Introduction

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for International and Security Affairs

Comments

Repressing Egypt’s Civil Society WP State Violence, Restriction of the Public Sphere, and Extrajudicial Persecution

Jannis Grimm S

Since the military coup of July 2013, one of the characteristics of the Egyptian regime has been the lack of clarity on the boundaries of political activism and on what activities it would, or would not, tolerate. Red lines have been shifting frequently, as a plethora of presidential decrees has restricted the public sphere ever more. Furthermore, state institutions and investigating bodies have increasingly abused their powers against civil society representatives. Torture, arbitrary detention and enforced disappearances have become recurrent phenomena. Embattled by State Security, a politicized judiciary and competing ministries, human rights activists are less and less able to fulfil their role as watchdogs. From being merely the witnesses of assaults and human rights viola- tions by the security forces, they have moved on to being their primary targets. Against this backdrop, Germany and its European partners should pressure the Egyptian authorities for compliance with basic civil rights and the rule of law, while aligning their support more closely with the needs of Egyptian NGOs.

On 4 May 2015, the Cairo Institute for improve the situation. In a statement, it Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) published had pledged to rethink its controversial a joint declaration of the leading non- protest law as well as its legislation on NGOs. governmental human rights organizations In this context, it had also emphasized the (HROs) in Egypt. It expressed their massive role of civil society as an essential partner criticism of the authorities’ “increasingly in strengthening human rights. aggressive actions”, which the HROs saw as However, these declarations were merely an attempt to “slowly strangle the work” of lip service: the military and police routinely Egyptian rights groups. At the same time, continue to use arbitrary or indiscriminate the signatories reminded the government violence against members of the opposition. of its commitment vis-à-vis the UN Human Torture is par for the course, as the statis- Rights Council: in March 2015, during the tics of the El Nadeem Center for the Reha- periodical review of the condition of human bilitation of Victims of Torture prove. In rights in Egypt, the leadership in Cairo had addition, there is an increasing number of accepted most of the recommendations out- reports of the security forces systematically lined by the international community to using sexual violence against prisoners and

Jannis Grimm is Research Assistant in the project “Elite change and new social mobilization in the Arab world” SWP Comments 41 realized by the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP). The project is funded by the German Foreign Office in the framework of August 2015 the transformation partnerships with the Arab World and the Robert Bosch Stiftung. It cooperates with the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Ph.D. grant programs of the Heinrich Böll Stiftung and the Hanns-Seidel-Stiftung.

