Diaspora Politics, Ethnicity and the Orthodox Church in the Near East

DIASPORA POLITICS, ETHNICITY AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE NEAR EAST

SOTIRIS ROUSSOS*

The Greek Orthodox diaspora has always kept an interest in Jerusalem, its shrines and the rituals performed by monks and Bishops in the Holy Places.1 As Adrian Hastings points out, ‘the vehicle and living proof of this holiness was to be found in the monks inhabiting these places and in the liturgies celebrated in their churches’.2 Diaspora support for those living in the Holy Land also took the form of donations. A large number of monks traveled in various places of the Ottoman Empire to call for financial support, ziteia, for the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The custom of fund-raising trips for the Holy Sepulchre was first inaugurated by Patriarch Germanos in the mid-sixteenth century and was continued all through the Ottoman period. The Ecumenical Patriarch issued several Synodal Letters to all Orthodox in Greek, Turkish, Wallachian and Slavic, urging their financial support of the Jerusalem Patriarchate.3 Donations could include land, houses and estates, even shares of ship-ownership. The Phanariotes governors of the semi-autonomous Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (Romania) granted the Patriarchate of Jerusalem twenty one monasteries with all their lands and revenues.4

* The author is Lecturer at the Institute of International Relations, Athens, and Coor- dinator of its Centre for Mediterranean & Middle Eastern Studies. 1 K. Amstrong, ‘Jerusalem: The Problems and Responsibilities of Sacred Space’, Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, 13,2 (2002), p.190. 2 A. Hastings, ‘Holy Lands and Their Political Consequences’, Nations and Nationalisms, 9 (2003), 1, p. 35. 3 Booklet of Chrysanthos, Patriarch of Jerusalem (Bucharest, 1768) [in Greek]. See also S. Tselikas, ‘Katagrafi tou Archeiou tou Patriarcheiou Ierosolymon [Catalogue of the Archives of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem]’, Deltion Istorikou kai Palaiografikou Arxeiou, 5, MIET (1992), pp. 390-395. 4 This section is drawn from S. Roussos, ‘Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on Church-State Relations and Religion and Politics in Modern Jerusalem’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 5,2 (2005), pp. 103-122.

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Michael Humphrey notes, ‘the term Diaspora has come into vogue in the last decade because it captures the ambiguities of contemporary social belonging. Diaspora refers to a form of social relations produced by the displacement from home. It implies a very conventional anthropological perspective on social life, the persistence of tradition (identity) despite its displacement from its place of origin. It ﬁts within the old dichotomy between tradition and modernity in which the anticipated loss of tradition is resisted. Yet current usage of the term includes not only the persistence of tradition (identity) as a product of collective resistance to cultural loss but also qualiﬁed acceptance by the host society.’5 The twentieth century has seen an increase in the exodus of the Christians from the Middle East. The Armenian genocide in 1915, the massacre of the Syriac Christians by the end of the Great War, and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1922 drastically reduced the demographic strength of Christianity in the Middle East.

After the second World War, the Greek Diaspora (mainly in the USA) has taken an increasing interest in the affairs of the Greek Orthodox Patri- archate in Jerusalem. The Patriarchate is inextricably connected to Greek heritage and thus to the ethno-religious character of the Greek Diaspora. As one “traditional intellectual” of the Greek Diaspora put it: ‘we [the Greeks] have the uniqueness of having a heritage and a church that match’. And another claimed, ‘the Church has been very much responsible for main- taining the Greek [ethnic] culture’.6 The close ties between the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem and the American government started when Patriarch Benedictos visited the USA in 1963 and met with President Kennedy, a meeting that the Greek Ortho- dox Archbishop of the Americas, Iakovos, unsuccessfully attempted to undermine.7 The meeting inaugurated close contact between the Patriarchate

5 M. Humphrey, ‘Lebanese identities: between cities, nations and transnations’, Arab Studies Quarterly (Winter 2004). Page reference needed. 6 Y. Anagnostou, ‘Model Americans, Quintessential Greeks: Ethnic Success and Assimila- tion in Diapora’, Diaspora 12,3 (2003), Page reference needed. 7 The account is based on comments by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theofilos (then Archbishop of Tabor). See G. Gilson, ‘A Cleric for Delicate Missions’, Athens News, 5 August 2005.

