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Electoral Studies xx (2007) 1e6 www.elsevier.com/locate/electstud Notes on Recent Elections The July 2006 presidential and congressional elections in Mexico
Joseph L. Klesner
Department of Political Science, Kenyon College, Gambier, OH 43022, USA Received 27 February 2007; accepted 11 April 2007
1. Introduction presidential election after Mexico’s transition to de- mocracy has tested both its electoral institutions and Mexico’s 2 July 2006 presidential election produced the broader commitment of the political elite to elec- a razor-thin margin of victory for Felipe Caldero´n of the toral democracy. National Action Party (PAN), who won by fewer than 235,000 votes out of nearly 42 million cast. A surprise 2. Background nominee of his party, Caldero´n came from far behind in a raucous campaign to edge out the former mayor of In the 2000 presidential election, Vicente Fox of the Mexico City, Andre´s Manuel Lo´pez Obrador of the Co- PAN-led Alliance for Change coalition pulled off an alition for the Good of All (Coalicio´n por el Bien de unexpected defeat of the Institutional Revolutionary Todos, composed of Lo´pez Obrador’s Party of the Dem- Party (PRI) candidate, bringing to an end 71 years of ocratic Revolution, or PRD, and two smaller parties). PRI dominance of the post-revolutionary Mexican However, carrying but 35.9% of the popular vote, Cal- regime. However, Fox’s coattails were not long enough dero´n can hardly claim a mandate. Indeed, Lo´pez Obra- to drag his coalition’s candidates into control of either dor challenged the legitimacy of Caldero´n’s presidency house of the Mexican federal congress, setting the and the democratic character of Mexican institutions by stage for divided government, with no party holding claiming that widespread fraud had been perpetrated a majority in either chamber. And the high expecta- against him during the campaign and on election day. tions with which Fox came to office quickly came to He disputed the announced results legally and mobi- be frustrated, as much by Fox’s political ineptitude lised large rallies to protest the outcome, disrupting in office as by the structural situation of divided Mexico City for weeks after the election. In addition, government (Dresser, 2003; Lawson, 2004). In the results of the congressional elections held the midterm elections for the Chamber of Deputies in same day have left Caldero´n and the PAN without ma- 2003, the PRI and the PRD each led coalitions that jorities in either the Chamber of Deputies or the Senate, gained seats in the lower house at the PAN’s expense. so divided government will continue to challenge the The PRI also won several gubernatorial elections, president for at least the next three years. This first showing that it was far from moribund as an electoral contender. Tel.: þ1 740 427 5311. In July 2000 Lo´pez Obrador won the second most E-mail address: [email protected] important electoral post in the country, as the head of
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+ MODEL 2 Notes on Recent Elections / Electoral Studies xx (2007) 1e6 the Mexico City government.1 This position at the na- party coalitions must nominate presidential candidates. tion’s geographical and political centre gave Lo´pez Presidents serve for a single term and are permanently Obrador the perfect platform on which to build his pres- barred from re-election. idential candidacy for 2006. His government came to be Mexico’s bicameral federal congress includes a Sen- known for ambitious public works projects, particularly ate of 128 members elected for six-year terms. Three road building to relieve traffic problems, and populist senatorial candidates are elected from each of Mexico’s spending programmes, notably the introduction of 32 states: two seats to the party or coalition that wins the a pension programme for seniors. Lo´pez Obrador sur- most votes in that state, and the third to the party in sec- vived an attempt by the PAN and the PRI to impeach ond place. The remaining 32 Senate seats are elected by and indict him for contempt of court with respect to proportional representation from party lists in a single a land disputedin effect a bid to disqualify him from national constituency. Voters cast a single ballot, the the 2006 presidential racedby organising mass demon- vote tallies being used to determine both state and na- strations in Mexico City supporting his case. At the tional seat allocations. beginning of the 2006 campaign, polls offered no evi- The lower house