner Eric, A. Sorry, America, the New World Order is Dead. / Foreign Policy. May 6, 2014. [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/05/06/sorry_america_the_new_world_ord er_is_dead_russia_ukraine]. 6 Henry Kissinger on the Assembly of a New World Order / The Wall Street Journal. Aug. 29, 2014. [http://online.wsj.com/articles/henry-kissinger-on-the-assembly-of-a-new-world- order-1409328075].
569 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century is not obvious in the conditions of clash between globalized economic system and nation-state political system of the world. To sum up, the contemporary concept of world order is in crisis. Inadequacy of current world order may lead to struggle between regions with different structure of governance (that could be more exhausting that the struggle between nations, Kissinger argues). The only solution is to implement a concept which brings different regional orders together. It means transformation of U.S. foreign policy that should be based not only on Western principles but the recognition of specifics of other regions and their system of values. Russian political scientist F. Luk’yanov argues that the dissolution of the Soviet Union marked the end of balance-of-power period but new world order since 1991 has not been established. Apparently the author takes into consideration the sense of term ‘order’ – disposition of some things according to a particular pattern, – and in this regard interprets the situation in world politics as disorder. Just after the Cold War, great powers had an intention to build up global political architecture, but later it became clear that globalization process was still out of the control.7 Instead, U.S. could manage to structure and govern only separate regions. Henry Kissinger recognizes the difference in the attitude of Russia and the Western countries towards Ukraine crisis. He argues that the “the ideal solution” would be to consider Ukraine as a buffer area between the two sides. In other words, the current world order will have more chances to remain stable if Ukraine sticks to nonaligned status as it did before. F. Luk’yanov explains the reaction of the West by historical heritage from Cold War period. In order to secure status quo on global political arena Western countries have to respond to the change of the “rules of the game”. It is expected that armistice and future negotiations between great powers could be a starting point for the formation of new world order.
2. Legal issues of Post-Soviet delimitation of border (the case of Russia and Ukraine) Russia realized on practice the principle of continuity of the USSR legal personality.8 It became possible not only on the basis of international recognition,
7 Лукьянов Ф.А. Принуждение к новому миру / Газета.ru, 4 марта 2014. [http://www. gazeta.ru/comments/column/lukyanov/5935113.shtml]. Лукьянов Ф.А. Игра в мировой порядок / Россия в глобальной политике, 4 июля 2007. [http://globalaffairs.ru/redcol /n_8898]. 8 According to international law, there are two types of succession: universal succession (complete transfer of sovereignty from predecessor to successor state) and liquidation of
570 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century but also due to stand of new sovereign states. Being active in the inheritance partition process, Russia could gather the Soviet overseas assets in exchange for taking sole responsibility for payment of foreign debt. Obligations and rights specified in international treaties of the USSR, including those concerning nuclear weapon, were the issue of multilateral and bilateral negotiations between the CIS countries9. Regulation of open questions concerning the delimitation of borders between Russia and new independent states took time, but it seemed that most of the problems with disputed boundaries were successfully settled. The future of regulation process became less clear after Crimean referendum (March 2014) and Ukrainian crisis in general. Breakup of the USSR led to uncertainty in the borders delimitation. The urgent problem was to determine rights and obligations concerning the border issue (in particular, borders between new sovereign states that considered as internal boundaries before the Soviet Union collapse). International law generally paid little attention to the theoretical basis of succession in respect to boundaries, mostly because of wide implementation of conditio sine qua non principle (indispensible condition) which was interpreted as constancy of borders in the transition of sovereignty rights. However, border issues have specific importance due to their conflict potential as it was proved by the latest developments in Russian-Ukrainian relations. The most usual delimitation measure is based on uti possidetis concept – the borders before and after the change of the legal status (e.g. independence) should remain the same. In spite of the worldwide spread, it is believed that this concept has no clear legal content and does not rely on the categories of international law. Uti possidetis acquires the nature of legal principle only when becomes a part of the broader principle of the inviolability of borders. A number of authors emphasize that there is a contradiction between the uti possidetis principle and the right of peoples to self-determination. For the reasons of stability new independent states had to recognize the borders existed before the USSR breakup. In the ‘Agreement on the establishment
previous state with the establishment of new state sovereignty. In the second case, transfer of rights and obligations is limited to the border treaties only. Besides that, law enforcement practice in international relations often refers to continuity concept. In contrast to succession concept based on transfer of rights and obligations continuity theory means continuity of the state as a subject of international law (in other words, the continuity of its rights and obligations). After the Soviet Union dissolution, there were two options for legal recognition of Russian Federation – as a successor state or as a state that continues international legal personality of the USSR. 9 For details see: Kulikova, N., Lobanov, M. International legal issues of the USSR inheritance partition / „Regulisanje otvorenih pitanja između država sukcesora SFRJ”, Institut za medjunarodnu politiku i privredu, Beograd, 2013, pp. 109-124.
571 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of the Commonwealth of Independent States’ (08.12.1991) this approach was reflected: “The High Contracting Parties recognize and respect the territorial integrity of each other and the inviolability of the existing borders”10. According to Russian Law ‘On the state border of Russian Federation’ (01.04.1993)11, the state border corresponds to the boundary of RSFSR which was legally fixed by international agreements and the Soviet documents. However, some borderlines had been disputed between Russia and its neighbors since of the USSR breakup. The most radical changes in border delimitation followed the conflict in Georgia (2008) and Crimean referendum (2014)12. These facts empirically refute the principle in international law called estoppel, when the state loses the right to plead the invalidity of the treaty in case if it agreed with the status quo for long time. In other words, the possible territorial claims of the former Soviet republics to each other should become less and less valid with the course of time. But, this is not happening. An Agreement on the Russian–Ukrainian border was signed in January 2003, but Ukraine intentionally delayed with ratification. The process was obviously accelerated by the construction of the dam from Russian Taman peninsula towards Ukrainian town Kerch. This construction caused a conflict over the ownership of Tuzla Island in Kerch Strait (in September and October 2003)13. In April 2004, Russia and Ukraine ratified the agreement on the border. The status quo was maintained almost ten years – until the referendum in Crimea in March 2014.
3. Russian–Ukrainian border region: The pre-crisis potential for cooperation and the present situation Spatial structure and other characteristics of Russian-Ukrainian border region became more uncertain since the escalation of political crisis in Ukraine in 2014. The aim of this paper is to single out pre-crisis factors of economic
10 Соглашение о создании Содружества Независимых Государств от 8 декабря . 11 Закон РФ от 1 апреля . № 4730-I „О Государственной границе Российской Федерации”. 12 The transformation of the post-Soviet territory map is sometimes legitimated by the priority of the right of the peoples to self-determination. Criticism of this position is based on the principle of priority of the territorial integrity of states (the United Nations Charter, 1945). Besides that, the problems of newly independent states recognition could end up with their international isolation and further conflicts over territorial claims. 13 Since 1941 an island was a part of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic belonged to RSFSR, but in 1954 was gifted to Ukraine together with Crimean peninsula. After the declaration of independence, Ukraine became the sole owner of the Kerch Strait and started to charge ships that pass the strait, including Russian ones. Russia could deepen
572 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century cooperation in the given area, to determine the main branches of cross-border investment flows and leading centers of industrial growth. It should be noticed that the recent developments in Russian-Ukrainian relations radically influenced the potential of economic partnership in the region. It is not an overstatement to say that mutual contacts have limited to the lowest level ever. In order to predict the directions of economic cooperation recovery the authors consider the situation at important industrial objects which were directly or indirectly affected by the military conflict. The investigation results are based on the data collected before the Ukraine crisis14, and therefore the border region is defined correspondingly the situation before Crimean referendum. It means that the considered border area consists of Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh, Rostov regions of Russia and Chernigov, Sumy, Kharkov, Lugansk and Donetsk regions of Ukraine. The key investigation method is mapping: several maps showing the structure of mutual investments and industrial production were made for this article. Map analysis makes possible determination of local features of production objects distribution and, in particular, estimation the achievements in industrial clusters formation.
a. Geoeconomic characteristics of the border region Russian-Ukrainian border region has a prospective for self-organization and modeling of clusters and spatial-production complexes. There are over 15 major industrial centers and dozens of medium centers in this area (characterized by a high level of branch diversification and stable cooperation links between companies). An important factor of cooperation development is territorial proximity of industrial agglomerations (such as Kharkov and Belgorod, production centers of Donbass on both sides of the border). The examples of successful investment projects (Donetsk, Lugansk, Kharkov, Sumy, Rostov regions) support thesis of high potential for industrial complex formation in the border area. The space between the basic production knots of the middle part of the Russian-Ukrainian border region (Kursk, Voronezh, Kharkov / Belgorod, Rossosh’, Sumy) is “filled” with existing industrial enterprises to a significantly higher extent than, for example, in the Russian- Belarusian border region. This feature makes possible prediction of cross- border clusters formation. A kind of axiom for industrial production
its shallow channel and make it navigable. The construction of the dam was halted after the meeting of Russian and Ukrainian presidents: in December 2003 they signed a ‘Treaty on cooperation in use of the Azov Sea and Kerch Strait’ that established the freedom of navigation for commercial and military ships of both countries. 14 Data set includes statistics from the national and regional statistical offices, local administrations and companies.
573 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century concentration is the agglomeration of Donbass (at least 60 industrial centers and knots) that was economically linked with Russian border regions for many decades. Ukraine crisis in 2014, besides triggering the humanitarian disaster, resulted in unprecedented transformation of economy spatial structure. The transport network of the Russian-Ukrainian border region is characterized by a high extension and the presence of not only the main, but minor railways and roads. The only part of the border region with a low density of roads divides agricultural areas of Lugansk, Rostov and Voronezh regions. Overall, the features of transport infrastructure are sufficient for the formation of industrial complexes. Social, cultural and historical factors traditionally play a key role in the development of integration processes in the border regions of Russia and Ukraine. Their manifestation largely enhances contact functions of the border between Belgorod and Kharkov regions, as well as Donetsk, Lugansk and Rostov regions. Integration projects development and cluster modeling in the region should be done with an eye to the phenomenon of structural inertia of industrial production organization, when the territorial structure changes slowly over time, and thus, “inherits” some elements of previous stages of industrialization. Features of the present-day industry location could be often explained by the influence of previous economic or administrative boundaries. This thesis is well illustrated by the projection of the Chernigov guberniya / province borders (1802-1919) on the modern grid of administrative territorial division.15 Taking into account the thesis of existence of territorial structure inertia, we can make the following particular conclusion: the development of industrialization programs and economic integration of border areas will be less effective without considering the peculiarities of earlier delimitation (see Map 1).
15 The ‘imaginary’ administrative border that was abolished long time ago still divides modern Bryansk region on western and eastern parts, and Sumy region – on northern and southern parts. It should be underlined that in the 20th century industrial centers and knots of these parts developed mostly independently from the regional centers. A similar conclusion can be drawn based on analysis of demographic indicators, such as migratory activity or ethnic composition of population.
574 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Diversification of industry branch structure allows predicting the development of clusters and spatial-production complexes characterized by variety of cooperated industries. Euroregion “Slobozhanshchyna” has the most favorable conditions for the formation of the first single-industry clusters (which could become more complex territorial entities in future). Among the main factors of dynamic development of Belgorod region is attraction of investments in agro- processing, that helps to expand the existed agro-industrial centers (Belgorod, Alekseevka Shebekino, Valuyki) and to form the new ones (Korocha). Production concentration in the neighboring Kharkov region is significantly higher: city of
575 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Kharkov forms an industrial agglomeration of monocentric type that produces a wide range of goods. In general, these two regions have a set of complementary industries, which could provide stimulus for interregional economic cooperation. The industries that can be represented in the cross-border territorial-production complexes include mechanical engineering, metalworking, construction materials and food industry. See Map 2 below:
576 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Among the most important contact zones of Russian-Ukrainian border region are Donbass and Priazov’ye (Azov Sea littoral). An optimal combination of factors for complex formation can be found in the following areas: Lugansk / Alchevsk – Kamensk-Shahtinskiy / Krasniy Sulin / Shahty and Donetsk / Makeevka – Rostov-on-Don / Taganrog. Bearing in mind the peculiarities of specialization and high market capacity of three regions (more than 10 million people), the potential for involvement in complex formation have businesses related to food and apparel industries, metalworking, construction materials industry, production of household chemical goods, electronics and electrical engineering (see Map 2).
b. Production links and investment cooperation in the border region An important aspect of cross-border economic relations is dynamic of investment flows and development of intercompany cooperation, with a particular attention to the enterprises with traditional production and technological links. The evolution of interfirm relations in the real sector of the economy, despite the long-term deindustrialization process, clearly reflects the nature of economic relations in the border region. Transformation of the sectoral structure of industry at the first stages of market reforms was caused by the collapse of a number of unprofitable industries involved in interstate cooperation and trade relations. Financial stability deterioration of the frontier companies had a negative impact on the scale of their investment activity. The companies situated in the largest economic centers were mainly involved in the process of capital export. Russia plays a role of the main donor of capital and takes part in the majority of cooperation agreements in the post-Soviet space. An important task is to increase the activity of investors in the rapidly developing industries, which have specialization in the production of goods with high added value. However, the Russian investment expansion in the region can contribute to technological upgrading of enterprises only in a very slight extent, as well as the direct investment inflows likely preserves the existing structure of Russian industry. Prospects for the export of Russian capital mainly depend on the peculiarities of the domestic TNCs development. Some of them have potential for successful functioning on competitive markets and progressively develop the network of production and service enterprises in the region. The number of Ukrainian companies engaged in investment activities in Russia is significantly lower. It should be noticed that for some of them the development strategy on the Russian market was based on the purchase of production capacities, because the imposed trade barriers negatively influenced their export potential. The state also contributes to the increase of intercompany cooperation level, particularly in strategically important branches of machine building (e.g.
577 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century armament production). The state policy of self-reliance led to isolation of drafting departments and industrial enterprises of the former Soviet republics. But, later the Russian government has initiated a number of mutual projects (mainly with Ukrainian companies) for inclusion of foreign partners in the production chain of the local arms industries. The other purpose of “artificial” formation of joint ventures (in aircraft construction, shipbuilding, aerospace industry etc.) was the indirect support of state corporations. From the other side, the policy of lost cooperation links restoration implemented before the Ukraine crisis was combined with the efforts to stimulate import substitution in the areas of promoted cooperation. It is obvious that for development of industrial cooperation political elites sometimes needed a certain level of mutual trust. Production of various types of weapons by joint ventures is one of the most remarkable forms of cooperation development. Projects in military-industrial complex have national status and they usually involve several firms of narrow specialization. Leading drafting bureaus and research-and-production departments in Russia and Ukraine are located in capital cities and other large settlements with high scientific potential (in case of border region – in Kiev, Kharkov, Voronezh, etc.). Pre-crisis potential of bilateral cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in military-industrial sphere could be explained by traditional specialization of both countries in the production of certain types of military equipment, assemblies and parts.16 Ukraine was a supplier of components for armament production at Russian plants (including aircraft manufacturing, shipbuilding, rocket production and aerospace industry). In particular, Ukraine is a regional leader in the production of gas turbine engines for helicopters (“Motor Sich” company from Zaporozhye, which owns one plant in border region – in Snezhnoye near Donetsk) and power installations for ships and naval vessels (“Zorya-Mashproekt” company from Nikolaev). Besides that, Ukraine has technological superiority in development of military transport aircrafts (Kiev- based concern “Antonov”), aircraft engines (“Motor Sich” and “Ivchenko- Progress ZMKB” from Zaporozhye), some types of armors and missile systems. It is noteworthy that the majority of assemblies and components for these industries Ukraine imported from Russia (for example, 80% of components for aircraft engines). In addition, there was a practice of so-called joint export of Russian helicopters and Ukrainian helicopter engines to other countries.
16 Before 2014 around 70% of Ukrainian companies of military-industrial complex used assemblies imported from Russia. According to official figures, Ukraine export of armament to Russia decreased in 1994-2010 from 620 to 64 million USD. Spatial structure of export has significantly diversified since 1990s: nowadays Russia is the fifth export partner for Ukraine, whereas after the collapse of the USSR it was the main one (with share exceeded 2/3).
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Ukrainian “Motor Sich” and its Russian competitor “Klimov” company (manufacturer of gas turbine engines) have approximately equal shares in the structure of supply to the Russian helicopter assembly factories (Canadian “Pratt&Whitney” is also represented on the market). The contract with the Ukrainian supplier was signed for 2012-16. At the same time cooperation with Ukraine partner was perceived in Russia as a dangerous dependence on external supplier. That is why in the mid-2000s St. Petersburg plant of “Klimov” company launched production of helicopter engines similar to Ukrainian ones. Furthermore, in order to make possible the refusal to import engines from Ukraine a new plant was built in St. Petersburg. The most important project of cooperation in machine-building before the Ukraine crisis was the agreement between Russian “United Aircraft Corporation” (UAC) and Ukrainian state company “Antonov” on joint production of the “An” aircraft models – heavy transport aircraft An-124 (“Ruslan”), military transport aircraft An-70, cargo-passenger plane An-140 and passenger plane An-148. It was expected that the joint venture would have only administrative functions, but in 2011, the sides started negotiations on the inclusion of production units in it, namely plants “Aviant” (Kiev), “Aviastar” (Ul’yanovsk) and “VASO” (Voronezh). Participation of Kiev and Voronezh plants in the joint project could develop cooperation in the aerospace industry of the Russian-Ukrainian border region (“Antonov” and UAC also hold aircraft plants in Kharkov and Taganrog). However, according to “VASO” performance reports the production of passenger plane An-148 remains unprofitable (in 2009-2011 12 aircrafts were assembled for customers from Russia and North Korea). Noteworthy that the engines for Ukrainian aircrafts assembled in Russia were produced by Zaporozhye-based “Motor Sich” and “Ivchenko-Progress ZMKB”. Some joint projects were realized in rocket production and aerospace industry. Among them is the establishment of JV “Kosmotrans” (in 1997) which developed carrier rocket “Dnepr” (on the basis of liquidated Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles) to launch satellites from cosmodromes “Baikonur” and “Yasniy”. This joint venture united companies from Moscow, St. Petersburg, Dnepropetrovsk and Kharkov. Since the late 1990s Russian and Ukrainian enterprises have been members of the international consortium “Sea Launch” using mobile maritime platform for launches of commercial satellites on “Zenit” rockets. This rocket was designed and manufactured in Dnepropetrovsk (about 2/3 of components for its production imported from Russia). In 2010, Russian RSC “Energia” received the control of this maritime platform. The permanent problem for the development of joint projects in the military-industrial sector was frequent politicization of any negotiations on possible cooperation. Russian authorities stimulated programs of import substitution for certain types of components, explaining this position by the
579 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century risk from possible membership of Ukraine in NATO, while the Ukrainian side avoided the agreements on cooperation linked to the issue of accession to the Customs Union. In 2014, the Ukrainian crisis has resulted in refusal of any cooperation in the military-industrial complex, and the restoration of the lost potential of mutual relations may take a lot of time, if possible. The analysis of mutual investments shows the domination of Russian exporters of capital. Strategies of these Russian investors are depended, first of all, on the level of profitability and market position. The proximity of the acquired Ukrainian firms to the state border is not accidental: territorial structure of industry is characterized by production concentration in the close- to-border Eastern regions and capital area. By the way, the geography of the Belarusian investment in Russia (in neighboring Bryansk and Smolensk regions) could be explained by the phenomenon of territorial adjacency. The neighborhood factor also influences investment strategies of the Ukrainian food companies (purchase of assets in the neighboring regions of the first order, such as Kursk region, or second order – Lipetsk region and Stavropol Krai) and machine-building enterprises (investments from Donbass in nearby towns of Rostov region). In general, the main recipients of recent investment in border region were located on Ukrainian territory (city of Kiev and Kiev region, Kharkov, Lugansk and Donetsk regions; see Map 2). Dynamics of mutual investments in civil engineering indicates the development of economic cooperation in the border region. Companies invest abroad to enter emerging markets, cut production costs and optimize their business, but in some cases the acquisition is aimed at getting know-how to narrow technological gap. The most widespread form of partnership is joint ventures; hundreds of specialized plants and factories participate in cooperative programs. The majority of M&A transactions in Ukraine happened in the second half of 2000s, but some businesses became a property of the Russian companies in the period of privatization in 1990s. The biggest enterprise of Ukrainian railway engineering – “Luganskteplovoz” – was sold in 2010 to Russian “Transmashholding”. JSC “Russian Railways” is the main buyer of company’s production, but in 2014 deliveries were stopped. Kharkov tractor plant (the leading company’ on the Ukrainian agricultural engineering market) is owned by Russian “GAZ Group” since 2007. Russian businessmen invest in the production of equipment for the fuel and power industries. For example, “HMS Group” producing pumping equipment for the oil and gas industry had a strategy for consolidation of the companies with the same specialization in a single holding (Sumy-based plants “Nasosenergomash” and “Hydromash” were included in it). Russian holding “Energy standard” bought block of shares in Ukrainian generation and
580 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century distribution companies and invested in energy engineering. The holding controls “Sumyoblenergo” (Sumy; electricity distribution), “Transformator” (Zaporozhye; transformers production), “Turboatom” (Kharkov; production of turbines for power plants) and “Sumy Frunze Machine-building SPA” (Sumy; production of equipment for nuclear power plants). Ukrainian investments in machine-building industry of neighboring Russian regions contributed to the formation of horizontally integrated TNCs. The development strategy of the acquired companies, as usual, involves the increase of export volumes to Ukraine. In this regard, the objects of “greenfield” or “brownfield” investments should be located as close to the border as possible. Therefore, companies from Donbass region were rather active in Rostov region: for instance, an enterprise owned by Ukrainian billionaire R.Akhmetov has a control over the producer of equipment for coal mining in Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy. Company “Nord” launched production at the new plant of refrigeration equipment in Matveev Kurgan located near the border with Ukraine. The branch structure of industry of Russian-Ukrainian border region is characterized by a significant share of ferrous metallurgy which had a high level of investment attractiveness until the end of the 2000s. Demand for metallurgical assets (which are mostly located in Donetsk and Lugansk regions) decreased with the deterioration of the situation on the world market of ferrous metals, but some foreign businessmen, in contrast, were interested in buying discounted assets. In 2010, the group of Russian investors (including the owners of “Evraz” holding) took over Ukrainian “Industrial Union of Donbas” including its key production facilities – Alchevsk and Dneprodzerzhinsk metallurgical plants. Ukrainian secondary metallurgy plants (in Kiev, Kharkov, etc.) which had been bought by holding “MAIR” in the early 2000s stopped their activities due to the company’s debt. “Donetsk electrometallurgical plant” operated for just a year after the change of owner: the company was acquired by the Russian industrial group “Mechel” in 2011, and in 2012, its work was stopped. Among successful investment projects is the acquisition of the plant for castings and forgings “Energomashspetsstal” (Kramatorsk, Donetsk region) by Russian state company “Atomenergomash”. Oil refining and petrochemical companies from Russia started their expansion on the Ukrainian market in the 1990s. One of the six Ukrainian refineries is located in border region – in Lisichansk (installed capacity is circa 8 million tons of crude oil). In 2000, it was acquired by Russian oil company “TNK” (in 2003-2013 – Russian-British “TNK-BP”, since 2013 – state holding “Rosneft”). Most of oil refineries in Ukraine became unprofitable in the second half of 2000s, just as Lisichansk refinery that temporarily used tolling scheme of production, but was finally suspended it in 2012.
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Foreign investors are also interested in small and medium-sized plants producing organic chemicals, mostly for construction companies or households. As an example of investment inflow in Ukrainian low-tonnage chemistry one can mention a takeover of Kharkov plant “Biolek” by Russian pharmaceutical company “Pharmstandard”. Russian companies are represented on Ukrainian market of building materials. For instance, “Group LSR” owns two production sites close to Kiev (porous concrete, ferroconcrete), while “Eurocement” holding possess two plants in Kharkov and Donetsk regions (cement, roofing slate). As a result of these investments, Russian companies control one-third of Ukrainian cement market. Russian producer of refractory materials for metallurgy “Magnezit” bought the leading Ukrainian plant of the same specialization in township Panteleimonovka near Donetsk. The volume of mutual investments in textile, apparel and footwear industries is limited by the shortage of companies’ financial resources. The only significant exporter of capital is “Gloria Jeans” registered in Rostov region. It is noteworthy that the development strategy of company is based on the establishment of “greenfield” facilities in the neighboring Lugansk and Donetsk regions: eight of nine garment factories belonged to “Gloria Jeans” in these regions are newly built. The factor of territorial adjacency is very important for investment in food and beverages manufacturing. Companies are active abroad in order to develop new markets and gain a foothold on them, especially when they are forced to expand their spatial structure in the conditions of import restrictions. The rules of international food trade in the CIS region are changeable (trade wars are regular occurrence), and in order to avoid the consequences of political tensions companies reduce risks through the acquisition of foreign production facilities. For example, in 2001 Ukrainian company “Roshen” (owned by the current Ukrainian president P. Poroshenko) acquired confectionery factory in Lipetsk mostly to reduce dependence on export to Russian market. In 2004, “Roshen” was followed by another confectionery producer, Donetsk-based company “Konti”, which invested in Kursk factory. Expansion of Russian milk producers on the Ukrainian market began in the first half of the 2000s. “Wimm Bill Dann”, one of the largest dairy producers in Europe, bought two milk-processing factories in Kharkov and near Kiev as well as milk powder factory in Sumy region. Its competitor “Unimilk” company acquired Kiev dairy plant. It should be mentioned, that later both enterprises became the daughter companies of the leading food and beverage TNCs: “Unimilk” merged with French “Danone”, while “Wimm Bill Dann” passed into the ownership of American “PepsiCo”.
582 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
c. Conflict-induce damage in industry of the border region and the results of severance of economic relations. Military conflict has led to drastic deterioration of socio-economic situation in eastern regions of Ukraine. Lack of main means of subsistence de facto caused humanitarian crisis and triggered migration. In such circumstances the maintenance of economic and, in particular, industrial growth remains impossible: some factories and plants were damaged or almost destroyed, the other ones had to suspend production due to the shortage of raw materials. Not to mention export- oriented companies that faced with the obstacles for deliveries abroad. Russian-Ukrainian relations are not far from the lowest point in contemporary history, and the talks about their improvement remain impossible. As for economic sphere, the state-controlled companies have to refuse cooperation with traditional partners over the border. Private enterprises are under administrative pressure and cannot determine their own policy. The thematic example of new obstacles for cooperation is the situation in military- industrial complex. In March 2014, Ukraine officially stopped deliveries of assemblies and parts for Russian munitions factories. After presidential initiative in June to suspend all the forms of military cooperation, Russia started to work out the plan of complete substitution of import of weapons from Ukraine. According to different estimates, the share of Russian firms that will have to find new suppliers varies from 1/10 to 2/3. “NPO Saturn” from Rybinsk manufacturing engines for aircrafts and ocean vessels will become the basic enterprise for realization of the program for imports substitution (total costs exceed 1 billion USD).17 Ukrainian producer of helicopter and aircraft engines “Motor Sich” has one the highest levels of dependence on export contracts with Russia, so its officials are planning to avoid the restrictions (even against presidential decision) by the establishment of joint ventures. The question is if Russian side plans to agree with this proposal, since there were efforts to substitute import of engines even before the crisis. From the other hand, current capacities of Russian factories allow to equip only fifty new helicopters with the engines – a third of the yearly plan defined by arms program.18 It is still impossible to launch production of gas-turbine engines for naval vessels technologically similar to the engines of Ukrainian “Zorya-Mashproekt”. It means slower delivery of new frigates and destroyers for the army and important foreign customers, such as India. The breakup of the ties with Russia will not put “Zorya-Mashproekt” on the brink of closure, since the share of engines in
17 С чувством глубокого замещения / Коммерсантъ – Деньги. 18.08.2014. 18 Военно-промышленный гопак / Огонёк. 30.06.2014.
583 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century company’s total turnover is rather low. An ambitious mutual project “Sea Launch” which enabled to put into orbit more than thirty commercial satellites on Ukrainian “Zenit” rocket will be also suspended due to difficult political situation. Maritime platform in Pacific Ocean will be out of use at least until the end of 2015. Machine-building and metal-processing companies located in the conflict area are also subjects of mutual sanctions. Some of them were damaged as a result of bombardment, like plants in Donetsk region: “Energomashspetsstal”, “KZTS” (both – in Kramatorsk), “DZMM” (Debal’tsevo), etc. First of these plants producing castings and forgings (owned by Russian “Atomenergomash”) will be likely suffer from the losses because Ukrainian officials forbidden state companies to cooperate with it. Due to the current ownership, the plant will not be able to supply Ukrainian thermal power stations with its production19. Lugansk plants producing machinery are also in the list of destroyed industrial objects. The leading railway engineering plant “Luganskteplovoz” (Daughter Company of Russian “Transmashholding” significantly suffered from bombardment and stopped the supply of locomotives on Russian market. It should be mentioned that Ukrainian media accused pro-Russian forces of demounting the equipment from strategic munitions factories, such as “Mashzavod-100” (Lugansk), “Yunost” (Krasnodon), “Tochmash” (Donetsk). Ukrainian food and beverages enterprises are involved in conflict as participants of trade wars. The new rules for activities of confectionary companies on Russian market confirm this thesis. The Federal Service for Supervision of Consumer Rights placed an embargo on import of confectionary produced by Ukrainian “Konti” and “AVK” (btw. total share of Ukrainian producers in import exceeded 1/3). Russian factory of “Roshen” confectionary company in Lipetsk (owned by Ukrainian president P.Poroshenko) faced with production difficulties. At first police investigated “Roshen” activities in Russia and arrested its financial accounts. Some months later Lipetsk factory representatives announced the production suspension due to sales slowdown caused by administrative pressure on retailers in Russian regions.20 Economy of Donbass region is traditionally highly dependent on situation in coal mining, ferrous metallurgy and chemical industry. Some of state and private facilities in these industries suffered from military conflict. For example, every fourth coal mine has been temporary closed and every second mine is exploited partially. Metallurgical plant in Alchevsk had to suspend its production due to the shortage of raw materials. Coke plants in Avdeevka and Yasinovataya were seriously damaged.
19 Украина отказывается от российского атома / Коммерсантъ. 10.06.2014. 20 „Рошен” в тесноте и обиде / Коммерсантъ-Черноземье. 12.09.2014. Запретные сладости / Ведомости. 08.09.2014.
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There are also many chemical plants in the area of armed conflict and in the case of their destruction, the vast territory will be threatened with ecological catastrophe. The leading producer of fertilizers “Stirol” from Gorlovka in Donetsk region had to suspend production in order not to endanger population; the workers disposed of the explosive materials, in particular, ammonia. Lisichansk oil refinery of “Rosneft” was damaged as a result of bombardment, but its facilities had not been used for two years before the incident. Russian company accused Ukrainian competitors (known for financial support of armed formations) of deliberate destruction of its property and intends to claim compensation from the Ukrainian government.21
* * *
The recent change of geopolitical and geoeconomic role of Russian– Ukrainian border region could be one of manifestations of new world order formation. Frontier regions of two countries seem to strengthen their barrier functions to the detriment of contact ones, which stimulated local cooperation and mutual investments. In these conditions, the period for re-establishment of bilateral relations is difficult to predict, not to mention the prospective of economic potential development.
21 “Роснефть” накрыло войной / Коммерсантъ. 21.07.2014.
585 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Pero PETROVIĆ1 Aleksandar ŽIVKOVIĆ2
INTEGRATION PROCESS AND THE SPECIFICITIES OF PLANNING IN AN INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
Abstract: European integration contributes to the change in all industries and economic life is introducing new rules of behavior, new techniques and methods in the operations of all businesses. Planning, as a primary managerial function, includes the definition of the final aims of one organizational unit and the adoption of all-encompassing strategy for the accomplishment of these aims. The next phase in the planning process is the development of a “hierarchy of plans” for integration and coordination of the activities. At all three levels of management, plans are made under the influence of external factors, and this is the primary specificity regarding the planning of international operations. It can be said that for a company which operates internationally, it is of utmost importance that, taking into consideration powers and weaknesses of its system, it recognizes dangers and opportunities in the external surroundings and eventually finds a happy medium. In order to provide an adequate response to the challenges in the external surroundings, a multinational company creates a strategy that serves as a basis for all other forms of planning. Key words: planning, expansion of business activities, international surroundings, strategy.
1. Introduction In the current economic conditions, the positioning of the Serbian economy and its image is not satisfactory. All states are in a position to seek a certain balance between economic independence and the degree of involvement in the
1 Prof. Pero Petrović, Ph.D., Institute of international politics and economics, Belgrade. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011-2015 period. 2 Prof. Aleksandar Živković, Ph.D., Faculty of Economics, Belgrade.
586 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century international economy and an increasing number of economic problems that the national economy cannot be successfully resolved. The exposure to international competition has resulted in an increase in labor productivity in the national economy. There is a common understanding on the factors that should be looked for the roots of the acquisition or the loss of a competitive position. The most commonly mentioned as important factors are economic management, enterprise management, the quality of the national strategy and an understanding of the changes in the factors of success in the international economy. Planning as the most basic management functions is a way to bridge the gap between the current and future operations of every social and business systems or companies. This is especially important for multinational companies that are oriented towards the future, not only through striving towards winning as many international markets, but also to the expansion of business in the global market. Planning mainly takes place on three levels: strategic, tactical and operational.
2. The importance of social planning Social movements are the regulator of economic relations, which is why the system of macroeconomic planning proceeds mainly from the constant changing social needs, in line with the achieved level of development. Under these conditions, the strategic planning of the national economy has dominance over the operational and regional development plans. As for the Serbian terms of macroeconomic development, especially considering many underdeveloped regions, planning must maintain a balance between development and the so- called sustainable risky market to be based on the concept of personal strengths which include the Serbian economy in the current conception of a new international economic order. This means that the comprehensive plan of action provides the power of Serbia as one of the important international division of profits and foreign aid donors on the basis of the detailed projections of investment in the economy and in particular on the development of underdeveloped regions. In the present circumstances, most of the development plans are initially based on more or less formalized macroeconomic models. This means that as planning area (region) less to the need detailzation higher. However, the fundamental question arises: how limited financial and human resources at the macro level planning toward achieving the most productive in terms of long-term effects of improving the economic performance of underdeveloped regions? Just macroeconomic planning, as the basis of controlled socio-economic development reflects the merging of different interests and different philosophy of survival of the regions. Therefore, complex individual interests of the country down to a single
587 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century denominator of continuous growth and development of the national economy, and therefore the different subsystems of its success. Macro-economic regional development planning in essence must unite the three basic components of socio-economic systems, as follows3: 1) A natural component – Analyze the natural resources as an integral system input-output resources; – Regional deployment of resources, mobility and flexibility (exchange within the national territory and harmony in international division of labor and economic resources); 2) The economic and social component – Connects the integral whole world all the requirements of socio-economic development with particular attention to the specifics of national growth and development; – Involvement in risky markets and future trends in the world economy; 3) Organizational component – Fits into the concept of macroeconomic planning a natural component of the observations to a national or international strategy (with special emphasis on the development of specific regions);
3. The importance of planning in companies Planning involves defining an organization’s goals, establishing an overall strategy to achieve them, and the development of the hierarchy of plans to integrate and coordinate activities. The importance of planning can be seen through its four main aspects: • Contribution to the planning aims and objectives, • The primacy of the managerial tasks of planning, • Ubiquity of planning and • The effectiveness of the plans created. Every plan and all its supporting plans should contribute to achieving the goals and objectives of the company, primarily coordination efforts. When employees know what direction the company is moving, and what their tasks in the way of development, they can coordinate their activities, cooperate and work in teams.
3 Obradović, S., 2001, Planiranje ekonomskog razvoja nerazvijenih regiona (Planning of economic development of underdeveloped regions), Ekonomski horizonti, br. 1/2001, Kragujevac, p. 53.
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The purpose of managerial positions in the organization, human resource management and control is to support the achievement of company goals, so planning logically precedes the performance of other managerial functions. Although in practice all functions merged into system actions, specific planning is setting goals necessary for all group efforts. In addition, the manager needs to plan, to know what types of organizational relationships and personal qualifications required, which way should be subordinate to and what type of control should be applied. Of course, all the other managerial functions, in order to be effective, must be planned. Planning and control are inextricably linked. Any attempt to control without a plan is meaningless because there is no way to determine whether a company is going in the right direction (the result of the task control), if you previously did not even plan what direction he wants to go (part of the planning task). The plans thus ensuring compliance control standards. All economic agents are involved in some aspect of the planning. The companies, managers need to plan, to achieve the maximization of profit as the main goal, but the current liquidity business. Managers of non-profit organizations and government agencies need to plan how to achieve the organization’s goals with available resources - budget. Although the nature and extent of planning varies in accordance with the authority of each manager, managers at all levels of the hierarchy of organizational plan. The effectiveness of the plan relates to the extent to which it achieves the purpose or objectives, and the effectiveness of the plan in its contribution to the aims and objectives in comparison to the costs and other factors needed for its formulation and implementation. The plan may improve the achievement of goals, but with unnecessarily high costs. Plans are effective if achieved its purpose at reasonable costs that are measured in not only time, money or the production, but also the level of individual and group satisfaction. However, if we start from the fact that the plan includes any direction of future actions, it is clear that there are various types of plans. According to the objectives, the implementation of which should allow, and non-compliant levels of management to which these objectives laid plans can thus be divided into strategic, tactical and operational. Strategic planning is long-term and defines the steps that companies should take a time period of two to five years. The purpose of the strategic plan is to turn goals into reality within that time period. On the other hand, as opposed to strategic - at the company level tactical goals are defined as goals to be achieved and sub-departments within the company. They are designed to assist in the implementation of major strategic plans and parts of the company’s strategy. Their time horizon is usually shorter than is the case with strategic plans-and refers to the year. Operational plans are developed at the lower levels of the company, in order to determine the
589 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century steps that achieve operational objectives, and at the same time providing support tactical plans. They are an instrument for the implementation of daily and weekly operations. Schedules are an important component of operational planning. They define a precise time frame for completion of each operational objective which provides the strategic and tactical objectives of the company. Operational planning should be coordinated with the available budget. Multinational companies use all three types of planning in their operations.
