CHAPTER XVI SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX-( I) THE GERMANS SEIZE THE VILLAGE THE night of April 23rd at Australian Corps Headquarters north of the Somme, at Montigny, was resonant with gun-fire. After three fine, cold days, the clouds fleeting across an almost full moon looked threatening with rain. The bombardment was mainly from the artillery of the V Corps, covering an unsuccessful attempt by the 35th and 38th Divisions north- west of Albert to regain the line of the Ancre. Towards morning a mist came on, growing denser as dawn approached, and at 4.45 (as foretold by prisoners) there descended on the British front south of the Sornnie, between Villers-Bretotineux and Hangard, intense artillery-fire, including gas-shells of all kinds but especially mustard. The shelling extended along the French front as far as the Bois de Senecat, six miles south-west of Hangard. The 8th British Division’s sector in front of Villers- Bretonneus was then held (from north to south) by the 25th Brigade north of the Roman road, with the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade in the front line and the 2nd Royal Berkshire in support: and by the 23rd Brigade south of the Roman road. with the 2nd Middlesex between the road and railway, the 2nd West Yorkshire from the railway to cross-ways south of the Monu- ment, and the 2nd Devonshire as counter- attack battalion in the Cacliy Switch and the gully south of the town. The garrison of Villers-Bretontieux was the 2nd East Lancashire, of the

538 Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 539 northern (25th) brigade. The 24th Brigade, in reserve, had the greater part of two battalions in the Aubigny (or Gentelles) line running through the Bois l’Abh6, and a third, together with the divisional pioneers (the 2znd Durham Light Infantry), back near Blangy-Tronville. Between Monument Wood and Hangard-the sector of the 58th (Lonc!on) Division-the front line was held by the three battalions of the 173rd Brigade, with the 174th in support. Of the latter, one battalion, the 2/10th London, was attached to the forward brigade for purposes of counter-attack. The 175th Brigadz was in reserve. In order to give its units as much rest as possible the I11 Corps was disposed in small bodies in great depth. The 18th (Eastern) Division had been withdrawn after the fighting of April 4th, the intention being to rest it and train its new draft; but several of its battalions had been used for counter-attacks at Hangard, and, though most of it was now behind the Avre, a detachment, known as “ Shepherd’s Force,”l together with a brigade of its artillery, had to be maintained in front of Cachy as a special protection for that village. The 8th was a particularly good British division-at this time when extra Lewis guns were issued to the best trained divisions, the 8th was one of three British divisions, exclusive of doniinion ones, chosen to receive the first allotment. But it had lost 250 officers and 4,693 of other ranks-half its infantry-in the March offensive ; since Ludendorff’s stroke. Lloyd George had been pouring into France the reinforcements which during the winter he had withheld. The allocation of man-power to the army having kept so low, it was now necessary to reduce the age at which boys were drafted to France. Sir \Villiani Robertson states that 140,000 reinforcements- were then hurriedly scraped together and sent out, the number including, contrary to the undertaking given in Parliament on January 11, many youths under nineteen years of age.2 ’ Commanded by Major S. F Le F. Shepherd, 6th En, Northamptonshire Regt. *Sir Henry \\‘ilson noted (Vol. II. p. 81) that “from March 21 to March zg we have lost 114,000 infantry. \Ve . . . will have sent out by April 4 IOI.OOO.They had some 20,ooo out there, but we have sent all boys of 184 who are trained ” 540 THE A1.F. IN FRANCE [Apr., 1918

These boys were now appearing. One of the Australians who saw then1 writes in his diary: For two days companies of infantry have been passing us on the roads-cunipatiies of children, English children ; pink faced, rouiid clieeked childrci~,flushed under the weight of their unaccustomed packs, w~ththeir steel helmets oii the back of their heads and the strap hanging loosely on their rounded baby chins. Beside these words in the diary is the sketch here shown. The 2nd West Yorks, holding the iront south of the railway, had received 11 officers and 700 of other ranks as reinforcements, and the 2nd Middlesex, between the railway and the Roman road, almost as many. The history of the 18th Division says that the 7th Queen’s-the battalion which went forward with the right of the 36th in First Villers- Eretonneux-now consisted, to the extent of GO per cent, of lads under nineteen, who till a week before had never fired ;I shot. Rawlinson realised that he was making too harsh a demand of these i)oys in thrusting them into battle on the Western Front without even a few weeks of hardening in less tempestuous areas ; but Foch’s insistence upon the tenure by the British Army of this sector between the Sonime and the Luce, and Haig’s determination to maintain reserves near Arras, had made it necessary. This morning Amiens and villages near the Amiens front were being bombarded; shells were bursting on the roads, the woods, and the known and probable battery positions. .411 troops under this fire, and almost all within sight or hearing, guessed that it was the prelude to the expected attack. At 4 o’clock Major-General Heneker3 of the 8th Division ordered his reserve brigade (24th) and pioneers (22nd Durham Light Infantry) to man the reserve trench system. Major-General Cator of the 5Sth Division ordered his reserve brigade--17~th--across the Avre to Gentelles. But to no commander was the bombardment a challenge for such vigorous activity as to Elliott of the 15th Brigade, now

‘General Sir \V. C. G. Heneker, K.CB, K.ChI.G., D.S.O. Commanded 54th Inf. Rde.. 19~5;190th Inf. Rate.. 1916: 8th niv. 1qr6/19. GOC.. Southern Command, India. 1928/32 B zz Aug. 1867 Died ZJ &fay, 1939 Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 54 1 in reserve to its division. During most of the previous fort- night, while the sister brigade-the 14th-was responsible for the northern front of Villers-Bretonneux, Elliott had, by arrangement with the divisional commander, kept a battalion in part of the Aubigny line in the Bois I’AbbB, a mile in rear of the town, with orders to be continuously prepared to recapture Villers-Bretonneux if lost. He had made his staff and battalion commanders study the ground, models of which had been constructed at his order, and he had laid down a plan for the operation. When, on April 20th, the 8th Division took over the southern part of his area, only one platoon arrived to relieve the battalion kept for counter-attack. Its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Scanlan, accordingly refused to accept relief ; but upon Elliott’s making repre- sentations through his divisional commander, General Hobbs.‘ the reply came from 111 Corps that General Butler had authorised altered arrangements for the three-batta!ion brigades of the 8th Division. The relief was at once completed, but Elliott, now more firmly convinced than ever that the town, if attacked, would be lost, kept one of his battalions, the 59th, in constant readiness to counter-attack. He also persuaded General Hobbs to order the 5th Pioneers to dig back from the Aubigny line on his right flank a long trench, ostensibly for communication, but actually as a switch, for the defence of the flank if the enemy broke through.a On first sign OF attack, the 59th and 60th Battalions, which would be first on his roster for counter-attack duties, were to send patrols towards Villers-Bretonneux to ascertain whether the British still held it. Accordingly now, before dawn, as soon as the bombard- ment fell, the whole 15th Brigade stood-to-arms. Elliott ordered the 59th and 60th to send out their patrols, and at 4.50 issued a provisional order containing his plan of counter- attack. This, if required, would be made by the 59th and 60th north of Villers-Bretonneux, up the parallel two spurs leading