of congress, the Chamber of dence that the impeachment attempt had damaged Deputies, has 500 seats, 300 filled by simple plurality Lo´pez Obrador’s candidacy, as he led the field in all elections, the other 200 elected by proportional repre- pre-election surveys. sentation through a system of closed and blocked (i.e. During the protracted transition to democracy lead- voters cannot change the order of candidates) party lists ing up to the 2000 election, a significant pro-regime, in five equal-sized multi-member districts or ‘regions’. anti-regime cleavage came to dominate Mexican poli- In this mixed system, the party list seats are not com- tics (Moreno, 1998; Klesner, 2005). Once the PRI lost pensatory, unlike for example in the German system. control of the presidency, however, this regime cleavage Parties must register candidates in at least 200 of the diminished significantly in its importance. In its place, 300 districts in order to compete in the election and to grave concerns about the direction of the Mexican de- register party lists for the regional PR seats. Parties velopment model, the country’s relationship with the may list up to 60 candidates simultaneously for district United States, and the breakdown of social order have races and the party lists. Although the parties provide emerged to dominate the issue agenda of the Mexican separate lists for the five multi-member regions, the citizenry. PR seats are allocated according to the proportion of the national vote. As with the Senate, voters cast a single 3. Electoral systems ballot, the tallies then being used to determine both the winners in district races and the party list allocation for Mexico holds presidential and senatorial elections the whole nation.2 every six years on the first Sunday of July; elections The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), an autonomous for the lower house of congress, the Chamber of Depu- government agency, maintains the national voter regis- ties, which sits for three years, are held simultaneously. try and administers federal elections. Its role includes The Mexican electoral system requires voters to show regulating the campaign practices of parties and candi- a voter identity card at their precinct. Those away dates, and allocating public campaign funds to the from home on election day may visit a ‘special’ polling parties. The individuals who staff polling places are or- place to cast a ballot; depending on how far away from dinary citizens chosen by lot by the IFE and trained to home an absentee voter is (in his electoral district, in his operate the precinct, count the votes, and report the state, or outside of both), he may be able to vote only for results to the IFE on election night. Disputes about elec- the president, for president and senatorial candidates, or toral practices must be taken to the autonomous Federal for those and party list deputy candidates. Electoral Tribunal (commonly known as the TRIFE, The candidate with the simple plurality of popular sometimes as the TEPJF), a specialised electoral court votes wins Mexico’s top executive office; there is no that has handled thousands of disputes over the past de- run-off election. Formally recognised parties and/or cade (Eisenstadt, 2004).
1 The position is known simply as jefe de gobierno, or head of gov- ernment, of the Federal District (DF). Mexico City covers most of the 2 Vote tallies in the PR races exceed those in the district races be- DF, which in most respects is comparable to a state. Thus, the posi- cause the votes of those who cast ballots away from home but within tion shares characteristics with a governor or big city mayor, in this the PR region count only in the proportional component of the case the biggest city in the hemisphere. system.
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4. Campaign paid advertising that trumpeted the accomplishments of the current administration, not too subtly implying that A year before the election, few observers expected these achievements would be undone by a Lo´pez Obrador Caldero´n to be the PAN nominee. However, he soundly presidency. The IFE eventually forced Fox and Caldero´n defeated Fox’s apparent choice, Interior Minister San- to withdraw both sets of ads, butdalong with Lo´pez tiago Creel, in a primary process. Caldero´n owed his Obrador’s unimpressive responsedthey helped to push nomination in part to his status as a veteran PAN insider Caldero´n into the lead in the polls by early May. (born into a PAN family, Caldero´n previously served as Madrazo