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items-in-Peace-keeping operations - Yemen - SECCOL documents

Date Created 28/02/1963

Record Type Archival Item

Container S-0877-0001: Peace-Keeping Operations Files of the Secretary-General: U Thant - Yemen (United Nations Observation Mission - UNYOM)

Print Name of Person Submit Image Signature of Person Submit UNITED NATIONS NATIONS L N I E S

UNITED HATIOSS TBMSS OBSSRY&TI03 iELSSION &»&**. 14 August 1963

lo la any rtport of 11 Ks^ 19&3 on th* «xpl oratory aiasica to I reooamssiiad Hi&ss asiaisffm foroa whiaM oaa execute ths noadr,*! :re»pc>a.$i'billile« as e*t forth in tka tsr^is of r«fer»ric# fcr a 90 to 3 '120 lay period ^. ' I si*t

2K My own tffittssats wa® that with properly coordinated «.sd quali fi$-! jlA&rJ.sg & mlaftlon of this am&ll 3!$$ ehould ^« partl within a fo^rt-alg^t a«ad fully operational w*thl£ t^rs? ^ir»^k a,araao-s *I®ffi«nt began to fcrriv© on 12 Ju.a«» Tfc© xiasion u?s.s not fully opte'ational' until "last 'Ksak of Julj0' T'la " psxiod 12 Jun© - 14 August operationally

ailitaxy p«rsoBn»l -• 80 per o@at • ' • Olytlian 54 ?e2r oeat airoraft 37 P®r . 3» SHorta^* of external sdrlift inaa pr*vsnt«l the oreatios of tb» Isa^-aast logistic supply reserv*« . Ina,dsq,uat« internal airlift oap-ao-ity ij^t seriously j$opardisad tB.^ isls&ion si 000 its

3y court&ay of Oomaaadsr, UMF, Ms -Air Staff Oftl.ter, Wln^ Commas d«r K.'Hladgr bas psrformsd a surv*y of 1Sie intaraal airlifi of " SSfCK, -h*r* attacked^ . • As ltor'158 out "by this ®arr®y? ualses at l«ae* one isora t is made availabl* sooasst, I shall fssl obliged to bsfor* *ad of August the withdrawal of at lsa*t t>=» r^coe oamiot H?« ada

Carl Oisoa von M&i01''0®11®^*! v. • Oomaaader, . • - .... ••<•-. ,^f- •• ' ;' • '• • :••'. • : .;; o.*c.» . Coaasaader, 'UHSF* jiifIjjai-;'j>'i*i,..,,_ .., u._.l .. ., -. ,.,.rL . • ••-'-•'•'_' -, i-'-'-an •<- ^ A •-I ,-i ^ o u •"•;<>> • A' STAFF PAPER

UOTCM ATEtOHAlT Commanded M. Hlady, ASO,

1, A vital aspect of UBYOU operations is air support, and to fulfil this requirement, two Caribou and four Otter aircraft have been attached to the "UK Mission in the TeB»n. The purpose of this paper is to re-assess the for air support to determine whether the amount provided is to meet tTKYCSS'a requirements. The minimum estimate of the Temea exploratory Biission was nine aircraft,

thr:«ie of , Bolg of Air SuRoy t in UHYCK 2, In. the UMYCM operation, aircraft are required for patrol purpos«» for log ratio* support. The Otter aircraft are deployed to Giaan and Hajraa • airports which are located in southern Saudi Arabia, and thess aircraft carry out air patrols, or they will patrol in conjunction with the Yugoslav Arsg Cojstingent in and along the Buffer Zone. A further requirement for air patrols exists in the interior of -the Yemen which ia beyond the oapa- Hlitj of the Otter »iroraft. This air patrol requirement is carried out J$ Caribou aircraft while they are engaged on logistics flights, or on spetdal nights wixioh originate at San*a airport. The major role of Caribou aircraft is l&gistio support of US establishments at San*a, Gisan, S®,*da a»d

3, The Otter aircraft are operating efficiently and are meeting TOY OSS's patrol roQAiirsioenta in the area of Gizan, a^d Najran» A daoiaion to supplement the patrol fleet with Helicopter aircraft is still in abeyance and this sill be the subject of another paper when ir.ore information is available* Is the meantime, the Otter aircraft are iceeting UFYQJi'e requiretnenta and will not, therefore, be discussed further in this paper» 4. The logistic support by Caribou aircraft is.more involved; therefore^ a, detailed analysis ia necessary of the amount of airlift which ia required, and of the capability of the two Caribou aircraft* - 2 -

Airlift

5« To support the RC1F and Yugoslav contingents whiqh ar* deployed at Glaan, Sa'da and Hajran, a monthly total of 12,000 Ibs must be lifted to Qisaau, 10,000 Ibs to Sa*d& and 24,000 Ibs to Hajr&n. Witfe San»a as th© jaa.iB logistics base, a monthly total of. 33 Caribou flights or 115 hours are required to airlift the 46>OQO Ibs to the three deployment (detailed breakdown of aircraft capability and flights' required is at Appendix "A".) If 0-130 aircraft are used for th© ra-supply^of UITOM, th»jl tha 24 5,000 Ibs for B«;JT&B could las offloaded at that base, with the result that only 22,000 Ibs would hare to be distributed by Caribou aircraft to Gizan and Sa*da, nfeioh could be completed in 16 flights. However, in this oase, it would still ba necas^ary to continue the circuit' to N%jran because of fresh ratios^ aircraft spares, rotation of personnel ate. There- fore, the total flying hours required would be 56. 6. In addition to ihe re-supply of the deployment bases, there is & for special flights to airlift fresh rations and'sp&cial PI and to carry out official visits by the Ccnamander. There is alao a need for extra patrol flights, operational liaison and investigation flights, welfare flights and special flights to the deployment bases for A/G spares and air evacuation,. The following details these ooanaitajentai (a,) J©d<$» "- Official visits - two a month 14 far® •'•'•*' (fe) Asmara - Rations and Welfare - two. a igeek.. 40 hro (o) Adan - Special PX items, asd^Loal two a month 6 hrs oheokfl at RAF hospital

(d) Specials - .Patrols, *ir evac.t A/C 30 Bparea eto« (e) Ferry - Inapaotione at'Bl Arisfe one a month 20 hra

?o Th® 33 re-supply • flights to the three deployment baes.a, together with the other flights listed in para. 6, total 225 hrs* It is readily appaxeatf that the two flaribou aircraft with an established fly i ng rate of 50 hours . each are totally inadequate to oairry out this commitment. It might b® suggested that oae could inorease -the Established flying rate to 100 hrs 1 - 3 -

on each aircraft and thus meat the requirement. However, this would not solve the problem becau.ee the frequency of flights, coupled with, the n®ed for 1/1 3 inspestionA a month (ot r twelve days each month that one A/iC would be out of service), together with unserviceabilities vrhich inevitably occur, it becomes readily apparent that the number of aircraft raguirsd, as opposed to flying hours available, play® an important .part in determining ,• j aircraft establishments^ ' " - /' • % 8»" "To carry out the above oomiaittoent of 225 hours, it ia considered that four Caribou aircraft are requiredo With four aircraft on strength the normal occurence of unserviceable aircraft noted in p&ra. 7 above would be absorbed without jjiaopardicing tfFTM'a miaeioa, tfhe 'possibilily of C-130 aircraft reeupplying Sa^r*B xeduces the'total flying coassaitjasist to 166 hours a month, and it ia considered that ihree aircraft on strength handle this Ea-location of the Hajh Lq^iatioB 9« It i« apparent from Appsndiac "A" that ths Caribou aircraft is restricted by the field elevation at San*s. (7,200»). Therefore, frqm aa air transport standpoitst it would TJ& advantageous to move'the baee to Hddeida, which ie near sea level*, The airlift capability of - - ' . ' QaTibou opera-tiag'from Hodeida airport ie detailed at Appendix *'BM * a« indicated, th® tfer«o deplojnaent bases could be rasupplied by aircraft wi'th 11 flights a month* Bsoauee of op®rational rotation-^ fresh ration delivery purpos©e, 11 flights a month to the deployment ..''•' f i® oonsidersd to b© a, lairdiauBo ffiierefor^,' sVen if UNYCM was resupplied " by C-130 aircraft, thtra would be little or no advantage in r®q.uiriiig tbis ^ • ''"«,' •"& A/C to reatipply EFa^raa. Instead, it would be raora desirable if the A/0 J _delivered all supplies directly to Hodeida, J ' ""3' 10« To reaupply the three deployasnt bases tuith 11 flights from Hodeida would require 49 hours 'flyings l^is auffij together with the eomiaitments

liattd in para* 6 above9 totals 159 hour^ per roonth« To oarxy out this • . flying programme, tare® aircraft would be required, Ae noted previously in para* f, a suggestion that increasing the established flying rate to

75 hour* p^r ftircraft to carry out the oossmitn^nt with only two airorafi?

