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Fair Chance and not a Blunt Refusal New Understandings on Nobel, France, and Ballistite in 1889

Yoel Bergman Cohn Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Ideas, Tel-Aviv University, Tel Aviv 6997801, Israel [email protected]; [email protected]

Abstract

Newly found documents demonstrate that Alfred Nobel’s 1887 patented smokeless Ballistite gunpowder was tested by the French Army in 1889, yielding unimpressive results. This and other technical reasons were the basis for final 1889 French rejection rather than political motives, as claimed by Nobel, repeated by an influential 1962 biography, and echoed on a current Nobel website. Nobel offered Ballistite to the French military in late 1887, but was refused by 1888 since the French smokeless poudre B of 1884 was already employed and Ballistite was considered erosive and unsafe to produce. However, letters from French officials (and the intervention of the French Minister of War) confirm that Ballistite was indeed tested by the French military in 1889. Ballistic results in the 8 mm Lebel rifle were unfavorable and this seems the final technical reason for the rejection, rather than French interests in promoting their supposedly inferior propellant. This case study highlights the question of balance between technical and social history of military technology. The latter, examining social factors often ignored in various past military technological histories, have shown to shape inventions. In this case, though, the author of the influential Nobel biography has missed the complex technical history of the issue, relying on the personal and political for explaining the decisions.

Keywords

Nobel – Ballistite – Poudre B – smokeless powder

Alfred Nobel filed his very first Ballistite patent in any country in Paris in late 1887. His attempts to market Ballistite in France following the approval of the

30 Bergman patent were reviewed by a few authors, resulting in the notion that France’s refusal to accept the new Ballistite in late 1887 to early 1888 was the final word on Nobel’s attempts in that country. Paul Tavernier, a renowned French powder engineer and historian provided a technical narrative. He wrote that Nobel was already late with Ballistite in 1888, since Poudre B, invented in 1884 in France, was already planned for adoption by the military. According to Taver- nier, Poudre B was also judged as less erosive to barrels than Ballistite since it contained only nitrocellulose, whereas Ballistite also contained the highly energetic nitroglycerine. Handling the nitroglycerine during the manufacturing process also posed risk to personnel and equipment involved (Tavernier 1950, 245). In Erik Bergengren’s 1962 biography on Nobel, the final French rejection of Ballistite seems also to have been made soon after he received his 1887 patent: “The French gunpowder monopoly … to which Nobel first offered his patent, rejected it because they felt fully covered by their own product” (Ber- gengren 1962, 105). Both Tavernier and Bergengren did not indicate whether Ballistite was actually tested in any caliber by the French, as part of the rejection, while Bergengren left the implication that it was rejected for economic/ national reasons hanging as the explanation. Nobel did however sign a contract with the Italian government in 1889 for the supply of Ballistite. Italy was seen as a rival to France and Nobel’s relation with the French public became strained. Bergengren writes:

Thus it came about that the first government to accept Ballistite was the Italian. At Nobel’s direction, a large factory department was erected in Avigliana for its production and a contract for delivery of 300 tons was signed in 1889. Soon afterwards the Italian government wanted to acquir e for itself the rights of manufacturing Ballistite, so Nobel li- censed his Italian patent to the government for the price of a half a million lire. As Nobel lived and worked in France, this action was not without its consequence of course. Influential people belonging to the French gunpowder monopoly’s administration had for a long time been following, with suspicion and ill-will, Nobel’s loud ammunition tests with mortars and rifles at a firing range rented from the state at Sévran-Livry. Ballistite was seen as a dangerous rival to the Vieille (Poudre B) powder, politics intervened and French passions were aroused. A violent press campaign was started against Nobel (Bergengren 1962, 106).

The contract for supply with Italy was concluded as early as 1 August 1889 and on 16 September the patent acquisition agreement with Italy was signed.