sought to steer a middle course on eco- party president and head of the party’s caucus in the nomic policy between the two front-runners, and to sug- Chamber of Deputies), a background sharply contrast- gest that he would bring more responsible leadership, ing with that of Creel, who had come relatively lately but his message failed to convert voters. Indeed, Ma- into the PAN (as had Fox before him). The PRI no- drazo consistently scored very poorly on feeling ther- minated its party president, Roberto Madrazo, a well- mometers in the polls (Langston, 2007), and the race known hard-liner. This followed an internal party strug- was clearly between Caldero´n and Lo´pez Obrador. gle in which he eliminated the party’s secretary-general This race was so close that either result fell within the from her leadership position in the Chamber of Depu- margin of error of the final pre-election poll forecasts. ties, and a primary process during which his strongest Mexican congressional candidates traditionally ride competitor dropped out after information was leaked the coattails of their parties’ presidential nominees, about his previously unknown property holdings hence they do not engage in campaigning that diverges (Langston, 2007). The PRI headed a coalition called far from their standard-bearers’ messages. Perhaps as the Alliance for Mexico; its partner was the Mexican evidence of this phenomenon, late in the race the PAN Ecological Green Party (PVEM). Lo´pez Obrador was apparently asked each of its congressional candidates unchallenged for the PRD nomination, and had long to contribute about US$15,000 from their campaign been odds-on favourite when the formal election season coffers to finance a large media buy for Caldero´n(Te- opened in January 2006. He led in opinion polls from hera´n, 2006). Interestingly, despite these well-known the outset until just after the first of two presidential de- coattails effects, many PRI leaders chose to distance bates on 25 April 2006 (CIDAC, 2006). Lo´pez Obrador themselves from Madrazo as his candidacy floundered, chose to skip that first debate so as to emphasise that he perhaps deflating the number of PRI’s congressional was well out in front of his adversaries and not inclined seats as a consequence (Langston, 2007). In the event, to stoop to their level by debating them in person more many who voted for PRI candidates for deputy and sen- than onceda strategy that backfired on him as the other ator split their ballot, opting for either Caldero´norLo´- candidates and the press made much of his absence. pez Obrador (Moreno and Me´ndez, 2007), and the PRI Lo´pez Obrador ran a populist campaign, promising congressional slates finished six percentage points new spending on social programmesdscholarships higher than Madrazo. for students, pensions for the elderly, health care subsi- diesdas well as on jobs. He condemned the Fox admin- 5. Results istration for perpetuating a development model that had worsened the quality of life for ordinary Mexicans. But On polling day 41.8 million Mexicans turned out to he carefully avoided criticising the United States, rec- cast ballots in the presidential election, representing ognising that most Mexicans prefer a close economic 58.6% of the registered electorate. This turnout rate rep- relationship with their neighbour to the north. Caldero´n, resents a continued decline from the 2000 (64%) and the in contrast, emphasised that he would bring continuity 1994 (78%) elections. Almost all Mexicans of voting in economic policy, with a focus on improving Mexi- age (95%) are registered, but actually casting a ballot co’s international economic competitiveness and thus is difficult for the millions who live away from the dis- creating jobs. trict in which they are registered, either abroad (typi- After making little headway against Lo´pez Obrador in cally in the United States) or elsewhere in Mexico. the first two months of the campaign, Caldero´nbeganin Mexico’s highly mobile society means that some 7 mil- March to run television spots comparing his main rival lion of the 71 million registered voters were estimated to Venezuela’s Hugo Cha´vez, suggesting that Lo´pez Ob- to be living in the US in July 2006. Those attempting rador would create a ‘danger to Mexico’ by damaging its to use the ‘special’ polling places typically find queues relationship with the US. Caldero´n’s campaigning was to be very long, and those precincts often run out of bal- boosted by President Fox in the form of government- lot papers before voting is concluded.
