Introduction Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs Comments Repressing Egypt’s Civil Society WP State Violence, Restriction of the Public Sphere, and Extrajudicial Persecution Jannis Grimm S Since the military coup of July 2013, one of the characteristics of the Egyptian regime has been the lack of clarity on the boundaries of political activism and on what activities it would, or would not, tolerate. Red lines have been shifting frequently, as a plethora of presidential decrees has restricted the public sphere ever more. Furthermore, state institutions and investigating bodies have increasingly abused their powers against civil society representatives. Torture, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances have become recurrent phenomena. Embattled by State Security, a politicized judiciary and competing ministries, human rights activists are less and less able to fulfil their role as watchdogs. From being merely the witnesses of assaults and human rights viola- tions by the security forces, they have moved on to being their primary targets. Against this backdrop, Germany and its European partners should pressure the Egyptian authorities for compliance with basic civil rights and the rule of law, while aligning their support more closely with the needs of Egyptian NGOs. On 4 May 2015, the Cairo Institute for improve the situation. In a statement, it Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) published had pledged to rethink its controversial a joint declaration of the leading non- protest law as well as its legislation on NGOs. governmental human rights organizations In this context, it had also emphasized the (HROs) in Egypt. It expressed their massive role of civil society as an essential partner criticism of the authorities’ “increasingly in strengthening human rights. aggressive actions”, which the HROs saw as However, these declarations were merely an attempt to “slowly strangle the work” of lip service: the military and police routinely Egyptian rights groups. At the same time, continue to use arbitrary or indiscriminate the signatories reminded the government violence against members of the opposition. of its commitment vis-à-vis the UN Human Torture is par for the course, as the statis- Rights Council: in March 2015, during the tics of the El Nadeem Center for the Reha- periodical review of the condition of human bilitation of Victims of Torture prove. In rights in Egypt, the leadership in Cairo had addition, there is an increasing number of accepted most of the recommendations out- reports of the security forces systematically lined by the international community to using sexual violence against prisoners and Jannis Grimm is Research Assistant in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” SWP Comments 41 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of August 2015 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Ph.D. grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung. 1 demonstrators in general, and homosexuals In contrast to the Mubarak regime, which and transsexuals in particular. Even the sought to stem dissent using mostly illegal state-run National Council for Human Rights intimidation tactics, the al-Sisi adminis- (NCHR), which is mostly staffed by those tration is pursuing a strategy of legalizing loyal to the regime and therefore tends to repression. The over 175 presidential de- be conservative in the number of victims it crees issued since July 2013 mark out a reports, more and more frequently criti- restrictive framework that makes authori- cizes serious human rights abuses. These tarian rule possible without the need to are committed not only against members impose emergency rule. of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been The Egyptian authorities have gradually banned since autumn 2013. According to limited civil society’s freedom of action NCHR reports, there were also 550 people and extended their repressive measures to without any personal ties to the Islamists include different segments of society. Fol- among the more than 1,900 civilians killed lowing the military coup in July 2013, a between the summer of 2013 and the end first phase saw the persecution primarily of 2014. The number of unreported cases is of the supporters of the deposed President presumably even higher. Mohamed Morsi. When the Muslim Brother- hood was designated a terrorist organiza- tion in late 2013, this explicitly placed it Restricting the Public Sphere within the jurisdiction of State Security, In the absence of a parliament (dissolved allowing its agents to raid and seize Islamist in the summer of 2012), the room for charities and civic associations under the manoeuvre of civil society actors has been pretext that they maintained ties to the systematically restricted through a series group or its members. of presidential decrees. The work of local The January 2014 Constitution then and foreign NGOs, but also of parties, trade contained an article that declared the fight unions and youth groups, has been made against “all types and manifestations of ter- more difficult, particularly through the rorism” to be a national goal, and endowed vaguely worded new law on assembly; the the security services with far-reaching pow- tightened rules on foreign funding; the ers. Since then, the regime has repeatedly introduction of an obligation to register; modified its definition of terrorism by de- and such groups being placed under the cree, expanding it each time to include a control of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. new set of criminal offenses. As a result, not Ambiguous wording in the legal texts is in only the Muslim Brotherhood but all actors no way an expression of legislative incom- critical of the regime or contradicting its petence. Given that in other policy realms narratives on contentious events in Egypt provisions were formulated with noticeably may now be persecuted by State Security more precision – for instance, in the new on the pretext that they threaten the public investment law – it stands to reason that order or national unity, and be prosecuted the lack of terminological clarity is in fact a by special courts for terrorism-related felo- tactic for unsettling potential critics of the nies and misdemeanors. The latest legis- regime and giving the relevant authorities lation from mid-August 2015 expands the a maximum of discretion. In July 2014, in a list of offenses to be tried as terrorist crimes memorandum addressed to Prime Minister to include even private expressions of sup- Ibrahim Mahlab, a coalition of the most port for groups blacklisted by the judiciary important national HROs already referred as terrorist entities. Rights groups have to a “declaration of war” on civil society. In slammed the new law as an attempt to this, the national leadership under Abdel establish “thought crime” as a punishable Fattah al-Sisi has been relying above all on offense and pointed to its “Orwellian” the judiciary to act as implementing body. character. SWP Comments 41 August 2015 2 A new protest law had already effectively political agenda or formal affiliation with barred all public shows of solidarity with a political camp. This particularly concerns such groups. Responding to the daily mass human rights organizations, which, in the protests that had been organized through- absence of independent media or a working out the country by circles sympathetic to separation of institutional powers, have the Muslim Brothers under the umbrella of taken on the important function of moni- the so-called Anti-Coup Alliance, this piece toring the executive. Those witnessing and of legislation from November 2013 limits documenting the repression and human the right to strike and the freedom of assem- rights violations committed by the security bly on pain of severe penalties. It subjects apparatus are now increasingly becoming all collective action to prior police authori- its victims. zation, specifying that the organizers of any In June 2014, social minister Ghada Waly demonstration must present themselves at announced a new draft law to regulate the responsible police station with their the work of NGOs, which was intended to itinerary, the number of participants and replace the Mubarak-era association law the names of those in charge, seven days in 84/2002. NGOs were to be prohibited from advance. Violating this procedure or the participating in political activities as well vague requirement not to impair the coun- as from carrying out unauthorized field try’s “productivity” through protests is research, data collection, or publishing. prosecuted as a crime. A supervisory authority with the power This protest law has led to a de facto ban of veto was to control the registration, on all demonstrations since the authorities funding and personnel decisions of NGOs issue hardly any authorizations. The law working in Egypt. A particular source of is increasingly being used retroactively as concern was the indication that represen- well. It is now the most common pretext tatives of State Security and the Ministry for prosecuting Egypt’s more than 40,000 of Interior would also be sitting on the political prisoners, including prominent committee. activists of the Tahrir Revolution such as Because of massive public criticism, the blogger Ahmed Douma or the human the law has so far been held back. However, rights lawyer Yara Sallam. a predecessor law has since been applied The protest law was complemented by a more consistently. NGOs had to formally presidential decree of 27 October 2014 that register by 10 November 2014, thereby categorized nearly all public institutions as placing their work content and structure military installations – with the result that under the auspices of the Ministry of Social all crimes committed there can be pros- Solidarity. At first glance a mere formality, ecuted before military courts (including this procedure drastically curtailed the retroactively).