‘The headquarters of General Hohbs were at the ch6tcou at Bussy-les-Daours. 34 miles west of Corbie. Those of Elliott were at Blangy-Tronville. ‘General Hobbs later decided to have a similar switch dug from his front line on Hill 104. His C.R.E., Lieut.-Colonel L. F. S. mther, surveyed it on April 23 and the digging was begun the same day. It was afterwards called “Pioneer Trench.’’ 38 542 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [24th Apr., 1918 to the town and to Hill roq respectively. On reaching a road near the top, tlie line would pivot on its right until it faced nearly south-east, and would then descend obliquely, ignoring tlie town on its right and making towards the Roman road. The right conipanies would next swing round to confront Villers-Bretonneux, and face south-west, and would help towards “ pocketing ” the Enemy as shown in the marginal sketch. The 5/”th would be ready to support the attack, its probable rde being to ,x. swing round the southern side of the town and cut ’ off the enemy in it, or at least squeeze him out. At 6.30, as the front had then become quieter, and no word had arrived of any attack, Elliott ordered his battalion comnianders to give their men breakfast and as much rest as possible, but to remain ready for instant action. The heavy German bombardment and the mist had induced a I‘ fog of battle ” tinusually impenetrable for even so severe ai1 action. At 7.10 the latest news from previously captured prisoners-that the Germans would attack at 6 a.m.-was telephoned by the staff of the 8th Division to Brigadier-General Coffin“ of the 25th Brigade, who at once passed it to the commander of the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade holding the front north-east of the town. A message came hack that no attack had taken place, and no S.O.S. signal had been seen. But barely a minute later arrived word that tlie right company of the battalion, on the Roman road, had give11 way; the centre company was reported to be holding its ground. General Coffin ordered his support battalion, the 2nd Royal Berkshire, to launch a company in counter- .ittack.

a Major-Gen. C: Coffin, V.C., C B, D.S.O., p S.C. Commanded 25th Inf. Bde., rg17/18; 36th Div, ig18/1g. Of Devonshire. b. Blackheatb. Eng, IO Feb.. 1870. (He bad won the Victoria Cross in the Third Battle of YDres. 31 July. 1017.) 34th Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 543

Meanwhile the 8th Division’s commander, Major-General Heneker, had heard at 7.20 from the commander of the town garrison a rumour that the Germans had attacked with tanks beside the railway, and shortly before 8 this was confirmed by a man from the trenches. Some troops were said to be still holding out in front of the village. Whether the ~3rd Brigade, at the Monument, was involved in the fighting was still unknown. No British general had ever yet had to deal with an enemy employing tanks, and both Heneker and the corps commander, General Butler, at once turned to their own tanks for meeting them. Heneker ordered three heavy tanks, which were kept in close reserve in the Bois l’Abb6, to go forward at once; and Butler allotted to the 58th Division sevcn light (“ whippet ”) tanks. Hearing that the left of the 58th Division had been driven back, Butler ordered Major- General Cator to restore its line by throwing in his reserve brigade, and to send forward a field-gun to deal with the tanks. While these preparations were being made by the British commanders, Brigadier-General Elliott’s earliest patrol, going out from the 5gth’s position under Lieutenants Christian‘ and Callander: had sent him clear information. Each of these ofticers had been directed to take with him half-a-platoon including a Lewis gun section. Both patrols made separately, through fairly heavy shell-fire on the lowlands, for the gully east of the town, where the railway from Villers-Bretonneux (half-a-mile beyond. on the hill) crosses the Cachy-Fouilloy road. Here they met a number of British infantry, wounded ant1 unwounded, retiring, who told them that the Germans had broken through and were coming on with tanks. The patrol officers had orders to reconnoitre a line8 on the edge of the plateau, just short of the town. They accordingly went on, passing, where the railway emerged from the cutting, a group of British artillerymen under a young officer (Lieutenant But1er)’O with a forward gun in action. The ’ Lieut. J. C. Christian. M.C.; 59th Bn. Actor: of Northcote, Vic.: b. Abbotsford. Vic., 18 Jiine. 1890. * Lieut. R. Callander, M.M.; 59th Bn. Draper: of Numurkah. Vic.: b. Numurkah, 31 March, 1892. The north-south grid line through ‘‘ 0.28 central ” on the niap. lo Lieut. (Temp. Capt ) A. I. Butler, M.C.: Sgrd Bde.. R.F.A. Train manager. of Reading. Eng.: b. 8 July, 1896. 544 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [zqth Apr., 1918 valley round the north, west, and south of the town-plateau was being heavily shelled, but the line to be reconnoitred was empty and no German was seen. The patrols, now acting as one under the senior officer. Christian, sent a message reporting the position and returned (with two extra Lewis guns which they had picked up) to the Aubigny line, 1,300 yards back, for orders. They were imniedi- ately directed to go back to the grid line, collect all possible stragglers, and hold on to the position at all costs. They moved at once, and by keeping close to the railway embankment reached, without casualties, the rise leading to the town. Again passing Butler and his field-gun, they tola him they were to form a line on the western edge of the village -by which assurance he was obviously much relieved.’l On the upper edge of the next hill were a number of men, who were found to be part of the East Lancashire and West Yorkshire from in and beyond the village. They were digging a line at right angles to the railway, but, as this lay short of the grid line specified in his orders, Christian took his patrols forward and dug in on the intended position 150 yards ahead. Numbers of British troops came past, but most of them,

11 Butler belonged to the 18th Division. and was In charge of a section of “ J3 ” Battery, 83rd Brigade, R.F.A., m hich was stili maintained with Shepherd’s, Force (see p. 539) in close support. His two guns were kept well forward, behind the railway embankment west of Villers-Bretonneux. In the German bombardment that morning one of them was put out of action, and at 7 a.m. machineegun bullets began to arrive at their position. Next came wounded men who said that the Germans were in the town, and “we then saw the first of the (German) tanks coming along the valley There were about five about a.ooo yards away (I.&, on the plateau east of Cachy), and they were followed by small batches of Geiman infantry. MY remaining gun engaged these and the Boche infantry scattered like rabbits.” Four tanks crawled on towards Bois I’Ahbe, and turned into a dip in the valley and passed from view. Butler now ran his gun on to the railway bank to protect the withdrawing troops. hut they retired (he says) past him. leaving his gun exposed. 24th Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUS 545

Christian reported, were without arms or equipment, and therefore useless for defence. Some, however, were collected, and a line was dug with its right on the railway, where Christian placed his Lewis gunners. They were under machine-gun fire; the Germans were now in the town and could be seen advancing from it to the south-west, running over the bridge that crossed the railway cutting on the south-western outskirts. Thence they swarmed across the valley (the same from which Milne had attacked on April 4th) and into the wood. His tank came along the railway line (adds Christian) and stopped under the bridge in 0 z8.d.12 This made our right flank very dangerous, but by sniping we were able to keep him down in the cutting. A number of the Lewis gunners were now hit, and, Christian's numbers being so small, he decided to withdraw to the line of British t r o o p s behind him. Here be met Lieutenant- Colonel Hill13 of the East Lnn- cashire, who was organising the posi- tion, and the two of them decided upon a line of defence and coni- bined their forces. It was at first hoped to estend the flank south of the railway, but the Germans in the railway cutting and the wood made this impossible. The flank was therefore swung back along the 1-ailway.