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and American diplomats in the region and this policy was continued by Benedictos’ successor, Patriarch Diodoros. In 1999 he took the decision to appoint a Greek-American former US Ambassador to Qatar, Patrick Theros, as the Patriarchate’s representative in Washington.8 Theros was appointed Ambassador to Qatar in 1995 after having worked for the US Foreign Service in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Leb- anon, Nicaragua and Saudi Arabia. In the early 1990s he served as Deputy Co-coordinator for Counter-terrorism responsible for the co-ordination of all US government counter-terrorism activities outside the United States.9 The choice of Theros by the Patriarchate signaled an effort of the latter to call upon the Greek-American Diaspora in general rather than to explore a new role for the Church of Jerusalem beyond the boundaries in an ecumenical approach. “Diaspora consciousness” signiﬁes the cognitive investment of members of a Diaspora community in promoting homeland interests in their host nation. In the case of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem the interests of the Church were identiﬁed with those of the Greek nation. Upon his election, Patriarch Eirineos maintained that the Patriarchate’s main aim was to pro- mote Greek presence in the Holy Land and that Greek national interests were his highest priority, more so since the Patriarchate is, in his view, an outpost of Greece in the Holy Land.10 The intervention of the Greek-American Diaspora became evident during the turbulent election of Patriarch Eirineos in 2001. The Israeli Government of Ariel Sharon could not afford it to see elected a “pro-Palestinian” Patri- arch at such a critical moment in the region. Israel wanted to avoid the “Arabisation” of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, as has happened with the Latin Patriarchate, and most importantly it feared Palestinian control over the Patriarchate’s property. Last but not least, it wanted to prevent any kind of non-Greek, i.e. Russian, interference in the affairs of the Patriarchate.11

8 P. Theros, ‘Jerusalem: Troubled Past, Threatening Present, Uncertain Future’, The National Herald, 11 November 2005. 9 See www.therosandtheros.com/bio.html (visited 1 November 2006). 10 Interviews of Patriarch Eirineos in Greek newspapers, Kyriakatiki Eleutherotypia, 19 August 2001; Typos tis Kyriakis, 19 August 2001; I Vradyni, 20 August 2001. 11 G. Kalokairinos, ‘Behind the Scenes in Jerusalem’, Kathimerini, July 22, 2001. [in Greek]

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Accordingly, it was decided to strike the names of five candidates from the list, including that of Metropolitan Eirineos, who was nevertheless eventually elected Patriarch. It was the first time since the nineteenth century that the government or an occupying power intervened so directly in the election and it constituted a major break with the tradition of church-state relations in the Holy Land. The problems emanating from such a decision were almost immediately visible. It could create a very dangerous precedent of state intervention into the heart of the Church and possibly lead to a schism inside the Church. The majority of the Synod refused to accept the intervention and sought help from Jordan. At the same time, leading Arab Orthodox figures from both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority expressed their desire to conduct the election of the Patriarch according to the Jordanian Law of 1958, ignoring the decision of the Israeli government.12 Eventually, the Israeli Ministry of Justice approved the list of candidates without erasing any names. However, the Israeli government did not for- mally acknowledge the election of Patriarch Eirineos for two years. Various Israeli officials and experts said that the real issue was the real-estate held by the Patriarchate, including land on which the Israeli Knesset stands and many other important properties in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and elsewhere in Israel. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate is the second biggest landowner in Israel after the state. Right wing and pro-settler groups accused Patriarch Eirineos of being a supporter of the PLO and of Yasser Arafat despite he had stated, ‘I am not pro-Palestinian, nor pro-Israel, nor pro-anything, I am only pro-God’.13 The Greek Diaspora sought to confer with the US government through various channels in order to press the Sharon government to recognise Eir- ineos. Andrew Athens, the Greek American President of World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE), an umbrella organisation of the World Greek Diaspora, announced that the Diaspora had embarked on a worldwide effort to achieve official recognition of Patriarch Eirineos. A number of Congress- men and Senators had signed a petition urging the Sharon government to

12 al-Quds, July 2001 (Arabic), Wafa (Official Palestine News Agency), January 8, 2002. 13 The New York Times, April 26, 2002.

