The Interpretation of Plato's Hippias Major”
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Abstract Travis John Mulroy “Delusions of Grandeur: The Interpretation of Plato's Hippias Major” My dissertation is an interpretation of Plato’s Hippias Major, in which Socrates investigates τό καλόν (usually translated as “the beautiful” or “the noble”). My reading of the Hippias Major focuses on the importance of appearing beautiful, to others and thereby to oneself, and reveals the way in which the impulse to appear beautiful is connected to the desire for the immortal preservation of oneself and one’s own. The impulse to appear beautiful is essential to political life, insofar as the pleasure of praise effects a kind of harmony between the private good and the common. This impulse, however, is also a fundamental impediment to Socratic philosophy, as it prevents the critical examination of oneself and one’s opinions, while hindering a truly erotic experience of the beautiful. In examining these issues, my dissertation seeks to establish the Hippias Major’s connection to and consonance with other more popular Platonic dialogues, such as the Republic, Symposium, and Phaedo. Acknowledgements I would like to thank all the friends and colleagues who have helped deepen my understanding of Plato. I am especially grateful to Professor Ronna Burger for her invaluable assistance, in matters both theoretical and practical. She exemplifies the serious play of philosophy, and I consider myself very fortunate to have had the opportunity to study with her at Tulane University. And finally, I could not have finished this work without the constant love and support of my parents, David and Mary, whose faith – I’m sure – never wavered. I dedicate this study to them. ii Delusions of Grandeur: The Interpretation of Plato’s Hippias Major Table of Contents Acknowledgments……………………………………………………………………………………………….. ii Introduction: On the Difficulty of Beautiful Things………..……………………………………… 1 Part One: Beautiful Wholes Section I (281a1 – 283b4): Wisdom and the Good….……………………………………………. 6 Section II (283b4 – 285b7): Persuasion and Paternal Law…………………………………….. 16 Section III (285b7 – 286c3): Beneficial Education ………………………………………………… 30 Section IV (286c3 – 287e3): Posing the Question, “What is the Beautiful?.............. 43 Section V (287e3 – 289c8): Hippias’ First Answer, a Beautiful Virgin.…………………… 59 Section VI (289c9 – 291c8): Hippias’ Second Answer, Gold.…………………………………. 82 Section VII (291c9 – 293c7): Hippias’ Third Answer, To Be Honored with Funeral Rites…………………………………………………………………………………………….. 111 Part Two: Autopsy of the Beautiful Section VIII (293c7 – 295b7): The Refuter’s Suggestion, the Fitting and the Nature of the Fitting Itself………………………………………………………………………… 139 Section IX (295b7 – 297d9): Socrates’ First Answer, the Useful, the Powerful, and the Beneficial…………………………………………………………………………………….. 159 Section X (297d10 – 304a3): Socrates’ Second Answer, the Pleasant through Hearing and Sight…………………………………………………………………………………….. 194 Section XI (304a3 – 304e9): Hippias’ Indictment and Socrates’ Apology.……………… 218 Endnotes……………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 232 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………………………………. 247 iii 1 Introduction: On the Difficulty of Beautiful Things In Plato’s Hippias Major, Socrates poses the question τί ἐστι τοῦτο τὸ καλόν – what is this thing, the beautiful? This question is so important that Socrates repeatedly suggests life is not worth living for anyone who cannot answer it.1 Even a cursory reading of Plato’s dialogues confirms that the nature of the beautiful is a fundamental question for Socratic philosophy. The Hippias Major is the only Platonic dialogue explicitly devoted to answering this question, and so it plays a particularly important role in the Platonic corpus. Despite these considerations, the Hippias Major has been generally ignored by contemporary scholarship. This is due in large part to the fact that the dialogue features a number of characteristics that many scholars deem “Un-Platonic.” The style, for instance, has struck some as so overly comic and crude that they have rejected the dialogue as spurious. In so doing, these scholars bear a striking similarity to Hippias himself, who rejects Socrates’ questions about a lowly pot because they are inappropriate to a refined discussion. Be that as it may, the Hippias Major does present interpreters with a number of difficulties, which at first blush can make the dialogue seem idiosyncratic and disordered. These appearances have led scholars to question the value, if not authenticity, of the dialogue, and as a result the Hippias Major has not received the attention it deserves.2 2 The task of demonstrating the true value of the Hippias Major and the task of understanding what Plato intends to convey by means of the dialogue require the same thing. One must resolve the apparent difficulties by explaining how even the most seemingly inappropriate or incongruous parts of the dialogue are in fact fitting, and how the dialogue as whole forms a rich and coherent consideration of the nature of beauty, despite any initial appearances