DOCSLIB.ORG

Conflict Observatory Nº 43 – July 2016

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Conflict Observatory Nº 43 – July 2016 Conflict observatory Nº 43 – July 2016 WORSENING AFGHANISTAN: ISIS attack in Kabul kills 80, mostly Hazara An attack in Kabul claimed by ISIS kills 80 people. 230 more were injured after two bombs went off, targeting the Hazara minority (of Shiite denomination), during a protest that brought together many people belonging to this minority. Two men set off belts with explosives despite the high security deployed in the Afghan capital, which they were able to avoid. This is the worst attack on the Hazara minority in Kabul since 2011, when 55 people were killed after an attack claimed by the Pakistani armed opposition group Lashkar-e- Jhangvi, which has carried out many attacks on this minority in the neighbouring country, defending the precepts of the Shiites. This was the first attack carried out by ISIS in the Afghan capital and was orchestrated by a commander of this organisation from the province of Nangarhar. The attack was condemned by the Taleban insurgency, assuring they had no links to the attack. There is a strong rivalry between the Taleban insurgency and ISIS, and there have been clashes in Nangarhar and in other Afghan provinces. The Hazara demonstration was calling for the power line crossing from Turkmenistan to Kabul to go through the Bamyan and Wardak provinces, where a large Hazara population lives. (Reuters, 24/7/16; BBC, 23/7/16) ARMENIA: Tension mounts after armed men linked to an opposition movement seize a police station and demand the resignation of the Armenian president Tension in the country rose following the siege and takeover of a police station by a group of armed men linked to the opposition movement Founding Parliament in mid-July. A police officer was killed when the police station was stormed and the assailants took several hostages. The armed men demanded the resignation of President Serzh Sarkisian and the release of the leader of the movement and Nagorno-Karabakh war veteran Jirair Serfilian. Serfilian had been arrested in late June along with six other people accused of possessing weapons, and days before his arrest he had announced his intention to create a new movement, National Resistance, to try to overthrow the government with the Armenian Army’s support. The group is also said to be unhappy with management of the negotiations over the unresolved conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, denouncing alleged concessions to Azerbaijan. The occupation of the police station continued during the second half of July, with tense episodes in the buildings and the streets. Demonstrations were staged in support of the assailants, with some incidents reported between the police and demonstrators. The assailants released the hostages after negotiations with the authorities. Finally, following the government’s ultimatum threatening to conduct a large-scale assault, the group surrendered on 31 July. The security forces reported the arrest of 20 people. According to the authorities, 75 people were wounded in the demonstrations between 29 and 30 July. (Reuters, RFEL/RL, 17-31/07/16) BANGLADESH: 29 killed, mostly foreigners, in an ISIS attack on a café in Dhaka An attack claimed by ISIS on a café in Dhaka, the country’s capital, kills at least 23 people, two of whom police officers, and the rest foreigners. Also, the Bangladeshi security forces declared that they had shot six assailants. A group of armed men stormed the café, which was very popular among foreigners, and took those inside hostage, to later free those who could repeat the Koran. Most of those killed were stabbed to death. The security forces launched an operation after the taking of hostages. The café was located in an area with a strong presence of security forces given the proximity of a number of embassies, meaning the assailants had to go through several security checks before reaching the place of the attacks. Bangladeshi authorities, who deny that ISIS is present in the country, pointed to the group Jamaeytul Mujahdeen Bangladesh (JMB), which according to the authorities has no ties to ISIS, but which has joined this organisation. The group JMB is one of the main insurgencies operating in the country. In late July, nine armed men were killed during an 1 Conflict observatory Nº 43 – July 2016 operation of the security forces in Dhaka linked to the attacks. Days after this attack, a group of armed men carried out another attack during celebrations to mark the end of Ramadan in Sholakia, the city where 200,000 people had met for this religious festivity. Four people –two police officers, a woman and one of the assailants– died. Ten other police officers were injured. (Al Jazeera, 3 & 26/7/16; The Guardian, 3 & 7/7/16) ETHIOPIA: Tension is on the rise in different parts of the country There was a rise in tension, serious confrontations and protests in the Amhara, Oromo and Ogaden regions. A Government decision to try to arrest the leader of the Wolkayit community (Tigray region) in the town of Gondar (northwest) triggered the disturbances. The Wolkayit community wanted the Wolkayit district, which was transferred to the Tigray region in 1994, to become part of the Amhara region. Between July 12 and 14 about 20 people, including soldiers, security forces and civilians, were killed when Ethiopian soldiers attempted to arrest the leader of the Wolkayit Committee in Gondar, Col. Demeka Zewdu, together with other members of the Committee. He was accused of murder, kidnapping and collaboration with Eritrea. The government’s decision sparked protests in the neighbouring Amhara region. Sporadic outbreaks of violence were also reported in Oromia, where the armed wing of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) stated that it had launched new attacks on July 17 against Ethiopian security forces. This was in addition to operations