4. The interdependence of the integration process and planning Plans at all three levels are formed under the influence of the external environment, and it is the main specificity of planning international operations. It should be noted, however, that the plan, as a function of management, developed under the influence of the internal environment of the company i.e. influenced by a number of the factors characteristic of countries in which the company promotes. This can be illustrated by the following presentation of the general characteristics of planning in Japan, the United States and China. Planning in Japan is largely influenced by the cooperation of the state and the economy. After World War II, Japan has set a policy of economic growth, strength, and the National Competitiveness which is coordinated monetary and fiscal policy under different economic sectors. In such a relatively predictable economic environment, planning is less risky. The Japanese, in general, have long-term orientation in planning than American managers. There are a number of reasons. One of them, as in Japan, the banking sector is the primary source of capital and is interested in long-term benefit of the company.4 American managers, by contrast, often under pressure from shareholders to assist them in any report demonstrate favorable financial performance. This, unfortunately, does not encourage investments that would be profitable in the long run. Americans with usually remain in managerial positions relatively short time, so that short-term decisions can rarely correlate with its bearer, making it difficult to determine responsibility. The main characteristic of the American way of planning is a short-term orientation, even when it comes to strategic plans. Emphasis on short-term aspect of planning largely led to the decline of U.S. companies that do business internationally.5 In China, the situation is completely different. Most companies are state owned, and only recently came to the establishment of private companies. The state- owned companies, which account for the vast majority, are made and the short-
4 S. Papadimitriou, P. Mourdoukoutas, Do Japanese companies have a competitive strategy?, www.ampforum.com. 5 R. Draft, Management, New York, The Dryden Press, 2000, p. 231.
590 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century term and long-term plans. The five-year plan is being prepared at the top (in the state planning commission), while detailed plans created at lower organizational levels. Orientation to achieving objectives and the achievement of the assigned plan is more important than success in the market. Although no wider practice designs strategies in a formal way, strategic thinking is, in military terms, a part of Chinese culture.6 Book Bing Fa is one of the most complete on military strategy. Managers apply such principles in dealing with Western corporations.7 For example, the best strategy is considered to be winning without war. Immediately after winning a victory, a strategy of alliances is made. There is also the difficulty of integrating organizational and personal goals, because achieving organizational goals has little impact on the well-being of the individual. Based on the above, it can be said that for a company that operates internationally, is of crucial importance to respecting the internal strengths and weaknesses of their system planning, recognizing the dangers and opportunities in the external environment and comply with them. In order to adequately respond to the challenges of the external environment, multinational companies to design appropriate strategies for deriving tactical and operational plans to achieve them. Therefore, the multinational company’s top management is trying to formulate a comprehensive strategy to ensure synergy between international operations in order to meet common goals. Strategy Development Company is the main motivation for small and large companies that operate internationally. Each country or region is a new potential market opportunities with higher wages and profits. In the international arena, the company is faced with strategic dilemmas between global integration and respect for the specificities of national markets. The organization must decide whether it wants to its global filial act autonomously or business activities will be centralized and standardized across countries. Some companies are trying to achieve both, using a transnational strategy. When a company decides to global strategy, this means that the design of its products and marketing strategies standardized around the world. This approach is based on the assumption that a single global market for industrial products and services, and consumers there. The most important consequence of the global strategy of saving millions of dollars in marketing campaigns. After extensive sociological research, many companies have rejected the idea of a single world market. Thus, in contrast to the global strategy of international business developed approach to each market is seen as a separate entity – a multi-domestic strategy. This strategy means the presence of multinational companies in many countries, along with her decision to design products and
6 W. I. Cohen, China’s Strategic Culture, www.theatlantic.com 7 A. Chang, China - The Management of Difference, www.aseanfocus.com, p. 2.
591 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century marketing campaigns modify and adapt to the special needs of the domestic market – each country. Many multinational companies, to reduce production costs, first established global strategy. However, in the case of Parker Pen Company, it proved to be a wrong decision. The company was at one time reduced the number of different models from 500 to 100 and launched a unique marketing campaign, which led to a strategic disaster. Now, a new pen, and devise an advertising campaign for each market.8 Avon found that their sales door-to-door work in Japan for cultural reasons. Compromise between global and multinational strategy can be achieved by applying a transnational strategy. The transnational strategy is a combination of the need for global integration, as well as the recognition of specific local markets. It is difficult to achieve, because the first objective requires global coordination, and other local flexibility. Today, however, many companies are discovering that, while growing competition means that they must achieve global efficiency, it does not lead to reduced pressure to take into account the specificities of each market. However, although most of the multinational company wants to achieve a certain degree of global integration, in order to reduce costs, it should be noted that, even global products require some modifications to comply with the legal regulations in different countries or adjusting preferences. Some products are more suitable than others are for Standardization. For this reason, most of the big multinational corporations, whose product range consists of various products for specific products using multi-domestic strategy, while for other products using global strategies.
5. Planning investments Planning at the macro and micro level must have a development component. However, as no development can be without an investment in planning effectiveness in defined economic areas coming to the fore based on the analysis of social costs and benefits of the projects in. Static indicators of the overall efficiency of planning is viewed through:9 a) the period of return on investment – The ratio of total development investment and gross accumulation of the economy during the year, and the income earned on the basis of evaluation of all available resources); b) capital ratio
8 A. Chang, China – The Management of Difference, www.aseanfocus.com, p. 7. 9 Obradović, S., 2001, Planiranje ekonomskog razvoja nerazvijenih regiona (Planning of economic development of underdeveloped regions), Ekonomski horizonti, br. 1/2001, Kragujevac, p. 53.
592 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
– The ratio between the value of production funds and the size of actual production; c) the market valuation of the available resources – Depends on the depreciation recorded during the year, carried interest on investment and total cost of production of all final goods; The reconciliation of the present value of all available results of operations in future value is a very important item in the planning of economic development, and therefore presents a dynamic parameter of national economic planning. In developing countries, a large proportion of the population is concentrated in less developed regions, so the question arises concerning rapid transformation of the area from low-productivity to high production. The rapid development of these areas in the first place, increasing employment redundancy and only where the development of agriculture followed by the development of its complementary activities. This creates a larger volume of food consumption per capita, higher agricultural income and reduces the constant pressure on urban areas. This means that planning for the development of rural regions must create the appropriate service rural areas, in order to raise the productivity of the implementation activities of the area. However, to achieve this in various countries established to support institutions with dedicated funds for specific segments of the rapid development of underdeveloped regions. In planning the development of the region, there are three main objectives:10 1) Each economic region should be able to be completed commercial units, which operate in the modern market principles, generate their own profit, the accumulation of its own and its own development infrastructure; 2) Each regional area has to provide all necessary production capabilities and elements of modern urbanization in order to follow the development of the whole society; 3) Any undeveloped area and social category of all its residents provides all the rights and obligations under the laws and constitution of the country in which it works. However, in order to achieve the planning process must take into account the synchronization of general constitutive instrument settings legislation macroeconomic policies of the state and the reflections coming from the practical application of specific plans. Because each development planning must include system inputs on the state, scope, structure and quality of the available factors of development, system processes and detailed screening process connections and relationships relevant factors in the development of the existing geo-strategic
10 Jan S. Hogendom, 1996, Economic Development, New York, pp. 380-381.
593 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century environment with the development of appropriate plans in strategic and operational with the force of the applicable functions. In this sense, planning lays requirements specifying the objectives of the development, coordination of all actors of his generation and execution, and control of results.
6. Conclusion Integration processes and long-term business planning, at any level, interact and these processes are interdependent because planning is a complex and dynamic process of constant change and adapting to the demands of modern economics in theory and practice. In our situation with specific internal and external factors to adapt to new economic, technical, technological, social and political processes required analysis and synthesis of several renowned international economic trends and the creation of new regional and global entities with a high risk factor in the market, spatial and qualitative alter production. Optimal planning is successful if it is implemented through a long-term perspective. In the medium and short term, it may be connected with the principles of the original resource planning. In all cases, the ultimate goal of planning is to meet the pre-determined development needs. Planning is seen as a constant process of finding new methods and forms and valorizing of all available premises that condition the main driving force for the purpose of integrity of the global framework and integrated goals of growth and development. In terms of achieving the basic principles of economy, i.e. economy, efficiency, profitability and productivity, planning must accurately distinguish between static and dynamic parameters of the indicators.
594 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Dobrica VESIĆ1
THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION AND INTEGRATION PROCESSES OF ECONOMIC RESTRUCTURING
Abstract: The beginning of the twenty-first century is marked by globalization and internationalization in all spheres of the social and economic activity and integration processes at regional and global levels. In the modern world, international and interstate economic relations are a denser network of power relations, a network that shapes and limit the activities of individuals and states. Economies are becoming less national and more global, autonomous policies are becoming less effective, being faced with global flows of capital, people, technology and knowledge. The world that was once a mercantile exchange system of sovereign national entities is becoming a global/ transnational production system based on the international division of labor in terms of unrestricted mobility of capital and people. There is a growing gap between (a) the state as a territorial/administrative units and (b) states as economic units. In the developed world, there is a shuffle of multinational companies that are extrovertively turned towards the international production and introvertively towards the national structures; On the other hand, the emergence of the financial and economic crisis is not an isolated case but covers most of the countries involved in the integration process. Key words: globalization, integration processes, economy, restructuring, impact.
1. Introduction The unstoppable process of globalization of the world economy has sharply accelerated in the last decade. Among other things, globalization implies a broad process of liberalization, the end of national monopolies, the creation of new (not just economic) policies and relations between nation-states and transnational corporations. In terms of the integration of the world economy, at
1 Dobrica Vesić, Ph.D., Institute of international politics and economics, Belgrade. The paper is the result of the work on the Project of the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Serbia No 179029 for the period from 2011 to 2014.
595 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century first glance, globalization, internationalization is similar, but unlike her result is strong coercion backed by real economic forces. Therefore, the process of globalization, despite the parallel process of regionalization, is dominant in international economic relations. On the other hand there is a process mega integration (enlargement of the capital), which leads to the fundamental financial and political imbalance (global economic war against transnational corporations every seeming sovereignty of nations lasted for over ten years). Often you can hear opinions that the world is a global lost orientation – reliable norms and principles with consequences that are uncertain and unpredictable in the socio- economic and politico-strategic terms (in international relations, there is a growing imbalance in the strategic and political sphere). In modern conditions of globalization, the traditional factors of economic development as well as the wealth of raw materials, the size of the territory and population are, in some ways, the barriers of development. This is best illustrated by the example of Russia, Brazil, India, Nigeria and Indonesia. On the other hand more dominant entities functioning of international economic relations, because of its economic power and dominance in the field of organization, technology, finance and knowledge, the transnational corporations that seek mega integration. It should be noted that the coupling of this expansion has been steady and rapid growth of foreign direct investment leading developed countries.
2. Global economic imbalances The process of globalization, among other things, establishes a number of negative trends in international economic relations. After the end of the “cold war,” the world is becoming more peaceful and safer, on the contrary, it happened a number of political and economic crisis in several regions, the crisis affected most countries in the world (instead of the unnatural balance of fear, caused bloc division, there was an expressed fear of imbalances and different chaos) – since 1989 occurred more than sixty armed conflict, with a large and undetermined number of casualties and with over seventy million refugees. Globalization, except positive, has also many negative effects on the overall global economy. A new economic order is established at the global imbalance: more rich in extraordinary prosperity (privilege minorities) and increasingly poor, and those who lag behind in development (poverty becomes the rule and takes on huge proportions). For example, two hundred richest people in the world, with its trillion-dollar finance are more than the total annual income of fifty poor countries, with about two and a half billion people. Under the influence of the new world economic order and regulate international economic relations in which the last ten years, the rapidly falling prices of raw materials on world markets. In addition to natural materials, which are the main export products of
596 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century developing countries, they are permanently replaced with synthetic substitutes or different types. For example, in Japan the consumption of raw materials cut in half and significantly increased production of finished products. New wealth is acquired through innovation, research and application of new knowledge and technology. Transnational Corporation has become a first-rate economic power, the most powerful entity of international economic relations. Their strength comes from their unique ability to finance; technology and modern business take advantage of the integration of production on a world scale, thereby creating a path towards a single, global market. The rise of the global economy is linked to the five stages: (1) the administrative mechanisms of the type of voluntary export restrictions; (2) management of trade – quantitative restrictions; (3) aggressive unilateralism; (4) trade blocks, and (5) industrial policy and strategic trade policy. It is not just about the withdrawal of the state, but the metamorphosis of its role in international relations in terms of globalization. The globalization of production, transportation, communication, finance increasingly intensifies a rift between the state as an economic individual and the state as territorial and administrative individuals. Faced with declining economic power of the state is trying to compensate for the political level, enhancing increasingly split between de facto disappear} e of economic power and proclaimed de jure political power. States still have some power to decide what can be done in their territory, but at the very constrained mobility of capital and people in the discriminatory circumstances leave its territory, threatening further progress. Multinational companies are not just extensions of state power, if it ever did and there; They are independent actors with their own interests intertwined in the global, supranational level, the actors now almost alone knit global network of institutions and relationships. Guided by the interests of ensuring the prosperity and welfare of the state become prey to protect their businesses and attacking the other. The domain in which the globalization of today has gone furthest revealed declining and narrowed the domain of state sovereignty as international finance, a domain that in the Middle Ages was just starting points of establishing a government sovereignty, when the force powers and authorities of the States imposed its monetary and fiscal sovereignty in the field of forging money and paying taxes. Today, precisely in this respect it must depart. In an idealized free- competitive system of international economy is vertically divided into separate national economy, but involves many types / levels of market activity that can spread horizontally across virtual space – replacing the physical geography of national borders quasi geography market structure, transaction flows and information cyberspace. Finance is the central mechanism that combines the diversified market processes into a single network – a structure in which to establish the relative prices of all goods, services and capital. Today, the network integrates not on the national financial system, but also through international
597 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century financial markets. International finance directly or indirectly, the following day reduced the power of the state: (1) the mobility of capital and the rise of internationalized market structure threatens national regulations; (2) deregulation and internationalization, circular reinforce each other and separate from the national regulations; (3) national monetary policy essentially loses its autonomy, because it can no longer be introverted facing local real aggregates, but extroversion to international capital flows; (4) in the globalized financial state area alone are no longer powerful enough and must unite and engage the international macroeconomic coordination. The changes are far-reaching: Monetary and fiscal policy states no longer rely on national financial systems, but the transnational financial structure. U such circumstances, national macroeconomic policies managed by the criteria of global financial markets, primarily monetary stability criterion of interest and exchange rates, while performance of the real sector derived from them. For a small country, it means looking for a niche in the international division of labor, which will enable it to prosperity. New technologies – global information network Internet – financial instruments are made relatively simple, low-risk and low transaction costs are realized significant profits. State protection of banks that provide national monetary stability by creating credit potential and offering resources now becoming unsustainable globally integrated banking world – a 24-hour world- time, deregulation, securitization (pack of traditional credit arrangements in complex tradable), attrition mediating role of creditor against corporations, because they themselves take to the capital market, all diminish the role of banks as monopolistic financial institutions backed by the nation-state. Seems kind of Ratchet effect: each new deregulation increased structural complexity and price sensitivity and prevents the return to national regulation. Small countries have to bear in mind that the profit margins are extremely low, the maximum shoot down transaction costs, and the profit gain economies of scale – huge transport corporations and banks. The only way out is the integration into the international division of labor in those areas – I’m not where there is a competitive advantage in relation to the partners who are in the hierarchical world system is relatively the same power in a similar position. The international system is no longer the interstate system, but the contract organized around the central economic, political and social issues of our time, the importance of which far exceeds the classical complex interdependence.
3. Macro menagement cooperative as a development environment small business Modern states compete with each other in the struggle to preserve and increase the competitiveness of domestic firms; the company is behind the
598 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century national state, and increasingly the state and the companies are behind – the transnational Company (TNK). Internationalization of realization of goods through trade, internationalization of production of goods through the activities of TNCs is now shifting to the global strategic alliance – a network of global companies and global superpower. Their power exceeds the power and highly developed countries of medium size (for example, those in the EU) and the only real counterparts their economic integration of the EU, G-7, OECD, ASEAN, NAFTA and some countries – the U.S., Japan, and Germany). Their power is based on a true strategic unit trust and long-term cooperation primary network partners (suppliers, customers, the environment, the partners); distribution of knowledge and technologies through partnerships is not strictly determined by the cash flows and profit. Commercial relations are now complete, and network relations: the activities that were previously becomes internalized by companies / multinationals are now being undertaken by the partners in the network, one of the firm become peripheral, for it directly means loss of profits, and gain profits for the network in whole; establish long-term relationships within the network, the relations of reciprocity, cooperation and collaboration, much like the industrial grouping – keiretsu in Japan. This is the kind of disintegration TNK, because losing the classic division of the national central line – multinational subsidiaries: all the partners in the network, the commercial relations which had previously come to the edge among {her company TNK-now-is pervasive, as well as other partners in the network. Macro management applies not only to macroeconomic policy, but also in a number of other government activities that include consulting, regulative, incentives, infrastructure activities, which the government assists local companies. Macro management is typically competitive: the government can identify with their companies in their efforts to win a share of the world market. Countries in the world-system overlap and affect each other in these multi- functional processes: 1) the labor market remains nationally; b) the market for goods and services is becoming regionally; c) capital markets globally. Active promoters of the development of the TNC, which won the domain of independent decision-making, so it has the resources, affect prices, create networks and alliances, and raise barriers to entry, developing new technologies. These intertwined relationships Country – TNK, relations of cooperation and competitiveness is illustrated by the following chart: In a globalized capital market manifest conflicts of national policies, the regional market for goods / services is expressed harmonized national policies, and the national labor market exclusivist protectionist policies. With reducing the national capabilities for Macro management, there is a change in the Macro management functions. Ability of individual TNCs are complemented by strategic alliances aimed at: a) win the market and (b) the conquest of new
599 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century technologies. Competitiveness in terms of a macro involves three key elements: (a) performance, (b) potentials and (c) processes: Competitiveness is no longer a state, but a process derived from the interactions in the model, such as a closed loop: a general competitiveness of efficiency and coverage and efficiency (realization of the objectives by optimum utilization of resources) and effectiveness (choosing the right targets). There is an unbreakable bond company – Country: bad state management can help companies in crisis, a good increase their strength and competitiveness: this is basically the concept of a macro, the management that goes beyond individualistic view of the company outside the context of the environment. Internationalization of markets are inextricably linked corporate and government management in Macro management and within national economies, particularly in the global level between TNK. Traditional forms: (A) Foreign direct investment and (B) The establishment of a subsidiary TNK is now being complemented by subtle forms (C) franchising, IR consortium, financial partnerships, which become angular supports business alliances and networks. These ventures differ in government and business identity. They create an integration international production system (IIPS) in terms of TNK more decision-making and critical business functions regionally and nationally dislocate, creative and so dispersed networks responsive to differences in levels of development and the quality of state management. A large volume of trade and the internationalization of production changes: (A) The structure of the national economy; (B) Relate the interdependence of these structures; (C) Attachment of the national economy for corporate management. The global character of the functioning of TNK implies their greater flexibility in terms of programs and production location and lists them on multiple strategic alliance partnerships / networks that are in constant processuality – changes in accordance with character (a) flexible technologies and (b) the changing political relations in the world-flexible networks / alliances, as opposed to rigidly structured block structure. States with jagged political process, individualistic political culture and the sharp ideological cleavages are exposed to constant and strong pressures discontinuity consensus. In contrast to these countries, highly integrated industrial democracies have macro management founded on solidarity and consensus building, policy continuity that relativize and removes the ideological schisms. Consensus based political decision-responsive functional aggregate corporate
600 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century interests encourages competitiveness and structural adjustment relaxed challenges of foreign competition. This is confirmed by the upcoming feature of an environment in which occurs macro management: 1) Pressure rivalry for the global market, the competition of individual governments to international and national level forcing each national administration to optimize the management of the economy, with the aim of increasing the structural competitiveness; 2) The different nature of national policy is manifested in the systematic effects: (A) Consensus based and rational decision-making is focused on creating an integrated political economy, the relational Government-national companies through a network of informal agreement / contract; (B) Conflict and reactive decision-making is focused on establishing competitiveness and less integrated national economy resulting in insufficient cooperation corporation; 3) a comprehensive operational policy based on consensus and rational choice, in its center is allocate disciplines – which means the ruling class to serve the public interest and thus provides support to citizens and businesses. The allocate discipline increases economic stability, reduces the cost of government, creating a climate of mutuality and cooperation conducive to social consensus, strengthening the consultative relationships and cooperative adaptation; 4) conflict and causing reactive policies are inconsistent and inadequate allocate effects of discipline, causing monetary restriction in order to control inflation and fiscal expansion, all of which, jointly, increasing the cost of government, stunted growth and reduced international competitiveness. Examples of functional policies are Japan and Germany, as well as the reactive policy of the USA. Focal points of Japanese politics are synergistic interactions technocratic government and dynamically integrated corporate system. German policy is based on the social market economy whose basis is diffused and institutionalized system of consultation and consensus in the triangle state – employers – work. Systemic effects of these policies are crucial for international competitiveness; spreading gains of me | International Trade and manufacture less favored liberal economic policy centered reactive and conflicting policies that encourage isolated and independent operation of companies in a fragmented national production system. Increasing the level of adjustment costs | expression further reduces the structural competitiveness of domestic and foreign confidence. Wide consensus all partners on the basic principles of a macro and strengthening the institutional environment provides a functional and aggregation of interests. This contributes to maintaining fiscal discipline,
601 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century establishing loyalty to national companies and is the basis of participation in international strategic alliances.
a) Japanese model technocratic input Intensifying competitive pressures of the world market and asymmetric internationalization cause the government to become very active in the field of consulting, coordinating and guiding role for the national company. Increasing the competitiveness of their efforts focused on the development and application of advanced technologies by those sectors that are of strategic importance. The creation of an integrated production system type international Japan Inc. today, the form becomes successful active ex ante policy that the state space of an unsuccessful reactive ex post policy. Application of the Japanese model is not possible in terms of fragmented production system, the traditional relationship of distrust actors and internal conflicts that undermine allocate discipline. Macro management implies that the company also actively cooperates and competes with each other, establishing relationships that weave the relational network / alliance. Add to this the technocratic inputs of high quality inputs acquired through years of administrative guidance of corporate development, which are global and target-oriented, strongly built informal thread in the fabric of the corporate system. Japan contractual management includes the following elements. 1) Implicitly contracting based on trust; 2) Scattered reciprocity in property relations in the sphere of trade and production as on Network / Alliance against profitability relations limited validity; 3) A management philosophy focused on overall corporate growth, not only in interests of shareholders, 4) selective and ad hoc interventions shareholders. From this, there follows the conclusion: all this has allowed Japanese companies to operate with lower levels of assets/property of integration, speaking in terms of high interaction. In domain labor as an input to mean the relationship of mutuality and credibility in the area of capital as inputs assimilation of technology flexibility, which bothers rigid ownership structure and static forms of organization. These ideas are still in incorporate concept of a macro.
b) The German social consensus In terms of the federal parliamentary system, diffusion from Japan, macro management must be based on broadly defined, and tightly structured social consensus. Traditional relational concerns, long-term financing of development,
602 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century active participation of banks, trade union activities include social consensus of the most important partners that will contribute to creating a spirit of solidarity in the intercorporating system. Individualistic-minded corporations are not conducive to the development of relational links that will advance to create a stable network of institutions / relations between the partners, but will, on the contrary, constantly seek government support and activate allocative mechanism. TNK from less integrated state his business philosophy based on rationalization of operations at the regional and global levels, while those in the more integrated countries their organizational unity built | including all Raza | vulnerable networks / alliances, thus avoiding internalization series of organizational problems. Business networks and alliances today create five partners: 1) The Central Company; 2) key suppliers; 3) key customers; 4) competition, and 5) non-business environment. The key in these networks is the lack of strict bounds, their continued flexibility, resilience, appropriate and of the military-political situation in the world in which frontal conflicts give way to the strategy of indirect occurrence in the way of establishing a global power and the corporation’s power and superpower. A five-member network model is completely similar to the Japanese industrial grouping – keiretsu. Characteristics of the network are: a) The adoption and fostering long-term relational ties, relations of reciprocity and cooperation, and development activities of the network; b) relocation and restrictive all business activities in the network as a whole, the all the partners in accordance with their potential; c) Assessment of the partners in the network solely through a contribution to the development of the network as a whole; d) Distribution of knowledge, not just profits, the development of a common language within the network learning. 1. Locus of control a) Horizontal model involves mutually attracting firms through horizontal relations, in which the subordination very far, because states have similar power, strength and resources, and network inputs including the synergistic effects of co-ordination. b) Vertical model is relational relationship in which one partner has more power and resources in relation to others, and added; employment in manufacturing / operations imposes a hierarchical position. c) a hierarchical model involves strengthening the weak network to harmonize shared vision and adopting unique business philosophy, and creating a network of coalitions which are precisely defined individual tasks.
603 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
2 forms the structure Structure of the form that is almost independent of the control locus as are the loci of all three controls (horizontal, vertical, hierarchical) can be open, closed or mixed. Open the configuration is undoubtedly the most flexible, while closed imposes certain restrictions, for example, all members of the network must agree on key issues of its organization. 3 The nature of the mission The objectives of the network members and the length of their membership in the network affect the character of the mission Networks: Technology-oriented networks are typically loose, horizontal and open to innovation. 4 The degree of formalization The degree of formalization affect power relations and forms of structure: horizontal networks by generally informal and loose, while the vertical rigid and formal. Social networks are crucial for the development of small businesses and in doing so must bear in mind the following postulates: a) actors and their actions are interdependent, not independent; b) relational relationships – connections – channels / streams – which transfer resources; c) the structural environment provides opportunities for their development, but they may limit; d) Structure of the network model is treated as a set of relationships between the actors.
Conclusion Restriction’s economy is based on the following elements: – Highlight the distinctive human capital and knowledge; – Reliance on labor and employment; – The introduction of new technologies; – Local initiative; – Comparisons of techniques (benchmarking) with respect to best practices and procedures major competitors. All this, as well as environment, integrated in order to achieve and maintain competitiveness which is defined as follows: competitiveness is the degree to which the country is in a free and fair market conditions may production goods and services that will withstand the test of international markets, providing a simultaneous increase in real personal income. In the center of the reliance on manufacturing is growth of living standards. Competitiveness is based on the concept of assembly line Research – Technology Management, not greatly
604 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century surpassed exchange-line research and classical marketing. The concept includes: – Not classic competitive management but cooperative Macro management; – Do not apply extreme competition, but alliances, networks and partnerships; – Not short, but the long term; – No exclusivity for cooperation. There are three important elements of the concept of competitiveness: (A) the supply side: the competitive power of the company, with support prosperity, includes two elements: (1) pricing mechanism and spillover savings in investment and (2) entrepreneurial activity in conditions of uncertainty; (B) the international dimension: competitiveness in the globalization game with positive outcome and win-win strategy for all partners; (C) Social Cohesion: competition is aimed at the welfare of individuals and societies as a whole and therefore the debate on the future of industrial societies. Environment in which small business develops and survives is a predatory society, as it seems to us, but a mixed economy dependent on economic efficiency and social cohesion, which is a point of support competitiveness in the global economy, which should ensure our place in the world economy.
605 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Silvana JOVCHESKA1
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS – CREATOR OF A NEW ECONOMIC STRUCTURE WITH NEW FUNCTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES AND NEW TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE CULTURES
Abstract: The management nowadays is an unpredictable process. It is very hard to make the right decisions. Even the most effective managers sometimes make mistakes and because of that it is necessary to learn from their mistakes if they would like to help their companies to succeed in the methods of organization and managing the global companies. The traditional way of managing the organizations turns out as insufficient for functioning in the new- made conditions of globalization. The traditional managers face the problems of: type of education, unacceptable behavior and limited knowledge of all the elements that fulfill the needs of the contemporary corporations. For that purpose the staff is obliged to follow the modern conduct by personal and organizational creation of the politics for professional development and career. There is a need to go beyond the historical means of traditional forms of managing the organization and introducing a new way of management. Exactly for that aim, a research of 100 international managers on a global level was made in order to identify the capabilities and skills that all the managers should develop if they would like to manage the organizations successfully. The research identifies the different types of managers needed for the multinational corporations for unimpeachable accession of the international market. Key words: international business, international management, international corporations, professional development, international strategy.
1 Silvana Jovcheska Ph.D., Faculty of Economics, FON University, Skopje, Macedonia.
606 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
We have the tape with rapid growth, and our main task is to attract and develop enough professionals that allow us to support the global growth that we face2. Graham Corbett, KPMG’s Continental European
A growing trend in modern manager’s ambition and direction of its domestic career outside of his country is building an international career. But the change of the place of work from home in the international market includes the ability to adapt and achieve business results of an international field. Hill competitiveness of the organization except the transfer of goods and services competitive in the international market sees through the acquisition and establishment of key competencies which are a prerequisite for establishing the values of the organization.3 They stem from the organization’s core activities: manufacturing, research and development, marketing, services, sales, logistics, human resources ... With the help of these the organization creates value by using that product or service creates a competitive market. Multinational corporations have their dominant advantage over other organizations in the world market of goods, services and capital. They are expressions of concentration and centralization of capital and monopolies tend to make maximum profits and wealth. They on one hand represent transmission development, and on the other side of the world are exploiting. According to Hill the concept of multinational corporations is: 1st Availability of modern technology, knowledge and capital move easily across different countries and regions worldwide. Special attention to human capital as capital of the new age which is undoubtedly the most precious and most necessary resource for uninterrupted operation of multinational corporations; 2nd The world is perceived as the only market to which they are adapted movements and directions of the markets. Globalization leads to an increase in the market, increasing competition and competitive relationships and reduce interstate barriers. The effect of globalization means: the same product everywhere, the same sales strategy and high quality standards of products and services offered in the global market. It involves the emergence of global products and necessary the implementation of global sales strategies to conquer the international market. Newly emerged conditions caused by the process of globalization also wear need to find
2 Graham Corbett, KPMG’s Continental European. 3 Hill C., “International Business: Competing in the Global Marketplace”, 6 ed., The McGraw- Hill Companies, Inc, USA, 2007.
607 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century appropriate solutions for preserving and leveraging the competitive advantages of corporations internationally. In these conditions, the implementation of the invention and cutting edge technology are the reason and necessity for gaining and retaining competitive advantage over others, and hiring a highly skilled and professional staff, are of great importance for the realization of corporate goals and objectives. Multinational corporations that end permanently invested in training and requalification of its staff placing special emphasis on the training of management personnel. Globalization causes growth in the volume of production and increase productivity and permanent organizational changes are part of the globalization process. For successful management of organizational change emerging multinational corporations engage highly qualified and professional staff to effectively and efficiently will know how to manage the change. Unlike working at home, the international field requires the ability to adapt to a new culture, great knowledge of international business and management time. From this derives the basic definition of an international manager, which manages and managed abroad, outside of the home country and is able to adapt to new cultures. He is emotionally stable person who possesses the ability to be a leader and brings independent business decisions and is able to cope with the stress caused by the key components of the work, regardless of the complexity of the global workplace. He is a skilled negotiator, inventor, possesses great knowledge of international business, is adaptable to new cultures and able to take risks in business4. According to Ratiu international managers are extremely effective and possess the ability to be chameleons - adjustable to continuously variable external environment: flexible and innovative, ready to respond to new situations in a new environment5. It requires a special approach to the building manager’s personality, his professional development and building domestic and international career. To this end, many studies have emphasized the need for permanent training and development of human cadres in organizations, placing special emphasis on personnel management. For meeting the growing demand for skilled and effective managers in modern corporations permanently implement appropriate training programs and development of its staff and thus staff is trained to respond to changes in the international environment through the implementation of reforms and innovations array modus operandi.
4 Brittain Ј. L., Dalton М., Ernst C., Deal J., “Managerial Efectiveness in a Global Context”, Center for Creative Leadership, Greensboro, North Carolina, USA, 2002. 5 Ratiu I., “Thinking internationally: A comparison of how international executives learn”, International Studies of Management and Organization, 13(1-2), 1983, pp. 139–150.
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Increasingly there is a growing recognition that international business success largely depends on the quality of international managers. The quality of international managers depends on the type of training that the international manager received before departure for international assignments, and the training that permanently gets during the execution of that task. The lack of international managers is substantial obstacle to successful implementation of global strategies6. According to Dowling and Welch: training aimed to enhance existing job skills and behaviors of employees, while professional development aims to increase their capability in terms of some future position or job, usually management. International training is training for international duties, and it is a very important activity whose benefits in practice, more are confirmed7. Kamoche emphasizes that “human resources by relating the accumulated stock of knowledge, skills and abilities that individuals possess Organizations that have built up over time in a recognized expertise”. Zhu purposes of training and development classifies as an opportunity8: (1) to remove the deficiencies in the performance of employees and to update their technical knowledge and skills; (2) to increase the adaptability of workers and (3) to increase the commitment of employees Our research is aimed at finding out the reasons for attracting and retaining high quality management staff to work in the international market in order competitive advantage globally. The problem highlights its weight. The fact that the practice shows that there is a lack of that staff. Research shows that the main reason there is a lack of opportunities for the organization to invest in professional and career development of its employees. Although the availability of candidates for a job in management positions in the international field is high, however the reality is that the availability of quality staff is very low, the demand for qualified foreign managers outstrips supply. It highlights the growing need for investment in human capital, investing in the professional development of staff and their going training and development. Respondents – international managers (expatriates) were of both sexes, disproportionately divided: 81 (81%) males and 19 (19%) females.
6 Kamoche, K., “Strategic Human Resource Management within a Resource–Capability View of the Firm”, Journal of Management Studies, 33(2), 1996, pp. 213–233. 7 Dowling, P.J., Welch, D., “International Human Resources Management: Managing People in a Multinational Context”, 4th edn, London: Thomson Learning, 2004. 8 Zhu, J. H., “Human Resource Management in China during the Transition to a New Economic System”, Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources, 35(3), 1997, pp. 19–44.
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Gender
Reference9: Silvana Jovcheska Respondents were international managers from the top management level of 49%, and the other managers were approximately half of the middle management level 43% and only 8% were managers from the operational management level.
Management level
Reference10: Silvana Jovcheska International managers surveyed 59% had past experience of working outside their country i.e. being expatriates in the past, and the remaining 41% current managerial position was first international experience. Have you ever been a manager – expatriate in the pas past?
9 Силвана Јовческа, “Професионалниот развој на менаџеритите како стратешка алатка на меѓународниот менаџмент на човечки ресурси за настап на меѓународниот пазар”, докторска дисертација, Економски институт, Св. Кирил и Мтодиј, Скопје, јуни, 2014. 10 Ibid.
610 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Reference11: Silvana Jovcheska The main goal in this research was to give special emphasis on practices that organizations are applied in order to successfully plan and implement a strategy that will yield the expected results internationally. The survey showed that information and communication technologies are used to a high degree by the policies of the organizations for training and professional development of managers. 56% of respondents agree with this statement, 10% completely and 12% are undecided relation, neither agree nor disagree, only 7% disagree, of which 1% completely disagreed.
1. The new information – communicational technologies are used for training and professional development of the managers.
Reference12: Silvana Jovcheska
11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.
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Modern organization is making great strides in gaining its greater efficiency and effectiveness. Only 47% of respondents agree that organizational behavior in their organization is aimed at gaining greater efficiency and effectiveness in operations. 32% completely agree that means 79% of respondents agree and affirm the importance of taking care of the nature of organizational behavior in any organization. Of the respondents, only 4% disagree, with only 1% completely disagreed, 11% were undecided, neither agree nor disagree.
2. The organizational behavior in the organization is oriented towards acquiring bigger efficiency and organization efficiency.
Reference13: Silvana Jovcheska Special attention in the work of contemporary organizations is their permanent care to attract and retain high quality management staff to work on an international market was part of this research, and the results showed the following: the experience of successful management of multinational corporations shows that 55% of respondents confirm their care organizations to attract and retain high quality management staff to work on an international market. 26% are undecided which category to classify the work of their organization, while 13% of organizations do not take care to attract and retain high quality management staff to work on an international market.
13 Ibid.
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3. The organization takes unconditional care for attracting and keeping the high- qualified managing staff for working on the international market.
Reference14: Silvana Jovcheska Every environment, every new place, according to the researches made of the worldwide research by professionals in the field of IMHR, accentuate the need for implementation of management strategies specific and unique for each environment separately. Each new environment and possesses specific characteristic alone: culture, customs, language, religion... Therefore it’s necessary to analyze the new environment and establish a strategy appropriate to the data obtained. 49% of respondents agree that the field organization respect that rule, 14% completely agree and 35% disagree. 30% of respondents did not agree entirely with this statement i.e. their organizations do not always apply specific and unique management strategies for each environment separately, and only 15% disagree, approximate proportion to the percentage of respondents who say that their organization does not take constant care to attract and retain high quality management staff to work the international market.
14 Ibid.
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4. The organization applies specific and unique management strategies for each surrounding separately.
Reference15: Silvana Jovcheska The situation is similar in contention for the identification of employees with the organization’s strategy. 49% agree with the statement that their organization implements easily affordable changes that ensure identification of employees with the strategy of the organization, 32% are not certain, and the percentage of 13% is repeated in this case, disagree with this assertion, 1% totally disagrees, 12% disagree.
5. The organization implements easily acceptable changes that guarantee identification of the employees with the organization strategy.
Reference:16 Silvana Jovcheska
15 Ibid. 16 Ibid.
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Modern organizations make permanent transfer of its technology, knowledge and capital out of their country. They have clearly defined their purpose, vision and strategy for the international market performance in accordance with international standards and regulations. The management of modern organizations looking thinks globally. Modern organizations caring for the professionalism of their staff - learn from all cultures, in all times, in any way, they are organizations that learn (learning organization). The research was directed towards exploring the extent to which respondents agree that they belong to a team of employees in an organization that teaches advanced (learning organization). 66% characterized their organization as such, 12% were undecided, 16% disagreed, of which 6% completely disagreed, 10 disagreed with this feature.
6. The organization which I currently work in, is characterized as a learning organization i.e. takes care for the professionalism of their employees – learns from all cultures, all the time and in different ways.
Reference:17 Silvana Jovcheska Quest for quality management personnel or the search for human capital is a problem of the future. The Western Balkans is necessary to change their old habits and practices of working. The modern world imposes a modern way of managing. Only the implementation of modern management practices, organizations Western Balkans will be able to successfully adapt to stringent European and international standards and norms of behavior. It is high time managers of organizations to draw attention to the search for quality staff, which means that caring for existing employees need to raise to a higher level. Every day should be invested in professional development and training, and
17 Ibid.
615 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century improving care for upgrading their existing and new qualifications in order competition as theirs, and the organization in general. All organizations that want to be competitive in the market, it is necessary to implement modern management practices into their daily operations, placing special emphasis on personnel management. Behind every successful corporation is a well-trained and quality management team, strategy for every successful corporation and his work tends to extend the European and international field.