~~ "This bridge, by which the Amiens road crossed the railway at the west end of the town, was zoo yards ahead of Christian's right flank. Lieutenant Butler says (History of 18th Druismn, 9. 323) that at 9.45 a German tank appeared again zoo yards from the railway bank. He slewed round his gun and fired when it was IOO yards away. The first round fell short; the second, percussion shrapnel, hit the tank. A large cloud of smoke appeared and the tank turned and retired Into the depression. A third round burst under its tail. The gun was then withdrawn, some of the infantry lining the railway bank at Butler's request to cover him. He bad fired too rounds, and lost only one driver killed Lieut Col. C. E. &I. Hill, D.S.0 Commanded 2nd Bn , East Lancashire Regt.. 1915/18. Officer of British Regular Army; of Tavistock. Devon: b. Tavistock. zt Feh.. 1876. 546 THE A.IF. IN FRANCE [24th Apr., 1918

I had considerable difficulty in holding a line (wrote Colonel Hill long afterwards). There were no trenches of any sort . and the Germans got round my right flank and fired into us from behind with a machine-gun. Just as things were looking rather blue a very cheery subaltern of your people (A.I.F.) turned up with a patrol. His name was Christian. He and his men helped to stop the Germans who attempted to rush us just after C. turned up. Callander and his men, who had been sent by Christian 500 yards to the left, were not withdrawn, but combined theni- selves with a platoon and a half of the 2nd Royal Berlishire whom they found there. Callander’s men were completely out of contact with any troops on their left, but kept touch with Christian by patrolling. Other sinall parties coming in. Colonel Hill’s force, including the .4ustralians, numbered eventually about 100 and held on all day, furnishing one element of certainty in an otherwise vague position. Cefore 7.20 the absence of news of any attack had created in some quarters the impression that, after all, nothing very serious was occurring. From that hour reports began to arrive, but niost of tliein vague. The Inttalion Iieyontl the Monument was now reported to have been driven in, and word arrived that the Germans were using fiuiiiiiietiwerfcr as well as tanks, and were advancing towards the village, but that some troops were still making a stand in front of it. Shortly after 8 Elliott received the first message from Christian informing him of similar reports, but adding that no definite information was obtainable. At the same time the 57th Battalion in the Aubigny line informed Elliott that a British artillery officer, passing through on his way to withdraw his guns, had said that the Germans were half -way through Villers-Bretonneux. Elliott passed this information to the 24th Brigade as “ entirely unofficial,” and on ringing up headquarters of the 5th Division at 8.50 heard that “ the situation is all right so far as it knows.” He ordered the 57th to find out the artillery officer’s name with a view to having him dealt with for “ spreading alarmist reports.” At the same time, as the Germans had certainly made some progress, and the “ alarmist report ” might be true, he asked divisional headquarters whether it was left to his discretion to counter-attack. General Hobbs replied that he might act without orders within his own area or if urgently appealed to by British commanders on his riglit; in such case he might act at once and inform Hobbs of the steps taken. 24th Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 547 It already seemed clear that the use of Elliott’s brigade to help the British would involve no danger to the 5th Division’s front, the main attack being evidently south of it. It is true that the 29th Battalion (Sth Brigade) immediately north of the Somme reported at 8.30 that at 4.30 an attempt had been made by 300-400 Germans on the Somme flats tu raid it. The attack had been beaten off. But this was recognised, even on the spot, as merely a diverting attack. Actually it was a feint made by the 85th I.R. (18th Division). The history of the supporting artillery says that it was “unsuccessful owing to the enemy’s machine-gun fire being too strong.” The 14th Brigade on Hill 104 knew that only its right battalion was involved in the heavy bombardment. It had practically no other information except a message from the British brigadier on its right that his right flank had bent back a little to conform with the left of the 23rd Brigade, which had

I‘ given ground ~lightly.”~‘ But, at 8.35, the whole face of the sittiation was changed by the receipt of an astonishing report from the 56th Battalion, which from its reserve position on the rear spur of Hill 104 could see Villers-Bretonneux. The Germans. it said. held Villers - Breton- neux; t h e i r machine-gun fire was coming from there down the Fouilloy road and the Ger- mans were now advancing from t h e northern edge of the village towards the 14th Bri- gade (that is, behind the front, towards Fouil- loy, Corbie, and the Somme).

]‘The quotation IS from the 14th Brigade’s war-diorv. 548 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE 124th Apr., 1918

The 25th Brigade was trying to fall back and cover the flank of the 14th. There were indications that a strong attack was in progress on the other side of the town, for British field-guns could be seen “ firing point-blank’’ in that direction. The 56th had from an early stage placed itself astride of the Villers- Bretonneux-Fouilloy road, and was standing fast there. This news electrified all the headquarters concerned. Captain Holmes15 of the 14th Machine Gun Company, to whom the Rifle Brigade’s retirement had been reported by Lieutenant Leslie,ls commanding the flank machine-guns, at once went up himself and got the British to form a line of posts behind the flank of the 53th ; but both these young troops, who were almost without officers, and the 2nd Royal Berkshire, who continued the line farther west, were constantly reported by Australian oficers and N.C.O’s who visited them that day to be badly shaken and probably liable to panic17-not an un- natural condition with very young and raw soldiers in such an action. Nor, in some cases, were their junior officers of the type capable of handling such a situation. The 54th kept its reserve company in readiness instantly to take the place of this line if it gave way. The 56th Battalion and the reserve machine-guns secured the rearward spur of Hill 104, defending the rear and the road to Fouilloy and Corbie; the reserve battalion, 55tl.1, of the 14th Brigade was prepared either to counter-attack Villers-Bretonneux from the north or to support the flank line. The troops watched with admiration the British field artillery which, standing in the open west of Villers- Bretonneux, hammered from close range the German troops there. The historian of the 39th German Field Artillery Regiment says: “An enemy battery on the slope west of the northern part of Villers-Bretonneux with notable dash, standing out against our infantry fully in the open, constantly caused it great trouble.” The I11 Brigade of the 39th F.AR. was ordered to suppress it by a bombardment with gas-shell. It was at about this time that the effort was made by the 2nd Royal Berkshire to counter-attack Villers-Bretonneux .. - 15 Capt. C. H. Holmes, M.C.: 5th M.C. Bn Clerk; of Canterbury, Vic.: b. Albert l’ark. VIC.. Q July. 1891 “Lleut. A. N. C. C. Leslie, 14th M.C. Coy. Clerk: of Campsie, N.S.W.: b. Darllnghurst, N.S.\V., b Fcb.. 189;. 1TThis is frequently mentioned in reports from Elliott’s patrols, and from officers of the 14th Brigade.

To face #. 5JV 24th Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 549 from the north, as ordered by Brigadier-General Coffin, but the 25th Brigade had then neither the strength nor the organisation for a vigorous thrust. The Germans were occupying the whole northern edge of Villers-El-etoiine~i~and the plateau afforded them a per- fect field for machine-gun fire. This project therefore remained abortive. While the British and .Australian officers on the spot were taking these and other measures, the telephone between Gcneral Hobbs and his reserve brigades was hot with Elliott’s requests for permission to intervene. His eagerness wras satisfied ivith The arrow shows the abortive the granting of permission to attack by liloyal Berks. move his battalions to the starting line for his projected counter-attack, in which position they would also be serving the useful purpose of joining the right flank of the 14th Brigade with such troops of the 8th Division as might be west of the town. While Hobbs repeated to the 8th Division the offer of assistance already made, Elliott ordered his battalions to move in accordance with his prepared plan, and to get touch with units on either flank. Characteristically, he appears to have said nothing of the order being provisional; so far as his battalions and the Chestnut Troop of Royal Horse Artillery (which was placed under him) knew, the counter-attack was “ on.” The third battalion (57th) was to advance behind the right rear of the leading two, and, “ultimately attack, if required, along the railway to the right of Villers-Bretonneux, ’ clearing it by an enveloping movement.” Elliott, who had received reports of unnecessary withdrawals of British troops, added : “ All British troops to be rallied and re-formed, as our troops niarch ~hroughthem, by selected officers, and on any hesitation to be shot.” The outrageous nature of the implication does not seen1 to have been realised by him. As