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In the all-important presidential race, Caldero´n 6. Post-election conflict triumphed over Lo´pez Obrador, but by such a narrow margindone percentage point according to the Mexicans will remember the 2006 election for the preliminary tallydthat the IFE was unable to call the dispute that occupied the nation for fully five months af- result on election night. Neither of the rivals was so ret- ter they voted. The narrowness of Caldero´n’s margin of icent, however: each announced his victory that same victory gave Lo´pez Obrador hope that he could triumph evening. The next day, Lo´pez Obrador challenged the if only what he saw as irregularities in the electoral pro- accuracy of the preliminary figures and demanded cess were considered by the TRIFE, leading either to a full recount. His case was strengthened by adjust- the votes being recounted or a considerable number of ments to the results that reduced Caldero´n’s lead to them being annulled. Lo´pez Obrador immediately initi- about 0.6 percentage points (Herrera and Za´rate, ated a dual response to the declared result: legal chal- 2006). That was established as the official margin of vic- lenges through the established procedures, and tory when the votes were tallied at the district level on popular mobilisation to put pressure on the TRIFE to Wednesday 5 July (Table 1). Lo´pez Obrador held his first meet demands for a full recount or cancellation of the major post-election rally three days later on the follow- election. ing Saturday. The next day, the Coalition for the Good of The Coalition for the Good of All complained that All submitted an 800-page legal brief to the TRIFE, de- the election had been unfair in two ways: first, the manding a full recount. vote count was suspect; second, the Caldero´n camp, in- The PRI’s Madrazo finished a distant third, about 14 cluding President Fox, had violated campaigning rules. percentage points behind the two front-runners. In con- On the first point, Lo´pez Obrador identified three spe- trast, his coalition’s congressional candidates fared cific irregularities: in the Preliminary Electoral Results much better (Tables 2 and 3), again finishing third but Programme (PREP) on election night, which he argued only about one point behind the Coalition for the was manipulated by the IFE to show Caldero´n maintain- Good of All in the Chamber of Deputies election. In- ing a lead all evening; in the district-by-district tally deed, the new congress is divided relatively evenly conducted on 5 and 6 July, which he suggested had among the three blocs, with the PAN slightly overrepre- not been conducted carefully; and in the counts at sented in terms of seats due to the distortion effects pro- some 50,000 polling places, where myriad violations duced by the plurality components in the two houses’ were alleged to have taken place. With regard to cam- electoral systems. However, in neither the Chamber paigning, the PRD argued that Caldero´n and the PAN nor the Senate will Caldero´n’s PAN command a major- had violated negative campaigning restrictions, that ity; indeed, it will need nearly 100 additional votes in Fox had inappropriately interfered in the race in order the Chamber and 13 in the Senate to pass Caldero´n’s to sway voters toward Caldero´n, and that the Business legislative initiatives. Coordinating Council (CCE, the major association of big business in Mexico) had launched illegal attack ads against Lo´pez Obrador. He and his coalition de- manded a full vote-by-vote manual recount of the bal- Table 1 e Mexican presidential election results, 2 July 2006, final corrected lots (NDI, 2006,5 7). figures To put pressure on the TRIFE to meet his demands, ´ Candidate Votes Votes (%) Lopez Obrador began holding regular large rallies in Mexico City. While such estimates are notoriously un- Felipe Caldero´n Hinojosa (PAN) 14,916,927 36.7 Andre´s Manuel Lo´pez Obrador 14,683,096 36.1 reliable in Mexico, suggestions that up to a quarter of (Coalition for the Good of All) a million people attended these rallies seem realistic. Roberto Madrazo Pintado 9,237,000 22.7 From the end of July until Mexico’s Independence (Alliance for Mexico) Day (16 September), Lo´pez Obrador joined hundreds Patricia Mercado Castro (PASC) 1,124,280 2.8 of his followers who camped in tents on Mexico City’s Roberto Campa Cifria´n (PANAL) 397,550 1.0 Others 298,204 0.7 major boulevard and its main square, disrupting traffic and discouraging tourists from visiting the capital. Cal- Registered voters (lista nominal) 71,374,373 dero´n, meanwhile, demanded that the legal electoral Ballots cast 41,557,430 58.2 Invalid ballots 900,373 2.2 processes be followed and vowed to respect whatever Valid votes 40,657,057 97.8 decision the TRIFE made. He also began plans to NB: In all tables, percentages are based on the total of valid votes. form a government, indicating that he expected the Source: TRIFE (2006, pp. 28e35). court’s final decision would be in his favour.
