Diaspora Politics, Ethnicity and the Orthodox Church in the Near East

Journal of Eastern Christian Studies 61(1-2), 137-148. doi: 10.2143/JECS.61.1.2045833 © 2009 by Journal of Eastern Christian Studies. All rights reserved. DIASPORA POLITICS, ETHNICITY AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH IN THE NEAR EAST SOTIRIS ROUSSOS* The Greek Orthodox diaspora has always kept an interest in Jerusalem, its shrines and the rituals performed by monks and Bishops in the Holy Places.1 As Adrian Hastings points out, ‘the vehicle and living proof of this holiness was to be found in the monks inhabiting these places and in the liturgies celebrated in their churches’.2 Diaspora support for those living in the Holy Land also took the form of donations. A large number of monks traveled in various places of the Ottoman Empire to call for financial support, ziteia, for the Patriarchate of Jerusalem. The custom of fund-raising trips for the Holy Sepulchre was first inaugurated by Patriarch Germanos in the mid-sixteenth century and was continued all through the Ottoman period. The Ecumenical Patriarch issued several Synodal Letters to all Orthodox in Greek, Turkish, Wallachian and Slavic, urging their financial support of the Jerusalem Patriarchate.3 Donations could include land, houses and estates, even shares of ship-ownership. The Phanariotes governors of the semi-autonomous Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia (Romania) granted the Patriarchate of Jerusalem twenty one monasteries with all their lands and revenues.4 * The author is Lecturer at the Institute of International Relations, Athens, and Coor- dinator of its Centre for Mediterranean & Middle Eastern Studies. 1 K. Amstrong, ‘Jerusalem: The Problems and Responsibilities of Sacred Space’, Islam and Christian-Muslim relations, 13,2 (2002), p.190. 2 A. Hastings, ‘Holy Lands and Their Political Consequences’, Nations and Nationalisms, 9 (2003), 1, p. 35. 3 Booklet of Chrysanthos, Patriarch of Jerusalem (Bucharest, 1768) [in Greek]. See also S. Tselikas, ‘Katagrafi tou Archeiou tou Patriarcheiou Ierosolymon [Catalogue of the Archives of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem]’, Deltion Istorikou kai Palaiografikou Arxeiou, 5, MIET (1992), pp. 390-395. 4 This section is drawn from S. Roussos, ‘Eastern Orthodox Perspectives on Church-State Relations and Religion and Politics in Modern Jerusalem’, International Journal for the Study of the Christian Church, 5,2 (2005), pp. 103-122. 22334-09_JECS09_05_Roussos_ME.indd334-09_JECS09_05_Roussos_ME.indd 113737 44/02/10/02/10 117:117:11 138 SOTIRIS ROUSSOS Michael Humphrey notes, ‘the term Diaspora has come into vogue in the last decade because it captures the ambiguities of contemporary social belonging. Diaspora refers to a form of social relations produced by the displacement from home. It implies a very conventional anthropological perspective on social life, the persistence of tradition (identity) despite its displacement from its place of origin. It fits within the old dichotomy between tradition and modernity in which the anticipated loss of tradition is resisted. Yet current usage of the term includes not only the persistence of tradition (identity) as a product of collective resistance to cultural loss but also qualified acceptance by the host society.’5 The twentieth century has seen an increase in the exodus of the Christians from the Middle East. The Armenian genocide in 1915, the massacre of the Syriac Christians by the end of the Great War, and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey in 1922 drastically reduced the demographic strength of Christianity in the Middle East. After the second World War, the Greek Diaspora (mainly in the USA) has taken an increasing interest in the affairs of the Greek Orthodox Patri- archate in Jerusalem. The Patriarchate is inextricably connected to Greek heritage and thus to the ethno-religious character of the Greek Diaspora. As one “traditional intellectual” of the Greek Diaspora put it: ‘we [the Greeks] have the uniqueness of having a heritage and a church that match’. And another claimed, ‘the Church has been very much responsible for main- taining the Greek [ethnic] culture’.6 The close ties between the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate in Jerusalem and the American government started when Patriarch Benedictos visited the USA in 1963 and met with President Kennedy, a meeting that the Greek Ortho- dox Archbishop of the Americas, Iakovos, unsuccessfully attempted to undermine.7 The meeting inaugurated close contact between the Patriarchate 5 M. Humphrey, ‘Lebanese identities: between cities, nations and transnations’, Arab Studies Quarterly (Winter 2004). Page reference needed. 6 Y. Anagnostou, ‘Model Americans, Quintessential Greeks: Ethnic Success and Assimila- tion in Diapora’, Diaspora 12,3 (2003), Page reference needed. 7 The account is based on comments by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch of Jerusalem, Theofilos (then Archbishop of Tabor). See G. Gilson, ‘A Cleric for Delicate Missions’, Athens News, 5 August 2005. 