to the contrary.3 To this end, it is helpful to begin by simply enumerating the main difficulties and questions posed by the dialogue. An immediate difficulty arises in even trying to articulate Socrates’ primary question in the Hippias Major, due to an ambiguity in the idea being examined, τὸ καλόν. The meaning and connotations of τὸ καλόν are so broad that choosing an English translation is unusually problematic. The idea of τὸ καλόν has an important aesthetic sense, and with this in mind many interpreters choose to translate it as “the beautiful.” But, the idea also has a political and moral sense, and in an attempt to capture this some choose to translate it as “the noble.” Still others try to strike a balance between these two, translating it as “the fine.” It is important to note from the outset that there is a way in which the political sense of τὸ καλόν is the focus of the Hippias Major, as indicated by the extended opening discussion of Hippias’ political activities, which sets the stage for Socrates’ question (281a – 286c). But the dialogue also suggests that the political sense can and should be understood on the model of the aesthetic; this appears most clearly in the examination of Hippias’ second answer, which features a discussion of the beautiful statue Athena Parthenos (289c – 291c). This discussion indicates that the aesthetic sense is broader and in certain way more primary 3 than the political, which is why I have chosen to translate τὸ καλόν as “the beautiful” throughout.4 Nevertheless, both senses of τὸ καλόν should be kept in mind while reading the Hippias Major, and an interpretation of the dialogue must explain how the aesthetic and political senses are related and encapsulated by one idea. In addition to the explicit question regarding the beautiful, the dialogue presents the interpreter with a number of implicit questions, the following of which seem to me to be the most important for understanding the dialogue as a whole. In order to learn about the beautiful, Socrates requests the help of Hippias, a renowned sophist from Elis, apparently in Athens on a diplomatic mission during the Peace of Nicias. Socrates approaches Hippias, not the other way around. Why does Socrates want to speak with Hippias in particular? This question is all the more glaring due to the fact that Hippias, for all his intellectual acumen, appears quite foolish in his conversation with Socrates. Why is Hippias the proper interlocutor for such an investigation of the beautiful? The Hippias Major begins with a lengthy discussion of wisdom and law, as these relate to Hippias’ public and private activities. How does this discussion of Hippias’ public and private activities serve as the proper introduction to the question of the beautiful? How might the issues and problems that come to light in the subsequent search for the beautiful be foreshadowed or illustrated by this preliminary discussion? When he asks Hippias to teach him what the beautiful is, Socrates requests that he be allowed to imitate a man who recently perplexed him with the same question and whom Socrates claims always refutes him (whom I therefore refer to throughout as “the 4 Refuter”). As a result, much of what Socrates says in the dialogue is not spoken in his own voice to Hippias, but rather in the voice of the Refuter as he would respond to Socrates, were Socrates to answer him as Hippias instructs. Although Socrates uses similar rhetorical devices in other Platonic dialogues, as when he imitates the Laws in the Crito (50a), in no other dialogue is a similar conceit as elaborate and extended as it is in the Hippias Major. Why does Socrates use such an elaborate rhetorical device in his conversation with Hippias? Why is it necessary that Socrates conduct his inquiry into the beautiful in the guise of the Refuter? When Hippias attempts to explain what the beautiful is, he repeatedly cites particular examples of beautiful things, as opposed to explaining what all beautiful things have in common that makes them beautiful. That is to say, Hippias explains what is beautiful but not what the beautiful is. Although Socrates suggests that Hippias may not understand the question, he does not correct Hippias as explicitly as he could, the way he corrects Meno, for instance (Meno 72a). Why does Hippias repeatedly make this mistake, and why does Socrates allow him to do so? Is this mistake, confusing particular embodiments with the form itself, somehow appropriate to the question of the beautiful? Toward the end of the dialogue, in what appears to be a consideration of aesthetics, the discussion abruptly turns toward issues of ontology, in particular to the question of whether certain affections can apply to two things together but not each individually. Socrates suggests that this is possible, whereas Hippias denies it vehemently. Socrates’ suggestion so angers Hippias that he condemns Socrates and his 5 whole method of investigation. How does this seemingly anomalous ontological digression fit with the rest of the dialogue? And why is Hippias so incensed by Socrates’ claim? The language and style of the Hippias Major raise a few related questions.