DID WHITE SUPREMACY STALL THE FORWARD MOMEMTUM OF

THE COLORED FARMERS’ ALLIANCE?

______

A Thesis

Presented

to the Faculty of

California State University Dominguez Hills

______

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts

in

Humanities

______

by

Danielle Cain

Spring 2019

This thesis is dedicated to all the patients and families at the Children’s Hospital of

Philadelphia that I have cared for over the years. They have helped me to keep life in

perspective and to understand what is important.

ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to acknowledge the following people who were very supportive of

me during my time in the master’s program at CSUDH.

First, to my family and friends I would like to say thank you for your encouragement and sage advice. It always came just when I needed it the most.

Next, a huge thank you to Dr. Matthew Luckett, who helped me get across the

finish line. From the reading list you provided me, to the advice regarding my thesis, your help was invaluable.

Thank you also to my committee members, Dr. Howard Holter, who stepped in at

the last minute to save the day and to Dr. Jackie Shannon whose assistance was much appreciated.

I would be remiss if I did not also thank the HUX professors that have taught me and guided me over the past few years. It has been a remarkable learning experience for me. A mere thank you does not seem to be enough.

Lastly, I would like to thank my parents and sister who passed away several years

ago. I did not have them nearly long enough, but cherish all the love they gave me and all that they taught me. I carry their spirit with me always.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

DEDICATION ...... ii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS ...... iv

ABSTRACT ...... vi

CHAPTER

1. INTRODUCTION...... 1

Background ...... 1 Statement of the Problem ...... 7 Purpose of the Study ...... 10 Theoretical Bases and Organization ...... 11 Limitations of the Study ...... 12 Definition of Terms ...... 14

2. THREE STEPS FORWARD; TWO STEPS BACK CIVIL RIGHTS BARGAINED AWAY ...... 16

Getting Out the Vote...... 19

3. SETTING THE STAGE FOR REVOLT ...... 21

The Farmer Versus Goliath ...... 21 The Farmer Versus Supply and Demand ...... 22 Debt Peonage ………………………………………………………………………… 23

4. EVOLUTION OF THE FARMERS’ ALLIANCES ...... 25

Fighting Back ...... 25 The Farmers’ Alliance Organizations ...... 27

iv

CHAPTER PAGE

5. THE COLORED ALLIANCE GAINS A FOLLOWING...... 35

Cracks in the Alliance ...... 37 The End of Cooperation and the End of the Alliance ...... 39 The Significance of Black Churches in the South ...... 41

6. FROM A FARMERS’ ALLIANCE TO A POLITICAL PARTY ...... 43

Elections of 1892 and 1896 ...... 45 Roots of Black Populism ...... 47

7. METHODOLOGY ...... 49

8. CONCLUSION ...... 51

WORKS CITED ...... 59

v

ABSTRACT

In Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America, Lawrence Goodwyn suggests, “White supremacy prevented black farmers from performing the kinds of collective public acts essential to the creation of an authentic movement culture”

(Goodwyn 122-123). This thesis offers another point of view endorsing the notion that despite white supremacy, the Colored Farmers’ Alliance did create a movement putting forth an agenda of “collective public acts” that not only sought the betterment of farmers during the 1880s and 1890s, but also contributed to the initial success of the Populist

Movement. A discussion entails of the events that precipitated the formation of the

National Farmers’ Alliance and subsequent evolution of the Colored Farmers Alliance along with accounts of their unified efforts effecting change. This grass-roots association became one of the largest African American cultural movements in the United States laying the groundwork for the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s.

1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Background

It was an extraordinary period in the United States during the latter half of the nineteenth century. The Civil War had ended, Reconstruction was underway

(only to be proven a failure), and the age of industrialization took off. The country was moving from solely relying on an agrarian economy to one of industrial development. Farmers were being left behind, and the severe economic struggles that burdened them were being overlooked by Congress. In order to gain a collective voice, Farmers’ Alliances were organized first as self-help groups that focused on the agricultural education of the farmer regarding new methods of farming, and then evolving into more of a present-day political action committee lobbying for agricultural interests until ultimately becoming the Populist Party in

1892.

Originally there were two Alliance movements—the Farmers’ Alliance and

Industrial Union, or Southern Alliance and the National Farmers’ Alliance, or

Northern Alliance. Later, a third movement for African American farmers known as the Colored Farmers’ Alliance would form to address the needs of Southern black farmers. The Southern Alliance was organized in 1877 as an agricultural group in

Texas. Gradually the group expanded to more regional representation throughout 2 the South. The Northern Alliance was formed in 1879 by a cooperative of Grangers from New York; and the Colored Alliance became an officially chartered alliance beginning in 1886.

In 1890, Dr. Charles Macune, leader of the Southern Alliance proposed a national cooperation or partnership with the Northern Alliance and the Colored

Alliance in order to have a more prominent showing nationally. The Farmers’

Alliance was formed and included all three of the independent farming organizations. The coalition boasted three million members and “grew to one of the most powerful protest movements in American history” (Barnes 1).

By the time the three Alliances joined forces under the banner of the

Farmers’ Alliance, their mission had progressed to being more political in nature, calling for economic reforms that included the Sub-Treasury Plan, increasing the amount of currency in production, increasing the coinage of silver, dismantling the crop-lien system, overhauling the banking industry, and advocating for government- control of the railroads and telecommunications industry.

Initially, the individual Farmers’ Alliances were a means of keeping farmers up-to-date on the latest agrarian techniques, education, trade news, and the economy. Lecturers would travel from one region to the next delivering the same message and inspiring solidarity. They were non-political organizations trying to effect change through cooperation and education. However, by 1889, the tide had started to shift. The farmers were buried in debt, losing their farms, and being 3 forced to turn to sharecropping or migrating to the more urban industrial areas.

The need for farmers to consolidate under one flag and speak with one very loud voice was becoming more necessary. It was a strategic move on the part of the farmers to band together into a three million-strong voting bloc in hopes that their solidarity would wield influence over the politicians. Politicians that had the power to pass legislation that could help the farmers in their plight. W. Scott Morgan, political activist and author of History of the Wheel and Alliance and the Impending

Revolution, noted, “The North and South will join hands against a common foe … The independent manhood of the country is rising up in defense of its liberties. An army of oppressed producers are organizing for victory” (17-18).

The cause of this oppression was for the most part economical. Farmers

experienced severe economic hardships resulting from increased production costs

coupled with a declining return on investment. It was costing more to grow and

harvest crops then the farmers were getting in return. In addition to two significant

economic downturns—the Panic of 1873 and the Panic of 1893—“the farmers in the

prairies and the Great Plains confronted terrible obstacles. They were far from

markets, burned by drought, beaten by hail, withered by hot winds, frozen by

blizzards, eaten out by the grasshoppers, exploited by capitalists, and cozened by

politicians” (Webb 503).

As crops failed due to the devastatingly long drought, there was no food to

eat or to sell; starvation became a major difficulty for the farmers. Having 4 undergone this litany of setbacks and misfortunes, one would expect to see a mass exodus from the Great Plains. While some families had been compelled to give up farming and move to the city, many homesteaders stayed on their farms, as there were not many relocation options available for the homesteaders.

In order to keep the Great Plains homesteads viable as they lived through the depression, drought, and dreadful winters, farmers took out mortgages to obtain funding to re-invest in their farming business. “Eastern and European investors, attracted by the 10 to 15 percent interest rates on the frontier, fell over themselves trying to give the settlers money” (Wishart 133). The local bankers, knowing the true value of the land, would not offer mortgages. Farmers, therefore, gravitated toward larger financial institutions that employed local agents solely to secure customers for mortgages. Unfortunately, in doing so, these financial institutions significantly inflated the value of the land, allowing farmers to borrow more than their land was worth, effectively causing them to become overextended. As the

United States entered its second depression in 1893, farmers found that their land had lost all value and faced foreclosure in order to satisfy the heavy debts incurred.

While the farmers in the South had not been hampered by poor weather conditions as those on the Great Plains, they were severely affected by the declining market price of their mainstay crop, cotton, due to over production. Over production of crops was not a planned outcome, but rather a result of westward 5 expansion and our own industrial advancements in farming that produced higher crop yields.

Prior to 1875, cotton prices fluctuated within the tolerable range of from $.12

to $.18 per pound. In 1875, though the average price of cotton fell to $.11 per

pound … By 1885, the average price of cotton had fallen below $.09 per

pound. Since on many farms, $.08 per pound went to cover the cost of cotton

production, the economic situation was extremely dire. (Barnes 1)

With only a $.01 profit, southern farmers were not earning enough money to provide for themselves and their families and purchase the supplies needed to produce the following year’s crop. Their way of life was not sustainable under these economic conditions.

Unlike the Great Plains farmers who had mortgaged their farms to the hilt, southern farmers had been severely hampered by the Crop Lien System, a scheme devised by the former Confederate states that was supposed to assist farmers with maintaining their farms during the economic recovery in response to the post-Civil

War cash shortage.

Under the Crop Lien System, farmers would obtain the supplies they needed to plant and harvest their crop without having to pay cash to the merchant. Instead, the farmers would give the merchant a lien against the future crop. The merchant charged interest on the total amount of goods given to the farmer. Unfortunately, the interest rate charged by the merchant was typically 20 to 50%, inflating the 6 amount owed by the farmer to an amount that the yield from his crop would not be able to pay off. The debts of the farmers would carry over from year to year. To compound the problem, because each harvest had already been promised to a merchant, the farmer lost the right to hold back his crops from market until prices rebounded. The farmer was essentially working for the merchant in a state of economic servitude. The final blow would come in the form of foreclosure when debts were not repaid. Farmers were faced with either migrating to urban areas and seeking industrial work or turning to sharecropping or tenant farming. Since the African American farmers in the South were newly freed slaves, the skills they possessed were farming in nature, so they typically turned to sharecropping.

As African American farmers were excluded from the Southern Alliance, they formed their own independent farmers’ alliance—the Colored Farmers’ Alliance.