39 550 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [qth Apr., 1918 one of his battalion comnianders afterwards said, “ Of course we knew that this was only one of the ‘ Old Man’s ’ figures of speech,” but in this instance it was a dangerous one. Not merely did it concern forces outside his brigade, but- according to Elliott himself-it was intentionally issued to troops some of whom were indignant at the actions of a weaker elenient among the British infantry and artillery. Captain Gollan,18 Elliott’s brigade-major, sent a copy of the order to divisional headquarters, and several hours later Elliott received from Hobbs a curt order forthwith to cancel the offensive sentence. Elliott’s action was, to say the least, a gross error of judgtnent and quite unnecessary; for, order or 110 order. his company and platoon leaders would, in the last resort, have tried to steady the defenders, whether their own men or the British, by threats of sIiooting.l9 Elliott further ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Layh of the 57th to represent him in the forward area, should immediate action be required, and to organise a system of continuous patrols, using a troop of the 13th Light Horse allotted by General Hobbs. This organisation was shortly afterwards placed by Elliott under a spare battalion commander,

Lieutenant-Colonel Watson,2o who as “ special intelligence

“Capt H. R. Gollan, D S.0, M.C.; 54th Bn. Staff Captain. 15th Inf. Bde.. i916/17; Brigade-Major. 1gr8/r9. Journalist; of Ceelong and Melbourne. h. Gawler, S. Aust.. 29 Aug., 1892. ’”On April 15 Elliott had issued another characteristic order, relative to the wreading of alarmist rumours. G.H.Q. had hecn discovering that the supposed ‘‘ Germans dressed in British unifcrm.” who were charged with spreading alarmist rumours or orders to retire, were invariably-when the case could be investigated- found to be officers or men on the British side, who acted either bono fide hut in mistake, or in panic A general routine order was therefore issued enioining a new procedure to he “strictly observed.” Any person so suspected was to he brought at once before the nearest conirnanding onicer. who. if he thought the niessage or order unjustifiable, was to arrest the man for trial by court-martial. The 5th Australian Division on coming into the line was. like most others, apprehensive of these dangers, and its staff. overlooking the new order from G H.0 , published on April 9 a strong wdming to the troops against the supposedly prevalent ruses. Its attention was, however, immediately called to C H.Q ’s instructions. and the first order was accordingly chased by a second setting forth the G H Q. order and the reason for it. But this did not satisfy Eliiott’s conception of the requlrc ments In the order, issued un Aprii 15. to all his battalions. after setting forth :he new procedure, he added: ‘‘ Should the hattalion he in action. and no satisfactory explanation he forthcoming from the man concerned, he will he summarily shot by order of the hattalion comynder, and a record of action taken forwarded in writing to these headquarters. Lieut.-Col. C. V. Watron, D S.O., V.D. Commanded 58th Bn, 1918. Civil wnpineer and architect; Examiner of Patents, C’wealth Attorney-General’s Dept. ; d Hawthorn. Vic.; h. Horsham, Vic.. z June. 1882. Died. IO Feb.. 1930. 24th Apr , 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 551

officer” sent back a stream of accurate newP through an advanced report centre to which a buried cable had been laid. Elliott \vas thus exceptionally well informed throughout most of the day. Meanwhile the 8th Division had replied to Hobbs’s offer with the intimation that it “was quite able to deal with the situation.” Hobbs received the impression that his offer was unwelcome, a not unnatural reaction if the British headquarters concerned had any hint of Elliott’s attitude. The 60th Battalion was already beginning to move to the starting point, and the 59th was about to do so, when they received the order to “ stand fast.” Elliott could now only wait fuming while the 8th Division all day telegraphed to them its postponeu or revised plans for counter-attacks. Judging from the nnturc of the British reserves, both Elliott and Hobbs felt certain that their own troops, after long delays, would have to carry out the counter-stroke which they had been prepared since before dawn to initiate.

The narrative must now pierce the mist of battle and give some notion of what had been happening to the young troops who that morning held the posts on the Attack on Villers-Bretonneux plateau. 8th Division The British front line of posts, like tlie Australian farther north, was nornially approachable only by night, no continuous front line or communication trenches having been dug, and any attempt to visit the posts over the bare surface by day meaning almost certain death. The German bombardment, at least on the Australian front, was heaviest on the supports, the front line being dealt with largely by nri)icnzevrfcr; but on the supports the concentration was terrific. In the report of the 8th Division the general shell- fire is described as being the heaviest ever experienced by the division. The British artillery on its side carried out “ counter-preparation of exceptional intensity by guns of all calibres.”22 The thickening- mist was made denser by smoke, ”The war diary of ’Ine Chestnut Troop, R.H.A., which was this day under Elliott’s orders, notes as one of the lessons of the action, Rapidity with wbicb attack orders were got out on 24th inst.. made possible by use of well trained cavalry (Aust Light Horse). who quickly located extrnt of enemy gains.” za TIic Eighth Division In War, 1914-1918, by Lieut -Colonel J. H. Boraston, p 202. 552 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE 124th Apr , 1918 and by 6 o'clock o1)jects loo yards away were invisihle in its white blanket. Out of this white wall there sudtleiily loomed up, north of the railway and at certain points 1)etween the Monument and Cachy, German tanks. They were slightly higger and faster, but more cumbersome than the British ones, and, the conditions of mist and ground being perfect €or them, they came steadily on, entirely unaffected by the Lewis gun IJullets hurriedly poured upon them by the startled infantry. The details of this terrifying trial of the young British troops are material

for theBritish history; but how hopeless was their task may be gathered from the narrative of an officer of the 2nd Middlesex whose company held the front immediately north of the railway. This writer-apparently the company coni- mander-was with a platoon in the support trench when. after the bombardment (which he, too, describes as the heaviest in his experience), he was startled by a sudden, accurate and deadly fire on his support platoon. . . . The nature of this machine-gun fire was unusual; it raked the parapet and any man who put his head up was shot down immediately. . . . Suddenly the machine-gun fire ceased, the writer put his head up and saw an enormous and terrifying iron pill-box . . . bearing straight dcwn on him 23 __ "The Army Quarterly. Jan r93o. pp. 381-? A pho*,graph of (me of the German tmks is given in Yo1 XI1 of the present history, elute 467 24th Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 553

The tank passed right over him as he crouched in the trench, its caterpillar tracks three feet above his head. AS soon as it was clear, he stood up and fired with his revolver at the water-jacket of its rear machine-gun, that being apparently its only vulnerable part, and then turned to face the party of German infantry which was following the tank. These tried to rush the trench, but were shot down by his youngsters. Two more tanks, however, now appeared coming from the front line. Resistance being hopeless, the officer and his men tried to escape by the railway cutting which ran past their right and close round the southern edge of the village. The first tank, moving beside the cutting, fired at them. The officer. \vho was here wounded, managed to get clear, rallied a small party, made for some abandoned field-guns and took away their sights, and then fell back on the wood in the valley, where he met his brigadier with a British tank-officer coming forward to ascertain the true state of affairs. On his telling them of the German tanks, the brigadier ordered the tank officer to attack them. Wherever the German tanks made the assault, the British front line was broken-in most places immediately. Thej, reached the front trenches almost unseen, straddled them or moved up behind them, and had the infantry at their mercy,. Their sudden appearance created panic-as would have happened with all troops-and, though some brave men fought stubbornly, whole companies were cut of€ and surrendered. The Germans claim to have captured this day a total of 2,400 British prisoners.24 A considerable part of the front line thus disappeared, and the German infantry, which actually followed the tanks although it was apparently meant to precede them, passed through the gaps and began to move in rear of the companies that were still resisting. The leading tank referred to in the description quoted above actually kept on its way beside the railway around the south and west of the town, letting the German infantry into this part, although they were held upz5 at the brickyards east of the village, and at many

