Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies Vol. 40, No. 2, March 1992
Pramiiavrttika IV. 202-206 -towards the correct understanding of svabhavapratibandha-
Shoryu KATSURA
I have recently finished reading the Pramanavarttika (=PV) chapter IV (Pararthanumanapariccheda) and this is a brief report on my study of a por- tion of the text. I intend to publish a Japanese translation of this chapter together with Manorathanandin's running commentary.' Now, PV IV. 202- 206 read: yannantariyaka satta yo vatma svoi avibhagavan/ sa tenavyabhicari syad ity artham tatprabhedanam//202// =PVin III. 37; 1 PVV: yo vatmany, VAB: yo vatmo so. (If X's existence is invariably connected (nantariyaka) with Y, or if X's own essence is not different (avibhagavat) from Y, X should not deviate (avyabhicarin) from Y. To show this, the [two varieties of hetus, viz. karya and svabhava] are distin- guished.) samyogyadisu yesv asti pratibandho na tad rs'ah/ na to hetava ity uktam vyabhicarasya sambhavat//203// =PVin III. 38 (Since the connected' (san2yogin) and other [Vaisesika hetus] do not have such an [essential] connection (pratibandha) [as characterised by identity or causality (td-. datmyatadutpattilaksana PVV)], they were not designated [by the Master Dignaga] as hetu, for they may deviate [from their sadhyas].) sati va pratibandhe'stu sa eva gatisadhanah/ niyamo by avinabhavo 'niyatas ca na sadhanam//204// =PVin III. 39 (Or if they possess [such an essential] connection, it must be the cause of [infer- ential] knowledge. Indeed, restriction' (niyama) [of hetu by sadhya] is [called] inevitable relation' (avinabhava) [between hetu and sadhya]. And that which is not restricted by [sadhya] cannot be sadhana (=hetu).)
-1052- (36) Pramanavarttika IV. 202-206 (KATSURA) aikantikatvam vyavrtter avinabhava ucyate/ tac ca napratibaddhesu tats evanvayasthitih//05// (Absolute cetainty of exclusion [of hetu from vipaksa; namely, vyatireka] is called inevitable relation'. However, it is not found in those which do not possess [essen- tial] connetion [with sadhya]. Precisely, from that [connection] anvaya is estab- lished.) svatmatve hetubhave va siddhe hi vyatirekita/ sidhyed ato visese na vyatireko na canvayah//206// (If it is established that X is either the essence or the cause of Y, it will be estab- lished that Y is absent where X is absent. Thus, a unique [i. e. asadharananaikan- tika-hetu] lacks both anvaya and vyatireka.) Motoi Ono has already clarified the context of these verses ("Dharmakirti's Interpretaton of hetucakra PV IV. 195-204-" Hikaku-shiso no michi 4, 1985). Namely, Dharmakirti here is trying to re-interpret Dignaga's theory of he- tucakra, so that his own theory of three kinds of hetus (viz, karya, svabhava and anupalabdhi) can be justified within the framework of hetucakra. He even goes further to suggest that Dignaga expected Dharmakirti's theory of karya and svabhava hetus. The above verses interested me because they ref eyed to and defined such key terms of Dharmakirti's logic as [svabhava]- pratibandha, avinabhava, niyama, etc. Since Shiro Matsumoto's sensational article ("Svabhavapratibandha", Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu 30-1, 1981), the term svabhavapratibandha has induced several scholars of Buddhist logic to try to present the correct interpreta- tion of the term (for the bibliography, please see Toru Funayama,"Dharmakirti's Theory of Essence"', Nanto Bukkyo 63, 1989, p. 39, note 47). I myself wrote "Svabhavapratibandha Revisited" (Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu 35-1, 1986), in which I criticized the ontic interpretation of the term given by E. Stein- kellner and presented a sort of conceptualistic interpretation. During the second International Dharmakirti Conference held in Vienna, June 1989, we had a debate on this topic and came to realize that there were at least two opposing positons; namely, one held that svabhavapra- tibandha represented the sate of affairs in reality (: how things are and how they are connected with each other) and the other held that. the term meant