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Natka JANKOVA1
THE NEED FOR NEW REFORMED EDUCATION AS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR FOR EASIER EU INTEGRATION
Abstract: At the beginning of the 21th century, the countries of the West Balkan are challenged to follow the contemporary societies where education is fundamental for creating a quality professional staff that would be the basis of the society. Educators and policy makers in West Europe fail to follow the contemporary trends of education and this makes the adverse circumstance. The need for changing the type of education within the countries of the Western Balkans in order to follow the dynamic change of the society leaves the challenges they need to face in order to succeed within the European Union and on the global level as well. In order to achieve that, what is needed before is resolving the problems that limit the development of these countries. This process is delayed because of the conflicts of priorities in the political and skilled structures of the governments that decide about the priorities of the taken activities, the slow economic growth, the lack of resources and the limited capacity of personal staff and their skilled experience. This paper deals with all the above mentioned problems in the countries of the Western Balkans and gives a possible solution of them including the projects for lifelong learning, changes and innovations in secondary and university education curricula and of course, studying languages and intercultural communication in order to avoid stereotyping, coming out of common classrooms and getting closer to more sophisticated tools and approach towards successful integration in the modern society. Key words: education, integration, solutions, communicative competence, studying languages, intercultural communication
Introduction At the beginning of the 21 century, the countries of the West Balkan are challenged to follow the contemporary societies where the education is fundamental for creating a qualified professional staff that would be the basis
1 Natka Jankova, M.A. FON University, Skopje, Macedonia.
617 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of the society. Educators and policy makers in West Europe fail to follow the contemporary trends of education and this makes the adverse circumstance. The need for changing the type of education within the countries of the West Balkan to follow the dynamic change of the society brings the challenges they need to face in order to succeed within the European Union and on global level as well. In order to achieve that, what is needed before, is resolving the problems that limit the development of these countries. The delay of this process is because of the conflicts of priorities in the political and skilled structures of the governments that decide about those priorities of the taken activities, the slow economic growth, the lack of resources and the limited capacity of personal staff and their skilled experience. Seen from the perspective of the market-based economy of these surroundings and the fast change of the global economy, the system of high skilled education in the countries of West Balkan is considered as old-fashioned and seriously insufficiently financed. At the same time there is a huge tension within the framework of the system which is about to change and should fulfil the needs of the different social groups or clients and should be applicable to the political system which turns to be decentralized and with wider representative form of governing. The system of skilled education and training has a potential to bring economical realization of the countries in the West Balkan. As the biggest component of the state system, the education serves as a tool for better future to many young people and a better professional career. Based on analysis done by visiting different schools on the Balkan, the results show that the skilled education is on a low level starting from its curricula content to the pedagogical perspective. No matter the obstacles, the countries from West Balkan have to improve the human resources base remained from the socialistic system into imposing formal sectors for employment. The changes should be in the direction of the type of education and training youths on different levels. The questions about quality, equality and efficiency (internal and external) ask for additional efforts and improvements.
Pre-school and high school education problems with Roma children The priority that should be imposed at this moment from the Governments of this region is to make a research of the conditions in this area for the pre- school education, especially for the children who would benefit from the very beginning. In this category are the children of Roma background who leave school earlier and become street children and will especially benefit from the
618 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century early bilingual pre-school surrounding. According to Marjan Mladenovski 2 “the biggest problem with Roma students are the mechanisms of prejudices through generations which continuously disable their social integration and the other attributes imposed to them such as poor, deceitfulness, indolence etc.” From a methodological research directed versus examination and analysis of stereotypes towards Roma students versus teachers in primary school3 it is concluded that educators consider that Roma people like music, wedding ceremonies instead of knowledge and education. From my own experience as an English language teacher at a skilled high- school and my own analysis of the first test of my students it can be concluded that the results from the test (see Table 1 below)4 in the mixed classes where there are Roma students (given in bold – I4,I12,I13) the results are on a very low level compared to the other classes. This test was made after the “transition” of the eight-graders to high school which is a big change for them. Because they do not possess the habit to study continuously and because of the problems of the educational system, they stay behind with most of the subjects.
Table 1 Number Grade class average of students 5 4 3 2 1 I2 33 / 4 1 3 25 1.51 I4 29 / / 1 3 24 1.13 I8 33 / / 7 4 22 1.54 I9 31 7 7 6 3 7 3.03 I12 34 / / / 3 31 1.08 I13 28 / / 3 2 22 1.25
From the experience of the teachers and the observations, it can be summarized that they do not possess working habits and live without conception for the future and always complain about something. This is part of their culture, behavior and customs i.e. it is within their lifestyle. Because of that fact, I am convinced that the educators should find a way to help them
2 Mladenoski, Marjan, Ethnic stereotypes and prejudices in primary school, p. 108. 3 Ibid., p. 112. 4 Analysis of an English language test.
619 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century during their studies. With the help of the teachers and other pedagogical staff, they can learn that education is even more important than their “music” habits. It is obvious that in this way, they make a living but with the obligational high school in our country, they face with problems of being expelled from school because of bad discipline or continuously showing low results. From one hand, the problem with these students occurs not because of their fault but the fact that students from Turkish and Roma background follow different systems and programs and at the end, they go to the same high school and do not achieve good results. Another thing is that maybe the teachers follow the stereotyping of them that they are not good students. On the other hand, of course, they are bad students, but what is the reason for that? A first grade student from Roma background goes to school and studies all subjects in Turkish language up to fourth grade. After fifth grade, they are faced with the problem of studying different subjects in Macedonian language which is something new to them. They speak in Turkish language with their friends and families and they go to school where they have to study Macedonian language only twice a week and with the new curricula English language too. They are not familiar with the Macedonian alphabet and start studying another foreign language too. Obviously, it is very hard for them to achieve good results and everyone in this situation will be probably the same. For that purpose, it is inevitable to support the opening of centers for the Roma kids in such areas full of people of this background. These centers should help them learn study and improve Macedonian language at first place. The fact that these children do not have knowledge of the state country language where they live and the pre-school education means that changing the system and doing something for them would be better if transition towards elementary education is made and this more important to them and for the country itself. Another thing that is very important here is to avoid stereotyping by studying the rules of Intercultural Communication. Intercultural communication teaches us about different cultures, how to behave in different surroundings without having prejudices about anyone but accepting the people the way they are. Without having knowledge of the culture of the minorities, their traditions, customs, their education and habits, we will always have problems of this type.
Communicative competence and studying foreign languages as an important factor for EU integration The world has become a global society nowadays. To be able to communicate people all over the world, have to learn and enable themselves to understand each other. At first sight, it does not seem so difficult. But, many
620 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century other components interfere with this matter. In order to achieve successful communication with the persons involved, communicators must draw attention to a number of domains that have to be considered and taken into consideration. Communicative competence is a linguistic term which refers to a learner’s ability for second language. It does not refer only to a learner’s ability to apply and use grammatical rules, but also to form correct utterances, and know how to use these utterances appropriately.5 So, in order to be able to learn a new language, one must be aware of the communicative intercultural competence. An essential development of globalization is beneath the increased cooperation and communication among cultures. By doing this, the integrated competencies in foreign languages and intercultural communication are deemed as important keys for successful participation in modern life and society. The foreign language education is seen as essential factors in fostering intercultural communicative competence. The merging of a foreign language with content subject matter seems to provide an ideal environment to initiate intercultural learning: content is never culturally neutral. On the other hand, it seems quite plausible that we can go far beyond the formalization that has been achieved so far in the fields of literary criticism and descriptive ethnographies of communication. In order to be able to study and learn foreign language we have to be familiar with communicative competence. Studying foreign languages opens doors and opportunities within the European Union for a better career and involvement in education. By studying the language, we also study the culture of the same language and by having that kind of knowledge we will avoid stereotyping as a problem mentioned in this paper below.
The reformed higher education The situation is a little better in the sector for higher education where the reforms have already started. The attention should be towards the change of the curricula that should make available more optional subjects. Another thing is the bigger participation of the students in increasing the competence based on studying. The content of the subject should be less theoretical and more practical. All these factors should be supported by better education and materials for studying. The need for a bigger offer of the European language courses (English, French, and German) is an undoubted obligation and more opportunities for usage of computers for easier studying. A special attention should be paid to the natural sciences and information technology to upgrade
5 Paulston, C. Brat., Linguistic and Communicative Competence Topics in ESL (OP).
621 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the educational materials, the equipment and training of the teachers as the biggest priority. The Globalization and the Society of knowledge brought further implications for higher education by transforming the nature of our private and professional lives. Today’s economy supported by the education gives the clear message that you should give an effort and study for life. In this way, the universities became and they will probably remain a developing industry. At the beginning of the new millennium in Great Britain there were 1, 5 million students or double more than a century before. With a bigger participation of life-long learning the “employment – power” decreased dramatically because of staff with university diplomas and this caused a need for more specialized and bigger academic qualifications. For that reason, there is a bigger need for master degrees and professional qualifications. Beside this, the increase or the qualifications coincide with the increase of the professional status and brings the universities in a stronger position as a purpose to fulfill the needs for new professionals in companies, i.e. entrepreneurship and social services – medical technicians, social workers etc. in the same way as fulfilling the needs in the industrial field such as engineering and pre-industrial professions such as lawyers, doctors and priests.6 If the universities want to deal with this challenge as some of them who already tried, they have to change the type of organizing the studies dramatically. Actually, they have to change their organization, not only putting the student at the center of attention but also to ensure that the conditions are adapted to their personal needs. In other words, they have to maintain a wider surrounding for studying, access to resources (from colleagues, library, e- libraries, computer and media rooms) and this is how they will be freed from the obstacles of time and space; they will organize their studying according to their needs for courses and at the end of the day they will be active participants under the surveillance of their teachers – mentors.
Conclusion Based on the analysis, observations and personal experience of teaching in pre-schools, high-schools and universities it can be noted that ethnic-based stereotypes and prejudices are very common nowadays and should be avoided abruptly by studying foreign languages, studying their customs, beliefs, way of living in order to understand their culture and try to behave in an
6 Schlumberger Business Consulting: Surviving the skills shortage, results of a global survey quantifying the supply & demand of petrotechnical expertise.
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“intercultural” way. The situation with Roma and Turkish students should be solved by imposing the above-mentioned centers for advice and help of these students who are in a way “victims” of the educational system. When speaking about universities as mentioned above, the situation is better but should continue improving too. A very important thing for students and university staff is the possibility of mobilization and exchange through different programs such as Erasmus, Fulbright, Comenius that are very popular within the countries of the European Union and recently in the countries of West Balkans and that is why the students and the academic staff should get informed and they will certainly find a way to succeed in avoiding stereotyping and solve the problems of today’s education.
623 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Dalibor ADŽIĆ1
SOCIAL HERITAGE – THE CAUSE OF CONFLICTS IN THE MODERN EUROPEAN SCHOOL
Summary: Schoolchildren spend most of their time at school communicating with their peers in the classroom. This communication is verbal and non- verbal. Apart from the good and harmonious communication, the constant interaction can cause conflicts and confrontations. The conflict as a phenomenon in communication is neither “good nor bad“ itself, but such communication leads us to a set goal: do not look for a relationship without problems, but learn how to resolve the conflict in an acceptable and appropriate manner. The conflict background is never unambiguous or flat. The causes are varied: the influence of a family, social and financial status, emotions, beliefs, opposite motives and the like are only a part of possible impulses that will push the communication among children into conflict. In our region, verbal and non-verbal social conflicts are evident throughout the history of education. The most evident emotion associated with the conflict is certainly anger that causes a disruption in communication and interferes with good interpersonal relationships. Such social conflicts are in the most cases “asymmetric“, because in such an unequal communication the person with a “higher” social status has far greater possibilities then the one with a “lower” social and, usually, a “lower” financial status. The dilemma is how to identify the cause of the conflict and how to resolve it in the best possible way. The skill of the conflict resolution process teachers learn partially in their formal education, but many years of work and experience in practice cannot be neglected. The teacher uses different methods of conflict resolution among children. In more complex situations, the school advisory service (pedagogue, psychologist, defectologist) can and should be of great help. There is also the question: To which extent one can and will handle the conflict? Because of its complexity, there is a great need for systematic education of all parties in the conflict. They should be educated how to resolve the conflict, what the possibilities of preventive actions are, how to deal with the conflict, how to recognize potential causes of conflict and how to
1 Prof. Dalibor Adžić, Senior Advisor, UF Doctoral Student in Zagreb, Agency for Education, Osijek, Croatia.
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build new, positive and improved interpersonal relationships after resolving the conflict. I am convinced that all participants in the school conflict want to improve their approach to conflict resolution and are willing to learn how to solve it. Key words: school, student, teacher, social conflict, social heritage, communication, conflict resolution.
Introduction Schoolchildren spend most of their time in school communicating with their peers in the classroom. This communication is verbal and nonverbal. The constant interaction apart from the good and harmonious communication can cause conflicts and confrontations. The conflict as a phenomenon in communication is neither “good nor bad” itself, but such communication leads us to a set goal: do not look for a relationship without problems, but learn how to resolve the conflict in an acceptable and appropriate manner. The conflict background is never unambiguous or flat. The causes are varied: the influence of a family, social and financial status, emotions, beliefs, opposite motives and the like are only a part of possible impulses that will push the communication among children into conflict. In our region, verbal and non-verbal social conflicts are evident throughout the history of education. The most evident emotion associated with the conflict is certainly anger that causes a disruption in communication and interferes with good interpersonal relationships. Such social conflicts are in the most cases “asymmetric“, because in such an unequal communication the person with a “higher“ social status has far greater possibilities then the one with the “lower“ social and, usually, the “lower“ financial status. The dilemma is how to identify the cause of the conflict and how to resolve it in the best possible way. The troublesome history of this area was and still is abundant with changes of the political, economic, social and every other character. By changing the social structure during the last century, the socio-economic status of the families from which children come and participate in the educational process has become one of the most important elements that regulate social relations. Socially stratified society was not seen as a potential problem that could turn into a conflict among children in school even before the two world wars. The reasons for not identifying the problem are numerous: the organization of schools, private (elite) boarding schools, private tuition at home for children of higher social status and folk (poor) schools that through four classes offered bare literacy and basic arithmetic operations, the evident stratification of society towards financial status which automatically influenced the social status not only of the parents but also the children or the fact that there were almost no
625 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century physical contact among children of different classes. After World War II the ideology that claimed that the socialist society is humane, a society of social and material equality, was spread, which did not correspond to reality. All human values including social sensitivity were devalued. Social differences, which until that time had been concealed, came out to the surface of the society and schools after the transition and were even more expressed. Neither the school as an important part of society was not devoid of these changes, but they are replicated in the classroom through a child’s perspective. That aspect of the social heritage, full of stereotypes and resistant to qualitative changes in the value system for the better, is the cause of conflict among children in modern European school. Students in the class base their communication largely on what they have brought from their family and / or the immediate environment in which they live in, which is characterized by, among other things, social heritage. Bullying and fighting among certain groups of students and young people are the consequence of the intolerance towards those who are different, and secondly, a consequence of the broader context of transition and other negative manifestations expressed in particular in the former Yugoslavia. The contemporary European schools were not spared of bullying of young people although it was developed in significantly less painful circumstances. The social crisis, the decline in living standards, the polarization of society in the material, social and political segment lead to the increase of bullying. Young people, as a particularly vulnerable category of society, react even stronger in such tumultuous change, often in violent conflicts. There are too many factors that influence positive or negative communication in the classroom. Status symbols in everyday life are increasingly present (clothing, footwear, cars, cell phones ...) even in school. Every well-meaning parent expects his child’s life will greatly surpass his, but there is a big obstacle that often destroys all hope. This is of course a reflection of pessimism as a way of thinking, believing that the worst-case scenario in life will happen, and destroy all potentials. A child is learning how to behave by watching his parents and begins to observe the world in the same or a similar way; this is a so-called domino effect. The role of parents is to fill their children’s lives with optimism, and if they do not know how to do it, we should teach them. Parents are often unaware of their impact on children and do not send such a positive message, but they sent a message of social exclusion of those who are, in their opinion, “below” their status in the informal social order. The teacher’s role in this regard in the last hundred years is becoming more demanding. Large socio-economic differences manifested themselves at the school, and there were schools that educated only children of a certain social status, or there was the era of socialism and the “blue coats” and “clothing equal
626 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century for all “so the social differences and the hence the social conflicts at the school level were not as strong or not so strongly expressed. Today’s situation in all its glorious materialism is very evident on the surface of everyday life and shows visible signs of social inequality, which, if exaggerated certainly lead to a potential conflict, in this case among schoolchildren. The conflict of a social character will be seen as a part of communication that cannot detract the people from one another, but will help them out in a constructive dialogue to be able to deal with this stressful communication. It gives us the task of becoming personally aware of it, and then clarifying to the children that the whole modern European reality is based on the potential of equal opportunities and on this basis, they should express all aspects of their potential regardless of whether they belong to the minority or majority of any European nation.
Communication, but more nonverbal Every person, regardless of their age spends much of his time in communication with people which is based on the verbal segment (tone, timbre speech rate, pauses in speech) and nonverbal communication segment (visual communication, facial expressions, body language). Nonverbal communication among students and teachers in the classroom context is very important. In non- verbal communication in the classroom, the teacher’s skills are important because they show the importance of nonverbal communication in its various possibilities of interpretation, and because of that, the teacher should be consistent in his non-verbal communication with students and send mixed messages as rare as possible. Student’s non-verbal communication in relation to the teacher’s, as well as the roles in the classroom is limited. The teacher’s task in communication is certainly to estimate what happens in the classroom. The teacher should take into consideration the development of non-verbal abilities in children during maturation and customize a range of non-verbal signs to the child’s capabilities. On the teacher as a leader of specific communication is the responsibility to the direct multidirectional communication “student-student; student-teacher; teacher-student) and make it more positive and less conflict. Such a positive attitude in communication is especially required if there is the underlying impossibility of communication because of the social (in)justice. There are three areas in which researchers focus their research: positive- subjective experience, positive people and positive groups, community. Satisfaction with the past, happiness in the present life, optimism, hope and faith in a good future define the first area of positive psychology-positive
627 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century subjective experiences. Of the three areas of research, the one about the positive emotions has the broadest tradition in scientific terms so far. Years of research by Martin Seligman and his colleagues proved that optimism reduces the risk of depression by children, improves school performance, physical health and develops mental strength they need at the time they are approaching teenage years and adulthood. Some studies show that more pessimistic students are hostile to school. Various projects offer parents and teachers programs to teach children optimism and to deal with pessimism, to encourage self-esteem in children and how to teach them to express their feelings freely. All under the assumption that the adult participants never put their social and especially financial status in the spotlight, but that they build children-students in human beings with the positive and healthy communication which will not be burdened with an emphasis on the material, but on humanity and the possibility of coexistence with others who are different.
Conflict is…! Lat. confliktare (hitting it, fight it) translated in Slavic languages as loanword conflict, unlike the Chinese script, which uses two characters for this word -a danger sign and a sign of opportunity, and our Slavic term conflict, are – kob (common destiny). Thus, it seems that “our” expression is the most logical and the most comprehensive in understanding and explaining this concept. The word conflict is used as a broad term that means any communication in which there are conflicting events, motives, purposes, political beliefs, financial situation, while the conflict is a confrontation of two or more entities in communication due to potential differences and disagreements about the spiritual and material reality. We define the conflict as a clash of different completely opposite actions in/and a person and individual, group or nation, and therefore we can distinguish conflict on the intrapersonal level (within the individual) and interpersonal (within the group, one or more people). Conflict is a term which refers to a specific situation in which there are people or groups opposing developments, trends, behaviours, emotions. Some authors who deal with conflict resolution or conflict situations and represent traditional or contemporary attitudes toward conflict conclude that individuals, groups (classes) are the most progressive when they treat the conflict as useful and normal part of communication.
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Conflicts in class are often in the same form from starting school until graduation, because children constantly mutually agree or oppose or do the same against a teacher. Especially because each class has its own particular “group”, “clans” that often have conflicting attitudes and beliefs. Social and economic status of parents and the social heritage are certainly reflected in the classroom environment and such division can be seen in the frequent exclusion of a certain circle of children of a “higher” social status. The vast majority of children and adults have a need to compare with others, to constantly compete and win in all situations, which at the same time encourage others to be “below”, “worse”, and to be perceived by their shortcomings and weaknesses, at the same time revelling in other people’s misfortunes. Such behaviour, also due to concealed or open aggression, leads to inevitable conflict. The teacher in this particular environment should be a good mediator and should be adapted to the situation in the classroom, to the best extent prevent conflicts among opposing groups or individuals and direct any communication towards constructive and / or positive outcome. Such treatment does not always work and not every teacher succeeds. Knowledge and skills in such communication cannot only be innate and learned, but many such experiences are gained with the practice in the classroom. Training of teachers in non-verbal expression and alternative models for the development of teachers’ skills develop three options: the “born teacher” model, where the teacher has all the necessary skills to resolve conflicts at the beginning of his formal education; “learned” skills model, when these abilities are developed and are the result of the learning process during the study; the third model is the possibility of interaction between the knowledge of his own capabilities and skills at the beginning and at the end of formal education where there is an evident willingness to adopt other new experiences that are necessary for the communication and conflict resolution communication. Personal, social and emotional intelligence are an essential part of the personality that certainly helps the teacher in the classroom to resolve every conflict including conflict among peers in the classroom that has a social background. These three intelligences are interrelated and interdependent. Anyone who has developed a personal intelligence understands primarily himself, knows who he is and what he is, what are his capabilities and achievements, he knows what he wants, what to avoid and what to strive to. He knows exactly how he will react in a given situation. He knows his good and bad traits, moods and knows what motivates him. A person with a developed personal intelligence uses all these skills and has a realistic picture of him.
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A person who has a developed social intelligence has a feeling that he understands the people around him well, recognizes their feelings, hopes, motives and goals. He believes that he can work with people successfully. He does not like to be alone and is often or almost always in the company. The company of others does him good. He cherishes good relations with other people, handle conflicts in a good way so people often turn to him for advice or support. A good teacher has a developed social intelligence. The emotional intelligence is a “brake” for a person’s own emotions, for the control of their intensity and their recognition. People with a developed emotional intelligence know themselves well to motivate and recognize other people’s emotions and easily establish and maintain relationships with other people. Raise these kinds of intelligences should begin at an early age by encouraging the child to set a specific goal, to plan how to achieve it and in the end to put it all into practice. He should try to connect the observed situations to a personal life. We should not be ashamed of emotions or hide them in front of a child, but we should talk about them and develop a child’s social skills. “Maybe it’s emotional intelligence what we used to call social intelligence- understanding of self, of the relationships, and others. For emotional intelligence, empathy is an essential component.“ Social sensitivity definitely belongs to the list of positive feelings that we show towards our family, school and the community, especially if the relations among students are burdened by the social, economic, political, or religious inequality.
Anger, anxiety, guilt, aggression The conflict, a common destiny, as well as most of the communication, are accompanied by certain emotions, and problems arise when anger becomes frequent, too strong and long lasting, when anger leads to aggression and interferes with good interpersonal relationships between students in the classroom. Accompanying element of conflict is, along with emotions, certainly a temptation to criticize the different, because it builds a defensive attitude and needs justification. On the other side, there is condemnation and the criticism does not affect the desired change, but it provokes hatred, which in turn results in creating resentment and general discouragement. All this necessarily implies a return to an expressed assertion that conflicts are solved by positively constructive and meaningful communication. It is important to know because of the understanding of aggression itself, how such an aggressive behaviour is motivated. For the most part the motivation for the aggression comes from fear, frustration, the need to protect
630 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century ourselves, the need to establish control, the desire cause negative emotions in other people, the desire to prevent another in his behaviour, the intention to fight for an idea in a violent way. Aggression as a cause of conflict is not only expressed in the student- student communication, but it manifests itself and from the direction of students to the teacher. It is, for example, a verbal aggression, ridicule, mockery, speaking obscenities and swearing, terrorizing with threats and in recent modern communication attacks on the blog and / or cell phone. These manifestations of aggression and non-communication are certainly based on the deeper and repressed motives, among which there are social and economic differences among the participants of the conflict. Although the aggressive actions are very unpleasant for all participants of the educational process, the teacher, as an experienced communicator of knowledge and skills, should detect causes of conflict and aggression and to resolve such situations of conflict where necessary and in cooperation with the professional services of the school in the best possible and most appropriate way. This kind of aggression is not the subject of this paper, but due to the increasing incidence, it is worth mentioning.
How to resolve a conflict “Conflict is a necessary part of every conversation, every speech among different people, each real mutual listening during a conversation.” Different authors offer a wide range of proposals to resolve the conflict. Starting from the positive assumptions imposed in the quote of professor Brajša which also brings a way of dealing with conflict of the known German communicologist Vera Birkrnbihl which consists of five steps to resolve the conflict. These steps are: Discordances – (avoid, go side by side), Fight – (attack, a direct clash between people in conflict), escape – (easy escape from one another and escape from every conflict situation), unification – (find a way from the one to the other participant of the conflict, continue along). Doubling – 8 on the principle of “we do not agree, but we still love each other”). According to this template, it is certainly possible to overcome the greatest number of conflicts, especially those of a social character because children in school age are still not so overshadowed by the social, financial, political and ideological problems that stifle everyday communication. To resolve the conflict effectively can only be done by the active approach towards the cause of the conflict where each side in the conflict will consider their own volition, but also the aspirations of the opposing party as an equal participant in this form of communication. The above mentioned assumes an
631 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century open communication and discussion of a particular conflict in which all views and opinions are to be taken into account and equally considered. Opposed to this mode is certainly the resolution of conflicts by putting aside the unresolved conflicts that lead to various disorders, anxiety, loss of self-confidence, and it ultimately leads only to the proliferation of conflicts because the negative feelings are constantly present and they just need a reason to come to the surface in all its fury. All modern European school systems generally insist on non-violent conflict resolution and this attitude leads to a broader educational activity on the child when he or she becomes a prosocial person and adopts a broad range of contents associated with interpersonal relationships in the school, the family and the wider community. Dudley Weeks points out the cooperation as a basis for actions in resolving conflict, for improving peer relationships by the effective positive resolution of conflicts, the mutual benefit as a result of effective conflict resolution and the interconnectedness of positive conflict resolution for building good interpersonal relationships by offering a handful of concrete solutions to overcome conflicts. A child, a student, a participant in the educational process can master the skills of non-violent conflict resolution and he needs to adopt certain skills. These skills are called social skills that involve learned or practiced skills, and are developed from the infancy and change in contact with others. The children learn and acquire social skills in the best way when their environment is supportive, collaborative and inclined to boast. It is possible for children to learn social skills through the school system because the children stay staying in school longer and longer in the various forms of instruction, additional, complementary and extracurricular activities. The impact is therefore larger but only under the assumption that the teachers and assistants in schools have adopted or want to adopt social skills. Students should learn communication, self-confidence, basic verbal and non- verbal skills, they should get help by our own example of self-assurance, and we should rejoice the small shifts in the direction of security and confidence to avoid the uncertainty that will lead into conflict with other children. A self-confident child will turn conflict into an opportunity for positive communication. Wendy Grant talks in his book in a very simple manner and popular language how to resolve conflicts and turn them into a cooperation through understanding and appreciation, through their own experiences, expectations, judgment of others, understanding with the family, neighbours, friends; how to defuse the situation, help people with reduced capabilities, suffering and specific advice (of conflicts).
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Instead of a conclusion A situation of the actual conflict within a class is described based on the template of Slavica Bašić. A schoolgirl named Marina wanting to establish herself as the most important student, believes that she was the deprived and neglected in the evaluation and to the benefit of her friend Ana. Her anxiety is also intensified by a tragic death in the family that has resulted in the loss of the former inherited high social status within the local community. The conflict between the girls hinders creative work in the classroom. The teacher shows no interest in a potential conflict. After one oral test, Marina expresses her antipathy towards Ana using physical violence. Marina leaves the classroom and goes home to his father and tells her version of the events. Her father rushes to the principal’s office without thinking and seeking explanations, demanding that the other child (student Ana) is punished or he will call the media and the police. The principal calls the teacher to clarify the situation, but the father does not wait for an explanation and shouts accusations. The teacher answers with a raised tone of voice and counter-accusations. The principal has not got the time to involve because of the rapid escalation of conflict between the teacher and the parents and has no opportunity to speak and is not willing to engage in any conflict due to socio-economic, social and personal prejudices. The father leaves the principal’s office angrily and with a lot of insults and threats, leaving the teacher and the principal without any additional opportunities for conversation.
THE DIAGNOSIS of the (described) conflict 1. The issue of the conflict Considering the issue of the conflict described above it can be characterized as an “affective (unrealistic, ”non-real“) – where there is not a real cause for the conflict, but it involves the character of ”opponents“, his attitudes, modes of behaviour, which are seen as the disruption in his own effort, even as an attack, terror, etc.“, in this case the attitude of the first girl about being systematically neglected and unjustly evaluated by the teacher, all in favour of her friend Ana. Everyone has reacted from his previously set positions full of prejudice, making it clear verbally and nonverbally to the other participants that they seek the ultimate fulfilment of their demands without considering a different attitude. According to the typical manifestations of the conflict, this has evolved into a struggle and conflict escalated to the physical abuse of the children and verbal conflict of the adults (father, teacher, principal). Description of the conflict according to the status of partners: in the beginning of the conflict was “symmetrical – equal (conflict between teachers
633 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century as colleagues, between spouses, team members, all of those relationships where the participants are equal and equally responsible for the process, aim, etc.);” relationship of Ana and Marina in the class, envy and hatred. Later it became “asymmetric: unequal (Ministry – principal/school), teacher – student; teacher – principal)“ because it grew into a conflict teacher-pupil, parent-principal (school) and parent-teacher. According to the scope, the conflict in the classroom was at the micro-level, student-student and student-teacher, that later evolved into a broader context of the conflict of parents and school staff (teacher and principal). The described conflict occurred almost randomly. 2. The course of the conflict – the history of the emergence and intensification of tensions No matter how hard she tried, studied, answered the questions, Marina could not satisfy her need to establish herself as the most prominent student in the classroom. She thought that the teacher favours other students, especially her good friend Ana. Her hard work and effort are perceived as persistent drawing attention to herself, especially after the tragic death in the family and sudden changes in socio-economic conditions in the family and all the social prejudices which have marked her. Because of such attitudes, her relationship with Ana becomes tenser every day and the hostility between the two of them interferes with the creative work of other students in the class. Marina has believed all along that her teacher systematically deprives her in the evaluation, which has one day, after the oral examination results, grown into an open physical fight between the two girls. Both came home with their own stories. Marina’s father did not even want to know the background of the conflicts or see the problems from Ana’s parents and the teacher’s point of view, but furiously went directly to the principal ultimately claiming punishment for the other child or summoning the media and the police. The principal, in order to gain a broader picture of everything, invited to her office the teacher who responded to the allegations of the father with counter-accusations against his daughter. The conversation turned into a loud shouting and did not contribute to examining the causes of the conflict in question. The negative stereotypes prevailed. Father left the principal’s office with curses and threats, leaving the teacher in tears, and the unprepared principal in disbelief that the conflict has grown into a major problem in a short period of time. 3. Parties in the conflict At the beginning there were individuals (Ana and Marina, Marina and the teacher), and later the parents and the school as an institution (the father, the teacher and the principal).
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4. The positions and relations between the parties in the conflict (formally described positions and relationships, but also informal positions and relationships, mutual roles, etc.) Marina, a student, claims to be suffering the direct damage, creates a picture of herself and her opponent (Ana and teacher), perceives it as a violation of her emotional life, becomes sensitive and loses the ability sympathize with the feelings of others, expresses disagreement in motifs, causes serious conflicts, the originator of the conflict. Ana, a student, seen as the biggest threat to the achievement of the desired needs, embroiled in a conflict without a valid reason, unprovoked, became the object of physical assaults. The father, subjective, one-sided, responds protectively , without serious and convincing arguments, not giving up its unrealistic demands at any price is, unprepared for any kind of dialogue, he loses the ability to transpose himself into the feelings of others, all areas of his personality are affected, which is manifested by external (coarse words, gestures). The teacher – leads the class, responds by suppressing potential causes of the conflict, responds in an inappropriate way, not taking the opportunity of a preventive action, had the ability to manage and control the conflict in the direction of solving the problem, and not escalate it, unprepared for the conflict resolution. The principal – manages the school, unversed in the course of the conflict and its origins, does not respond, there is no physical ability to react or is not being able to clearly resolve the serious conflict. 5. The basic attitude towards the conflict – whether and how they see the solution of the conflict, what they expect from the conflict According to the way they had split after the escalation of the conflict, it seems that neither side wants nor do not know how to resolve the conflict. They all stand firmly on their pre-defined positions do not show the willingness to move forward in resolving the conflict, or at least approaching the point of view of the parties in the conflict. They are unprepared for such a situation by their behaviour, nonverbal and verbal communication, they contribute to the increasing incidence of outward manifestation of the conflict. Marina expected, by potentiating the conflict, to accomplish her needs, she did not know or could not express her frustration, potentiated the conflict that escalated into a personal physical confrontation. The father wants to gain benefits for his child, not taking into account the course as well as the cause of the conflict in which his child was involved. It seems to me that the teacher failed to recognize the potential causes of the conflict and take some preventive actions and that after that the
635 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century healing actions that would mitigate the conflict and contribute to the resolution have also lacked. She was completely unprepared entered into a dialogue (conflict) with the girl’s father, as well as he, without any arguments, but only by taking defensive positions in an attack-defence situation. The principal, without any physical possibilities of intervention in the conflict (in a loud argument and turmoil she did not have the ability to say anything) she apparently did not even know about, let alone that he was acquainted with his course and intensifying tensions. Due to such circumstances, she could not act either preventive or curative. In the end the question of how one can and will act in a given conflict has to be asked. Because of its complexity, there is a great need for systematic teaching of all parties in the conflict, in order to overcome this conflict. Another set of questions are to be answered: What is the possibility of preventive action in order to deal with the conflict, how to recognize the potential causes of conflicts and how to resolve conflicts after the development of new and improved positive interrelations? I am deeply convinced that all these parties from the real conflict, regardless of their own social heritage want to improve their approach to the conflict resolution and are willing to learn how to solve it.
636 V – World order and law
Jelica GORDANIĆ1
DEVELOPMENT TENDENCIES IN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW IN EUROPE- CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW WORLD ORDER
Apstract: The European system of human rights can be analyzed in multiple dimensions. First, there is a system of protection within the Council of Europe, which has been the most effective so far. Documents of great importance were adopted within the CSCE system (later renamed to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe-OSCE). The third area of protection was developed in the legal framework of the European Union. The paper examines the main trends and issues that have emerged in jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, particularly, the increasing number of applications which have reduced the Court’s effectiveness as well as the government’s refusal to act in accordance with the Court’s decisions. The influence of OSCE on the development of the European system of human rights will be presented as well as the relation of human rights established by the acts of the EU and with European Convention on Human Rights. The last question has caused some difficulties in practice and has led us think: is there in Europe one system of human right protection with several items? Key words: Human rights, Council of Europe, OSCE, European Union, European Convention on Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights.
Introduction Since ancient times, Europe was considered as the cradle of civilization and continent which developed basis and ideas of many sciences -history, geography, and medicine. European continent in 13th century provided the cornerstone for the human rights development. Important documents on
1 Jelica Gordanić, M.A., Institute of International Politics and Economics. The paper has been carried out within the project “Serbia in contemporary international integration processes – foreign policy, international, economic, legal and security aspects” of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, No. OI 179023 for the 2011–2015 period.
637 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century human rights in this age were England’s Magna Carta Libertatis (1215) – a compromise between the king and rebellious nobility, which allow certain privileges for nobility and limits royal power. Similar character had Hungarian Golden Bull (Aranybulla) from 1222, Serbian Dušan’s Code (1349), English Petition of Right (1628), and Habeas Corpus Act (1679).2 These acts are not related to human rights issue in the modern sense of the word- as rights which belong to all people. Their main goals were self-limitation of sovereign authority for equitable and more humane governance or compromise between nobles and sovereign, which gives some benefits to nobles. Development of human rights in modern sense started within French Revolution 1789. Members of the French National Assembly in Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen stated that “forgetfulness and contempts of the natural rights of man are the sole causes of the miseries of the world” and that exist “sacred and inalienable rights“ for all the people. Revolution and the overthrow of absolute rulers in other countries contributed entering provisions on human rights in constitutions and laws. Vienna peace conference in 1815 was made a prohibition of the slave trade, and the Geneva and Hague Conferences (1899.) provided foundation for humanitarian law development. League of Nations contributed minority rights development, and Versailles peace treaty led to the establishment of International Labour Organisation. However, the most significant activities in the area of human rights occurred after the Second World War. United Nations and its many subsidiary bodies and specialized agencies, contributed faster development of human rights legislation. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 motivated states and contributed formation of three major human rights system- European, American and African. European system of human rights can be analyzed in three different (sub)-systems: Council of Europe, the CSCE / OSCE and European Union systems.
Three systems of human rights protection in Europe System Council of Europe Council of Europe was established in 1949 with the goals of “closer unity between all like-minded countries of Europe” and promotion of freedom, democratic values and human rights.3 Its most important contribution to
2 For more details on human rights development: Dihan Shelton, An Introduction to the History of International Human rights law, Working paper, The George Washington University law school, August 2007. 3 Statute of the Council of Europe, London, 5.V.1949, Internet: http://conventions.coe.int/ Treaty/ en/Treaties/Html/001.htm 26/04/2014.
638 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century human rights development was adoption of European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Rome 1950. It was signed by 13 member states.4 Over time, 14 Protocols, as substantive as procedural character, were adopted within the Convention. Of particular importance is the Eleventh Protocol, which entered into force in 1998 and completely revised the Convention procedure of human rights protection placing the European Court of Human Rights as the sole organ for monitoring implementation of Convention. In its Articles 33 and 34 Convention, provide two types of applications which might be submitted to the Court due to the violation of a right provided by Convention. These are individual and inter-state applications. Inter-state applications are extremely rare in practice.5 Some of them were operated mainly in cases of protection of its own interests and the interest of its own citizens living in another country. This kind of character had cases e.g. Austria v. Italy (1960), Ireland v United Kingdom (1971), Greece v. United Kingdom (1956). So far, there are only two cases in which state sued another state solely because of serious violations of human rights. Thus in 1967 Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden sued Greece, during the military junta regime when torture and inhuman and degrading treatment were everyday occurrence. The same group of states, extended with France, launched an interstate application against Turkey, where the government was overthrown in a military coup and human rights violation (especially of political rights) were serious and numerous.6 It remains to see if the attitude of states about these types of applications will change. There are little possibilities for that, for several reasons. First of all, interstate applications cause diplomatic complications and automatically aggravate inter-state relations, so “diplomats and their advisers believe that quiet diplomacy is more effective method.”7 Secondly, it is necessary to collect a lot of evidence and its careful preparation which is a process that requires a certain (long) period of time. Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe in Recommendation 1456 appealed on member states to use Article 33 of the
4 Today all the European countries except of Belorussia signed the Convention. 5 List and details of all interstate disputes, see at: European Court of Human Rights Inter-States applications, Internet: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/InterStates_applications_ENG.pdf 26/04/2014. 6 Government of Denmark v. the Government of Greece; Government of Norway v. the Government of Greece; Government of Sweden v. the Government of Greece; Government of the Netherlands v. the Government of Greece, Internet: http://echr.ketse.com/doc/3321.67- 3322.67-3323.67-3344.67-en-19680124/view/ 26/04/2014. 7 Christian Tomuschat, Human rights Between Idealism and Realism, Oxford University Press, 2008, р. 242.