¶‘De? Grosse Klieg 1914-1918, by M. Schwarte. Vol. III. p. 456. 25Probably by part of the teserve companv of !he 2nd hliddlesex. part of the 2nd East Lancashire, and machine-gunners The doings of the tanks are recorded in I he Army Quarterly, July 1934. pf. 308-313, and The Royul Tank Corps Jowrrol July. 1935. p. 70 (Major-General J. F. C. Fuller). 554 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [zqth Apr., 1918 points farther north. Finally, returning through the village. it helped two other tanks to take the brickyards in flank and rear, and widened there the gap through the defences. Part of the penetrating German infantry turned northwards. behind the and Battalion Rifle Brigade, north of the Roman road. Portion of that battalion was cut off; the rest, nest to the Australians, fell back and, after trying to stop the enemy at the support and reserve I I-enclies, withdrew north- wards on the Australian flank. and formed. with many wide gaps, a thin line at right angles behind it, facing smtliwards. RIcanwhile the three German tanks pushet! on to the northern outskirts of the town. South of the railway six tanks advanced. One broke down near the British front line but the other five subdued the Eritish supports at the Monument-where one nionster broke the final resistance of a strong-post by pushing cio\rr:i a wall-and then nioved on towards the deep guliy south of Villers-Bretonneux, where the wood began. It should here be said that the eastern part of this lofty but open timber was known as the Bois d’Aquenne, the Cachy-Fouilloy road dividing it from the Bois I’Abb6 which was part of the same ‘I forest.”lG These tanks out- flanked the garrison of Villers-Bretonneu.uix (2nd East Lanca- shire) to the north of them and the counter-attack battalion (2nd Devon) in Cachy Switch to the south. The first that the commander of the Devons knew of the German attack was the appearance of the nose of one monster over the parapet of his headquarters. The two northern companies of his battalion, where Cachy Switch ran to the edge of the valley, were scattered into the Bois d’Aqiienne, aid the two coinpanies in the southern part of the Switch, on the plateau between the

Y’A third portion. at the western extremity tno miles alrn), was hnown as the Bois de Blangy 24th Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 555 wood and Cachy. found themselves enfiladed by machine-guns ensconced in the deep, sunken cross-roads on the southern rim of the valley. A mile in front of the Switch, between the Monument and Hangard Wood, four more tanks had broken through the northern linttalion (2/4 London) of the 58th 58th Division DivisiomLi Its fragments fell back far across the plateau, the centre battalion (2/2nd London) at Hangard Wood swinging back with them and losing the wood except at its south-western corner. The coniniander of the support battalion (2/10th London) at once counter-attacked, and the retreat stopped, actually a few hundred yards east of Cachy; but, for some time, the higher headquarters were uncertain whether or not Cachy had been lost. The French reported that Hangard was attacked but was still held. On the northern flank, only the southern battalion of the 5th Australian Division, the 54th, was within tht area of intense bombardment. The two flank front- 14th AU6t. Brigade line posts of Captain RlcNali's2s company, which lay next to the aid Rifle Brigade, consisted of platoons tinder Lieutenants Harveyz9- and \Vinterbott~rn.~~These were about 50 yards apart; and 30 yards from the flank post, Harvey's, lay the first post of tb: 2nd Rifle Brigade, close behind which was stationed a British niachine-gun. Shortly after the bombardment began Harvey, who expected an attack, thought he saw Germans come up to the thin wire-entanglement in front of the He there- fore went over to the Rifle Brigade's post, told the officer-iti- charge that he was going to investigate, and moved out to

I' At 8 45 one of these tanks ran into some "undermined ground,'' turned over on its side. and was afterwards said to have been blown UD.- by German enrrincers. In Capt. D. .4. McNab, M.C.; 54th En. Clerk; of Lidcombe. N S.\V., h. Rookwood. N.S.W., 23 July, 1889. *a Lieut. C. \V. Harvey, h1.C : 54th En. Share farmer; clf Little Swamp, Tambar Springs, N.S.W.; h. Camberwell. London. 6 Nov., xS9j. '0 Lieut C. T. \Vinterbotton;. 54th Bn. Orchardist; of Mangrove Mountain. N.SW., b. Padiham, Lancs, Eng.. XI Nov., x8ib. 'I Earlier in the night he had seen a German patrol in front, and, having arranged with his Lewis gunner, he fired a flare The Lewis gun pinned the Germans down. and Harvey went out and captured them. They were carrying a number of water. bottles, and one who could speak English told Harvey that they had been told that It was possible for them to go into the village and fill their bottles with wine. It seems probable that they were confusing Villers-Bretonneux with Hamel or WarfusCe 556 THE A.IF. IN FRANCE [zqth Apr., 1918

the wire. No German was visible, but he remained sure that an attack was imminent. His sergeant, C. S. Joyce,s2 sug- gested that the bombardment might he “ just an ordinary strafe.” “ Did you ever see one like that ?” replied Harvey, pointing to the band of shells bursting along the rear. The company’s support trenches were completely destroyed by :his fire, the troops there, however, being saved by Captain McNab, who moved them back in time to the reserve trenches. Being somewhat short o E ammunition Harvey, with Joyce and a corporal, again visited the next British post, but found it empty of men, as was also the machine-gun post, although the machine-gun remained. Close to it a ~rtiizen~cwferbomb . had torn a great crater. Harvey returned with the animuni- tion that he required, and sent a section to occupy the British trench. Immediately afterwards he was surprised to see approaching from the rear, through the bombardment on Hill 104, a solitary figure. It was Captain McNab going the rotund of his posts. Harvey reported to him the situation, and sent with him two men in case he was hit and left unaided. lis day dawned, the first movement seen by the flank posts was that of an aeroplane which was heard very close and suddenly appeared low overhead, flying so close and swift that no one could distinguish its marli- ings, and then zooming into the fog. About 7 o’clock the mist cleared, arid Vaire Wood 1)ecame visible across the valley. From it there was moving into the valley a line of Germans. They passed out of sight there but presently reappeared on the edge of the near slope, rso xards away, beyoiid the wire, and began to set up a m;lLliine-gun. Harvey ordered one of his men to fire the S.0 S. signal-a rifle-grenade, which should have burst into a

=Sgt. C. S. Joyce (No. 2432; 54th Bn.). Clerk; of Gladesville. N S.\\‘., b Well~ngton,N.S.W.. 15 Oct , 1S75. 24th Apr , rg18] SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 557

string of three flares. The youngster was a reinforcement and, instead of firing the grenade with a blank cartridge, he inserted a live one which blew it to pieces. But Harvey's nien, for whom this was the longed-for opportunity to meet the German offensive, clambered into the open and, standing full height, fired from the shoulder into the advancing line. On the right also could be seen parties of Germans in single file, passing the flank and making towards Villers-Bretonneus, which was hidden from the ALE- tralian front line by the curve of the crest. As the " diggers " shot into these, the enemy machine-gun in front got into action. It would probably have swept down the standing nien had not a rifle-grenade fired by Harvey burst fairly among its crew . The Gernian party withdrew and did not return. The Lewis gun in the old British post on the right blazed into the Germans on the flank until smashed by a shot from the Rifle Brigade's trenches to the south-the first sign that this line had been seized by the enemy. Thereafter German firing came from the right rear, but Harvey was aware of a line of British troops directly behind his flank. Some time afterwards the Germans endeavoured to enfilade him with a machine-gun at the cross-roads at the head of the valley, a quarter of a mile to his left front; but his left Lewis gun answered them shot for shot, and later, catching their gun's crew in the open, so handled it that all trouble from that, quarter ceased.