Steven Hahn, author of A Nation Under our Feet writes, “There can be little doubt that the Colored Alliances’ stated objective to find homes for the families of the colored people and its promotion of education and improved farming techniques resonated powerfully with the aspirations and sensibilities of blacks throughout the southern countryside” (Hahn 417). Hahn goes on to report that the black Alliance members in South Carolina saw their mission as one of elevating their race, promoting education, and to vote more intelligently (Hahn 417).

However, William Rogers, in “The Negro Alliance in Alabama,” describes a slightly different take on the formation of the Colored Alliance—from the white 7 man’s perspective, “What we desire is, that the Farmers’ Alliance men everywhere will take hold and organize or aid in organizing the colored farmer, and placing him in an attitude to cooperate intelligently and systematically” (Rogers 40).

While Gerald Gaither reports in Blacks and the Populist Movement, that

African American farmers were “attracted by ritual, secrecy, and the possible economic benefits the order might offer poverty-stricken blacks” (Gaither 5).

Needless to say, there are quite divergent points of view with respect to the formation of the Colored Farmers’ Alliance.

Statement of the Problem

Beginning with only a few hundred members in Texas, the Colored Farmers’

Alliance grew to over a million members representing every southern state.

Southern Democrats saw this Alliance as a means for African Americans to upset the political status quo of the South and through fear tactics, violence, and murder did what it could to put down this “revolt.” The incident in Leflore County, Mississippi, provides an archetypal example of the white man’s response to a free black post-

Reconstruction populace attempting to better itself. In Leflore County, Mississippi, there was a large contingency of poor, rural African American farmers who joined the Colored Alliance in order to improve themselves both from an educational standpoint, as well as financially not unlike any of the other Colored Alliance chapters. The soil of Leflore County proved to be extremely fertile for growing cotton and there were many plantations in the region. The white plantation owners 8 in these Mississippi lowlands recruited African Americans to harvest the cotton which caused a population shift whereby blacks outnumbered whites by a five and one half margin.

Oliver Cromwell, a black member of the Colored Alliance traveled through

Leflore County recruiting members for the Colored Alliance. He promoted the

Alliance exchanges where the farmers could buy goods and supplies at reduced rates and encouraged the farmers to join the Alliance and to forego doing business with the local Leflore merchants and purchase from the exchanges instead. When the white merchants realized why their business was dropping off, they blamed

Cromwell for instigating a black insurgency. At first they tried defaming the character of Cromwell among the black farmers, having failed to accomplish submission of the farmers, the white merchants issued threats of violence and death; however, this only prompted the black farmers to unite around Cromwell and issue a formal statement of solidarity to the white townspeople. Fearing a black uprising by this show of unity, the Sheriff requested that the Governor send in the

National Guard. Unfortunately, the Guard turned into a posse of white supremacists that reports estimate killed at least twenty-five unarmed black people. Extreme violence and threats continued to hamper the progress of the Colored Alliance in

Leflore County finally forcing the members of this local chapter to disband.

“Some might argue that the Leflore County massacre represented an unusual event, for it occurred in an isolated frontier section of the South … where white 9 minorities used whatever means necessary, including violence, to control black majorities” (Holmes 273-274). “From what is known of the high number of lynchings and race riots in … the post-Reconstruction South, however, violence was a force that permeated the entire region” (Holmes 274).

Despite this show of violence, however, the Colored Alliance continued to

expand its membership and went on to play a significant role in advancing the cause

of farmers both black and white ultimately morphing into the Populist Party. The contributions of the Colored Farmers’ Alliance will provide evidence to support a differing point of view than that put forth by Lawrence Goodwyn in Democratic

Promise: The Populist Moment in America. It is the contention of this writing that

Goodwyn diminishes the overarching effect the African American farmers had on the farming industry, politics, and the advancement of civil rights. Goodwyn states,

“White supremacy prevented black farmers from performing the kinds of collective public acts essential to the creation of an authentic movement culture” (Goodwyn

122-123). He draws the conclusion that because of the southern caste system,

African Americans had been impeded from organizing an authentic movement.

However, evidence will be presented supporting the fact that it is because of the caste system that African Americans were compelled to take a more aggressive path—a path that was a delicate balance of passive aggressiveness and sheer determination.

10

Purpose of the Study

Learned historians have deliberated over the successes and shortcomings of the Northern and Southern Farmers’ Alliances and the role the Alliances played in the birth of Populism. The Colored Farmers’ Alliance, however, is often treated as an adjunct of the Southern Alliance and often receives only a footnote mention or cursory review in scholarly texts. Hahn writes, “Yet we would be mistaken to see the Colored Alliance as a mere offshoot or shadow of the white Alliance, for it had a dynamic of its own and stood as one of several, sometimes interconnected, initiatives that built on established institutional foundations” (Hahn 415). The

Colored Alliance initially focused on improving the lives of its members through agrarian education and the establishment of exchanges to promote financial independence. As the movement grew, so did its significance, becoming an important vocal opponent of anti-agrarian legislation and business practices. Their dissent, such as that of the Cotton Pickers Strike of 1891, along with an unsubstantiated fear among southern white supremacists of a potential African

American uprising prompted racial violence and the murder of black farmers.

There is no denying that the extreme violence manifested from white supremacy had an influence on African Americans, how could it not. However, an internal organizational rift that occurred when the Alliance moved from an agrarian self-help group to a major political party, the Populist Party, ultimately proved insurmountable and brought the Colored Alliance to an end. Nevertheless, the 11

impact this independent movement had on the country and the seeds it sowed for

future crusades were remarkable.

It is the intent of this writing to discuss the accomplishments the Colored

Farmers’ Alliance achieved in spite of the oppressive tactics of white supremacy in the setting of nineteenth century farming; to present to the reader evidence that

African American farmers rose above the violence and remained steadfast to their stated Alliance mission; and to highlight the successes of the modern day National

Black Farmers’ Alliance whose seeds were sown over one hundred years ago.

Theoretical Bases and Organization

For purposes of this work, the Theory of Change was applied. The Theory of

Change (TOC) provides the framework for the components of a process. Typically this theory is applied when mapping out the steps to achieve a goal or mission.

However, it lent itself nicely to the laying out, in chronological order, the events that occurred from post-Reconstruction through the end of the nineteenth century in broad terms. Including a comprehensive history of the period in this work was essential to gaining an understanding of the social and political climate of the day and the situations that presented themselves to African Americans as well as the choices they made at the time. In a parallel outline, TOC was applied that specifically chronicled the history of the African-American farmers—from initially gaining their freedom to sharecropping to the Colored Alliance, and finally the

Populist Party. 12

Part of TOC includes a step known as backwards mapping and connecting

outcomes. By continuing to backwards map the steps in a process, the root cause can be determined. This was a critical step especially when trying to put together the events surrounding the Cotton Pickers Strike of 1891. Having read multiple journal articles and texts capturing the events pre and post-strike, it became evident that each resource told a slightly different story, had varying accounts of the event, and had differing outcomes.

Relating the application of TOC in this research project to other studies is somewhat difficult because there have not been an overabundance of studies specifically devoted to Black Populism. Additionally, when each study would have been completed, the amount of resources that would have been available would have differed. Ali confirms that since 1938 there have only been five regional studies focused on the role of African Americans in Populism—two master’s theses and three doctoral dissertations (Ali 178).

Ultimately TOC methodology allowed for the creation of the framework for the hypothesis of this work, that the Colored Farmers’ Alliance was a bona fide movement that was able to exist and thrive in spite of the horrors of white supremacy in nineteenth century America.

Limitations of the Study

The Colored Farmers’ Alliance served as a fraternity of sorts for the African

Americans of post-Reconstruction South. It was an organization rooted in self- 13

improvement and benevolence whose mission was to create a pathway to financial

independence through education, hard work, and community outreach. However,

because African Americans had been subjected to bigotry, racial discrimination, and

fear mongering many of their early meetings were clandestine—held in secrecy

under cover of darkness in woods or church basements for the safety of the

participants. Because of this need to remain secretive, there is an assumption that

few records were kept for posterity with regard to names of participants, topics

discussed, or the outcomes of debated issues. Consequently, the availability of

primary source documents tracing the Colored Alliance to its roots is problematic.

Additionally, there are not many studies focused on Black Populism and the

Colored Farmers’ Alliance. Omar Ali writes in In the Lion’s Mouth, “While there are dozens of state-based and regional studies on the white-led Populist movement, there is significantly less scholarship on Black Populism” (177). He further points out that many of the scholarly works treat the Colored Alliance as a footnote to the

Southern Alliance or identifies the Colored Alliance as being “organized and led by whites. There were also some black organizers” (177). He identifies that omissions of facts and mischaracterizations have done a disservice to the study of the roots of

Black Populism.

The methodological limitations did create the challenge of reading a multitude of primary and secondary sources, identifying key events in the Colored

Alliance movement, gaining an understanding of the motivation for the actions of 14

the black farmers, and comparing and contrasting the sources in order to ascertain

the highest probability of not only the actual events, but the correct order of events.

Ali confirms in his research, that “while the primary records that have

survived, which are mostly known through other contemporary sources, provide

key insights into Black Populism, they also limit the scope of our knowledge about

the movement” (179).

Through the scholarship of such authors as Omar Ali, Steven Hahn, Gerald

Gaither, and Jack Abramowitz, resources, both primary and secondary in nature,

have been brought to light. It is because of their writings addressing periods of

post-Reconstruction history that this work was possible.

Definition of Terms

Bimetallism: Basing a monetary system or currency on two different precious

metals, typically gold and silver.

Brown v. Board of Education (1954): A Supreme Court case where the Court

unanimously held that it was a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the

Fourteenth Amendment to institute segregation of public school children. It is often

considered the cornerstone of the Civil Rights Movement.