•vould not meet the re^ttiyeaaeat of UIKSf*s miesioa0 ' . • -, 4 •»

-. Present 11. With only two Caribou aircraft on Btrtragth, this mission faoea serious

. it diffioul^.' The £%i»£ unit is making every effort to keap tha aircraft flying and with the ingenuity of ths unit's oaaintenanGe organization, the aircraft have barely tmnaged to fulfil their missions The efforts of the ^ ^ & ' maintenance organization are further hampered by a serious laek of aircraft spars parts; this problem is further ooa$pli$ated by the faot that thers ..*•-. '" * • ' x, ' is only on« flight a ttaek which oould dalivsr spars'parts* Perhaps tha most critical situation will fao« this mission within a few day® when oae of the Caribou, airoraft ie tarried to ®1 &rish for its periodic Inspsotlon, Thia will Isavs only on« transport airoaraft at San'a for & period of about nine days and if it beootces unsdrvioeabloj this Edssion oould be without air transport for a.period of ^p to 0eve»

.of jgotal.. l*o^ of 12« Tha 3UOG®as of the TJinTCM missioa ooxild be placed in jeopardy if ther®

J j "ar. ©~ , no Cari'b'ot u Mror'af• t available'*(,''^', A- good" - nuabe• r of patrols are oarried * out "by Caribou airoraft* In addition, spare parts for Otter airoraft fflusti Ibe held at San 'a and delivered lay Caribou when requirado Moreover j the Yugoslav Array mod© o'f operation is such that their senior officer must be flom to ta® various outjsoats to organise and plan future patrols, Pinally, in "the avaat that PSTCM mus't vaosta the Temsn,, s,ir trarsapo. t is vital "bscautSiQ th«ra is no other practical Eean« of leaving th* oouBt^o Of leaser iiaportancaj but nererthsleaB critical, is ths n©ed for aiir " evacuation of hospital cases* HedicjaJ. facilities in Yemen are extremely

'•:•'.* ' limited, and the US "doctor is not equipped to do

13. It is apparent -that tha provision of only two Caribou airoraft is grossly inadequate to.o&rry out the air transport requirement of UHYCH. It Is also apparent that theOTTCt lm i ssi ok'could be placed in jeopardy' . \ unl«aa ths airlift o»pabili1y is increased, With respect to the Iwatios .-

-\\\4\

• l'~'i'1 , ;\\ \ > ,i 'A

i.WVSs''-'^; ~'S ^im-ff^-f

V;> Y

: • ''.-'• i»t.. i i • ' "' ¥ ? ^^'^ v ^^yM^^'" ^-^^^ i of the Three Outposts fOffl Saia/a. b Caribou

~ 3aa * a/Ho&ei Aft/3 1 z&a/S& * da/N a jraa/San * % B'**io wight ~ 19,360 Srew (4 z 16Q) • - 640 • Tool b*oc«» - 100

perffiisellsl© take off wedsbt at San* a (1,200 «) is 26,000

2^,000 * 24i'600 « 13400 Totfd weight *o- ba iift*di . - 12, ; - -io, oop

46,000

Number .of flights required 46 » 000 J 1,400 » 33 Fiji tig houi-s tor eaoh odrouit - -1 -f 30 flying iwmra ' - 3 n- " 30 x '33f ' • 115

t£s G-130 drops 24,000 ltf@, into Hsjranp then S*'ds &ad. Giasua oould "be r«~aupipli©d with 16 trips* Hovrevar, th« airouit to Ha.^**1 would b© oontinued^ 00 that the total number -of hoxire required Is

of tfee lack of radio aid® and extreme difficulty of f navrg«ion, fuel r©quirement« have TsQen ©stablisBed as total flight \ tiiae plus 3 !;•

, JSSI®M»J!S1

af...jth.g.... ThjM>» _0utpoeia. jftrom HofojLAaL fey Gariboja

Route - Sa3i*a/jEodeidA/aia«ai/3a* da/Fa jr&n/SanV

Baaic weight «- 19f360 Cr»w 4 jc 160 ~ ^40 ' Tool Boxes - 100 . ... • . • _ f j fUal ~ 4,OOO (out of Hodeida •- aea not») Op«r» weight 24,000

* Maximum permissible taka-off weight at Hodeida whioh ia at sea leval i» 28,500-lb»*" . .a. Majcimum payload .^ 28,500 •i-24» 100 » 4,400 fotal wtigfct to be lif*»di , • • *-' •

10,000 24*000 46,000

Number.of flights r«

Because of the laok of .radio a±ds and extreme diffioulty of nafrlgatiojotj fuel yeq[uir®m*»t» have b«s@ja astablished as total- flight time pits* 3 hoture UNITED NATIONS N A T I 0 N S U N I E S

DECLASSIFIED r PER ST/AI/326r 28 DEC }984 By Date \H yo ( THE IlflffiM SITUATION

Mflffigageaent Agreement t iJXJJ:?t: \ffffk Aa regards the formal implementation of the disengagement agreement, progress during the past few weeks has been negative. There are more Egyptian troeps in tfce oottntry now than on 4 January,, a situation ascribed by the U.A«Bo command to increased Rebel activity. There are no longer public U.Jk«E0 charges of Saudi Arabiaa aid to the Royalists by thte previously used routes. Indeed, U.A»B0 intelligence points to Belhan in South Arabia as the place from which arms are being iotrodtjced into the country0 The UeA«a* Command is inclined to believe, howeverf that sosae of tbpse arms «rc atill being suppliad by Saudi Arabia, but by a round-about channel, though doubtless with British connivence. % impression is thai the Saudi Arabian Government is continuing to provide the Royalists with full moral support and substantial financial asaistance.

th& Military Situation t

The view, has been advanced by many Western sources - including the British Sigh Canaaiseioner in Adon, newspaperman and R'ed Cross officials, and privately by some of oar observers, that Royalist strength euad aural* have recently improved aad that their action is BOW assuming the proportions of a national crusade against the unpopular Egyptian forces, wjjieh in the end anist be successful, This vie* is in aiy opinion an exaggerated one0 The Egyptians are of course subjected to considerable b&rassED€nta When I visited their exposed headquarters at Sada in the extreme North I found in a low state of morale because of dicing at their doorstep*,. ever, they are q«it« capable„ there and elsewhere in the towss, of maintaining themselves easily against forroal attacko They (ire also able to clear, with heavy loss to the tribes concerned, their major linos of communications when they are cut let guerilla operations,, Moreover, my visit to Taias showed me a major source of Re-pufal lean strength and sentiment, which is not ao a&sy ta discern; in Sana'a, which remains quiet ia the raidat of an Egyptian military occupation. The Sbaf'i tribesmen of the South have been arsed and are dct«rmin«>d. . to fight to protect their area from Royalist iaeuraiotss from tb® Nortb? as they did whon til® Sana'a Hodeida road was cat in January* Regu] ai* Tauten! force*. - mainly of Shaf*i tribesmen — are being cmrrently trained both ia South Yemen and in Egypt, In the meantime South Teraen ia commercially prosperous and IB capable of considerable economic progress. U N IT E D N A T 10 N S NATIONS UNI E S

- 2 -

I ato of the opinion that much of the Royalist sentiment amongst tiie Zeidi hill tribesmen of the North is due to the lure of money and rifles, though I do not exclude the importance of anti-Egyptiafi feeling, dt»* to the heavy-handedness of Egyptian reprisals. The Bgyptian farces are entirely.on the defensive, but as long as they remain in the country, even in snail numbers, there could be BO- military solution. Even if they were to be completely with- drawn, the North would probably becoae entirely Royalist in view of th* continuous covert support froa Saudi Arabia*but there would be a prolonged civil war between the North and the Soatfa.

The Political Situation t A new Government and a new single party organisation were famed by the fiepublicana during my recent stay, but'it is now clear that so great additional strength waa obtained thereby. Sallal in Sana'a remains the saiBe nervous p*rsoa that I saw in December in Cairo and is incapable of providing constructive leadership to the country, although be is a quite imposing figur* on public occasions* Several of the ministers have not even come to take their posts In Sasa'a. &i Astri is a brave and straightforward but narrow defender of the Hepublic, and he too, is now under.treatment abroad. Only £ub0iry, a fighter against the Issafljat* since 1938 and a cum of great dignity and dc-terminat-'oa and Hainan, a much younger man of considerable education and intelligence who had also apant mack of his life in exile, have ideas for creating .wide popular support for the Republic and for bettering the life of the people. It ia interesting to note that these two leaders, while regarding tfe* old regime with great distaste and insisting that in a final settle- ment the ex-Ia&» and all the members of his family must leave the couxttry, would be quite ready to join in a Government with Shaiai, the Imam's Foreign Minister, and other persons of position on the royalist sids. Kvea if a stronger Government is formed it will be Irapossibl* for it to establish a aodern administration and to develop ths country without outside fialpe. I attach importance therefor® to a recommendation I have made to David Owe® that even at this stage a planner of Intar- national reputation should be assigned to the Yetaan Goveruoxmt to help them build up an administration 'and to prepare plans and surv^ya for future development activities*

Rrcspeetjs for a Solgtion

During my conversations with the ILA.B. and Saudi Arabian authorities I have always emphasized that real disengagorasat and a political in Yea&n could only corae about as a result of direct discussions then and a resulting agreement to promote the formation of a Governweat of national unity in Yemfett which would bo frieodly towards both of iheut.

»/»* UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

In this connexion the improvement in inter-Arab relations resulting from the Cairo Conference waa a hopeful siga. The subsequent- agreement that the question of the resumption of diplomatic relations between the 0".A.R. scad Saudi Arabia should be discussed at a high level meeting at Riyadh on 1 Ikreh 1964 was also encouraging. Fundamentally lasting diplomatic relations between them are impossible without agreement on settling tho Y»raIraq - to settle this one remaining rift in Arab unity. The U.3« will, I believe, be ready to interrene discreetly in the same sense. After my. visits to Saudi Arabia, I am, however, rather doubtful if even the beginning of a real solution of the Yemen problem will be achieved at the forthcoming Riyadh talks. Peiaal remains confident of the strength of his position in regard to Temen and at tho vary least he will use It to create a strong bargaining position. He has reiterated in several recent newspaper interviews his insistence that the U.A.R. troops Bust b& with- drawn, wheraapon the Temsni people can determine .their awn form of Government. Basically, too, he aruat be earefttl of his position vis~a-via hia electorate^ namely the many princes of royal bloodf a relatively unenlightened group who are undoubtedly emotionally attached to the royalist cfcuse. For the present, I believe that the United Nations should allow Arab efforts of conciliation and mediation to rail, their course and hope that they will be successful. 1 plan, however, subject to the continuation of the Mission, which I am inclined to believe also on .this occasion will in the end be acceptable to both parties, to return to the area in about one month's time.. If no progress has been achieved by that tlma, perhaps a ffloradirec t action of mediation by the United Nations might bo called for. 1 have already some ideas in that regard; which I would discuss with yow in that eventuality. Hote for File 14 January 1964

Mr.. Dragan Bernardic, Minister Yugoslav Mission, called at his request. He said that he had just been informed that Col Branko Pavlovic, COS UNYOM, was to be relieved and that his replacement was not to be from Yugoslavia, His Government would appreciate to be infoimed as to why Colonel Pavlovic was being relieved and why a replacement had not been requested from their country. He also expressed surprise at not having been advised of this by the Secretariat. I explained to him that UNYOM, including Pavlovic, had recommended that maximum duty period with the Mission should not exceed six months. The UN also has a policy of rotating key appointments and Pavlovic was to be replaced by an Indian officer, I also expressed surprise that the Yugo Mission had not so far been informed as I felt sure that in fact they had been. After speaking to Dr. Bunche and obtaining further clarification I 3ndc called Mr. Bernardic on lA* January to inform him that request for relief had been sent to us by Colonel Pavlovic himself. I also informed him that Dr. Bunche had advised the Yugoslav Ambassador of this change, Mr. Bernardic requested that as the Yugoslavs have made a sizeable contribution to UMYOM and continue to maintain five officers in the Mission, their Government would very much appreciate if the appointment of Operations Officer or some other appointment on the HQ staff is allotted to them. k-*O - I.J. Rikhye

cc: Secretary-General Dr. Bunche Mr. Narasimhan UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES