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Convention and to initiate an interstate complain with Russia over the Russian military activities in Chechnya.8 All the reasons above contributed that Council of Europe members refrain from interstate complain. Other types of complains that can be submitted to the Court are individual applications. They are submitted by individuals, groups, companies or NGOs against state parties of the Convention. Individuals may submit complain independently, without an authorized proxy. To ensure effective protection Court does not require any fees or any monetary claims. An authorized proxy is required only when the application is accepted by Court. Conditions for acceptance of the application are legitimate interest; exhaustion of domestic remedies; prohibition of abuse of rights; no apparent insubstantiality; prohibition of parallel proceedings; the existence of considerable damage.9 During the sixties number of individual applications before the Court was extremely small. Over the seventies, number of cases increased gradually. Unlike interstate applications which are rare, individual applications are submitted en masse which might block Court’s work. In the period 1958-1998, it was submitted 45 thousand applications. In the two thousands situation became alarming, and the number of applications increased rapidly. For example in 2000, it was submitted 10,500 applications, in 2005, 35,400 applications and in 2009, 57,100 applications!10 This caused serious backblock in the work of Court. In 2007, there was a backlog of 104 thousand cases which were resolved in the next 2 to 3 years.11 According to 2013 data, more than half of the total number of submitted applications was against four countries: Russia, Ukraine, Italy and Serbia.12 Also, a great number of applications was against Romania (for restitution), Turkey (violation of political freedom, the brutal behavior of members of the military and police and destroying property in Kurdish region). Changes established by Eleventh Protocol caused small revolution about status of individuals as a subject of international law, giving them the ability to initiate proceedings before an international judicial body.
8 Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, Recommendation 1456 (2000) Conflict in the Chechen Republic – Implementation by the Russian Federation of Recommendation 1444 (2000). Internet: http://assembly.coe.int/Main.asp?link=/Documents/AdoptedText/ta00/ EREC1456.htm 07. 04. 2014. 9 More details about the conditions of admissibility of individual applications seen in Milan Paunović, Boris Krivokapić, Ivana Krstić, Međunarodna ljudska prava, Pravni fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu, Beograd 2013, pp. 112-114. 10 50 years of activity, The European Court of Human Rights Some Facts and Figures, 2010, p. 5. Internet: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Facts_Figures_1959_2009_ENG.pdf 07/04/2014. 11 Christian Tomuschat, Human rights Between...., op. cit., p. 245. 12 50 years of activity, The European Court of Human Rights... ор. cit., p. 3.
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Rapidly increase of applications might cause a real possibility that Court of becoming a victim of its own success. The Court, as a “body that has the duty- and the privilege- to critisize national judges because of the slowness of their handling of disputes would lose any credibility if it follows the same pattern of unreliability.”13 In order to prevent such a scenario, in 2005 it was adopted 14 Protocol, which entered into force on 1 July 2010.14 Article 27 of Protocol stipulates that a single judge may declare complain inadmissible if it is possible to make such a decision without further examination. If the judge cannot declare the complaint inadmissible, it goes to Board or Chamber on consideration. The Board does not only decide on admissibility, it can decide on the merits of the dispute and, if it is important for application or interpretation of the Convention. Thus, the Protocol has created a “special system of processing applications, which favors the simplest cases, and cases in which the time factor eliminating damage is crucial”.15 The Protocol has been criticized as a possible danger which could worsen the Court protection. Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is “essentially declaratory character” which means that the Court might ascertain a violation of Convention provisions and awarded compensation and costs of the procedure. It should be noted that the Court could not revoke a domestic court judgment or repeal any local law, if its provisions are uncoordinated with the Convention. In the case that the state does not take active measures to alter its legislation, the court will not comment on the coming judgments of similar themes. In some cases, the Court goes further, and in a judgment on a breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol to the Convention (right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions), may require the government to return the seized property. Turkey has been quite problematic in cases of violation of the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, especially in cases of violation of rights in Cyprus. In the case Loizidou vs. Turkey, Court decided that Turkey should return the property which was wrongfully taken away and to pay 915 thousand dollars of compensations.16 Turkey has long refused to comply with the court’s decision, primarily because at that time the Court was filed more than 300
13 Christian Tomuschat, Human rights Between...., op. cit., p. 246. 14 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 13.V.2004, Internet: http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/194.htm 07/04/2014. 15 Vuk Raičević, Evropski sud za ljudska prava, Institut za pravo i finansije. Internet: http:// ipf.rs/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/EVROPSKI-SUD-ZA-LJUDSKA-PRAVA-Institut-za- pravo-i-finansije-www.ipf_.pdf 07/04/2014. 16 Loizidou v. Turkey (preliminary objections), European Court of Human Rights Judgment, Strasbourg, 23. March 1995. Internet: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i= 001-57920#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-57920%22]} 09/04/2014.
641 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century applications that accuse Turkey of a violation of the right to peaceful enjoyment of property, which could cost the country about $ 7 billion. Pressing the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Turkey has made commitments in Loizidou case, but its problematic practice of avoiding the implementations of judgments on Cypriot backdrop continued in the future.17 Judgments of the Court have a great impact on changing the legislation of European countries. Thus, for example acting by court decision, Austria made changes on its Law on criminal procedure, Denmark amended the Law on custody of illegitimate children; France passed a law on telephone tapping; UK prohibited corporal punishment in schools, and Greece adopted the Law on pre-trial detention. Also, Serbia made changes in its legislation, primarily about slow proceedings before domestic courts. Law on the Constitutional Court was amended and it was introduced a constitutional application for violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time. A particular problem that accompanies Court judgments is the payment of a “fair compensation” to the injured party. In the cases of “fair compensation”, Committee of Ministers supervises is in the time period of three months respected Court decision. Almost always, the disbursement of compensation is delayed more than six months, and in some cases of politically complicated situations, states have deliberately refrained from paying compensation. In order to eliminate this practice the Committee of Ministers requires of the Member States written confirmation on payment of compensation.
CSCE / OSCE and the protection of human rights The second area of human rights protection in Europe was developed in the framework of the dialogue between East and West- as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Nowadays, it is considered that insistence of Western countries on respect of CSCE system of human rights played a crucial role in the disintegration of communism. In this process, important role had prominent individuals, academics and intellectuals, as well as numerous non-governmental movements, such as the “Charter 77” in Czechoslovakia and the independent trade union “Solidarity” in Poland, which pointed to the discrepancy between the actual human rights situation and the commitments made by the their governments.
17 For example in the case Xenides-Arestis v. Turkey. Internet: http://sim.law.uu.nl/SIM/ CaseLaw/hof.nsf/233813e697620022c1256864005232b7/d93093b8d08ca7bac12570f20035a170? OpenDocument 09/04/2014.
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First act within the CSCE was the Helsinki Final Act in 1975.18 For human rights protection of great importance is seventh of ten principles of Helsinki „Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States.” “This principle defines relationship between human rights and international relations. States recognized that human rights respect is an important factor of peace, justice and prosperity, and thus a prerequisite for development of friendly relations and cooperation among states.”19 Sixth principle of Helsinki Act deemed inadmissible directly or indirectly, individually and collectively interference in the internal affairs of a state- armed intervention or threat of such intervention, aiding terrorist activities, military and economic coercion. In practice, problems have emerged over the interpretation of the sixth principle, since it is not precisely defined what is meant by the term of “indirect interference”, what constitutes “terrorist activities”, what is “military and economic coercion.” This period of Cold War CSCE was finished at the end of the eighties with conferences in Vienna (1986-1989). The new, post-Cold War CSCE and the OSCE’s future in the coming years bring some new parameters in the European system of human rights protection. Result of the Vienna Conference was adoption of Final Document which has a prominent place to “Human Dimension of the CSCE” – by which participating states pledged to harmonize their legislation in the field of human rights with the rights and obligations set forth in the CSCE documents. The extraordinary importance of this mechanism is reflected in the establishing a mechanism of four phases of surveillance and observation in the field of human rights. The phases implied: – exchange of information and response to the request of another state which has an interest in assumed human rights violations; – bilateral meetings with the goal of solution these kind of violations; – draw the attention of other members of the CSCE on the case – attempt on problem solvation on the CSCE conference. Such thoughtful mechanism was good kind of pressure on countries that systematically and continually violated human rights.20 End of the Cold War and the disappearance of the block system in the early nineties changed the atmosphere of CSCE role and objectives. In newly created
18 Act was signed by Eastern (without Albania) and Western European states, USA and Canada. 19 Branislav Milinković, Ljudska prava u okviru OEBS, p. 52. in: Ljudska prava-pet decenija od usvajnja Opšte deklaracije o pravima čoveka, Belgrade, 1998. 20 For example, Turkey and Bulgaria have launched proceedings against each other for violation of minority rights, the United Kingdom in the case of f playwright Vaclav Havel arrest, European Union against DR Germany for the Berlin Wall.
643 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century international environment, Western states were oriented on CSCE as a starting point for a new European reproaching in order to “consolidate the new situation, the strengthening of peace and stability, the promotion of democracy and human rights and the development of cooperative international relations in Europe.”21 These objectives were expressed in Charter of Paris for a New Europe in 21 November 1990. Thus, Helsinki CSCE system was replaced with new stage of European cooperation- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. New era of CSCE system, or OSCE, introduces a lot of innovations in European system of human rights protection. The document adopted in Copenhagen in 1990 emphasizes rule of law and creation of democratic societies. For countries of the former socialist bloc, this meant the adoption of legislation on political parties formation and fair and free elections. Formation of new states during this period has for a consequence national minority issues. Copenhagen Document pays special attention to this problem and creates an exhaustive list of the rights of persons who have this status. The biggest and perhaps the most controversial step CSCE made with Moscow Document in 1991. This document provides sending missions to the countries accused for violation of CSCE human dimension, at the request of ten states without the consent of the accused State. Such content sent a message that human rights are no longer strictly a matter of domestic jurisdiction of the state, but rather a matter of interest to the entire international community. However, “... there is no authorization for military intervention in the service of democracy, human rights and the rule of law (as under the influence of certain political elites claimed certain…scholars).”22 Bearing in mind that UN Charter prohibits the use of force and the fact that Moscow Document not classic international agreement, there is no doubt about “the validity of conclusion which bans military intervention in the service of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”23 From operational and implementation aspects, OSCE activities are very diverse, but special importance has so-called field activities, as well as meetings consider emergencies. Activities on the spot are known as the “OSCE mission” (such as missions in Bosnia mission in Georgia Mission in Kosovo), “the groups for help” (e.g., Georgia), “center” or “office”. They cover wide range of activities: help in resolving conflict situations, aid in the transition process and the development of democratic institutions, protection and promotion of human rights, organization and supervision of local and
21 Ljubivoje Aćimović, OEBS na početku XXI veka- mesto, uloga i dometi, Međunarodna politika, Vol LXV, br 1, January 2013, p. 9. 22 Branko Rakić, Budimir Košutić, Bojan Milisavljević, Uvod u pravo evropskih integracija, Beograd, 2013., p. 277 according to: Matthias Herdegen, Europarecht, p. 399. 23 Ibidem, p. 277.
644 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century parliamentary elections (e.g. in Bosnia, Croatia) and the implementation of relevant international instruments. OSCE documents, primarily of soft law character, continued to develop European system of human rights. Section 9.1 of Copenhagen Document introduces new right- right to communicate (right on communication) which is not mentioned in European Convention nor the International Covenant on Civil and Politic Rights. In particular, it was emphasized that “no limitation will be imposed on access to, and use of, means of reproducing documents of any kind, while respecting, however, rights relating to intellectual property, including copyright.“24 The same document mentioned in paragraph 9.4 and the “freedom to change one’s religion or belief and freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief, either alone or in community with others” which was not contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.25 OSCE standards also introduced the right to the right to property, which is also omitted from the Pact for ideological disagreements between East and West. It stipulates that “everyone has the right peacefully to enjoy his property either on his own or in common with others.”26 Nowadays the OSCE is not the organization which makes key decisions. That role belongs to other organizations, such as EU, UN and NATO. Although success of its activities is according to many opinions “below expectations” (e.g. in Bosnia or Kosovo), its role in post-Cold War international relations cannot be denied. Political significance of OSCE may be lower in cooperation with CSCE, but it should be noted that OSCE has a practical value. Further OSCE activities largely depend on the activities of more relevant organizations, EU and NATO. These organizations are open for the accession of all the countries of European region. “This development could weaken, and in any case, modifies the role and character of the OSCE. Its secondary role in key issues would be even more pronounced, and the primary jurisdiction further reduced to issues of relatively minor importance.”27 Today, OSCE has an important role in protection of national minorities due to activities of Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and High Commissioner on National Minorities. The role of the High Commissioner has primarily preventive character and it is consisted of conflict prevention at the earliest stages. “While, therefore, his task is not to deal with the protection of minorities as such, but to contribute maintenance and strength of international peace and security in the region, the High Commissioner developed practice which in cases of ethnical
24 Document of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human dimension of the CSCE, Internet: http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304?download=true 22/04/2014. 25 Ibidem. 26 Ibidem. 27 Ljubivoje Aćimović, OEBS na početku XXI veka, op. cit., p. 15.
645 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century conflicts might have an important contribution on its prevention and protection of minorities in the region.”28 In these cases, OSCE must act impartially, independently and confidentially.
Human Rights and the European Union Development of human rights in Europe might be observed through the legal system of the European Union (formerly the European Community). Within this system, the legal framework of human rights developed rather slowly. The EU is as an economic organization, dedicated to coal, steel, industrial and agricultural production, which do not have much in common with human rights. But, the founders of European Communities could not miss out to mention protection of fundamental human rights in the founding treaties, particularly the Treaty establishing the European Economic Communities –e.g. freedom of movement and residence, prohibition of discrimination national grounds and economic and social rights of workers. In 1977, Joint Declaration of the Parliament, the Commission and the Council of the EU on Human Rights was adopted. These statements organs of the EU “stress the prime importance they attach to the protection of fundamental rights, as derived in particular from the constitutions of the Member States and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.”29 Maastricht Treaty continues the tradition of the Joint Declaration, and states that the Union shall respect fundamental rights in a way that guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (...) and constitutional traditions that are common to all Member States, as well as general principles of Community law. At this moment, “the question of the human rights comes to the agenda of European integration. To whose agenda? Council of Ministers? Commission? No, but to the agenda of the Court of Justice of European Communities.”30 Here we have an interesting situation. The founding treaties did not give the Court of Justice of the EC (later EU) explicit authority to protect the basic human rights violations by the institutions of the organization, neither contained a precise list of the rights which institutions are required to comply
28 Boris Krivokapić, Organizacija za nezbednost i saradnju u Evropi i zaštita manjina, Zbornik radova Pravnog fakulteta u Nišu, XLIII/2003, pp. 148-178. p. 162. 29 Joint Declaration by the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission, Official Journal of European Communities, NO C 103, Luxembourg, 5 April 1977. 30 Vesna Knežević Predić, Some messages from the Matthews Case: Judicial Protection of Human Rights, the European system of one, two or ..., Zbornik radova Evropski sistem zaštite ljudskih pravd iskustva i novi izazovi, Centar za publikacije Pravnog fakulteta u Nišu, Niš, 2005, pp. 37-53, p. 37.
646 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century and Court to protect. Faced with the possibility that human rights take some other institutions (e.g. the European Court of Justice) and thereby undermine the supranational character of the EC / EU, the Court of Justice of the EC conceived the protection of human rights as “part of the general legal principles” of Community legal order. This solution has proven deficiencies and has not answered the questions which rights belong to the corpus of general principles. The new solution is achieved through the concept of “common constitutional traditions” of member states, which also proved as ineffective.31 The fact that protection of human rights is out of the sphere of exclusive domestic jurisdiction of member states signing of the European Convention on Human Rights asked for a much more efficient solution. Convention becomes the starting point of the Court of Justice of the EC / EU. EC and EU were not ready to accept this kind of solution and accede to the Convention. This might provoke special system of human rights protection with European Court of Human Rights on the top. Case Matthews vs. United Kingdom launched many issues related to the protection of human rights in the EU.32 Within the framework of EC / EU, it is necessary to mention Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers. The Charter does not have binding character but it specifies the most important rights of workers such as freedom of movement, employment and remuneration, provision of adequate working and living conditions, equal treatment of men and women, health and social care. Also, specific character has Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, which includes civil and political rights (which is important, because EU acts on human rights include mostly economic and social rights).33 The Court is not obliged to apply it, but every citizen has the right to send a written communication to the European Parliament in case of violation of some right which provided by Declaration. Parliament has an obligation to resolve applications, but final solution does not have binding character. Perhaps the
31 It the famous case Nold vs. Commission, Court it is concluded that “the court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the member states, and it cannot therefore uphold measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the constitutions of those states. Similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the member states have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines which should be followed within the framework of community law“, J. Nold, Kohlen- und Baustoffgroßhandlung v Commission of the European Communities. Judgment of the Court of 14 May 1974. Case 4-73. 32 On Matthews vs. UK see at: Јean-Рaul Сosta, The European Court of Human Rights and Its Recent Case Law , Тexas International Law Journal, vol. 38, 2003., p. 466. 33 Declaration of fundamental rights and freedoms, Official Journal of the European Communities, No C 120/51, April 1989., Internet: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/docs/pdf/ a2_0003_89_en_en.pdf 25/04/2014
647 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century most important act in the regulation of human rights is the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. “With this act, one specific organization such as EU showed its primary objective is not just the economic development of its members, but also issues related to human rights received significant role in its activities.”34 Text of the Charter is legally obligated incorporating in Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009. This makes Charter one of few act of EU dedicated human rights which is legally binding.
Conclusion European system of human rights evolved through activities of three different organizations Council of Europe, the CSCE / OSCE and the European Union. Each of these systems gave its contribution to development of human rights in Europe, which enable European system of human rights to become more organized and complex in comparison with American and African systems of human rights protection. The first and most important in development of European system of human rights was establishment of Council of Europe, an organization that has adopted the European Convention on Human Rights in 1950. The European Court of Human Rights based in Strasbourg, is the main organ of supervision over the Convention. Changes introduced in 1998 caused constantly increasing number of applications which threatens to paralyze the work of the Court. Remains to see whether, and to what extent, will be successful measures relating to the faster and easier the verdict. When we speak of the CSCE / OSCE, it is indisputable that this system contributed awareness of human rights in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. But also, it is undisputed that CSCE / OSCE in post-Cold War period has too much political character, and some of its acts could be observed as interference in internal affairs of state. This is obvious in case of Moscow Document. Such perceptions had contributions on revival concepts of humanitarian intervention and preventive attacks. Development of human rights within EC / EU was slow. This is logical, having in mind that EU is an economic organization. But, with transformation of EC into the EU, more attention is paid to human rights. A large number of adopted legislation was non-binding. A major step was the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. One of the earlier actual questions was accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. This did not happen, or will happen in the future. This might cause formation of a
34 Milan Paunović, Boris Krivokapić, Ivana Krstić, Međunarodna ljudska prava ... op. cit., p. 103.
648 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century special system of human rights protection with European Court of Human Rights on the forehead, whose decisions would be binding for European Union. This kind of concept would jeopardize the supranational character of the EU. Thus, each of the three systems had their advantages and disadvantages. It remains to see if Protocol 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights will reduce the number of individual applications. OSCE is politically outnumbered NATO and the EU, but still may have a significant impact in the development of minority rights. Also, it will be interesting to see further development of legislation devoted to human rights in the EU in the time period when this organization is faced with one of the biggest crisis in its existence. Finally, Human Rights in Europe (and the rest of the world) should remain just that-rights. Neutral, independent, equal for all, original, inalienable and universal. Recently, policy has a major impact on human rights. This trend should be resisted, and human rights must be observed in their basic form- as rights which belong to all human beings, without distinction. This important branch of law cannot become a tool of any political blackmail, conditionality and bias.
649 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Filip TURČINOVIĆ1
SOME INTERNATIONAL LAW ASPECTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION REGARDING CULTURAL HERITAGE
Abstract: Cultural heritage is a neologism being mostly perceived as a category bearing a positive cognitive significance. Protection of both corporeal and immaterial parts of it often conclusively influencing formation of both the human community and individual identities is supposed to be comprised by that context. The achievement of these rights is connected to the territories where individuals are very often exposed to various conflicts, including wars. Conflicts sometimes originate from the conflicts over the natives` property rights and their special attachment to their native ground and produce of it as well as between minorities and the dominant population in general, especially when the definition of cultural heritage and authorization of an entity or a person entitled to its protection and care of, including rights to income gained on the basis of it, is a question. That could sometimes include integration on the basis of universal values specified by international regulation or, unfortunately, by separation – if those values are specified according to the unjust basis which, by its very nature, leads into clashes which are hard to settle. Obviously, this is not a category implying exclusively positive values, because very often, it becomes a very powerful instrument of repression and violence. Key words: cultural heritage, immaterial cultural heritage, decade of culture, conflicts.
I. Introduction To confirm the above stated position, the UNESCO Declaration Concerning the Intentional Destruction of Cultural Heritage, adopted in 2003, is especially indicative as stating that cultural heritage is a very important component of
1 Filip Turčinović, Ph.D., Full-Time Professor of International Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Banja Luka, Republic of Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina.
650 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century cultural identity of human communities, groups and individuals, as well as that intentional destruction of it causes inimical and often very hard consequences regarding both human dignity and human rights. International regulation accepted in the frame of UNESCO represent, in general, a collective pattern of universal action for protection of cultural heritage around the World. This standpoint has numerous supporters in almost all states of the World. This is the reason why increasing interest of the wide global public in these problems is not of incidental nature. Strong condemnation of destruction, especially concerning corporeal artefacts, is very prominent, insisting on qualification of these actions as the heaviest criminal acts. At the same time, it has been emphasized that these actions are directed against generations to come, depriving them from any possibility to make their connection with antecedent of that inevitable and integral part of their modern identities. In the face of actual circumstances, cultural heritage takes very important place in activities of some universal interstate organizations, especially of UNESCO itself. The context of these activities was initialized by powerful political action within UNO, motivated mostly by the World War II Holocaust.
II. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Codex on Universal Pacts on Human Rights Ratification of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights was a very strong stimulus of unavoidable importance.2 The Declaration named, for the first time gathered in one single paper, numerous human rights and basic liberties, such as rights on life, liberty, safety, right on fair proceeding and on free communication inside states and out of them, ban of torture and slavery, and the like. Personal liberties, such as rights of opinion, conscience and religion are of the special importance. These liberties are very important because they ensure possibilities of expression, without any restrictions, of people’s own religious beliefs, either individually or within communities. Freedom of practicing religious rituals is of high importance as well. In 1966, by ratification of both the Pact on Civil and Political Rights and the Pact on Economic, Cultural and Social Rights, some dilemmas on primacy in cases of collisions between universal inalienable human rights and national rights were removed. Primacy of universal human rights is considered
2 See: UN General Assembly Declaration, G. A. Res.217A (III) Dec 10, 1948.
651 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century uncontested, but it is often emphasized that it is important for them to be correctly applied on national levels. In addition to presenting patterns of incorporation, national rights in the above context reflect problems emerging in the course of implementation of these universal rights. Some authors pleaded that universal human rights were global by their character, even in their early phases. In the time length, these attitudes were partly justified. Notwithstanding that, the universal dimension neglects actual controversy between ethics and morality of Western views on one hand, and those of various national, as well as local, communities based on alternate principles and values on the other. The fact that morality is a natural category could hardly be justified, since it diminishes or entirely eliminates actual social influences and values. The tendency of emphasizing the importance of civil and political rights in relation to social, cultural and economic rights is obvious as well.3
III. UNESCO Conventions of 1970 and of 1972 The two following conventions were adopted by UNESCO in 1970 and in 1972 respectively: Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and the Convention on Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage.4 The one adopted in 1970 was especially important as it contributed to regulation of the question of both illegal trade and rights of member states to claim retransfer of cultural property that had been illegally taken off. The right of a state whose cultural property had been exported to claim its return through diplomatic ways was established as well. It was also established that a state claiming return of them was due to recompense conscientious holders of a part of its cultural heritage and to settle all transport costs. A benefit they are entitled to was their right on exemption from duties during these transactions. The Article 1 of the 1970 Convention states: a) Cultural goods should be considered all goods of religious or civilian character marked by a state as important for its archaeology, prehistory, history, literature, arts and science. Categories of these goods are stated in detail. Intention was not to quote every possible item, but, nevertheless, they
3 See: Henkin and others, International law, Cases and materials, 2001, pp. 586-591 and pp. 592-612. 4 The first Convention was adopted at the UNESCO General Convention held in Paris, France, October12-November 14, 1970. It was published by the Official Gazette of SFRY No. 50/1973. The second one was adopted at the UNESCO General Convention held in Paris, France, October17-November 21, 1972. It was published by the Official Gazette of SFRY No. 56/1974.
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were named exhaustive enough. Some rare examples of flora and fauna, minerals, anatomy, and also palaeontology items were named as well; b) Property related to history, including history of science and technology, military and social history, as well as to biographies of statesman, philosophers, scientists and artists of national importance, as well as those related to important national events; c) Archaeological findings, both regular and illegal, and archaeological discoveries; d) Parts of disassembled artistic or historical monuments and archaeological sites; e) Valuable ancient items, older than a century, like inscriptions, coins and stamps; f) Ethnological material; g) Property of artistic value, such as: 1. Canvases, pictures and handmade drawings made on any substructure and out of any material; 2. Original sculptures made out of any material; 3. Original engravings, stamps and lithographs; 4. Original art groups and installations made out of any material. h) Rare manuscripts: incunabula, antique books, papers and publications of special importance – individually or as collections; i) Postal, duty and the other stamps – individually or as collections; j) Archives, including phonographic, photo and cinematographic ones; k) Furniture items older than a century and antique musical instruments. The Article 2 of the Convention states that illegal export, import and transfer of ownership of cultural property presents one of main causes of impoverishment of origin states` cultural property as well as that international cooperation is one of the most efficient methods of protection of that property. The objective basis of the kind makes the Convention member states due to struggle, with all available means, against this practice by removing its causes and by giving help with execution of the necessary reparation.5 The Convention quotes the following general formulation: illegal import and export is considered as transfer of ownership on the basis of regulation which member states adopted as contrary to its rules. Measures that member
5 Quoted, with fractional abbreviations, from: Vladimir Brguljan, Međunarodni sistem zaštite kulturnih i prirodnih dobara (International system of protection of cultural and natural goods) Beograd- Zagreb, 1985, pp. 62-63.
653 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century states are due to implement are regulated by the Article 5 of the Convention, comprising the following obligations: 1. Making drafts of laws and regulation; 2. Making national registers of protected property, lists of both public and private cultural property which, as exported, would appreciably impoverish national cultural heritage; 3. Improving development and establishment of scientific and technical institutions, museums, libraries, archives, laboratories and workshops necessary for conservation and usage of cultural property; 4. Organizing control of archaeological exploration on sites... as well as zones reserved for the future archaeological exploration; 5. Adopting regulation concerning conservators, collectors, antiquaries and ethical principles to be respected; 6. Taking care on every single case of disappearance of any part of cultural heritage, giving it the appropriate publicity; Also, and that is very important, it anticipates an obligation concerning cooperation in the cases when cultural heritage of member states is seriously jeopardized. All member states are due to take temporary measures in order to protect cultural heritage of the applicant state from incorrigible damages in situations of the kind (elementary hails or any possibility of origination of considerable damages). Coercive exports and transfer of ownership of cultural property, effluent directly or indirectly from military occupation of a state is considered illegal.6 However, apart from the above stated positive normative assumption, there have often been contrary opinions presented, making practical application of these norms more difficult. There were some objections to insufficient precision of these rulings and claims that they need to be made more concrete. In reaction to that, UNESCO referred to the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, asking it to make a Draft Convention on Retransfer of Cultural Property.7 In 1974, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law made the Draft Uniform Law on Conscientious Acquisition of Corporeal Cultural Property, but it was not adopted. The problem is not possible to comprehend without conceptualization of it, which was partly elaborated by the 1970
6 See in detail in the work by Prof. Jelena Vilus, Ph. D., Međunarodna (privatnopravna) zaštita kulturnih dobara (International /private-legal/ protection of cultural goods); Jugoslovenska revija za međunarodno pravo (Yugoslav International Law Review) No. 1/19990. pp. 1-6. 7 See: Vilus J, Ibid, p. 5.
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UNESCO Convention. Cultural property has unfortunately been perceived, partly at least, as an economic category. This often causes controversies which were present even within some of the most important legal papers. For instance, the Draft Convention on Restitution and Retransfer of Items of Cultural Importance, of 1989, names both cultural property and works of art.8 Making account of philosophical attitude to the problem of relations between cultural heritage and human rights, the start point is that it is perceived as a specific cultural property in both corporeal and immaterial form. Nowadays there is an increase of interest on the course, especially within academic circles, in questions of righteous valorization of cultural heritage. It is likely enough that cultural heritage is of symbolic and of the most extensive cultural and permanent economic importance to dignity of human beings. It plays, absolutely by all means, a very important part in questions of legitimacy of territorial questions as well as of intellectual property rights and spirituality as uncontested basis of any critical approach to identity formation. Nevertheless, relying on attitudes of the kind, some practical importance of cultural heritage is especially promoted by international conventions of UNESCO, ICOMOSA, ICOM and the other international organizations in the domain. This is where dangers to survival of cultural heritage in its genuine form are hidden. In addition to that, there are, in assessment of authenticity as a basis of criteria of universal values, numerous problems difficult to solve. Especially in cases of insisting on respecting the criteria belonging to the Western World, which are in their essence contradictory to some individual values relaying on different spiritual substrata. There is obviously a substantial conflict between universal and individual components of human rights, which is especially visible in the domain of cultural heritage. It is an important problem which is not possible to settle entirely. Some authors give priority to differences between human beings and their corporeal culture. Obviously, conception of corporeal culture, as observed in comparison level in different communities, relies on various foundations. For instance, it is obvious that these differences rely on religious particularities, tribal origin, caste system, political or petty-political attitudes and orientation which often and inevitably dominate over manifestations of culture, as well as over clashes between various entities and groups. Unfortunately, they are realities of the modern World. It is evident because cultural heritage itself is an inevitable determinant of identity.
8 See in detail: Vilus, J., Ibid. p. 6.
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At the regional plan, in 1988 San Salvador Protocol, cultural heritage was mentioned, but not in a clear way. This Protocol was added to the American Convention on Human Rights, in the frame of the American States Organization. Its part was entitled as “Rights on Benefits of Culture“, referring to its Article 14 comprising benefits of arts, science and technology. It emphasized that this form of action could be developed in many ways. It is clear that cultural heritage was not explicitly comprised by it, though it was partly comprised by some formulations of the kind.9 On the other hand, in the frame of international professional organizations (such as ICOM which adopted, at its 19th General Assembly session, the Resolution No. 1 – referring to museums and cultural differences and variations) the importance of museum activities of all nations and groups was pointed at in the context of rights established by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948. In addition to that, continuity of tensions in various parts of the World was emphasized as induced mostly by cultural variance, what should normally prompt promotion and more efficient implementation of rights established by the above Declaration.10 The OUN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, of 1994, emphasizes the importance of development of museums as, by general perception, places where it is possible to get intercultural dialogue realized. In addition to that, the UNESCO Convention on Protection of Immaterial Cultural Heritage is very important as well.11 The Article 2 of this Convention describes immaterial cultural heritage as „rules of technical exploitation, samples that could be representative, knowledge and skills“. Concerning the two later categories, they consider knowledge and skills adopted by a nation, as different from lifeless material things. Formulations of the kind abound in confusions and obscurity, which has been confirmed by opinions of numerous experts. It was doubtlessly a result of work on making the Convention which was done relatively too fast. Debates held in scientific and expert circles on applicability of the New Representative list of Immaterial Cultural Heritage, established by the Article 2 of the Convention, are illustrative concerning the matter. According to numerous opinions stated, there are not any objectively established criteria on incorporation of cultural property into the List. It is perfectly clear that lack of these criteria causes insuperable objectivity problems when it comes to assessment of representativeness of works. In addition to that, it is necessary
9 See: www.oas.org/dil/1988 Additional protocol 10 See: www.icom-cc.org.conferenses 11 This Convention came into effect on April 20, 2006, after signed by Romania as 30th signatory.
656 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century to get established limits for incorporation into the Representative List established by the Convention on Immaterial Cultural Heritage. All the above stated, in addition to the other numerous problems, as well as to lack of constant and checked models of protection of immaterial cultural heritage, produces, unfortunately, numerous ethical and practical problems. Some opinions, especially within international environment, plead that in this domain, good results could be realized and many problems could be solved with higher respect of human rights. By application of international regulation in the field of rights on culture, a negative tendency, present for a long time within international community forcing political and civil human rights, would be also properly managed. Therefore, since 1982 an important change of the course of treating these problems has started. Namely, at the World Convention on Culture, held in Mexico under UNESCO auspices, the reduction approach, the former one, relating mostly to arts and literature, was abandoned. It was extended by introduction of various works distinctive to particular kinds of spirituality of various nations and ethnic groups, as emerged in various corporal and immaterial forms, emotional relationships and rituals connected to land and its produce. It includes ways of living of both individuals and groups of human beings, their value systems, tradition and beliefs.12 UNESCO activities were very important to protection of various cultural events because, according to general opinion, globalization has brought a destructive process, often contrary to their preservation. The United Nations proclaimed the Decade of Development of Culture with Cultural Differences in 1988-1999, insisting on differences. The Decade ended in 1998 by the Stockholm intergovernmental convention which was entitled “Cultural Policy and Development“, recommending member states to promote the idea of treating both cultural property and services as beings and under no circumstances as merchandise. The World Development Commission presented its final report, entitled “Our Creative Diversity“, in 1995. In the course of the year 2000, the UNESCO Executive Board requested identification of basic elements of Declaration on Cultural Diversities. Enhancement of UNESCO’s involvement in promotion and protection of cultural heritage was also requested.
12 The Mexico Declaration on Cultural Policy, 1982 See in detail on: www.unesco.org/images/ 0005/0005/000525/052505.eo.pdf.
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Regarding the above, export of cultural property is a special problem. According to some opinions, grey market cultural property trade exceeds trade in narcotics. In the context of our consideration, it has very often been confirmed that cultural properties representing very important parts of cultural heritage of some nations are marketed. Facing that problem, international community has initiated an incentive for adoption the Convention regulating taking these parts of cultural heritage, providing that specific conditions were fulfilled, back to countries from which they were illegally exported or taken. That would be highly appreciated, but unfortunately, it is still a good intention only, as well as a postulate designated for the future activities.
Conclusion The Article 1 of the European Convention on Protection of Archaeological Heritage states that “cultural heritage is a proof of values and peculiarity of epochs and civilizations”. In accordance to that, there is a widespread opinion that this is the only way to get some frontiers between them established. Value indicators which they rely on are possible to find as the most reliable confirmations of their cultural heritage. This is the most reliable document bringing undisputable knowledge on anthropological commonalty. It is perfectly obvious that it is not possible to justify any purification which could, under cover of making new authentic styles, or new cultural marks, justify uncritical understanding of the past, since without the past the future would look gloomy and uncertain. This ensues from the necessity of showing respect and ethical attitude towards cultural heritage, both one`s own and the one belonging to others.13
13 See: Turčinović F., Međunarodni pravni dokumenti kulturnog i prirodnog nasljeđa (International legal papers on cultural and natural heritage), Cetinje, p. 93.
658 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Žaklina SPALEVIĆ1 Milan PALEVIĆ2
THE RIGHT TO WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT AND A NEW WORLD ORDER
Abstract: The wars that took place, which are currently being conducted and will be conducted in the future were primarily aimed at the control and use of natural resources. The right to water as one of the most important human right is verified by the UN General Assembly and Human Rights Council of the United Nations 2010 as a basic human right. This right is largely determined by economic, social and natural specificities of a particular region. In this paper, attention is paid to the individual documents in which the right to water is directly or indirectly, treated as a human right. Following negative tendencies of the modern world is pervasive commercialization of many spheres of social life, even if it is more harmful than helpful. Such is the case with water supply services. This is a bad solution which is the negative consequence of the development of science and technology. However, it is the facticity of the modern era, in which 13% of the world population does not have access to clean drinking water. Availability of drinking water is possible if there is an adequate level of water services, that is, if the water used for such purposes is bacteriological. The paper is an attempt of reconciliation humanistic aspirations for comprehensive protection of human rights in the context of the right to water as a basic human rights on the one hand and trying everything it can to make a profit to be commercialized to the maximum limits on the other. Key words: Water, Human Rights, New World Order, The Right to Water as a Basic Human Right, Water Supply Services.
I Introduction The picture of contemporary international relations is not bright at all, and the predictions that future wars will be fought over water seem to be increasingly realistic. Freshwater is limited natural resource, which means that its global
1 Žaklina Spalević, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Business Faculty, Singidunum University, Belgrade. 2 Milan Palević, Ph.D., Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Kragujevac.
659 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century supplies can be exhausted. Although freshwater represents vital precondition for human life and health, as well as healthy environment, over one billion people in the world do not have access to freshwater, while the same number of people have limited access to it, or its availability is scarce. Globally speaking, diverse nature and mutually connected and dependent dimensions of water resources, which is their political, social, financial and ecological implications, can potentially further limit the access to this necessity. Also, the contemporary technical and technological development has resulted in the permanent increase of water pollution in general, particularly the pollution of freshwater springs, as well as to an uneven distribution of the existing water resources.3 In some parts of the world, the poor people are denied the access to fresh water or this access is limited to sustain adequate living conditions. Lack of access to potable water makes the living and economic conditions of many nations to be on the verge of human dignity. Since the human dignity also represents a legal category and value, it is clear that there is a firm connection between the access to free water, on one side and dignified life, on the other. However, it is not enough just to identify the right to water supplies, it is also necessary to mark it as a human right. Identifying the right to freshwater as a human right is the essence of a struggle for life of endangered categories of population from the territories affected by chronic lack of water or from those where its availability does not satisfy elementary human needs. Thus, the special reporter of UN Sub-commission on the prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities, El Haidi Guisse, listed the obstacles preventing the realization of the right to free access to drinking water supply and sanitation service. These obstacles, identified back in 1998, still exist: poor management of water resources and water springs, lack of a planned approach to management of existing water supplies, uneven distribution of freshwater across the world, the process of transforming state enterprises for water treatment and supply into private companies and the increase of price of bottled water.4 Rosemary Bar stated that it was not sufficient just to observe the obstruction of the realization of the right to water supply, but to pay attention to other implications as well. One of them is certainly politically motivated transformation of the water status from the category of public good into the category of goods whose price is governed according to market criteria, like any other service.5
3 Ramon Gonzales, Privatizing Water Supplies Punishes the Worlds Poor, Western Reporter, Week of November 3rd, 2003. 4 El Hadji Guisse, The right of access of everyone to drinking water supply and sanitation services, Working Paper 15th Session, Economic and Social Council, E/CN, 4/sub. 2/1998, p. 29, 7-10 June 1998. 5 Rosmarie Bär, Water needs protection of international law, Alliance Sud, the Swiss Alliance of Development Organisations, pp. 2-5, March 2004.
