sign in sign up
<<
Home , Postcritique

Vol. 5, No. 1, 2018, pp. 29–38 ISSN 1903-7031

Striving for Experiential Resonance: , Postcritique, and Phenomenology Jesper Aagaard  Aarhus University, Department of Psychology and Behavioral Sciences, Barholins Allé 11, Bldg. 1350, #223, 8000 Aarhus C: Denmark ([email protected])

•

iven that qualitative researchers have (rightly) abandoned the idea of social scientific as mirrors of nature, what kind Gof do we hope to provide to our readers? In other words, what is the point of qualitative research? Taking in- spiration from Paul Ricoeur’s distinction between a of suspicion and a hermeneutics of faith, this article sketches out two possible answers. It first presents a critical approach that exposes hidden truths to educate and emancipate its readers. The concept of ‘critique’ has recently come under scrutiny, however, with postcritical scholars denouncing its tautological reasoning, its reductionist analytical strategies and its arrogant approach to other people. Acknowledging these criticisms, the article then goes on to present a phenomenological approach that points out unnoticed truths to reverberate and resonate with its readers. It is argued that this self-consciously ‘weak’ approach helps us circumvent the analytical issues currently associated with critique. Keywords: critique, interpretation, phenomenology, post-critique, resonance.

•

Introduction inspiration from Paul Ricoeur’s (1970) distinc- . Evidence. Truth. Qualita- tion between a hermeneutics of suspicion1 and tive researchers often refrain from using such a hermeneutics of faith, this article sketches grandiose terms (in fact, some of us even out two possible answers: a critical approach have problems writing these words without us- and a phenomenological approach. The arti- ing ironic capitalization or metaphysical scare cle first examines the critical approach, which quotes), because they seem tainted by a meta- exposes hidden truths to educate and emanci- physical realism in which social is ‘out pate its readers. In the past few years, however, there’, waiting to be empirically studied and this approach has come under scrutiny. Eve causally explained by the objective methods Sedgwick (2003), for instance, has forcefully re- of (Denzin, Lincoln & Giardina, jected what she calls paranoid reading; Bruno 2006). In other words, these extravagant terms Latour (2004b) has provocatively argued that convey the idea of social science as a neutral critique has ‘run out of steam’, and Rita Felski purveyor of objective facts about the world, the (2015) has cogently identified the limits of cri- so-called correspondence theory of truth. Op- tique. Summarizing these arguments, we can posing this idea, qualitative researchers have say that the critical approach has been faulted long insisted that social scientific knowledge for its tautological reasoning, its reductionist is socially, culturally, historically and politi- analytical strategies and its arrogant approach cally embedded (Gergen, 1973). This rhetori- to other people. The article then goes onto cal strategy, however, raises an important ques- explore the phenomenological approach, which tion: if qualitative researchers embrace a phi- points out unnoticed truths to reverberate and losophy of flux and abandon the idea of so- resonate with its readers. It is argued that this cial scientific truths as mirrors of nature (Rorty, self-consciously ‘weak’ approach helps us cir- 1979), what kind of truth do we hope to pro- cumvent the issues associated with the critical vide to our readers? In other words, what is the approach. In the interests of full disclosure, I point of reading qualitative research? Taking should state that I consider my own research

29 J. Aagaard: Striving for Experiential Resonance 30 Qualitative Studies 5(1), pp. 29–38 ©2018 to belong to this latter camp, so this special is- enhance readability, I here provide a schematic sue constitutes a welcome opportunity to ex- preview of the differences between the critical plore the phenomenon of resonance: what is it? approach and the phenomenological approach When does it occur? And what does it do? To (see Table 1):

Table 1

The Critical Approach: A does not take its analytical object (whether this Hermeneutics of Suspicion be a statement, a dream or a common house- What since Ricoeur (1970) has become known hold item) at face value, but treats it as a sym- as the hermeneutics of suspicion is a collec- bol in which ‘a direct, primary, literal mean- tion of interpretive strategies that relies on an ing designates, in addition, another meaning architecture of meaning layered in terms of which is indirect, secondary, and figurative and surface/depth, manifest/latent or apparent/hid- which can be apprehended only through the den, with a deep gulf separating these two first’ (Ricoeur, 1974: 12f). In other words, the layers. As Marx (1971) famously declared: hermeneutics of suspicion uses its analytical ‘All science would be superfluous if the out- object as a gateway to a deeper level of mean- ward appearance and the essence of things di- ing. Freud, for instance, saw the manifest con- rectly coincided’ (p. 817). Accordingly, while tent