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Fair Chance and Not a Blunt Refusal 31

(Schuck & Sohlman 1929, 118). This implies that after mid-1889, re-examinations, either through field tests or other procedures were very unlikely. Likewise, re- examinations were unlikely to have been made between 1888 until mid-1889, since according to Bergengren, the ill-will towards Nobel has persisted for a long time. Bergengren’s one-sided account may have stemmed from his natural sym- pathy to Nobel, whom he quotes saying following the rejection that “for all governments a weak powder with strong influence is obviously better than a strong powder without this essential compliment” (Bergengren 1962, 106). This accusation seems to have been made following the final rejection of 1889, since Nobel complained similarly to the Russian Minister of War that in 1890 about the “inertia of the State (French) engineers with regards to my powder”. (Bergman 2014, 48). The current Nobel Prize organization website presents a similar pro-Ballistite view (Lemmel, 1998). The complete rejection in 1887 and the total rift between Nobel and the French were first questioned after hearing the work of Patrice Bret, who had indicated that the final French rejection took place in 1889 (Bret 2002, 7). An- other indication came from a 1893 report by the inventor of Poudre B, Paul Vieille. He wrote that the he tested two Ballistite samples from Nobel during the 1880s, but without indicating the dates of receipt and tests (Vieille 1893, 362, 363). Since the samples contained the stabilizer aniline, I had previously proposed that the samples were probably sent in 1889 (Bergman 2009, 45, 53). This would have been surprising, since it meant that Nobel was given an opportunity to be tested as late as 1889 and that the 1887 rejection was not final. But this was an estimate based on logical deduction, not textual evidence. More direct evidence came in late 2011 through the discovery of several letters concerning Nobel, France, and Ballistite from 1887–1890 which seem to rep- resent only a small part of the correspondence between the two sides during the period. These documents seem to have been unnoticed by Noble’s pr evious biographers Schuck and Sohlman (1929) and Bergengren (1962). One additional 1887 letter to Nobel found during this research does not concern Ballistit e directly, but underscores the high esteem in which Nobel was held by the French establishment at the time. Two other additional letters demonstrate Nobel’s ties with the Russian military on Ballistite, a fact also not found in past sources. (For Russian story, see Bergman 2014). One of these two letters was sent by Nobel to the Russian Min- ister of War on 31 August 1890 updating him on Ballistite’s progress in different countries. In it, he was trying to demonstr ate his success in marketing the new propellant, but actually reveald the difficulties he was finding with Ballistite in

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32 Bergman

Germany, France, and in Russia. With regard to France, Nobel wrote that the government had purchased some Ballistite for the use of the gun developer Gustave Canet, working at the time for a private company in southern France. My previous argument for that decision was that it was a French government initiative to help Canet, who was selling abroad, to compete with foreign sup- pliers that had already started using smokeless powders in their ammunition, since the French government was unwilling to sell Poudre B to the private sec- tor as late as 1889. Among the options that it offered in 1890 and 1892, was to manufacture Poudre B of a lesser quality or to manufacture Ballistite-like powder, without taking responsibility for the high erosion to the gun barrels that it attributed to Ballistite (Bergman 2014, 41–62). The letters between Nobel and the French military on Ballistite examined below, however, can explain the technical background as the main motive for Nobel’s rejection by the French government in 1889. The intricate story of France, Ballistite, Nobel and his agent Paul François Barbe in 1889 joins the story of Nobel, Italy, and Ballistite in the same year (Bergman 2011, 57–67) and shows that Nobel was at once an inventor, a shrewd entrepreneur, and an industrialist (Lindqvist 2001, 17, 28), and far from being a political victim. In his article on “Why the social history of military technology,” Bart Hacker (2008, 1–2) argued that studies focusing only on the development and usefulness of a military technology, may miss very important questions on its social context. Indeed, in many cases social and cultural factors do affect military technological changes and these have often been overlooked in the past. The repercussions of the invention on the social side may turn out to be important in the construction of a comprehensive historiography. Yet the case of Nobel, France and Ballistite exemplifies perhaps a reverse tendency in earlier days of historiography, that is, overlooking the detailed and important technical questions when writing about technical related histories. Previously thought to be purely a social story, the Nobel–Ballis- tite–French story now appears to have been at its core a technical story, though as always, the social and technical intertwine to produce for us the full picture.