Geneva,• 22 February 1964

AN? CONFIDENTIAL

Bear Mr. Thant,

*«* I am submitting herewith a brief report on the current situation in Yemen to napplement the telegrams which I sent you while I was in the ai&aion are*. As the report shows, any substantial improvement in the Situation is dependent on agreement between the U.A.R. and Saudi Arabia to persuade the different factions in Yemen to settle their differences. The forthcoming meeting at Riyadh for the resumption of diplomatic relations between these two countries otay lead tc some progress in- the femes question, but after recent talks in Saudi .Arabia I are doubtfyl whether the Saudi Arabian authorities are ready yet to enter iato a real discussion of the ffiatter, as their covert support to the Royalists pats them in & strong position* Irrespective of the results of the Meeting, I rs commend that the Yemen Observation Mission should be extended, as otherwise incidents on the frontier are boued to make eventual Saudi Arabian - U.A.R. agreement more difficult, I QJB at your disposal to go to New fork .to report to you in person. However; I believe that Berendaen will be able to aaswer any detailed questions which nay occur to yoa while reading the report. I could then M*SBa» with you when you are here on 19 March the line which I should take on By next visit at the and of that month, fhia would be & more useful time as the results of the Riyadh talk* will then be known.

sincerely,

H,B. U THANT, Secretary-General, United Nations Headquarters, Hew Tork.

V' V Note for the Secretary-General 1 August 1963

Summary of UNYOM situation

The Commander and advance party arrived in Yemen on 13 June and made contacts with Saudi, Yemeni a,nd UAR authorities in Jedda, Sana and Hodeida. A liaison office was also established in Cairo. The Yugoslav reconnaissance unit arrived at Hodeida on k July 1963, on which date the Mission "became fully established. The Mission consists of headquarters and military observers stationed in Sana (l8); Canadian 13^-th Air Transport Unit (strength5^) stationed in Sana, Qizan and Najran; and the Yugoslav reconnaissance unit (strength 11^) stationed in Sada, Qizan and Najran. There are in addition 26 United Nations civilian staff. The principal object of the Mission is to observe the implementation of the Disengagement Agreement by the UAR and Saudi Arabia. To this end there- are ground patrols in the buffer zone and surrounding areas by troops stationed in Qizan,, Najran and Sada. These are supplemented by air patrols over the mountainous central area of the buffer zone and over the eastern extremities of Yemen. In addition, military observers in Sana and Hodeida have the task of certifying the withdrawal of UAR troops. In addition to these functions, the Mission, where possible, receives and investigates incidents and complaints reported by either side, although the terrain and existing military situation often make such investigations difficult or impossible. As regards withdrawal of troops, it seems probable that some2;2,500 UAR troops have been pulled out in the last month. On the Saudi Arabia side there has also been some withdrawal of troops from the buffer zone. There have been allegations by both sides mainly concerned with punitive raids upon Royalist strongholds, the alleged use pf p»ison gas, and, from with the UAR, allegations of continued support, both/material and propaganda, of the Royalists by Saudi Arabia. These allegations are investigated wherever possible. Apart from the Canadian and Yugoslav units, the headquarters and observer staff of UNYOM consists of officers from Australia, Austria,/Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, the United States and Yugolsavia. SBSB!S^«?WB«!!SS™>™SW95

CFF3CE OF:.THE RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE UA.R.

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INCIDENTS From 13 June 1963 to 15 July 1963