carried out on June 20, 21 and 23, in which 27 soldiers were allegedly killed in the areas of El Kere, Goro and Haro Dibe. Protests and outbreaks of violence mainly targeted the Tigray community, which despite being a minority, controls the Government and the Armed Forces. The Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) is the party at the core of the ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), with the coalition favouring the Tigray community to the detriment of the rest. (East African, Allafrica, 14/07/16; DW, 15/07/16) INDIA (JAMMU & KASHMIR): Killing of an insurgent by armed forces leads to a wave of riots in the State The killing of insurgent Burhan Wani, a member of the armed opposition group Hizbul Mujahideen, after his hideout was besieged by the Indian security forces, led to a wave of riots in the region. As a consequence of these riots, at least 30 people died –mostly demonstrators – and 200 were injured. Wani, who was 22 years old, was considered one of the most influential insurgents among young Kashmiris due to his activity on social networks and was credited with strengthening his armed organisation in recent months – surpassing other organisations like Lashkar-e-Taiba– and improving the image of insurgency among the population. Thousands attended his funeral, and funeral tributes were paid to him in other places around the province. Following the riots that erupted after his killing, local authorities declared curfews in many places. The operation led by the Armed Forces in which Wani died, as well as other insurgents, came after someone revealed their hideout. The Armed Forces bombed the house where they were hiding. (BBC, 11/07/16) IRAQ: ISIS claims responsibility for the worst suicide attack in Baghdad since 2003, with over 320 people dead The worst attack in Baghdad since Saddam Hussein's fall in 2003, a car bombing by the ISIS armed group, claimed the lives of at least 324 people. At the end of July, authorities warned that the death toll could continue to climb because the forensic teams were still identifying the victims. The bomb went off on a busy commercial street in the predominantly Shiite Karrada district of central Baghdad and it took place as the armed group was losing ground in an offensive by Iraqi troops backed by an international coalition led by the United States. After the bloody attack, the Iraqi authorities decided to speed up the execution of those charged with acts of terrorism, which prompted the UN to issue a warning. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra'ad al-Hussein, said that there was a serious 2 Conflict observatory Nº 43 – July 2016 risk that fast-tracking the process could result in acts of vengeance rather than justice and it could end the lives of innocent people. In this sense, the diplomat underscored the weaknesses of the Iraqi justice system, which together with the serious climate of tension and conflict in the country could lead to the irreversible conviction of many people. According to press reports, in 2016 alone 45 people have been put to death and another 1,200 are awaiting execution. Meanwhile, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi vowed to take back Mosul, the country's second city and under ISIS’s control since June 2014. The announcement prompted thousands of people to flee the area before the government's offensive began. According to UNHCR, more than 55,000 people had fled from the village of al-Shirqat, south of Mosul. In late July ISIS also launched attacks on oil and gas facilities in Kirkuk. (Reuters, 31/07/16 y 01/08/16; AFP, 31/07/16) KENYA: Violence and attacks by al-Shabaab are on the rise in the border area and on the coast During the month, the Somali Islamist armed group al-Shabaab and its militants in Kenya have increased their attacks and armed violence in the Somali-Kenya border area and in the coastal zone of the country.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 6, Issue 1 Jan/Feb 2014
    Counter Terrorist Trends and Analysis Volume 6, Issue 1 Jan/Feb 2014 Annual Threat Assessment SOUTHEAST ASIA Myanmar, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore SOUTH ASIA Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA China and Central Asia MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Egypt, Libya and Somalia INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH S. RAJARATNAM SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES NANYANG TECHNOLOGICAL UNIVERSITY 2 ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT Terrorism and Political Violence in 2013 Southeast Asia peace talks were held in January 2014. Iraq, too, remains besieged by sectarian violence and constant attacks. In Yemen, Southeast Asia has seen some of its insurgencies and conflicts multiple insurgencies and a robust threat from Al Qaeda in the diminish while others have continued unabated. In Thailand, the Arabian Peninsula have hampered an already difficult political restive south continued to see violence in 2013 while Bangkok transition. In Egypt, Morsi’s ouster has seen protests continuing witnessed a political crisis with protests against the government to plague the country while the military attempts another turning violent. In Myanmar, reforms have moved forward but political transition. Libya, meanwhile, faces a persistent security communal violence continues to plague the country and has challenge in its southern border region and the success of its evolved from targeting Rohingyas towards Muslim minority transition after Gaddafi will depend on the militias which communities in general. Indonesia continues to face a potent deposed the former dictator giving up their arms. In Somalia, threat from radicalization and concern has emerged over the al-Shabaab has intensified its campaign against the role its “hard” counterterrorist approach is playing in fueling government in the wake of a hardline faction emerging further extremism.