Interstate Commerce Act of 1887: Federal legislation that regulated the railroad

industry by creating an Interstate Commerce Commission that would oversee the

business operations of the railroads. 15

Jim Crow Laws: Laws enacted after 1877 that mandated racial segregation in the

South. Additionally, literacy tests and poll taxes were enacted as a method to

disenfranchise the African American voters. Jim Crow referred to a minstrel character.

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP): A civil rights

organization formed in 1909 and is still in existence today. The primary mission of

the group is to eliminate racial biases and discrimination.

National Black Farmers’ Association (NBFA): An advocacy and education group for

African American farmers founded in 1995 that assists farmers with agricultural

education and access to funding either through private banks or government loans.

Plessy v. Ferguson (1896): Supreme Court case that upheld racial segregation and

the constitutionality of the separate but equal doctrine that dictated racial segregation was legal as long as equal facilities are provided to African Americans.

Wabash v. Illinois (1886): Supreme Court case that struck down a state’s ability to

regulate interstate commerce. The Wabash decision indirectly led to the creation of

the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887.

16

CHAPTER 2

THREE STEPS FORWARD; TWO STEPS BACK CIVIL RIGHTS BARGAINED AWAY

With the Civil War over and the Reconstruction Period underway, the United

States was still not on firm ground. The Republican-controlled federal government was

rebuilding the infrastructure of the South, as well as, setting the stage to align southern

voters to the Republican Party. During Reconstruction, legislation had been passed into

law that significantly benefitted African Americans. Namely, the Thirteenth and

Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution abolishing slavery and striking down the

clause that people who descended from Africans could not be United States citizens.

Recognizing that the African American population in the South comprised a large voting

bloc, and after having narrowly won the election of 1868, Republicans were convinced

that they would need the African-American vote in order to sustain future election

victories. In 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment had been passed giving adult black males

the right to vote.

“Reconstruction saw a dramatic expansion of black electoral participation in the

South” (Ali 15). “Over two thousand African Americans would hold public office during the period, with hundreds more white Republican allies being elected to offices with black support. By the mid-1870s, however, federal enforcement of Reconstruction policies began to falter as the nation sank into an economic depression” (16). 17

The Panic of 1873 would usher in an economic downturn that would have

disastrous effects lasting until 1879. It was in 1873 that the banking firm of Jay Cooke

and Company closed its doors setting off an economic panic throughout the country. In

addition to underwriting the Union’s effort in the Civil War, Jay Cooke had financed the

first transcontinental railroad. When a second transcontinental railroad got underway,

Jay Cooke invested heavily in it as well. In September of 1873, the firm realized that it

was overextended and shuttered the business. A depression ensued causing the price of

cotton to plummet in the South.

Southern Democrats had alleged that Republican corruption had caused the collapse of the economy. Because the Republicans had been distracted, having to answer these allegations of corruption, deal with striking workers, and focus on economic recovery, their promise of Southern Reconstruction faded and with it went protections for

African Americans. Reconstruction officially ended with the Compromise of 1877 that resolved the outcome of the 1876 presidential election between Democrat Samuel J.

Tilden and Republican Rutherford B. Hayes. Tilden had won the popular vote; however, the electoral votes of three southern states were in dispute. Republicans had agreed to allow Home-Rule in the South and to withdraw federal troops from the southern states, if the Democrats would agree to award the contested electoral votes to Hayes and declare him President. During Reconstruction, federal troops had been dispatched to the South as a means of protecting African-American men’s right to vote. Withdrawing the troops sent a message that Republicans were no longer interested in protecting the civil rights of

African Americans. By agreeing to Home-Rule, Republicans would not interfere in the 18 affairs of the southern states. Reconstruction was effectively over and the South began passing legislation instituting racial segregation and legalizing the disenfranchisement of over five hundred thousand African-American males eligible to vote. For the most part,

African Americans voted for the Republican candidates as they represented the party of

Lincoln. It was crucial for the Southern Democrats to marginalize this group of voters in order to rule the South.

In the post-Reconstruction Era, African-American voters had been subjected to literacy tests and poll taxes in the Deep South as a form of voter suppression. In some instances, the voter would have to read a portion of the state’s constitution and explain the passage. As expected, many of the black voters were former slaves who could not read, let alone explain the state’s constitution. Additionally, a poll tax would have to be paid in order to cast a vote. Since most of the African-American voters could not afford to pay a tax, they were not allowed to vote.

During the latter part of the nineteenth century, there were, however, a few southern states where disenfranchisement was not an issue, namely, Delaware, Maryland,

West Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri. These states had been considered border-states during the Civil War; and, while they were slave states, they did not secede from the

Union. The African Americans living in these states tended to have some education and in the case of Maryland, there were large pockets of highly educated, free blacks prior to the Civil War who did wield some influence.

The southern caste system represented by the racially biased Jim Crow laws enacted in 1876 called for segregation in public arenas such as schools, streetcars and 19

trains, libraries, and restaurants. Miscegenation was illegal as were interracial adoptions.

In 1896, the Supreme Court handed down its famous Plessy v. Ferguson decision

outlining the separate but equal doctrine in constitutional law allowing for state-

sponsored segregation. Not until the passing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were

discrimination and segregation prohibited.

Getting Out the Vote

In the post-Reconstruction Era, African Americans, finding themselves facing

economic challenges as well as political suppression, needed a plan to combat the

Southern Democrats’ coordinated efforts to quash the collective voice of the African-

American population at the ballot box. “This de facto erosion of political and civil rights would lead some African Americans to seek out white independents as allies in the electoral arena. Black voters in the North had done so in the antebellum period, beginning in 1840 with the Liberty party; African Americans, this time in the South, would do so with the Greenback Party” (Ali 20).

The Greenback Party, formed in 1874 in response to the heavy debt farmers incurred because of the Panic of 1873, called for currency expansion. The monetary theory endorsed by the Greenback Party mandated a use of non-gold backed currency and to ease the debts of farmers by printing enough money causing inflation which in turn would cause prices to rise giving the farmers a greater monetary return and the ability to pay their debts. 20

Additionally, the Party denounced the attempted disenfranchisement of citizens

and any laws that would interfere with a person’s right to vote, so much so that this

sentiment was added to their party platform. In 1875, a delegation of African Americans

attended the Greenback Party’s founding convention in Cleveland, Ohio. Feeling

hopeful, after the convention, that this was a viable avenue to address the economic

concerns of the African American people, the delegation traveled to Texas to urge white

independents to join them in launching the Texas Greenback Party. By 1878, “the

Greenback Labor Party convention brought together representatives from four hundred

eighty two chapters, of which seventy were all-black chapters” (Ali 21). Over the course of the next few years, African Americans joined forces with the Greenback Party in seven southern states—Mississippi, Texas, Arkansas, Alabama, Virginia, Louisiana, and South

Carolina. In 1888, however, after losing their labor-based support to the Democratic

Party, the Greenback Party dissolved. They did not have enough delegates or candidates to launch a successful campaign.

The Greenbacks were successful in increasing the amount of paper money allowed in circulation under the Resumption Act and a limited resumption of silver dollar coinage under the Bland-Allison Act. During its existence, the Greenback Party elected a total of twenty congressmen to the United States House of Representatives. It is important to note, however, that whatever success the Greenbacks had, it only addressed the symptoms of a bigger problem faced by farmers, not the disease itself—corporate monopolies and corporate greed.

21

CHAPTER 3

SETTING THE STAGE FOR REVOLT

The Farmer Versus Goliath

The year 1865 was pivotal for the United States in that the Civil War ended, and the country began a transformation from an agrarian nation to a wealthy, industrial powerhouse. The end of the nineteenth century saw a period of rapid growth and development that had exponentially boost commerce leading the way for the rise of industrial empires such as Standard Oil, US Steel, and the New York Central Railroad.

The main objectives of these empires, aside from creating revenue, were to put the competition out of business, create monopolies, influence legislation, and manipulate pricing. All of which can have a negative effect on a farmer’s bottom line.

Industrialists and farmers found themselves on opposite sides of the country’s currency issue. The government had limited the amount of gold-backed money in circulation thus driving up purchasing power and worth. Business tycoons were adamant that the success of the industrialization of the country depended upon a currency that retained its worth. Farmers, however, were proponents of increasing the amount of money in circulation and moving to a gold and silver-backed currency. By increasing the amount of money in circulation, it would be more readily available to the consumer and would subsequently drive up prices causing inflation, ultimately benefiting the farmers. Legislators viewed industrialization as being profitable and good for the country, therefore, industries received tax breaks. Unfortunately, farmers, at the mercy of the government, did not receive this same consideration. Farmers were also at the mercy of the railroads. Because of increased competition in the Northeast, the railroads were actually losing money. In order to make up for lost revenue, railroads would charge 22

farmers in the South and Midwest higher rates when shipping their crops to market.

Since there was less rail competition in the agrarian regions, the farmers were forced to

pay the higher shipping costs effectively subsidizing the railroads losses. Lastly, American industries had been protected by tariffs or import taxes levied

on goods imported into the country. The tariffs would increase the costs of foreign

goods, thereby making domestic products more attractive to consumers. There were no such protections for farmers, as these tariffs did not apply to agriculture.

The Farmer Versus Supply and Demand

As more land was made available for farming through the Homestead Act, it

follows that more people would be farming which caused an overproduction of crops. To compound the issue, automated farm machinery replaced manual farming practices

thereby increasing production, which drove down the price per pound per crop an average

of 40%. The cost to grow crops exceeded the return on investment. Without adequate revenue, farmers faced a whole host of additional problems. The most important of these

issues would be their inability to pay their rent or mortgage forcing farmers to take out

loans at extremely high interest rates. Ultimately, farmers defaulted on their loans and lost their farms.

In the South, the crop lien system was devised whereby the farmer could obtain credit from future crop yields. The merchant would lend the farmer money at a high interest rate and the farmer would pay the merchant back when he sells his crops. The farmer would use the money borrowed to buy equipment, seed, fertilizer, and supplies.