It was known to the highest British and French commands early in the day that the Gernian attack extended from Villers-Bretorineux to Castel, and the great German"he Side importance of Villers-Bretonneux at once focussed the eyes of all conitnanders on the battle. Even Foch, at noon, issued a direct order io Rawlinson to recapture the town as soon as possible. But it was als, obvious that this attack was not a general resumption of the " Michael '* offensive, but a local attempt to reach or endanger Amiens. 558 THE A I.F. IN FRANCE [4th-z$h Apr., 1918

It was not, however, known that the principal object of the German attack was to divert attention from the operations in Flanders, where a final attempt was to be made next day to capture Kemmel. After the war German narratives disclosed that the Michael offensive had really ended on April 4 and 5-the Battle of Dernancourt on the 5th being actually the last flicker of it. Even the effort to reach Amiens on April 4 and 5 was undertaken only through the strong w~llof the supreme command-the front-line commanders would already have abandoned the attenipt.33 The Lys offensive4esigned to further weaken the English and possibly drive them from the Channel ports- had by then been ordered by Ludendorff. The German forces on the front of the “ Michael offensive ” were to revert to a general defensive, but, in order to prevent their enemy from detecting the change, they were not to dig in or protect their fronts with barbed-wire. Moreover, to divert attention from the Lys front, the Seventeenth and Second Armies were to make limited attacks as soon as possible On April 7 Ludendorff suggested that these attacks should be made near HCbuterne, at the Albert bridge-head, and in the Somme-Luce area, and said that the last-named attack must be delivered by April 12 at latest.34 The two armies concerned, however, reported that for a fortnight any major operation must be out of the question. One reason for this, according to the German historian Schwarte, was the constant counter-attacks and bombardments in the Luce area (including, of course, the operations of the 5th Australian Brigade) which “tried the (German) troops to a very high degree” It thus happened that the only diversion for the Lys attack, apart from keen artillery bombardments, was a successful thrust made on April 6 by the right flank of the Seventh Army-against the French at the southern hinge of the “ Michael ” advance.36 On April 12 at a conference at Avesnes Ludendorff explained that the attack at Villers-Bretonneux was also required to blunt the sharp German salient driven into the French front south of the Luce. He strongly desired another diverting attack, north of the Somme, but Crown Prince Rupprecht had not sufficient force for both offensives. Even the Somme-Luce attack had to be planned as three phases : advances, first to the line Hamel-Cachy-Domart ; then to Fouilloy-Cachy; finally the niopping up of the triangle between Somme and Ancre.30 The main operation was undertaken by three corps, XIV Reserve (south of the Somme), XI (astride of the Luce), and LI (south of the Luce). Each of these was to have received one fresh division, and was also specially to rest some of its own divisions. The arrival of the fresh divisions was delayed. and the attack was postponed, first (as already mentioned) to April 20th; then to the 23rd; finally, for more thorough preparation, until the nqth. In the end only one completely fresh division-the 77th Reserve, from Russia-was available Other divisions were given short rests-the 22Sth, 5 days; Jth Guard. 12 davs: 208th, 18 days; Guard Ersatz, 5 days; 13th. IO *J Der IYeltkrwg, 1911-18, by General von Icuhl. I’d II, p. 333 3’ Crown Prince Rupprecht. Mein Krtegstagebuch, Vol XI. p. 373 This attack (“ Archangel ”) was delivered earher than at first intended. It did not greatly disturb the French, who fell back to the Ailette. 30 Recoi ds of the Second German Army show that it had previously envisaged an advance first to the line Fouilloy-Cachy-Domart. and later to the line Corbie. Aublgni-nlangy Tronville-Gentelles \Vood-Fouenramps-Rouvrel-Merville 17th-z.rth Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 559 days The Guard Ersatz received 1,000 reinforcements. Of the divisions which meanwhile held the line, the 19th and 9th Bavarian Reserve would furnish reserves for the battle. The 1st Division continued to hold the line south of the Somme, but one of its regiments was allotted to the battle reserves. The zq,rd Division was shifted northwards to opposite Hill 104, and, though already ten days in the line. would swing forward on the northern flank of the attack The objective was finally reducec! to the line Villers-Bretonneux- Bois d'Aquenne-Cachy-Hill 105 (beyond Domart)-Berteaucourt- Thennes; but, if the two divisions attacking Villers-Bretonneux suc- ceeded, their success was to be exploited. Villers-Bretonneux, the prin- cipal goal, was to be assaulted by the 228th and 4th Guard Divisions, both of the XIV Corps. The ZzSth, advancing astride of the Roman road, would attack the town from the north, east, and south-east. The 4th Guard Division, advancing from the south-east into the valley south of the town, would attack from south-east and south. After finding touch in Villers-Bretonneux with the zzSth, the 4th Guard Division would swing west to seize the Bois d'Aquenne. In the sector of the next corps (the XI) the 77th Reserve Division was to take, first Hangard Wood and then Cachy. Next on the south, the mSth Division would seize Hangard village and copse, and Hill 99 beyond them. South of the Luce, the Guard Ersatz would take Hourges and cut off the French retreating from Hangard The 208th would then seize Domart and, together with the Guard Ersatz, advance upon Berteaucourt. The 13th Division (right of the LI Corps) would attack west of the Avre, towards Castel. On the northern flank, Hill 104 was not to be attacked in the first assault-the 243rd Division (north of the Roman road and at Vaire Wood) would merely swing forward its three regiments to make a flank for the 228th. But, as soon as Villers-Bretonneux was taken, the 228th was to advance northwards and seize Hill 104 from the south in conjunction with an attack by the z43rd from the south and east. North of the Somme, the XXlII Reserve Corps would keep down the British artillery there by bombardment, and carry out a strong raid about an hour before the main attack began. The three divisions attacking on the Villers-Bretonneux-Cachy plateau--228th, 4th Guard, and 77th Reserve-ere each assisted by tanks.37 The preliminary shelling of the town, woods, and trenches with mustard gas, begun on April 17, was to continue at intervals until the attack : and-a bold departure from the usual practice-in the intense

'7'I'he allotment IS shown in the sketch on p. 552. 560 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [24th Apr., 1918 bombardment for two and a quarter hours preceding the attack all these targets, as well as the opposing artillery, would be shelled with gas-chiefly mustard 38 The preliminary bombardment was to include Hill 104, whose garrison was also to be kept under fire during th: attack The German staff noted the “ systematic and powerful activity of the British artillery during the nights preceding the operation, and, significantly, an ammunition train at Wiencourt was hit by a British aeroplane bomb. To many Germans this seemed to indicate that information of the coming attack had reached their opponents, but some attributed the activity of the artillery to the influence of the French, who were wrongly suspected of exercising the command in this sector.s@ The attack of the 228th and 4th Guard Divisions and of their tanks met with complete success. Part of the 207th R.I.R. (228th Division) pushed on after its tanks straight through the British front north of the railway. Farther north, part of the 48th I R of the same diyjsion, apparently without tanks, broke through near the Roman road. The prisoners,” says the historian of the 10th Foot Artillery Regiment, ‘I were mostly young people who only fourteen days before had set foot on French soil.” The infantry who turned northwards behind the 2nd Rifle Brigade were two companies of the III/&th allotted for that task; the rest of the leading troops pressed on into the north of the town ; the penetrating battalion of the right regiment-the 1/48th- advanced very rapidly and, according to its historian, in spite of hand-to-hand fighting among the houses, it reached the northern outskirts by 720. The left regiment, the 207th, was equally swift, reaching the western outskirts at about 8. Farther south the 4th Guard Division, however, was delayed by tough resistance about the Monument : and, even when the tanks had subdued this, the 93rd R.I.R. and 5th Guard Grenadier lost heavily in crossing the open, since (according to German accounts), although many young English troops were rounded up without difficulty-one tank capturing 17s-others fought most stubbornly. Eighty British, counter-attacking south-east of the town, captured twenty Germans but in turn were captured by two companies of the Guard Grenadier Although the town was burning, its garrison maintained deadly machine-gun fire upon the Guard regiments advancing south of it. Thus, although the 228th Division early broke into Villers- Bretonneux, it was not until about IO o’clock that the regiments of the 4th Guard Division reached the edge of the town and the valley south of it The 93rd R.I.R. made contact with the 207th R.I.R. in the town and thence streamed out again over the bridges south-westwards into the valley and the Bois d‘Aquenne. Between IO and 11 a.m. the left regiment-5th Guard Grenadier-accompanied by five tanks, entered the valley direct, the infantry then pressing on into the wood. Opposite the right of Colonel Hill’s position, at the western extremity of Villers-Bretonneux, a gap had opened between the 207th and 93rd, but it was filled some time after IO o’clock by two companies of the reserve regiment of the zzSth Division, the 35th Fusilier, whose I1 Battalion was in close support. Accordlng to the regimental history, one of these