    [Show full text]
  • Research Notes
    RESEARCH NOTES The Washington Institute for Near East Policy ■ No. 38 ■ Oc t ober 2016 How to Secure Mosul Lessons from 2008—2014 MICHAEL KNIGHTS N EARLY 2017, Iraqi security forces (ISF) are likely to liberate Mosul from Islamic State control. But given the dramatic comebacks staged by the Islamic State and its predecessors in the city in I2004, 2007, and 2014, one can justifiably ask what will stop IS or a similar movement from lying low, regenerating, and wiping away the costly gains of the current war. This paper aims to fill an important gap in the literature on Mosul, the capital of Ninawa province, by looking closely at the underexplored issue of security arrangements for the city after its liberation, in particular how security forces should be structured and controlled to prevent an IS recurrence. Though “big picture” politi- cal deals over Mosul’s future may ultimately be decisive, the first priority of the Iraqi-international coalition is to secure Mosul. As John Paul Vann, a U.S. military advisor in Vietnam, noted decades ago: “Security may be ten percent of the problem, or it may be ninety percent, but whichever it is, it’s the first ten percent or the first ninety percent. Without security, nothing else we do will last.”1 This study focuses on two distinct periods of Mosul’s Explanations for both the 2007–2011 successes and recent history. In 2007–2011, the U.S.-backed Iraqi the failures of 2011–2014 are easily identified. In the security forces achieved significant success, reducing earlier span, Baghdad committed to Mosul’s stabilization security incidents in the city from a high point of 666 and Iraq’s prime minister focused on the issue, authoriz- per month in the first quarter of 2008 to an average ing compromises such as partial amnesty and a reopen- of 32 incidents in the first quarter of 2011.
    [Show full text]
  • Policy Briefing
    Policy Briefing Asia Briefing N°83 Jakarta/Brussels, 23 October 2008 The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao Once the injunction was granted, the president and her I. OVERVIEW advisers announced the dissolution of the government negotiating team and stated they would not sign the On 14 October 2008 the Supreme Court of the Philip- MOA in any form. Instead they would consult directly pines declared a draft agreement between the Moro with affected communities and implied they would Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Philippines only resume negotiations if the MILF first disarmed. government unconstitutional, effectively ending any hope of peacefully resolving the 30-year conflict in In the past when talks broke down, as they did many Mindanao while President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo times, negotiations always picked up from where they remains in office. The Memorandum of Agreement on left off, in part because the subjects being discussed Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD or MOA), the culmination were not particularly controversial or critical details of eleven years’ negotiation, was originally scheduled were not spelled out. This time the collapse, followed to have been signed in Kuala Lumpur on 5 August. At by a scathing Supreme Court ruling calling the MOA the last minute, in response to petitions from local offi- the product of a capricious and despotic process, will cials who said they had not been consulted about the be much harder to reverse. contents, the court issued a temporary restraining order, preventing the signing. That injunction in turn led to While the army pursues military operations against renewed fighting that by mid-October had displaced three “renegade” MILF commanders – Ameril Umbra some 390,000.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq's Displacement Crisis
    CEASEFIRE centre for civilian rights Lahib Higel Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: Security and protection © Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights Group International March 2016 Cover photo: This report has been produced as part of the Ceasefire project, a multi-year pro- gramme supported by the European Union to implement a system of civilian-led An Iraqi boy watches as internally- displaced Iraq families return to their monitoring of human rights abuses in Iraq, focusing in particular on the rights of homes in the western Melhaniyeh vulnerable civilians including vulnerable women, internally-displaced persons (IDPs), neighbourhood of Baghdad in stateless persons, and ethnic or religious minorities, and to assess the feasibility of September 2008. Some 150 Shi’a and Sunni families returned after an extending civilian-led monitoring to other country situations. earlier wave of displacement some two years before when sectarian This report has been produced with the financial assistance of the European Union violence escalated and families fled and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development Canada. The con- to neighbourhoods where their sect was in the majority. tents of this report are the sole responsibility of the publishers and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union. © Ahmad Al-Rubaye /AFP / Getty Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights The Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights is a new initiative to develop ‘civilian-led monitoring’ of violations of international humanitarian law or human rights, to pursue legal and political accountability for those responsible for such violations, and to develop the practice of civilian rights.