-1051- Pramanavarttika IV. 202-206 (KATSURA) (37) a logical concept, i. e. the necessary connection between the probans and probandum (thus, somewhat synonymous with avinabhava/vyapti). Steinkellner playfully named the former sambandhavada and the latter vyaptivada. Then I supported the vyaptivadi. While reading the above veses of Pramanavarttika chapter IV, I came to realize that I had to be converted to the sambandhavada. In the follow- ing space I shall try to give my reasoning. Meanwhile, I would like to thank Mr. Funayama whose article mentioned above as well as personal correspondences stimulatad me greatly to shaping my new interpretation. It is to be noted in passing that R. Hayes and B. Gillon, in their new translation of the beginning portion of Pramanavarttika-svavr, tti (Journal of Indian Philosophy 19-1, 1991, p. 46), criticized my previous conceptualisitic un- derstanding of svabhavapratibandha. I am now ready to accept their criticism. The gist of the difficulty concerning how to understand the term sva- bhavapratibandha lies in the fact that Dharmakirti identified it with both ontological as well as logical concepts as the following passage of Pram- anavarttika-svavrtti (=PVSV 17, 12-14) indicates: tasmat svabhavapratibandhad eva hetuh sadhyam gamayati. sa ca tadbhavalaksanas tadutpattilaksano va. sa evavinabhavo d rstantabhyam pradarsyate. (Therefore, only on the basis of the essential connection hetu makes sadhya known. And it (=the connection) is characterized either by identity or by causality. That [connection], in other words inevitable relation', is shown by both [positive and negative] examples.) This results in the following chain of equations: (1) tadatmya/tadutpatti=svabhavapratibandha=avinabhava -sadhyasadhanabhava In another passage of PVSV (2, 19-21, 3, 3-4), however, Dharmakirti appears to differentiate the above three terms and put them in a sort of logical order: svabhavapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rtham na vyabhicarati. sa ca tadatmatvat...... karyasyapi syabhavapratibandhah. tatsvabhavasya tadutpatter iti. (For when there is an essential connection, one object does not deviate from the
-1050- (38) Pramanavarttika IV. 202-206 (KATSURA) other object, and that [connection] exists because of identity, -[between the two objects].... An effect also has an essential connection, because its essence arises from the [cause].) This indicates the following chain of the terms: (2) tadatmya/tadutpatti-svabhavapratibandha-czvyabhicara The same idea is elaborated in. Nyayabindu. II. 20-25: syabhavapratibandhe hi saty artho 'rtham gamayet/ tadapratibaddhasya tadavyabhicaraniyamabhavat/ (Cf. PVSV 8, 12-13: apratibaddhasvabhavasyavinabhavaniymabhavat.) sa ca pratibandhah sadhye 'rthe lingasya/ vastutas tadatmyat sadhyarthad utpattes ca/ atatsvabhavasyatadutpattes ca tatrapratibaddhasvabhavatvat/ to ca tadatmyatadutpatti svabhavakaryayor eveti tabhyam eva vastusiddhih/ (For when there is an essential connection, one object makes known the other object, because if X is not essentially connected with Y, there is no restriction that X does not deviate from Y. And that connection exists between a logical in- dicator (linga) and an object to be indicated, if in reality the former is either idetical with or caused by the object to be indicated, for if X neither takes Y as its essence nor arises from Y, X is not essentially connected with Y. Further, since both identity and causality exist only in svabhava and karya respectively, positive reality can be proved only by these two.) This can be schematized as follows: (3) tadatmya/tadutpatti-svabhavapratibandha-avyabhicaraniyama =avinabhavaniyama -gamyagamakabhava One further passage of PVSV (8, 12-13) interests us: na hi asati pratibandhe 'nvayavyatirekaniscayo'sti. (For when there is no essential connection, there is no determination of anvaya and vyatireka.) (4) svabhavapratibandha-anvayavyatirekaniscaya Now, I would like to go back and comment on PV IV. 202-206. Since both Devendrabuddhi (Derge 309b4) and Manorathanandin identify prati- bandha' in v. 203 with tadatmya and tadutpatti, vv. 202-204ab seem to sug- -1049- Pramanavarttika IV. 202-206 (KATSURA) (39)