The Letters

The earliest letter concerning Ballistite in France was sent on 9 January 1889 to Nobel, on behalf of the Minister of War, Charles-Louis de Freycinet. According to the letter, Nobel had been asked in December to send samples to

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Fair Chance and Not a Blunt Refusal 33 the Ministry and had replied on 8 January 1889, asking the specific acceptance requirements (that letter has not been found). The letter of 9 January answers his request and specified requirements for an 8 mm diameter rifle (the Lebel) and a nominal muzzle velocity of 625 m/s. Paul Vieille has achieved this muzzle velocity by 1886 with his Poudre B. At that time, old black powder could only achieve approximately 500 m/s. Why was the Lebel chosen for tests? In the 1880s priorities with the new smokeless powders were given to rifles, so the French, or Nobel, or both may have regarded the Lebel as an important show- case for Ballistite’s advantage. The next letter was also sent on behalf of the Minister of War two months later, on 20 March 1889. It instructed Nobel to send his samples to the army firing and acceptance unit “la Commission de Versailles”, in Versailles near Paris. In a later letter the Minister recalled that at the time of the letter he made it clear to Nobel that the Ministry was not committed in any way to choose Ballistite, whatever the results will be. This indicates that Ballistite had not yet been tested by the French military, either in the Lebel or similar small calibers, since the French had no experience with Ballistite’s actual performance. At the end of March 1889, a letter was sent from the president of la Commis- sion de Versailles to provide Nobel with the dates and place of the tests [Ap- pendix i]. The letter reads:

Monsieur, I have the honor to inform you that the commission of Versailles will begin tests next Monday, April 1st and will continue afterwards, for the next three following days with the rifle powder that you have sent. Unless postponed by unexpected circumstances the firings will begin each day towards 1 o’clock at the firing range of Salory. Please accept Sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

The next letter was sent four months later, on 3 July 1889, by the Minister of War, Charles de Freycinet to Nobel’s French partner Paul François Barbe [Ap- pendix ii]. It was written following a series of updates and questions from Barbe that had been sent to the Minister (this letter, too, has not yet been found). The Minister asserted that Nobel needed to improve the production process of the powder, given the samples that had been sent before. This suggests that the April 1889 tests were not successful since improvements had to be made. It also suggests that Nobel was in direct contact with the Minister (or the officers at the firing range at Salory), and Barbe was not up to date. Nobel

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34 Bergman was indeed intensively improving his process during from June to A ugust 1889 in his Italian factory (Bergman 2011, 61–64). He may have hoped that this would help persuade the French to allow for additional tests. This does raise the question of why Nobel was communicating directly with the Ministry and not through his local partner, Barbe. It could have been due to Nobel being in Italy at the time, or, due some mistrust of Barbe. The two never became close friends. Nobel was full of respect for Barbe’s profes- sionalism, but soon became aware of his unreliability where Nobel’s interests were concerned. He once described Barbe as “an excellent fellow and exceedingly industrious, but his conscience is as flexible as indiarubber” (Schuck and Sohlman 1929, 105). In 1885, Barbe was elected to the Chamber of Deputies, the legislative assembly of the French Parliament, and in 1887, he became Minister of Agriculture. The latter appointment lasted for a year, but even after that he continued to exert great political influence as a deputy . Ultimatley, Barbe was discovered engaging in illegal speculation activities and escaped his creditors by taking his own life in 1890. Barbe’s illegal ma- nipulations behind Nobel’s back were disclosed upon his death and caused Nobel gigantic losses. In addition, the Panama scandal (when it became clear in 1889 that Ferdinand de Lesseps and the French endeavor was never going to be able to complete the Panama Canal project) put Alfred Nobel in a very precarious situation because of Barbe’s involvement (Nobelprize.org 2014). Nevertheless, it is plausible to assume that at least part of Minister Freyci- net’s interest in Ballistite resulted from the lobbying efforts of Paul Francois Barbe. In the letter above, the Minister also noted that Nobel has offered to send samples for higher calibers. Nobel may have hoped that his more energetic Bal- listite would have a clearer advantage in cannon. The Minister was willing to test the samples in a 90 mm gun and provide Nobel the data, under the same provision that he indicated on March 20, that the Ministry was still in no way committed to choose Nobel’s powder regardless of the results. The Minister sent additional data on the 90 mm gun to Barbe in another letter two days later, on 5 July 1889, which included length of the powder chamber, 430 mm and the diameter of the chamber, 94 mm. This indicates that Ballistite had not been tested in small or large calibers before 1889. During mid-1889 we do know that Nobel was testing it in cannon, because on 2 May 1889 the Russian delegate in Paris, General Fedoroff, acknowledged the receipt of Ballistite test results from a Whitworth cannon, although it is not clear in or for which country the tests were done (Bergman 2014).