of a dream as little more than a carrier the hermeneutics of suspicion views the so- for the significant content, which is latent. As cial world as inherently meaningful, it treats all Frieden (1990) explains: ‘Freud’s dream theo- surface meanings with suspicion, because such ries rely on the basic opposition between man- outward appearances are presumed to conceal ifest and latent dream contents, between actual a deeper and truer layer of meaning. For Marx, dream images and concealed meaning, explicit this hidden truth was class struggle; for Freud, and implicit layers, surface and depth struc- it was libidinous drives; for Nietzsche, it was tures’ (p. 21). the to power. Although operating be- To unlock its secrets, critical interpreters neath the surface, these structures are taken read the analytical object in accordance with to regulate people’s behaviour and condition a theoretical apparatus such as psychoanalysis their . Ricoeur’s masters of suspi- or Marxism. Using this theoretical master key, cion therefore shared a profound mistrust of the critical interpreter performs a symptomatic people’s ordinary everyday experiences, which reading of the object, which plumbs its depths they primarily approached in terms of false and digs out ‘a latent meaning behind a mani- consciousness. As a result, the critical approach fest one’ (Jameson, 2013: 45). The hermeneutics J. Aagaard: Striving for Experiential Resonance Qualitative Studies 5(1), pp. 29–38 ©2018 31 of suspicion thus involves an element of eso- as a movement from secrecy to exposure, from tericism in that it presupposes the specific style ignorance to knowledge, or from darkness to of reading that is necessary for that particular light. This kind of learning can be considered as form of decoding (Josselson, 2004). The pur- a formation of critical consciousness, the abil- pose of a symptomatic reading is to penetrate ity to see through deceptive appearances, or the surface of the analytical object, get in touch simply as the ‘unlearning of bullshit’ (Colaizzi, with its underlying layer of meaning and un- 1978). Brinkmann (2012) calls this critical strat- mask this repressed truth. Such demystification egy ‘making the hidden obvious’ and uses Ian eschews the object’s apparent meaning in order Parker’s (1996) analysis of the directions on the to uncover the truth that lurks beneath its sur- back of a tube of children’s toothpaste as an ex- face. As Ricoeur (1970) argues, ‘This hermeneu- ample (p. 188f): tics is not an explication of the object, but a tearing off of masks, an interpretation that re- Directions for Use duces disguises’ (p. 30). The quest for such hid- Choose a children’s brush that has a den truth presupposes some sort of explanatory small head and add a pea-sized amount structure that lies beneath and explains the sur- of »Punch & Judy«–toothpaste. To face appearances (e.g. class struggle, libidinous teach your child to clean teeth, stand drives, will to power). While a recourse to such behind and place your hand under the grand metanarratives has lost some momentum child’s chin to tilt head back and see in our postmodern times, Felski (2015) convinc- mouth. Brush both sides of teeth as ingly argues that many strands of poststruc- well as tops. Brush after breakfast and turalism can still be characterized as suspicious, last thing at night. Supervise the brush- since they retain the basic architecture of mean- ing of your child’s teeth until the age ing while simply inverting the relationship be- of eight. If your child is taking fluoride tween surface and depth: ‘It is superficiality treatment, seek professional advice con- that is now the hidden truth, while interiority cerning daily intake. is demoted to a deceptive façade’ (p. 80). While Contains 0.8 per cent Sodium Monoflu- suspicious scholars traditionally ‘dig down’ to orophosphate. excavate a hidden layer, and poststructuralists ‘stand back’ to denaturalize the analytical ob- To the untrained eye, these directions may at ject, both approaches require the interpreter first glance look like innocuous instructions to tear away a veil of appearances in order to for caring for one’s child, but Parker argues expose what is really going on to the reader. that they actually contain a rich tapestry of In both forms of interpretation, the researcher power, violence and domination. According is thus positioned as an enlightened author- to Parker’s analysis, ‘Punch initiates the infant ity that has already discovered some truth and and the audience (of children) into a form of vi- must now lead others to see it, too. olent (ir), a surplus of enjoyment in Since this truth transcends everyday ex- the puppet narrative which is also, for the bat- perience, it is not important that lay people tered baby, and Judy, beyond the pleasure prin- and other outsiders immediately understand or ciple’ (p. 191f). This symptomatic reading un- agree to it. In fact, a cardinal objective of the masks the exercise of power that lurks behind hermeneutics of suspicion is to debunk ordi- an otherwise innocuous everyday object. As a nary people’s beliefs and educate them on the result, the toothpaste text can no longer be read hidden forces that drive their . This