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HATE SPEECH MONITORING and CONFLICT ANALYSIS in SOUTH SUDAN Report #4: September 8 – September 23, 2017

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HATE SPEECH MONITORING and CONFLICT ANALYSIS in SOUTH SUDAN Report #4: September 8 – September 23, 2017 September 26, 2017 HATE SPEECH MONITORING AND CONFLICT ANALYSIS IN SOUTH SUDAN Report #4: September 8 – September 23, 2017 This report is part of a broader initiative by PeaceTech Lab to analyze online hate speech in South Sudan in order to help mitigate the threat of hateful language in fueling violence on-the-ground. Hate speech can be defined as language that can incite others to discriminate or act against individuals or groups based on their ethnic, religious, racial, gender or national identity. The Lab also acknowledges the role of “dangerous speech,” which is a heightened form of hate speech that can catalyze mass violence. Summary of Recent Events uring this reporting period, ongoing, tribally targeted violence, reflected by sporadic skirmishes in the Greater Upper Nile and in Northern and Western D Bahr el Ghazal, have been particularly alarming. On September 15, for instance, government forces attacked the opposition’s positions in Fashoda State. Government forces were also accused of attacking a civilian displacement camp at Aburoc. During the previous week, the government accused the rebels loyal to former Vice President Dr. Riek Machar of launching attacks in Gany County, resulting in the death of at least 28 government soldiers and 100 fighters on the rebel side. In Northern Bahr el Ghazal, the rivalry between the Dinka subsections of Apuk and Aguok continues to result in large-scale violence. Unreported clashes between these groups took place in Gogrial State on September 14, during which two people were killed. Some observers believe that the Apuk-Aguok conflict is a proxy fight between President Kiir and his estranged former Chief of Staff Paul Malong. In June, Kiir removed Paul Malong from his post, a move some viewed as a calculated strategy to consolidate control among the Dinka of Warrap (the home area of Kiir and the director of internal security, Akol Koor) at the expense of the Dinka of Aweil (the home area of Malong). Malong is currently in confinement in Juba, and his former associates are increasingly being purged by President Kiir. For example, the Wau State governor Andrea Mayar Achor was sacked on September 15, and the former director of military intelligence in the South Sudanese army, General Marial Nuor, was fired on September 16. The appointments of both Mayar and Nuor had been recommended by Malong. Additionally, divisions among Equatorian groups continue to deepen. Composed of highly diverse communities, Equatorians are uncertain which rebel outfit, the SPLA-IO or the National Salvation Front (NAS), to support. Both opposition groups have established bases in the region, and each is trying to assert itself in Greater Equatoria. On September 9, NAS was reported to have executed nine military personnel from the Eastern Equatoria region for refusing to denounce allegiance to SPLA-IO and pledge themselves to NAS. NAS also accused SPLA-IO of causing insecurity in the Equatorias, 1 including the recent killing of an ICRC staff member, Kennedy Laki Emmanuel, which precipitated the suspension of ICRC operations throughout Greater Equatoria. Amidst these conflict dynamics, supporters of rival factions continue to engage in inflammatory rhetoric via social media. Previously identified language such as “Nuer wew,” “Cowards,” and “Jienge” are still trending on various platforms, although the context and meaning of these terms continues to evolve. Additionally, the term “kuethpiny” has emerged online, largely to target President Kiir and his allies. SOUTH SUDAN ONLINE HATE SPEECH MONITORING: REPORT #4 Visualization and Analysis of Conflict Events Violent Events: September 9 – September 23, 2017 The visualization and table below use data from the Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (ACLED) to portray incidents and trends in conflict-related events in South Sudan from September 9 – September 23, 2017. This is the most recent two-week period for which we are able to generate event data for South Sudan. Data Source: Armed Conflict Location and Events Database Date Event Type Location Description Fatalities 9/11/2017 Battle-No Aburoc Fighting between government and rebel forces in Aburoc, 10 change of Upper Nile, has forced UNMISS to withdraw 30 territory humanitarian workers from the area on 11 September. Date of fighting unclear. Rebels claimed 10 killed and shops looted in government attacks on their positions around Aburoc around this time. 9/18/2017 Battle-No Nhialdiu Clashes between SPLA and SPLA-IO forces as the latter 25 2 change of attacked Nhialdiu town in Unity. Machar's forces claimed territory to have dislodged the government forces and killed 19 including their area Commander, while one died and four were injured on their side. The government forces claimed to have repulsed the rebels after they burnt down some houses at the outskirts of the town. A later toll