1 demonstrators in general, and homosexuals In contrast to the Mubarak regime, which and transsexuals in particular. Even the sought to stem dissent using mostly illegal state-run National Council for Human Rights intimidation tactics, the al-Sisi adminis- (NCHR), which is mostly staffed by those tration is pursuing a strategy of legalizing loyal to the regime and therefore tends to repression. The over 175 presidential de- be conservative in the number of victims it crees issued since July 2013 mark out a reports, more and more frequently criti- restrictive framework that makes authori- cizes serious human rights abuses. These tarian rule possible without the need to are committed not only against members impose emergency rule. of the Muslim Brotherhood, which has been The Egyptian authorities have gradually banned since autumn 2013. According to limited civil society’s freedom of action NCHR reports, there were also 550 people and extended their repressive measures to without any personal ties to the Islamists include different segments of society. Fol- among the more than 1,900 civilians killed lowing the military coup in July 2013, a between the summer of 2013 and the end first phase saw the persecution primarily of 2014. The number of unreported cases is of the supporters of the deposed President presumably even higher. Mohamed Morsi. When the Muslim Brother- hood was designated a terrorist organiza- tion in late 2013, this explicitly placed it Restricting the Public Sphere within the jurisdiction of State Security, In the absence of a parliament (dissolved allowing its agents to raid and seize Islamist in the summer of 2012), the room for charities and civic associations under the manoeuvre of civil society actors has been pretext that they maintained ties to the systematically restricted through a series group or its members. of presidential decrees. The work of local The January 2014 Constitution then and foreign NGOs, but also of parties, trade contained an article that declared the fight unions and youth groups, has been made against “all types and manifestations of ter- more difficult, particularly through the rorism” to be a national goal, and endowed vaguely worded new law on assembly; the the security services with far-reaching pow- tightened rules on foreign funding; the ers. Since then, the regime has repeatedly introduction of an obligation to register; modified its definition of terrorism by de- and such groups being placed under the cree, expanding it each time to include a control of the Ministry of Social Solidarity. new set of criminal offenses. As a result, not Ambiguous wording in the legal texts is in only the Muslim Brotherhood but all actors no way an expression of legislative incom- critical of the regime or contradicting its petence. Given that in other policy realms narratives on contentious events in Egypt provisions were formulated with noticeably may now be persecuted by State Security more precision – for instance, in the new on the pretext that they threaten the public investment law – it stands to reason that order or national unity, and be prosecuted the lack of terminological clarity is in fact a by special courts for terrorism-related felo- tactic for unsettling potential critics of the nies and misdemeanors. The latest legis- regime and giving the relevant authorities lation from mid-August 2015 expands the a maximum of discretion. In July 2014, in a list of offenses to be tried as terrorist crimes memorandum addressed to Prime Minister to include even private expressions of sup- Ibrahim Mahlab, a coalition of the most port for groups blacklisted by the judiciary important national HROs already referred as terrorist entities. Rights groups have to a “declaration of war” on civil society. In slammed the new law as an attempt to this, the national leadership under Abdel establish “thought crime” as a punishable Fattah al-Sisi has been relying above all on offense and pointed to its “Orwellian” the judiciary to act as implementing body. character.

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2 A new protest law had already effectively political agenda or formal affiliation with barred all public shows of solidarity with a political camp. This particularly concerns such groups. Responding to the daily mass human rights organizations, which, in the protests that had been organized through- absence of independent media or a working out the country by circles sympathetic to separation of institutional powers, have the Muslim Brothers under the umbrella of taken on the important function of moni- the so-called Anti-Coup Alliance, this piece toring the executive. Those witnessing and of legislation from November 2013 limits documenting the repression and human the right to strike and the freedom of assem- rights violations committed by the security bly on pain of severe penalties. It subjects apparatus are now increasingly becoming all collective action to prior police authori- its victims. zation, specifying that the organizers of any In June 2014, social minister Ghada Waly demonstration must present themselves at announced a new draft law to regulate the responsible police station with their the work of NGOs, which was intended to itinerary, the number of participants and replace the Mubarak-era association law the names of those in charge, seven days in 84/2002. NGOs were to be prohibited from advance. Violating this procedure or the participating in political activities as well vague requirement not to impair the coun- as from carrying out unauthorized field try’s “productivity” through protests is research, data collection, or publishing. prosecuted as a crime. A supervisory authority with the power This protest law has led to a de facto ban of veto was to control the registration, on all demonstrations since the authorities funding and personnel decisions of NGOs issue hardly any authorizations. The law working in Egypt. A particular source of is increasingly being used retroactively as concern was the indication that represen- well. It is now the most common pretext tatives of State Security and the Ministry for prosecuting Egypt’s more than 40,000 of Interior would also be sitting on the political prisoners, including prominent committee. activists of the Tahrir Revolution such as Because of massive public criticism, the blogger Ahmed Douma or the human the law has so far been held back. However, rights lawyer Yara Sallam. a predecessor law has since been applied The protest law was complemented by a more consistently. NGOs had to formally presidential decree of 27 October 2014 that register by 10 November 2014, thereby categorized nearly all public institutions as placing their work content and structure military installations – with the result that under the auspices of the Ministry of Social all crimes committed there can be pros- Solidarity. At first glance a mere formality, ecuted before military courts (including this procedure drastically curtailed the retroactively). This includes not only elec- principle of freedom of association guaran- tricity plants, pipelines, railway stations teed in the Egyptian constitution – in par- and bridges but also the Egyptian universi- ticular because of the large amount of dis- ties that have become the hotbeds of resist- cretion that the vaguely worded paragraphs ance against the autocratic rollback after of the law afford the authorities. For in- the severe crackdown on the Anti-Coup stance, article 11 states that an association street protests. may be refused approval if its activities risk endangering national security or the public order and morals, or if it represents the Restrictions on the Freedom of Assembly vested interests of individual parties or Since late 2014, the security apparatus trade unions. In addition, article 17 pro- has also increasingly been targeting non- hibits associations from accepting monies partisan civil society organizations working from abroad without the Ministry’s express for the common good without any explicit agreement. This provision is made even

