Sartre, Freud, and Lacan

Marquette University e-Publications@Marquette Dissertations, Theses, and Professional Dissertations (2009 -) Projects The Fantastic Structure of Freedom: Sartre, Freud, and Lacan Gregory A. Trotter Marquette University Follow this and additional works at: https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Trotter, Gregory A., "The Fantastic Structure of Freedom: Sartre, Freud, and Lacan" (2019). Dissertations (2009 -). 892. https://epublications.marquette.edu/dissertations_mu/892 THE FANTASTIC STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM: SARTRE, FREUD, AND LACAN by Gregory A. Trotter B.A., M.A. A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School, Marquette University, in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy Milwaukee, Wisconsin December 2019 Abstract THE FANTASTIC STRUCTURE OF FREEDOM: SARTRE, FREUD, AND LACAN Gregory A. Trotter B.A., M.A. Marquette University, 2019 This dissertation reassesses the complex philosophical relationship between Sartre and psychoanalysis. Most scholarship on this topic focuses on Sartre’s criticisms of the unconscious as anathema both to his conception of the human psyche as devoid of any hidden depths or mental compartments and, correlatively, his account of human freedom. Many philosophers conclude that there is little common ground between Sartrean existentialism and psychoanalytic theory. I argue, on the contrary, that by shifting the emphasis from concerns about the nature of the unconscious to questions about the role of imagination in psychical life, we can see that Sartre and Freudian-Lacanian psychoanalytic theory develop strikingly similar accounts of human subjectivity. After establishing the historical background of Sartre’s career-long engagement with psychoanalysis, I demonstrate the proximity of Sartre and Lacan on the nature of unconscious thought. I proceed to develop the claim that there is a homology between the concept of unconscious fantasy in psychoanalysis and the concept of the imaginary in Sartre’s philosophical corpus. Despite the concept of fantasy being one of the more structuralist-inspired aspects of Lacan’s metapsychology, I show that Sartre’s concept of the imaginary is likewise a structural feature of the psyche, one which establishes the coordinates within which the subject engages with the world. For Sartre, Freud, and Lacan fantasies form the core of subjectivity, giving form to the basic patterns of one’s character. Taken together, these three thinkers furnish a nuanced view of fantasy/the imaginary. On the one hand it is determining insofar as it is responsible for many of the psychopathologies met with in psychoanalysis. On the other hand, it is liberating insofar as the agency of the subject is implicated in the formation of fantasy. I thereby show that Sartre does not fit the caricatured picture of a radical voluntarist that is often attributed to him and that psychoanalysis can accommodate a conception of human freedom. i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Gregory A. Trotter B.A., M.A. This dissertation would not have been possible without the support of many people. To begin with, I would like to thank the supervisor of this project, James South, for seeing me through its completion. What began as an independent research study several years ago gradually coalesced into this dissertation. My work more than likely went in directions he did not expect, but his patience and guidance are greatly appreciated. I have benefitted from his knowledge of psychoanalysis, not to mention his willingness to drive me to and from the early admissions seminars at the Wisconsin Psychoanalytic Institute on cold winter mornings. The breadth of his intellectual interests is truly astonishing and serves as a model for my own pursuits. Mike Monahan has been a mentor to me since I arrived at Marquette. I deeply appreciate the discussions both philosophical and otherwise that we have had over the years, discussions that have expanded my intellectual horizons. I also want to thank him for agreeing to continue to supervise my work even after his departure from Marquette. His professional and personal advice have been invaluable to me. Curtis Carter has been a discerning reader of my work during my years at Marquette. My experience there benefitted tremendously from his engaging discussion and invitations to the ballet, art museums, and his home. His generosity, philosophical acumen, and engagement with the arts has both improved my work and enriched my life. Tom Flynn has shaped this project in many ways. His important work on Sartre was an inspiration to me well before I had the privilege of meeting him, and that work continued to influence my thinking as I wrote this dissertation. Recently, he has had a more direct impact on my work. The bulk of this project was written while I was living in