given by the area's information minister put the number of fatalities at 25, including six policemen and four civilians killed in the crossfire. Data Source: Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (events in South Sudan with 5 or more fatalities) SOUTH SUDAN ONLINE HATE SPEECH MONITORING: REPORT #4 Early Warning of Violence – Predictive Analytics PeaceTech Lab is collaborating with partners to develop an early warning system using predictive analytics. Using a combination of data sources including the Armed Conflict Location and Events Database (ACLED), the Global Database of Events, Language, and Tone (GDELT), and social media content from Crimson Hexagon, the Lab has built a statistical model for predicting violence in South Sudan before it occurs. Over time the Lab plans to refine and improve this model. ACLED publishes new updated data every Monday. Each update covers the violent events that occurred up until the Saturday prior to the Monday that data is released. Our statistical model is re-trained every Monday with this updated data and then produces predictions for the upcoming week. The most recent ACLED data was published on September 25, 2017, for the week ending on September 23, 2017 (Week 38). We used that data to train our model and then forecasted for the following week of September 23-30 (Week 39). The maps below visualize this system in practice. The model outputs a probability of violence for Week 39 – illustrated by shades of red in the map on the left. Using a probability threshold we then make predictions of which states will experience violence for Week 39– the red states in the map on the right. Based on our predictions for week 38, compared to the real data that was released for week 38, our models accuracy remains at 70%. Western Nile 0.2 0.4 0.6 (Kodok)Northern Upper Nile (Renk) Ruweng (Panriang) Central Upper Nile Aweil East Twic (Malakal) (Wanjok) Northern Liech Maiwut (Mayen−Abun) (Bentiu) (Maiwut) Lol Latjor Gogrial Fangak (Raja) Aweil (Nasir) (Kuacjok) (Ayod) (Aweil) Bieh Tonj Southern Liech (Waat) Akobo (Tonj) (Leer) (Akobo) Wau (Wau) Gok (Cueibet) Jonglei Western Lake (Bor) Boma (Rumbek) Eastern Lake Tambura (Yirol) (Pibor) (Tambura) Terekeka Amadi (Terekeka) Gbudwe (Mundri) (Yambio) Maridi Kapoeta (Maridi) Jubek Imatong (Kapoeta) Probability and Optimal Threshold Forecast (Juba) (Torit) Week 39 of 2017 Yei River (Yei) Predicted Violence against Civilians for Week 39 3 SOUTH SUDAN ONLINE HATE SPEECH MONITORING: REPORT #4 Predicted Battles for Week 39 Western Nile 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 (Kodok)Northern Upper Nile (Renk) Ruweng (Panriang) Central Upper Nile Aweil East Twic (Malakal) (Wanjok) Northern Liech Maiwut (Mayen−Abun) (Bentiu) (Maiwut) Lol Latjor Gogrial Fangak (Raja) Aweil (Nasir) (Kuacjok) (Ayod) (Aweil) Bieh Tonj Southern Liech (Waat) Akobo (Tonj) (Leer) (Akobo) Wau (Wau) Gok (Cueibet) Jonglei Western Lake (Bor) Boma (Rumbek) Eastern Lake Tambura (Yirol) (Pibor) (Tambura) Terekeka Amadi (Terekeka) Gbudwe (Mundri) (Yambio) Maridi Kapoeta (Maridi) Jubek Imatong (Kapoeta) Probability and Optimal Threshold Forecast (Juba) (Torit) Week 39 of 2017 Yei River (Yei) 4 SOUTH SUDAN ONLINE HATE SPEECH MONITORING: REPORT #4 Nuer Wew/Nuer Weu The term “Nuer Wew” is still actively trending on social media. As initially identified in the Lab’s research, the term has variations in spelling and is most often used by Nuer (and some Equatorians) in the SPLA-IO to insult those Nuer who either stayed in, or rejoined, the SPLA-In Government, such as first vice president Taban Deng Gai. The term portrays the Nuer loyal to President Kiir and his government as money-minded or money-lovers. The most frequent online targets include the current Minister of Health, Dr. Riek Kok Gai, the Minister of Petroleum, Ezekiel Lol Gatkuoth, as well as Taban Deng Gai. As shown in the sample posts below, the term portrays the Nuer loyal to President Kiir and his government as selfish people “whose concepts and reasonings are overrided by money,” or as people who simply “love money (more) than their families.” While these characterizations are not new, some social media users have broken the term into distinct groups, including: “Nuer Wew group under Riek Gai and Nuerbetrayed under Taban.” In this case, the former group refers to those Nuer who stayed with former VP Machar, while the latter category refers to those who rejoined the government after Taban Deng Gai became vice president. Due to the ongoing clashes in predominantly Nuer areas, the war can be perceived in part as an intra-Nuer conflict between Nuer rebels and “Nuer Wew” loyal to Taban Deng Gai. As one pro-government Nuer minister noted about killings that occurred in Bentiu, “Am saddened by the Lost of our people in the hands of their own people. a price will surely be paid by this outlawed and it will be soon…”1. This response seems to reflect the commitment by those viewed as "Nuer Wew" to fight against the rebels. The term can be considered inflammatory because it portrays those loyal to the government as tools rather than individuals following their conscience.
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