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3 stricter by a revision of the criminal law, of their staff abroad. Some groups simply which was determined in September 2014 ignored the deadline. The Arabic Network by presidential decree. Paragraph 78 now for Human Rights Information (ANHRI), strictly defines as an offence the receiving for example, pointed out that the NGO law of money or benefits in kind from abroad, was undemocratic and that the ANHRI was wherever they are used to endanger the a law firm. This tactic was adopted by other public order or national interest. Violations NGOs as well, which registered as media of these provisions – once again deliberately production companies, limited liability kept vague – are punishable by heavy fines companies or law firms – sectors where and prison sentences. Government em- regulation is noticeably less restrictive – ployees even risk the death penalty. so as to circumvent the mandatory registra- The paragraph is formulated so as to be tion. However, it remains unclear whether open to interpretation, which suggests that this absolves organizations from addition- it might potentially also apply to foreign ally having to register under the NGO law. journalists or employees of international Ultimately, this is at the discretion of the organizations. These include the German Ministry for Social Solidarity. The registra- political foundations, which have been tion requirement thus gives the Ministry unable to work as intended ever since the the possibility of leaving civil society groups verdict against the Konrad Adenauer Foun- in the dark regarding their legal status – all dation for illegal money transfers and lack the more so, considering that the Ministry’s of a licence in Egypt. Some international 60-day grace period for deciding on sub- organizations, such as Human Rights Watch mitted registration requests can be arbi- or the Carter Foundation, have in the mean- trarily extended for administrative reasons. time closed their Cairo offices. Besides, non-registration is becoming an increasingly unattractive option: in June 2015, the Ministry began to make good its HROs: Unprotected and Powerless threats of legal action against unregistered Egyptian human rights organizations have NGOs. On the other hand, even an unequivo- been pursuing very different strategies of cally clarified status does not provide suf- adaptation so as to retain their freedom ficient protection from prosecution. For of action within the restrictive legal frame- example, the Egyptian Democratic Acad- work. In the light of the legal grey areas emy (EDA), despite having registered on and the certainty that even a potential clari- time, was subjected to a criminal investiga- fication of their institutional status would tion into its funding sources – alongside not protect individual members from per- the unregistered human rights organiza- secution, they did not, in fact, register en tions CIHRS, the Hisham Mubarak Law masse before the deadline. According to Center and the Egyptian Center for Eco- the Ministry, about 45,000 HROs were nomic and Social Rights. registered nationwide by the deadline, but among Egypt’s large human rights groups so far only the Egyptian Initiative for Per- Extrajudicial Persecution sonal Rights (EIPR) has done so, in early The limits of the protection afforded by a 2015, avowedly to set a precedent for Egyp- clarified legal status were made obvious in tian HROs – though it also announced that early June 2015, with the publication of the it intended to continue working towards first substantiated numbers on the relative- democratic reform of the law. ly new phenomenon of extrajudicial forced By contrast, other groups, such as disappearances. According to the group Al-Mawred al-Thaqafy, discontinued their Freedom of the Brave, which campaigns work just before the deadline expired; yet for prisoners’ rights, over 160 people were others, including the CIHRS, moved a part kidnapped between early April and early