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Table 2 Mexican senatorial election results, 2 July 2006 Party/coalition 96 seats from 32 states 32 party list senators Total Seats Votes Votes (%) Seats Votes Votes (%) Seats National Action Party (PAN) 13,896,869 34.4 41 14,035,503 34.5 11 52 Coalition for the Good of All 12,298,745 30.4 26 12,397,008 30.4 10 36 Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) 23 6 29 Workers’ Party (PT) 022 Convergence 325 Alliance for Mexico 11,629,727 28.8 29 11,681,395 28.7 10 39 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 27 6 33 Mexican Green Party (PVEM) 246 New Alliance Party (PANAL) 1,677,934 4.2 0 1,688,198 4.1 1 1 Social Democratic and Peasant Party (PASC) 787,797 1.9 0 795,730 2.0 0 0 Others 118,966 0.3 0 119,422 0.3 0 0 Source: IFE (2006, pp. 69, 74e76).
After considering the Coalition for the Good of All’s election, and that Fox had remained within the limits of claims and those of other parties, the TRIFE decided to the electoral law by not explicitly referring to the candi- have the electoral packets of about 9% of polling places dates (NDI, 2006,6e7). opened and recounted. This low percentage represented Despite these rulings, which made Caldero´n the a major setback for Lo´pez Obrador, but the electoral court president-elect, Lo´pez Obrador vowed to keep up his argued that the Coalition had challenged outcomes in only struggle for power. He staged an ‘election by acclama- 230 of the 300 electoral districts, and so a complete re- tion’ in which those present at a rally on Mexico’s Inde- count was unwarranted. After examining the reopened pendence Day (16 September) ‘elected’ him by a show of packets, the TRIFE annulled the results of only 174 poll- hands, and he then held an ‘inauguration’ ceremony on ing places, reducing Caldero´n’s tally by 81,080 votes but 20 November, the anniversary of the onset of the Mexican Lo´pez Obrador’s by almost as much, 76,897 votes. The Revolution. However, the political tide began to swing TRIFE issued its final judgment on 5 September. In that against the PRD, which in August only narrowly held judgment, the electoral judges chastised the Caldero´n a gubernatorial seat in the contested southern state of campaign and the CCE for their negative ads, and Presi- Chiapas, and in October lost the governorship of Lo´pez dent Fox for intervening in the campaign by indirectly ad- Obrador’s homestate, Tabasco. The PRD’s congressional vocating Caldero´n’s candidacy in his public appearances caucus attempted to prevent Caldero´n from taking the and by running media ads promoting the achievements of oath of office on 1 December, but the PAN’s deputies his administration. However, the judges also ruled that the managed to control the podiumddespite a melee involv- negative ads had not determined the outcome of the ing dozens of deputies from both partiesdenabling
Table 3 Mexican chamber of deputy election results, 2 July 2006 Party/coalition 300 district deputies 200 party list deputies Total Seats Votes Votes (%) Seats Votes Votes (%) Seats National Action Party (PAN) 13,784,935 34.2 137 13,845,122 34.2 69 206 Coalition for the Good of All 11,969,049 29.7 98 12,013,360 29.7 60 158 Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD) 90 36 126 Workers’ Party (PT) 31316 Convergence 51116 Alliance for Mexico 11,647,697 28.9 65 11,676,598 28.9 58 123 Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) 63 41 104 Mexican Green Party (PVEM) 21719 New Alliance Party (PANAL) 1,876,443 4.7 0 1,883,494 4.7 9 9 Social Democratic and Peasant Party (PASC) 847,599 2.1 0 850,985 2.1 4 4 Others 128,731 0.3 0 128,825 0.3 0 0 Source: IFE (2006, pp. 70, 77e79).
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Caldero´n formally to assume the presidency. Meanwhile, References three of the five PRD governors, including former party president Amalia Garcı´a of Zacatecas and La´zaro Ca´rde- CIDAC, 2006. Poll of polls junio 2006. Centro de Investigacio´n para nas of Michoaca´n, perhaps the party’s leading presiden- el Desarrollo, A.C., Mexico City.
Please cite this article in press as: Joseph L. Klesner, The July 2006 presidential and congressional elections in Mexico, Electoral Stud. (2007), doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.04.002