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II Respecting the right to water and sanitation as a human right Although the process of internationalization of the issues of human rights and their protection was initiated back in the 19th century, it was not before the end of the Second World War that people became aware of its universal character. Traditional intrenational law was predominantly focused on states as international legal subjects and the relationship among them, not paying much attention to the issue of the treatment of their citizens as individual human beings. Gradual strengthening of the status and the role of international public law which started to interfere in those relations that had not been touched by the traditional law before, has changed the corpus of its provisions from the rules that focused on the authorities of states to those focusing on their obligations that have to be exercised regardless their volition. Today, global and regional international documents that guarantee human rights are state of affairs. The contents of many contemporary constitutions have been shaped under the influence of the following documents: the UN Charter (particularly its Preamble), the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, and two international agreements from 1966 – the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Since the formation of the United Nations, inside the walls of this organization there have been many problems related to the realization of human rights. The predictions presented before relevant UN bodies immediately after the Second World War that the realization of human rights would face many military, political, economic, social and cultural obstacles, have proven to be true. In an attempt to solve this systematic problem, the United Nations relied on a conceptual framework that treats the process of human development according to internationally recognized human rights standards, while operatively and effectively aims at the promotion and protection of the human rights.6 Legal and political theories include a number of various classification of human and civil rights, depending on the applied criteria. Thus, we can speak about the division of human rights according to the subject that is the holder of the human rights and liberties. This is the case with individual and collective human rights, which can be further differentiated according to a number of characteristics. Within the scope of this division, the right to water supply would fall in the category between individual and collective human rights. Namely, it can be viewed as a right guaranteed to each individual, but in some circumstances it can be perceived as a collective human right (in different
6 Internet source: www.unhcchr.ch/development/approach-04.html. Date of considering: March 7, 2014.
661 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century armed conflicts, one of the ways to destroy population collectively is to deprive them the access to safe drinking water). Depending on the possibility to realize human rights in practice, they can be divided into realistic - that is those that can be implemented, and formal – those that only exist in legal phrases and proclamations and represent so called “dead norms”. For a large number of the global population, the right to water supply is, unfortunately, a formal proclamation that cannot be realized, or is inadequately realized, due to different social and economic reasons. According to the scope of protection of human rights, they can be divided into individual, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Human, individual and political rights are recognized as classic human rights, while economic and social rights are recently identified rights. This classification is irrelevant as for the subject of this paper since the right to water supply is as old as human race. The right of water is a facticity – it had existed before any theoretical concept, although it came into legal and normative focus only a few decades ago. Humanity- oriented theoreticians have treated the right to water supply as a human right based on its political and economic aspects, but it is almost impossible to neglect the political implication for its realization. According to the time of their origin, the human rights can be divided into the rights of first, second and third generation, with some rights starting to appear in the fourth generation. “First- generation human rights are the oldest rights determined according to their subject and are related to individual and political rights. Second-generation human rights include economic, social and cultural rights, while the third- generation human rights mostly comprise those rights whose holders are certain collectivities and their contents are rather complex since they constitute a broad class of rights, such as a right to peace, development, healthy environment, right to communication, etc.“7 This last classification of human rights leads us to conclude that the right to water supply as a human right can be classified somewhere between the second-generation human rights, as an economic and social right and the third-generation human rights, as a right with complex nature. The right to water supply is the part of a broader right to healthy environment. It can be sub-divided into different, but related rights, including the right to safe and healthy water. There is a broad circle of subjects that are directly or indirectly linked to the realization of the right to water supply. The subject that bears the largest responsibility in this field is the national state. It is the state that sets up the mechanisms, adopts the laws, creates the institutions and carries out the policies and procedures aimed at the adequate realization of the right to water supply.
7 Ljiljana Slavnić, Constitutional Law, University Business Academy, Novi Sad, 2007, p. 353.
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In addition, certain constitutions explicitly state that it is obligation of state to ensure effective use of water resources, their protection and prevention from pollution.8 The obligation of a state to provide safe drinking water and adequate access to its supplies at the same time represents the right of every individual. From the aspect of the unhampered use of the right to water supplies, a responsible state policy aimed at the protection of human rights in general, particularly of the right to water supply, would undertake permanent measures against any kind of discrimination (gender, minority) in relation to the right to water supply. The water crises have already affected many regions around the world. Therefore, the promotion of equal opportunities and freedom to make choices is something that makes this approach suitable for resolving the mentioned crisis.
III Legal framework for the right to water supply There are few documents at the international level that provide explicit protection of the right to water supply. Most of the international documents do not directly deal with the issue of water and its usage, but rather indirectly treat this matter through other rights, such as the right to life, adequate living standards, health, etc. The right to health was identified simultaneously with the formation of the World Health Organization in 1946. The founding act of this specialized organization precisely states that “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental human rights, the demand of imperative character we should all strive to improve. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948 stipulates that everyone has the right to a standard of living, adequate for his health and well-being himself. The Article 12 of the International Covenant recognizes the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.9 The Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women from 1979 explicitly deals with the issue of the protection of the right to water supply. The Additional Protocols to Geneva Convention from 1977 related to the application of international humanitarian law in armed conflicts also mention the right to water in a specific form (strictly forbidding all the activities depriving the war prisoners the access to food and water).
8 Switzerland Constitution, BB1 2000 2990, Article 76. 9 Similar regulation was foreseen by the provision of Art. 24 of The Convention on the rights of the Child from 1989.
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The Convention on the protection and use of trans-boundary watercourses and international lakes was passed in 1992. It comprises the additional Protocol on water and health that came into effect in 1999. This Protocol is particularly significant for the topic of this paper since it represents the first international instrument that treats the right to water supply as a human right. The Article 6 of this Protocol regulates the obligation of each signatory state to provide the access to drinking water and sanitation to everyone. The UN Committee for economic, social and cultural rights adopted in 2000 the General Comment on the right to health. This regulation provides the correct interpretation of the right to health designated in Article 12 of the Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights from 1966. The right to health is viewed in a unique way. In this approach, the right to health is not only recognized as the right to adequate health protection, but also includes providing the preconditions for good health in general. The conditions that, according to the General Comment, influence human health are: the access to safe and potable water and adequate sanitation, sufficient supply of safe water, adequate food, housing and working conditions, healthy environment and free access and use of information of public importance related to the mentioned factors. The UN Conference on water,10 which took place in Mar del Plata in 1997, focused on the availability of freshwater resources around the world. This international meeting set the goals defining the standard of, so called, drinking water quantities and quality equal to basic human needs. The General Comment No. 15, adopted by the UN Committee on economic, social and cultural rights, closely defines the standard of “sufficient quantities of water“ as the adequate amount of safe water necessary to prevent death from dehydration, to reduce the risk of water-related disease and to provide for consumption, cooking, personal and domestic hygienic requirements. The Millennium Summit that took place in New York in 2000 resulted in the adoption of famous Millennium Declaration which, among other things, supported the efforts for reducing the number of people who are deprived of the access to drinking water. Yet, the access to water supply was not identified as an independent millennium goal in this Declaration, but rather in the context of ensuring sustainability of healthy environment – the goal to be attained by 2015. It also identified the significant improvement of the conditions necessary to sustain healthy environment, speaking about the period that preceded the Millennium Summit.
10 March 22nd is the World Water Day. This, also speaks for the fact that the world public also pays attention to the promotion of the right to water as a human right.
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The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted the General Comment no. 15 in 2002 which defines the access to water supply as a special right. The right to water is linked to the right to the highest attainable standards of living and adequate housing and nutrition conditions, which implies the conclusion that the right to water is internationally recognized right while the assumed duties have become a sort of ethical imperative, but, unfortunately, not legally binding obligations that have to be exercised.. In line with this comment, states around the world perform numerous and continuous duties originating from the very essence of the right to water supply: the duty to provide sustainable access to existing water supplies, the duty to provide conditions that this access is unhampered, the duty to establish an efficient system of water distribution and quality control, as well as the adequate system of water management, thus creating the equal opportunities to all people to use this guaranteed right.
IV The right to water as a human right The right to water falls into the category of the guaranteed rights that are necessary to sustain human life, particularly if we take into account that water represents basic prerequisite for human survival. There is a certain distinction in defining the right to water as a human right in relation to other cases of the human rights definitions. Water is basic human necessity. The use of water in everyday life is not only the human right, but also the human obligation. It is not a luxury and cannot be regarded as a service on good-will basis. On the other side, it is a legitimate right of every person to live in an environment that does not endanger his mental and physical health and his well-being. Destruction and pollution of environment, water too, represent crime against nature and human beings and violate their rights. When the right to water is identified as a human right, the categories of population that are deprived of the free access to safe water supply, acquire legal and legitimate right to be active participants in decision-making process related to the use of water resources, the position they are entitled to by natural law instead of being just passive observers and recipients of this right. Yet, the international community has not reached a consensus whether the right to water should be constituted as a human right. Thus, the 3rd World Water Forum held in Kyoto in 2003 resulted in the adoption of a Ministerial Declaration marking water as the driving force for sustainable development and environmental integrity, and the eradication of poverty and hunger, indispensable for human health and welfare. Not a word identifying water as the basic human right. There is no doubt that water represents basic human necessity and, from this aspect, there is nothing to oppose in the aforementioned text of Declaration.
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However, we believe that it is mandatory that every international document related to environmental issues and sustainable development of safe water resources should identify the right to water as the human right. This would impose larger obligations on states to ensure the implementation of this right. If water is just viewed as a human necessity, this will not inflict any biding obligation on states. The obligations will be moved exclusively to market domain. In this way open market becomes major, if not the only instrument for satisfying this basic human need. From the humanitarian point of view, we have to express our skeptical opinion and reserve that water should be exclusively viewed as an economic category (rather than social and public good) and that water has to have an economic value attached to it, like any other product with market price and profit. The tendency to treat water as an economic good leads to general commercialization of water supply services and to the degradation of the initial approach derived from natural and humanitarian law that the right to water is a human right. Identifying the right to water as a human right inaugurates the right to free access to fresh water to everyone. Thus, the General Comment No. 15 establishes the principle forbidding any kind of discrimination in the realization of the right to water. In Article 16 of this Comment, the signatory states are asked to take steps to ensure that individuals and groups who have traditionally faced difficulties in exercising this right, including women, children, minority groups, indigenous peoples, refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced persons, migrant workers, prisoners and detainees should be provided an unhampered access to water supply.11 States should refrain from any activity that would prevent the realization of the right to water and, in this context, they are obliged to use their institutions to exercise measures preventing any unlawful activity aimed at obstructing the realization of this right. The obligation of any state to ensure the right to water is at the same the right of every person to use it. This right “and its realization should be viewed as a precondition for the realization of other human rights“ since they derive from the right to water.12 Thus, in our everyday life we can hear the phrases: the right to water needed for life and survival, the right to free access to safe drinking water, the right to water and sanitation, the right of water and food and nutrition, the right of water as the right to use natural resources, the right of water and healthy environment, etc.
11 Although the principle of antidiscrimination assumes that the access to water us available to everyone under equal opportunity, without any restriction or privileges, the mentioned categories of population are, due to their specific characteristics, in the regime of so called affirmative action, that is positive discrimination. 12 Amnesty International, Public Statement IOR 10/002, March 24, 2003.
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To deny that the right to water is not a human right means to deny human dignity and human right to life, which is the fundamental right of every human being. In Catholic Church circles in Western Europe, there is an opinion that the issue of free access to water should be treated as the realization of a human right. Senior bishops of this church are against modern company ownership tendencies (leaving them in the hands of private capital), particularly the companies in the field of water supply services. Also, M. D’ Alemeida provides a few interesting and significant suggestions aimed at ensuring more adequate legal protection of water in the context of transforming the right of water into a human right.13 We have selected some of them – to implement the right to water as any other human right which imposes the obligation for its realization; to guarantee the right to water to future generations; to protect water as public and social good of the mankind; water supply should be considered as a priority over all priorities; states should be held accountable for the realization, protection and application of the right to water; to prevent the privatization of water and its commercialization; human right to water should have priority over other rights resulting from the states membership in the World Trade Organization; the rules regulating the protection of water springs and trans-boundary watercourses and lakes should be under the protection of international public law; certain categories of population that are considered particularly vulnerable, such as women, old persons and children, should be additionally protected in relation to their right to free access to water; to protect the right to water of local population and natives under the provisions of international public law; to strengthen the position of traditional culture and the rights of local population (ex. nomads) related to water under the provision of international public law; to ensure the position of citizens as an interested party who will have their role in democratic and transparent procedures related to development of water- related plans and policies and to ensure legal methods that all women and men can claim their right to water on national and international level.
V Global picture and perspective of water supply services Although this paper supports the approach that the right to water should be treated as a human right and that it should be given a constitutional character, that is, it should become a constitutional category included in supreme legal acts of all states, the signatories of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, this does not minimize our obligation to also present a
13 Jon D’ Almeida et all, Is water public good or just merchandise? Considerations related to the water privatization and issues concerning poor population, published in Resource Net Friday File, Issue 198, October 8, 2004, available on www.globalizacija.com.
667 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century pragmatic view, that is to raise the question: how to ensure the realization of the right to water. A simple answer would be: by ensuring adequate water supply services. The quality of these services, as well as of waste water disposal services influence the realization of the right to water as a human right in numerous ways affecting the environment in general. To be more precise, we will make a distinction between the water supply services that provide the access to water and their commercialization, which provides this access only to one part of population that can financially afford to enjoy this right. If the water supply services were excessively commercialized in undeveloped countries, they would make the right to water a “dead norm”, a norm that cannot be applied in practice. Providing water supply services can be further complicated (in addition to their commercialization) by the phenomenon marked in the ecological dictionary, but also in everyday life, as water crisis. Integral approach to contemporary systems of water supply and waste water disposal comprises several constituent parts, such as the accumulation of row water that will be treated in order to obtain drinking water – this is a factual activity that makes the right to water a human right that may be realized, and not a “dead norm”; using electrical power, chemicals and other matter for the purification of atmosphere and waste water that will be transferred into water storage facilities; using biological waste matter left after the purification process in agriculture; releasing gasses directly or indirectly connected with the water supply or purification processes, etc. The essential role of the systems of water supply and waste water disposal and the services they offer is to provide sanitary safe water, dispose of waste water in order to prevent the appearance of unsanitary conditions, purification of waste water for the purpose of protecting the water storage facilities and to ensure rainwater drainage system for the purpose of preventing flooding of urban areas. The water supply systems (that include the systems of waste water disposal) provide basic services that allow economic and social development and at the same time they influence the ways in which a society treats water as a developmental resource.14 Thus, the relevant UNESCO body stated in 1999 that sustainable water supply systems were designed, and accordingly managed, in such a way to fully attain the goals of the contemporary society, as well as of future generations, by maintaining safe ecological and hydrological environment. In dense urban areas with old water supply infrastructure and inadequate management of utility enterprises, it is quite
14 Vid Vukasović, International legal regulation of protection and sustainable use of water resources, International problems, 2006, Vol. 58, No. 1-2, pp. 169-173.
668 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century obvious that it is unlikely to expect a fully sustainable system of water resources. These urban ecosystems are located in the areas with concentrated population and industry so that industrial waste water can be collected and transferred to the city or industrial systems for water purification and further to the locations where they are released into nature. The general characteristic of these ecosystems is the constant increase of the population per unit of area, accompanied by deterioration of the quality of living conditions through the increase of air, water and soil pollution. Conditio sine qua non for the survival and balance of such an ecosystem lies in the availability of necessary energy sources at the expense of natural systems which makes this ecosystem unsustainable from the ecological point of view since it does not generate food, but produces enormous quantities of waste. The recycling of matter and energy partially occurs in this ecosystem and its maintenance requires a great amount of resources taken from other areas to meet human needs. Most of the cities around the world, regardless their size and the extent of the country’s development share similar problems and concerns related to the quality and safety of their environment. It is a significant issue since the interest for the state of environment generally appears in urban settings where the changes in ecological conditions have direct influence on human health. Water supply in cities and urban settlements and transfer and purification of waste water can be considered as one of major problems in the development of communal infrastructure and directly depends on the number of citizens and the extent of the country’s and region’s development. Therefore, there is a justified concern for attaining a more balanced development of the cities and their infrastructure. Balanced urban development assumes the implementation of policies focused on the environmental protection and support of the projects that contribute to the decreased consumption of natural resources and minimize the impacts of industrial and communal sectors on human environment. The projection of sustainable development assumes the creation of links between the use of land and resources, air and water pollution and the increase of waste as a consequence of various social and economic influences in the development of urban areas and wider spatial artificial and natural ecosystems. The realization of the concept of sustainable development is challenged by the pressure that human actions impose on natural resources which can be, as we already know, renewable or non-renewable, where we can select three key points or critical spheres. They are: food provision, energy supplies and environmental protection. The use and protection of water resources, which are generally treated as renewable, have become an issue that found its place in all three key fields: it is vital for the production of food and energy as a row
669 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century material or means of work, while preserving its quality and preventing its damaging effects play major role in the environmental protection.15 The realization of the right to water as a human right is in question if water crisis exists. A water crisis occurs in a region if there is a situation when none of the following factors are met: the water resources are insufficient, as for both quality and quantity in order to plan its use; water cannot be distributed to a certain location in due time, and the construction and exploitation costs are economically unacceptable. In order to use the right to water in the most effective way it is necessary to overcome the water crisis wherever it appears. It can be avoided or its consequences on overall development minimized by a long-term strategic concept of sustainable planning of water resources that can be realized by respecting the following principles: • Reducing certain percentage of water consumption in all spheres of life; gradual transfer to multiple-use water supply technologies; • Planning of urban and industrial development according to the available water resources and water supply and water protection infrastructure; • The protection of the existing and potential water springs and resources using adequate economic and spatial planning policies implemented by relevant government institutions, particularly those responsible for water supply, environmental, agricultural and financial issues; • Purification of industrial and communal waste waters before releasing them into water flows as the most important measure for environment protection and enhancement. Sustainability criteria comprise various requirements that need to be fulfilled by the management of communal enterprises and companies in charge of water supply and waste water disposal. We can consider the following approaches in defining ecological sustainability of urban water supply and waste water disposal systems: ecological sustainability which assumes compliance with politically defined criteria of the quality of environment, ecological sustainability which is defined based on the scientifically determined level of critical capacity load and maximum capacity and the ecological sustainability which is determined taking into account the sustainability criteria. According to first approach, which is in relation to political implications, a certain activity can be called sustainable if it is in line with politically established criteria of environmental protection.16 The second approach is based on the
15 Željko Dj. Bjelajac, Dragan Dašić, Milovan Spasović, The environmental policy of the EU and its criminal justice framework, International problems, 2011, Vol. 63, No. 4, pp. 569-573. 16 See the following documents: Millennium Development Goals for Serbia from 2011, National program of the protection of environment from 2010 and National strategy of sustainable development of Serbia.
670 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century concept of critical capacity load in relation to the maximum pollution values or maximum possibility for exploitation that an ecosystem can endure without producing adverse and damaging effects.17 The third approach can be formulated through sustainability criteria that assess sustainability of a certain activity or a system as a whole using certain indicators. Defining the sustainability and environment indicators represents the essential precondition for the enhancement of a sustainable society and therefore, in the course of the 20th century, a number of programs appeared aimed at creating these indicators as qualitative and quantitative measurements of sustainable development. Although considerable efforts have been invested into this, none of these sets of indicators have been generally accepted and most of the countries are still at the beginning of their creation and adoption and will hardly meet the deadlines and obligations set in Rio de Janeiro Declaration of 1992.
Conclusion The right to water is definitely a human right, vital for the human survival on Earth. There is a set of measures that require the revival of this right since in many parts of the world this right is endangered. If the right to water is just a formal proclamation, then we can speak about a “dead norm” which should not be the goal of modern civilization. Diminishing the importance of the right to water, or its complete ignoring, indirectly leads to the violation of this right or hampering its realization, as well as the realization of other rights, such as the right to education, housing, or some cultural rights. The implementation of this right is only possible if there is an adequate quality of water supply services. General social progress cannot be achieved in the 21st century unless states provide adequate water supply and water control systems, but also the adequate system of managing water resources allowing all people an equal opportunity to realize this right. The criteria for the assessment of sustainable management of water supply systems should include ecological, social and economic aspects of communal infrastructure. Such aspects should provide a certain level of services to all citizens without endangering the comprehensiveness of established social systems that support the provision of these services. Unfortunately, the facts speak in favor of the assumption that even in the 21st century, not all states are
17 According to the Republic of Serbia positive law and the Decree on the categorization of watercourses and the Decree on the classification of waters in the Republic of Serbia, watercourses in the Republic of Serbia are classified I, IIA, IIB, III, and IV, according to the established marginal values of quality indicators. We would like to emphasize that the Water managment basis of the Republic of Serbia from 2001 is the fundamental document defining the basic strategy of using water resources, water protecting and protecting from water in the etire country.
671 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century capable of ensuring to its citizens the minimum of guaranteed economic, social and cultural rights and providing some of basic public services, such as water supply. The provision of water supply services to public should be the priority in the 21st century state of social justice. States are under obligation to ensure unhampered realization of the right to water and to protect this right from other legal and natural persons, especially in regards to contamination of water springs and resources. In addition, public authorities should participate in campaigns aimed at raising public awareness and educating the institutions of civil society to be more accountable in relation to water consumption. Every responsible government should attempt to eliminate the risks recognized in long-term plans and predictions by undertaking measures such as: to use water wisely and efficiently, to build new regional channels and maintain and expand the existing water supply systems. The ministries responsible for the protection of environment and natural resources should adopt adequate managing policies aimed at assisting in bringing water to remote settlements, so that people who live there would not depend upon local, frequently polluted wells and springs. Finally, we would like to emphasize the need for adopting a water convention by UN that would not just be an unrealistic attempt such was, unfortunately, the case with the General Comment No. 15 of the Covenant on economic, social and cultural rights that we have discussed in this paper. The new convention should be binding for all signatory states thus becoming an instrument for solving future global water crisis.
672 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Žarko RADIĆ1
CITIZENSHIP AS AN IMPEDIMENT FOR EXTRADITION IN THE LIGHT OF THE OLD AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER AND EUROPEAN UNION LAW
Abstract: When concluding international agreements on legal assistance in criminal matters a variety of states insists that the rule of banning extradition of their own citizens should be respected. This prohibition is regulated by national legislations of those countries, while in some of them it has a constitutional rank. In terms of legal acts of international criminal tribunals, surrender of persons wanted by theses courts is not considered extradition and it involves surrender of their own citizens, too. By applying historical law, comparative law, dogmatic and sociological methods, the author explores the influence of the old and the new world order and European Union to citizenship as an obstacle to extradition. Because of the similarities between extradition and surrender of persons wanted by international criminal courts (ad hoc and the so-called permanent ones), he also pays special attention to the reflection of the new world order to the surrender of their own citizens to these courts. Finally, the author concludes that the compatibility of the paradigm of the new world order with the international criminal law, i.e. law of the European Union affects both the normative and the actual situation in terms of facilitating the extradition or surrender of their own citizens, whether in relations between the Member States of the European Union or the international criminal courts. In conclusion, he emphasizes that, especially in the first decade of the 21st century, the Republic of Serbia has shown a significant regulatory activity that allowed the surrender of its citizens to international criminal courts, while the absence of provisions on the prohibition of extradition of one’s own citizens in the Constitution of this State from the year 2006 can also be understood as removing one of the obstacles on its path towards the membership in the European Union. Key words: extradition, assumptions for extradition, citizenship, new world order.
1 Žarko Radić, PhD student at the Faculty of Law, University of Kragujevac.
673 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
1. Introduction According to one of the definitions of the term extradition, “extradition is an act whereby one state surrenders a person located in its territory to another state with the purpose of standing trial or serving a prison sentence.”2 In more recent times, it is also undertaken with the purpose of executing other criminal sanctions. However, when concluding international agreements on legal aid in criminal matters, many countries insist that the rule on prohibition of extradition of own nationals be respected. That prohibition is regulated in national legislation of those countries and in some of them, it is at the constitutional level. Bilateral international agreements which are binding to the Republic of Serbia in this matter also contain provisions according to which the citizens of the requested country shall not be extradited, and in that country an assumption for passive extradition is that the person whose extradition is requested is not a national of the Republic of Serbia – also determined in the provisions of the Law on International Legal Aid in Criminal Matters from 2009.3 Even though there is no prohibition of extradition in the common law system countries, they also exclude the obligation for extradition of their own citizens in some of their extradition agreements through the so-called facultative clause.4 Generally speaking, “reasons for denying extradition of country’s own nationals lie in the fact that it is believed that it is one form of protection which a country owes to its nationals, as well as in increased potential for resocialisation if convicted persons serve prison sentences in their own country.”5 Furthermore, other reasons are stated supporting the refusal of extradition of nationals: an individual on trial abroad is exposed to difficulties due to not knowing the local language and law and various dangers arising from lack of resources, prejudices of foreign judges, etc.6 On the other hand, prohibition of extradition of the country’s own nationals may lead to considerable difficulties in punishing delinquents: criminal proceedings in the requested country, as means of replacement for unapproved extradition (if it comes to pass at all /although in many countries it is possible based on the so- called active personal principle of territorial validity of criminal legislation – note
2 Ilija Pržić, Izdavanje krivaca u međunarodnom pravu (Extradition of offenders in international law), Biblioteka Jugoslovenskog udruženja za međunarodno pravo, Beograd, 1934, p. 5. 3 „Zakon o međunarodnoj pravnoj pomoći u krivičnim stvarima”, artical 16 (1), Službeni glasnik RS, no. 20/09. 4 Those are the agreements between those countries and the countries which insist on prohibition of extradition of their own citizens. 5 Đorđe Lazin, Posebni i pomoćni krivični postupci (Special and supporting criminal proceedings), Kultura, Beograd, 1996, pp. 331-332. 6 See: Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin, Međunarodna krivičnopravna pomoć (International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters), Informator, Zagreb, 1987, p. 38.
674 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century by Ž.R./) suffers from difficulties in obtaining and deriving evidence (due to which the trials often end in unsatisfactory results).7 Thus, there are many proposals in literature for this prohibition to be removed or at least restricted by the above-mentioned facultative clause.8 In the European Union, by a Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States local nationality of the requested person is not defined as mandatory or facultative reason for refusal of execution of a European arrest warrant. In exceptional cases, surrender of a national may be denied if that warrant has been issued with the purpose of execution of a custodial sentence or detention order, provided that the sanction is executed in the country the requested person is the national of, pursuant to national laws. The activities within the European Union (hereinafter referred to as: EU) which have been undertaken in order to facilitate the extradition process, to adopt and implement the mentioned Framework decision run, in terms of time and essence, concurrently with search for other simplified forms of criminal proceedings in criminal matters which are conducted in the EU, but also outside of it, by the legal science and legal practice.9 At the same time, new forms of international criminal cooperation are being sought out and in Europe, even those countries which are not members of the EU, try to harmonise their legislation with the law of the Union.10 Legal science is analysing origination and directions of development of the European criminal and criminal processing law.11 Above all,
7 Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin, Međunarodna krivičnopravna pomoć (International Judical Assistance in Criminal Matters), op. cit., p. 40. 8 Ibid, p. 40. 9 Regarding the simplified forms of criminal proceedings in criminal matters, see: Stanko Bejatović, „Pojednostavljene forme postupanja u krivičnim stvarima kao međunarodnopravni standard i novi ZKP RS” (“Simplified forms of criminal proceedings in criminal matters as international legal standard and the new Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Serbia”), in: Duško Dimitrijević i Brano Miljuš (urs), Harmonizacija zakonodavstva Republike Srbije sa pravom Evropske unije (II) (Harmonisation of Legislation of the Republic of Serbia with European Union Law – II), Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu – Institut za uporedno pravo – Hans Zajdel Fondacija, Beograd, 2012, pp. 729-752. 10 Regarding these issues, see: Božidar Banović, „Harmonizacija zakonodavstva Republike Srbije sa pravom Evropske unije i savremeni oblici međunarodne krivičnopravne saradnje” (“Harmonisation of legislation of the Republic of Serbia with European Union law and contemporary forms of international cooperation in criminal matters”), in: Duško Dimitrijević i Brano Miljuš (urs), Harmonizacija zakonodavstva Republike Srbije sa pravom Evropske unije (II) (Harmonisation of Legislation of the Republic of Serbia with European Union Law – II), Institut za međunarodnu politiku i privredu – Institut za uporedno pravo – Hans Zajdel Fondacija, Beograd, 2012, pp. 753-771. 11 See: Snežana Soković, „Evropsko krivično i krivičnoprocesno pravo – nastajanje i pravci razvoja” (“European criminal and criminal-procedural law: Constitution and directions of development”), Revija za kriminologiju i krivično pravo, vol. 42, no. 1, 2004, pp. 117-136.
675 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century after a century-long waiting for the criminal law professionals, the International Criminal Court was established and surrender of the requested persons to that court, as well as to International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (the so-called ad hoc international criminal courts), pursuant to requests of those tribunals, also represents surrender of the country’s own nationals. Since the mentioned activities within the European Union and start of operation of international criminal tribunals coincide in terms of time with the new world order era, the issue of nationality as the obstacle for extradition is imposed as an issue which might be considered in the light of dominant values and ideas of the old i.e. new world order. Moreover, under the new world order we imply the post-Cold war world order for which the American president George H. W. Bush said, in his address to the Congress on January 29, 1991: “...it is a big idea: a new world order, where diverse nations are drawn together in common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind — peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law.”12 The issue of extradition of the country’s own citizens is partly related to the problem of state sovereignty. Therefore, understanding of that sovereignty is of special importance in international law.13 Finally, new world order paradigm is burdened with fight against terrorism but also with internal self-negation processes. Thus a dilemma is presented regarding whether the simplified forms of action in criminal matters, including extradition, i.e. surrender of the country’s own citizens to another country or international criminal tribunals may in certain cases lead to disruption of human rights of the requested (charged or convicted) person? Namely, legal science is already pointing to the dangers from regression of the rule of law in the fight against terrorism to simplified forms of international criminal aid.14 Since it is possible to define the old world order in several ways and conduct its periodisation according to different criteria, we believe that the subject problems related to that order should be an integral part of the analysis in the second, largest chapter of the paper. We shall deliberate on the extradition (surrender) phenomena of nationals within the EU and to the international criminal tribunals, established in the new world order era in the third i.e. fourth chapter.
12 For more, see: Miloš Jovanović, „Poslehladnoratovski svet između ideologije i politike sile” (“Post-Cold War world between ideology and power politics”), Srpska politička misao, vol. 40, br. 2/2013, pp. 187-204. Words of George Bush quoted by Miloš Jovanović from: “Bush Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the Union 1991-01-29”, Internet, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu (see: Miloš Jovanović, loc. cit., p. 189). 13 More on state sovereignty in the light of contemporary international law: Senad Ganić, Državni suverenitet u svetlu savremenog međunarodnog prava, doktorska disertacija (State sovereignty in the light of contemporary international law, Ph.D. thesis), Beograd, 2012. 14 See: Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni, “The regression of the rule of law under the guise of combating terrorism”, Revue internationale de droit pénal, 2005/1, vol. 76, pp. 17-26.
676 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
2. Development of principle of (non)extradition of nationals from the Brabant bull to the European Union Most likely, the extradition right started to develop in the time of Feudalism, and the first phase of that development was marked by extradition of mostly political offenders.15 However, even in that phase examples of contracts may be found about mutual obligation of deportation of general crime offenders. For example, in the second half of the XIII century, there was an agreement between Italian cities and also an agreement between the French King Charles V and Count of Savoy dated 04 March 1376, related to extradition of persons charged with criminal offences against general law.16 It is interesting to note that in this agreement the parties obliged themselves to mutually extradite their own subjects, while the Brabant bull guarantees, back in 1355, the right and privilege to its citizens – not to be extradited in order to stand trial in foreign courts.17 Moreover, one of the most significant characteristics of law development in the period of advanced Feudalism (from the X to the XV century) is an almost complete prevalence of the territorial principle (validity of the territorial legal regulation for each person on the subject territory) over the personal one, even though somewhere and in some forms there is still the personal principle of the application of the law evident.18 However, the so- called classic international law is one of the major achievements of the late Feudalism (from the XVI to the XVIII century).19 After the Thirty Years’ War, which ended in the Peace of Westphalia, a situation was created which was adequate for quicker development of international public law in the modern sense, i.e. of law the main principles of which are equality between sovereign states in international relations, respect of the international agreements, freedom of the sea, etc.20 The main features of development of the law during the late Feudalism manifested themselves in the legal regulation of extradition, with science and philosophy contributing significantly to it. According to one
15 For more, see: Žarko Radić, „Ekstradicija političkih krivaca – od Antike do Evropske unije” (“Extradition of political offenders – from Antiquity to the European Union”), Evropsko zakonodavstvo, 2013, vol. 12, br. 45-46, pp. 42-46. 16 Pasquale Fiore, Antoine Charles, Traité de droit pénal international, A. Durand et Pedone- Lauriel, Paris, 1879, p. 293. 17 Milenko Vesnić, Izdavanje sopstvenih podanika: javno predavanje (quaestio inauguralis) Milenka R. Vesnića, (Extradition of the country’s own subjects: public delivery /quaestio inauguralis/ by Milenko R. Vesnić), Štamparija Kraljevine Srbije, Beograd, 1888, pp. 6-7. 18 Albert Vajs, Ljubica Kandić, Opšta istorija države i prava: feudalni period (General history of state and law: the feudal period), Savremena administracija, Beograd, 1996, pp. 73-74. 19 Ibid., p. 120. 20 Ibid., p. 120.
677 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century opinion (Kohler), modern international criminal law, understood naturally in its classical concept, has been created with the famous Grotius’ (Hugo Grotius, 1583–1645) postulate aut dedere aut punire.21 Apart from justifying the territorial principle with regard to citizens by their voluntary establishment of the country and ceding to the country the natural rights pertaining to themselves and agreeing to obedience, Hugo Grotius believes that a country may also impose punishments for criminal offences which foreigners commit abroad, whether against the interest of that country or against their nationals and in general, in matters of grave criminal offences against the natural law.22 Logically, Grotius “had no objections to extradition of the country’s own subjects, considering it to be quite a natural consequence of the territoriality.”23 In France, in the XVIII century, in the Enlightenment era, ideas of Montesquieu (Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu), Rousseau (Jean-Jacques Rousseau) and Voltaire (François Marie Arouet Voltaire) are also important for the international criminal law.24 According to them, the criminal law has a strictly territorial validity which has also been accepted by Beccaria (Cesare Beccaria), who has been very reserved towards extradition due to cruel punishments which have still been prevalent in many countries (the bad sides of the strict territoriality principle have been gradually removed in France by the Law on criminal proceedings from 1808 and its modification from 1866, which introduced the principle of active personality in France, while the reality principle is still valid for criminal offences of foreigners committed abroad to the detriment of French interests).25 In Germany, under the influence of idealist philosophy of Kant (Immanuel Kant) and his postulate of absolute justice, there was an expansion of the repressive state government which favoured the reactionary German countries in the first half of the XIX century.26 Also, the general acceptance of Herder’s (Johann Gottfried von Herder) idea on individuals’ connection to law, culture, language and customs of their people should be added there which has led to strong nationalist feelings.27 That is why the German particular criminal laws, starting from the famous Bavarian
21 Bogdan Zlatarić, Međunarodno krivično pravo (International Criminal Law), Informator, Zagreb, 1979, p. 39. 22 Ibid., p. 42. 23 Milenko Vesnić, Izdavanje sopstvenih podanika: javno predavanje (quaestio inauguralis) Milenka R. Vesnića (Extradition of the country’s own subjects: public delivery /quaestio inauguralis/ by Milenko R. Vesnić), op. cit., p. 10. 24 Bogdan Zlatarić, Međunarodno krivično pravo (International Criminal Law), op. cit., pp. 43-44. 25 Ibid., pp. 43-44. 26 Ibid., p. 44. 27 Ibid., p. 44.
678 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Criminal Code from 1813, adopted the active personality principle as the basic principle, although the Prussian Criminal Code from 1851 took the territorial principle as the starting base, supplementing it however with the active personality principle, but with certain limitations, so that those provisions were also included in the essence of the unique German Criminal Code from 1871.28 Finally, advocates should be pointed out for those concepts which are (i) nowadays considered current in the matter of substantive criminal law and procedural law, i.e. the international criminal aid law in its wider sense and are therefore significant for the subject of this paper. Above all, Bluntschli (Johann Caspar Bluntschli) and Laband (Paul Laband), as representatives of the state law start from the point of national honour and obligation of protection, which each country owes to its nationals and declare themselves resolutely against extradition of the country’s own nationals.29 Their contemporary, Binding (Karl Ludwig Lorenz Binding), presented back towards the end of the XIX century the radical thesis which was obviously leaning on the idea of the state’s absolute sovereignty, the so-called Kompetenz-Kompetenz theory, according to which the country itself is competent to determine its competence.30 There are many consequences of that concept, which has long been dominant in theory and is still present in law and practice of most countries, with manifestations both in the area of the substantive criminal law and even more in the area of procedural law in legal limitations of extradition, among other things, where one is expressed as an obstacle with regard to the nationality of the requested person.31 However, the absolute state sovereignty thesis is not the prevalent one in the international law science.32 Furthermore, certain theorists of international criminal law emphasise, as the basic principles of that law, the principle of solidarity and cooperation among the countries (which implies the state sovereignty concept limited by a demand for peaceful and active coexistence of countries), principle of trust among the countries, principle of elimination of political relation of the moment, principle of successful fight against crime, etc.33
28 Ibid., p. 44. 29 Milenko Vesnić, Izdavanje sopstvenih podanika: javno predavanje (quaestio inauguralis) Milenka R. Vesnića (Extradition of the country’s own subjects: public lecture /quaestio inauguralis/ by Milenko R. Vesnić), op. cit., p. 10. 30 Bogdan Zlatarić, Međunarodno krivično pravo (International Criminal Law), op.cit., p. 73. 31 See: Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin, Međunarodna krivičnopravna pomoć (International Judiical Assistance in Criminal Matters), op. cit., p. 9. 32 See one interpretation of the state sovereignty in: Senad Ganić, Državni suverenitet u svetlu savremenog međunarodnog prava, doktorska disertacija (State sovereignty in the light of contemporary international law, Ph.D. thesis), op. cit., p. 243. 33 See: Bogdan Zlatarić, Međunarodno krivično pravo (International Criminal Law), op. cit., pp. 33-37.