1. UNYGM Commander's Plane hit by ground fire 2. Use of poison gas by UAR 3. Bombing of Saudi Arabian villages Z{.» Contact with the Royalists 5. British Incident 6. Difficulty in Liaison with Yemeni Authorities 7. Support of Royalists by Saudi Arabia &. UAR authorities do not cooperate with UN 1. UHYOM Commander* s Plane hit by Ground Fire When flying from Sada to Sana on 16 June, after having conducted air and road patrols witjr one Caribou, Commander UNYOM had his plane hit by ground fire. Bullet entered cargo door, bottom rear fuselage, and emerged top fuselage, No casualties. Source of firing ignored, probably Royalists (?). Due to low altitude(the plane was flying between 1000 and 2000 ft) it could have been rifle fire. 2, Use of Poison Gas by UAR Complaint On 30 June a complaint was passed to UNYOM LO Jedda in which the Saudi Arabian Government stated that some bombs had been dropped at Najran some days previously which were supposed to contain poison gas. The information came from the head of a hospital at Najran who was also requesting the Government to provide gas masks for protection of the population. Information On 21 June a query was sent to Commander UNIOM asking for information and Investigation as to whether there was any truth contained in rumours circulating in New York about use by UAR Airforce of "some kind of gas which is alleged to cause bleeding and unconsciousness". On 23 June the Commander replied that same allegations had been made by Saudi authorities in Jedda; however, the Mission was unable to confirm. On 28 June the Commander informed that a recconnaissance flight conducted on the 2§th, when approaching Sada, observed black smoke approximately 10-15 km i\rest of Hi^jiiasi - nature of smoke suggested use of napalm. On landing in Sada group observed one IL-14 with empty bomb shackles which had dropped a bomb (canister type, no fins) on end of runway. At Najran Prince Khaled and Colonel Al Hadi (Saudis) informed that UAR forces were mounting heavy operations and utilising all sorts of weapons. The A/Commander informed on 9 July that due to the fact that "we had been in Najran on 24, 28 ajid 29 June and saw no evidence of bombing, nor were UN personnel approached by any Saudis about poison gas attacks", he instructed the LO Jedda to the effect that "no investigation would be conducted until more specific information was received from Saudis" about the complaint given on 30 June. On 11 July the A/Commander informed - (1) Query to Saudi Arabian-Government through LO Jedda. had not been answered. (2) Investigation would start next day at Najran. (3) 10 Jedda informed on 11 July he was called on 10 July to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he received a strong protest from the Deputy Minister against UAR bombing of the village of Ahem, Yemen, on 1 July. He stated that it was Market Day and therefore 1?0 people were killed and 120 wounded, mostly women and children. The bombs were napalm followed by machine-gun strafing and raid was considered an act of terror. A protest was made also against alleged previous dropping of gas canisters or gas bombs though he had personally no proof in his hand. The Deputy Minister also pointed out that a "Daily Telegraph" correspondent named Beeston had samples of bombs and that also an American had such samples. (4) After checking with the American Embassy the A/Commander was informed that "no American is known to have been in area alleged gas bombing or to be in possession of fragments." (5) A summary of this complaint was sent to UAR authorities in Yemen. On 12 July the A/Commander sent the following summary of investigation conducted at Najran on same day - "UNMD lit ¥ebb Trammell, accompanied by Capt Lechner, Medical Corps, Austrian Army, interviewed Dr. Iqbal, Hospital Head at Najran. Ths latter stated that approximately 6 weeks ago he had been told by travellers passing through Najran of poison gas attack in town of Gizan with attendant casualties. He had not ascertained number of casualties but had been told that majority had been children. Upon receipt of these reports he had asked the Government for gas masks. Five days ago a cable arrived from Deferice Minister asking if poison gas had been used in Najran area. The answer was no. Najran was last bombed on $ and 7 June by three planes using high explosive bombs, no napalm or phosphoros. As of this date gas masSs had not yet arrived in Najran". On the same date the A/Conmander informed that no report had been received from the LO Jedda referring to "poison gas bombs allegedly dropped by Egyptian planes on village of Alkoma, north of ¥ash-ha in Hajja Province. On 14 July the A/Commander informed he had received a letter from UAR Forces HQ in Sana: -, "In reply to your letter dated 11 July 1963 concerning the allegation of Saudi Arabia, I would like to draw your attention that we did not use bombs containing gas." On 15 July the UN Office in Geneva reported that they had been approached by Ahmed Al Shaniy, Yemeni Royalist Minister for Foreign Affairs. During the conversation the following points were stated: (1) During the last months aircraft had parachuted or dropped into areas held by Royalists "explosive cigarettes, biscuits, combs and tins of food which injured people who made use of them." A cigarette alleged to have come from one of these packages was exhibited, (2) On 8 June an aircraft dropped 4 bombs on the village of Kawma, two of which exploded giving out blue-black smoke* Six children who approached died from inhaling fumes. Two died two hours later and four the next day. Another child was allegedly burned and has since suffered infection of respiratory organs (the child was accompanying the Minister). Other adults and cattle also suffered from the explosion. Fragments of bomb were shown by the visitors. Press Reference to the use of poison gas by UAR in Yemen have come out in Comments the Press during the last two weeks. The following points have been stressed: (a) Richard Beeston, correspondent for the London "Daily Telegraph", stated to have been at ths bombed village and to have been shown the remains of what villagers said had been the gas bomb (New York Times - 9 July). (b) A former American Airforce officer, now fighting with the Royalists in Yemen, Bruce Conde, stated that said gas bombs were actually napalm fire bombs that had failed to explode (New York Times, Washington Post - 10 July). (c) The Secretary-General was approached in Geneva by British Government officials and ordered an investigation to be conducted by UNYOM (New York Times, Washington Post, Christian Science Monitor - 11 July). (d) A boy from Yemen arrived in London for hospital tests on his wounds (Daily Telegraph - 16 July). G.2 comments (a) There is not any concrete evidence of use of gas by UAR up to the present time. The bomb fragments presented in Geneva (see para(2) above on this page) could be very useful to prove it if they could be chemically analysed, (b) The use of napalm, fey UAR is well substantiated by evidence and investi- gation. Napalm is nothing but jelley gasoline, therefore its fumes are as harmful as high octane gasolinej this would be more true if the bombs are outdated or deteriorated due to improper storage because then they would not explode and ignite completely but would produce a heavy harmful smoke capable of causing the alleged effects. (c) A complete investigation by UNYOM will be impossible, unless the Observers can have access to areas now controlled by the Royalists. 3» Bombing of Saudi Arabian Villages On 14 June the .Permanent Representative of Saudi Arabia addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (S/5333) complaining about air-raids carried on by the UAR troops against Saudi Arabia on 6 and B June. This letter was answered by a letter dated 20 June from the Permanent Representative of the UAR addressed to the Secretary-General (S/5336) in which the air-raids were neither denied nor acknowledged. Complaints On 24 June UHYOM LO Jedda was called to the Foreign Office and received the following: (a) On 23 June at OSOOLT three Egyptian planes air-raided the village of Maynaith (Ayinah) 50 km south of Abha. They dropped about fourteen bombs, four persons were seriously wounded and 70 sheep were killed. (b) Saudi Foreign Office asked for an investigation to be carried out as soon as convenient. The Saudi Ministry of Defence arranged for a UN Mission Info and to land at Khamis, Mushait, 30 km east of Abha. Investigation On 25 June Commander reported that UAR planes had carried on a bombing mission NE and SW of the village of Sada. This information was given by the Commander of Hodeida Military Airport and one of the pilots on the bombing mission. On the other hand, crew of UN aircraft grounded at Sada that same day reported IL-28s passing overhead. However, UN personnel saw no first-hand evidence of bombing. On 26 June the Commander informed that a recconnaissance flight 7 conducted on the 2fth, when approaching Sada, observed black smoke approximately 10-15 km west of IfflOflmi - nature of smoke suggested use of napalm. On landing at Sada group observed one IL-14 with empty bomb shackles which had dropped a bomb (canister type, no fins) on end of runway. At Najran Prince Khaled and Colonel Al Hadi (Saudis) informed that "UAR forces were mounting heavy operations and utilising all soirfcs of weapons". On 29 June the Commander informed that even though preliminary investigation of Saudi complaint confirmed allegation this "has been formally denied by UAR". On 4 July the A/Commander reported there had been a "marked increase in military activity in Yemen in the past few days, including air activity, troop movements, local executions, noticeable feeling of unrest and tension". This was attributed to a last effort by both UAR and Royalists to gain as much foothold as possible in the area prior to the deployment of UN troops. On 14 July the A/Commander informed he had received a letter from, the UAR Forces HQ in Sana referring to the Saudi Arabian complaint, with the following comments: "1. The terms of the disengagement agreement complete (sic) each others. "2. ¥e did not take punitive action against so-called Royalists of Yemen. "At the same time we took certain measures to protect our troops from the profiteers in Yemen who still with the aid of Saudi Arabia infiltrate ammunition, guns and money to them. Me consider this aid as an act of violation of the terms of the disengagement agreement." On 14 July the A/Commander informed a summary of investigation conducted by LO Jedda with reference to the Saudi Arabian verbal complaint of 24 June about the bombing of the village of Maynaith on 23 Juno: (a) Investigation carried out 26-27 June. (b) 14 bomb craters and bloodstains observed at scene of incident one mile south of village. (c) Bomb fragments were collected at scene and from villagers. (d) Witnesses and wounded interviewed. (e) Wounded were - 1 woman aged 35 and 3 boys (aged 12, 9 and B yrs), all expected to recoverj however, two of the boys expected to remain lame. Complaint LO Jedda informed on 11 July he was called on 10 July to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs where he received a strong protest from the Deputy Minister against UAR bombings of the village of Ahem, Yemen, on 1 July. He stated that it was Market Day and therefore 170 people were killsd and 120 wounded, mostly women and children. The bombs were napalm followed by machine-gun strafing and the raid was considered an act of terror. A protest was made also against alleged previous dropping of gas canisters or gas bombs though he had personally no proof in his hand. The Deputy Minister also pointed out that the "Daily Telegraph" correspondent, named Beeston, had samples of bombs and that also an American had such samples. Info and Since the village of Ahem is under control of Royalists and UHYOM Investigation had no contact with them it will be very difficult for this incident to be investigated, (Report from the A/Commander on 11 July). 4» Contact •with the Royalists When visiting Najran on 16/17 June the Commander received a letter from the 'Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Yemen' in which he complained about the action of the UAR and of Yemeni troops and welcomes the UN Mission, stating at the same time that "no one will attack or do anything against you or the UN personnel 'either on the border or inside the country itself". (Quotation from unofficial translation). On 26 June the Commander was instructed from New York that he should not acknowledge the letter since there were "legal and political reasons for ignoring it". Since then there was no more contact with the Royalists in Yemen. 5. British Incident A party of about t$o dozen British servicemen stationed in Aden inadvertently crossed the southern Yemeni border and were attacked by Yemeni, tribesmen. Five were said to be killed and the others were turned over to the Yemeni authorities by the capturing tribesmen. After several days of diplomatic talks, especially through the US Mission in Yemen, the prisoners were released and returned to Aden. The UN Mission was not part of the incident except for a personal plea made to President SaTOal by the Commander (this was reported on 28 June by the Commander for information, "realising fully that it was not within my terms of reference"). 6, Difficulty in Liaison with Yemeni Authorities On 2B June the Commander reported UNYOM was having trouble in establishing direct liaison with Yemeni authorities due to the fact that the UAR insisted upon making all arrangements and demanding that the UN should conduct "business with Yemeni authorities only through UAR Liaison Office, even regarding matters which concerned only Yemenis and ourselves". On 28 June the Commander was informed that the UAR Mission in New York would be approached accordingly. On 30 June the Yemeni Foreign Minister informed the Commander that a Liaison Office was established in the Ministry to handle UNYCM/Yemeni affairs. On 4 July, however, the Commander was again informed by telephone that he would have to use UAR Forces Liaison HQ in Sana for any contact with Yemeni authorities. On 7 July the Commander was asked by New York to try to "convince them of desirability of having separate liaison with UNYOM". If this proved impossible in a reasonable time he should try to obtain an agreement by which a liaison office would be established under Yemeni authorities having a permanent observer of the UAR Command 7. Support of Royalists by Saudi Arabia Complain~Vt On 2? June General Anwar Al Kadi wrote a letter to the Commander in which he complained about - (a) Infiltration and smuggling ammunition through Yemen borders by Saudi Arabian Government (101 camels loaded with ammo and iveapons infiltrated through Qizan towards ¥ash-ha). (b) Wireless stations at Qizan and Najran still operating for the benefit of Royalists. (c) Broadcasting station of Imman El Badr has not yet stopped propaganda, Info and On 6 July the A/Commander informed he had visited the village of Marib

Investigation where the local UAR Commander and the Yemeni Governor of Marib stated that "infiltration via Baihan continued". It was stated also that withdrawal of UAR forces from the area would result in immediate occupation of Marib by Royalist forces. On 10 July the Saudi Arabian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs stated to the UWYOM LO Jedda that there was "no base whatsoever for the UAR allegations" that 101 camels had crossed the border with ammo and weapons. 8. UAR Authorities do not cooperate with TO On 28 June the Commander was asked to contact the UAR Commander in Yemen and ask him for a latest timetable which they had in mind for disengagement. On 6 July the A/Commander informed that there was "still no indication of UAR phase-out schedule". On 12 July the A/Commander reported that "while UAR authorities are reluctant to give information on departing troops they resent any queries reference incoming forces". "While observing the departure of aircraft from Sana carrying UAR troops, the UN officer was asked to leave the area. On 12 July the A/Commander was informed that New York HQ would contact UAR Mission on the subject. DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND CONFIDENTIAL SECURITY COUNCIL AFFAIRS

5 December 1962

A NOTE PET THE REPERCUSSIONS OF TSE YEMENI REVOLT

Copy No. 1 5 December 1962

A EQT3 OH TES HEPjECUSSIXMS OF THE YEMENI REVOLT

1. The Army coup d*e*tat in Yemen was staged last September to end the

monarchical regime and introduce social reforms. It has now developed into

a civil war in which republican forces led by Brigadier Al-Sallal are contending

against the forces loyal to the deposed Iniam Al-Badr. The further result has been to deepen the rift within the Arab world. For, on tne one hand, the

U.A.R. Government stands fully committed to support the revolutionary govern-

ment of Brigadier Al-Sallal and, on the other, Saudi Arabia and Jordan are

backing the monarchist regime of Imam Muhammad Al-Badr. These rapid developments

in the Yemeni situation have been talcing place at a time vmen tne efficacy

of the Arab League as an agency of conciliation has been consideraoly reduced

owing to tne boycott of tne U.A.R. of its sessions. 2. Revolutionary social change is already overdue in Yemem. It has time

and again been checked by the old Imam. The radicals have now made their influence effective. They believe that the Yemeni Army, as else-^here in the

Arab world, can be the instrument of change; nevertheless, the recent develop-

ments in Yemen leave no doubt that, were it not for the prompt U.A.R. military

help, the Republicans could not have scored their initial success. The main

functions of the Yemeni Army has always been in the past to coerce the tribes,

and therefore its role to "bring about social changes in a medieval society

remains to be seen. - 2 -

3. Support for the Republicans is thought to be concentrated in the towns * of Sana, Hodeida and Taiz, where people were oppressed under the royal regime and fear its return. The Shafai sect in the south and southeast, who have resented the dominance of the more numerous and warlike Yeaidis of the north- west, are also counted among the supporters of the Republicans. 4« The Royalist forces led by Imam Al-Badr include some of his guards and a number of officers and men who have deserted from the regular army. They are supplemented by mountain tribesmen of the Zeidi sect. The Royalist troops are broken up into guerrilla groups according to their tribal divisions. 5. The civil war in Yemen has changed the structure of alignments in the Arab world and introduced for the first time the issue of "Repuolicanism" versus "Monarchism" as an element in inter-Arab States relations. The monarchical States (Libya, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia) have withheld recognition from the new Yemeni Government. All Arab States with republican regimes have recognized the new government. 6. Whatever their original intentions, tne revolutionary regime in Yemen has found it necessary to look to the United Arab Republic for support. In the first place, the Republicans can achieve little by themselves. U.A.R. military help is indispensable to put down the resistance of the various trices loyal to Imam Al-Badr. U.A.R. support was at first cased on the Jaddah Pact -' now replaced oy the defence pact with the Yemeni Republic (10 November 1962).

