Socrates and ontology: The evidence of the

Hippias major1

PAUL WOODRUFF

Aristotle notes with approval that Socrates did not separate the forms.2 By this he means, at least, that Socrates did not subscribe to the existence of forms separate from their particular instances, and implies that Socrates either did not admit forms into his ontology at all, or ceded them only the shadowy status of Aristotelian forms. Aristotle's testimony in this regard fits neatly with the evidence of Plato's earlier dialogues, which of all Plato's work seem most accurately to represent the historical Socrates.3 T'he Socrates we have from the early dialogues does not develop a theory of forms, though he talks frequently about forms, and evidently uses an unstated theory of forms in his dialectic.4 Unlike the Socrates of the middle dialogues, our Socrates does not argue explicitly for the separation of the forms,5 and does not obviously presuppose their separate existence in the process of his dialectic. The consensus of recent scholars writing in English on the matter is that the early dialogues treat forms as immanent in particular things.7 R. E. Allen has challenged this orthodoxy:

The truth of the matter is that in a strong sense of the term Forms are as 'separate' from their instances in the early dialogues as they are later on. For they are not identical with their instances, and ontologically prior to their instances. That is, they exist 'apart'.8

That Socrates' forms are not numerically identical with their instances no one would deny. But the thesis that his forms are "ontologically prior" to their instances is controversial; so, of course, is the orthodoxy Allen attacks. The position I support in this essay is that the Socrates of Plato's early dialogues did not dabble in ontology. He was an asker of questions, a seeker of moral definitions. He does not reflect on his question, or wonder about the metaphysics that a successful answer would presuppose. He does not need to reflect on his question, because it is not really his question; he is not committed to its being answerable. In each case the question is raised by the boasting or otherwise arrogant behavior of his interlocutor, who is committed by that behavior to giving a successful answer. So the question is a dialectical one, and does not need to make any more sense than does the moral arrogance that provokes it. Socrates' inquiries do not and need not require him to engage in metaphysical speculation. The early dialogues

101 that represent Socrates are thus innocent of metaphysics. They are onto- logically neutral in that there is no particular ontology that they require, and, though they tempt one to provide them an ontology, the proof of their neutrality is that Plato and Aristotle respond differently, but with equal respect, to the temptation. Socrates' exercises in definition are at the same time a rich breeding ground for Plato's lavish ontology and assimilable gracefully to Aristotle's more austere one. I come to this position by imputing to Socrates first whatever elements of a theory are directly implied by the text. Since Socrates' part of the text consists mainly of questions, the result of this operation is negligible. Second I impute to Socrates whatever elements of a theory must be true if Socrates' arguments are to be sound. That Socrates does consider his arguments generally sound I shall assume without argument. Without that assumption we cannot uncover the theories that regulate Socrates' dialec- tic : It is dangerous, but if my results do credit to the assumption, I shall be satisfied.9 Two passages in the Hippias Major (287c l-d3 and 288a7-11 ) are gener- ally understood as arguing for the separate existence of a form. If the Hippias Major is genuinely Platonic and if it belongs with the Euthyphro family of dialogues, these passages are tough test cases for my position on Socrates' ontological neutrality, since they are unique among Plato's early writings. The dust has now settled on the dispute over the dialogue's authenticity, and little support remains for the negative side.l° But the place of the Hippias Major in Plato's development remains seriously in question. In subject and dramatic style it belongs with the early dia- logues.ll But in its treatment of the forms, it seems to be in a class with the Phaedo and Symposium, chiefly in virtue of the two passages I have just mentioned, and also in virtue of a number of stylistic clues I shall not discuss in this paper.12 I shall argue that we may take the Hippias Major as an early dialogue without being driven to the conclusion that our Socrates did separate the forms. My argument will concentrate on the two test passages and will at the same time safeguard my position on Socrates' ontological neutrality and undermine the strongest arguments against an early date for the Hippias Major. The dialogue begins with Hippias, 6 x«X6s TE xai the polymath sophist, boasting of his ability to combine his lucrative educational enter- prises with ambassadorial service for his city. When it turns out that business is poor for Hippias in Sparta, Socrates feigns surprise. The Spartans do not trust their young to the teachings of foreigners, however

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