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That has been confirmed by discussions at the XIII International Congress of Penal Law (Cairo, 1984).34 Apart from that, the recommendations of Section IV of the XV International Congress of Penal Law (Rio de Janeiro, 1994) indicate the necessity of regionalisation of international criminal law and the protection of human rights in international cooperative procedures in criminal matters.35 As far as extradition is concerned, under point VII/3. of the resolution of Section IV of the X International Congress of Penal Law (Rome, 1969), it is recommended that: “The principle of non-extradition of its own nationals should be pressed back so that its own nationals be returned for adjudication in the state where the crime has been committed; however in such cases the enforcement of the sanction will be reserved to the state of nationality.”36 Furthermore, under point VII/1. a) of that resolution, it is pointed out that the requested state, which wishes to maintain the rule of non-extradition of its own nationals, should be engaged in exercising its repressive power with regard to them or to enforce the judgment of the requesting state upon the request of the latter. Therefore, for that purpose, it should adopt the necessary legislative measures at an internal level.37 In complementary resolutions of that Congress held in 1969, it is emphasised, among other things, that is desirable to take, within the groups of states of likeminded ideological and legislative tendencies, all reasonable efforts to conclude multilateral conventions of extradition and that the ideal to achieve in the future might be an conclusion of a universal convention of extradition, the application of which would be confined to a universal international criminal court.38 Examples of (non)extradition of the country’s nationals, originally called subjects, are evident not only during the third (starting with the Belgian Law on Extradition from 1833) but also towards the end of the second period of development of extradition. Thus, while Ludvig XIV extradited his subjects, their extradition was prohibited in the declaration between France and the Netherlands dated 1736.39 However, forty years later, France agreed with
34 Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin, Međunarodna krivičnopravna pomoć (International Judical Assistance in Criminal Matters), op. cit., p. 10. 35 See: De la Cuesta José Luis (ed.), Resolutions of the Congresses of the International Association of Penal Law (1926–2004), ReAIDP / e-RIAPL, 2007, D-01, Internet, http://www.penal.org/ IMG/RICPL.pdf, 29/07/2013, pp. 135-138. 36 Ibid., p. 63. 37 Ibid., p. 62. 38 Ibid., pp. 64-65. 39 Milenko Vesnić, Izdavanje sopstvenih podanika: javno predavanje (quaestio inauguralis) Milenka R. Vesnića (Extradition of the country’s own subjects: public delivery /quaestio inauguralis/ by Milenko R. Vesnić), op. cit., p. 7.
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Switzerland (28 May 1777) to extradite their own subjects to one another but since the principle of non-extradition of one’s own subjects, adopted in the Netherlands, has later been extended to all other provinces of the Habsburg crown, it has almost imperceptibly and gradually moved into all new agreements on extradition of offenders and then in the codes.40 Furthermore, it should be taken into account that the term extradition was used in France for the first time in the decree dated 19 February 1791, and that in the agreements concluded by that state up to 1828, expressions remettre, restituer and livrer have been used in place of the term extradition.41 At the start of the XIX century, more precisely in 23 October 1811, Napoleon I allowed extradition of his own nationals to foreign states’ courts in a decree, while subsequent French rulers considered this decree to be a limitation of their special rights and terminated it completely in 1830.42 Already in mid-XIX century, legislations of Serbia, Germany, Austria and Italy consider non-extradition of their own nationals an order of the public law, Belgium, the Netherlands and France consider it a privilege which the accused may renounce, Norway accepts the option of extradition of its nationals to foreign countries’ courts in trials for acts they might commit against private persons while Sweden and Denmark have no orders which would prohibit extradition of their own nationals.43 The Netherlands Code dated 1881 enabled the solution of this matter to international agreements and the USA and England continued to oblige themselves regularly in their agreements for extradition of their own nationals for trials in foreign courts.44 Generally speaking and if relations between the European Union Member States are not considered, today the countries of the continental legal tradition do not extradite their own nationals, and literature notes the countries which have, in the course of the XX century, created an exception to that rule, namely Nordic states, Italy (where the Constitution from 1947 allows such extradition if it has been expressly prescribed in international conventions) and Switzerland (Art. 7(1) of the Law on International Legal Aid in Criminal Matters from 1981 allows extradition of a
40 Ibid., p. 7. (somewhat different in Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin: “Prohibition of extradition of one’s own national has appeared for the first time in the area of internal law in the Belgian Law on Extradition dated 1833, and in the international law plan, in the Belgian-French Extradition agreement dated 1834. Shortly after, it has been adopted into internal law of other states and numerous international agreements” - Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin, Međunarodna krivičnopravna pomoć /International Judical Assistance in Criminal Matters/, op. cit., p. 38). 41 Pasquale Fiore, Antoine Charles, Traité de droit pénal international, op. cit., p. 300. 42 Milenko Vesnić, Izdavanje sopstvenih podanika: javno predavanje (quaestio inauguralis) Milenka R. Vesnića (Extradition of the country’s own subjects: public delivery /quaestio inauguralis/ by Milenko R. Vesnić), op. cit., pp. 7-8. 43 Ibid., p. 8. 44 Ibid., str. 8.
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Swiss citizen with his/her approval).45 However, it should be added that, during harmonisation of their internal law with that of the EU, some countries have also, by that law, enabled extradition of their own nationals to countries outside the EU, pursuant to an international agreement (Republic of Serbia and Republic of Croatia, for example). Literature also notes Peace treaties after the Second World War, which have imposed to the defeated Axis powers the obligation of extradition of their nationals who are war criminals, as example of obligation of extradition of the country’s own citizens for the continental law countries, in line with some international agreements with a lex specialis effect with regard to the overall prohibition of extradition of the country’s own nationals.46 Prohibition of extradition of the country’s own nationals has been raised at the constitutional level in some countries. Apart from Yugoslavia and Republic of Serbia until 2006, it may be stated, for example, that in the amended Constitution of FR Germany from 1949, it was determined that: “No German may be extradited to a foreign country. The law may provide otherwise for extraditions to a member state of the European Union or to an international court, provided that the rule of law is observed.”47 Furthermore, in the provisions of the amended Constitution of the Republic of Croatia from 1990 it was determined that: “A citizen of the Republic of Croatia may not be forcibly exiled from the Republic of Croatia nor deprived of citizenship, nor extradited to another state, except in case of execution of a decision on extradition or surrender made in compliance with international treaty or the acquis communautaire of the European Union.”48 However, it should be observed, at the same time, that there are no provisions on extradition in the French Constitution dated 04 October 1958.49 There are not any in the Constitution of the SSSR dated 07 October 1977, PR China Constitution dated 04 December 1982, Indian Constitution dated 26 January 1950.50 Taking into
45 See: Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin, Međunarodna krivičnopravna pomoć (International Judical Assistance in Criminal Matters), op. cit., pp. 38-39. 46 Ibid., p. 39. 47 “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, 23 May 1949” Article 16 (2), Internet, http://www.bundestag.de/blob/284870/ce0d03414872b427e57fccb703634dcd/basic_law- data.pdf, 28/04/2014, p. 23. 48 „Ustav Republike Hrvatske (pročišćeni tekst)”, član 9. stav 2, Narodne novine, br. 85/10, Zagreb. “The Constitution of the Republic of Croatia (consolidated text)”, Article 9(2), Internet, http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=2407, 28/04/2014. 49 “Constitution of October 4, 1958”, Internet, http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil- constitutionnel/root/bank_mm/anglais/constiution_anglais_juillet2008.pdf , 28/04/2014. 50 See provisions from the above mentioned constitutions in: Miodrag Jovičić, Veliki ustavni sistemi: elementi za jedno uporedno ustavno pravo (Large constitutional systems: elements for one comparative constitutional law), Svetozar Marković, Beograd, 1984. Refer in the same section to Overview on pages 736-737.
682 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century consideration that the legal system of SSSR has often been a role model in establishment of legal systems in the countries of the former socialist Eastern European block, and the fact that in the above mentioned Constitution of the SSSR there have been no extradition provisions, it may be assumed that the constitutional prohibition of extradition of one’s own nationals was not a specific feature of the constitutions of the countries with socialist order. However, that is also evident in the comparative analysis. Thus for example, the Constitution of the SR Romania from 1965, the Constitution of the PR Bulgaria from 1971, the Constitution of the PSR Albania from 1976, the Constitution of the SR Czechoslovakia from 1960, do not contain extradition provisions.51 However, in the Constitution of DR Germany from 1968 it was confirmed that no citizen of DR Germany might be extradited to a foreign power.52 Regarding the socialist states outside of Europe, there have been no extradition provisions in the same historical period, for example in the Constitution of the Republic of Cuba from 24 February 1976, as well as in the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam dated 01 January 1960.53 In the common – law system countries (the Anglo-Saxon legal system) there is no prohibition of extradition of their own nationals, which also means there is no constitutional prohibition.54 That stems from the strictness of the territorial principle of territorial validity of the criminal law, according to which a change in criminal law is possible (with rare exceptions) only if a criminal offence has been committed within the boundaries of a territory which is legally considered
51 See: - „Ustav SR Rumunije” (“The Constitution of the SR Romania”), Zbirka novijih ustava III, Institut za uporedno pravo, Ser. E, No. 43, Beograd, 1966. - „Ustav NR Bugarske” (“The Constitution of the PR Bulgaria”), Zbirka novijih ustava V, Institut za uporedno pravo, Ser. E, No. 54, Beograd, 1972. - „Ustav NSR Albanije” (“The Constitution of the PSR Albania”) Zbirka novijih ustava VI, Institut za uporedno pravo, Ser. E, No. 58, Beograd, 1979. - „Ustav Čehoslovačke SR” (“The Constitution of the SR Czechoslovakia”), Zbirka novijih ustava I, Institut za uporedno pravo, Ser. E, No. 25, Beograd, 1961. 52 „Ustav DR Nemačke” (“The Constitution of the DR Germany”), čl. 33. st. 2, Zbirka novijih ustava V, Institut za uporedno pravo, Ser. E, No. 54, Beograd, 1972, p. 12. 53 See: - „Ustav Republike Kube” (“The Constitution of the Republic of Cuba”), Zbirka novijih ustava VI, Institut za uporedno pravo, Ser. E, No. 58, Beograd, 1979. - „Ustav Demokratske Republike Vijetnam” (“The Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam”), Zbirka novijih ustava I, Institut za uporedno pravo, Ser. E, No. 25, Beograd, 1961. 54 See an overview of relevant constitutional provisions of the USA and the UK in: Miodrag Jovičić, Veliki ustavni sistemi : elementi za jedno uporedno ustavno pravo (Large constitutional systems: elements for one comparative constitutional law), op. cit., p. 736.
683 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century state territory.55 Thus if a person has committed a criminal offence abroad, these countries do not have legal options to prosecute him/her upon return.56 Such a viewpoint leads to considerable difficulties in relations with the countries of the continental legal system which prohibit extradition of their nationals: the common law – system countries shall refuse extradition of their own national if the continental system countries do not ensure reciprocity – while for these that is legally impossible.57 Therefore, in order to avoid for such a delinquent to go unpunished, the common – law system countries foresee a facultative clause in their extradition agreements, where extradition of one’s own national is not considered mandatory and the executive authorities are authorised to, at their discretion, decide whether to extradite the requested person or not (agreements between Serbia and the USA and the United Kingdom foresee that there is no obligation for the requested country for extradition of its own nationals /Art. 5 of the agreement with the USA/, i.e. that the requested country may, at its discretion, refuse extradition of its own subjects to the other party /Art. III of the agreement with the United Kingdom/)58. In the agreement on extradition between France and USA dated 06 January 1909, it has been determined that the parties to the agreement shall not be obliged to extradite their nationals on the basis of provisions from that agreement (Art. 5).59 A new agreement between those two countries which came into effect on 01 February 2002 contains a Facultative clause.60 However, it is an integral part of the Bustamante Code from 1928 and the European Convention on Extradition dated 1957 (Art. 6(1)).61 Finally, facultative clauses between the USA and the EU Member States have not been disrupted by an Agreement on extradition between the USA and the EU from 2003, because in their provisions it is prescribed: “This Agreement is without prejudice to the invocation by the requested State of grounds for refusal relating to a matter not governed by this Agreement that is available
55 Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin, Međunarodna krivičnopravna pomoć (International Judical Assistance in Criminal Matters), op. cit., p. 38. 56 Ibid., p. 38. 57 Ibid., p. 38-39. 58 Ibid., p. 39. 59 See: France, Extrait du Juris-classeur d’instruction criminelle : De l’extradition, Libraire de la Cour de Cassation, fasc. II, Paris, 1950, p. 18. 60 “Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and France”, signed at Paris on April 23, 1996, Article 3(1), Internet, http://internationalextraditionblog.com/2011/04/27/france- extradition-treaty-with-the-united-states/, 28/04/2014. 61 For more, see: Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin, Međunarodna krivičnopravna pomoć (International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters), op. cit., p. 39.
684 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century pursuant to a bilateral extradition treaty in force between a Member State and the United States of America.”62 In Serbian, i.e. Yugoslav law, the history of regulating the prohibition of extradition of the country’s nationals may be tracked back to the second half of the XIX century. During that time, the Criminal (Penal) Code for Dukedom of Serbia dated 28 March 1860 was in force, and the mentioned prohibition was defined in provisions from Art. 6 of that Code.63 In Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the Code on the Judicial Criminal Proceedings dated 16 February 1929, contained a provision on assumption for extradition: “for the person not to be a national of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia”.64 Prohibition of extradition for its own nationals was also foreseen in the Criminal Code dated 27 January 1929.65 In all laws and criminal proceedings codes in (FPR) SFR Yugoslavia, and later in FR Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia (until the Law on international legal aid in criminal matters came into force in 2009), one of the assumptions for passive extradition consisted in the fact that person whose extradition is requested is not a national and the impossibility of extradition of its own national was sometimes regulated in substantive criminal law.66 Finally, in almost all extradition agreements which bind the Republic of Serbia, it was determined, in various formulations with the same meaning, that the nationals of the requested state shall not be extradited.67 Apart from specific exception in the agreements with the United Kingdom and the USA, all its recent agreements with some South- eastern Europe countries are partial exceptions (after it has removed the constitutional obstacle for extradition of the country’s own nationals from the
62 “Agreement on extradition between the European Union and the United States of America”, Article 17(1), Official Journal of the European Union, L 181, 19.7.2003, p. 31. 63 See: Toma Živanović, Krivični (kazneni) zakonik i zakonik o postupku sudskom u krivičnim delima Kraljevine Srbije: s kratkim objašnjenjem (s obzirom na odluke Kasacionog Suda) / od Tome Živanovića (Criminal /penal/ code and code on the court procedure in criminal offences of the Kingdom of Serbia: with a brief explanation /with regard to the decisions of the Court of Cassation/ by Toma Živanović), Geca Kon, Beograd, 1922, p. 17. 64 „Zakonik o sudskom krivičnom postupku”, Article 494. paragraph 1 (1), Službene novine, No. 45 – XX, Beograd, 23.02.1929. 65 „Krivični zakonik”, Article 12. paragraph 1, Službene novine, No. 33 – XVI, Beograd, 09.02.1929. 66 See: „Krivični zakonik – opšti deo”, Article 101. paragraph 1, Službeni list FNRJ, No. 106/47; „Krivični zakonik – opšti deo”, Article 97. paragraph 1, Službeni list FNRJ, No. 13/51. 67 Moreover, status of a national is determined according to the moment when a criminal offence is committed or according to the moment of the extradition process determined in agreement (the first solution is more correct because it prevents avoidance of the extradition obligation by granting nationality status to a requested person), and in case of dual citizenship, extradition may always be refused regardless of the fact that it is a person who is also a national of the requesting country. For more, see: Davor Krapac, Vlasta Birin, Međunarodna krivičnopravna pomoć (International Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters), op. cit., pp. 39-40.
685 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century legal system), because in these agreements it is determined that extradition of the country’s own nationals shall be allowed only for some criminal offences referred to in those agreements – those of certain gravity (considering the length of proposed i.e. pronounced criminal sanction). Those are the criminal offences which are also the subject of some multilateral conventions (organised crime, corruption, money laundering) and not so often (only in the Agreement with the Montenegro) criminal offences against humanity and other goods protected by international law are added, including other grave criminal offences i.e. serious forms of criminal offences.68 Constitutional prohibition (“it is prohibited...”) of extradition of its own nationals appeared first in the Constitution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes from 28 June 1921, with a regulation of the identical content that was “transferred” into the Constitution of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia dated 03 September 1931.69 After the Second World War, prohibition of extradition of one’s own nationals, albeit in a linguistically milder form (“may not be” extradited) was determined in the provisions of the Constitution of the SFR Yugoslavia dated 07 April 1963 and 21 February 1974, the Constitution of the of the Republic of Serbia from 1990 and the Constitution of the FR Yugoslavia from 1992. However, the provision “...to another country” was explicitly expressed only in the Constitution of FR Yugoslavia from 1992.70 Making the content of the constitutional prohibition of extradition of one’s own nationals milder was done in the Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties, which was an integral part of the Constitutional Charter of The State Union of Serbia and Montenegro from 04 February 2003. According to that Charter, the country’s own nationals may not be extradited outside the territory, except if in accordance with the international obligations of the State Union.71 An extremely turbulent legal and political start of cooperation of FR Yugoslavia with the International Criminal Tribunal for
68 See and cf. (for example): „Zakon o potvrđivanju Ugovora između Republike Srbije i Republike Hrvatske o izručenju”, Article 8, Službeni glasnik RS - Međunarodni ugovori, No. 13/10; „Zakon o potvrđivanju Ugovora između Republike Srbije i Crne Gore o izručenju”, Article 7a, Službeni glasnik RS - Međunarodni ugovori, No. 1/10 i 1/11. 69 See and cf.: „Ustav Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca”, Article 20. paragraph 2, Službene novine Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca, No. 142a, Beograd, 28.06.1921.; „Ustav Kraljevine Jugoslavije”, Article 20. paragraph 2, Službene novine Kraljevine Jugoslavije, No. 200, Beograd, 03.09.1931. 70 See and cf.: „Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Jugoslavije”, Article 54. paragraph 2, Službeni list SFRJ, No. 14/63; „Ustav Socijalističke Federativne Jugoslavije”, Article 200. paragraph 2, Službeni list SFRJ, No. 9/74; „Ustav Republike Srbije”, Article 47. paragraph 2, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 1/90; „Ustav Savezne Republike Jugoslavije”, Article 17. paragraph 3, Službeni list SRJ, No. 1/92. 71 „Povelja o ljudskim i manjinskim pravima i građanskim slobodama”, Article 35. stav 2, Službeni list SCG, No. 6/03.
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Former Yugoslavia contributed considerably to provisions of such content. Finally, the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia, adopted in 08 November 2006 does not contain provisions on extradition of the citizens of the Republic of Serbia, whether in the sense of prohibition or approval (under certain circumstance) of extradition.72
3. European Union and the problem of extradition (surrender) of the country’s own nationals With the purpose of simplifying the extradition procedure between the EU Member States, certain important activities have been undertaken within the Union, especially in the last two decades, which also reflected on the problem of extradition of the countries’ own nationals. With regard to that, the Convention should be pointed out drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on the European Union on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union.73 Also, the Convention prepared based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on the EU, on extradition between the EU Member States.74 Even though the extradition procedure was supposed to be facilitated based on those conventions with regard to the procedure regulated by the European Convention on Extradition from 1957, adopted within the scope of the Council of Europe, many reservations, i.e. obstacles for extradition enabled by the Convention from 1957, including prohibition of extradition of one’s own nationals, have not been removed with its adoption. Since the Amsterdam Treaty from 1997 made it possible to adopt framework decisions within the EU, the solution was sought in 13 June 2002, with adoption of the Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between the Member States.75 As one of the reasons for its adoption, it is pointed out in point (5) of the introductory provisions that “the objective set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and justice leads to abolishing extradition between Member States and replacing it by a system of
72 „Ustav Republike Srbije”, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 98/06. 73 “Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on simplified extradition procedure between the Member States of the European Union” Official Journal of the European Communities, vol. 38, 95/C 78/01, 30 March 1995, pp. 2-10. 74 “Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, relating to extradition between the Member States of the European Union”, Official Journal of the European Communities, vol. 39, 96/C 313/02, 23 October 1996, pp. 12-23. 75 “Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States” (2002/584/JHA, 2009/299/JHA), Official Journal of the European Communities, vol. 45, L 190, 18.07.2002, pp. 1-20; vol. 52, L 81, 27.03.2009, pp. 24-36.
687 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century surrender between judicial authorities”. In provisions of Art. 3, 4 and 4a of that decision, nationality of the requested person is not defined either as mandatory or facultative reason for refusal of the European arrest warrant. In exceptional cases, surrender of a national may be denied if that warrant has been issued with the purpose of execution of a custodial sentence or detention order, provided that the sanction is executed in the country the requested person is the national of, pursuant to national laws (Art. 4(6)).76 Even though the Member States have implemented the Framework Decision, soon the procedures have been initiated for determining the constitutionality of the national implementation regulations due to the constitutional prohibitions for extradition of the country’s own nationals.77 Their final results led to adoption of the new implementation legislation and/or to harmonisation of the Constitution with the Framework Decision (for example in Germany, Poland, Cyprus).78 In Italy, it has been determined in the Constitution that: “Extradition of a citizen may be granted only if it is expressly envisaged by international conventions.”79 According to one viewpoint, even though the Framework Decision is not a real international agreement, it may still be included in “the rules which originate from the agreement”, which means that they stem directly from the Treaty on the EU and that it might be enough to remove the opposition to the Italian Constitution since its Art. 11 provides for limitation of sovereignty in this case.80 Finally, it should be noted that the Republic of Croatia has harmonised its constitutional provisions in this matter with the EU law by changing its Constitution in 2010, i.e. significantly earlier before it became member of the EU (01 July 2013).81 Even though it is not an EU member, the Framework Decision has obviously been a guideline to the Republic of Serbia in terms of what to follow regarding the issue of the European Convention on Extradition, with additional protocols, confirmed by the Law from 2001.82 Namely, at the end of 2010, it has erased the
76 In Article 4(6) a person staying in or a resident of that country is made equal to the national. 77 For more, see: Zlata Đurđević, „Europski sud pravde i legitimitet europskog uhidbenog naloga” (“The European Court of Justice and the legitimacy of the European Arrest Warrant”), Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, vol. 14, No. 2, Zagreb, 2007, p. 1024. 78 Ibid., p. 1024. 79 “Constitution of the Italian Republic”, Article 26(1), Internet, https://www.senato.it/ documenti/repository/istituzione/costituzione_inglese.pdf, 28/04/2014, p. 10. 80 See: Marco Palmieri, „Evropska integracija na polju krivičnopravnog delovanja (Evropski nalog za hapšenje)” (“The European Integration in Criminal Field (The European Arrest Warrant)”), 2005, Internet, http://www.doiserbia.nb.rs/img/doi/1450-6637/2005/1450-66370504037P. pdf, 29/07/2013, p. 40. 81 See Article 9(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in the second chapter of this paper. 82 „Zakon o potvrđivanju Evropske konvencije o ekstradiciji, sa dodatnim protokolima”, Službeni list SRJ – Međunarodni ugovori, No. 10/01.
688 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century reservation expressed in submission of the instrument on ratification of the European Convention on Extradition, with additional protocols, which related to refusal of extradition and transit of its nationals.83 It should also be added that it has passed the Laws on ratification of the Third and the Fourth Additional Protocol to the European Convention on Extradition.84
4. Surrender of the country’s own nationals to international criminal courts By a resolution of the UN Security Council no. 827 dated 25 May 1993, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the so-called ad hoc International criminal court) was established.85 It is in charge of criminal prosecution of persons responsible for grave breach of international humanitarian law committed on the territory of former Yugoslavia since 1991, pursuant to provisions from its Statute.86 For the purpose of cooperation with that tribunal, the countries have adopted the necessary implementation regulations upon its establishment. In 1996, the Republic of Croatia adopted a Constitutional law on cooperation of the Republic of Croatia with the International Criminal Court but also a multitude of other regulations.87 Bosnia and Herzegovina regulated the surrender issue i.e. extradition at the request of the International Tribunal on 06 April 1995 with a legally effective Decree and the following countries have adopted the laws which implement the Statute of that Tribunal from 1993 to 1998: Italy, United States, Finland, The Netherlands, Spain, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, France, Germany, New Zealand, Australia, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, United Kingdom, Hungary,
83 „Zakon o izmeni Zakona o potvrđivanju Evropske konvencije o ekstradiciji, sa dodatnim protokolima”, Article 1, Službeni glasnik RS – Međunarodni ugovori, No. 12/10, Beograd. 84 „Zakon o potvrđivanju Trećeg dodatnog protokola uz Evropsku konvenciju o ekstradiciji”, Službeni glasnik RS – Međunarodni ugovori, No. 1/11; „Zakon o potvrđivanju Četvrtog dodatnog protokola uz Evropsku konvenciju o ekstradiciji”, Službeni glasnik RS – Međunarodni ugovori, No. 13/13. 85 We shall not deal with surrender of nationals to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. 86 See: “Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”, Article 1, Internet, http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_ en.pdf, 28/04/2014, p. 5. 87 For more, see: Ivo Josipović, Haaško implementacijsko kazneno pravo (The Hague implementing criminal law), Hrvatski pravni centar, Zagreb, 2000, pp. 337-364. 88 See: UN ICTY, Member States Cooperation, Internet, http://www.icty.org/sections/Legal Library/MemberStatesCooperation, 28/04/2014. 89 Ibid.
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Romania, Greece.88 Serbia and Montenegro passed such a law in 2002.89 Apart from doctrine related disputes, many countries have held parliamentary discussions (in Germany for example) particularly with regard to two issues: whether there is an authorisation from the UN Security Council to establish such a tribunal and whether it is the right time to touch the centuries long principle of state sovereignty and principle of non-extradition to a foreign court, even to an above-national one.90 Considering that the problems related to surrender of the country’s own nationals (in the capacity of accused persons) to an ad hoc International Criminal Court have been, with good reason, most expected from the countries involved in the war, regarding the legal reason for refusal of surrender which would consist of a Constitutional prohibition of extradition of the country’s own citizens, a theory has been developed in expert circles that surrender of accused persons to that court is not extradition in the classical sense, because extradition represents surrender of a person to another country for the purpose of standing trial or serving a sentence.91 Rather, surrender to the International Criminal Court is not conducted at a country- country relation, but a country-International Criminal Court relation, which is an authority above the state.92 Regarding these problems and the provisions from the Rules of procedure and evidence, which have been adopted pursuant to Article 15. of the Statute, and “correctly assuming possible legal and political problems when surrendering the accused persons to the International Court, Art. 58. of the Rules declares that execution of the obligation of surrender of the accused to the International Criminal Court pursuant to Art. 29. of the Statute has a greater legal strength than the national legislation provisions which could prevent fulfilment of that obligation.”93 Legal and political start of cooperation of FR Yugoslavia with the International Criminal Tribunal was extremely turbulent, and surrender of the former president of FR Yugoslavia Slobodan Milošević, to the Tribunal was at
90 For more, see: Mitar Kokolj, Međunarodni krivični sud za prethodnu Jugoslaviju (kome se sudi u Hagu) (The International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia (Who is being tried in the Hague?)), Centar Marketing, Beograd, 1995, pp. 142-143. 91 Ivo Josipović, „Obveze država prema Međunarodnom kaznenom sudu za bivšu Jugoslaviju” (“Obligations of the individual states to the International Criminal Court for the former Yugoslavia”), Hrvatski ljetopis za kazneno pravo i praksu, (Zagreb), vol. 2, No. 1/1995, pp. 160-161. 92 Ibid., p. 161. 93 Ibid., p. 160. 94 The Federal government of FR Yugoslavia adopted on 23 June 2001 a “Decree on the cooperation procedure with the International Criminal Tribunal” („Uredba o postupku saradnje sa Međunarodnim krivičnim tribunalom”, Službeni list SRJ, br. 30/01 i 37/01). Pursuant to Art. 132 of the Constitution of FR Yugoslavia, the Federal Constitutional Court adopted on 28 June 2001 a “Decision IV U number 103/01 to 129/01 about the suspension of
690 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
execution of the Order by the Federal Ministry of Justice for extradition of accused persons adopted on the basis of the Decree on the cooperation procedure with the International Criminal Tribunal, number 2/1-121/8-01-06, dated 25 June 2001 and actions of other state bodies undertaken for the purpose of execution of that order”. With regard to that decision, the Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted on 28 June 2001 a “Decision” 05 number 713-6483/2001 („Odluka” Vlade Republike Srbije, 05 br. 713-6483/2001, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 37/01), which contained two articles. In provisions from Art. 1 it is determined that bodies of the Republic of Serbia, when fulfilling obligations and generally accepted rules on the international law regarding the work of the International Tribunal for criminal prosecution of persons responsible for grave breach of the international humanitarian law committed in the territory of former Yugoslavia from 1991, shall act according to the procedure determined by the Statute and the Rules on procedure and evidence of that tribunal, and in provisions of Art. 2 it is determined that the decision shall come into force on the date it is published in the “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” (Službeni glasnik RS). Furthermore, the Decision was published in the “Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia” (Službeni glasnik RS) on the date of its adoption, i.e. 28 June 2001 and on the same date Slobodan Milošević was surrendered to the ad hoc International Criminal Court (Tribunal). Sometime later, in a Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court dated 06 November 2011 („Odluka o ocenjivanju ustavnosti i zakonitosti Uredbe o postupku saradnje sa Međunarodnim krivičnim tribunalom”, Službeni list SRJ, br. 70/01 i 5/02), it was determined that the above mentioned Decree dated 23 June 2001 was not in line with the Constitution of FR Yugoslavia and the Law on Criminal Proceedings. Also, in a Decision dated 26 March 2002 („Odluka o ocenjivanju ustavnosti i zakonitosti Odluke Vlade Republike Srbije, 05 broj 713-6483/2001, od 28. juna 2001. godine”, Službeni list SRJ, br. 19/02 od 12.4.2002.), that court determined that the mentioned Decision of the Government of the Republic of Serbia dated 28 June 2001, is not in line with the Constitution of the FRY and the Law on Criminal Proceedings. However, on 27 March 2002, the Government of the Republic of Serbia adopted an almost identical “Decision” (with limited implementation until the law was passed – Art. 2) 05 number 713-3796/2002 („Odluka” Vlade Republike Srbije, 05 br. 713-3796/2002, Službeni glasnik RS, br. 14/02). In justification of the above mentioned Decision of the Federal Constitutional Court dated 06 November 2011, it is emphasised, among other things, that manner (procedure) for achievement of certain freedoms and human and citizen rights can only be prescribed by law and under the condition that it is foreseen in the Constitution of FRY or when that is necessary for their achievement; that the Federal government has overstepped its powers as an executive government body defined in the Constitution because ratification of international legal acts and their inclusion in the internal legal order is, according to Art. 78. of the Constitution of FRY, the exclusive competence of the Federal assembly; that the Decree is not in line with Constitution of FRY, because it has prescribed the possibility of extradition of Yugoslav citizens even though that option is expressly prohibited by the Constitution of FRY, regardless of whether the request for extradition is submitted by the court established by one country or several countries by means of international agreements or international organisation acts, because the provisions from the Constitution of FRY, being the principal law in FR Yugoslavia, in the hierarchy of legal regulations, are the norms with greater legal effect, and therefore all other general norms, including the ratified and published international agreements, must be in line with those provisions and that the constitutional provisions may only be modified by a legally effective act of the Constitution; that the Security Council Resolution number 827 on establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal is not a part of international law which forms an integral part of an internal legal order referred to in Art. 16 of the Constitution of FRY, because an ad hoc measure – establishment of the Tribunal does not contain international-legal norms which
691 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century its epicentre.94 The Law on cooperation of FR Yugoslavia i.e. Serbia and Montenegro with that Tribunal was adopted on 11 April 2002 and is still in force in the Republic of Serbia.95 Apart from its adoption, the mentioned Charter on Human and Minority Rights and Civil Liberties from 2003 contributed to a decrease in turbulences in political and legal discussions on surrendering the Republic of Serbia citizens to the International Criminal Tribunal and also adoption of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 2006, because the issue of extradition of the country’s own nationals is not regulated in the provisions of that Constitution. The problem of surrender of the country’s own nationals to the International Criminal Court (the so-called permanent International Criminal Court), having the authority to administer criminal proceedings on the most serious criminal offences with international significance (the crime of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; the crime of aggression) is not burdened with the issue of its establishment because that is undisputed in the international legal sense. Namely, it was established as a permanent judicial body by the Statute adopted on 17 July 1998 in Rome, at a diplomatic conference under the scope of OUN, and the Statute came into force on 01 July 2002, i.e. on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.96 Furthermore, until 28 April 2014, 122 countries have deposited the above-mentioned instruments, but the fact that there are no considerably influential countries in international relations among them, such as USA, China and Israel is of extreme interest for the practice of that tribunal and further development of international criminal law.97 Truth be told, USA and Israel did sign the Statute on 31 December 2000, but a modest effect of those signatures is especially reduced in the case of USA, after
produce “validity” i.e. which have “mandatory power” and that the Resolution is just a political act producing political obligations, but the legal validity of which is achieved only by granting the legal power by a legitimate and legal body in an individual legal order of each country; etc. (note: unlike our paraphrasing, in line with the terminology from the 1992 Constitution of FRY, the Constitutional Court is using in its explanation the term izručenje instead of the term extradition – see footnote 103). 95 „Zakon o saradnji Srbije i Crne Gore sa Međunarodnim tribunalom za krivično gonjenje lica odgovornih za teška kršenja međunarodnog humanitarnog prava počinjena na teritoriji bivše Jugoslavije od 1991. godine”, Službeni list SRJ, No. 18/02, Službeni list SCG, No. 16/03. 96 See: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 126(1), Internet, http://www.icc- cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatut Eng1.pdf, 28/04/2014, p. 74. 97 See: “United Nations Treaty Collection”, Internet, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails. aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-10&chapter=18&lang=en&clang=_en#11, 28/04/2014.
692 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century a letter of the US Government to the Secretary General dated 06 May 2002, where, among other things, existence of any legal obligation from the signature on the Statute is denied.98 Furthermore, by concluding bilateral agreements with many countries and opposed to the Common viewpoint of the EU on integrity of the Roman Statute, USA are offering protection to its nationals to prevent their surrender to the International Criminal Court by the signatories of those agreements.99 Success of such actions by the USA was enabled by provisions from Art. 98. of the Court Statute.100 Regarding the problem of surrendering nationals to that Court, it must be taken into account that there are no efficient sanctions prescribed for the countries which do not cooperate with the Court because in that case, the case, after the Court makes its declaration, it is forwarded to the Assembly of the Member States i.e. to the Security Council in case the Court has, in that particular case, acted upon an order from Security Council.101 The Law on ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court is currently in force in the Republic of Serbia.102 In that law, the provisions from Art. 102. of the Statute have been partially wrongly translated, so that, instead of the term predaja (surrender) for surrendering persons to the Court by
98 Ibid. See: Declarations and Reservations (Israel); End Note (11 – USA). 99 Regarding such an agreement between USA and Montenegro, see: EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Brussels, 10.10.2012, SWD(2012) 331 final, COMMISSION STAFF WORKING DOCUMENT, MONTENEGRO 2012 PROGRESS REPORT, accompanying the document, Internet, http://aei.pitt.edu/44857/1/Montenegro_2012.pdf, 21/04/2014, p. 16. 100 Article 98 (Cooperation with respect to waiver of immunity and consent to surrender): “1. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity. 2. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender” – Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Internet, http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7C F02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf, 28/04/2014, p. 63. 101 See: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 87(7), Internet, http://www.icc- cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/Rome StatutEng1.pdf, 28/04/2014, p. 56. 102 „Zakon o potvrđivanju Rimskog statuta Međunarodnog krivičnog suda”, Službeni list SRJ – Međunarodni ugovori, No. 5/01. 103 Namely, the term izručenje is from the Croatian legal language but the core of the problem is not in the fact that it entered the Serbian legal language and everyday speech through the
693 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century a country the term izručenje (delivery) was used.103 That terminological error was not repeated in the Law on cooperation with that Court, which was adopted in Serbia in 2009.104
5. Conclusion Range of legislative competence of a certain country, i.e. dimensions of the territorial validity of its criminal law and the concept of the state sovereignty which it is inheriting and developing with its politics are some of the factors which strongly influence (non)existence of prohibition of extradition of its own nationals. Unlike the conclusion of international conventions, regulation of that prohibition in internal rules of the countries during the block division of the world should not be regarded through the ideological stereotypes of the world order in that period, because provisions related to it may be found in the rights on extradition in the countries with different political and social order. That thesis is confirmed by the fact that prohibition of extradition of the country’s own national was placed at the constitutional level both in DR Germany and in FR Germany. In the geographical sense, the mobility of contemporary man, labour market which often does not recognise the state borders, transnational organised crime and other circumstances and events which influence the increase in number of criminal cases with a foreign element contribute to the fact that today, much more than in the past, the efficiency of the national and international criminal judiciary depends on the solidarity, cooperation and trust among the countries. In line with that, new forms of international criminal cooperation are being established and simplified forms of action in criminal matters are becoming an international legal standard. In relations between the judicial bodies of the EU Member States, nationality is no longer an obstacle for surrender of a requested person and termination of extradition between the Member States and its replacement with the system for surrender of requested persons between the judicial bodies of the Member States is justified, among other things, with the EU goal of becoming an area of freedom, security and justice. Those goals are almost identical to an “inaugural” notion of the new world order where the nations are united around a common goal to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind – peace and security, freedom, and the rule of law. Considering the basic principles of the contemporary international
Constitution of FR Yugoslavia from 1992 and later through the regulations of internal Serbian law on extradition by replacing the traditional term “izdavanje”, but in the fact that the terms izručenje and izdavanje in Croatian, i.e. Serbian legal language are used as synonyms for the term extradition. 104 „Zakon o saradnji sa Međunarodnim krivičnim sudom”, Službeni glasnik RS, No. 72/09.