What the farmer did not factor in was that overproduction of crops drove the price down so the yield did not generate enough money to pay the loan. The loan would carry over from year to year, interest would continue to accumulate, and the debt would become 23

excessive. Each year the farmer would have to turn over everything that he earned to the

merchant as a down payment. Eventually, the farmer would lose his farm and be buried

in debt. Harry Tracy describes in The Farmers Alliance History and Agricultural Digest a straightforward mathematical approach to defining the economic problems faced by the farmers. He explains that the farmer … sells at a time when prices are forty percent lower than they were when he bought.

No business on earth could survive such an unfair discrimination, and the farmers

could not, but for the fact that nearly forty percent of the value of their products must have been labor, not capital investment; and as forty percent exceeds the

labor investment, it shows the inroad made upon their capital by these losses,

which are largely represented, at this time, by mortgage indebtedness. (Tracy 342)

Debt Peonage Perhaps the most unfair and demeaning farming practice was that of sharecropping. Sharecroppers were severely impoverished and owned no land or farming equipment. “Sharecropping emerged when confiscated land had been placed back into the hands of wealthier white southerners following the Civil War. In 1865, the

Freedman’s Bureau controlled over 850,000 acres of “abandoned land” (Ali 17).

Reconstruction had ended and the Southern Democrats were taking back the South and they needed labor to work the land. While there were white sharecroppers, the wealthy landowners saw the system of sharecropping as a means to control black workers—a replacement for slavery. “Sharecroppers borrowed money or credit from their landlords against future harvests to purchase tools, seed, fertilizer, and other supplies. But landlords and 24

‘furnishing merchants’ (often one and the same people) demanded grossly inflated interest rates and costs for supplies” (17). In addition to having to repay the loan, sharecroppers would typically have to turn over fifty to 75% of their crop to the landlord. Perhaps, the most abusive form of debt servitude occurred with the cooperation of

local governments and law enforcement. Southern states would arrest black men on

fabricated charges; the prisoners would receive excessive fines that they could not afford to pay and would be forced to labor in the fields in order to work off their fines. To

compound the problem, records were not kept with regard to the debt or the work

completed by the prisoner so their state of servitude would persist without an end date. Considered a step up from sharecroppers, tenant farmers typically owned some

farming equipment and perhaps, an ox. They would pay rent to landowner in order to

farm a plot of land. In addition, the landowner would take on average 25% of the tenant farmer’s yield.

Farmers in the nineteenth century faced many obstacles, most of which were not

of their own doing. They were at the mercy of greedy corporations, economic downturns, the law of supply and demand, unmerciful credit lending practices, corrupt

lobbyists and politicians, a boll weevil infestation in the South, as well as severe

weather—record breaking droughts and harsh winters on the Plains. While the weather may have been out of the control of farmers, the oppressive business practices of the

corporations, the bank industry, and politicians were not; and the answer lied with an

organized revolt.

25

CHAPTER 4

EVOLUTION OF THE FARMERS’ ALLIANCES

Fighting Back

In 1867, an agrarian cooperative known as the National Grange of the Order of

Patrons of Husbandry came into existence. Still in existence today, known as the Grange, it is a national organization focused on the needs of the agrarian community. As in 1867, the Grange continues to serve as an advocacy group for farmers. Formation of the

Grange was the brainchild of a Minnesota farmer named Oliver Hudson Kelley. While working for the United States Bureau of Agriculture after the Civil War, he traveled through the farmlands of the country speaking with farmers about their planting and harvesting techniques. Noticing that there were gaps in their knowledge of farming as well as in their harvesting methods, he was compelled to organize groups of farmers throughout the country into local chapters where each chapter would appoint a lecturer that would lead the group in discussion and would provide education to the farmers with regard to the latest advances in agriculture. The Grange had “cautioned farmers not to oppose or abuse other classes; all classes were said to be essential to the proper functioning of society. The farmer was told by Grange organizers that the betterment of the farmer rested solely on improving himself” (Barnes 39). Knowledge and education was viewed as a form of self- improvement. Membership in the Grange grew and by the mid-1870s, membership in the organization numbered 800,000 and represented farmers in all by four states. 26

The Illinois Grange, however, decided to take the “self-help” doctrine a bit further. Recognizing there is power in numbers, they called upon their state legislature to address the disparate rates the farmers were being charged for shipping their crops in railroad cars. Legislation was passed by the State to set a pricing schedule for the railroad. The constitutionality of the law was questioned and in 1886 the Supreme Court struck down the Illinois law by ruling in Wabash v. Illinois that only the Federal Government is allowed to set pricing for interstate commerce. While this initially appeared to be a setback, the ruling finally prompted Congress to act.

Previously, the Grange had petitioned Congress to pass legislation regulating railroads; however, Congress was taking an inordinate amount of time investigating the issue not wanting to upset the status quo for the railroads. While the farmers were being gouged, the railroads were making huge profits. When Wabash v. Illinois was decided, Congress was left with no choice but to craft federal legislation. The Interstate

Commerce Act of 1887, representing the first piece of legislation regulating business, was signed into law. In summary, farmers were increasingly finding themselves victims of bankruptcy which led to tenant farming and sharecropping. Farming primarily cotton in the South and wheat in the Midwest was disastrous when the price per pound dropped too low. Banks preyed on farmers, making them targets of rate gouging and loan schemes.

Perhaps the most abhorrent lending ploy was the crop lien system. To compound the problem, ready cash in circulation was limited, as the conglomerates were growing larger and more profitable, they were pulling available currency out of circulation. Without money, consumers cannot buy things so the price of goods plummets to the point it costs more to grow crops then farmers can earn. Because of the lack of available money in circulation, interest rates were driven up to 40%. 27

The consensus among the various Granger chapters was that farmers needed

representation in government; someone to look out for their needs and interests. Crossing

the line into politics strayed from the original “self-improvement” dogma of the Grange, but the farmers were adamant that the only way to effect positive change would be to

elect legislators who understood the issues faced by farmers and who would propose

legislation that would benefit them. To do this would require a coordinated national revolt.

After the Civil War competition between the two major parties—Republicans and Democrats—was fierce in the years following the end of the Civil War. Many elections had been decided by only 1% of the popular vote. In an effort to appeal to a multitude of voters and not to ruffle any feathers, particularly those of the big corporations, the party spokesmen and candidates avoided taking a firm stance on any controversial issues especially those that directly impacted farmers. Typically the issues that were in the forefront for farmers were directly opposed to big business. With both major parties being emboldened to the railroads, steel mills, and other conglomerates, the farmers concluded a third party candidate would be necessary. However, to have any chance at success, a national insurgency among farmers would be requisite. This type of revolt, however, was not in keeping with the ideology of the Grange, an altruistic society, but would require more aggressive means. Membership in the Grange gradually declined because of the ineffectiveness of its ideology to bring about the changes needed to ensure stability among the farming community.

The Farmers’ Alliance Organizations Throughout the 1870s, Farmers’ Alliance groups were forming throughout the country. They organized cooperative stores where farmers could buy goods at reduced 28

prices. They also founded their own mills reducing production costs for farmers, which

in turn allowed them to reap more profits. “The early alliance cooperative program, so

similar to that of the Grange but cloaked in a more radical ideology, succeeded in generating significantly more movement momentum than the Grange” (Barnes 39).

However, they lacked a singular focus as well as agreement on the best way to

move their message to the national stage. The three main Farmers’ Alliance groups were the National Farmers’ Alliance (known as the Northern Alliance), the National Farmers’

Alliance and Industrial Union (known as the Southern Alliance), and the Colored

Farmers’ National Alliance and Cooperative Union (known as the Colored Farmers Alliance).

In 1877, the Northern Alliance was founded by a group of Grangers from New

York. The primary concern of the Northern Alliance was to have their grievances against the railroad redressed and to reform the tax code. In April 1880, Milton George, a

Chicago editor, organized a Farmers’ Alliance for Cook County, Illinois, as a charter of

the Northern Alliance. George used his newspaper, the Western Rural, to report on the activities of the Alliance. As word spread, more chapters organized and in October 1880, the chapters came together in Chicago “to organize the movement on a national basis”

(Hicks 99). By 1890, two million farmers, both white and black, were members of the Northern Alliance.

Over the next decade, the various chapters of the Northern Alliance were successful in getting the attention of politicians; “Republicans and Democrats were bidding against one another in order to obtain Alliance support” (qtd. in Hicks 149). “For example, when a delegation from the Minnesota Alliance met with the Republican state nominating convention of 1886, the spokesman for the farmers reported: ‘The committee on platform … gave us everything we asked for, in even stronger language than we had 29 used, and the … convention unanimously adopted it’” (qtd. in Hicks 149). The Northern

Alliance extended its reach to the Northwest by the end of the decade. Farmers were being elected to office at the state and locals levels and legislation that favored the Alliance was enacted.

The Southern Alliance grew out of the disbanded Lampass County Alliance in

Texas. The Lampass Alliance struggled with different factions within the organization. Some farmers disagreed with the politicization of the agrarian society and others understood the importance of having representation in Congress. “Some Alliance members had argued that the root cause of the farmers’ problems was in the government’s land, transportation, and financial policies, and thus necessitated independent political action” (Barnes 108). Democrats in the Alliance did not agree with this assessment; “they argued that all necessary political reforms could be achieved through the ‘party of our fathers.’ Still others contended that the problems of the farmer could best be addressed through economic self-help strategies, and that the farmer should avoid the quagmire of politics altogether” (108). After Charles W. Macune assumed the powers of president pro tem of the

Southern Alliance, he realized that it was imperative to quell the different factions among the farmers. He called for a special convention in order to develop a unified plan for how the Alliance would move forward. Members were able to compromise on an agenda that included ending the crop lien system, transitioning control of the railroads from private industry to the government in order to diminish the strangle-hold of private monopolies; transitioning banking from government-run banks to local privately held banks that would be more readily available and able to issue currency as needed to keep pace with the increasing population; operating the mints at full capacity in order to coin enough silver and gold to diminish the national debt; institute a graduated income tax; and the 30

cornerstone to their platform was to institute the Sub-Treasury Plan which would

effectively transfer credit burden from private lenders to the government. In summary,

the plan required the federal government to construct warehouses, or sub- treasuries, in counties that marketed crops with an annual value of $500,000. At

harvest, farmers could deposit crops in the warehouses and receive negotiable

federal notes for up to 80% of the value of the crops. The farmer had one year to sell the crop and then satisfy the notes and a 1% per year interest charge. A fee

for storage would also be charged. Unsold crops could be liquidated at auction.