I/The Jaddah Pact was signed by Egypt, Yemen and Saudi Arabia on 22 April 1956* Its provisions ask that these countries use all available means, including armed forces, to aid any of the signatories attacked. - 3 -

The pact provides that both States regard any armed aggression against either as an aggression against both. It also stipulates the establishment of a supreme war council. Other steps to bolster the position of the Republicans

include air and naval support. The number of U.A.R. troops in Yemen is

estimated at 109000 men. The Egyptians have also established a new Yemeni broadcasting station in Sana and provided the new regime with many experts. 7. The Saudi Arabian and Jordanian Governments have committed themselves to re-establish the authority of Imam Al-Badr. They regard his government as still the legitimate one representing all the Yemeni people. They have stated that, if the "U.A.R.'s interference in Yemen continues, they will be prepared to fulfil their obligations and extend full military help to the Royalists". So far as can be established, their assistance to Imam Al-Badr has included arms, money and a number of military technicians. They have, however, constantly denied the presence of their own troops with the Imam's forces. 6. As to the relations between Saudi Arabia and the Republican regime in Yemen, there had been continuous threats by both sides to carry the war into the other*s territory should it continue to rely on outside help. Dr. Al-Bydani, the Vice-President of the Yemeni Republic, stated on 10 October, that, because the Saudi Arabian Government has concentrated its forces on the Yemeni border and has begun to smuggle arms into Yemen, the "Yemeni Government is compelled to consider itself in a state of war with Saudi Arabia". TASS Hews Agency reported on 11 October that the Government of Yemen had "declared war" on Saudi Arabia. However, there has been no official statement on the part of the Saudi authorities with regard to this alleged Yemeni declaration of war. - 4 -

"9 . Another immediate result of tJae Yemeni situation has also "been the breaking off on 6 November of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic. The Saudis took this step in response to alleged

Egyptian air attacks on Saudi territories on 2 and 3 November. These attacks were presumably related to threats made by Yemeni Republican leaders that

Yemen would carry the war into Saudi Arabia if the Saudis were to send troops across the border.

10. The Syrian Arab Republic took the view that the new Yemeni regime should be given a chance to prove itself and that no outside interference is to be permitted. President El-Koudssy of Syria has appealed for a hands-off policy on Yemen and suggested that all Arab States not involved in the dispute find an immediate solution to end the Yemeni crisis. The Tunisian proposal to send joint Arab forces to Yemen in order to protect the Republican regime seems to have run into many difficulties. On its part, the Iraqi Government has made it clear that no "foreign" elements should interfere in the affairs of Yemen.

Lebanon, while recognizing the Republican regime in Yemen, has stood aside in the present conflict. 13-. There is no doubt also that the developments in Yemen have created a new situation facing the Western Powers in a highly strategic and important area.

On their part, the communist countries have declared their support of the

Republican regime and extended to it their diplomatic recognition. The only major Western Power which has recognized the Repuolicans is West Germany. As to the United States and the United Kingdom, it seems that tneir delay in - 5 - recognition awaits further clarification in- the internal situation in Yemen itself. The U.S. press has been preparing the groundwork for sucn recognition, provided certain conditions are met by the Republicans. What is of immediate concern to the United States Government is its relations with Saudi Arabia and the future of its oil concessions there. On the other hand, there is a growing belief in the United States Government that Prince Faisal of Saudi Arabia, who recently formed a new Cabinet, should be encouraged to carry out social and political reforms in his country, and that no outside attempts - presumably coming from the Yemeni Republicans or the United Arab Republic - should be allowed to overthrow his regime. The Americans seem also to be seeking a formula on which their recognition of the Republicans can be based. Such a formula would probably envisage the settlement of the Yemeni conflict on the basis of the withdrawal of the U.A.R. forces from Yemen and the withdrawal of support to the Royalists by Saudi Arabia and Jordan. It also appears that the

United States Government is anxious not to commit itself to reactionary regimes in the Middle East.

13. It would seem probable that peace in the area can only be safeguarded by securing an end to the present civil war in Yemen, together with the with- drawal of all foreign troops, to be followed by a period of conciliation aiming at guaranteeing the future of the Republican regime. If such guarantees could be obtained, the United Arab Republic might find it in the best of its interests to withdraw its troops before the Yemeni situation becomes too heavy a liability.

The U.A.R. commitment to the Republican regime was made at a time when it was assumed that the Imam had been killed; a long guerrilla war was hardly espected, - 6 -

As for Jordan, the support given to tiie Imam is unpopular vd.th.in the country, and if continued would further weaken the shaky throne of Jordan itself. The

Saudi Arabian Government, in a statement of 14 November, called for the evacuation of all foreign forces and armies in Yemen under neutral international supervision.

15. Consequently, the elements appear to esist for a peaceful liquidation of the situation. Since the Arao League is itself at the present the scene of dissension, the Arab countries may come to the conclusion that their interests would 'be served "by invoking the General Assembly resolution of 21 July 195° which is still regarded as in force. Nevertheless, despite frequent references by the Yemeni Republicans and Dy tiie Royalists regarding the suomission of the question to the Security Council, the general desire is first to esaaust the good offices of certain Arab States not directly involved in the dispute. "(r

NAUOIvTS TECHNICAL ASSISGMCE BOA!®

Beport fcjjr B,F, on his Visit to Yemen £rom 7 to 15 4pril 1963 Relative to the 1963 -61j. ITnited nations Programmes of feehnieal Assistance + • {FH?st Part)

*

OFFICE OF !MB * IN !tHB uwijim» AR|B KEHJBLIC GA:mo, 25 APBH, 1963 SEPORg .

Contents

Chapter Covering letter to the $4B Executive Chairman 1, Qeographis and Historical Background 1 2, ike Civil Wai? and afterwards..., 3 3, Some Explanations of the Royalist lefeat 5 lu Hatiiral Hesources 6 '5* Finances ? 6. temen First Constitution 7 7* Critical problems 8 8. tJrgent Meeds 9 9. Hew faces aM Plans 10 to, Foreign Aid 11 11. Technical Assistance from the United Hat ions 13 12* ^e Foreseeable Future 15

I. a» presidential Council U.fUe Executive Oouncdl COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

25 April 1963

To: The Secretary-General

Attached paper on the Observer Group for Yemen for your perusal.

Indar

Ralph has seen it. SG 29/4 Jose" COWIDMTIAL 27 April 1963 York

Bear $&?« Owen, Report OJB Yemen (gjbpgfe Fart) Complying with your instructions,, I accepted the Invitation ^tended to me by the President of the Republic and I travelled to Sana' a* the national coital of Yemena via Adeils on Sunday 7 Aprils aceaa^anied by Dr. H.I. Haufflij, Director of the Cairo restitute of Public Actoinistration and Adviser appointed by the Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations to the Gwemaeat of Yemeni Mr. Jan Sraidj, Birector of UNESCO Kiddle East Science Co-operation Office! syrtd Mr. Abdullah Aly Harean^ mioff ic3al of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs^ who has been appointed Head of the Co-ordiaatiug Office for feehn3«al Assistance said was a former tJH Fellow. I returned to Cairo on Itarsdggr 18 April* As indicated in ngr letter of 20 April* I have prepared a 'General Eeport1 on present social and economic conditions in Teraen^ td£h Some suggestions foe* action. 1 am pleased in enclosing that HeportA with & copy that yoii jai^ht consider useful to bring to the attention of the Secretary General. 5his Heport will be followed immediatlely by a Comprehensive Beport on the technical assistance that 1&e Oovemment is requiring from the As sal interim measure., I shall ask you for the approval of a aupplesnenfcary programme for Yejnen during 3563«61t5 in the vicinity of TSB |150,000. With best regards. lours sincerely;, Mr, David Owen* Executive Chairman, UIvf'BB^ B.F. Osoria-Tafall Kew Xork. Eesident Eepresentative of the United Nations Technical Assistance Board REPORT OM YEMEN (HRST

1» Geographical and Historical Background

Until proclaim tion of the Republicr In September 1962, Yemen was official! known as the Motuakkliyyah Kingdom of Yemen. -low the official title of the country is the Arab Republic of Yemen* Situated! in the southern part of the Arabian peninsula, the so-called. nBree Yemen" covers an area of 75,000 square miles. There is a traditional claim to 112,000 square miles of territory called "Occupied Yemen" consisting of the &ejen Colony and the Aden Protectorate, not* integrated in the Federation of Southern Arabia, The population of "Sree Yemen" is about U| million, and near to l| million live in "Occupied Yemen11 . The national capital is Sam »a, with an estimated population of 60,000 people. The former capital, where most of the European diplomatic missions are stationed, is Taiz with 30,000 inhabitants. The port of Hodeida on the Red Sea has also about 30,000 people. All Yemeni are Arabs* There were about 50,000 Jews in Yemen who emigrated to Palestine in 1950. Yemen was a monarchy tightly ruled by its "lawful and spiritual leader" . . the Imam Ahmad, father of the last Imam Mohammad el-Badr. The Sfjnam Ahmad, claimed to be the 66th Imam of the Bashemyyah Bynasty, founded 1101 years ago by al-Imam Al iadi Ila al-Haq Yehya ben al Hossaid ben al-Qasem, 7tjh son of al-flroaia Ali benAbi faleb, the prophet Mohammad's cousin and son-in~!attt Ahmad »s predecessor and father was the Imam Yah§a ben Mo&aMssd Hamid al-Birii who reigned from 190U to 19^8, The Imam Yehya was the actual architect of- the Yemen recent independence, when be initiated in 190lt a rebellion against the military occupation by the Ottoman Empire* Yemen was finally liberated from the Turkish arngr in 1918 at the end of tha First ¥orld ¥ar. Accordi ng to the Imanate system in Yemen, the Imam is to be elected by the Council of the "U3a*maw, a Council integrated by the learoeds and notables of the country. The Imam to be elected has to inset fourteen requirements and must belong to the Zeidites sect. An absolute power was concentrated in the hands of the Imam whose position was enhanced by tha fact that while being recognized ruler (King) of all Yemen, he was at the same time the spiritual head of the most influential Islamic seet^ the Zeidites. There was no check over the undisputed power of the King, fhe Um*ma or Council of Advisers met only when convened by the Imam and deliberated exclusively on matters submitted by him. This Council consisted solely of learned men, belonging also to the Zeidite sect; hence it represented only a part of the community and included the most traditional and conservative group. Opposed to the Zeidites which account for 55 per cent of the total '.••-• ' •* 2 -