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recognise the Patriarch. There were also close contacts with Jewish organ- isations in the United States, which had supported the recognition of the Patriarch.14 Athens repeatedly appealed to the Israeli government and held numerous meetings with US government ofﬁcials in order to achieve this goal.15 Together with four other leaders he met with the then Secretary of State Collin Powel and the National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice for discussions on US action supporting the recognition of Patriarch Eiri- neos. It seems that there was some kind of discrete US intervention on the matter.16 Following the initiatives of the secular Greek American Diaspora, the Eparchial Synod of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America also addressed the issue of Israel’s non-recognition of Patriarch Eirineos. Arch- bishop Demetrius acknowledged the interest of President Bush in the matter when it was raised at the White House meeting with representatives of the “Standing conference of the canonical Orthodox bishops of the Americas” (SCOBA) on July 9, 2002.17 The stance of the Greek Orthodox Church prompted a unanimous resolution by the National Council of Churches in the USA calling upon the government of Israel to recognise the election.18 Eventually Eirineos was recognised by Israel only to ﬁnd himself in a huge scandal over sales of the Patriarchate’s land to Israeli real-estate companies in Jerusalem. The scandal caused uproar and harsh reaction by the Arab laity, the Palestinian Authority and Jordan. Eirineos was deposed by the majority

14 H. Shapiro, ‘Archbishop Eirineos Elected Greek Orthodox Patriarch’, Jerusalem Post, August 14, 2001. 15 See at http://www.sae.gr/EN/Nea_Eidiseis?default.asp?cmd=show&id=356, (visited 3 October 2006). 16 P. Mpailis, ‘The New Patriarch of Jerusalem to Be Elected on Monday’, Ta Nea, 7 August 2002. 17 Announcement of the Holy Eparchial Synod of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America, September 27, 2002, http://www.goarch.org/en/news (visited November 20, 2006). The establishment of the “Standing conference of the canonical Orthodox bishops of the Ame- ricas” (SCOBA) in 1960 and of the “Standing conference of Oriental Orthodox Churches in America” (SCOOCA) in 1973 was viewed by many as an expression of a growing unity among the Orthodox in the United States. SCOBA and SCOOCA are the national church bodies that brought together the leaders of nearly all major Eastern and Oriental Orthodox jurisdictions in the USA. 18 Resolution of the Executive Board of the National Council of Churches, October 7, 2002, http://www.goarch.org/en/news (visited November 20, 2006).

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of the Synod and his deposition was approved by the Great Synod of all Greek Orthodox Patriarchates and Autocephalous Churches in 2005. Because of the pattern of immigration, it had become common for Orthodox Christians in the USA to view themselves as the ethnic communities dispersed from the motherland. The same perspective historically col- oured the understanding of the nature of the Orthodox Churches in North America. Each jurisdiction came to see itself as a ‘Diaspora’ Church and/or as a geographic extension of the Mother Church. The attitude of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese towards the issue of Eirineos’ recognition fits into this pattern. The Greek Orthodox Church in the USA makes up more than half of the faithful under the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, which exerts great influence on this Church despite her autonomy.19 The initiatives of the Greek Orthodox Church in USA on the issue of Jerusalem came as a result of both the ethnocentrism of the Greek Orthodox Archdiocese of America and the concern of the Ecu- menical Patriarchate to preserve the Greek character of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem, and most importantly to avoid the weakening of the Patriarchate and a possible take over by pro-Russian prelates.20 Indeed the same views about Church ‘geopolitics’ can be found in Theros’ rationale for seeking Diaspora support for the Patriarchate of Jerusalem in the (again) turbulent election of Theophilos in 2005 and the delay in his recognition by Israel. Theros stated, ‘Orthodox Christians in the United States must recognise that the actions of the Israeli government damage the Patriarchate of Jerusalem at least as much as those of the Turkish government damage the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Both Patriarchates sit on the edge of disaster because of hostile government action. The flock in Constantino- ple has almost disappeared and the Patriarchate is under existential threat. If nothing is done, we can expect to see Orthodoxy disappear from the Holy Land as well. Abandoning Jerusalem will be a harbinger of abandoning Constantinople.’21

19 G. J. Saad, ‘Orthodox Christianity in America: Religion and Nationalism’, www.duke. edu/-Jgs5/JamesGSaadReligionThesis.pdf (visited October 25, 2006). 20 G. Kalokairinos, ‘New Balance after Eirineos Election’, Kathimerini, 19 August 2001. 21 Theros, ‘Jerusalem’.