38 It was usually assumed that the attacking infantry would not be thrown into places that had heen rcceiitly sbellcd with gas. For the bombardmczt each Cerma; field-battery had 1.000 rounds of hieh-cxplosive and 1,000 of yellow cross (mustard gas), and rnch field-howitzer battcry 1,000 1I.E. and 750 gellow cross. 19 Hlstory of the 10th Foot Ar:dlery Reginlent. P 157. 24th Apr ,19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 56 1

companies, after reaching the crossing of the Roman road over the railway, seized just beyond it a house containing two British field-guns

oiie of which they turned on their opponents. Fire from a higher part of the ridge near by, however, forced them to abandon the place. Several of the tanks which reached the same area reported that they fired on and drove back British reinforcements. The field-batteries allotted to the regiments of each division pushed forward to positions near the Monument, where some of them were seen by the British when the mist rose, and came under machine-gun fire from Hill 104. Farther south still the 77th Reserve Division,. with its four tanks helping to direct it, advanced steadily until it had crossed the Villers-Bretonneux-Domart road ; but there its right was stopped, and the left of the Guard Division, pushing on into the valley and Aquenne Wood, drew farther and farther ahead of it. The III/5th Guard Grenadier, which was close in support, was ordered to fill the gap. The left of the 77th Reserve Division was stopped some distance before Cachy. but two tanks went on towards the village. The left of the 77th and the 208th Division, with no tank to assist, made only trifling headway against the right of the 58th British Division and the French at Hangard. South of the Luce the Germans failed at Themes; but, beyond the Avre, they drove the French to the Avre-Luce junction and the north-eastern corner of the Bois de Senecat. The troops who attacked the 54th Australian Battalion were part of the 243rd Division, which, on the extreme northern flank of the attack. swung forward its line from Vaire Wood to keep touch with the 228th in Villers-Bretonneux. Its southern regiment, the 478th. attacking the 2nd Rifle Brigade, had (says its histqrian) hardly climbed out of its trenches than it was stopped by withering machine-gun fire froin Hill 104. Next to it the II/47gth, facing the southernmost Australian company, crossed the head of the valley in the mist, despite a light artillery barrage and indirect machine-gun fire. But, on its comiiir: in sight of the posts, the fusillade swelled to “extremely vigorous. well-aimed fire which occasioned very heavy losses ”40 It tried to dig in on the edge of-and partly in-the wire-entanglement

40 Htstory of 479th I.R. fi. 72 562 THE A.IF. IN FRANCE [24th Apr., 1918

The second wave remained sheltered by the edge4,0f the valley, 150 metres in rear. The British barrage descending, what remained of the first wave” tried to fall back on the second. By shortly after 7 o’clock the 479th was stopped, waiting for the British barrage to lift, and asking for artillery support against the machine-guns ahead The commander of the 478th also had asked for all possible artillery fire upoil Hill 104, and ordered his attached battery to suppress the machine-guns by direct fire Meanwhile in Villers-Bretonneux the I and III/48th I R., which had got through to the northern outskirts of the town, were beginning to carry out the second part of their duty by turning northwards and attacking Hill 104. The German artillery, however, evidently had no knowledge of their success, for as they launched this advance it laid- as requested by the 478th-a heavy bombardment on the ground over which they were moving, and also behind them, on the eastern edge of the town, preventing the entry of the II/48th I.R, which should have reinforced them. They were also met by rifle and machine-gun fire from ahead. The tanks, which should have accompanied them, do not appear to have been there. The movement stopped. and the companies were withdrawn to the northern edge of the town The 2nd Rifle Brigade, which had been holding up the advance, was at about this time overcome-not by the renewed bombardment, but through being outflagked after the loss of the brickworks farther south-and the rest of the 4Sth 1.R. and 47Sth, went forward. The 243rd Division thus linked its flank with the troops in Villers-Bretonneux. The II/48th also was now able to enter the town. But it was then too late for any movement of either side to be possible on Hill IoJ-the field for machine-gun fire was too good. The three battalions of the 48th dug-in in depth to defcnd the northern edge of the town, with the 478th ill a series of posts across the ground to the north-east As British prisoners said that a counter-attack would probably come from Hill 104, the local commander of the 48th seized the two remaining companies of the II/35th Fusilier and placed them in gaps in his line. All day reports came iii to the headquarters of the German divisions concerned and of the XIV Reserve Corps that Hill 104 had been taken Like those concerning the mythical advance of the two British tanks at Bullecourt,41 these messages were most detailed. Observers said they could see the infantry moving up the slope and getting into the trenches on the summit. They “could be definitely recognised by their steel helmets, they had put out sheets for aeroplanes, sent lamp messages, and so forth.” Many German histories indeed still say that Hill 104 was taken Deceived by the reports the German ”See Vol. XV. pp 318.20. 24th Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 563 artillery lengthened its range and left the hill untouched. " Actually," as the historian of the 479th I.R. says, " no German attacking party set foot on Hill 104 either from the east or attacking north from Villers-Bretonneux."

The 14th Brigade's troops in support and the British rettinants on the Hank north of Villers-Bretonneux could see, what the 14th Brigade's outpost-line could not see, that the Gerniatis attempting to advance from the town behind the 14th Brigade's line had been driven back to the hedges and plantations forming its outskirts.'* Facing them were, first the British groups on the northern and western edges of the same plateau-the northern ones so thin and scattered that many watching Australians were not aware that this line existed; and, second, the support company of the 54th, and the whole of the 56th, very strong and confident, waiting on top of Hill 104 and along its western spur respectively. IVith them were all sixteen guns of the 14th Machine Gun Company, besides some British machine-guns, and there was therefore little fear of the loss of the hill. There now occurred a long pause while General Heneker of the 8th Division developed his projected counter-attacks. The first one ordered, that of the 2nd Royal Berkshire4j from the north, was, it will be remembered, found impossible, necessitating, as it did, an advance over the plateau in face of a host of machine-guns. General Heneker next ordered the reserve battalion (2nd Devon) of his southern brigade (23rd) to retake the western third of the town. This under- taking eventually devolved upon a battalion (1st Sherwood Foresters) lent by the reserve brigade (24th):' and had not been hegun by noon. Actually the two first counter-attacks to be made were those of the tanks, which had been sent up in accordance with the earliest orders of the divisional and corps commanders. The first of these strokes was delivered by the three heavy