is with an innocent eye. thought to emancipate them from the thrall of Distrusting The Hermeneutics of Suspicion false consciousness. ‘It is the lesson of Spinoza’, For many years, the merits of the critical ap- Ricoeur (1970) argues, ‘one first finds himself a proach seemed self-evident as social science slave, he understands his slavery, he rediscov- prided itself on exposing hidden power struc- ers himself free within understood necessity’ tures. Additionally, the very notion of ‘critique’ (p. 35). The truth shall set you free. Truth is normatively powerful: after all, who wants in the critical approach can thus be understood to be associated with the uncritical, the gullible J. Aagaard: Striving for Experiential Resonance 32 Qualitative Studies 5(1), pp. 29–38 ©2018 and the naïve? Gayatri Spivak (1996), however, vance. Presuming the inescapability of some has argued that ‘, if one wants harmful entity X, however, leads researchers to a formula, is, among other things, a persistent circularity: it is first argued that no area of in- critique of what one cannot not want’ (p. 28). In quiry is immune to the influence of X, because that spirit, the concept of critique has recently X is an omnipresent systemic condition that come under scrutiny in academic fields like colours everything that we say and do. This queer theory, and literary studies: assumption leads to an ‘anticipatory mimetic Eve Sedgwick (2003), for instance, has force- strategy’, in which the influence of X is pre- fully rejected what she calls paranoid reading; sumed so as not to catch us off guard. In the (2004b) has provocatively argued end, this interpretation ends up proving its own that critique has ‘run out of steam’, and Rita assumption, namely that X is significant. We Felski (2015) has cogently identified the lim- inevitably end up at the predetermined destina- its of critique. Two things need mentioning tion, but, as Felski (2008) asks, ‘what re- with regard to this burgeoning field of so-called mains in the act of unmasking when we know ‘postcritique’ (Anker & Felski, 2017). First, full well what lies beneath the mask?’ (p. 1). while a backlash against critique may sound This circular reasoning leads us to a second flaw like nostalgic yearning for natural scientific re- of critical interpretation, namely that it is (or alism, these postcritical scholars are emphati- at least can be) peculiarly reductionist. The cally not seeking to replace meanings and in- critical approach treats its analytical objects as terpretations with and brute facts. symbols that, when properly read, yield hidden Paraphrasing (1990), they read- truths about large-scale, »hypostasized villains« ily accept interpretation in the broad sense in (Fleissner, 2017) like Neoliberalism, Patriarchy, which ‘there are no facts, only interpretations’, Technocracy or Capitalism. The analytical ob- but protest the narrower sense in which criti- ject thereby serves as a reflection, expression, cal interpreters say, ‘Look, don’t you see that X or manifestation of one of these larger entities. is really—or, really means—A?’. Secondly, any The problem with this interpretive strategy is critique of critique can logically be faulted for not that it is necessarily wrong (in fact, it might having critical aims itself, for having a blind be alarmingly accurate), but that the analyti- spot regarding its own hermeneutics of suspi- cal object is reduced to allegory and ceases to cion (Barnwell, 2016). Postcritical scholars are matter. As Latour (2005) argues: ‘If some “so- well aware of this performative paradox. Fel- cial factor” is transported through intermedi- ski (2015), for instance, explicitly avoids laps- aries, then everything important is in the fac- ing into a metasuspicion that exposes, subverts tor, not in the intermediaries. For all practical and dismisses critique. Her book is not ‘against’ purposes, it can be substituted by them without disagreement, objection or negative judgment. any loss of the nuances’ (p. 105). The critical ‘I have engaged in all these activities in the pre- approach strips the analytical object of ceding pages’, as she states in its conclusion (p. and reduces it to a neutral instrument that sim- 187). The goal of postcritique is not to doaway ply transports meaning from one domain to an- with critique, but to treat it simply as one lan- other. guage game among others, to challenge the fact Finally, there is the arrogant demeanour of that critique has become ‘a mandatory injunc- critique. According to Latour (2004b), critical tion rather than a possibility among possibili- scholars have always known better than ordi- ties’ (Sedgwick, 2003: 125). nary actors, often dismissing and deconstruct- Apart from its hegemonic status, however, ing these people’s naïve beliefs. ‘You have to what seems to be the matter with critique? Ac- learn to become suspicious of everything peo- cording to postcritical scholars, there are at ple say because of course we all know that they least three additional problems. The first is- live in the thralls of a complete illusio of their sue is the strongly tautological nature of cri- real motives’ (p. 229). Critical interpreters are tique. According to Sedgwick (2003), its fierce presumed to have privileged access to the world aversion to surprise means that critical inter- compared to ordinary actors, whose under- pretation requires bad news to be known in ad- standings are taken to spring from hidden en- J. Aagaard: Striving for Experiential Resonance Qualitative Studies 5(1), pp. 29–38 ©2018 33 tities of which they remain blissfully unaware. ond division goes on to apply a hermeneutics Accordingly, critique adopts a rather conde- of suspicion. ‘The job of Division I is thus scending stance towards other people, who are to call attention to those aspects of everyday treated as self-deluded pawns: ‘Forgive them activity that that activity itself makes it diffi- Father, for they know not what they do’ (La- cult for us to notice’ (p. 36). Calling atten- tour, 1996: 199). When language is taken to tion to unnoticed aspects of everyday activ- speak through people, for instance, individu- ity is in fact a succinct characterization of the als become unwitting mouthpieces for certain phenomenological approach that follows. The discourses, and we can safely brush away their overarching principle of Heidegger’s – and, in- own understandings of what they say and do. deed, any—phenomenological approach is cap- This critical strategy can also be found outside tured in the famous maxim ‘To the things them- the walls of academia. Not too long ago here in selves!’ (Zu den Sachen selbst!) (Carman, 2006). Denmark, for instance, a male Member of Par- But what exactly are such things? According liament suggested that female left-wing politi- to Heidegger, they are neither physical objects cians who oppose increased immigration con- nor brute matters of fact, but phenomena de- trol are acting under the sway of repressed sex- fined as ‘that which shows itself in itself’ (p. ual desire for Middle Eastern men.2 51). Importantly, such phenomena cannot be Conversely, politicians who favour in- reduced to mere appearances, and Heidegger creased immigration control are often accused ferociously opposed any such metaphysical dis- of acting out of latent racism rather than le- tinctions between appearance and reality: ‘Be- gitimate political concerns. In both cases, the hind the phenomena of phenomenology’, he ar- assumption is not only that the other party is gued, ‘there is essentially nothing else’ (p. 60). mistaken about their own motives (‘Look, don’t Phenomenology thus relies on a flat architec- you see that what you’re doing, X, is really—or, ture of meaning: human is interpretation really means—A?’), but also that, if they only ‘all the way down’ (Dreyfus, 1991). There is realized the truth of this interpretation, they nothing lurking behind our everyday practices would presumably change their wicked ways. that can be invoked to explain them; there is Just like that, political disagreement turns into only interpretation within these practices, and epistemological deficiency. In the words of Ri- the researcher’s job is to ‘interpret the interpre- coeur (1981): ‘Ideology is the thought of my tation embodied in our current practices in as adversary, the thought of the other. He does comprehensive and responsible a way as pos- not know it, but I do’ (p. 186). Summarizing sible’ (Dreyfus, 1980: 14). But if phenomeno- these arguments, we can say that the critical logical inquiry is concerned with ‘that which approach has been faulted for its tautological shows itself in itself’, then what is the point of reasoning, its reductionist analytical strategies doing it? What does it let us see that we do and its arrogant approach to other people. not already know? ‘Manifestly, it is something that first and foremost precisely does not show The Phenomenological Approach: itself’, Heidegger argued, ‘something that, in A Hermeneutics of Everydayness contrast to what first and foremost shows itself, How do we overcome the shortcomings of the is hidden, but is at the same time something that critical approach? There are almost as many essentially belongs to that which first and fore- suggestions as there are detractors. In this most shows itself, and belongs to it in such a section, however, I want to sketch out a phe- way as to constitute its meaning and ground’ nomenological approach derived from Division (p. 59). The first law of phenomenology states I of Martin Heidegger’s magnum opus Being that what is closest to us in our everyday ac- and Time (1927/2008). According to Hubert tivity remains furthest from us in terms of our Dreyfus’s (1991) highly influential interpreta- ability to take it up and understand it (Thomson, tion of this book, this first division relies on 2009). As Wittgenstein (2009) said: ‘The aspects a hermeneutics of everydayness (equivalent to of things that are most important for us are hid- Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of faith), while the sec- den because of their simplicity and familiarity. (One is unable to notice something—because it J. Aagaard: Striving for Experiential Resonance 34 Qualitative Studies 5(1), pp. 29–38 ©2018 is always before one’s eyes.)’ (§129). The pur- In my own research on digital technology, I pose of phenomenology is to point out these subscribe to an actor-network-inspired variant obvious but unnoticed aspects. This process of phenomenology called postphenomenology is known as disclosure, Heidegger’s translation (Aagaard, 2017). While the topic of technol- of the Greek word aletheia, which means to ogy will not be further explored here, I find it discover or draw out of concealment—to make instructive to follow postphenomenology’s re- the unnoticed noticed. In this process, the fusal to treat its analytical objects (i.e. technolo- phenomenological researcher acts as an expe- gies) as mere epiphenomena. Instead, postphe- riential guide who uses meticulous attention to nomenology follows Latour’s (2005) injunction detail and evocative examples to convey their to treat things as concrete and ‘worthy’ actors analysis. The phenomenologist’s job is to point in their own right. The analytical object has out details and make them ‘light up’ in order to to be treated as a fully fledged and irreducible get the reader to notice them. The phenome- phenomenon that is investigated in its speci- nologist’s endeavour is thus somewhat simi- ficity. As Don Ihde (1998) maintains: ‘The post- lar to Toril Moi’s (2017) description of Sherlock modern hermeneutics of things must find ways Holmes’s investigative process: ‘It’s not that to give voices to things, to let them speak for the others look at the surface, whereas Sher- themselves’ (p. 158). This insistence on letting lock looks beneath it. It is that he pays at- things speak impedes large-scale of tention to details they didn’t think to look at’ Capitalism, Technocracy or Neoliberalism, be- (p. 186). In other words, the phenomenolog- cause, at this level of abstraction, technologies ical researcher applies the hermeneutical con- are often reduced to mute symbols of such neb- ception of interpretation as explication (Ausle- ulous entities (Aagaard, 2017). gung), which means to lay out, unfold and elu- cidate (Dreyfus, 1980). Such explication is re- Resonance: The Phenomenological lated to what Albert Borgmann (1984) calls de- Nod of Recognition ictic discourse: ‘The word “deictic” comes from But if phenomenology neither discovers ob- Greek deiknýnai, which means to show, to point jective facts nor unmasks hidden truths, then out, to bring to light, to set before one, and then what does it do? According to Max van Ma- also to explain and to teach. Speakers of deictic nen (1990), a good phenomenological descrip- discourse never finally warrant the validity of tion resonates with life and evokes the phe- what they tell but point away from themselves nomenological nod of recognition. The concept to what finally matters; they speak essentially of resonance derives from the words re (back, as witnesses’ (p. 178). again) and sonare (to sound) and means to echo, To achieve disclosure, phenomenological reverberate, or ‘re-sound’. The goal of phe- inquiry takes departure in human nomenology is thus not to shock or surprise, in its average everydayness. Contrary to the but to strike a chord of familiarity with its read- hermeneutics of suspicion, the hermeneutics ers. When a text resonates with the reader, it of everydayness has faith in people’s experi- excites, stimulates and sets the person in mo- ences of the world. This is not to say that tion. It moves the reader. What van Manen people always know with why they calls the ‘phenomenological nod’ is the embod- are acting (phenomenology is not seeking a ied expression of such experiential resonance. return to the self-transparent Cartesian sub- As Michaele Ferguson (2009) argues, applying ject), but that it is imperative to trace mean- resonance as a validity criterion helps us steer ing back to people’s lived experiences. As Fel- between the tricky extremes of false universal- ski (2015) puts it, ‘I strive to remain on the ism (‘everybody shares the same experiences’) same plane as my object of study rather than and idiosyncratic subjectivism (‘each person’s casting around for a hidden puppeteer who is experiences are unique’): ‘We can only gen- pulling the strings’ (p. 6). Phenomenology thus eralize from these experiences for those with offers understanding from within: truth may whom they resonate’ (p. 54). A phenomenolog- be unnoticed, undiscovered, or hidden in plain ical interpretation offers itself to anyone read- sight, but it is there. The devil is in the details. J. Aagaard: Striving for Experiential Resonance Qualitative Studies 5(1), pp. 29–38 ©2018 35 ing the article, but does not lay claim to uni- cal. Young’s article certainly is not uncritical, versality. One of phenomenological research’s but alters the usual direction of attack: instead ardent critics, John Paley (2017), raises a crit- of finding patriarchy hidden behind everyday ical objection to using resonance as a validity practices, Young demonstrates how it is consti- criterion, namely that, if the phenomenologi- tuted within them. Patriarchy is not so much cal nod is the litmus test of good research, then expressed in baseball as it is performed or en- phenomenology cannot tell us anything that we acted within it. did not already know: ‘In which case, what’s It should be mentioned that the phe- the point of it?’ (p. 71). So, is phenomenology nomenological approach described here is more just trite, predictable and uninformative? Not akin to a broad, qualitative stance than a sub- at all. By pointing toward something that has stantial theoretical allegiance. Accordingly, the remained unnoticed and overlooked, but which concept of resonance is in no way limited to we immediately recognize when it is pointed texts that self-identify as phenomenological. out, phenomenological research helps us notice In fact, the first time I remember having the and spell out certain important aspects of our phenomenological nod of recognition evoked everyday practices. was not at all while reading phenomenology, Brinkmann (2012) calls this phenomenolog- but when, as an undergraduate, I read Erving ical strategy ‘making the obvious obvious’ and Goffman’s descriptions of behaviour in pub- uses Iris Marion Young’s seminal article Throw- lic places. Goffman’s knack for dissecting the ing Like a Girl (1980) as an example. In this ar- micro-dramas of everyday life has led Pierre ticle, Young describes how women are social- Bourdieu (1983) to characterize him as a ‘dis- ized to comport their bodies in inhibited ways coverer of the infinitely small’ and Howard when throwing (but also when walking, lift- Becker (2003) to describe his work accordingly: ing, and so forth): while boys step forward, ro- ‘To begin with, many of the things he gives tate their hips and shoulders, and hurl the ball names to are well known to us, his readers. forward, girls do not bring their whole bodies We recognize them immediately; they are fa- into motion. ‘Rather, the girls tend to remain miliar experiences we have had or events we relatively immobile except for their arms, and have witnessed. But, and this is a very impor- even the arm is not extended as far as it could tant but, we don’t have names for these experi- be’ (p. 142). Girls, in other words, throw only ences and events […] We feel that we have al- with their forearm and elbow joint. In accor- ways known it but, until Goffman gave it to us, dance with the criterion of resonance, Young did not know its name’ (p. 663). As an example notes that this analysis is not necessarily appli- of this uncanny ability, here is a brief excerpt cable to all women and may also apply to some from Goffman’s (1963) descriptions of civil inat- men (there is a famous picture of then Presi- tention: ‘Where the courtesy is performed be- dent Barack Obama ‘throwing like a girl’ as he tween two persons passing on the street, civil throws the ceremonial first pitch at the Wash- inattention may take the special form of eyeing ington Nationals’ 2010 home opener). Never- the other up to approximately eight feet, during theless, Young’s analysis (sadly) resonates with which time sides of the street are apportioned many of us. As Bonnie Mann (2009) puts it: by gesture, and then casting the eyes down as ‘“Like a girl” is one of those phrases we wish the other passes – a kind of dimming of lights’ didn’t make sense, and hope one day will not’ (p. 84). Reading this passage, I immediately (p. 84). Young does not simply describe the recognized the phenomenon Goffman describes overt physical movements involved in femi- and thought to myself, ‘How have I never no- nine body comportment, however, but metic- ticed that before?’. It’s not that my previous ulously analyses the meaning of such com- way of perceiving the world was somehow false portment: inhibited intentionality. This mean- or mistaken; I simply had not noticed that par- ing does not lie hidden behind, beneath or be- ticular aspect of life before and was now struck yond the phenomenon, but originates from the by it. Accordingly, resonance does not so much steady repetition of restricted movements over penetrate a veil of ignorance as sharpen the time. The issue is not spatial, but chronologi- reader’s sensory apparatus. As Latour (2004a) J. Aagaard: Striving for Experiential Resonance 36 Qualitative Studies 5(1), pp. 29–38 ©2018 puts it: ‘The more you learn, the more differ- us break out of the tautological loop. ences exist’ (p. 213). And after reading Goff- Secondly, there is the issue of reduction- man’s texts, one’s world becomes slightly more ist analytical strategies. The critical approach articulated. treats the analytical as a symbol that has to be deciphered by an enlightened authority. Conclusion This manoeuvre often leads us back tothe The critical and phenomenological approaches usual suspects of Discourse, Power and Capi- share a number of family resemblances. They talism. The phenomenological approach, how- both view mainstream psychology as flawed ever, does not grant much explanatory power to in its and instead take departure these macroscale entities, but treats its analyti- in an inherently meaningful social world (i.e. cal objects as fully fledged and irreducible phe- they are both hermeneutic). As a result, both nomena. We have to beware of one seemingly approaches take an interpretive approach to obvious consequence of this analytical move: studying human . Although quite simi- to grant the idea that phenomenology is well lar in that respect, however, the two approaches suited for exploring phenomena at the individ- are far from identical, and it was this arti- ual