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This ‘domino theory’ about the affairs of the Patriarchates and the Greek Orthodox communities emerged in the early twentieth century in the reports and memoranda of several Greek Orthodox Patriarchs and Archbishops in Constantinople, Alexandria and Athens that revealed a belief that any devel- opment in any single Orthodox Patriarchate would influence the position of the rest of the Patriarchates in the Middle East. They also confounded the ecclesiastical conscience with the modern national conscience: they tried ‘to represent the modern Greek national conscience as identical with and a continuation of the Greek [Orthodox] national conscience under Turkish domination’.22 For the Palestinian Christians in general, emigration was an even larger problem than in Syria and Lebanon, since it led to the near extinction of the Christian communities in Israel/Palestine. It is estimated that in the twentieth century eighty-five percent of the Christians have emigrated. Anthony O’Mahony gives the following figures: ‘the Holy Land has seen some 230,000 Christians leaving since 1948, with the Christian population in Jerusalem alone dropping from 30,000 to as few as 5,000 today.’23 Moreover, in the mid-1990s twenty-two per cent of the Christian population in the Holy Land had an interest in emigrating, due mainly to fear and insecurity together with the search for jobs.24 Greek Orthodox Palestinians fit the model of a migrant community: high educational qualifications acquired in Western schools, relatively high living standards, and ties with relatives abroad.25 In the case of the Greek Orthodox Palestinians in the Diaspora, there is an endeavour to resist new types of solidarity and to preserve their ethnic identity against the tendencies towards assimilation and against the growing impact of globalisation. Most importantly, they try to maintain their identification with a shared national narrative. For a significant portion of the Palestinian Greek Orthodox Diaspora, this narrative is closely tied with the

22 T.H. Papadopoulos, Studies and Documents Relating to the History of the Greek Church and People under Turkish Domination (London, 1990), p. 149. 23 A. O’Mahony, ‘Exodus under fire’, The Tablet, 12 August 2006. 24 A. D. Hanania, ‘Churches of the Holy Land, Obligations and Expectations: A View from the Holy Land’, in Christian in the Holy Land, eds. M. Prior & W. Taylor (London, 1995), pp. 206-207. 25 B. Sabella, ‘Palestinian Christian Emigration from the Holy Land’, Proche-Orient Chrétien, 91 (1991), pp. 75-76.

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struggle to “arabise-nationalise” their home Church. The formation of a Task Force in the USA by Arab Orthodox aimed at conducting a heavily politicized campaign against Greek domination in the Patriarchate of Jeru- salem should be considered in light of this attitude. The Task Force was founded in 1994 by Arab Orthodox residents in the USA and Canada. Their main aim is to reconstruct the narrative of the Patriarchate as an Arab Church as a ﬁrst step towards the “arabisation” of the Patriarchate. The Task Force has active chapters in North America, Jordan and the Palestinian territories, with headquarters in California. Among the speakers invited to participate in its conferences is Metropolitan Philip Saliba, Primate of the Antiochian Orthodox Christian Archdiocese of North America.26 The Task Force argues that the Jerusalem Patriarchate was in the hands of Arabs until 1534, when a Greek Patriarch, Germanos, hellenised the Patriarchate and removed all Arab prelates from the Orthodox Church in Jerusalem.27 They connect the exodus of the Orthodox from the Holy Land with the domination of the Greeks over the Church, which they consider to be a form of “religious colonialism”. The Task Force calls for the “re-arabisation” of the Church, not as an option but a national necessity.28 The formation of the Task Force coincided with a serious decline in the number of Christians in the Palestinian Territories. As Justus Reid Weiner points out, ‘since 1994 Bethlehem’s Christian population has dwindled to just one-third of the city overall population and in Beit Sahour, a predominantly Christian Jerusalem suburb, more than 50% percent of the Christian population is seriously considering emigration due ﬁrst to economic deterioration, political conditions and sociopolitical islamicisation’.29