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4 June. The Egyptian Coordination for Rights The location of the kidnappings and and Freedoms (ECRF), a coalition of lawyers witness statements of the way they unfold that investigate the whereabouts of disap- show that the perpetrators are highly pro- peared Muslim Brothers, identified almost fessional and well-informed. In this context, 1,000 people that have gone missing since it is surprising, at least at first sight, that the start of 2015. What is more, both or- the kidnappings are not more targeted. The ganizations point to the rapid increase in victims do include some members of the kidnappings, which are carried out mainly banned April 6 Youth Movement and leaders by security forces in plainclothes on the of the protest coalition Students against the street, but also in private flats or the cam- Coup, which is sympathetic to the Muslim puses of state universities. Until recently, Brotherhood. However, other victims can- the kidnapping of unwelcome citizens – not be assigned to any banned group, and such as the photo journalist Omar Abdel have in some cases not been politically Maqsoud, who in autumn 2014 had re- active for some time. The case of Esraa ported on the abuse of his wife in police cus- el-Taweel is emblematic in this regard. An tody – remained exceptions that attracted amateur photographer, she retired from a great deal of attention. This makes the activism after receiving a gunshot wound current wave of kidnappings even more as she photographed the protests on the alarming – it marks a new dimension in 2014 anniversary of the January 25th revo- the abuse of state power. lution. She disappeared in early June 2015 While dozens are still missing, some of along with two friends. Only after intensive those kidnapped have now been released. searches carried out by relatives and a Others were eventually found in the Egyp- broad solidarity campaign in social media tian jails of Tora, al-Qanater and al-Aqrab. was she identified in al-Qanater women’s In several cases, activists whose location prison and subsequently brought before a had been discovered were brought before prosecutor. She remains in custody to date a magistrate on a litany of trumped-up with her provisional detention being re- charges so as to legitimize their detention newed on a monthly basis pending further retroactively. The charges brought ranged investigation into the charges of belonging from membership in a banned organization to a terrorist organisation. (such as the April 6 Youth Movement) to The fact that prominent human rights violating strike bans, to spreading false news activists and journalists have so far been and murdering policemen. In other cases, spared kidnappings is not a result of the pre-trial detention was renewed without security apparatus’ incompetence. For un- any formal charges by the prosecution. like the ministerial bureaucracies in Cairo, The Ministry of Interior, which formally State Security is highly effective. Mubarak’s administers Egyptian prisons, either does infamous State Security Investigations not comment on kidnappings or else denies Service (SSIS, Amn ad-Dawla) may have been that they have taken place, making reference formally dissolved in March 2011, but it to their illegality. However, even individual continues to operate with largely the same representatives of the NCHR attribute pri- personnel under the umbrella of the newly- mary responsibility for the kidnappings to founded Egyptian Homeland Security (EHS, State Security, which is directly assigned to Al-Amn Al-Watani). The absence of in-depth the Ministry of Interior. This interpretation reforms of the security sector since 2011 has is backed up among other things by the fact enabled the agency to take up the secret- that the forced disappearances are not lim- service structures and informant networks ited to a few districts, which come under that had grown up over the decades of the the jurisdiction of certain governors or Mubarak era. This has been demonstrated local police stations, but are a nationwide not least in the highly efficient campaign phenomenon. of arrests against the Muslim Brotherhood

