The Santiago Commitment As a Call to Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U
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University of Miami Law School University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 7-1-1994 The aS ntiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala Stephen J. Schnably University of Miami School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr Part of the Human Rights Law Commons Recommended Citation Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 393 (1994) Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol25/iss3/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-American Law Review by an authorized editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 393 THE SANTIAGO COMMITMENT AS A CALL TO DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: EVALUATING THE OAS ROLE IN HAITI, PERU, AND GUATEMALA STEPHEN J. SCHNABLY* I. INTRODUCTION ............................................. 395 II. THE PROBLEMS OF EFFECTIVENESS AND PERSPECTIVE ................ 412 III. TESTING THE SANTIAGO COMMITMENT ............................ 418 A. H aiti ................................................. 418 1. The Coup and the Initial Reaction ....................... 418 2. The First Attempts to Negotiate a Settlement .............. 422 3. The Governors Island Agreement ........................ 430 4. Settlement Efforts and U.S. Intervention After the Collapse of the Governors Island Agreement ........................ 446 B . Peru ................................................. 460 * Professor of Law, University of Miami. A.B., Harvard College, 1976; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1981. The description of events in this Article is complete as of October 15, 1994. I would like to thank Marc Fajer, Elizabeth Iglesias, Lili Levi, Bernard Oxman, Tucker Ronzetti, and Irwin Stotzky for the generosity of time and insight they brought to their critiques of earlier drafts of this Article. Edgardo Rotman, Foreign and International Law Librarian, was unfailingly diligent in locating critical documents. Dina Hamdy, Victor Marroquin, Sidney Patchett, and Alberto Zapata provided impeccable research assistance, and Michael Cover provided useful com- ments. An earlier version of the article was presented at a Workshop on the Evalua- tion of the Inter-American System of Human Rights, sponsored by the Institute Latinoamericano de Servicios Legales Alternativos (ILSA), in Bogota, Colombia. Funding was provided by the University of Miami School of Law Summer Research Grant Fund. 394 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:3 C. Guatemala ............................................ 470 IV. EVALUATING THE OAS AND U.S. RESPONSES ....................... 482 A The Problem of Effectiveness ............................... 483 1. Economic Sanctions .................................. 483 2. International Condemnation ........................... 495 3. The Absence of Political Will ........................... 509 B. The Problem of Perspective ................................ 516 1. The Danger of Exclusive Emphasis on Constitutionalism ...... 517 a. The Structural Impediments to Democracy ............. 518 b. The Controversial Nature of Efforts to Lessen the Impediments ................................... 524 c. A Framework for Addressing the Impediments .......... 527 2. The Danger of Manipulation of Constitutionalism ........... 531 C. Improving the Santiago Commitment ........................ 545 V. THE NEED FOR AN EXPANDED COMMITMENT TO DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS WITHIN THE U.S ...................................... 556 A The Problem of Effectiveness ............................... 558 1. The Weakness of Democratic Constraint on U.S. Foreign Policy Regarding Democracy and Human Rights ............ 558 2. The Structural Barriers to Democracy .................... 566 3. Overcoming the Structural Barriers ...................... 578 B. The Problem of Perspective ................................ 582 C. Conclusion ............................................ 585 19941 THE OAS AND DEMOCRACY 395 I. INTRODUCTION Ending a period in which elected civilian governments had become virtually the norm throughout the Americas, coups in Haiti and Peru during 1991 and 1992 presaged difficult times for democracy and human rights.' Coup attempts in Venezuela in 1992 and 1993,2 the imposition of emergency measures and 1. See, e.g., THE ASPEN INSTITUTE, CONVERGENCE AND COMMUNITY: THE AMER- ICAS IN 1993 24 (1992); ROBERT A. PASTOR, WHIRLPOOL: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY To- WARD LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 288 (1992); Kenneth Freed and William R. Long, Recession, Corruption Fuel Latin Coup Jitters, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1992, at 6; Andres Oppenheimer, Events in Peru Spread Fear in Latin America, MIAMI HER- ALD, Apr. 7, 1992, at 1OA; Caleb Rossiter, Peru Without Tears; Democracy Isn't Dead - It Never Lived, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 1992, at Cl; Les Whittington, The Haiti Effect: Venezuela Coup Try May Have Been Fallout from What Happened to Aristide, THE GAZETTE (MONTREAL), Feb. 5, 1992, at A9. See also Don Bohning, Haiti and Peru Testing Newfound Resolve of OAS, MIAMI HERALD, May 17, 1992, at 12A; Christopher Madison, U.S.