*See Vd. XII. plote 466 '' Support battalion, 25th Brigade. "The first order was that, while the 2nd Devon attacked, the Foresters were tc occupy Cachy Switch. As, however, the remnant of the and Devon was alread) in Cachy Switch. it was decided to keep it there and attack with the Foresters 561 THE A.IF. IN FRANCE [a$h Apr., 1918 tanks kept by the 8th Division in Bois 1’AbbB. Brigadier- General Gr~gan,‘~commanding the 23rd Brigade, and the commander of this section of tanks, Captain J. C. Brown,4u had met in the Bois d’Aquenne shortly after 8 o’clock the company commander of the 2nd Middlesex. whose account has been quoted in this chapter. T~USsecuring some accurate information, Grogan ordered Brown to take his tanks at once to the vital reserve line across the plateau-Cachy Switch, a trench most vulnerable to tank attack-and stop the Germans before they reached it. The tanks accordingly skirted the south of the wood, climbed on to the plateau, passed through the German barrage, and almost ran over their own men in the Switch. An infantryman, however, stepped up to one of them and called through the flap: “Look out! Jerry tanks about.” The commander of the tank, Lieutenant Mitchell,” opened the loop-hole and at once saw, 300 yards away, a “ squat-looking monster ” approaching, with two waves of infantry following. Farther to left and right crawled two more of these “armed tortoises.” Two of the British tanks were “ females ”-that is, armed only with machine-guns. They were immediately fired on by a gun from the leading German tank, and, being hit and having no gun with which to reply effectively, they withdrew. Mitchell, whose tank was a “ male ” (carrying two six-pounder guns), fought a duel with the German, manceuvring so as to bring first one gun and later the other to bear upon it. Eventually Mitchell took the risk of stopping, so as to give his gunner a better plat- form, and at once hit the opposing tank three times in succes- sion. Its crew left it, and he then turned to fire case shot at the infantry, and to shoot at the two other German tanks, which were still advancing. As soon as he fired at one of these, it turned and made off,and, to his surprise, the third followed it. His own tank was now shot at by artillery

“Brig.-Gcn. G W. St. G. Groesn, V.C, C.B., C.M.G.. n.S.0. Commanded 1st Bn, IVorcester Regt, rg15/17; 23rd Inf. Bde., 1g17/19; 238th Bde., North Russia, 1919. Officer of British Regular Army: of Flfeshlre, Scotland: b. Devon- pJrt, Eng., I Scpt, 1875 “Capt. J. C. Brown, M C ; 1st Bn.. Tank Corps. Of Dundalk. Co. Louth. Ireland; b. Ravensdale, Dundalk, 31 May, 1884. Ktlled In actlon. 8 Aug.. 1918. ‘7 Lieut. F. Mitchell, M.C.: 1st Bn.. Tank Corps. Bank clerk; of London; b. St. Peter Port, Guernsey, Channel Js, 16 Nov.. 1404. (See hls accounts In Everyman at War. pp 231-8, and Tank IVarfare, 9. 184 seq) 24th Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 565

and was eventually hit. Mitchell then withdrew his nien, and his tank was afterwards repaired and brought in. As Mitchell retired, at about noon, he saw seven British light tanks-'' whippets "-coming speedily into action past Cachv. These were the force4* allotted by General Butler to the 58th Division, and had been ordered by its commander to " clear up " the situation in front of Cachy. They made past the north of that village- across the plateau to the undulation leading southwards to Hangard Wood. On this ridge they quickly came on a line of Germans in shell-holes, with many light machine-guns. Rattling on, they surprised, on the reverse slope, a couple of battalions forming up in the open. These they scattered in all directions, and then turned upon groups of the enemy in shell-holes, chasing them, firing at them, even running down some and crushing them. The heavy German tanks, as well as the field-guns accompanying the German infantry and some winenwerfer, fired on the whippets and put four out of action, the crew of one being killed; but the casualties to personnel were only five in all, and whatever further thrust towards Cachy the Germans were then contemplating was foiled; it was not till late in the afternoon that they attempted a new advance there. The German tanks reported that they rallied a retirement of the 77th Reserve Division in front of Cachy at 11.30 a.m, and destroyed two tanks; and an advanced field-battery of the 4th Guard Division claimed to have hit three. The whippets scattered part of the front line and supporting troops and increased the gap between the 4th Guard and 77th Reserve Divisions, but whether they really caused the 400

'8" X " Company, 3rd Battalion, 3rd Brigade. Tank Corps.

40 566 THE A.I.F. IN FRANCE [a4th Apr., 1918 casualties, which British observers estimated them to have caused, may be seriously doubted. German regimental historians are usually frank as to losses suffered, and in this case the available records, though mentioning the tanks, say nothing about the casualties, which, if severe, they would hardly fail to notice. This attack occurred about noon. At the same hour the 1st Sherwood Foresters were moving south of the Bois I’Abb6 to reach the south-western corner of the Bois d’Aquenne, where they would make their counter-attack. Brigadier-General Grogan and the commander of the Foresters had gone up and ascertained the position of the enemy. But the battalion ran against a number of machine-guns of the 5th Guard Grenadier, which had been pushed on ahead of their infantry into the wood, and against the flank of the I and I1 Battalions of that Regiment, which were then thrust- ing through the empty northern half of the timber. Lieutenant- Colonel Moore4* of the Foresters was badly wounded, and the counter-attack entirely failed. News of these events was very slow and vague, but the battalion was reported to have fallen back through the wood to the narrow road forming the boundary between its two parts-Bois 1’AbbB and Bois d’Aquenne. The road was shelled and the battalion lost heavily. Meanwhile General Heneker at 11 a.m. had ordered the commander of his northern brigade (25th) to prepare a counter-attack with the 2nd Royal Berkshire and “two com- panies ” of the 2nd Rifle Brigade from the north against the town. Upon the brigadier’s consulting the two battalion commanders, all agreed that the operation was impossible. After long delay it was accordingly cancelled. But one male and one female tank-Lieutenant Grove’sso section of the 1st Battalion-which had been allotted to the 8th Division and ordered to co-operate with this attack, duly arrived at I p.m. north of the railway, in the valley half-a-mile west of the town. Grove found that the infantry there knew nothing of any order to counter-attack, and the male tank was hit

+*Lmut.-Col, R. F. Moore, D.S 0, M C.; 1st Bn, Notts and Derby Rea. (Sherwood Foresters). Killed in action 30 May, 1918.

y, Capt. C. F S. Grove. M.C.: 1st Bn.. Tank Corps. Structural engineer: of New Melden. Surrey, Enq : b. London. 19 Dec.. 1891. Killed in action. S Aua, 1918. 24th Apr., 19181 SECOND VILLERS-BRETONNEUX 567 by a forward German gun. Lieutenant commanding the other, was asked by the local infantry to withdraw as it was attracting shell-fire. Grove, however, sent it forward again, and at about 4 o’clock it reached the thin line, formed by Colonel Hill’s men, Christian’s and Callander’s patrols, and the 2nd Royal Berkshire. near the edge of the village. Passing through, it cleared a number of German machine-guns from the ground about the north-western outskirts and, despite intense machine-gun fire from the houses, rounded a small outlying copse-the furthest point that the Germans here had reached. The enemy ran back from the come and the British line on this side- of the village52 advanced about 150 yards to the posi- tion which Christian had first occupied, and to the copse. This spontaneous attack by the troops on the spot was the only counter-attack carried out with success by the infantry of the 8th Division, and was the only one that could have been SO carried out. The orders for the others had become impossible of fulfilment long before the troops could have iaunched them. German records show that the male British tank of Grove’s section was disabled by a hit by one of two field-guns of the 2/3gth German battery which their commander, Sergeant-Major Jarocz. had actually brought through to the western edge of Villers-Bretonneux. The history of the 35th Fusilier Regiment says that part of the 93rd R1.R. in the valley south of the Roman road also retired in front of the tanks, but, with the support of these field-guns, the 5th company of the 35th Fusilier held its position, and the 93rd advanced again.

~~ Lieut S C. Bell, 1st Bn., Tank Corps Railway clerk: of Lincoln. Eng., b. 28 July, 1889. s’The remnant of the 2nd East Lancs. under Colonel Hill, and the right post of the 2nd R. Berkshire. Hill was out of touch with headquarters, runners being unable to,,get through. Christian, however, reached headquarters. and sent him a message, Hold on, help IS coming.” Christian’s patrol had signalled back to its brigade by lamp, but no answer could be obtained to its signals.

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