    [Show full text]
  • International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Republic of Iraq
    International Protection Considerations with Regard to People Fleeing the Republic of Iraq HCR/PC/ May 2019 HCR/PC/IRQ/2019/05 _Rev.2. INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION CONSIDERATIONS WITH REGARD TO PEOPLE FLEEING THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ Table of Contents I. Executive Summary .......................................................................................... 6 1) Refugee Protection under the 1951 Convention Criteria and Main Categories of Claim .... 6 2) Broader UNHCR Mandate Criteria, Regional Instruments and Complementary Forms of Protection ............................................................................................................................. 7 3) Internal Flight or Relocation Alternative (IFA/IRA) .............................................................. 7 4) Exclusion Considerations .................................................................................................... 8 5) Position on Forced Returns ................................................................................................. 9 II. Main Developments in Iraq since 2017 ............................................................. 9 A. Political Developments ........................................................................................................... 9 1) May 2018 Parliamentary Elections ...................................................................................... 9 2) September 2018 Kurdistan Parliamentary Elections ......................................................... 10 3) October 2017 Independence
    [Show full text]
  • ISIS in Iraq
    i n s t i t u t e f o r i n t e g r at e d t r a n s i t i o n s The Limits of Punishment Transitional Justice and Violent Extremism iraq case study Mara Redlich Revkin May, 2018 After the Islamic State: Balancing Accountability and Reconciliation in Iraq About the Author Mara Redlich Revkin is a Ph.D. Candidate in Acknowledgements Political Science at Yale University and an Islamic The author thanks Elisabeth Wood, Oona Law & Civilization Research Fellow at Yale Law Hathaway, Ellen Lust, Jason Lyall, and Kristen School, from which she received her J.D. Her Kao for guidance on field research and survey research examines state-building, lawmaking, implementation; Mark Freeman, Siobhan O’Neil, and governance by armed groups with a current and Cale Salih for comments on an earlier focus on the case of the Islamic State. During draft; and Halan Ibrahim for excellent research the 2017-2018 academic year, she will be col- assistance in Iraq. lecting data for her dissertation in Turkey and Iraq supported by the U.S. Institute for Peace as Cover image a Jennings Randolph Peace Scholar. Mara is a iraq. Baghdad. 2016. The aftermath of an ISIS member of the New York State Bar Association bombing in the predominantly Shia neighborhood and is also working on research projects concern- of Karada in central Baghdad. © Paolo Pellegrin/ ing the legal status of civilians who have lived in Magnum Photos with support from the Pulitzer areas controlled and governed by terrorist groups.