-Latin Tango, 24 NATVL J. 1408 (June 13, 1992); Robin Wright, Poverty's Shadow Haunting New Democracies, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1992, at 1. Many Latin American politicians drew a similar lesson. See Oscar Arias Sanchez, Halting the Reversal of Democracy, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1992, at 19 (statement of former President of Costa Rica) ("Recent events in Haiti, Peru, Panama, and Brazil serve as a warning."); Venezuela Presidential Address on Na- tional Unity Following Coup Attempt, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, NEWS File (speech by Carlos Andrds Perez) ("Now more than ever, we are able to understand our energetic position on Haiti"). 2. A coup attempt in Venezuela nearly succeeded in February 1992. See Andres Oppenheimer, At Least 56 Die in Abortive Rebellion, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 5, 1992, at IA; Venezuela Crushes Army Coup Attempt, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 1992, at A6. The OAS condemned the coup attempt, see Support for the Democratic Govern- ment of Venezuela, C.P. Res. 576 (887/92), OAS Permanent Council, OEA/ser.G, OAS Doc. CP/RES. 576 (887/92) ((1992), see also OAS Resolution on Support for the Dem- ocratic Government of the Republic of Venezuela, A.G. Res. 2906/92, OAS General Assembly, OAS Doc. AG/doc.2906/92 (1992), reprinted in FOREIGN POLY BULL., July- Aug. 1992, at 84, and sent the Chairman of the Permanent Council and the Secre- tary General to Venezuela after the coup attempt was put down. See Venezuela Presidential Address on National Unity Following Coup Attempt, supra note 1. Al- most as disturbing as the coup attempt itself, President Carlos Andres Perez sus- pended key constitutional rights for a brief period after the coup. Andres Oppenheimer, Venezuela Suspends Key Rights, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 5, 1992, at 1A. For an analysis of the background of the coup attempt and its aftermath, including the popularity of the attempted coup's instigators, see Joseph Ricciardi, Venezuela: The Military's Wake-Up Call, NACLA REP. ON THE AMERICAS, July 1992, at 7. In November 1992, a second and more bloody coup attempt occurred in Vene- zuela. It was notable for its failure to gain popular support, in contrast with the first. See James Brooke, Venezuelan Chief Rules Out Resigning, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1992, at A6; Caracas Derails Coup by Air Force Units, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 1992, § 1, at 3; Andres Oppenheimer, Rebels Mount More Attacks in Venezuela, MIAMI HER- 396 INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:3 the suspension of liberties there in mid-1994,3 and the recurrent hints of coups elsewhere in Latin America4 contributed to the sense of instability. To make matters worse, Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's "autogolpe" (i.e., self-coup) and the February 1992 attempted coup in Venezuela won significant domestic sup- port,5 as did the suspension of civil liberties in Venezuela in June 1994.' These developments make clear that representative democ- racy has neither fully captured the popular imagination nor found solid institutional grounding in many Latin American and ALD, Nov. 29, 1992, at 1A. In early December 1993, there were rumors of a third coup attempt in Vene- zuela as the country elected a new President and Congress. See James Brooke, Vene- zuelans, Coup Weary and Still on Edge, Await Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at A4; Coup Rumours Back in Circulation, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., 12 Aug. 1993, at 365. The U.S. government threatened economic sanctions in the event of a coup. See Andres Oppenheimer, Clinton Acts to Avert Coup in Venezuela, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 4, 1993, at 22A. 3. On June 27, 1994, in an action that drew comparisons to Fujimori's coup, see A Caudillo in Caracas?, MIAMI HERALD, July 28, 1994, at 20A Financial Emer- gency Accelerates Caldera's Move Away from Free Market, LATIN AM. WKLY. REP., 14 July 1994, at 301. President Rafael Caldera's new government suspended civil lib- erties, including the right to travel abroad, the right to freedom from arbitrary search and seizure, and the right to property, as part of an emergency