level, but struggles to account for larger po- cle’s contention that the phenomenological ap- litical and socio-economic structures. This kind proach helps us circumvent the problems that of concession plays right into the stereotypi- postcritical scholars have pinpointed. cal characterization of phenomenology as naïve First, there is the tautological notion of al- and subjectivist (for an excellent discussion of ready knowing what you are going to find. The this long-standing critique, see Greiffenhagen phenomenological approach tries to avoid this & Sharrock, 2008). But phenomenology does circular disposition by remaining modest, at- not advocate political complicity and , tentive and inquisitive concerning its analyti- nor does it endorse the status quo or hinder cri- cal objects. Using Sedgwick’s distinction be- tique, as we have seen with Young’s (1980) arti- tween weak and strong theory, we might say cle. On the contrary, to give an account of po- that the phenomenological approach has delib- litical structures without attention to how we erately fashioned itself as a ‘weak’ theory that live them is to risk an abstract objectivism that strives to give credence to the things them- cannot grasp the lived experience of structural selves. Does this lead us back to the naïve re- injustice (Mann, 2009). alism that we so desperately want to avoid? Finally, there is the idea that critical schol- To an indiscriminate acceptance of the myth of ars possess an acute awareness of the hidden the given? This is certainly an understandable structures that prefigure and mould other peo- concern, since some phenomenological schol- ple’s experiences. In the situated perspective ars claim that phenomenology liberates us from of phenomenology, there is no external van- theory and allows us to see the light of lived tage point from which the researcher can as- experience (see Aagaard, 2017). Phenomenol- sume this privileged position vis-à-vis their an- ogy, however, is emphatically not a neutral lens alytical object. On the contrary, phenomenol- through which we perceive a pre-given phe- ogy wants to lead us back to the everyday nomenon, but an intellectual tool that shapes world, and in this endeavour it considers peo- our research process all the way down to data ple’s lived experience as a helpful ally against collection: it influences what we see, which overly restrictive understandings: when suf- questions we ask, and what ultimately stands ficiently probed, lived experience exhibits nu- forth as significant (Aagaard, 2017). A weak ances that cannot be contained by crass philo- theory, in other words, is not the same as an sophical binaries. Although it was not this ar- empty theory. This clarification clears the way ticle’s intention to let critique serve as a dialec- for an important distinction: although phe- tical foil to phenomenology (things are not al- nomenology dictates what to look at (i.e. ex- ways simply as they appear, and critique cer- perience), it remains open as to what we may tainly has its rightful place in qualitative re- find. By mediating the research process with- search), this last issue constitutes a challenge out determining its outcome, it thereby helps to critique: when critical interpreters challenge J. Aagaard: Striving for Experiential Resonance Qualitative Studies 5(1), pp. 29–38 ©2018 37 or contradict the sentiments expressed by or- privileged position from which they make that dinary people, they owe us an account of the call.

Endnotes Ferguson, M. (2009). Resonance and Dissonance: The 1. Role of Personal Experience in Iris Marion Young’s Ricoeur’s now-famous phrase ‘hermeneutics of sus- Feminist Phenomenology. In: A. Ferguson & M. picion’ is actually nowhere to be found in Freud and Nagel (eds.). Dancing with Iris: The Philosophy of Iris Philosophy (1970), but came up at a later date (Scott- Marion Young. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Baumann, 2009). Fleissner, J. (2017). Romancing the Real: Bruno Latour, 2. Ian McEwan, and Postcritical . In: E. Anker Incredible as it may sound, this accusation actu- & R. Felski (eds.). Critique and Postcritique. Durham: ally happened. Here is a link to the published letter (in Duke University Press. Danish): http://www.fyens.dk/debat/Socialdemokrater- Frieden, K. (1990). Freud’s Dream of Interpretation. Al- svigter-kvinderne/artikel/3130263. bany, NY: State University of New York Press. References Gergen, K. (1973). Social Psychology as History. Jour- Aagaard, J. (2017). Introducing Postphenomenologi- nal of Personality and Social Psychology, vol. 26(2), p. cal Research: A Brief and Selective Sketch of 309–20. Phenomenological Research Methods. International Goffman, E. (1963). Behavior in Public Places: Notes on Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education, vol. ,30(6) the Social Organization of Gatherings. New York: The p. 519-533. Free Press. Anker, E. & Felski, R. (2017). Critique and Postcritique. Greiffenhagen, C. & Sharrock, W. (2008). Where dothe Durham: Duke University Press. Limits of Experience Lie? Abandoning the Dualism Barnwell, A. (2016) Entanglements of Evidence in the of Objectivity and Subjectivity. History of the Human Turn Against Critique. , vol. 30(6), p. Sciences, vol. 21(3), p. 70-93. 