    [Show full text]
  • March 2011 Trends April 2011 Watchlist Crisiswatch
    1 April 2011, No92 Board of Trustees Co-Chairs CrisisWatch: Christopher Patten summarises briefly developments during the previous month in some 70 situations of current or potential Thomas Pickering conflict, listed alphabetically by region, providing references and links to more detailed information sources (all references mentioned are hyperlinked in the electronic version of this bulletin); President and CEO assesses whether the overall situation in each case has, during the previous month, significantly deteriorated, Louise Arbour significantly improved, or on balance remained more or less unchanged; Executive Committee alerts readers to situations where, in the coming month, there is a particular risk of new or significantly esca- Morton Abramowitz lated conflict, or a particular conflict resolution opportunity (noting that in some instances there may in fact be Cheryl Carolus both); and Maria Livanos Cattaui summarises Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers that have been published in the last month. Yoichi Funabashi Frank Giustra CrisisWatch is compiled by Crisis Group’s Brussels Research Unit, drawing on multiple sources including the Ghassan Salamé resources of our some 130 staff members across five continents, who already report on some 60 of the situations George Soros listed here. Comments and suggestions can be sent to [email protected]. Pär Stenbäck Adnan Abu-Odeh To search past issues of CrisisWatch visit our databases and resources page at www.crisisgroup.org. Kenneth Adelman Kofi Annan Nahum Barnea
    [Show full text]
  • Routledge Handbook of U.S. Counterterrorism and Irregular
    ‘A unique, exceptional volume of compelling, thoughtful, and informative essays on the subjects of irregular warfare, counter-insurgency, and counter-terrorism – endeavors that will, unfortunately, continue to be unavoidable and necessary, even as the U.S. and our allies and partners shift our focus to Asia and the Pacific in an era of renewed great power rivalries. The co-editors – the late Michael Sheehan, a brilliant comrade in uniform and beyond, Liam Collins, one of America’s most talented and accomplished special operators and scholars on these subjects, and Erich Marquardt, the founding editor of the CTC Sentinel – have done a masterful job of assembling the works of the best and brightest on these subjects – subjects that will continue to demand our attention, resources, and commitment.’ General (ret.) David Petraeus, former Commander of the Surge in Afghanistan, U.S. Central Command, and Coalition Forces in Afghanistan and former Director of the CIA ‘Terrorism will continue to be a featured security challenge for the foreseeable future. We need to be careful about losing the intellectual and practical expertise hard-won over the last twenty years. This handbook, the brainchild of my late friend and longtime counter-terrorism expert Michael Sheehan, is an extraordinary resource for future policymakers and CT practitioners who will grapple with the evolving terrorism threat.’ General (ret.) Joseph Votel, former commander of US Special Operations Command and US Central Command ‘This volume will be essential reading for a new generation of practitioners and scholars. Providing vibrant first-hand accounts from experts in counterterrorism and irregular warfare, from 9/11 until the present, this book presents a blueprint of recent efforts and impending challenges.
    [Show full text]
  • The Philippines: Back to the Table, Warily, in Mindanao
    Update Briefing Asia Briefing N°119 Jakarta/Brussels, 24 March 2011 The Philippines: Back to the Table, Warily, in Mindanao its founding is also used as ammunition by critics to argue I. OVERVIEW against any plan that would result in an expansion of its powers or territorial reach. Peace talks between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) are back on track, The Aquino government has not made its negotiating with one round of talks in Kuala Lumpur in February stance public, but it seems to accept in principle the idea 2011 and another scheduled for late April. The obstacles of a sub-state as long as its territory is contiguous; the de- to achieving a final peace are huge, but the administration tails will be the hard part. It also understands the need for of President Benigno S. “Noynoy” Aquino III has at least consultations with and buy-in from potential opponents brought some fresh air to the process. A new government and is determined to avoid the pitfalls that led to the 2008 peace panel seems determined to find a way out of a ne- breakdown of negotiations. gotiator’s nightmare: multiple parties engaged in parallel and sometimes contradictory talks; powerful potential The talks would be difficult enough if this were all the spoilers; and ethnic divisions, feuding clans and divergent negotiators had to contend with, but there are other com- political interests among the Bangsamoro – the Muslims plications. Government unhappiness with the Malaysian of Mindanao and the Sulu archipelago – that make unity facilitator, Datuk Othman Abdul Razak, delayed resump- within the MILF’s own constituency elusive.
    [Show full text]
  • Iraq 2016 Human Rights Report
    IRAQ 2016 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT Note: This report was updated 3/29/17; see Appendix F: Errata for more information. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Iraq is a constitutional parliamentary republic. The outcome of the 2014 parliamentary elections generally met international standards of free and fair elections and led to the peaceful transition of power from former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki to Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi. Civilian authorities were not always able to maintain effective control of all security forces which include: the regular armed forces and domestic law enforcement bodies; the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a state-sponsored umbrella military organization composed of nearly 60, predominantly Shia components , which report directly to the prime minister; and the Peshmerga--the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) principal military force. Prime ministerial decrees on February 22 and July 27, as well as a November 26 parliamentary vote, boycotted by most Sunnis, established prime ministerial authority over the PMF; however at year’s end the command and control over the PMF remained inconsistent and ineffective. Violence continued to divide the country, largely fueled by Da’esh’s actions. Violence occurred throughout the year as government forces fought to liberate territory lost to Da’esh, principally in Arab Sunni and some other minority and mixed areas. Armed clashes between Da’esh and government forces caused civilian hardship. At year’s end the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) declined to 3.03 million from a peak of 3.4 million in March. The decrease in IDPs was primarily due to Iraqis returning to their homes after those areas were liberated from Da’esh.