(ncpedia.org) The issue of race, however, was one that the ranks of the Southern Alliance

overwhelmingly agreed upon—membership was to be restricted to whites only because

of racial prejudices, hostile propaganda, and a fear of African Americans achieving par status with white southerners. C. Vann Woodward writes in Origins of the New South,

that “the two races were brought into rivalry for subsistence wages in the cotton fields,

mines, and wharves, the lower-class white man’s demand for Jim Crow laws became more insistent” (211). However, Gerald Gaither theorizes in “Blacks and the Southern

Farmers’ Alliance Movement,” “any aberrant action in white ranks was regarded

suspiciously in the mind of the white South as an attempt to revive the horrors of Black Reconstruction and open identification with blacks at this point probably would have

produced pressures that would have would have quickly eliminated the alliance” (24).

Regardless of whether or not southern whites discriminated against African Americans because of competing for the same wages or because of a fear of black

supremacy, the numbers do not lie. The Southern Alliance could not ignore the sheer numbers of black farmers in the South. To discount this group would serve no good purpose and, in fact, would have negative economic ramifications. “It was impossible to 31

establish a profitable agricultural system in the South while the Negro acted as a potential

competitor and a cheap source of exploitable labor, and the small white farmer soon

realized that he could rise no higher on the ladder of prosperity than his black counterpart” (Gaither 24). White southerners could not disagree with the fact that

regardless of what their racial biases were, the African-American farmers could not be

excluded from an agrarian rebellion. In 1889, Macune brokered a coalition between the Southern Alliance and rival

group, the Agricultural Wheel, under the name the National Farmers’ and Laborers’

Union of America. Another merger was attempted between the National Farmers’ and Laborers’ Union of America and the Northern Alliance, however, there were a few

hurdles to clear before a merger could be agreed upon by the two groups. African

Americans were freely admitted to the Northern Alliance, but they were barred from membership of the Southern Alliance. In order for a merger to be possible, the Southern

Alliance would have to change its membership rules.

[U]nder duress [the Southern Alliance] agreed to remove the word “white” as a membership qualification, leaving to each state any decision about the eligibility

of blacks as members. However, only whites would be allowed to serve on the

powerful Supreme Council, the legislative body of the National Alliance. As a final concession, the Southern Alliance acquiesced to the proposal that blacks be

allowed even into the sacred Supreme Council if it would help facilitate

consolidation. (Gaither 34) The merger, however, never came to fruition, even with the compromise on

segregation. The one insurmountable issue was that of secrecy. The Southern Alliance,

fearful of infiltration by unfriendly subversives, was a secret society. The Northern

Alliance was not. Secrecy was non-negotiable. The Southern Alliance was concerned 32 that if their organization was penetrated, members would be turned against one another and their main objectives would not be attained. With no concessions on either side regarding the secrecy issue, the merger was called off and the Northern and Southern Alliances continued to exist as separate entities. The Southern Alliance would reinstitute its segregation rules banning blacks from membership.

The initial reluctance of the Southern Alliance to admit black members fostered a suspicion with the black farmers that even if the rules had been changed to clear their path toward membership in the Southern Alliance, the goals and objectives of African

Americans would be dismissed. Therefore, because of this distrust, the Colored Alliance wanted to remain a separate organization in its own right. Understanding the potential economic benefits of unity, however, the Colored Alliance saw the necessity of cooperating with the Southern Alliance. The spirit of cooperation was returned. “Though the Southern Alliance barred

Negroes from membership, it took an active interest in the formation of the Colored

Farmers’ National Alliance and Cooperative Union” (Abramowitz 91). As the membership of the Colored Farmers’ Alliance surpassed one million members, it was not lost on the Southern Alliance how crucial this voting bloc would be in the election of a third party candidate as the farmers were actively considering breaking from the Democratic and Republican parties.

The Colored Farmers’ Alliance was founded in 1886 with R.M. Humphrey, a white Baptist missionary working in the Black community, serving as the general superintendent; the remaining officers were African American. The Colored Alliance did not exclude whites from joining their organization. They encouraged white members because whites had better access to newspapers and would be better suited to serve as liaisons to the heads of other organizations that declined to meet with the black members 33 of the Alliance. The Colored Alliance, like its white counterpart, was a secret society.

This attribute of the organization along with the potential for economic gains attracted many black farmers in the South. Membership in the Colored Alliance exploded almost overnight. Within eighteen days of its founding, the Colored Alliance considered it imperative to commit to writing its mission and objectives. Recognizing the difficulties

African Americans would have in establishing and sustaining a farming organization, they drafted a resolution whose intention it was to cement an ideological coalition with the Southern Alliance.

The resolution stated: That though we are organizing separate and apart from the Farmers’ Alliance now

existing in Texas, composed of white members, we believe it will be to our

interest to work in harmony with that organization. That we ask the members of the white Alliance throughout the United States to aid us in perfecting our

organization. (qtd. in Gaither 25)

The Alliance continued to grow and by 1888 it had reached national status and boosted a membership of over one million members (some estimations put the number closer to 1.2 million members).

The mission of the Colored Alliance was to educate farmers to more efficient farming techniques; provide economic instruction regarding debt; increase educational opportunities for their children; ensure their individual rights; raise funds for the sick and disabled; and to promote agricultural. One of the Alliance’s fundamental principles was for its farmers to be debt free and to own their own homes. To that end, the Alliance established exchanges where African Americans could purchase supplies and dry goods at reduced rates. The exchanges also financed loans at low interest rates allowing

African Americans to pay off their mortgages and become homeowners. 34

Because the Southern Alliance maintained an interest in the Colored Alliance, there was an assumption that the Colored Alliance was merely an African American adjunct of the Southern Alliance. While both Alliances did often pool their resources and work together to achieve common goals. There were instances where the Colored

Alliance stood in direct opposition to the Southern Alliance. For example, in 1890, the

Colored Alliance supported the Lodge Bill allowing federal authorities to oversee national elections if election fraud had been alleged. In order to involve the authorities, the voting district had to have at least 500 people with at least 50 people signing a petition claiming electoral fraud. The Colored Alliance also broke from the Southern Alliance during the 1890 State constitutional convention when they supported the candidate who voted against disenfranchisement. The candidate backed by the Colored

Alliance proved to be victorious and went on to be a Populist Party leader. Understanding the climate of white supremacy in the 1880s makes the formation of a farmers’ alliance for African Americans an extraordinary accomplishment. When the Cooperative Workers of America, a forerunner of the Colored Farmers Alliance, organized a local chapter in South Carolina it was to the ire of the whites. “Since any effort to organize blacks was viewed with a suspicious eye, the meetings of the order were kept clandestine and nocturnal, usually held in black churches, with sentries posted to warn the member of any approaching intruders” (Gaither 13).

While Goodwyn contends that the efforts of African Americans did not constitute an authentic movement culture, the formation of the Colored Alliance would prove otherwise. With the collapse of Reconstruction, it was imperative for black leadership to assert itself, creating solidarity among the African American community while fostering economic cooperation and benevolence. The Colored Alliance provided the outlet for over one million farmers to speak up and be counted. 35

CHAPTER 5

THE COLORED ALLIANCE GAINS A FOLLOWING

While solidarity was a key component in the success of the Northern and

Southern Farmers’ Alliances, it was the lifeblood of the Colored Farmers’ Alliance and the African-American people. The problems the African-American farmers faced were not unlike those of white farmers in that many faced bankruptcy, poverty, and extreme anguish. However, black farmers had to live constantly with the ugliness of white supremacy, segregation, and the threat of death from violence. Unity was key to survival. With the Compromise of 1877, the federal government, knowing that the messaging of the Democrats ruling the South was one of racism and hate, left African Americans to fend for themselves. Approximately 90% of African Americans in the United States were located predominately in the South and Midwest; “three-fourths of the South’s six million blacks engaged in agrarian pursuits” (Gaither 4).

In the latter half of 1888, leaders of the Colored Alliance traveled through the South establishing chapters and trading posts where members could buy goods at reduced prices and obtain loans to pay off mortgages. By 1891, the Alliance boasted chapters in every southern state. The Colored Alliance published its own newspapers that served to inform farmers of the latest developments in farming as well as pending legislation, taxation, and the effects of corporate monopolies. Articles would explain to the farmers about currency and how price fixing and inflated interest rates directly affected them. The newspapers would report on how corporations were getting away with paying low wages while driving up costs for farmers. Conversely, they also provided members with 36

updates on the Alliance’s efforts to influence legislation, as well as financial vehicles

such as credit programs and other forms of financial assistance.

The idea of economic prosperity attracted black farmers to the Colored Alliance. However, it was the Alliance’s principled vocation to assist black farmers with their own educational and literacy development and that of their children by organizing schools and preaching a message of self-improvement that manifested itself in greater confidence and financial growth that sustained the movement. African Americans began to take a more active role in their own economic success.