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5 and its members after the violent dis- These institutions in turn – in particu- persal of their protest camps in Rabaa lar State Security – can be identified as al-Adawiya and Nahda in mid-August 2013, the driving forces behind the campaign of which caused hundreds of deaths. By May repression, alongside the judiciary. A range 2015, the security forces had managed to of leaked files and inquiries have illustrated arrest thousands of sympathizers and how the internal security agencies very members as well as the most important carefully prepared a series of legal actions leaders of the Brotherhood and its allies against NGOs on suspicion of “espionage in the protest coalition against the Sisi under the cover of civil society work” and regime. against opposition media for “false report- ing” and “deliberate disinformation”. Activ- ists furthermore confirm the existence of Divides in the Regime Coalition blacklists of organizations and individuals The selective restraint shown by State Secu- who have been identified as potential tar- rity towards leading representatives of the gets for prosecution and ascribe the fact non-Islamist parts of civil society in fact that these have not yet been processed point to differences within the regime. The primarily to circles in the president’s office country’s most influential actor, the army, around security advisor Faiza Abu-l-Naga, rarely takes a position and is only indirectly which fear that the West may impose involved in the repression – through the sanctions. military justice system, to which the public This might also explain why the kidnap- prosecutor’s office has transferred over 2,200 pers have so far largely concentrated on the civilians in the few months since October grassroots and middle ranks of civil society 2014. However, beyond the institutional organizations. Persecuting these actors at- boundaries, at least two camps can be iden- tracts noticeably less attention than kid- tified in the repressive triad of army, do- napping human rights defenders who are mestic security and judiciary, two camps part of international networks. This keeps that pursue divergent strategies on dealing the foreign-policy costs of the kidnappings with civil society. low. In addition, it is almost impossible to The Ministry for Social Solidarity, For- prove state responsibility. The degree of dif- eign Ministry and Ministry of Finance repre- ficulty involved in independently confirm- sent the approach of restricting the oppo- ing the accusations made by Egyptian HROs sition under cover of the law. They are thus is shown among other factors by the fact a counter-weight to those who advocate a that the UN Working Group on Enforced policy of intransigent extrajudicial repres- or Involuntary Disappearances has been sion. Like the President’s office, the minis- refused entry into Egypt since 2011. At the tries insist on maintaining a pluralistic same time, every kidnapping creates a fait façade, apparently for strategic reasons – accompli that is hardly revisable, strengthen- and especially with an eye on normalizing ing those responsible inside the regime coa- diplomatic relations with Egypt’s tradition- lition: When kidnappings become known, al western partners, for which they strive. the various regime factions present a united In addition, they benefit from NGO exper- front in public and, if necessary, begin retro- tise in fighting corruption within the ad- active legal proceedings so as to legalize the ministrative apparatus and in formulating arrests. draft laws, for instance in the adoption of Last but not least, targeted kidnappings a criminal-law article against sexual harass- have a preventative effect on the opposition ment. Last but not least, NGO reports on in general. The primary addressee of the transgressions by the security apparatus are kidnapping is not necessarily the victim useful tools in potential conflicts with the himself or herself. Rather, the abduction domestic security services. of former activists such as el-Taweel sends a

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6 signal that even withdrawing from human tives of the Egyptian regime routinely play rights work does not provide protection down any criticism, pointing out that Egypt from persecution, any more than the legal enjoys a separation of powers – an argument process does. The deaths of kidnapping vic- that is frequently and uncritically accepted tims, for example the activist Sabry al-Ghoul by international partners despite their from the Sinai Peninsula or the student knowledge of Egypt’s politicized judiciary. Islam Ateeto, are a particularly powerful deterrent. What Role for Germany and the EU? The repressive approach of the authorities Eyes Wide Shut on Egypt in Cairo works against Germany’s and the Hardliners in Egypt are strengthened among EU’s declared intent of stabilizing the coun- other things by the fact that the step-by-step try. Such stabilization is highly unlikely transition to routine repression has so far to succeed without a vibrant civil society to had hardly any negative consequences in- represent the interests of all segments of ternationally. Quite the contrary: the desire the population and demand good govern- of Western states to normalize relations ance. Instead, the severe restriction of the with the Sisi regime is shown in their politi- public sphere and the brutal approach cally willed, large investments in Egypt’s of the security apparatus sow the seeds of energy sector, as well as the resumption of political violence. Escalation becomes more military aid and security cooperation. This likely as peaceful expressions of opposition impression is further strengthened by ques- and non-violent mechanisms for conflict tionable measures – such as the temporary resolution are repressed. imprisonment of the Al-Jazeera journalist Germany and its European partners and critic of the regime, Ahmed Mansour, should therefore not stop at their princi- in Berlin – which suggested close coordina- pled criticism of the death penalty, but tion of the German authorities with the should strongly condemn both mock trials Egyptian security apparatus. The official and extrajudicial repression as well. Fur- receptions accorded to President al-Sisi in thermore, they need to judge the leader- Madrid, Berlin and soon London also reha- ship in Cairo by how well it respects the bilitate the Egyptian dictatorship on the 2014 Constitution, which guarantees international scene, and send the signal citizens’ freedom of assembly and asso- that Europe prioritizes cooperation in secu- ciation (articles 73 and 75) and ties the con- rity and economic affairs over respect for duct of the state to international human human rights. During her visit to the eco- rights conventions (article 93) that have nomic summit in Sharm-el-Sheikh in March been ratified by Egypt, such as the Inter- 2015, the EU’s High Representative for For- national Covenant on Civil and Political eign Affairs, Federica Mogherini, assured Rights. the Egyptian leadership of Europe’s con- Germany and its European partners tinued support, without even addressing should not cooperate with Egypt’s internal the human rights situation. Wherever criti- security institutions. This specifically in- cism has been voiced, it has been largely cludes fighting terror, for as long as Egypt limited to condemning the hundreds of uses vaguely worded criminal law to per- death sentences that have been handed secute even peaceful opponents as terror- down against opponents of the regime ists. Cooperating with Egyptian State Secu- since the summer of 2013 – although even rity and the domestic security services is here there has been a process of habitua- out of the question while these institutions tion, so that new verdicts in mass trials no remain primarily responsible for the grave longer cause any diplomatic consequences human rights situation in the country. Any above the level of verbal notes. Representa- thought of overcoming these repressive ten-