    [Show full text]
  • Foreign Military Studies Office
    community.apan.org/wg/tradoc-g2/fmso/ Foreign Military Studies Office Volume 7 Issue #10 OEWATCH November 2017 FOREIGN NEWS & PERSPECTIVES OF THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ZAPADVIEWS FROM THE RUSSIA, “ZAPAD”NEIGHBORHOOD MILITARY EXERCISE 31 Iran Questions the Nuclear Deal as North Korea ASIA-PACIFIC 3 A Russian Critique of “Zapad” Defies the West 50 The Hulunhu: Another Step Forward for China’s Global 4 Polish Views of “Zapad” 32 Iran Sends University Instructors to the ‘Resistance Military Expansion 5 Kazakhstan’s Parallel Military Exercise Front’ 51 China Casts a Heavy Hand in Exploration of Oil and Gas 7 Russia Takes Note of Conflicting Kazakh Exercise 33 Iranian General: Iraqi Kurdish Referendum is Part of 52 PLA Attempts to Attract Higher-Quality Recruits 9 Telephone Threats US Plot 53 China: The J-20 Enters Official Military Service 10 China: Not So Concerned with “Zapad” 54 China and Russia Donating Arms to the Philippine 11 Turkish Perspectives on “Zapad” AFRICA Military 13 It Wasn’t “Zapad” and It Wasn’t Coincidental 34 North Korea’s African Ties 55 China Supports Duterte’s Drug War 14 The Aerospace Troops Get a Ground Forces 35 Somalia’s Plea for Heavy Weapons 56 ISIS Exploiting Crisis in Myanmar Commander 36 Somalia: Drought Benefits al-Shabaab 57 The Maute Group in Mindanao: Who They Are and How 16 The Future Looking Bright for the Russian Aerospace 37 The Paradox of Increasing Democracy and They Operate Forces Decreasing Stability 58 New Group Presents Twist in Marawi Violence 17 Russia Trying to Increase the Number of Electro- 38 Counterproductive Police Practices in Africa 59 Indonesian Foreign Fighters Return Home for Optical Satellites 39 Lassa Fever: West Africa’s Next Massive Epidemic? Assassination Missions 18 Russia’s Counter to the “High Frequency Global 40 An ISIS Faction in Africa..
    [Show full text]
  • The Pennsylvania State University Schreyer Honors College
    THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE CIVIL WAR, GUERRILLA WARFARE, AND TERRORISM: UNDERSTANDING NON- STATE POLITICAL VIOLENCE THROUGH THE PHILIPPINES’ MORO CONFLICT ROBERT Y. CHEN Spring 2015 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for baccalaureate degrees in International Politics and Economics with honors in International Politics Reviewed and approved* by the following: Douglas Lemke Associate Professor of Political Science Thesis Supervisor Gretchen Casper Associate Professor of Political Science Honors Adviser * Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College. i ABSTRACT Civil wars are traditionally studied as distinct from other forms of political dissidence. If a given political conflict does not reach a battle-related death threshold – a standard criterion for classifying a conflict as a civil war – it would fall out of most civil war datasets. I argue that this distinction is arbitrary, and that separating the study of civil war from the study of political conflict both limits and distorts our understanding of all forms of political conflict. In lieu of the separate study of different forms of conflict, I propose a framework from which to consider a particular form of conflict (self-determination) holistically, placing different non-state actor political strategies – terrorism, guerrilla warfare, and interstate war-like conventional warfare – on a spectrum, hypothesizing that actors choose their tactics based on their strength relative to their opponent, the government. In this way, we can understand when, where, and why a non- state actor seeking self-determination will employ terrorism as opposed to attempting to build a de facto state from which to challenge the government.
    [Show full text]