While the Negro’s progress was slow, very slow, here was tangible proof indeed that the agrarian black masses, through unity, might rise out of their oppressed

state. This was perhaps the greatest black agrarian expression of the ideals of

self-help and solidarity since reconstruction whereby the Negro farmer had organized on such a broad scale to take the initiative and work out his own

economic salvation in a hostile environment. (Gaither 26-27)

It was unity of the black agrarian class that created a fear among the Southern Democrats. Even though the Colored Alliance was not a political organization, the

cohesiveness of the Alliance, and the extent to which it reached throughout the South, did

not go unnoticed. Fearful of a large black coalition upsetting the status quo in politics, the Southern Democrats used propaganda to stir up unrest among white voters. By

rekindling Black Republicanism, the hope of white Democrats was to create inner turmoil

among the white farmers of the South with a threat that blacks will reign supreme if the Republicans win elections. Black Republicanism, post-Civil War, was a pejorative term

referring to white, Republican politicians that had an allegiance to Abraham Lincoln and

subsequently to the plight of African Americans. Up until this point, there existed a 37

bond, however tenuous, between the Southern and Colored Farmers’ Alliances. While

the Farmers’ Alliances shared a common goal, the Republicans and Democrats did not.

Cracks in the Alliance As the Colored Alliance continued to increase its membership, it also began to increase its voice in the public arena. Gradually shedding its non-partisan cloak, the group began taking political sides on economic issues. Losing a unified voice proved to be the first step toward its demise. In 1891, in an effort to increase their bottom line profits and decrease their costs, a group of planters and vendors in the South secretly colluded to institute wage and price controls. The planters were going to reduce wages to fifty cents per one hundred pounds of cotton picked. Black cotton pickers would be affected severely by the decrease in wages. The Colored Alliance felt obligated to take some action to protect the cotton pickers, but were in disagreement as to what that action should be. R.M. Humphrey, superintendent of the Colored Alliance, decided to call for a massive cotton pickers strike throughout the South. Not all leaders in the Colored Alliance agreed with him, however, citing concerns for race riots and a lack of solidarity with the Southern Alliance. Additionally, many members of the Alliance owned or rented land and picked their own cotton, so they were not in favor of a strike. Furthermore, the Southern Alliance was not in favor of the Colored Alliance supporting a cotton pickers strike throughout the South. Up to this point, the Southern Alliance and Colored Alliance had been working in tandem with one another, wherever possible, toward the common goal of betterment of the agrarian way of life. Both organizations had worked together to oppose the Conger Lard Bill, much to

the chagrin of the Northern Alliance, who supported the bill that would regulate the 38 taxing of vegetable oil. They also joined forces to put an end to the Louisiana Lottery that was proving to be synonymous with corruption and leading farmers into debt. The

Southern Alliance also invited the Colored Alliance to frequent their exchanges and to have their exchange agents join the National Association of Business Agents and State

Exchanges formed by the Southern Alliance.

In defiance of the Colored Alliance’s lack of support for the cotton pickers strike, Humphrey formed the Cotton Pickers League comprised of field hands that did not own any land and who made their living at picking cotton on plantations. The Cotton Pickers

League was a distinctly separate organization from the Colored Alliance, but because Humphrey was the spokesman for both groups, there was confusion with the general public as to the true sponsor of the strike. Humphrey’s attempt to coordinate a mass strike throughout the entire South was doomed to failure for several reasons. First, the maturity date of the cotton differed throughout the South making a coordinated strike date impossible. Secondly, there were not enough cotton pickers willing to strike to make an impact. Additionally, there was not enough leadership at the local level to coordinate the cotton pickers in a coordinated massive strike. Lastly, the newly formed

Cotton Pickers League did not have the fiduciary means to support the workers while they were on strike. A feeble attempt at a strike ensued; however, it had been violently put down almost immediately. Unfortunately, several farmers and cotton pickers lost their lives in skirmishes, posse attacks, and murders by lynching. The Colored Alliance lost the respect of the Southern Alliance and Humphrey had been discredited. Additionally, many black farmers were left to re-evaluate their association with the Colored Alliance as some perceived the strike an extreme departure from the original tenor of the association—a self-improvement, educational, and benevolent society. 39

While the cotton pickers’ strike was a colossal failure, it did prove something very important. When opposing the strike, the white landowners of the Southern Alliance had put their needs ahead of those of the black landless cotton pickers. The white farmers needed the cotton pickers to pick their cotton. A strike would have been economically disastrous for them. It begged the question, what consequences would await the black farmers should another situation arise where their interests were in opposition with those of the white farmers? This was a watershed moment in the history of the Colored

Alliance and it gave many a cause for pause.

The End of Cooperation and the End of the Alliance African Americans were frustrated with the small gains they were making in the

South. Having the backing of the Southern Alliance did not yield them the benefits of equality and opportunity. It was with some trepidation that the Colored Alliance entered into a working relationship with the Southern Alliance knowing that racism/segregation divided them. The Colored Alliance was willing to work toward tearing down racial barriers over time if the Southern Alliance would continue to support the work of the

Colored Alliance and the African-American people.

In 1887, in the spirit of racial solidarity, African American sociologist, Jesse Lawson, in his address entitled, the “Ethics of the Labor Problem,” put forth his cooperative vision of what he called an ethico-economic system. It was a theory that did not look to politics to furnish relief, but appealed to the better angels and ethical judgment of all leaders especially in regard to offering opportunities and paying fair wages to everyone regardless of race. Lawson dictated that “we must resort to reason and 40

common sense to supply the deficiency, and build up a system of our own upon the broad

foundation of justice and benevolence” (Lawson 4).

However, reason and common sense did not resonate with the white farmers of the Southern Alliance. When the Southern Alliance repeatedly and openly supported laws that suppressed African Americans, it became harder to sell the idea of cooperation to the members of the Colored Alliance. “The local Alliance chapter … issued orders in 1889 that no land could be leased to blacks … In 1890 the Alliance won control of a number of state legislatures in the South, and those legislatures under their control adopted anti-Negro laws” (Holmes 194). In 1890, the Southern Alliance advocated for a poll tax and literacy test as a means to disenfranchise black voters. “In 1891 … the

Alliance legislature in Georgia passed a Jim Crow law for railroads, revived [the] use of the whipping post, and provided that white and black prisoners could not be chained together. The colored Alliance of Georgia protested these measures, but to no avail”

(Holmes 194). Additionally, the Southern Alliance routinely published articles that were anti-black. Furthermore, in some instances when the Colored Alliance pursued organizing Alliance chapters, their outreach to African Americans had been met with harsh, sometimes violent, push back from the Southern Alliance. Albion Winegar

Tourgée, a Republican judge during Reconstruction, remarked that he had “hoped that the Colored Alliancemen, who had tended to put great faith in the Alliance movement would now realize the ‘true spirit and purpose’ of the whites. Blacks, he insisted, could expect little at the hands of the southern white farmers” (Holmes 199). It was becoming more obvious that white economic dominance over blacks was the objective of the Southern

Alliance and that African Americans in the South could expect the violence to escalate each time they began to get a foothold in a region. 41

Gradually, the membership of the Colored Alliance started to drop off and with it went the membership dues that kept the organization afloat. Subsequently, the merchant exchanges had failed, as they could not afford to buy stock that they would sell at reduced prices to the black farmers. As the black merchant exchanges failed, the farmers would have no alternative but to deal with profit-hungry merchants who would bankrupt the farmers. There is some speculation that had the Colored Alliance restricted its activities to the educational and personal development of the black people and not have tried to upset the status quo, they may not have endured the horrible atrocities befallen them, and their organization may have been allowed to peacefully coexist. Not only did the Colored Alliance have to deal with the white Southern Alliance, but there were also other black farmer alliances that vied for members. One such organization was the National Colored Alliance that started in Texas as did the Colored Farmers’ Alliance. There was a constant battle between the two organizations as they competed for members. As reported in the National Economist in 1890, the leaders of the two organizations remarked that their discourse was causing a rift not only between their families, but also their churches.

The Significance of Black Churches in the South With the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, African-American men were now voting. This was short-lived, however, as the Compromise of 1877 effectively ended Reconstruction and with it went the right of African Americans to vote in the South. Through a series of voter intimidation tactics and state laws dictating literacy tests and poll taxes, African Americans were kept away from the polls. 42

Black churches in the South provided a venue where African Americans could exercise their right to vote in church matters and in elections of church officials. Church politics provided a proving ground, of sorts, for African Americans to learn organizational skills; how to evaluate and debate current events; how to mobilize church members around a cause; and how to raise money for their church community. In essence, black churches became a political and sociological arena for the African American society. Black churches were based locally bringing together the generations of a community—both young and old. Culturally dynamic, the church provided a venue where preachers and community leaders could communicate a message to the congregation and keep them informed of current political developments.

Church leaders were expected to look out for the needs of their congregation by speaking out about the plight of the African Americans, unfair business practices toward blacks, and other socially relevant subjects. The congregation financially supported the head of the church leaving him unencumbered to work fulltime in support of the congregation. In 1890, Reverend Walter Alexander Pattillo, a minister of the Black Baptist

Church in North Carolina, traveled across Texas as a lecturer and organizer for the

Colored Farmers Alliance advocating the mission of the Alliance and encouraging blacks and whites to join. In 1891, Pattillo attended the Confederation of Industrial

Organizations Conference coordinated by the Farmers’ Alliances and other similar groups where he advocated for the formation of a third party. “The Black Baptist and African Methodist Episcopalian (AME) churches were not only seedbeds of African political activity from the antebellum era through

Reconstruction, but also provided much of the organizational impetus and leadership that would help develop Black Populism” (Ali 24). 43

CHAPTER 6

FROM A FARMERS’ ALLIANCE TO A POLITICAL PARTY

The coalition of the Southern Alliance and the Colored Alliance gave farmers a

collective voice, however, “it [would] soon become evident that no major reforms would

be effected unless it went into politics” (Abramowitz 258). Initially, the Alliances turned to the existing political parties. The Southern Alliance courted the Democratic Party, pointing out that support of the Alliance would put over one million farming votes in their column on Election Day. Because the Democrats continued to rule the South after Reconstruction and were not sympathetic to the black farmers and their problems, the

Colored Alliance turned to the Republican Party for support. The Republicans, while they had shown support of the farmers in the past, seem to be distancing themselves as they cozied up to the big conglomerates in the North. By 1890, agrarian reform was not something mainstream politics was talking about and cared even less.