26 M. Raja Abu Jabr, ‘Orthodox Christians’ Task Force Opposes Sale of Church Lands’, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, (July/August 1999), pp. 121-122. 27 This is a widely held view among Arab intellectuals; see Suleiman al-Akkawi, ‘Le patriar- cat orthodoxe et le paix. Levez l’ hegemonie grecque sur Jerusalem’, An Nahar, 18 October 1995. 28 P. Twair & S. Twair, ‘Lebanese Newspaper Exposes Sales by Greek Clerics of East Jerusalem Lands to Israelis’, Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (December 1997), pp. 107-111. 29 J. Reid Weiner, Human Rights of Christians in Palestinian Society (Jerusalem, 2005), p. 6.

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The Task Force claimed that by neglecting the material and spiritual needs of the Arab Orthodox, and most importantly by selling lands of the Church for Israeli settlements, the Greek upper-clergy has seriously under- mined the very existence of the Arab Orthodox faithful in the Holy Land. The use of land plays a key role in the well-being of Palestinian society and the Palestinian Christians in particular. More importantly, in the face of an ascendant Islamism, the Arab Orthodox in Palestine and Jordan had nowhere to turn for spiritual guidance and refuge. Rauf Abu Jaber, chairman of the Orthodox Central Council in Jordan with views linked to those of the Task Force, stressed the reckless land sales by the late Patriarch and stated that he hoped that his successor would be a good shepherd and correct the mistakes of the past twenty years.30 Despite harsh statements against Greek rule in the Patriarchate and calls for the “re-arabization” of the Church, however, there are parts of the Arab Orthodox community in the US that do not fully subscribe to these views. The Council of the Jerusalem Orthodox Patriarchate Representation in California, which represents some eighteen thousand Arab Orthodox of Jordanian and Palestinian origin, decided to send a delegation to attend the special ceremony of the enthronement of Patriarch Eirineos in August 2001.31 Some members of the Arab Orthodox Diaspora, distinguished by high levels of group identiﬁcation, deep immersion in group life and attachment to religious identity, are more amenable to mobilisation in the conﬂict with the Greek upper clergy. Many others, however, are no more than bystanders. The Arab Orthodox Diaspora is a source of political and economic strength that the Arab Orthodox in Palestine and Jordan lack. In the mid- nineties, priests in Fuheis, in Jordan, collected more than $600,000 to build a church school in their town, since the Patriarchate refused to take upon it part of the cost. In the political arena the Task Force has tried to raise the dispute from the local level between the Church upper-clergy and the Arab Orthodox faithful to a regional and international level. More- over, they try to engage regional governments, the Jordanian and the Palestinian Authority, in pursuing their goals. The Task Force draws on

30 Jordan Times, August 16, 2001. 31 Al-Quds, August 21, 2001.

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the host country’s resources and tries to play a role on the regional and international scene.32 Its ethnocentrism is driven mainly by humanitarian concerns, a sense of historic or contemporary group-specific injustice, and ethnic-religious solidarity.33 In 1997, the Task Force appealed to Hanan Ashrawi, a member of the Palestinian Legislative Council, to investigate the rights of the Arab Orthodox Christians who suffer the injustice of Greek rule in the Church and the continuous selling of Church lands to Israeli interests.34 In recent years the ethnic-sectarian identification and solidarity of Diasporas has been challenged and to a certain extent eroded by new types of solidarity and identification that some have thought to be threatening for the identity of the Diaspora community.35 The Greek Orthodox Archbishop in America, Spyridon, tried to reverse such new types of solidarity and appeared to view the Orthodox church as a body in crisis, with its traditions being eroded by an American religious culture that emphasises individual spirituality rather than obedience to a religious hierarchy. He thus reinforced Greek ethnocentrism within the Church and complicated efforts towards close co-operation among the various Orthodox Churches in America. The new Archbishop, Demetrios, elected in 2000, shows a less ethnocentric attitude towards the use of English in the Church and, most importantly, towards mixed marriages, the main vehicle of integration of the Greek Diaspora into new solidarities. He said that there can be no turning back from the trend towards mixed marriages, something that has alarmed Greek Orthodox traditionalists36 The demise of ethnocentrism and Diaspora nationalism might allow the Orthodox faithful in America, Greek and American, to reflect on the history of Christianity in the Holy Land and to acquire a common stance on its