694 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century criminal law, and above all the principle of legality and solidarity and mutual trust between the countries, and taking into consideration the competence of the international criminal courts and the fact that surrender of the requested persons to those courts implies surrender of the country’s own nationals as well, formal logic leads to the conclusion that compatibility of the new world order paradigm with international criminal law i.e. EU law is also influencing the normative and actual condition regarding the enabling of extradition or surrender of the country’s own nationals, whether in relations between the EU Member States or international criminal courts. Such a conclusion poses at least one further question. Namely, if according to the proclaimed goals there is a significant compatibility between the EU and the New World Order, will the forms of the criminal cooperation between the EU Member States and their judicial bodies soon start to be realised outside its borders i.e. can it be expected that, in the near future, all countries give up the extradition of their own nationals? The question is not unfounded having in mind that the common law system countries and Nordic countries there is no such prohibition. However, the reply to the question is negative for many reasons. The New World Order paradigm is burdened with fight against terrorism, and based on examples from practice, the legal science is already indicating the danger from regression of the rule of law through application of simplified forms of international criminal aid in that fight. On the other hand, that order is burdened with internal self-negation processes, where, when it comes to international criminal law, “distancing” of the US Government should be particularly stressed even regarding the importance of its own signature on the Statute of the International Criminal Court. Furthermore, reasons inherited from the New World Order are not to be disregarded: differences between the countries in dimensioning of the territorial validity of criminal legislation and the understanding of the state sovereignty, (un)justified mistrust in foreign criminal judiciary which is presented in relations between certain countries, different political interests, etc. In such constellation of matters, the recommendation from point VII/3. of the Resolution, Section IV of the X International Congress of Penal Law /Rome, 1969/ (“the principle of non-extradition of its own nationals should be pressed back so that its own nationals be returned for adjudication in the state where the crime has been committed; however in such cases the enforcement of the sanction will be reserved to the state of nationality”), should be considered as current recommendation also in the first decades of the 21st century, both for European countries and for those from other continents. It has been completely applied in the EU and manners of its acceptance which would be between the model applied in the EU and historical burdens are quite diverse. Since in the Republic of Serbia the procedure for provision of international legal aid in criminal matters is regulated by the Law in cases where there is no ratified
695 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century international agreement or when certain issues are not regulated by it, and since 2006 there has been no constitutional prohibition of extradition of the country’s own nationals, there are no legal impediments for the Republic of Serbia to enable extradition of its own citizens with international agreements. Furthermore, the Republic of Serbia has expressed, especially in the first decade of the 21st century a significant normative activity which has enabled surrender of its nationals to international criminal courts and lack of such a prohibition in the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia from 2006 may be understood as removal of one obstacle on its road to the EU membership.
696 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Jasmina VUKOTIĆ1
THE ROLE OF COMMUNITY LAW (EUROPEAN UNION LAW) IN THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION PROCESS
Abstract: European Union law including both primary and secondary laws influences the process of European integration. This impact will be analysed first through the process of creating this law (particularly secondary law), the competences of the European Union in the light of general principles (the principle of conferring competences, the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality). Furthermore, there will be analysed the nature of the legal order of the European Union: its autonomy, supremacy over legal orders of the Member States and the limits of supremacy as well as its legal effects (especially the direct applicability and the direct effect of certain sources of EU law). On the other hand, the impact of EU law on the process of European integration can be seen from the standpoint of its application, both the implementation at the European Union level and especially at the level of Member States. Bearing in mind that the process of application of Community law or European Union law in the Member States is supplemented by national procedural rules and remedies (unless when such provisions of Community law are supplemented by directly applicable procedural rules), the application itself will be analysed in the Member States in the light of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness developed in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Key words: Community law (European Union law), European integration, principle of subsidiarity, supremacy of EU law, direct effects of EU law, application of EU law.
1. Introduction Community law or Law of the European Union and the European integration process are interconnected. The conclusion of the Treaties between the Member States on the establishment of the European community and after
1 Jasmina Vukotić, Ph.D., University Business Academy, Novi Sad.
697 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century that the European Union and the subsequent amendments of these Treaties made conditions for the functioning of institutions of the European Community i.e. the European Union and thus, created an autonomous and supranational legal order.2 The above-mentioned Treaties and amendments thereto, constitute primary law of the European Union (its main part)3, but on the other hand the law which creates institutions of the European Union is its secondary law.4 In this paper will be discussed first about the process of creation of the secondary law of the European Union by the Union’s institutions, where will be analysed the competences of the Union in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Lisbon, within the limits of the competences conferred upon the Union by the Member States and within the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. With the creation of the EU law is linked the character of the law as autonomous and supranational and this paper will also deal with the analysis of the specific nature of the legal order of the European Union and the relationship to the legal systems of the Member States. Further, on the process of European integration affects also the application of this law in the Member States, it will be given due consideration to this matter, of course to the extent provided by the subject and scope of this paper.
2. The creation of the European Union law As noted above, the establishing Treaties of the European Union (formerly the European Community) have given certain powers or competences to the institutions of the EU to issue the regulations and the other documents. Unlike previous Treaties (where the competences of the institutions were not explicitly stated and were subject to the interpretation), the Treaty of Lisbon defines the limits of Union competences by the principle of conferral and also provides that use of the Union competences shall be governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.5 The Treaty on the Functioning of the
2 In the following, we will mainly use the term Law of the European Union, with the exception of the historical references when we use also the term Community law. 3 The most important sources of law pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon since 2007 was Treaty on the European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (the latter replaced the Treaty establishing the European Community and all its amendments). 4 Closer to the sources of the law of the EU and the different classifications of the sources of this law see: B. Košutić, Osnovi prava Evropske unije, Beograd 2010th, 270 and pages which continue, S. Hobe, Europarecht, Köln-Berlin-Bonn-München 2002th, 60-70, R. Streinz, Europarecht, Heidelberg 2001th, 147 and pages which continue, as J-C.Zarka, Osnovi institucija Evropske unije (translation), Beograd 2004th, pp. 113-125. 5 See Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union, consolidated version.
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European Union are certain areas in which the EU has exclusive competence (customs union, the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning of the internal market, monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is the euro, common commercial policy, the conclusion of certain international agreements, etc.), then the area of shared competence between the Union and the Member States (internal market, environment, consumer protection, energy, the area of freedom, security and justice, etc.) and areas of the complementary competence of the Union and the Member States (protection and improvement of human health, industry, culture, tourism, public health, etc.).6 Exclusive competence is assumed that in certain areas (those assigned to it by the Member States) the Union is only authorized to take the appropriate legal documents and that the Member States are excluded from activities in these areas. Exclusivity does not mean that the Union’s activities in these areas are unlimited in the scope, but Member States are deprived of their right to decide on them.7 The Union in the exercise of the competence must attain the objectives set out by the Treaties. Until the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the question of exclusive competence was in dispute and it has often been subject to interpretation by the Court of Justice.8 Shared competence exists where the Union and the Member States may exercise legislative activities. In the Treaty of Lisbon, this competence is determined negatively (not to fall under the exclusive or complementary competences) and positively (by enumeration). However, the characteristic of this competence pursuant to the Treaty of Lisbon, is that Member States may exercise their powers only to the extent or in the district in which the Union is not already used them or has decided to cease using them. That means that the EU has a priority in the use of these powers and if a matter is already regulated by the Union, the Member States cannot repeat their regulations to regulate this issue (of course the competence of the Member States in these areas would be completely excluded if one question is fully regulated by the Union, if it is only partially regulated by the Union, the Member States are free to regulate the remaining part). This notion of shared competence is consistent with the theory
6 See Articles 3-6 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, consolidated version. 7 Notwithstanding the Member States in the field of exclusive competence of the Union may make legislative acts only when exists so-called clause of survival (protection of the essential interests of its security, serious internal problems that threaten public order, war or serious international tension constituting threat of war). About this closer see R. Vukadinović, Uvod u institucije i pravo Evropske unije, Kragujevac 2010th, 41. 8 About exclusive Community competence or EU before the Treaty of Lisbon see Arnull et al., European Union Law, London 2000th, 157-159 and R. Schütze, “The European Community’s Federal Order of Competences – A Retrospective Analysis,” 50 Years of the European Treaties, Oxford and Portland, Oregon 2009th, pp. 72-76.
699 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century of pre-emption.9 In addition to the shared competence discussed above, there is shared competence that can be performed together or both by the Union and the Member States.10 Complementary competence means that a particular area remains under the competence of the Member States and the Union is competent only to take the action that supports, coordinates and supplements the action of the Member States. In the areas of complementary competence of the Union, it shall make mainly recommendations and guidelines and also in these areas, it cannot be made harmonization of the law of the Member States, which may raise the issue of its contents.11,12 The institutions of EU cannot exercise the competences outside the areas which the Member States conferred upon it in the Treaties of the EU and to attain the objectives set out in the Treaties (the principle of conferral or the attribution of powers).13 This means that the Union can act only in certain areas, which are conferred on it by the Member States in the Treaties and that the Union may not adopt a legal act if the Treaties have not contained the legal basis for its adoption (both explicitly and at least by the interpretation established legal basis in the Treaties). Considering that the competence of the Union to issue legal acts is provided in certain specific provisions of the Treaties, it is possible that these provisions determine not only the area which are conferred to the Union, but also the type of legal acts14 that it is authorized to issue and the procedure for their adoption, etc.15 Above mentioned principle of conferral authorizes the EU institutions to conduct only when there is a proper legal basis is supplemented by the provisions of Art. 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, which provides that the Union, under certain circumstances, may take action although it is no legal basis for
9 Further about this theory See B. Košutić, (2010th), pp. 354-356. The same author this kind of shared competence calls shared competitive competence as opposed to parallel competence (where the Union establishes the basis of law and the Member States continue to perform editing their regulations). 10 See R. Vukadinović, p. 47. 11 Ibid. 12 Closer to the type of the competences before the Treaty of Lisbon See R. Schütze, pp. 70-90. 13 See Art. 5 of the Treaty on European Union, which in paragraph 2 stipulates that the Union shall act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties to attain the objectives set out therein. 14 Institutions of the European Union are authorized to make the following legal acts: regulations, directives and decisions as binding acts and recommendations and opinions as non-binding acts. 15 See: B. Košutić, (2010th), p. 347 and A. Arnull et al., p. 153.
700 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century it.16 This Article provides that the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament,17 shall adopt the appropriate measures if such action by the Union should prove necessary and within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, and if there is a need to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers.18 This provision was subject to interpretation because it contained the power of the Union to take appropriate action if necessary to attain the objectives established in the Treaties, but on the other hand, this power cannot go so far as to be carried out on the basis to make changes in the Treaties.19, 20 The principle of conferral in the areas where the Union has exclusive competence is complemented by the principles of subsidiarity21 and proportionality. As mentioned above in the period before the implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon, the areas in which the Union was exclusively competent were not listed and such areas were determined on the basis of the case law of the Court of Justice, although some issues were subject to different interpretations.22 In the Treaty on the European Union the principle of subsidiarity is defined in such a way that in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at a regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level. So, the Union could undertake actions in areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, it needs that these actions meet the criteria of necessity and sufficiency, i.e. that the anticipated objectives cannot be achieved to the necessary extent at the level of the Member States and that the Union can successfully accomplish them. Detailed conditions for the application of the principle are set out in the Protocol on the application of
16 Such competence is referred to as implicit competence, which can be the exclusive, as it is here. About implicit competences, see R. Vukadinović, pp. 44-46 and M. Herdegen, Europarecht, München 2005, pp. 168-170. 17 The main institutions of the European Union are the European Council, the Council of the European Union or the Council, the Commission, the European Parliament and the Court of Justice. 18 See Art. 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 19 See the opinion of the Court of Justice No. 2/94, as well as other interpretations listed in: A. Arnull et al, p. 155 and fn. 30-33. 20 Compare B. Košutić, (2010th), pp. 347-348, who considers that this article did not reveal any “competence to competence” of the Union, nor challenged the principle of individual conferred powers. 21 The principle of subsidiarity was introduced by the Treaty on European Union in 1992. 22 See A. Arnull et al., pp. 156-162.
701 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, which is attached to the Treaty of Lisbon.23 The legal effect given to this principle is limited. It cannot be used to question the granting of powers to the Community (or Union) by the Treaties, but only to exercise of those powers by the passing of particular measures.24 On the other hand, the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties, which means that measures to achieve the objectives of the Treaties shall be proportional. The principle of proportionality is applied in accordance with the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.25 The essence of this principle is that the nature and intensity of the action taken by the Union shall be such that, within the selected objectives, the least possible enters into the competence of the Member States and that provides a balance between action of the Union and such of the Member States.26, 27
3. Characteristics of the legal order of the European Union The legal order of the European Community, later the European Union, for its surface has the establishing Treaties, considering that these Communities were result of the conclusion of the Treaties between the Member States.28 Given
23 Closer to the procedure by which the national parliaments of the Member States ensure compliance with this principle in the legislative activities of the Union, the obligations of the institutions of the Union to draft legislative acts and submit an explanation for the observance of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, as well as the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice to act on appeals submitted regarding violations of these principles and the similar See B. Košutić, (2010th), pp. 350-353. 24 See T. Hartley, European Union Law in a Global Context, Text, Cases and Materials, London 2004th, p. 61. 25 This Protocol does not contain provisions that specify the application of the principle of proportionality, except its mention in the title. About this closer, see B. Košutić, (2010th), pp. 353-354. 26 Closer to the administrative origin of this principle and its political context and functions See A. Arnull et al., pp. 162-163. 27 Given that the purpose of all three above mentioned principles is to create a balance between the activities of the Union and the Member States and that the Member States as possible, preserve their powers (of course to the extent that they are not conferred to the Union), in the same context, it can be spoken about the principle of flexibility, which provides that one or more Member States can stay out of certain activities of the Union or because they chose to or because they did not meet all the conditions for accession. About this, see Ibid., pp. 163-168. 28 Under the Treaties, we include the Treaties establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community in 1957, and the Treaty establishing the European Union in 1992, with all subsequent amendments. Closer to the origin and development of the European Communities and the European Union See B.Košutić, B.Rakić, B. Milisavljević, Uvod u pravo evropskih integracija, Beograd 2013, pp. 131-152.
702 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century that the European Union was founded on a contract basis as international organizations,29 the legal system originated in its scope has characteristics that derive from public international law. But, during its development, communitarian legal system is assumed some features of the national legal system of the Member States and become hybrid and autonomous supranational legal order that on the one hand has the characteristics of “ordinary” international organization created under international treaties and on the other side features of “undeveloped” federal system.30 Moreover, the Court of Justice in an opinion interpreted the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, in the sense that the EEC Treaty, albeit concluded in the form of an international agreement, nonetheless constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the rule of law.31 Also, the practice of the Court of Justice has crystallized the principles of supremacy and direct effect of Community law, later the European Union law. In the famous case of Costa v. ENEL32 The Court analysed the communitarian legal system and affirmed the principle of the supremacy of Community law over the national law of the Member States. Specifically, in this case set out the view that the Treaty establishing the EEC, by contrast with ordinary international treaties, has created its own legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty became an integral part of the legal system of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply. By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its own personality, its own legal capacity and capacity of representation on the international plane and, more particularly, real powers stemming from a limitation of sovereignty, or a transfer of powers from the States to the Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and have thus created a body of law which binds their nationals and themselves.33, 34 The supremacy of Community law over the national law of the Member States extends not only to the national legislation adopted prior to the appropriate communitarian acts
29 For the European Union is used also the term “international integration-organization”. See D. Curtin, Executive Power of the European Union, Oxford 2009th, p. 34. 30 A. Arnull et al., p. 64 31 Opinion 1/91 on Draft Agreement EEC and EFTA [1991] ECR I-6079; Quoted from: Ibid. 32 The first hints of the principle of supremacy was found in the case of Van Gend en Loos (Case 26/62), although in this case the crucial question was the direct effect of communitarian law and in the case Humblet v.Belgium. 33 Case 6/64 [1964] ECR 585, p. 593. 34 Closer to the supremacy of community law in relation to the law of Member States through the practice of the Court of Justice in the above case, as in other cases: B. Košutić, (2010th), pp. 244-249 and R. Vukadinović, pp. 83-84.
703 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century but also to subsequently adopted national legislation, as confirmed in the case Simmenthal.35 The principle of supremacy, as developed in the practice of the Court of Justice, means first that the law of the European Union cannot be suppressed by the national rule of the Member States, because it has the advantage over the existing rule and in relation to future national rule. On the other hand, the Member States signing the establishing Treaties of the Community, later the Union, permanently transferred part of its sovereign rights and area where those rights are transferred to their sovereignty is limited and the law of the European Union has supremacy in this area. In case of conflict between the EU law and national law, the rules of national law disapply.36 The principle of supremacy of Community law, later the European Union law, as developed in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, was not automatically and without reservation accepted by the Member States. In France, first the Court of Cassation accepted the notion of the supremacy of Community law, the State Council much later, bearing in mind the position of the Constitutional Council on the issue.37 In Germany, the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) initially held that Community law is not part of the national legal system, nor of the international law, but it is an independent legal system which is derived from autonomous sources of law, and that as long as the protection of the fundamental rights38 in the Community isn’t indicative to the protection under the Basic Law, the legal acts of the Community shall be subject to review of their compliance with the provisions of fundamental rights in the German Basic Law (Solange I case).39 Later in the case known as Solange II, the Federal Constitutional Court has abandoned this review determining that as long as the European Communities, in particular the practice of the Court of Justice provide effective protection of fundamental rights against the sovereign powers of the Community, the application of legal acts of Community law will not be subjected to review by the Constitutional Court.40 Deciding about the constitutionality of the German
35 Case 106/77 [1978] ECR 629, pp. 643, 644. 36 This implies that the rules of national law which are contrary to EU law will not apply, but will remain in force until repealed or amended in accordance with the provisions contained in national law. This is the essence of learning about the supremacy in the application, not in the validity of Community law i.e. Union law compared with the national law of the Member States. More about this learning see B. Košutić, (2010th), 249 and next pages, as well as R. Steinz, 74, pp. 83-86. 37 Closer to the viewpoints of the highest courts of France see B. Košutić, (2010th), pp. 249-250. 38 German Basic Law (Constitution) in 1949 devotes special attention to the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, as opposed to the constitutions of other European countries. 39 See M. Herdegen, p. 217. 40 See Ibid., and R. Streinz, p. 80.
704 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century law on the ratification of the Treaty on European Union - the Maastricht Treaty, the Constitutional Court of Germany once again pleaded the issue of supremacy of communitarian law or EU law in relation to national law. According to this the Community acquires the powers of the Member States and cannot have more powers than those granted to it by the Member States. It is the duty of the Constitutional Court to examine whether the legislative acts of the Union are in accordance with the responsibilities granted to it by the Member States. If the authorities of the Community in making legal acts exceed the granted powers, such laws in Germany are not legally binding.41, 42 The UK was also gradually recognized the supremacy of community law, with reference to the views of the Court of Justice and section 2 (1) of the British Act of the European Union in 1972.43 To become an integral part of the national legal system of the Member States it is necessary that the EU law be introduced into the domestic legal system in the proper way.44 As noted above, the Court of Justice, starting with the case Costa v. ENEL, held that the establishing Treaties have created its own legal system, and that this legal system for the entry into force of the Treaties became an integral part of the legal system of the Member States. Consequently, this special legal system is characterized by special rules for its introduction into the domestic legal systems of the Member States, what is called the direct applicability of this law in the Member States.45 In the case Simmenthal Court of Justice has defined direct applicability of Community law which means that its rules must be fully and uniformly applied in all the Member States from the date of their entry into force and for so long as they continue in force and that such provisions are a direct source of rights and duties for all those affected thereby, whether Member States or individuals.46 Regarding the differences between the direct applicability and direct effect, the Court of Justice in the case of Van Duyn said that regulations are directly applicable by virtue of the provisions of the Treaties and
41 See M. Herdegen, pp. 218-220 and R. Steinz, p. 82. 42 Similar judgment rendered Supreme Court of Denmark, Carlsen v. Rasmussen. See T. Hartley, p. 157. 43 A. Arnull et al., pp. 67-68, and N. Foster, EC Law, Oxford 2005th, pp. 63-67. 44 The introduction can be carried out either in accordance with the rules of international law or under the special rules, depending on how the law of the European Union is treated. 45 Conceptual confusion enters mixing concepts direct applicability and direct effect of the Court of Justice and in legal theory, as well as the formulation used in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union where the direct applicability is used for regulation, not explaining its meaning. 46 Case 106/77 [1978] ECR 629, p. 643; Quoted by: R. Vukadinović, p. 66.
705 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century consequently may by their very nature have a direct effect.47 Bearing the above in mind it can be said that the direct applicability of EU law is the ability of its provisions to be directly incorporated into the domestic legal systems of the Member States or direct applicability concerns the manner of the introduction of an act of EU law in the national legal system.48, 49 In contrast to the direct applicability, the direct effect of the Community law i.e. EU law means that the provisions of this law are able to directly create rights and duties for the individuals. This does not mean that all sources of EU law in equal measure are suitable for direct effect or that all provisions of these sources have such an effect.50 For the direct effect of the establishing Treaties the major is the first judgment of the Court of Justice in Van Gend en Loos, where the Court starting from the objectives of the EEC Treaty, which is to establish a Common Market, the functioning of which is of direct concern to interested parties in the Community, implies that this Treaty is more than an agreement which merely creates mutual obligations between the contracting states, as confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty, which refers not only to governments but to peoples and it is also confirmed more specifically by establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise of which affects Member States and also their citizens.51 In this case is given a three-fold argument for the direct effect to suitable provisions of the Treaty: The EC Treaty is more than a contract between States because its objectives are of concern to interested parties, the fact that the European Court (Court of Justice) is given the power to interpret the Treaty on a reference from a Member State court implies that it is intended to have a direct effect and that the Community law is a separate legal system i.e. a new legal order of international law and the subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals.52 For the direct effect of the provisions of the Treaty the Court of Justice in this case is set out strict conditions: that provision
47 See R. Vukadinović, p. 67. 48 The establishing Treaties only mention the direct application of regulations, which are directly entered into the domestic legal systems of the Member States, so that no internal measures are either necessary or permitted. 49 Closer to the direct application of the establishing Treaties, monistic and dualistic approach i.e. method of adoption and transformation, as well as the direct application of secondary sources of the EU law See R. Vukadinović, pp. 68-71. 50 In contrast to the direct applicability which term refers by the Treaties only to the regulation, the term direct effect is not contained in the Treaties, but originated in the practice of the Court of Justice and applies in principle to all sources of EU law, but not to the same degree. 51 Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1; Quoted by: T. Hartley, pp. 146-148. 52 See Ibid., pp. 149-150.
706 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century must contain a clear obligation of the Member State (as Community law not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights, which arise not only where they are expressly granted by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the Community), that this obligation must be unconditional, that it is a prohibition and that it is not qualified by any reservation that would make its implementation conditional upon legislative measures enacted under national law.53 After this case, the Court of Justice has further expanded the area of the direct effect of the provisions of the establishing Treaties and alleviated the conditions that provision must meet in order to have a direct effect (it is a clear and precise, unconditional and does not require the implementing measures of the State and of the institutions).54 Also, the direct effect is recognized to the general principles of law, regulations and decisions55, and under certain conditions to directives. For the regulation, it is in the establishing Treaties, provided that it shall have general application and shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. Direct applicability of regulation does not mean that each and every provision of each and every regulation give rise to rights in individuals against other individuals or against the State.56 The regulation can have vertical (in relation between the individual and the State) and horizontal (in the relationship between individuals) direct effect, but also it has pre-emptive quality, what means that conflicting national legislation will not be applicable.57 Unlike regulations which are directly applicable in entirety, directives shall be binding as to the results to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods for its achievement. Due to their nature for directives is provided only vertical direct
53 See Ibid., p. 150. 54 And out of the provisions relating to the Common Market in the strict sense. Thus, in the case Defrenne v. Sabena it was recognized direct effect of the provisions of the Treaty in the area of social policy, in which it was first recognized that the provisions of the Treaty have direct horizontal effect (effect between individuals), in contrast to vertical effects (effects between the State and individuals). Closer to the direct effect of establishing Treaties and other international agreements See V. Knežić-Predić, Z. Radivojević, Kako nastaje i deluje pravo Evropske unije, Beograd 2009, pp. 139-144. 55 Decisions only bind the entity to whom they are addressed i.e. to whom are directly applicable. Their direct effect depends on whether the conditions for direct effect are fulfilled. 56 About this capacity of regulation and the permissible extent of their incorporation into the national legal order see A. Arnull et al., pp. 84-88. 57 See Ibid, pp. 88-89.
707 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century effect, not the horizontal one.58, 59, 60 While the provisions of a regulation must meet the requirements listed above for a direct effect of the provisions of the establishing Treaties, the direct effect of the provisions of a directive require the additional conditions: that the State is failed to implement the directive in national law by the end of the period prescribed or where it has failed to implement the directive correctly, that the provision is unconditional and sufficiently precise and that this provision may be relied upon before the national courts by an individual against the State.61
4. The method of application of EU law in the Member States As we have already mentioned a number of sources of the Community law i.e. EU law has the capacity of direct applicability in the Member States.62 However, in most cases, these sources do not contain procedural rules for the national courts and other authorities in the Member States in the process of the application of law or the provisions of the remedies to be applied in case of violation of prescribed rules. Exceptionally, in some regulations may be prescribed the procedural rules for their use, as in the field of competition law.63 Bearing in mind that procedural rules of certain Member States are not identical and to ensure as much uniformity in the application of Community law, the Court of Justice has laid down two principles which allow it. These are the principles of equivalence and effectiveness. The principle of equivalence means that the procedural rules and remedies applying for enforcement of the
58 Despite a directive cannot impose obligations on an individual, it seems that an individual may be prevented from relying upon, or deriving rights from a national legislative or administrative measure which conflicts with the directly effective provisions of a directive. About “triangular” direct effect of directives, see Ibid., pp. 102-104. 59 Individuals whose rights have been violated or whose protection would be impossible due to the lack of horizontal direct effect of the directive may obtain protection in proceedings to establish the responsibility of the State for damages resulting from failure to enforce the directive. About this, see R. Vukadinović, pp. 82-83. 60 About indirect effects of a directive (in the sense of taking into account in the interpretation of national law), see T. Hartley, pp. 174-175. 61 Further about this, see A.Arnull et al., pp. 96-98. 62 It will be mainly discussed the methods of application of legal rules of European Union law which are capable of direct application. In addition to these rules, there are rules that are not capable of direct application incorporated into national law, as such rules which are not incorporated into national law. On the types of legal rules from the viewpoint of their applicability in the Member States See Ibid., pp. 110-111. 63 About regulations which are supplemented by directly applicable community procedural rules, see Ibid., pp. 111-112.
708 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Community or Union law must be no less favourable than those which apply to similar domestic situations. The principle of effectiveness means that the application of national procedural rules and remedies must not make the enforcement of Community or Union right virtually impossible or excessively difficult. These principles are set out in the case Peterbroeck Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v. Belgian State.64 In applying those principles must be analysed the role of each procedural provision in the national legal system, its progress and its special features before the various national instances, also must be taken into consideration, where appropriate, the basic principles of each national judicial system.65 With regard to the above national courts and other bodies which make the application of law have a difficult task ahead of him as they in the application of a rule of law of the European Union must take care to use those procedural rules and remedies that are equivalent to the rules and means apply to similar situations that arise in the application of domestic law and on the other hand such national procedural rules and remedies shall not render virtually impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of rights arising for individuals from the provisions of the European Union law. In assessing compliance with the above conditions, national courts must assess whether there is a similarity with the domestic situation in terms of its purpose and also explaining its essential features. This approach can lead to that in certain situations, national courts apply the more favourable procedural rules and remedies when protecting an individual’s right that comes out of the rules of EU law, as when they protect a right that arise from national rules.66 Such conduct is in accordance with the general principle of the existence of effective judicial protection, which was also developed in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice.67 The application of the EU law in the Member States should be viewed in light of the state’s responsibility for the violation of the European Union law, which includes liability and damages resulting from the failure of national courts to apply the law of the European Union,68 as well as in accordance with the obligation of Member States, that pursuant to the principle of sincere cooperation, in full mutual respect, assist each other in carrying out the tasks which flow from the Treaties.69 In certain cases,
64 Case C-312/93 [1995] ECR I-4599; Quoted from: Ibid., pp. 112-113 and fn. 16-18. 65 See Ibid. 66 About the fact that the principle of legality prevails in case of violation of community rules than in the case of violation of national rules see M. Herdegen, pp. 224-225. 67 See A. Arnull et al., p. 114 and fn. 25. 68 The responsibility of the State established in the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice was initially concerned only the responsibility of the State for failure to implement directives (case Frankovich), but later that responsibility broadened to other areas. About this, See R. Vukadionović, p. 88. 69 The Member States shall take any appropriate measure, general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out the Treaties or resulting from the acts of the institutions
709 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century national courts were obliged to apply the so-called hybrid remedies, as in the case of Factortame.70 The Court of Justice in this case held that a national court in a case before it concerning the Community law must disapply the rules of national law, considers the sole obstacle which precludes it from granting interim relief is a rule of national law. According to the understanding of the Court of Justice any provision of a national legal system or any legislative, administrative or judicial practice, which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the national courts having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, even temporarily, Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible with those requirements (equivalence and effectiveness) which are the very essence of the Community law.71 In another case - Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen 72 The Court of Justice in the reasoning of the decision stated that the uniform application of the Community law is a fundamental requirement of Community legal order and that the suspension of enforcement of administrative measures based on a Community regulation, whilst it is governed by national procedural law, must in all the Member States be subject, at the very least, to conditions which are uniform so far as the granting of such relief is concerned.73 It is also significant recent jurisprudence of the Court of Justice on the legal abolition of the power of the administrative acts of the Member States which have been adopted in the implementation of EU law containing incorrect interpretation of this law.74 A special case is the obligation of Member States to recovery to individuals various charges and taxes levied by Member State contrary to EU law. In the case San Giorgio, Court of Justice has held that the requirement of non- discrimination cannot be construed as justifying legislative measures intended to render any repayment of charges levied contrary to Community law
of the Union, shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and refrain from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the Union’s objectives. The obligations of the Member States are provided in Art. 4 of the Treaty on European Union, the consolidated version. 70 Court of Justice in this case was asked whether Community law could authorize or require the provision of a remedy (interim relief) which could not be granted under the provisions of national law. 71 See A. Arnull et al., pp. 119-120. 72 This case concerned, inter alia, the possibility to suspend the national measures adopted in the process of application of Community law by national courts. The Court held that it is possible if certain conditions were fulfilled. 73 See T. Hartley, pp. 204-206. 74 See M. Herdegen, p. 225.
710 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century virtually impossible, even if the same treatment is extended to taxpayers who have similar claims arising from an infringement of national tax law.75 76 Also, by interpretation of national legislation by national authorities carrying out its implementation, certain provisions of the legislation of the European Union are taken into account. Thus, the Court of Justice in Marleasing in S v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA held that the national courts are obliged to interpret national law as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of a relevant directive.77 78 This means that national law must be interpreted as more in line with the European Union law, of course, as far as possible and if it is not in contradiction with the principle of legality, which is adopted into national law.
5. Conclusion Analysing shortly the creation and implementation of EU law in the light of the principles set out we can conclude that this law affects the process of European integration both in the process of its creation and in the process of its implementation. Initially the competence of the European Community, later the European Union was not explicitly mentioned in the Treaties and the scope of these powers was interpreted by the Court of Justice. After the Treaty of Lisbon, the competences of the Union are extended and listed in the Treaty and was carried out their classification. It means that in those areas where the Union has exclusive competence and where the Member States cannot intervene legislatively, adopted acts are identical for all Member States. Also, in areas where the powers are shared the Union by its acts can “exhaust” a particular area and the Member States are incapable to adopt new provisions in those areas (of course they could implement the provisions of the Union). Uniformity of law is primarily achieved through regulations which have general and direct application and shall be binding in its entirety and through those acts is expressed the authority of the Union to enact provisions that are directly applicable in all Member States and which have direct effect to the Member States and to their citizens. Also, other acts of secondary EU legislation express
75 See A. Arnull et al., pp. 122-123. 76 About taking into account the interests of the Community or Union for a similar application of law in all Member States in terms of German administrative law See M. Herdegen, pp. 223-224. 77 On this case, as well as other similar see A. Arnull et al., pp. 92-95. 78 The duty to interpret national law in the light of a directive is similar to giving direct effects to a directive.
711 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the need for uniformity of EU law, but not to the extent as through the regulations. Decisions are applied to certain persons to which are addressed, directives are binding only with respect to the result, while the choice of form and method of achieving this result is left to the will of the Member States. Of course in this form and method must be respected autonomous character of the legal system of the European Union and the principles that have been developed within it. In the field of application of EU law, also we can track gradual harmonization of law in the Member States through the supremacy of EU law or communitarian law. The law of the European Union in relation to the national law of the Member States, through recognition of direct application and direct effect of certain sources of law (number of sources that have a direct effects gradually spread), and the principles of equivalence and effectiveness in the use of national procedural rules and remedies for the application of the European Union Law. The aim of European integration can be different (economic, political, etc.), but the means and technique used are legal, “the application and progressive development of common rules and enforcement procedures.”79
79 D. Curtin, p. 44.
712 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Milena TRGOVČEVIĆ PROKIĆ1
PUBLIC NOTARY IN SOUTH SLAVIC REGIONS
Abstract: The paper deals with the development of the public notary in Yugoslav areas with a special emphasis on the Law of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia and the need of this institution in the Serbian legal system, so that it contributes to the relief of the courts. Key words: notary, notary public, public service, public documents, activity, relieving the courts, legal security, preventive care.
Introduction From notary to notary public, an evolutionary time period has passed and both terms, although by the rules of logic almost identical, should be considered different concepts. The jobs notaries perform receive a certain specific weight, which mainly stems from the fact that the number and range of activities of the general state or public interest they perform, is increasing. A notary has obtained independence from political authorities and has received public authority. Therefore, in modern legal systems the term notary is expanded into the term notary public. This institution has become a public service and great importance of public notary represents the delegated power of jurisdiction, while the significance of the notary service lies precisely in this fact. A precursor of today’s notary is linked to the emergence of the first script, cuneiform script, three thousand years BC (Sumer, Uruk, Babylon) followed by Egyptian hieroglyphs. In Roman law, a notary – notary public, was designated with the word tabellio.2 In the last century of the Roman Republic,
1 Milena Trgovčević Prokić, LLD, Judge of the First Basic Court in Belgrade, Head of the Non- Contentious Department and Court Practice, Union University Faculty of Law, Belgrade. 2 The term tabellio is first mentioned by Ulpianus in “Digeste” 48 19.9&4 cit. in Ankum, Hans, Les tabellions romains, ancétrés direct des notaries modernes, Atlas du notariat, 1989, p. 6, and it derives from the word tabella, which in Latin means “board“ or “plate“, which was covered with wax and used by Romans until the end of the 3rd century AC for writing letters and acts.
713 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century experts for writing short-form political speeches (notae) emerged.3 The function and organization of notaries were defined by Justinian, who gave a probative value to the documents of tabellions, much more important than of a private document, although it was “a document without public and legal certification”.4 A bright spot in the development of notary service of the Western Europe in the Middle Ages represents the advent of a notary in Italian cities, where the development of trade affected the renaissance of Roman law, especially after the discovery of the manuscript of the Digest in Pisa in the 11th century, studied by members of glossator and post-glossator law schools. Notary service in medieval Serbia and Dalmatia can be found in Dušan’s Code, and the statutes of the cities of Kotor, Dubrovnik, Trogir and Budva. In the South Slavs territories, forerunners of today’s notaries appeared in the early Middle Ages, firstly in the area of coastal towns, which was largely influenced by Venice, and had the developed trade network. The scope of notary’s work includes writing of judicial decisions, contracts and wills,5 therefore it was explicitly stated that this job must be released in a public form. Notarial act or deed had the power of a public document if it was made in the presence of a judge and an auditor,6 and if the names of judge and auditor were not specified in the document, such document was considered invalidate. The credibility of a public document could have been contested only by other public documents. Legal security was guaranteed by the strict formalism in writing notary documents and registration in public registers.7 Statutes explicitly provided for termination of office of a notary. City statutes stipulated notary’s responsibility for the violation of his/her official duties. A notary could not deny clients his/her service oficium to which he was obliged,8 he/she had to draw up a valid contract. City statutes determined
3 The word notarius derives from the word nota, which means a note (shorthand). Notarius can be found in Roman documents from 1st century A.C. 4 Mooser, Michael, Le droit notarial en Suisse, Berne, 2005, p. 7. 5 Kolanović Josip, Križman Mate, Zadarski statut (sa svim reformacijama, odnosno novim uredbama donesenim do 1563. g.), Zagreb, 1997, Predgovor, Zadarski statut, naslov XXII, glava 106. In Kotor, wills make extensive group of imbreviatura from the period of Phylipus de Auximo, who was the Kotor notary from XIV century, namely from 1326 to 1337. In: Fejić Nenad, “Kotorska kancelarija u srednjem veku,” Istorijski časopis, Beograd, 1980, p. 39. 6 Sindik Ilija, “Arhivska građa Kotora u Boki Kotorskoj”, Istorijski časopis No. 1-2. 7 In majority of statutes, public books were called quaternus imbreviaturarum-abreviaturrum. Statuta et leges civitatis Spalati, Chapter LXI, Statut Zadra, Chapter 96, Statuta Cathari, Chapter 51, in Kotor it was called Catasticum. 8 Ibidem, Chapter LIX, Statuta civitatis Chatari, chapter 160 stipulates that: “nobody can forbid writing of documents to a notary”; Šufflay Milan, Dalmatinsko-hrvatska srednjovekovna lisnina – Povjest hrvatskog notarijata od XI-XV stoljeća, Zagreb, 2000, p. 97.