Atlanta. During those years, Tom was gracious with his time, insights, advice, and friendship. I am very grateful to him for the time he put into working with a student who is not in his own department. This project would not be what it is without our conversations together. I am grateful to the wonderful friends I have made at Marquette. In particular, I would like to thank Clark Wolf, Jorge Montiel, Phil Mack, and Daniel Adsett. Our conversations about philosophy, film, food, and many other things were both formative in helping me to formulate some of the ideas in this dissertation and made my years in Milwaukee truly enjoyable. Finally, my ability to complete this project was sustained by the patience, love, and support of my entire family. There were many moments in which it appeared as if this project would not come to fruition, but through their belief in me and support of my work, it has finally taken shape. My mother and father especially have been unfailing in their support ever since I first decided to seriously pursue philosophy. The road to completing my doctorate was longer and the terrain rougher than I expected, but my family was there every step of the way. Thank you. ii Preface How to Philosophize with a Tape Recorder: Existentialism, Psychoanalysis, and the Freedom of the Subject By 1969, Jean-Paul Sartre had been the editor of Les Temps modernes for twenty- four years. In the intervening decades, Sartre had established himself as one of the leading philosophers and public intellectuals of the twentieth century, a span during which he continuously engaged either directly or indirectly several facets of psychoanalytic theory and practice. 1969 marks a particularly interesting moment in Sartre’s long and complex engagement with Freud and his legacy. For it was in April of that year that Sartre decided to publish within the pages of Les Temps modernes, against the protestations of several editorial board members, “The Man with a Tape-recorder,” a tension-riddled conversation between a patient and his psychoanalyst. The transcribed conversation chronicles an encounter between a man, known simply as ‘A…’, who is frustrated with his analyst, dubbed ‘Dr. X’, and the apparent lack of progress they have made together during the course of A…’s treatment. A… evidently sought to get his analyst on record so that he might impose a kind of check on his methods. During a particularly tense exchange, Dr. X, who up to this point has repeatedly expressed his distrust of A…’s tape recorder, implores his patient to turn the recorder off: DR. X: You’ve got your tape-recorder there! A: So? Dr. X: Switch it off! A: Come on, it’s not so bad as all that. Does it frighten you? It’s not a gun. Dr. X: Switch it off! A: Are you frightened? Dr. X: Switch it off! A: What do you mean—switch it off? Dr. X: I don’t like this sort of interview. A: Now listen, do you want a spanking? iii Dr. X: There, you see, you’re dangerous! A: Do you want a spanking? Dr. X: You see, you’re dangerous. A: No, I’m not, I’m simply asking you this question: would you mind stop acting like a child? (Sartre 2008, 210) The encounter escalates from here, culminating with Dr. X shrieking out of his office window for help and attempting to call the police only to be stopped by A… Why did Sartre see fit to publish this troubling conversation? After qualifying his approval of A…’s recorded encounter with his analyst by noting that he does not intend the published conversation to serve as a blanket indictment of psychoanalysis itself, Sartre states the precise reason he felt compelled to publish the transcription, a reason quite pertinent to our purposes here. Sartre writes, “Why then did I find this dialogue so fascinating? Because it spotlights, with dazzling clarity, the irruption of the subject into the consulting room, or rather the overthrow of the univocal relationship linking the subject to the object” (Sartre 2008, 200). In his explanation of what he means by ‘subject’ here, Sartre references material from his early essay The Transcendence of the Ego, material that we will examine in closer detail below. Sartre proclaims that “by subject here I do not mean the Self or the Ego—a quasi-object that is a product of reflexion—but the agent: in this brief encounter, A… is the subject in the sense in which Marx called the proletariat the subject of History” (Sartre 2008, 200). According to Sartre, “The Man with a Tape-recorder” showcases the active irruption of subjectivity within the analytic situation, a situation that, Sartre seems to imply, transforms analysands into passive objects. For Sartre, what the exchange between A… and Dr. X reveals is the way in which psychoanalysis encourages analysands to relinquish their responsibility, which for Sartre, of course, is one of the gravest sins one iv can commit.

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