gest thef ollowing relations: (5) tadatmya/tadutpatti=svabhavapratibandha-avyabhicara -gamyagamakabhava The half verse. 204cd identifies avinabhava' with 'niyama'. The former is.a logical concept of inevitable relation' which literally means X is absent when Y is absent' and which was used by Vasubandhu as a guarantee for the sound relation between sadhya (Y) and hetu (X). It is Dignaga who identified 'avinabhava' with niyama'. The latter expresses the function of the restrictive particle 'eva'; namely, when the domain of 'X is restricted by the domain of Y, X is a sound hetu for Y. Dignaga, further identified it with 'avyabhicara' (meaning X's non-deviationfrom Y) and vyapti' (meaning X's being pervaded by Y). The next half verse 205ab identifies-'avinabhava' with absolute certainty (aikantikatva) of exclusion of X from where Y is . absent', which seems to be a stronger 'expression of Dharmakirti himself for inevitability' than 'avinabhava'. Now we reach the following equations: (6) avinabhava=niyama (=avyabhicara=vyapti)=vyavrtty-aikantikatva Incidentally, if I am not mistaken, 'niyama' and 'vyavrtty-aikantikatva' seem to correspond to ayatta' and ekaniv rttyanyaniv rtti', an interpretation of svabhavapratibandha given by Yoichi Fukuda ("On the meaning of svabhava- pratibandha in the case of Dharmakirti", Indogaku BukkyogakuKenkyu 35-2, 1987). Finally vv. 205cd-206 set svabhavapratibandha and tadatmya/tadutpatti as the basis of establishing the positive and negative concomitance (anvaya- vyatireka) between sadhya and hetu: (7) svabhavapratibandha=tadatmya/tadutpatti--anvayavyatireka-sthiti This is of course identical with (4) above. Now we may be able to put (5), (6) and (7) together in the long chain of terms: (8) tadatmya/tadutpatti=svabhavapratibandha-anvayatirekasthiti-avina- bhava=niyama=vyav rttyaikantikatva=av yabhicara(=vyapti)-*gamyagamaka- bhava Indian logicians had long searched for certain relations which could guarantee a valid reason, e. g. Vaisesika's connection, causality, contradiction, -1048- (40) Pramanavarttika IV. 202-206 (KATSURA) etc. and Samkhya's owner-owned relation, etc. As mentioned above, it seems to be Vasubandhu who first introduced the concept of 'avinabhava' as the firm ground for a valid reason and it is indeed Dignaga who developped this idea by introducing new concepts, such as avyabhicara', 'niyama' and vya- pti'. Dignaga confirmed such relations between two items when anvaya and vyatireka relations are observed between them (cf. his theory of trairapya). He further justified such observations by the common sense accepted by people (lokaprasiddhi). Dharmakirti introduced a new concept of svabhavapratidandha, as Hayes- Gillon (p. 46) says, "to provide some sort of ontological guarantee that our judgements about some pervasion relations are not accidental and subjective but rather are firmly grounded in the nature of things." Ontological nature of svabhavapratibandha is clear in (8) where it is identified with causality and identity. However, when as in (2) and (3) svabhavapratibandha is derived from causality and identity, it may be shifted from the realm of real objects to that of concepts, so that it becomes identified with avina- bhava', etc. as in (1). Finally, it is well known that Dharmakirti justifies causality by a limited number of observations of anvaya and vyatireka and that he tries to prove identity by reductio ad absurdum named 'viparyaye badhakapramana'. If we add this account to (8), we will face the problem, as Hayes-Gillon (p. 56ff.) suggests, "that the account is esentially circular", because sva- bhavapratibandha is guaranteed by the observation of anvaya and vyatireka which in turn is determined by svabhavapratibandha. A way out of this circularity may be the introduction of the concept of lokaprasiddhi as in the case of Dignaga.
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