: £ are the Shafi'ites, Orthodox Moslems who constitute Uo oer cent. population^/ The other 5 per cent belongs to other religious sects, of which the most important is the Ishmaelite. the differences between these religious tendencies of the Islamic religion is in its effects on the State. Only the Zeidites recognized the Imam simultaneously as political and religious leader, but not the Shafi'ites and the Ishmaelites, who saw in him the Chief of the State but not the religious head. In contrast to the 2eidite interpretation, the other Islamic sects denied to the Iraam tte right to interpret or to change religious laws, The Iisaaate maintained a rigid social classification. First caiie the forming the upper class or aristocracy. They claimed to be descendants of Ali, the prophet's son-in-law and they therefore belong to those Mohammedan Yemenis who, according to the Zeidite interpretation, alone have the right to occupy the highest positions in the country". A Zeidite believes himself entitled to an exceptional position with special honours . During the past regime, all principal positions in the Government were occupied by Zeidites, many of whom acquired great wealth as representatives of a traditional class of feudal masters. After the Zeidites come the tribesmen grouped in many tribes, still strong politically and socially. Bach tribe is actually a small nation with its own names9 customs, territories, gracing lands, markets, alliances, etc,, under Sheikhs who owed allegiance to the Imam and sent him hostages (customa- rily their children) as a guarantee of that allegiance. The third group includes the merchants, the majority residing in the towns and engaged in commercial activities. As a rule the tradesmanship is passed on from father to son. She peasants who used to work on a wage basis for the landlords are numerous and compose the fourth class. They live in very poor conditions and were not held in very high esteem by their employers or by the tribesmen. During the Imamate, some slaves were still left in Yemen and they were highly valued by thsir owners who placed considerable trust in them* The abolition of the slavery was one of the first measures to be adopted by the Eepubliean regime* Finally there are the Akhdan. This name indicates "servants". They are a mixed group of Abyssinian-Arab origin* In Yemen, as in Central Arabia , the amputation of hands and the severing of heads was the normal procedure of justice. The Revolution of February 19hB during which the Imam Yehia was killed was organized and led by the so-called "progressive Yemenis", whose activities were centred^ in. Aden* His son and successor, the Imam Ahmed, removed his residence to faiz. This led to some decline in the influence of the Zeidites^ the intransigent conservative element from the north of the country, and increased the role of the Shafi'ites, a branch of Sunnis or Orthodox Moslems, as mainly its followers are among the inhabitants of Southern Yemen and are much less conservative* Although the way in which the Republican Government will deal with the social system of caste stratification and with the various religious sects remains to be seen, this constitutes a serious problem if a national unit and a feeling of duty to the country are to be established. Be that as it nay, the fact is that the September 1962 Revolution which proclaimed the BepubHc although led by a Zeidite, the then Colonel Abdulla El Sallal, was engineered and executed by people from Southern Yemen in co-operation with outstanding immigrants, thus indicating a modern and liberal approach in conducting State business. Buridg the regime of the Imam Ahmad, a number of legations were established ;in Yemen, It was symptomatic that the residence of the European and the USA Diplomatic envoys was in faiz, the residence of the Imam, while the representatives of the Arab countries (Saudi Arabia, UAR and Iran) were in Sana*a*

fhe CiTil War and afterwards > I left Sana'a on the morning of Monday 15 April, after a week's stay, the prevalent atmosphere was one of guarded optimism. According to reports from Cairo, the :£ven months of civil war was approaching its end, once Saudi Arabia and U&R had agreed to wind up the support which they had been giving to the royalists and the republicans respectively. This news, incessantly repeated by Eadio Sana 'a, was confirmed by an official broadcast from Hadio Mecca, informing that the Saudi Arabian Government "has agreed to a suggested solution made by mediators...." on the basis of "the establish- ment of a UM Commission to supervise and implement tLe agreement" aimed at "preventing outside interference in Yemenis internal affairs" . With this statement ths Saudi Arabian Government admitted, for the first time, that it was taking part in the straggle. Yemen Government officials confirmed that the UAR was prepared to withdraw its military contingent (sometimes aaid to be 30,000 men strong) leaving behind only security and specialized units and training missions. However, if subsequent events demonstrate the good will of both intervening powers to disengage in the Saudi Arabia-Yemen border which is to be supervised (by TO observers) to prevent infiltration, a very sensitive thorn of conflict still remains - the frontier between Yemen and the new Federation of Southern Arabia (Aden and the Western part of the Aden protecto- rate) a territory which the Yemenites insist on calling occupied Yemen« It seems that only the resumption of diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and Yemen will lead to the normalisation of conditions along the border between the Southern Arabia Federation and the Yemen Arab Republic. it the time' of the writer's departure j> signs of tte U&E military evacuation were visible in Sana'a, the national capital, particularly at the military airport (practically managed by Egyptians) and also at the new harbour of Hodeida where a large group of Soviet Union technicians (perhaps 200) were assigned to maintain and repair waff material. But the victory proved to be more expensive than the forecast have indicated* The deposed Imam, fugitive from his capital, had fled from the country and sought refuge in Saudi Arabia. Soon after his re-apparition in Saudi A^feife^s, a strong bid for a restoration of the monarchy was made and waves of Saudi Arabian supported royalist tribesmen began to recapture border towns and valleys, tFAR troops began to land in Yemen in answer to an appeal by the new Republican Government for protection against "Saudi Arabian aggression". It was not an easy task for the t&R to despatch to Yeiren an army, with all supporting services, of the magnitude which eventually was committed to help the Republican regime. In spite of its tremendous Superiority in men and war material^ very inany difficulties were met, and heavy losses were suffered as well as a substantial number of casualties. Although it was said that the morale of the Egyptian troops was low and that their relations with the Yemeni population were far from being satisfactory, there is no evidence to support that contention* It has been also published that the weight of tbs military operation fell on the Egyptian army with very little, if any, participation of the Yemeni republican soldiers* Those statements are not substantiated by the facts. On the contrary, the Yemeni regular army proved itself excellent in guerilla warfare. It is true, however, that the Yemeni Republican forces were supported by the CAR Aviation, tanks and artillery with a superiority of men and material, such that the poorly armed and disorganized tribal forces were not a match, despite their knowledge of the terrain, large sealed hostilities had ceased by the end of Hamadan in Inarch, after the launching by the US.R troops of what appeared to be the final offensive to liquidate royalists po^dsof resistance.

*./. 5 *• 5 •*

fh© evidence points out the fact that a military decision, favourable to the Republic^ has been already reached. The republican forces have already sealed the frontier with Saudi Arabia, making practically impossible foreign assistance to the various enclaves of royalist resistance still existent,particularly in the region of Hajja. Egyptian troops are expected to begin a phased -withdrawal if plans to terminate the seven months civil war are to materialize.

3. Sam explamtion of the royalist defeat I feel that whatever loyalty the deposed Imam commanded among tribesmen, the assistance of the warlike tribes raver was either warm or strong during the few days he was ruler of Yemen and much less at tte beginning of the civil war, when the S&publican forces were still too weak to impose authority among all the population* f This lack of support tjb the new Imam by the tribes contrasted with that received by both his fatter, the Imam Ahmad and his g randfather, the Imam Tehya. Both were also confronted with internal rebellions, and the two, efficiently helped by loyal tribesmen, were able to defeat the rebels. In the writer's opinion, the reasons for such a behaviour are two-folds First, the Imam Ahmad who died in September 1962 and was the father of the last King Mohammad al-Badr, committed the mistake, a few years ago, of proclaiming his eldest son GrowB Prince of Yemen, without consulting the Council of the "Um'ma", thus imposing his son as the future King. That was an infringement, the first in several centuries, of the traditional law and a violation of the spirit of full democracy and justice as proclaimed in ttal-Kuran" and ttas-Sonnah" j and secondly, when the death of Imam Ahmad was announcedj the Crown Prince proclaimed himself Imam and King, that is spiritual leader and temporal ruler. On such a solemn occasion the Council of the "Um'ma" was not consulted. By this attitude, the self-proclaimed Imam antagonized the most influential sheiks, who declared themselves free of allegiance to the Imam* It is almost sure that - in a normal situation - the Council of the "Uitt'ma" would elect as a new Imam the Prince Hassan, former Permanent Delegate of Yemen to the United Nations, whose popiarity was far greater than that of the Crown Prince* U. ifetxo&l Resources Yemen is a predominantly agricultural country. The ample variation in climate^ soils and topography allow for the cultivation of a large variety of crops. Total acreage of crops is estimated at about 2 per cent of the area of the country} the rest being largely semi-arid grazing land with areas well suited for extensive livestock rearing and production* Moat agriculture is practised on a subsistence basis} with the surpluses over the food needs being sold to meet expenses. Out of an estimated population of about lt| million people only one quarter of a million live in towns, i.e. Yemen is dondnantly rural. The percentage of the population engaged in agriculture is certainly not less than 90 per cent* It appears that with tie exception of the hot coastal plain known ae the Tihama, most of the arable land is presently under cultivation. Cultivation of the land shows a relatively high degree of skills in terracing and irrigation works. Usarly the whole population is settledj there are very few nomadic tribes and those that exist are practically confined to the eastern desert part of the country. The insufficiency of cultivable land is becoming a problem, creating under-employment and unemployment. Tflhenever work is offered, the supply of manpower exceeds the denand. Since the time of Turkish occupation many Yemenis were compelled to leave their home land and to go abroad for religious, political or economic reasons. Everywhere these industrious intelligent people encountered work so that in all cities bordering the Red Sea thousands of Yemenis are to be found. It is estimated that about half a million Yemenis are living in the Federation of Souttern Arabia and in Saudi Arabia« Jfeny are settled in ffekistan, in Egypt and as far afieM as Indonesia. In Iferseilles, Singapore and Cardiff, there are quarters of these cities exclusively inhabited by Yemenis. The mining resources of Yenen have never been properly prospected. There is a huge deposit of rock salt in Salif , on the Red Sea coast, under exploitation. Coal and shale bituminous deposits are known to exist in the region of Sana'a. A USA enterprise, the American EB.com Company, is drilling for oil in the Coastal Plain north of Modeida. A mining expert sent in 1953-55 by the United Nations, identified deposits of gold, iron, copper,manganese, lead etc.j but apparently of only minor importance. It can hardly be said that industry exists in Yemen, beyond small electricity plants, tanneries, modest repair shops and textile nails. There is a rather primitive handicraft work in towns and villages. Goldsmith and Silversmith were famous in the past, but since the emigration of the jews, the quality of the craft has deteriorated. - 7 -

5. finances A decree was issued on 9 April calling for the preparation of the State budget. The various Ministries have been requested to produce estimates. This is the first time in the history of the country that a budget is being prepared. The Government has announced its intention to replace the Maria- Theresa tEaler^ the silver dollar circulating in Yemen, by a new coin of equivalasb value to be called Baksha» The new coin is expected to come into circulation shortly and gradually replace the old currency. It has also been proposed to organise a Central bank of Yemen, which •will issue Yemeni banknotes. The Maria-fheresa thaler was brought to Yemen at the end of the 18th century by European traders and is to this day minted with the bust of the Austrian Empress Jdaria-Theresa and the unchanged date of 1780. Its value has risen wi%h the price of silver to about 7 shillings («= US |l). SSfo other money ;is presently accepted in Yemen. All attempts made in the past to introduce new coinage nst with opposition. The decision of the Government to issue new coins and paper money, if and when implemented, will serve as a test to the resistance of the people to change its traditional currency.