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Fair Chance and Not a Blunt Refusal 35

The Minister also wrote that in order to permit the completion of the earlier tests, it would be helpful if Nobel will provide five samples for rifle tests, with the following requirements:

No 1 – square grains of at least 2 mm on the side and of 0.5 mm thickness No 2 – square grains of at least 2 mm on the side and of 1.0 mm thickness No 3 – square grains of at least 2 mm on the side and of 1.5 mm thickness No 4 – cubic grains of 2 mm size No 5 – cubic grains of 2.5 mm size

The request can be understood as a French attempt at optimizing grain geom- etry following the previously tests of Nobel flakes and tiny cubes in the Lebel. This is a common workflow of powder developers who prepare grain samples of varying thicknesses and lengths, then test their performance in the gun. If the required muzzle velocities are not attained or the maximal gun pressure is above specifications, the dimensions of the powder are changed and further tests are performed. Beginning with the work of Paul Vieille, as exemplified in his tenth lab notebooks from the beginning of 1885 and as codified in Challéat (1935, 214–215), the modern method is to test samples in a closed “bomb” to predict the results in the gun, and then suitable charge weights and grain ge- ometry are chosen so as not to surpass the maximal allowable gun pressure. It is clear that the Minister, based on the Lebel results and possibly with the help of French ballisticians as Vieille (which would seriously undermine any sug- gestion of hostility between the two powder developers), was obviously trying to help Nobel improve Ballistite’s performance. Nobel was still enjoying the backing of the Minister of War at the end of 1889. This can be learned from a 30 December 1889 letter sent from the national gunpowder plant near Paris at Sevran-Livry [Appendix iii]. Nobel was told that the Minister of War ordered tests to proceed required in Nobel’s letter of 27 November 1889. He was asked whether the small caliber tests will be performed in a military rifle or a hunting rifle. This, despite of the logical notion that relations with the French establishment had soured after the Italian contract of after mid-1889, Nobel was still finding support from some in the French establishment. Indeed, the good relations between Nobel and the French military establishment apparently existed years before. This can be inferred from another letters not linked directly with Ballistite. The head of the powder and explosives department in the French Ministry of War, Gustave Maurouard, informed Nobel from Paris on 7 March 1887 that he has persuaded the Minister of War

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36 Bergman to hold a meeting in the Minister’s office to discuss Nobel’s proposed use of compressed gas in hollow projectiles (a question of external ballistics). It is known that Nobel’s inventiveness in ballistics went beyond powders, which are part of gun internal ballistics. Such inventiveness was a probable outcome of his intensive involvement with Ballistite (Shuck and Sholman 1929, 136). Maurouard named the others in attendance, which included high ranking officials from the French Artillery and the French powder administration, such as as Emile Sarrau, the head of the Paris laboratory where Poudre B had been de- veloped only a short time before. Thus, in 1887 Nobel was taken seriously, even by his most potential rival, the head of the powder administration. The letter also lends more support to the claim I made in an earlier article (Bergman 2009, 51–54), that the powder administration did not regard him as a rival in powders since it has already concluded in 1885 that Ballistite was too problem- atic. If Maurouard was competing with Nobel, he should have prevented any mentioning of Nobel to the Minister of War.

Conclusions

The recently discovered letters demonstrate that Nobel’s Ballistite was most probably tested by the French military in 1889, despite of the initial rejection of late 1887, which itself was not based on actual tests. Thus, Nobel was not totally rejected in 1887 and did not stand alone against the French establishment as current historiography seems to assume. He enjoyed the support of the Minister of War, at least until the end of 1889, despite of the histori- cal notion of a soured relation with France after his mid-1889 contract with Italy. Erik Bergengren in 1962 seems to have over-sympathized with Nobel, who protested his rejection and blamed French political considerations. As a consequence, he did not examine in details the technical questions and the French side. Their political and commercial explanation persisted for a long time, but through the reading of technical documents it became apparent that the technical explanation is more dominant, and especially after finding the letters in 2011. The case could encourage researchers in social history of military technology, to explore in details the technical side no less than its social interrelations or outcomes. Understanding technical complexity, preferably with “hands on experience” can assess the importance of the issue at hand, since in technology, a seemingly minute detail can make all the difference.