When the Southern and Colored Alliances met at the convention in Ocala, Florida, in 1890 to devise their Alliance platform, it was a known fact that there was already discussion among members of the Colored Alliance about supporting a third party. In 1890, the Kansas Alliance Party, a Populist Party won control of the Kansas State Legislature. Populism was gaining support throughout the western and southern states. In 1891, during a Populist state convention held in Texas, two African-American people were named to the executive committee of the party marking a turning point in race relations. In response to these appointments, African Americans dispatched lecturers to address rallies throughout the South in hopes of converting people to the

Populist Party. 44

The demands that were ultimately adopted at the Ocala convention were not new ideas, but were considered progressive. Specifically, the Alliances called for only United

States citizens being allowed to own land; reclaiming lands given to the railroad, but not used; a graduated income tax; abolition of national banks; low interest loans to farmers through sub-treasuries; an increase in the amount of money in circulation; a provision for the direct election of senators; and government ownership of the railroads and telecommunication businesses.

Populism was seen as a viable option that found its roots in the collective organizing efforts of the farmers. Since both black and white farmers suffered from the same economic hurdles such as the crop lien system, a currency shortage, and furnishing merchants that sold dry goods and supplies to the farmers at inflated prices, pooling their resources seemed a natural next step. However, when a joint meeting of the Alliances occurred in May 1891, the Southern Alliance continued to be unresolved with moving forward with the establishment of a third party. Additionally, they attempted to trot out segregation rules that were quickly and overwhelming defeated. “They also failed to prevent the conference from establishing a tentative People’s Party committee which was to exist pending the formation of a permanent party organization for the 1892 elections.

The inability of the Southerners to prevent establishment of this temporary committee meant that a third party virtually was assured within the next year” (Abramowitz 261).

On July 4, 1892, in Omaha, Nebraska, the Populist Party held a convention where the party, officially establishing itself as a formidable political entity adopted its party platform. Borne out of the Farmers’ Alliance movement, the Populist Party wanted to fight corruption and amorality in government and remove the influence and power that big business had on government. Influence that ultimately placed undue hardship on the working class either through unfair taxation, restrictive monetary policies, or the 45 unnecessary usurpation of land for corporate use. The delegates in attendance overwhelmingly agreed on a platform that aimed to put the common worker on equal footing with the multi-millionaire. Specifically, the Populist Party incorporated planks that called for a graduated income tax, coinage of silver and gold at a ratio of sixteen to one, government ownership of telecommunications, the reclamation of land for settlers, and free and fair elections for all eligible voters.

Elections of 1892 and 1896 The Populist Party went through a few iterations of candidates for the 1892 election. First putting forward the name of Leonidas L. Polk, leader of the Farmers’

Alliance, however, he unexpectedly passed away. Walter Gresham, an appellate judge, was also considered, but he had decided to vote with the Democrats. Finally, James

Weaver was considered and ultimately represented the Populist Party in the Presidential election taking twenty-two electoral votes and over one million of the popular vote. Not the showing the Party was hoping for.

Having been a supporter of bimetallism, Weaver was able to garner votes in the mid-western states of Kansas, Colorado, North Dakota, and Idaho; along with Oregon and Nevada in the West. Furthermore, in a strategic gamble the Democratic Party sympathized with the Populists in the mid-western states adopting a fusion policy. They threw their support to the Populist candidates in hopes that they would take away votes from the Republican candidates and improve Grover Cleveland, the Democratic candidate’s chances. Fusion politics proved to be a successful venture in Kansas and

North Dakota. Being a former Union soldier, it was thought that Weaver did not connect as well with the constituents of the South. However, realizing that the Populists were turning out 46

the agriculture vote, the Democrats took no chances. They resorted to “bribery and

intimidation, the stuffing of ballot boxes, [and] the falsification of election returns. The

total vote of Augusta…turned out to be double the number of the legal voters” (Hicks 253).

The election of 1892 proved to be a learning exercise in politics for the Populist

Party. Dealing with wholesale election fraud; accusations of their leadership accepting bribes to throw elections; and lacking the understanding of why people vote. They

learned the hard way that “the silver states were not interested in Populism, they were

interested in silver, and they supported the Populist ticket solely because of this one item in the Populist creed. Had the Populist program not included free coinage it could hardly

have appealed seriously to any of the mountain states” (Hicks 268).

The Farmers’ Alliances did not fare very well after the election. Resenting the fact that the Alliance had become a political entity, many members left in droves. When members originally joined, it was under the auspices of a non-partisan, non-political organization. As the Election of 1896 drew near, the Populists had been heatedly debating whether or not to nominate as their presidential candidate a member of their own party or

Democrat William Jennings Bryan. The Populist Party had had some success with electing candidates at the state level, but not nationally. Bryan, a Democrat, had been vocal of his support for the Populist platform so appeared to be a good fusion party option for the Populists. If elected, many of the reforms Populists were championing would have a better chance of becoming actual policy.

The decision to choose Jennings Bryan caused internal strife within the Populist

Party as the members were concerned that they would lose their identity as an independent party. Additionally, the African-American farmers argued that the 47

Democratic Party which Bryan represented had never supported the black farmers in the

South. Unfortunately, they were out-voted by the white Populists. The debate that

ensued marked the beginning of the end of the Populist Party as members could not agree on which party best represented their ideals. Each of the major parties absorbed some of

the Populist platform making the Populist Party superfluous. In the end, the Populists

nominated Bryan who had a respectable showing by winning 176 electoral votes and six and half million popular votes, but it was not enough to save the Populist Party from

extinction. Without gaining the support of urban workers as well as the farmers, the

Populist Party was never able to demonstrate national prominence. Interestingly, after Bryan lost the 1896 election he gave an address to the

bimetallists expressing his commitment to the cause of bimetallism. He also makes a

provocative accusation that ends with an ominous prediction, Gold standard Democrats have publicly advocated the election of the Indianapolis

ticket, while they labored secretly for the election of the Republican ticket. The

trusts and corporations have tried to excite a fear of lawlessness, while they themselves have been defying the law; and American financiers have boasted that

they were custodians of national honor, while they were secretly bartering away

the Nation’s financial independence. (Bryan 625)

Roots of Black Populism The roots of Black Populism can be traced back to the Cooperative Workers of

America launched in South Carolina in 1886. This organization predates the Colored

Alliance formed in Texas by several months, however, its mission was very similar in nature. The Cooperative Workers of America was an organized group of African-

American rural farmers in the South that were focused on gaining access to free 48

education, eliminating the poll tax, and agrarian wage reforms. The Cooperative

Workers of America “helped give expression to Black Populism, which had begun to

coalesce as an independent movement of black farmers, sharecroppers, and agrarian workers” (Ali 191). The workers would hold clandestine meetings at churches, in small

groups, usually late at night primarily for their safety as they were often subjected to

threats and violence as a means of trying to quash their spirit. As their organization grew, so did its mission. Moving from a more self-help platform to a more aggressive political

agenda—calling for the direct election of senators and land reforms—the movement crossed into the realm of Populism. Toward the end of 1886, “the mantle of the Cooperative Workers of America was taken up by the Colored Farmers’ Alliance” (Ali 191). The Farmers Alliance also began

as a self-help group, but within a few years found it necessary to take its agenda to the electorate for validation. As previously discussed, the Farmers’ Alliance ran candidates on the Populist ticket in the elections of 1892 and 1896. With each election, the Populists garnered more support much to the chagrin of the Southern Democrats who took extreme measures to stop the forward momentum of the Black Populists. For example, in 1895,

South Carolina held a constitutional convention specifically to rewrite their state’s constitution to legally disenfranchise African Americans. However, “In the end, Black Populism in South Carolina, as in other areas of the South, was unable to sustain itself as a movement in the face of paramilitary attacks, intimidation, and other extra-legal tactics orchestrated by the Democratic Party” (Ali 203). However, this was not the end. Just as the Farmers’ Alliance took the baton from the Cooperative

Workers of America, nationwide civil rights movements would continue to achieve their objectives through the 1940s to the 1960s. 49

CHAPTER 7

METHODOLOGY

In order to gain an in-depth understanding of the subject matter I relied on

qualitative methodology. Specifically employing biographical and life history

research methods to identify key individuals, trends, reasons, motivations, and

outcomes. By understanding the events as they unfolded, I was able to gain valuable insight into the issues that nineteenth century farmers had faced as well as the cause and effect of discrimination, segregation, and economic instability.

The resources that were used included both primary and secondary sources that allowed me to not only compare and contrast documented insights and events, but also to gain insight into the humanity of the people involved. By specifically relying on printed material that supports both sides of the stated hypothesis, a fair appraisal was able to be rendered. The types of sources relied upon included peer-reviewed journal articles, books by subject-matter experts, newspaper reports from the era being studied, and essays.

The intent of the manner in which this thesis was written was to not only report the known historical facts, but to also elaborate on the relationships of the farmers to one another, to their communities, and to politicians. The intent was not to pass judgment or to discuss the immorality of how African Americans were treated in the South. 50

The hypothesis will be proven by drawing reasonable conclusions about the associations of the individuals within their social framework based upon the biographical research.

51

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

Goodwyn makes reference to black farmers not being able to perform collective

public acts which in turn diminishes the significance of their movement. He refers to an authentic movement culture not being achieved. Perhaps Goodwyn is equating

unequivocal success with being an authentic movement culture. In that instance,

Goodwyn could be correct. The Colored Alliance was not a resounding success in that it did not achieve all that it set out to do before the organization became defunct. However, authenticity is not necessarily predicated on success. Initially failing in its endeavor, the

American Civil Rights Movement had a few reboots before it was ultimately successful in ensuring civil rights for all. The Niagara Movement and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) were both precursors to what would become the modern Civil Rights Movement (1954-1968). In response to southern states re-writing their constitutions to legalize the disenfranchisement of African Americans, a group met in Canada at a hotel on the

Niagara River in 1905, hence the name, the Niagara Movement. Their meeting produced a manifesto outlining their philosophy of equal voting rights for African American men and an end to racial segregation. The Niagara Movement was led by W.E.B. Du Bois and

William Monroe Trotter who continually spoke out about equal rights for all. Unlike African American leader, Booker T. Washington, who at the time preached apologetics in that he proposed that the pathway to achieving equality for African Americans started with their own self-improvement in order to be worthy of inclusion. The Niagara Movement started to wane in 1907 and disbanded in 1908 due to a lack of singular focus and diverging philosophies on how to achieve their goals. The work accomplished by 52

this group, however, laid the foundation for the formation of the NAACP in 1909.