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7 dencies by providing training and equip- zations in the wider Arab world. However, ment, or through workshops, is as absurd many NGOs would like to have closer ex- as the idea of enshrining accountability changes with European groups, among mechanisms in such a way. other reasons to prevent a regime-coopted, Instead, NGOs need to be supported in façade civil society from establishing itself their work wherever they continue to carry as the West’s interlocutor. out effective monitoring of human rights Not least, civil society groups point to a violations despite the growing personal huge need for professional care by psycholo- risk, and thus take on the role of scrutiniz- gists and therapists. Almost all NGOs com- ing government conduct. Alongside a few plain of stress and staff shortages because independent online editorial teams, such as of depression, burnout and traumatization the journalists’ collective Mada Masr, they caused by personal or mediated experiences have become the only reliable source of of suffering. For women’s activists groups information on corruption, abuses of state this has an additional gender component,

© Stiftung Wissenschaft und power, and other systematic violations of since female activists frequently keep their Politik, 2015 collective and individual human rights. experiences of violence silent for fear of All rights reserved A closer alignment of supportive meas- social stigmatization. Thought needs to be These Comments reflect ures with the needs and legal status of local given to how psychological care might be solely the author’s views. organizations would be crucial, but access to offered. Not only could this tie into the SWP Egyptian HROs has worsened dramatically. experience of the German Ministry for Eco- Stiftung Wissenschaft und On the one hand, they fear being accused nomic Cooperation and Development with Politik German Institute for of espionage, while on the other they have traumatized civil-war victims, but support International and become suspicious of foreign support from medical and psychological services Security Affairs because of the West’s policy of rapproche- should also meet with less resistance from Ludwigkirchplatz 3­4 ment with the Sisi regime. The revision the Egyptian authorities because of the 10719 Berlin of the criminal law has strongly limited pos- technical nature of such help. Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Fax +49 30 880 07-100 sibilities for directly funding local projects www.swp-berlin.org in particular. Indeed, by giving material [email protected] help and financial contributions, foreign ISSN 1861-1761 partners risk handing the authorities a Translation by Tom Genrich legal pretext for prosecuting the benefi- ciaries. The same is true for indirect help (Updated English version of SWP-Aktuell 60/2015) through issuing service contracts. However, there still are some channels for promoting civil society. It should be explored whether it is possible to provide local venues for civil society exchanges, which have been in short supply since the implementation of the assembly law. Alter- natively, such forums could also be offered outside Egypt to promote closer coordina- tion between activists, who have thus far only been loosely cooperating with one another. This could be accompanied by workshops abroad on improving network- ing, for instance in public relations and legal support, or data encryption and secure forms of communication. A few instances already exist of bilateral cooperation be- tween Egyptian NGOs and partner organi-

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