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Fair Chance and Not a Blunt Refusal 37

Appendices

Copies of all letters were received from the Swedish National Archive in 2011. Editorial remarks have been added in [square brackets] and illegible original text is rendered as “????”.

Appendix i: Letter to Nobel from Versailles, 30 March 1889

Commission d’Expériences de Tir de Versailles No. 139. Objet: Au sujet de l’essai des poudres á fusil. Versailles, le 30 Mars 1889 [48]

Le General Macé commandant l’Artillerie du 3e Corps d’Armée, président de la Commission d’expériences de a Tir de Versailles á Monsieur Nobel 53 Avenue Malakoff.

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38 Bergman

Monsieur.

J’ai l’honneur de vous faire connaitre que la Commission d’expériences de Ver- sailles commencera Lundi prochain 1erAvril et continuera les trois jours suiv- ants, l’essai des poudres á fusil que vous avez présentées. – A moins d’incident imprévue, les tirs commenceront chaque jour ver 1 heure au polygone de Salory.

Veuillez agréer Monsieur, l’assurance de ma haute considération.

[Signed] Mace ???

Appendix ii: Translation of Letter from the Minister of War (de Freycinet) to Paul Barbe, 3 July 1889

Ministry of War, 3rd department Paris, 3 July 1889

The Minister of War to Monsieur Barbe, Deputy (member of Chambers of Deputies)

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Fair Chance and Not a Blunt Refusal 39

Monsieur Deputy Following the information that you have given me, M. Nobel would improve his powder manufacturing procedure from which he has delivered some samples recently, to the firing test commission of Versailles. This chemist would also be able to produce suitable powder for tests in cannons. I have the honor to bring to your attention that I am ready to test new powder samples for rifle, and the samples for cannon which Nobel would like to put at my disposal in the conditions that I have indicated to him last March 20, that is to say, under the conditions that the tests do not oblige in any way the administration commitment to Ballistite. In order to permit the completion of tests performed before, it would be helpful that the samples for the rifle will be of 5 (types/ dimensions): No 1 – square grains of 2 mm at least on the side and of 0.5 mm thickness No 2 – square grains of 2 mm at least on the side and of 1.0 mm thickness No 3 – square grains of 2 mm at least on the side and of 1.5 mm thickness No 4 – cubic grains of 2 mm No 5 – cubic grains of 2.5 mm Each sample should be at least 2 Kg; for powders above, No’s 1, 2, 3 the gravi- metric density should be fixed as such that the maximal charge should fill as much as possible the cartridge. Regarding the powders intended for cannon tests, the requirements of use of these powders would be the followings: Chamber ????? [volume?] ………… 2.800 liters Barrel length ………… 23 calibers Weight of projectile ………… 8 Kg Initial velocity ………… 550 m[/sec] Pressure on the “inferior crusher” ………… 2,400 Kg[/cm2] [a mechanical pressure gauge]

Receive [my high esteem], etc,.

Signed: De Freycinet

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40 Bergman

Appendix iii: Translation of letter from Sevran to Nobel, 3 December 1889

Ministry of War, (Service des) Poudres et Salpêtres National (gun) powder plant of Sevran-Livry at Saine et Oise Telegraph Bureau of the plant Sevran-Livry, 3 December 1889

Monsieur Nobel, 53, Avenue Malakoff Paris

Monsieur, The Minister of War having ordered the Fabrication commission to proceed with the tests required by your letter of last November 27, the execution of these tests has been entrusted in the hands of the powder plant of Sevran. As a consequence, I have the honor to ask you to send me a powder sample that you want to test and I would also like to know the exact composition, the type of weapon needed for testing, military rifle or rifle for hunting.

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Fair Chance and Not a Blunt Refusal 41

Please receive, sir, the assurance of my great distinguished consideration.

The Director [signed] Mssr. Nobel, 53 Rue Malakoff, Paris

Works Cited

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