Taking up the mantle from the Niagara Movement, the NAACP to this day functions as an organization that promotes equality for all and calls for the elimination of discrimination. When Brown vs. Board of Education came before the Supreme Court challenging the “separate but equal” doctrine made law as a result of Plessy vs. Ferguson, the NAACP lobbied hard to have the Court reverse its previous decision and ensure equal education for all. The NAACP remains active and influential to present day.

Looking again at Goodwyn’s statement regarding the Colored Farmers’ Alliance not being an authentic movement, Oxford Dictionary defines movement as being “a group of people working together to advance their shared political, social, or artistic ideas.” The Colored Alliance did organize local, state, and regional chapters of farmers united in solidarity to better their lives. It was a formal organization of dues paying members, with an executive board, and regional conventions to decide as a group what issues were most pressing and for what they would be willing to die as this was a possibility never far from the minds of post-Civil War African Americans. For the ugliness of white supremacy would manifest itself in extreme violence and lynching mobs. To say that this movement was not authentic is at best an affront and at the very least a disservice to the African American community. The systematic stripping African Americans of their right to vote was authentic. The killing was authentic. And, the subsequent answer to the infringement of these basic human rights was authentic. The

Colored Farmers’ Alliance attempted to redress the imbalance of power through an organized effort. An effort that purposely did not exclude whites.

According to sociologist, Theodore Abel,

A social movement may be said to exist wherever a group of individuals,

operating within a community, aims to win the support of that community for the 53

establishment of some innovation in the ways and means of promoting a common

interest. The innovation or change may be a new or untried mode of procedure, or

the restoration of a mode applied in the past. In either case the intention that underlies the attempted change arises from the experience of the inadequacy of a

given procedure, and the belief in the adequacy of the proposed change. (348)

The Colored Alliance meets this definition of a social movement. The history of the Colored Alliance is one of a group of farmers that despite faced with overwhelming discrimination methodically developed what they saw as a pathway to a productive life.

From its inception, it was an organization focused on economic cooperation and education for the betterment of their community and to change the attitudes of the whites toward African Americans. Literacy and education were especially important in order

that their community be informed of legislation, taxation, currency issues, and new developments in farming. Literacy was key to participation and community involvement.

Black farmers and their families would meet in church halls where they would teach each

other how to read the newspaper; those who could not read would have the paper read to them so that everyone could stay informed. Additionally, Colored Homestead

Companies were established to not only assist African Americans with purchasing their

own homes, but to also raise money to extend public school terms. The Colored Alliance saw the advantage of including white farmers in their

association in order to increase their chances of success of winning community support.

It was an extremely strategic move on their part knowing that having a white man at the helm would help to open up doors with other associations, politicians, and bankers that

may not typically entertain talking with an organization of black farmers. Creating an

avenue for this dialogue was another win for the Colored Alliance. In addition to

organizing farmers to teach them about the latest advances in agriculture, the Colored 54

Alliance established merchant exchanges, loan programs, and newspapers. They raised

money for education and lobbied for reforms. Lecturers would travel through the South

to exchange knowledge and recruit members. Goodwyn does agree that the Colored Alliance was extraordinary. “That the

Colored Alliance touched the lives of as many people as it did was a remarkable political

and cultural achievement” (Goodwyn 123). However, he goes on to say, “But it was not remotely enough. By 1890, it was still unclear just how the mass of black farmers across

the South were to be recruited away from the party of Lincoln” (123).

Efforts to recruit large numbers of black farmers to pledge allegiance to the Southern Democrats were not successful, hence voter suppression. Both parties—

Republicans and Democrats—were interested in acquiring the black vote. They

represented well over one million highly coveted votes. However, since the black vote was not clamoring to become Democrats; the Democrats took away their right to vote

through a myriad of voter suppression laws to the extent that it yielded full-fledged

disenfranchisement of the black vote. Goodwyn does not offer a definition of what he considers an authentic movement

culture. He does, however, explaining his point of view, offer that because of “the

Southern caste system, there could be no vast Colored Alliance cooperative and no public demonstrations of support for such cooperatives” (123). In December 1890, the Southern

Alliance and the Colored Alliance met in Ocala, Florida. The Alliances decided to meet jointly as the organizations were moving from out of the realm of a farmers’ benevolent society and into the political arena. The purpose of the convention was to agree on a platform or demands. These demands would ultimately become the platform of the

Populist Party. In direct opposition to Goodwyn’s statement, this meeting was a public

demonstration of support for the Alliance and its manifesto. 55

“Historically, independent political movements have been the driving force behind changes in public policy and the law, even if their impact is not immediately felt.

The abolition of slavery, the expansion of the right to vote, and the protection of civil rights were all the products of protracted independent-movement building efforts” (Ali

176). The common theme in all movements, whether initially successful or not or whether politically motivated or not, is that someone or some group has to start somewhere.

In the case of black Virginia farmer, John Boyd, Jr., he had reached the end of his rope. He was about to lose his farm because he was buried in debt having taken out high- interest loans that he was unable to repay. He had applied to the United States

Department of Agriculture for a low-interest loan, but his application still had not been processed after years of waiting. Knowing that white farmers had not only received low- interest loans from the government, but also subsidies, he was concerned that black farmers’ loan applications were not being processed. Because of the lack of funding, they were not only losing their farms, but their homes as well. John Boyd was going to be next. Just as his ancestors who were sharecroppers realized, he knew that in order to make progress he would have to organize the black farmers. The year was 1995. One hundred and nine years after the formation of the Colored Farmers Alliance, John Boyd organized the National Black Farmers’ Association because of racial discrimination against black farmers. As a country, we have not gotten very far on the issue of discrimination. Like his ancestors, Boyd formed the National Black Farmers’ Association

(NBFA) to help better the lives of black farmers. The NBFA mission statement is as follows: “To encourage the participation of small and disadvantaged farmers in gaining access to resources of state and federal programs administered by the United States 56

Department of Agriculture. To communicate and educate our community through

effective outreach and technical assistance” (blackfarmers.org). This does not differ

greatly from the original mission of the Colored Alliance—to assist with self- improvement and education.

The NBFA organized protests, marches, created a newsletter, and launched a

website. They marched on Washington, testified before Congress, and filed a billion- dollar class action lawsuit against the United States Department of Agriculture alleging

discrimination against African-American farmers with regard to loan allocation. In 1999,

the court decided Pigford vs. Glickman in favor of the farmers, ordering the government to process all claims attached to the class action. The farmers were paid one billion

dollars with another one billion two hundred million dollars appropriated for the black

farmers in the 2008 Farm Bill. When the remaining payments were not forthcoming, Boyd got on his tractor and drove from his southwest Virginia farm to Washington, D.C., to find out why. When he was informed that tens of thousands of claims were disqualified, he rallied the NBFA, staged protests, and met with lawmakers individually. In 2010, President Obama signed legislation that set aside over a billion dollars to resolve all outstanding claims.

It started with one man’s outrage and morphed into a two billion dollar court settlement. Reflecting on Goodwyn’s statement that white supremacy kept the Colored

Alliance from becoming an authentic movement culture, it is difficult to support this theory when over one hundred years later, the same issues arose, and the same tactics were employed for a successful outcome. Realizing that a counter-argument could be made that attitudes have changed and, therefore, a different outcome should be expected today. However, it is important to note that the cause of the problem of today’s farmers 57 was the same as that of the farmers in the nineteenth century—discrimination and bigoted attitudes.

The NBFA fought for over thirty years before they saw any kind of reimbursement and acknowledgment of wrongdoing on the part of the government begging the question, did the Colored Alliance give up too soon? A primary cause of the

Alliance’s demise was because they lost their membership due to a rift. A rift that began to emerge in the Alliance as the organization moved from an agrarian society to a political mouthpiece. Many of the members did not agree with the decision to enter politics while others were convinced that representation in Congress was the only way to make their voices heard, put an end to disenfranchisement, and to ensure that Congress kept the interests of the farmers in mind when crafting legislation.

The NBFA, however, kept true to their mission statement of encouraging the participation of small and disadvantaged farmers in gaining access to resources of state and federal programs. They banded together in a class action lawsuit, relentlessly lobbied politicians, and heightened the public’s awareness through rallies and protests until they had a resolution. Nobody can say for sure what would have happened if the

Colored Alliance had stayed out of politics and continued as an agrarian society, but it is interesting to theorize about the how the outcome may have been different had that option been chosen.

The threat of violence and death that the farmers were subjected to in the nineteenth century most likely had some influence on their decision to band with the white farmers’ alliance; and the white farmers’ alliance was moving into politics.

[T]he murderous atmosphere in much of the countryside, which already had

claimed the lives of young militants through lynchings and political repression,

produced caution and gave the initiative over to those black leaders most ready to 58

reach an accommodation with whites. With little hope of derailing the drive for

disenfranchisement, these black leaders often looked to mitigate the results by

aligning with white conservatives. (Hahn 447) It is most unfortunate that a race of people who were declared free citizens of the

United States were forced into a situation that challenged their self-worth and diminished their humanity. Progress has been made to redress the situation, however, given the mood of today’s political climate, it is evident that we still have far to go.

In closing, Steven Hahn said it best, “Relying on the relations and institutions that they had built and that enabled them over many decades to endure repression and make themselves as a people, they challenged the nation—as their slave and freed forebears had done—to confront the meaning of its own democracy. Their challenge remains with us. And they are still to be thanked” (Hahn 476).

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