22334-09_JECS09_05_Roussos_ME.indd334-09_JECS09_05_Roussos_ME.indd 113838 44/02/10/02/10 117:117:11 DIASPORA POLITICS, ETHNICITY AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH 139 and American diplomats in the region and this policy was continued by Benedictos’ successor, Patriarch Diodoros. In 1999 he took the decision to appoint a Greek-American former US Ambassador to Qatar, Patrick Theros, as the Patriarchate’s representative in Washington.8 Theros was appointed Ambassador to Qatar in 1995 after having worked for the US Foreign Service in Jordan, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Leb- anon, Nicaragua and Saudi Arabia. In the early 1990s he served as Deputy Co-coordinator for Counter-terrorism responsible for the co-ordination of all US government counter-terrorism activities outside the United States.9 The choice of Theros by the Patriarchate signaled an effort of the latter to call upon the Greek-American Diaspora in general rather than to explore a new role for the Church of Jerusalem beyond the boundaries in an ecumenical approach. “Diaspora consciousness” signifies the cognitive investment of members of a Diaspora community in promoting homeland interests in their host nation. In the case of the Patriarchate of Jerusalem the interests of the Church were identified with those of the Greek nation. Upon his election, Patriarch Eirineos maintained that the Patriarchate’s main aim was to pro- mote Greek presence in the Holy Land and that Greek national interests were his highest priority, more so since the Patriarchate is, in his view, an outpost of Greece in the Holy Land.10 The intervention of the Greek-American Diaspora became evident during the turbulent election of Patriarch Eirineos in 2001. The Israeli Government of Ariel Sharon could not afford it to see elected a “pro-Palestinian” Patri- arch at such a critical moment in the region. Israel wanted to avoid the “Arabisation” of the Greek Orthodox Patriarchate, as has happened with the Latin Patriarchate, and most importantly it feared Palestinian control over the Patriarchate’s property. Last but not least, it wanted to prevent any kind of non-Greek, i.e. Russian, interference in the affairs of the Patriarchate.11 8 P. Theros, ‘Jerusalem: Troubled Past, Threatening Present, Uncertain Future’, The National Herald, 11 November 2005. 9 See www.therosandtheros.com/bio.html (visited 1 November 2006). 10 Interviews of Patriarch Eirineos in Greek newspapers, Kyriakatiki Eleutherotypia, 19 August 2001; Typos tis Kyriakis, 19 August 2001; I Vradyni, 20 August 2001. 11 G. Kalokairinos, ‘Behind the Scenes in Jerusalem’, Kathimerini, July 22, 2001. [in Greek] 22334-09_JECS09_05_Roussos_ME.indd334-09_JECS09_05_Roussos_ME.indd 113939 44/02/10/02/10 117:117:11 140 SOTIRIS ROUSSOS Accordingly, it was decided to strike the names of five candidates from the list, including that of Metropolitan Eirineos, who was nevertheless eventually elected Patriarch. It was the first time since the nineteenth century that the government or an occupying power intervened so directly in the election and it constituted a major break with the tradition of church-state relations in the Holy Land. The problems emanating from such a decision were almost immediately visible. It could create a very dangerous precedent of state intervention into the heart of the Church and possibly lead to a schism inside the Church. The majority of the Synod refused to accept the intervention and sought help from Jordan. At the same time, leading Arab Orthodox figures from both Jordan and the Palestinian Authority expressed their desire to conduct the election of the Patriarch according to the Jordanian Law of 1958, ignoring the decision of the Israeli government.12 Eventually, the Israeli Ministry of Justice approved the list of candidates without erasing any names. However, the Israeli government did not for- mally acknowledge the election of Patriarch Eirineos for two years. Various Israeli officials and experts said that the real issue was the real-estate held by the Patriarchate, including land on which the Israeli Knesset stands and many other important properties in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and elsewhere in Israel. The Greek Orthodox Patriarchate is the second biggest landowner in Israel after the state. Right wing and pro-settler groups accused Patriarch Eirineos of being a supporter of the PLO and of Yasser Arafat despite he had stated, ‘I am not pro-Palestinian, nor pro-Israel, nor pro-anything, I am only pro-God’.13 The Greek Diaspora sought to confer with the US government through various channels in order to press the Sharon government to recognise Eir- ineos. Andrew Athens, the Greek American President of World Council of Hellenes Abroad (SAE), an umbrella organisation of the World Greek Diaspora, announced that the Diaspora had embarked on a worldwide effort to achieve official recognition of Patriarch Eirineos. A number of Congress- men and Senators had signed a petition urging the Sharon government to 12 al-Quds, July 2001 (Arabic), Wafa (Official Palestine News Agency), January 8, 2002. 13 The New York Times, April 26, 2002. 22334-09_JECS09_05_Roussos_ME.indd334-09_JECS09_05_Roussos_ME.indd 114040 44/02/10/02/10 117:117:11 DIASPORA POLITICS, ETHNICITY AND THE ORTHODOX CHURCH 141 recognise the Patriarch.

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