906-925. Heidegger, M. (2008). Being and Time. New York: Harper Becker, H. (2003). The Politics of Presentation: Goff- Perennial. man and Total Institutions. Symbolic Interaction, vol. Ihde, D. (1998). Expanding Hermeneutics: Visualism in Sci- 26(4), p. 659-669. ence. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. Borgmann, A. (1984). Technology and the Character of Jameson, F. (2013). The Political Unconscious: Narrative as Contemporary Life. Chicago: Chicago University a Socially Symbolic Act. London: Routledge Classics. Press. Josselson, R. (2004). The Hermeneutics of Faith and the Bourdieu, P. (1983). Erving Goffman, Discoverer of the Hermeneutics of Suspicion. Narrative Inquiry, vol. Infinitely Small. Theory & Society, vol. 2(1), p. 14(1), p. 1-28. 112-113. Latour, B. (1996). Aramis, or the Love of Technology. Cam- Brinkmann, S. (2012). Qualitative Inquiry in Everyday bridge: Harvard University Press. Life: Working with Everyday Life Materials. London: Latour, B. (2004a). How to Talk About the Body? The . Normative Dimension of Science Studies. Body and Society, vol. 10(2-3), p. 205–229. Carman, T. (2006). The Principle of Phenomenology. In: C. Guignon (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Hei- Latour, B. (2004b). Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? degger. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. Critical Inquiry, vol. 30(2), p. 225-248. Colaizzi, P. (1978). Learning and Existence. In: R. Valle & M. King (eds.). Existential-Phenomenological Alter- Latour, B. (2005). Reassembling the Social: An Introduction natives for Psychology. New York: Oxford Univer- to Actor-Network Theory. New York: Oxford Univer- sity Press. sity Press. Denzin, N., Lincoln, Y. & Giardina, M. (2006). Disciplining Mann, B. (2009). Iris Marion Young: Between Phe- Qualitative Research. International Journal of Quali- nomenology and Structural Injustice. In: A. Fergu- tative Studies in Education, vol. 19(6), p. 769-782. son & M. Nagel (eds.). Dancing with Iris: The Philoso- phy of Iris Marion Young. Oxford: Oxford University Dreyfus, H. (1980). Holism and Hermeneutics. Review of Press. , vol. 34(1), p. 3-23. Marx, K. (1971). Capital (Vol. III). London: Lawrence & Dreyfus, H. (1991). Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Wishart. Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge: Moi, T. (2017). Revolution of the Ordinary: Literary Studies MIT Press. After Wittgenstein, Austin, and .Cavell Chicago: The Felski, R. (2008). Uses of Literature. Malden, MA: Black- University of Chicago Press. well Publishing. Paley, J. (2017). Phenomenology as Qualitative Research: Felski, R. (2015). The Limits of Critique. Chicago: The Uni- A Critical Analysis of Meaning Attribution. London: versity of Chicago Press. Routledge. J. Aagaard: Striving for Experiential Resonance 38 Qualitative Studies 5(1), pp. 29–38 ©2018

Parker, I. (1996). Discursive Complexes in Material Cul- The Spivak Reader: Selected Works of Gayatri Chakra- ture. In: J. Haworth (ed.). Psychological Research: In- vorty Spivak. New York: Routledge. novative Methods and Strategies. London: Routledge. Thomson, I. (2009). Phenomenology and Technology. In: Ricoeur, P. (1970). Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on In- V. Hendricks, J. K. B. Friis, & S. Pedersen (eds.). A terpretation. New Haven: Yale University Press. Companion to the . Hobo- Ricoeur, P. (1974). Existence and Hermeneutics. In: The ken: Wiley-Blackwell. Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Van Manen, M. (1990). Researching Lived Experience: Hu- Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press. man Science for an Action Sensitive Pedagogy. New Ricoeur, P. (1981). Science and Ideology. In: Hermeneu- York: SUNY Series in the . tics and the Human Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge Wittgenstein, L. (2009). Philosophical Investigations. Ox- University Press. ford: Wiley-Blackwell. Rorty, R. (1979). Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. Young, I.M. (1980). Throwing Like a Girl: A Phenomenol- Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. ogy of Feminine Body Comportment, Motility and Spatiality. Human Studies, vol. 3(2), p. 137-156. Scott-Baumann, A. (2009). Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion. New York: Continuum. • Sedgwick, E. (2003). Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading, or, You’re So Paranoid, You Probably Think This Essay is About You. In: Touching Feeling: Affect, About the Author Pedagogy, Performativity. Durham: Duke University Jesper Aagaard is an assistant professor in the Depart- Press. ment of Psychology and Behavioural Sciences at Aarhus University, Denmark. His research interests include Sontag, S. (1990). . In: Against In- qualitative methods, postphenomenology and media terpretation and Other Essays. New York: Anchor technologies. His PhD study explored the relationship Books. between using digital devices, paying attention and be- Spivak, G. (1996). Bonding in : Interview with coming distracted as these phenomena coalesce and in- Alfred Arteaga. In: D. Landry & G. MacLean (eds.). tertwine in the contemporary classroom.