6. Yemeil Provisional Constitution On Saturday 13 April, the President of the Arab Republic of Yenen, Field Ifershajl Abdullah El Sallal, proclaimed the Provisional Constitution of the State. The ceremony was held at tha Independence Square in Sana, 'a at 10.00 in the smorning, and was attended by the members of the Revolutionary Command Council, Ministers, the Representative of the Suprems Council of Sheiks, tribal chieftains, diplomatic envoys and a great number of citizens. The writer, as well as all UU experts in Sana'a, were also present at the ceremony. Resident Sallal declared that the Provisional Constitutions, tie first ever to be granted to the Yerreni people, will guide the country during the transitional period, until the Yemeni people freely express their will in approving a permanent constitution. The Provisional Constitution has been drafted, reviewed and approved by the National Council of Yemen Revolutionary Command, under the chairman- ship of President El Sallal, It contains 60 Articles. In its preamble, the Provisional Constitution states that Yemen is an Arab independent republic, part of the Arab nation, and that the Yemen people are the source of all power and 3Tslam the eountry»s religion, Salienb features of the document ares social solidarity will be the backbone of Yemeni societyj the State will guarantee freedom, security and equality of opportunity for all citiaensj the national economy -would be based on proper planning according to principles of social justice; and private economic activities will be free, provided that their ultimate goal is the social welfare* Full guarantees are given to private enterprises. There will be no nationaliza- tion of private property, except in case of general interest. All citizens are equal before the law, and no-one will be punished for offenses except after due process of law. The administration of justice will be independent and free from State interference* Personal liberties are assured within the limits of the law* fhe State is pledged to provide free national health and education services for all citizens. The Presidential Council iS the Supreme Body of the State. It will decide the general policy in all fields of public life. The Constitution organizes tte Highest Authority of the State, adopts the principle of collective leadership and provides for the people»0 participation in the Government. The proclamation of the Provisional Constitution is to be followed by a reshuffle of the cabinet, because various Ministers had been appointed to the Eepublie Presidential Council integrated by 18 members. Annex I lists the 18 members of the Presidential Council. On 26 April President Abdullah El Sallal designated an Executive Council, to replace the formsr Cabinet of Ministers. Annex II gives the Hat of the new Executive Council, integrated by a Chairman and 12 Ministers. Under another Presidential Decree a new Central Committee for Tribal Affairs has been formed.

7. Critical Problems President Sallal and all Hinisters are overwhelmed by petitions (a custom inherited from the old regime) scribbled on a scrap of paper by tribesmen* A Government official has said that this is a system of the feudal past but awe have to keep it for the present", fhe time actually left for constructive work by the President and his close collaborators is really very short. Here again we met with one of tbs difficult tasks for inducing the Temenites to change their ways. The Government, despite the great number of advisers from every quarter, is trying almost desperately to get its economic and political bearings. Confusion prevails because the advice is not always free of strings and more often than not there is contradictory advice provided by the various sources. The deep rooted habit of chewing the Stimulant tender leaves of Kat is one of the main problems that the Government will have to confront, one day or another, if it decides to increase the productivity of the labour force. Kat is a ahrub which, due to high revenues, is gradually replacing coffee. The leaves are chewed and stored by the Yemenis in a bulging cheek so that they look as if they have a ping-pong ball in their mouth. According to the present Ministers , "chewing Kat will end when we end unemployment" , problems of over-population and unemployment must be confronted by the new Government, An amasing spectacle is the hundreds of young people walking idle in the streets, during working hours, in the main towns of Sam 'a, Eais and Hodeida, It has been indicated elsewhere in the report that due to the shortage of cultivable land and precarious development of small industries, the Yemenites are forced to immigrate. If the Government wishes to reverse the trend, the institution of a sound programme of public works has to be initiated at once. Otherwise the hopes raised in the new generation by ths Republican Regime will fade. Something has to be done and done soon in that field. The programmes of aid already initiated by the USSR and the US/AID can contribute to the improvement of present conditions. She -writer has been told by foreign diplomats and experts of the exceptional mechanical ability of the Yemenites in maintaining and repairing heavy equipment, such as trucks, bulldozers, etc., utilised in road building. The Yemenis are ingenuous and resourceful and assimilate very soon that type of knowledge, A most striking factor is Yemgn is the low level of illiteracy. According to reliable estimates only aorae 20 par cent of ths male population are unable to write and read, this is due to a wide spread network of Koranic Schools, in addition to the Government Schools. But the education given in these Koranic Schools is one-sided, because it is limited to the teaching of Arabic, the Koran, and Islamic law. Hot even rudimentary elements of arithmetic are .included in the curriculum. Concerning women, with the exception of Government Girls Schools in Sana 'a, the only education received by girls in Yemen is at their homes* Although the data is not reliable, the writer was told that presently there are about 300 Yemeni students abroad. 8» Urgent Jfeeda Until the finances of the country are put in order, a sound tax system adopted, and an efficient customs administration organised, it is unlikely

../.10 * 10 that the new Oovsmment can spend in development; any substantial amount. She -almost seven, months of civil war contributed to the exhaustion of the treasury (on the assumption that the deposed Imam left a treasury about the Magnitude of which the most fantastic tales are circulated) and dislocated the traditional, but operating system of tax collection, It seems that in spite of the confiscation of the property of tha Royalists, the State's revenues are insufficient to cover even the modest needs of the Government's mfhinery. Outright grants from friendly countries are the only isay of meeting expenditures. Nevertheless, most of the revenue has been devoted to raising salaries, enlarging the national army, and starting public works in order to reduce uneraployraent* After the first few euphoric months of the Bevolution, the Government realized the ^possibility of affording big expenditures and salaries have since been curtailed, pLin obstacle to a balanced development of the country is the absence of a public administration, in the modern sense of this term. One of the most urgent needs iif the organization of a skeleton modern civil service. Former Yemenis graduated from the Cairo Institute of Public Administra- tion and from the Arab Stages Training Centre for Education in Community Development (ASH5C) can provide a basis for such organization. The Government of Yemen has requested for jfcbe organisation of its machinery the assistance of the UN Bureau of Technical Assistance Operations which has appointed Br. M.T, Bamsi (at present fin Sana'a), Qireetor of the Cairo Institute of Public Administration. She) same type of aid has been requested from the US/AID and an expert in Public Administration is not? in Taisj and recently, a UAR mission was sent to Sana 'a :&iso to advise on organ! zation and methods. This is an illustration of a triple* request as referred to latei?,

9. HQW .l&ces and Plans It is encouraging tt| see a great many young people in charge of responsible positions in thfe Republican Government. Among my new acquaintances the following are illustrative* Mr. Mustafa Yacoob^ Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Charge d'Affaires in Gaechoslovakiaj Mr. All Mbbamed" Abdou, Deputy Minister of Agriculture, an agronomic engineer from the University of Gairoj Ur. Ahmed Al-Mouhanni, Director of Health and graduated from Tulane University in Louisiana. I found everywhere a genuine desire to achieve a high standard of development and to improve the socio-economic conditions. Un- fortunately I failed to see agreement as to the plans and means necessary to attain the desiref objectives* The Government has not even the frame or the foundation of a development plan*

+ In the reorganization of the Executive Council / •,-, both Messrs* Taeoob and Abdou were designated * Minister of Foreign Affairs and Agriculture respectively. -11 -

-a- dcvclgpffignt plenT In the beginning of the new regime, when Dr. Abdel Rahman El Beidani, an economist trained at the University of Bonn was Deputy Prims Minister, the organization of a High Economic Council was decided upon. That Council was to have the function of drafting a national economic policy and of super- vising the execution of economic plans for the rational use of the country's natural resources and human energies. Unfortunately it is still on paper, Br. El Beidani Completed the preparatory work for the drafting of a tiro-year development plan to attend primarily to the most urgent needs. (By the way, Br» Beidani, a Yemeni born in Cairo and brother-in-law of a prominent UAR politician, is supposed to be the man who convinced President Sfesser to send the UAE troops to Yemen to support the Revolution.) The promising political star of Dr» Beidani suffered an eclipse and he left Yemen, being now a ^forced" resident of Cairo. Although last December, Dr. Beidani said "We are going to change everything and we are starting from zero", no plans were completed and most of the development projects are selected, and requests made simultaneously to every possible source ;of foreign assistance, in the nost haphaaard way. The writer has already discovered a number of cases of duplication and at least one of triplication.