32 D. K. Wald & D. B. Williams, The Diaspora Consciousness of Arab Americans: the Intersection of Social Identity and Global Politics, www.middlebury.edu/NR/rdonlyres/ 2#4A90EFC6-581-49C4-A7A5-BF-4B7F4BF9F3/0/waldandwlliamspaper.pdf (visited November 24, 2006). 33 Ibid.; see also D. Carment, ‘The International Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict: Con- cepts, Indicators and Theory’, Journal of Peace Research, 30 (1997), pp. 137-150. 34 Twair & Twair, ‘Newspaper Exposes’ (see n. 28). 35 M.A. Bamyeh, ‘Postnationalism’, Bulletin of the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, 3,2 (2001) Page reference needed here. 36 The Milwaukee Journal, August 26, 2000.

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future. As Ruth and Thomas Hummel point out, the Christian shrines should not be a Disney-like theme-park in a Jewish and Islamist political and social environment. The Christian communities and Churches in Israel/Palestine can host a pilgrimage by diverse Christians to an ecumenical renewal and rediscovery.37 Most importantly, in the case of Jerusalem the Orthodox should discuss among themselves how to collaborate in the exchange of information and opinion through the media and how their voice would be heard as strong and convincing in the world media that are at present ignorant or less sensitive to the living Christian heritage in the Holy Land.38 Otherwise Orthodox Diaspora faithful and Churches cannot break the ring of their ethno-religious camps and would never really be part of the mainstream American decision- making.39 Events such as the siege of the Church of Nativity in 2002 can serve to engineer a common Orthodox approach and activism and to search for a common ground in the dialogue with Islam and Judaism.40

Conclusion. The recent conﬂicts in the Middle East have added new waves of Christian refugees. Some 200,000 Christians ﬂed Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime. Around 40,000 sought refuge in Jordan and approxi- mately 60,000 in Syria, while the rest are dispersed around the Middle East, Europe and America. At the same time, Christians in northern Israel and southern Lebanon are trapped in the Israel-Hezbollah struggle and most probably consider emigration as a safe alternative.41 Metropolitan Philip, Archbishop of the Antiochian Orthodox Church in America, pointed out that the Diaspora’s body resides in the West, but its

37 V. R. Hummel & C. Th. Hummel, ‘Lord, Who May Dwell in Your Sanctuary? Who May Live on Your Holy Hill? A Palestinian Pilgrimage’, in They Came and They Saw. Western Christian Experiences of the Holy Land, ed. M. Prior (London, 2000), p. 219. 38 C. Carras stressed the necessity of a unified stance of the Orthodox Churches particularly in the English-speaking world. See C. Carras, ‘The Orthodox Church and Politics in a Post-Communist World’, in The Orthodox Church in a Changing World, eds. M. P. Kitro- milides & Th. Veremis (Athens, 1998), p. 27. 39 R. Ch Ajalat, ‘A Vision for American Orthodoxy’, Again Magazine, 25 (2003), 4, pp. 9-12. 40 I. Urbina & H. Nasser, ‘Church Siege Narrowed a Religious Divide’, Los Angeles Times, May 12, 2002. 41 A. O’Mahony, ‘Exodus under fire’, The Tablet, 12 August 2006.

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heart and soul remains elsewhere.42 As demonstrated in the cases of the Greek and Arab Diasporas, the homeland still has a strong inﬂuence on their collective memory and imagination. It could lead to a perpetual imaginary vision in which Christian mission is dominated by a nostalgic narrative of the past. Orthodox Diasporas feel themselves to be culturally besieged and thus introverted ethnic minorities rather than part of an assertive Orthodox mission in the West. Moreover, by neglecting this prophetic role in the modern world, Orthodox Churches might fail to help sustain the Orthodox presence in the Orient and in the Holy Land in particular.

42 A. Walker, ‘Introduction: The Prophetic Role of Orthodoxy. The View of the Diaspora’, in Living Orthodoxy in the Modern World (Greek edition), eds. A. Walker & C. Carras (Athens, 2001), pp. 13-26.

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