714 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the reward the notaries received from clients.9 For performing their service, they received a salary.10 The Dušan’s Code, which was passed on state assemblies in 1334 and 1354, as the most important document of Serbian medieval legislation, mentions pristavs (court officers),11 and it is believed that they had the role of a notary whose oral statement enjoyed protection of “public faith”, because in court proceedings pristav served as a witness or was a member of “council of faith”.12 It is believed that pristav had the status of “independent body of public faith”. There are different opinions in professional literature, but everything indicates that pristavs were persons of confidence hired by parties to carry out legal transactions in order to secure themselves witnesses of concluded private legal business. Pristav was mentioned in Kotor document of 1396, and it was presumed that he was a notary’s assistant.13 Pristav was also mentioned in the Statute of Poljica,14 and according to it, his scope of work was to send calls, to institute proceedings, and interrogate witnesses. Pristav was awarded for his work.15 In the XII and XIII century in Byzantine, educated clergy took an oath before the governor of the city of Constantinople, which had “five notaries” at churches, and they were called nomikos. Nomikos also wrote private legal documents for citizens for a fee. Nomocanon16 stipulated the scope of work of nomikos.17 Clergy wrote legal documents and gave legal advice. Acts of nomikos had no probative
9 Chapter 100 of the Split Statute provided for the award for a notary for judgment prepared in the form of a public document – notary shall get 4 solids. Chapter 34 of the Zadar Statute stipulated that: „notary who was asked to write a contract, should see to it that he gets paid, because when the contract is found in the book, it is believed that the notary was paid, because only when the notary is paid, he is obliged to entered in the notarial book the names of witnesses and contractors”. For a will, a public notary could take „two and a half groats, and for other documents – 1 groat”. 10 Statuta et leges civitatis Spalati, Chapter LVII stipulates that the community gives a salary of 20 Venetian groats and provides an apartment to a notary. 11 Kostrenčić Marko, Fides publica (javna vera) u pravnoj istroji Srba i Hrvata do kraja XV veka, SKA 77, Belgrade, 1930, p. 5. 12 Ibidem, p. 16, states that in some regions one could not take as a pristav a “cousin” either from their father’s or mother’s side, a servant or a parish priest, according to the law of Matija Ban of 1273. 13 Sindik, Ilija, op.cit., p. 336. 14 Poljički zbornik, sv. II, Zagreb, 1968, pp. 33-103, Art. 67a, b, c. 15 Article 68a of the Statute of Poljica: “of everything on account of which a charge is brought, of that which is judged upon and proved, one tenth accrues to the court officer”. 16 “Nomocanon” (a collection of legal nature, containing ecclesiastical rules and civil laws relating to the church). 17 Šarkić Srđan, Enciklopedija srpskog srednjovekovnog prava, Beograd, 1989, p. 445.
715 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century value, as did the notary acts in Italy and Dalmatia, but their status was similar to those of tabelliones, because their documents also required witnesses, and sometimes nomikos themselves were the witness. In our region, the term nomik18 was first mentioned in the Charter of Skopje (1299-1300), and all records on nomikos are linked to the south part of the Serbian state, since Byzantine’s influence was the greatest there. The documents written by nomikos were related to legal issues, buying and selling, wills, etc. Documents written by nomikos in our region resembled the Byzantine models, with listed witnesses, but they also had a certain independent probative power, because they had to keep notary books.19 In the 19th century, the institution of notary was present in the southern Slavic regions located within the former Austro-Hungarian Empire, however not in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the area of the Appellate Court in Zagreb and Ljubljana, the Austrian Notary Order was in effect,20 while in the area of Novi Sad (Baranja, Bačka and Banat), and county courts Čakovec and Međumurje, the Hungarian Law on Notary of 1974 was applied.
2. The Law on Notaries of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia Notary public21 was introduced in the Yugoslav legal system in 1930, but its function was mainly achieved in the area of traditional influence of the Austro-Hungarian law, while in other parts of Yugoslavia (Serbia without Vojvodina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Metohija, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia) it never was affirmed. The absence of notary institution in these areas required a disproportionate allocation of jobs in certain notary regions. Thus, the notaries from Croatia and Dalmatia were authorized to issue notarial documents to clients from Bosnia and Herzegovina, because the Law
18 Kostrenčić Marko, op.cit., pp. 85-93, The Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium, 1991, New York– Oxford see nomikos, Bogdanović Dimitrije, Nomokanon 2, Rečnik književnih termina, Beograd, 1991, p. 425. 19 Šafarik Janko, ”Srpska isprava o prodaji nepokretnog dobra u Prizrenu iz vremena careva srpskih, ili iz XIV v.” Glasnik SKA, 35, 1872, pp. 119-124. 20 In Austria, the Imperial notary decree of 1512 was in force. With the emergence of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1781, notary services experienced a crisis, since protested bills gained the strength of notary acts, or public documents. The Notary order came into force in 1850, and was amended in1855, and later replaced in the Austrian part of the monarchy in 1871. On the territory of Zagreb’s Court of Appeal the Notary Order of 1855 has been applied since 1859, and on the territory of the Court of Appeal of Split and Ljubljana, the Notary Order of 1871 was applied. See more in: Krešić Mirela, Javnobeležništvo na hrvatskom-slavonskom pravnom području 1859-1941, Časopis za suvremenu povijest, Zagreb, No. 2010/1, p. 94-95. 21 Zakon o javnim beležnicima Kraljevine Jugoslavije “Službene novine KJ”, 220/1930, 22/31 and 72/31, (Law on Public Notaries of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia – LPN KY).
716 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century on Notaries22 had the mandatory power for these regions, too. The specific situation existed in Banovina of Croatia – a special form of the notary service was preserved, namely the lawyer-notary. One person could be both a lawyer and notary, and was able to perform two functions at the same time.23 This parallel function was caused by the inability of lawyers to survive by performing only lawyer’s office, and by the lack of persons who had all the legal requirements to be a notary. However, the institution of lawyer-notary did not survive, because the decree to abolish the right to practice advocacy in addition to the public notary service, was passed.24 2.1. Activities. Notary service covered by the Law on Public Notaries of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, in terms of organization, was a Latin type notary service. The activities of a notary included: concluding private legal business that required a notary public deed,25 sealing/stamping and signing (verification) of private documents, issuing certificates, deposits, and acting upon court’s order in specific proceedings. Notary’s activities also included representation in non-litigious matters of parties, but only in relation to a document issued by that notary. According to this law, documents issued by a notary public had the character of public document. Under certain conditions, it could also have the power of executive document. Competitive jurisdiction of the court was retained in the verification of signatures, deposits and issuing of protested bills of exchange.26
22Article 253 of the LPN KY. 23 This solution is present in the contemporary legislation of Germany. The Article 3 of the Federal Regulation on Notaries of Germany of 24 January 1961 (German FRN) stipulates that in court districts, where notary service was only a sideline activity until 1 April 1961, exclusively lawyers shall be appointed for notaries, namely during their registration at a particular court for performing notary services in addition to law practice. The legal requirement for a lawyer is to have minimum 5 years experience, and three years of service in the place where he/she wants to become a notary. 24 The Decree on the abolition of the right to practice advocacy in addition to public notary of 30 May 1931 abolished this possibility and instructed all persons to decide whether they will keep an attorney or notary public position. However, according to Article 4, paragraph 1 of the same Decree, the possibility of practicing advocacy in addition to the notary public service, was extended. It was not until the Decree of 20 September 1940 that the possibility of keeping both functions was abolished. 25 Article 52 of the LNP KY, legal activities that required a notary act were the following: marital property agreements, acknowledgment of receipt of a dowry, deeds of gift without recompense, for all legal transactions among the living, which were personally assumed by the blind or deaf who could not read or mute who could not write. 26 Article 70 of the Law on Bill of Exchange of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (of 29 November 1929) stipulated that “protests are raised by public notaries or district courts in the place of their local jurisdiction. District courts raise protests of bills of exchange in places with no notary public, and if there is a notary public in the place of local jurisdiction, a district court will raise protests only in cases when a notary public is excluded by the law.”
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Notary’s activities also included certification, however, the parallel jurisdiction of courts and administrative bodies was preserved. The law stipulated verification of transcripts and verification of signatures – legalization. In practice, verification of signatures was done by district courts, regardless of whether a notary was present in their headquarters.27 Public notaries witnessed legally relevant facts or events. The law has provided for certificates of the following: whether a person is alive, submission of documents, statement of documents, witnessing other facts, conclusions of the public assembly meetings. Deposit left to a notary did not have a nature of court bailment.28 Storing of documents required keeping of separate register.29 2.2. Acting on Court Order. Notary public acted on court orders in probate and enforcement proceedings. Notaries were delegated certain actions from enforcement proceedings. The courts implemented the enforcement through court clerks, however, there where no executive officers was appointed, implementation of important and serious enforcement actions was confided to notaries.30 In bankruptcy proceedings, the court could delegate to a notary discussions on the division of the bankruptcy estate and the examination of the account of the bankruptcy estate manager, or the role of a receiver. Before arbitration tribunals, mutual calls to parties were done through a notary public or district court;31 – notary public had the role of the donee for receiving documents. Croatia has taken over this provision, and thus the court may appoint a notary public as donee for receiving documents.32
27 Announcement of the Minister of Justice No. 1368 of 13 December 1931 „courts were able to verify signatures of private persons outside the court building only in cases when a party is ill or for other unavoidable reasons cannot access the court.“ 28 Article 126 of the LNP KY, Slovenia took over this provision (Article 91 of the LNP of Slovenia). 29 Article 129 of the LNP KY. 30 Article 26 of the Law on Enforcement and Security of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia “Službene novine KJ” No. 131/1930, herein after referred to as: LES KY. 31 Goršić Franjo, Komentar građansko-sudskog postupka, knj. II, “Geca Kon” Belgrade, 1934, p. 485; Article 676 of the Civil Procedure Code of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. 32 Article 146 paragraph 2, Article 77 of the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Civil Procedure Code of the Republic of Croatia, ”Narodne novine”, No. 123/03, hereinafter referred to as: LCACPC of Croatia, while civil procedure codes of Montenegro and Macedonia do not explicitly state the appointment of notary public as a proxy for the receipt of documents, but leave open the possibility for court to appoint proxy for the receipt of documents for defendant who is abroad from the ranks of lawyers or notary publics. While drafting the new Civil Procedure Code (CPC of Serbia) “Sl. glasnik RS”, Nos. 72/2011, 49/2013,55/2014, Serbia left out this option, stipulates action of a notary on court order in a civil action only related to the submission and provision of evidence.
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2.2.1. Proceedings in Probate Procedure. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the scope of actions in the probate proceedings is not delegated “obligatory”, but as a rule, which delegates the authorities for notary public actions. However, a notary public was not given a legal remedy against a court decision, which issues a rule that the court retains implementation of probate proceedings, but he/she was given a remedy against a court decision ordering him/her to revoke the inheritance hearing with which he/she was already entrusted. In fact, in accordance with this law, notary publics primarily conducted probate proceedings, thereby unburdening courts in the areas in which the institution of notary public was just introduced. The Law of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia did not say which were those “important reasons” determined by the court when entrusting a notary public with the management of the probate proceedings. The court could not delegate implementation of probate proceedings to a party in proceedings, especially when there is a conflict of interest between testator’s heirs and legal heirs and legatee. The court had the discretion to entrust probate proceedings in a concrete case to a notary public, and the “important reasons” could be a variety of local and real circumstances. For example, if minors or persons under guardianship participate in a probate hearing as heirs or participants in the necessary legal action. The legislator could not list all the important reasons, since the court was left discretion to entrust these tasks to a notary public, taking into account the interests of the party, which the law on non- contentious court proceeding also stipulated.33 In modern legal systems in South Slavic regions, this rule was adopted. If a solution that the appeal is allowed were adopted, it would delay the procedure and derail goal of notary service, which is faster protection of parties and prevention of disputes. Notary public was given the role of court commissioner when making the inventory of estate. Inventory of estate could also be performed by court representative,34 however, in practice, it was also performed by parties themselves. This diversity of procedures did not suit legal regulations. The Law on non-contentious court proceedings stipulated that the heirs themselves could carry out probate hearing, and in such case, the heirs had to submit to the court a document on conducted probate proceedings, and a statement on the division of the inheritance, within one month. The heirs were left to carry out the probate proceedings and make an inventory of estate. That is why a problem in practice emerged, concerning whether the heirs had the
33 Article 4 of the Law on Non-Contentious Court Proceedings of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, ”Službene novine KJ” No.178 XLVII, of 4 August 1934, Belgrade, hereinafter referred to as: LNCP KY. 34 Article 70 of the LNP KY.
719 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century right to make inventory of estate when there is an agreement among them on the division of inheritance. In legal theory,35 it was pointed out that regardless of the fact that heirs themselves could make inventory of estate, this still was a scope of work of a notary public, as a court trustee.36 A notary public conducted the hearing fairly, especially in cases including a conflict of interests between heirs, for example, between legal and testamentary heirs. Notary public, on court’s order, was writing death certificates, and municipal authority was competent for that. This jurisdiction was transferred to a notary public, and guaranteed the courts the regular delivery of death certificates. 2.3. Organization of Notary Service. According to this law, notary public is incompatible with any other regular, private or public service performed for a salary, and any profession not matching the honour and independence of a notary public, as well as with advocacy. The exception was that notaries could perform part-time teaching service at a university or vocational school, as well as lawyers. These prohibitions were stipulated in contemporary laws of the former republics of Yugoslavia.37 Notary public service could not be assumed by a person who was bankrupt or who was under investigation or charges, as well as persons who, due to physical or mental defects were unable to perform that service or who express the principles against the existing state form or advocate the change of state order. The law specifically stipulated that notary public could not occasionally perform attorney duties or other activities incompatible to notary public service. Notary public received award for his/her work, and the rate was determined by the ministry competent for justice. 2.4. Notary Public Positions. Number of notary public positions was determined according to generally accepted criteria set up on the principle of numerus clauses, according to the number of residents and the scope of the legal transactions in certain areas. According to this law, every three years the Minister of Justice could, upon proposal of the chamber or the president of a court of appeal, revise boundaries of the districts and if necessary, appoint notary public. The area in which a notary public operates includes the territorial area of the county court. Notary public was obliged to have a permanent office in his/her official seat, and was not allowed to have a branch office elsewhere.38 This solution was accepted by contemporary legislations in this region.
35 Žilić Franjo, Šantek Miroslav, Komentar Zakona o sudskom vanparničnom postupku (Vanparnični postupak) i uvodni Zakon za Zakon o sudskom vanparničnom postupku, Zagreb, 1934, p. 290. 36 Article 31 of the LNCP KY and Articles 221 and 222 of the LNP KY. 37 Article 5 of the Law on Notary Public, “Službeni glasnik RS” No. 31/2011, 85/12, 19/2013, herein after referred to as: LNP of Serbia. 38 With the latest changes to the LNP of Serbia (“Službeni glasnik RS”, No. 19/2013), Article 30 stipulates that a notary public must have residence in the municipality or city where his/her official seat is.
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2.5. Election Notary was appointed by the Minister of Justice, based on the competition announced by public notary chamber upon Minster’s order. The requirements for becoming a notary public included completed law faculty, court or bar exam, work experience and notary surety bond, the amount of which was stipulated by law and depended on the place where his/her seat was. Surety bond served as collateral for the obligations of a notary public arising from his/her operations as a person of public trust and as a court trustee, as well as for fines or costs of the disciplinary proceedings.
2.6. End of Office Notary public could not be deprived of his/her profession, except for the reasons stated in the law, nor could he/she be moved to another place without his/her consent. Notary public’s service was terminated if by the decision of the disciplinary tribunal he/she was sentenced to loss of service; if he/she lost his/her civic honour or public service or has been convicted of a criminal offence committed for gain; if he/she expressed principles contrary to existing ruling authority or did not commence his/her work within three months.39 Taking into account the specificities of notarial service, the law also stipulated conditions for termination of service in case when a notary fails to supplement the surety bond or goes bankrupt, or practices advocacy. The decision on the dismissal based on resignation or expression of principles contrary to existing state form, was passed by the Minister of Justice, upon the hearing of a notary public, while in all other cases, the decision was passed by appeal court.40 2.7. Accountability. The law stipulated accountability of a notary for mistakes and violations of official duties that he/she made. The surety bond served as security for damages to the damaged party. Among the many criticisms of the application of the law, remarks made by the Bar Association in Novi Sad41 regarding the work of notary public and
39 Article 29 of the LNP KY, judge’s service was terminated when he/she was sentenced for crimes or offenses, and based on the decision of the disciplinary court sentenced to loss of service, Article 112 of the Constitution and Articles 43, 44 of the Law on Judges of Regular Courts of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (LJ KY, of 8 January 1929). 40 From Archives, No. X–X A. 27/6–1934, president of the district court dismissed Aleksandar Matić, notary based in Pančevo, and notified the president of the Court of Appeal on the said action. 41 President of the Bar Association in Novi Sad, sent a petition to the Minister of Justice No. 1526/1939 on 18 November 1939, about the need to abolish notary public, and remarks were
721 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century his/her accountability, particularly stand out, and with good reason, because a notary public was accountable only by his/her surety bond for the damage he/she caused, and civil servant had greater accountability for the damage caused to a party, according to the law by which he/she is accountable to the state. Criticism also referred to the election of notaries. The state government appointed notaries from among members of the Parliament, mayors, people which country had confidence in, because thus it protected the regime. This criticism also referred to the function of representation of notary publics. Lawyers felt that the state has expanded the scope of notaries’ powers, giving them a lawyer’s function – representation, and thus violated the principle of representation that is inconsistent with the concept of notary public service. It can be concluded that the lawyers considered notary public service as competitive profession. Notaries were appointed by the state government, same as judges and civil servants. The institution of notary implies freelance notary service, his/her independence in relation to the state, as well as to the parties. Notary was like an impartial judge to the parties, and according to the law of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, had a role to help prevent possible disputes between the parties, and notarial documents had the character of public documents. Therefore, criticism of lawyers that stated that notaries deducted the scope of lawyers’ work is not substantiated, because lawyers were drafting private documents and represented parties. Acting of notaries on court order in a probate proceeding has been used as an important argument for the abolition of this institution, as it was considered that the costs of a notary public were excessive and unnecessary, given the fact that the proceedings could be conducted by heirs themselves. This institution was abolished on 7 November 1944. Public notary service was an important judicial institution in the legal system of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Its work was of great benefit to the legal order and legal certainty, especially for the correct application of the law, and it can be said that the notaries had the role of preventive legal regulation – jurisdiction. It can be concluded that the institution of notary facilitated unburdening of courts and administrative bodies, and greater legal certainty and the protection of citizens. The significance and scope of work of notaries were best characterized by Culja,42 by noting that “according to the importance and volume of work, notaries in the area of non-contentious jurisdiction come immediately after the county courts,” and that they are of the same importance
related to the election of notaries and their work, as well as their accountability. They felt that notaries took over their jobs, especially the representation of parties. 42 Srećko Culja, Građansko procesno pravo Kraljevine Jugoslavije, II sveska Vanparnični postupci (izvršno,stečajno i vanparnično procesno pravo), Predgovor, Geca Kon, Beograd, 1938, p. 604.
722 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century in the equalization of fragmented legal system43 at the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, as the law had obligatory force for all regions.
3. Contemporary Comparative Law In the contemporary legal system of South Slavic regions, notary has again assumed its place as an important legal institution. This institution was first adopted in Slovenia,44 then in Croatia and later in other former republics of Yugoslavia.45 Serbia has only recently passed the Law on Notary Public.46 By continuing the interrupted tradition, the European model of notary, the so- called Latin notary model, which is the most widespread in the world, has been adopted again in this region.47 According to the laws of South Slavic regions, notary public service is exclusive and permanent profession of a notary. The function of a notary implies public trust, his/her impartiality and independence. Notary publics are not civil servants and they perform their service as a free call.48 As already mentioned, prohibitions for notaries were
43 In Bosnia and Herzegovina the Austrian Civil Code of 1811was applied, and among the Muslim population – Sharia law; in Montenegro – original General Property Code of 1811; in Croatia also the Austrian Civil Code; in Slovenia and Dalmatia, as provinces of Austria, Austrian Civil Code with changes of 1914, 1915 and 1916; in Vojvodina, which included part of Baranja (but not Srem which was in the legal field of Croatia) - Hungarian Customary Law, which was not codified; in Serbia – Serbian Civil Code of 1844, and in Macedonia the so-called Ottoman Law. 44 Law on Notary Public ”Udarni list R. Slovenije” No. 13/94, herein after referred to as: LNP of Slovenia. 45 Law on Notary Public ”Narodne Novine“ Nos. 78/93, 29/94, 162/98, 16/07, 75/09, herein after referred to as: LNP of Croatia; Law on Notaries “Službene novine Federacije BiH“, No. 45/02, herein after referred to as: LN BiH; Law on Notaries “Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske,“ Nos. 86/04, 2/05, 74/05, 76/05, 91/06, 37/07 and 50/10, herein after referred to as: LN of the Republic of Srpska; Law on Notary Service of the Republic of Macedonia ”Službeni glasnik R Makedonije,“ No. 55/07,86/08, herein after referred to as: LN of Macedonia; Law on Notaries ”Službeni list R.Crne Gore,“ No. 68/05,48/08, herein after referred to as: LN of Montenegro. 46 Changes to the LNP of Serbia („Službeni glasnik RS“, No. 19/13) envisaged that the conditions for the implementation of the Law on Notary Public will be met by 1 September 2014. The inability of application of law is justified by the inability of the opening competitions for notary publics, because the small number of candidates passed the notary public exam, so there was no possibility of initiating the process of appointment of notary publics. In addition, these reasons have caused the inability of establishing the Notary Public Chamber, which should make notary public acts. 47 It is recognized in 44 countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, South America and partially North America. 48 In Slovenia, a notary public service is defined as a free profession, Article 2, paragraph 2 of the LNP of Slovenia: “Notary service is performed by notaries appointed under this Law, as a free profession...“, while in the Republic of Srpska Article 2 of the ZN of the Republic
723 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century stipulated, and they referred to performing other professions, except from science, literature or business based on decision of a competent body.49 The view adopted from comparative law is reflected in the laws of the former republics, and thus the activity of the notary public is based in the field of preventive legal assistance and trust in the institution of notary service. In order to preserve the public trust, the law provides for the prohibition of business cooperation, and thus a notary must not cooperate and use office space with an attorney or other natural or legal entity for a joint business activity. However, two or more notaries may jointly carry out their service only if approved by the relevant ministry, and based on the prior opinion of the chamber.50 A notary is forbidden to participate in the activities of political parties and to be a member of their bodies. 3.1. Activities. In general, according to these laws, notary public activities include: legal affairs concerning property relations between spouses and those living in extramarital community; agreements on the use of significant parts of the immovable property of minors and legally incompetent persons; the promise of gift and deeds of gift in case of death; legal affairs concerning the transfer or acquisition of ownership and other real rights over immovable property, as well as securing real rights (in the sphere of mortgages and enforcement); drawing up last wills and revocations; the preparation of the minutes of the various facts; certification of non-public documents; issuance of certifications on certain statements; storing of documents, cash, securities and valuables; performance of tasks on court order in the probate proceedings and enforcement proceedings (implementation of inheritance disputes, enforcement proceedings, submission), and legal representation in connection with transactions drafted by a notary public. Already established form of documents is used, public notary acts, records and minutes, there is a difference only in the adopted terminology.51
of Srpska “Notary service is a public service performed by notaries, who are independent holders of that service“. 49 Article 5 of the LNP of Serbia provides that the prohibition of dealing with other matters is not related to “jobs based on the decision of the competent authority, for example, executor of the legacy, guardians etc., occasional or additional performance of scientific, educational, artistic and similar activities, the performance of jobs within the chamber and the international notary public associations, the performance of services of mediator, arbitrator, court interpreter“. 50 Article 27 of the LNP of Croatia, Article 55 of the LNP of Serbia. 51 Our legislation modelled on the German law uses the term “record”. In Germany, the term notarielle Niederschrift is in use, which means record, protocol. Notary public writs down statements of will of the parties, so the editors of the law considered more appropriate term for our legislation would be record instead of act, which is used by other legislations. Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (Article 70 of the LN) and the Republic of Srpska adopted the term: notary processed document.
724 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century
Although until recently they all had the same legal order, in contemporary legal systems there is no harmonization of terminology when it comes to procedure of confirmation of documents and their certification. This procedure was terminologically differently determined as solemnization (accepted in Croatia, Serbia, and according to the law of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia), record of certifying a private document (Montenegro,) or notarial processing of documents (Republic of Srpska, Bosnia and Herzegovina). Therefore, we believe that these concepts should be terminologically determined and harmonized, since the theory itself advocates the harmonization of public notary activities. The laws on notary public of the former Yugoslav republics stipulate mandatory form of a notary public act for certain legal affairs, however the room was left for it to be determined by other laws. Serbian legislator determined the imperative form of acts in the same manner, but legislator also determined the competitive form of acts for certain legal matters for which the jurisdiction of the court and other agencies was provided.52 Optional choice of a notary public act contributes to legal certainty in legal transactions and is a “useful domain” of authenticity of a notary public act. Serbian law determines the form of acts in three ways, as an imperative, optional and competitive form. In the former case, the imperative form of acts is determined for specific legal matters, while left with an option of determining the form by other laws. In the latter case, the imperative character of form is not required; however, legal affairs and statements that may have this form are listed, specifying it as optional and competitive. Comparative analysis of the laws of countries of the former Yugoslavia is also indicating the differences. Jurisdiction of notary publics is set out in a series of separate laws, which are harmonized with the Law on Notary Public.53 Montenegro, Republic of Srpska, and Bosnia and Herzegovina passed new non-contentious laws, and the reform of non-contentious procedural law is related to compliance with the Law on Notary Public. Serbia54 passed a new Law on Non-Contentious Procedure. New changes to Serbian non-contentious legislation, next to terminological harmonization, refer to the amendments
52 See more in: Trgovčević Prokić Milena, Ovlašćenje javnog beležnika i organizacija beležništva, Službeni glasnik, Belgrade, 2011. 53 For example, Slovenia, Montenegro and Serbia in their respective laws on notary public stipulated the form of notary public acts – deeds, for contracts for lifelong care, for the distribution of property, for the agreement on accepting the inheritance and gift contract in case of death, while Croatia envisaged the form of notary public documents in the Law on Inheritance “Narodne novine“ No. 48/03, 163/03, herein after referred to as: LI of Croatia, (Articles 32, 46, 105, 116 of the LI of Croatia). 54 Law on Non-Contentious Proceedings “Službeni glasnik RS” Nos. 46/95,18/2005, 85/2012, 45/2013, 55/2014, herein after referred to as: LNP of Serbia.
725 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century necessary for complying with the Law on Notary Public, and thus they refer to the actions of a notary public on court order, hence procedural provisions of notary public procedure received their place in this law. Croatia has not yet passed the Law on Non-Contentious Procedure, but applies legal rules of the Law on Non-Contentious Proceedings of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia of 1934, as well as a number of laws of primarily substantive nature that contain procedural provisions,55 however it has harmonized other laws with the Law on Notary Public. These comparative legislations have different solutions for notary public service. Laws on notary public of Slovenia,56 Croatia,57 and Macedonia58 do not foresee that all legal matters relating to the transfer of title to real estate or other things should be concluded in the form of a notary public act. However, in Serbia and Montenegro, the imperative form of notary public act – deed was provided for all contracts on the use of real estate, which has also been adopted in European countries with a long tradition of notary public activities.59 Company law is the traditional jurisdiction of the notary public. Laws on notary public of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina60 predict that the foundation and any other change of the status of a capital company are followed by notary public processing in the form of a certified document. However, the laws on notary public of Macedonia,61 Serbia and Montenegro exclude notary public documents in the foundation of companies, but stipulate certification of the conclusions of the assembly or other bodies, if a notary public is present at the meeting or assembly of these bodies. Slovenia has introduced the Central Registry of Testaments.62 The Registry keeps records of all testaments irrespective of whether they are
55 Family Law (Narodne novine, No. 116/03, 17/04, 136/04), Protection of Persons with Mental Disorders (Narodne novine, No. 111/97, 27/98,128/99,79/02), Law on Inheritance (Narodne novine, No 48/03, 163/03), Law on Declaring the Missing Persons Dead and Proof of Death (Narodne novine, No. 10/74, 53/91), Law on Ownership and Other Property Rights (Narodne novine, No. 91/96, 73/00,114/01), Expropriation Act (Narodne novine, No. 9/94, 35/94, 112/00, 114/01) and other laws. 56 Article 47 of the LNP of Slovenia. 57 Article 53 of the LNP of Croatia. 58 Article 41/41a of the LN of Macedonia. 59 Article 20 paragraph 2 of the FLN, Article 95 item 1 of the Notary Code of Greece, while in Bulgaria it is necessary to respect the form of a notary public act for legal validity of all contracts on the use of real estate, particularly all mortgage actions (Articles 18, 209, 222-223 of the Law on state Property). 60 Article 73, paragraph 5 of the LN of BH. 61 Article 41, paragraph 1 of the LN of Macedonia. 62 Regulations on the Central Registry of Testaments, Uradni list R. Slovenije, No. 2/2007.
726 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century court, notary public or handwritten testaments. The Law on Notary Public of Slovenia introduced the obligation to keep records of testaments in the Central Registry of Testaments within the Notary Public Chamber. Serbia63 determined that notary public document could be made in electronic form, provided that the notary public and the parties have registered and deposited electronic signature in accordance with the law. The laws prescribe the contents and enforceability of notary public documents. Executive notary public document is equated with a final court decision. Notary public act can be the basis for registration in the land registry if it contains an obligation to establish, transfer or revoke a land law, meaning that executive notary public act supersedes the decision of land law judge and based on land registry changes can be made. All notary public laws of these countries stipulate the jurisdiction of notary to protest bills of exchange,64 giving a notary the role of a protest body. 3.4. Deposit. In comparative law of the former Yugoslav republics, the nature of notary public deposit was regulated differently. Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia65 have equated the effect of notary public deposit with the court deposit, while Slovenia,66 as already said, took over the provisions of the law of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, which stipulated that notary public deposit had no effect equal to court deposit. Bearing in mind that the institution of notary public is auxiliary body of the court, as well as the specificity of the service itself that determines the activity of notaries in the field of public law, we believe that the notary public deposit should have the nature of a court deposit. 3.5. Representation. Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Montenegro67 took over the provisions of the law of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia68 concerning the authority of the notary to represent parties in uncontested matters before the courts and other authorities, if these matters are directly related to a document made by that notary, which gave notary the rights and duties of a lawyer. Serbia, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina69 and the Republic of Srpska
63 Article 70 of the LNP of Serbia. 64 Article 91 of the LNP of Croatia, Article 70 of the LNP of Slovenia, Article 73 of the LN of Macedonia, Article 91 of the LNP of Serbia. 65 Article 174 of the LNP of Serbia, Article 113 of the LNP of Croatia, Article 71 of the LN of Montenegro, Article 114 of the LN of the FBH, Article 86 of the LN of Macedonia. 66 Article 91 of the LNP of Slovenia. 67 Article 6 of the LN of Macedonia, Article 5 of the LNP of Slovenia, Article 4 of the LNP of Croatia, Article 34 of the LN of Montenegro. 68 Article 4 of the LNP KY. 69 Article 73 of the LN BH.
727 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century have not foreseen representation by notaries. We believe that it is necessary that a notary public has the function of representation, since with this jurisdiction a notary does not receive a new activity, advocacy, but becomes authorized to represent the party in relation to the document he/she compiled, because the need for presentation is reflected in the faster functioning of the legal transactions. 3.5. Acting on Court Order. In certain laws that do not contain the institution of (professional, “extrajudicial”) executors, as is the case in the Republic of Srpska, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia,70 notary is as an auxiliary body of the court in the execution and implementation of claims or rights. In these laws, acting on court order includes the following notarial activities: public sale, delivery, issuance of ads. Serbia, Slovenia and Macedonia have introduced professional executors; hence, notary does not act on court order in the enforcement proceedings. Probate proceedings remained under the jurisdiction of the courts. Croatia,71 Republic of Srpska, Macedonia, Slovenia, Montenegro and Serbia,72 delegated to notary public conduct of probate procedure, however, probate proceedings are still legal proceedings initiated by court ex officio. In the Republic of Srpska, a special condition is required, which is that all participating heirs agree on delegating proceedings to a notary, while other rights give discretion right to the president of the court.73 According to these laws, the court has the right to control and has the power to set a deadline to a notary for action. The first instance court’s president, who entrusted a notary with the procedure, also decides on his/her exemption. As already mentioned, a notary public has no right of appeal against the decision on taking away of a case, and these provisions were also taken from the law of
70 In the Law on Changes and Amendments to the Law on Execution “Narodne novine, No. 173/03, herein after referred to as: LCALE – Novela 2005, Croatia has transferred to independent jurisdiction of notary public making of decision on enforcement on the basis of valid document. 71 Article 240 of the LI of Croatia. 72 Article 145 of the Law on Non-Contentious Proceedings “Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske” No. 58/03, 85/03, 74/05 herein after referred to as: LNP of the Republic of Srpska, Articles 190-206. Law on Non-Contentious Proceedings “Službeni list RCG”, No 27/2006, herein after referred to as: LNP of Montenegro. According to the LNP of Serbia, notary public is exempted from conducting inheritance hearing procedure, when a law of a foreign country is applicable (Article 110a). 73 In Montenegro (Article 147 of the LNP) president of the court is entitled to delegate all probate cases the notary public, while in Croatia and Serbia a certain number of cases can be delegated to entrust notary, however all laws state that the delegation of the case depends on the workload of the court.
728 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Bosnia and Herzegovina predicted action of a notary in probate proceedings on court order only in the performance of preliminary actions and the decision on the measures to ensure the legacy. Characteristic feature of our neighbours is that transferred jurisdiction in the probate proceedings does not include making a decision when legal issues and facts are arguable. Notary public cannot make the decision on termination of the procedure, nor decision on measure to ensure the legacy if there is a dispute between the parties, because the full consent of all parties is required. However, in proposal on amendments to the procedural law, Serbia anticipated that a notary public could issue a decision to terminate the proceedings. Characteristic feature of all the laws is that procedural activities of notary public is to determine the composition of legacy and declare heirs, – adoption of a declaratory decision. It also refers to taking process actions that serve to protect the rights of heirs (inventory of estate, estimate, etc.), and are aimed at determining the composition of legacy and its security.74 It can be concluded that the Law on Notary Public of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was the inspiration for the modern laws on notary public of the former Yugoslav countries and that it remained a beacon of notary service in these regions. Contemporary legal systems of the former Yugoslav republics involve much wider range of notarial powers, for instance conduct of probate proceedings, making decisions on the execution based on authentic document, but basically the activity and organization of notaries are taken from the Law on Notary Service of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. De-jurisdiction and transfer of powers of extrajudicial matters to notary public is conditioned by the interest of legislator to protect certain social values, which resulted in the difference in the content of notarial activities in modern comparative law in this region. It should be emphasized that the countries that have adopted the institution of notary relieved the courts concerning probate proceedings and inheritance law. Imperative form of notarial document that are required for certain contracts is a great relief for the courts within the non-contentious procedure.75 In addition, notarial document is primarily important in the area of international private relations. Notarial documents, according to the
74 Antić, Oliver, Nasledno pravo, Pravni fakultet, Belgrade, 2004, pp. 353-355. 75 Informator No. 5324 of 16 March 2005 – Statistical analysis of actions of notary publics in the area of the Municipal Court in Varaždin in probate proceedings shows that in 2003 and 2004 notaries resolved 1382 probate cases. According to the framework standards for judges of municipal courts, prescribed by the Ministry of Justice for the achievement of annual framework standards, a judge of a municipal court should have resolved 660 cases per year. This statistical analysis, although done in relation to one micro-location, indicates that there was relief of the court, thus the court was able to deal with controversial cases.
729 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century principle of reciprocity and legal force, are recognized and equal to the domestic public documents. This allows use of notarial document in a foreign country, thus avoiding possible civil proceedings abroad. By introducing notary public, although delayed, Serbia has made significant progress towards approaching the European community. The reason for the introduction of this institution is certainly a need to relieve the courts,76 as well as increase of the overall safety and culture of rights. The necessity of harmonizing our legislation with European standards is required in all areas of law. Conclusions and recommendations of the Committee of Ministers of Europe77 are mandatory and useful guidelines for the reform of the judicial system. There is also recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Principles of Civil Procedure Designed to Improve the Functioning of Justice.78 Serbia is approaching closer to these trends by introducing new institution of (professional) executor.79 Ratio legis of notary public service is in taking over court jurisdiction with the rights of issuing of public documents that provide greater legal certainty in legal transactions, and of enforcement services – in assuming court jurisdiction in enforcement proceedings and implementation of enforcement. In this way, using of non-judicial authority – notary public, and (professional) executor,
76 From 1 January until 31 December 2010, the First Basic Court in Belgrade received 20927 probate cases, of which 13234 resolved and 7693 unresolved cases. The average workload per judge includes 1923.25 cases, and the average number of solved cases per judge per month is 300.77 cases. The Second Basic Court received 4770 cases, 2903 were resolved, and 1867 cases remained unsolved. On the territory of Serbia, a total of 109 360 cases was received in 2012. At the end of 2012, 37000 cases remained unsolved. In the First Basic Court in Belgrade, only in the six-month report of 2014, received 5046 probate cases, of which 2014 resolved and 3446 unresolved cases. 77 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of Europe 86, adopted on 12 September 1986, recommendation 95 adopted in February 1995, recommendation 02 adopted on 10 September 2002. Recommendation 21 for execution was adopted by the European Committee on Legal Cooperation CDCJ. 78 Recommendation (84/5) of 28 February 1984 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on Principles of Civil Procedure Designed to Improve the Functioning of Justice. 79 Law on Execution and Security “Službeni glasnik RS”, No. 31/2011,99/11, herein after referred to as: LES of Serbia. It is envisaged that the execution is determined by the court and implemented by the court and out-of-body professional executor. A judgement creditor has two possibilities after the effective decision on execution, he/she may entrust the execution to a court, or (professional) executor. Executor implements decision on execution based on the decision of the court where he/she has been appointed. Exclusive jurisdiction of executor dative is provided in the area of family relations and returning of workers to jobs. Professional executors began working on 1 June 2012, while the application of the Law on Notary Public is set for 1 September 2014.
730 The Old and the New World Order – between European integration and the historical burdens: Prospects and challenges for Europe of 21st century who have public authority, contributes to the acceleration of the court proceedings and its relief and increase of efficiency. The tradition of notary public service existed in our regions and was unduly interrupted. Notary service must be in function of an efficient legal system, whose goal is protection of rights, in the context of achieving justice and fairness. The contemporary law complements the system of legal protection through notary service, sets fundamental institutional guarantees for notary service, since a notary is preventive judge who ensures the smooth operation of the judiciary.
731 CIP - Каталогизација у публикацији Народна библиотека Србије, Београд
316.322:32(082) 316.322:94(082) 316.322:33(082) 316.322:34(082)
INTERNATIONAL Conference The Old and the New World Order-between European Integration and the Historical Burden: Prospects and Challanges for Europe of 21st Century (2014 ; Beograd) The Old and the New World Order-between European Integration and the Historical Burden: Prospects and Challanges for Europe of 21st Century : proceedings : [Belgrade, May 29-30, 2014] / edited by Duško Dimitrijević. - Belgrade : Institute of International Politics and Economics, 2014 (Novi Sad : Mala knjiga). - 731 str. : ilustr. ; 25 cm
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ISBN 978-86-7067-207-9 a) Глoбaлизација - Политички аспект - Зборници b) Глoбaлизација - Историјски аспект - Зборници c) Глoбaлизација - Економски аспект - Зборници d) Глoбaлизација - Правни аспект - Зборници COBISS.SR-ID 210653196 View publication stats