10. Foreign A id During the regime of Imam Ahmed a substantial number of foreign Medical Doctors were working in Yemen. Some mining prospecting missions were allowed to enter the country and engage in research, and a number of foreign experts some of them supplied by the United Hfetions were engaged. An agreement with the United Nations for the provision of technical assistance was signed on 26 July 1956 and another with the USA/ICA.. This agreement has been brought up-to-date and ratified on lU April 1963. (The UN agreement) With Soviet plans and equipment and technicians a modern harbour at Hodeida capable to berth ships up to 10,000 tons was constructed, while the lopleis Republic of China terminated the 225 km;pa

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U&Rt A good guess is that about 300 UAR specialists advise the Government in general planning., broadcast services, telephonic and tele- graphic exchanges, civil aviation etc. A substantial group of T3&R advisers is dj&ectly attached to President El Sallal. To advise the Ministry of Agriculture, there are nine UAR specialists in agronomy, plant protection and agricultural credit. An agreement has been signed by ths Arab Republic o£ Yemen and the UAR, whereby the latter will, for the present time', handle ths marketing of Yemeni products abroad, The UAR will send a delegation composed of trade, customs, economic and financial experts, to plan sound principles for the establishment of the Yemen Government machinery and to handle economic and commercial affairs* Another UAfi mission composed of eight specialists, led by El Sayed Ahmed Fathy Rifaat, Deputy Director of the UAR State Personnel, is in Sana'a helping to organize the administration and auditing system* Their task will take one year. The mission*s members were seconded from the Personnel Department to State Audit Department and the Ministry of Treasury. Twenty-nine UA.R Doctors (two medical advisers, fifteen practitioners and twelve specialists) are working in the Sana'a, Hodeida and Taia hospitals. Ten advisers are assigned to ths Mnistrypf Education in Sana'a. It is estimated that about 260 teachers from the UAHrpresently in Yemen; the majority are teaching in elementary schools, Ujj&s The USA. are heavily engaged in ths construction of the road Mokka-Taia-Sana »a. This is a macadamised road, the first section of which (Mbkka-Taia) has been completed. It will take about three mare years to finish the most difficult and longest section, from Taiz to Sana'a. This road will constitute an important highway because it will provide an outlet for the fertile lands of ths high plateau. The road will cross the old towns of Ibbj Yarin and Dhajtnar, the USA are completing the water supply of Taiz as well as several water projects in Heiifca and the Tihangt. Work has also been started in the lU km road from Sana'a to the capital airrort. The new Sana'a city will be built with that road as its main artery. USSR* A number of agreements have been signed between the Arab Republic of Yeznen and the USSR. These include provision for agricultural expertsj hydrogeological and electrical engineersi and specialists to establish a technical office to study development projects and formulate plans for implementation by the Government, with the assistance of the Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The reports on the presence in Yemen of about 800 Russian experts appears to be exaggerated. Reliable sources indicate that about 150 technicians from the USSR are in Hodeida. Some of them are assisting in the operation and maintenance of the harbour, but a large number of experts

*/.13 are preparing blueprints for an ambitious housing programme in Hodeida. It is said that the Soviet Union will contribute building materials, such as cement and iron, to this project. An estimated number of 200 technicians are in charge of repairing and maintaining military equipment. Federal Republic of Germany : The Federal Republic of Germany- has annoiinp a credit of D.H. 10 million {* |2.5 million) to help in irrigation works at the Tihama and in promoting vocational and technical education* Yugoslavia.? Yugoslavia announced aid to instal a cement plant and a textile factory* German Demperatic Republict An economic agreement was signed on 11 December between the Arab Republic of Yemen and the German Democratic Republic* This agreement provides for a credit to buy water pumps and agricultural implements. Repayment of the loan will be spread over five years, starting at the end of the first year of implementation of the agreement* Following signature of the agreement, 100 tractors were donated as a gift of the East German people. The Government has turned over these tractors to ;the recently established Yemen Bank for Reconstruction and Development / with instructions to organize an agricultural experimental farm in the vicinity of Sana'a to grow vegetables and fruit for the local market. Kuwait3 Kuwait has promised to establish schools and hospitals under the "Kuwait Development Fund". A Kuwaiti delegation, headed by El Sayed Badr o|t Khalid, Chairman of the Arab Gulf Assistance Committee, was in Sana la to discuss with the Government a programme of assistance. It is expected that Yemen will obtain a loan from Kuwait within a limit of 10 Hdllicto, dinars* . •"' -i .

11. Teehriical, Assistance from the United Ifettiona The scope for tectoical aid to Yemen is unlimited. But the institutional framework within which the technical assistance would have to work sets limitations to the type of assistance that could prove useful. The greatest need of Yemen in the writer's opinion is for OFEX type of experts, who would assume executive and operational functions as Heads of Departments or Institutions. Another urgent need is for "in-service training" , Fortunately the United Nations have been implen©nting,for the past few years, three important projects: UNESCO Teachers Training College $ FAQ Agricultural Education and WHO Health Centre and Training School. Expansion of these activities consolidating the good results so far achieved is in order. The writer is preparing an urgent request to the TAB Executive Chairman for a

../.lit in to t?S tl50j,O50A -shittl* constitutes a ainfsiuEU lite eriter does not ih'nk that ti'sy® le ime& scop© In Yss®n for experts? *Jhase activities Ijr s&dslsosrj* they® ia lardly a field in tib® Oovensasnt serricas the esElstlisg ajfspifmfeis woaM b© capable to ttaiisilat' © advice ard act

difficulty- s»6 unssmntfnsss of sstfe£tlr»g *>et» are «•;> tsehsical peraonjsel of aay kin^j, ®mp, auxiliary, In t»!se ed«n*.sy to Bs>lp its iTOpl^sr^nilBg. most of tte ra® pra^cts alraasfy in op@i®tlon* ^s ai@i stiimilBte andf'halp t!>3 in ae'^slsr-atisig education assl training pps^r a *?oeatiossal 'Xrat.nljng C-eutra* in saeh Iron woJt:s? electricity, ffel@ t^nild be as it to5-ia» 'tlsat tba Fedsyal F.epnblle of tferr^my is interested IB

to realise tfcsi tte al'mst «osplate absene© of sets Hsdtatienfflf to tis typs a-j tjse «usib0T of sxjsarte to t??f suspires, tfnl&ss tise n'?? ssepsrts as?s?,?sas> esseutix?® ^ or are elosseV folLls*®^ b? otbsr aK^ytfe4 wh-3 ?:

If ii is tyaa that 0sss^: excsH^nb srsgnlis feim basn obtained in t *f" ^Is^sentai t©sehssr£stf |^sietj.tloTierst it IB dlffioylt^ towsver, to 0f Mtl^ml pffiirs0nn&l 'by faraig^ 'eslpsrts up to a l^vel t-hst- of tfess «psrt§« F^fere this co«ld fee. attempt© ^ tfcgs tttsjssJajpd1 of ««tue®tta» of pablic servants ts^tild te-^ to b© TSlsetl, The ®§1©«ti^u $f fallow for atadtea abraadl i@ mt eas^ efes to thi loii? le-rel of tduewsMsm «.f tfe pr0^^efeive eimcft^atfei? « Hoi^tBr^ torn® goffi! results tea&& b©.©i?5 obtist*Jr>ed at the li^titi^te of l^'bilf Adislttistration in Ci55.ro s sjnd isa tfe 'kmfy stai-eis Ti^sl4n.i^ Centra i"er '^^usatioii la Co^sts.aity I^'SBlftpmari ?fo$r atoeets ia tsainiTSg T>»^nlt st t£e throe WJ projects la Sam j; W,o Agrio^ltwal Sd«cat,5Qn ant! '-;"po U

ifedfleetss tls nst^l for inta?$ftsis^ ih® fsssaber of TesssMs feller «eh-sfeKti«a^ and tfea fact tha.t sesst education m^t bs saeure^ at Isa outsiide Ye^srie Areordlnglj^ tbei*® Iss1 ^>0d scdjjs for in tte j^igMj^rcring eousferiaSjt ps'tieulairlj' T?A??~ th® rsore ©o sJ of T©sse« reeojpiiiass tli© bemf it of such a - 15 •

In that Scholarship progranss»a not only the UN Faintly s but tb© firab and tba bil®rt'.©5?al sources of tsfe rdeal assistance should ec writer has re&eived from tfee Mialstsfj of Foreign Affairs for the a«a*& of at least two fellowships to two numbers of that * follow atttdi&s in dipXoffi&cyj either at tfe Tastitut "niversitaiT© de Ffctntes St d«s IntemstiongleSji at GesBTa,, the CalmMs University Graduate gohoal of International Affairs in Hew Tork^ or !&rwrcl tlrdvarsity Centre for latermtlosial Affairs at Casforidgo^ Kassaclmsotts. Tbs possibility of eallstiug the assistasros of the Carnsgi© ^ndoiittaeat for Jnterr^tio^l which [email protected] pragramraEis for dlploaaey, ssteuld fee explored* fhe ^Pitaa? is eoswimed that better than spanning inonej and tins® in providing afMssrs with doubtful and resste results, tfce prissary msd of YesiiesR is assistaiKse in tbs ftormlation of a coraprefcenslva plan including jnaana of flnsKsing it, Such a plan eowlrl only be p'epsre^ by a survey ssission (for i&stsme® tey tJ», Intermtlortal Ban!t far B©construetion and EeveXspssat). ihe aiiasion coisM compile the scanty infonnatdon available includijjg stat^Btleal ^atas to stwdy tins actual au«i potential resotjrees of tbs and its eoa&felta&ional fra?«t^ork4 and then suggest tli© lines for ds^elsp and the |53i?i0a?iti®@ to be giimn to rattle «3ar projects, OR the basis of such a Surrey a sound programs® of testeicsl assistance could be drafted tewsss of refkraae© for tie eacpepfes#

Tire Foreseeable and political apathy go band in Ijajyf in In the witesr's opinion, tfe Hertrolution IBS besn aa Arab progs-sssiv© imyvemnt pra*3g*©$ by people from ths sotfcfi of tb5 countrjs with the bslp of politioal irefsgses abroad* I'ter© is imch reirolutionaiy fervour # but isosi of tba psopl® la Charge are young and inssperismceii . Fuptbsrmore, mnoir shades of opinion a#@ soticeabls* Saoh has t&'fee carefully blesided before policies can ei?Br^# slitera^i evsrp>n0 hopes that tte "Big Brpthsr" will ^o the Job, What bss iieldod the asu jregirae togsfb@r is a COSSSOP. figbfe against tie tfeocratic all its a certain miv©tj IB tsost of the Government believe tbst isarely b.y overthrowing tte sssnarchy tfeay «an sud«3aa3gr ^dtralBs ana tra;®fcfim fhs tyadltioaal social and political structures* It t^s«l<3 b0 necessary to lattiieli a series of far reaching and social •rBferm to elirulaat© inequity in. tfcs distribution of oTOrtj-? ignojsnee and disease, if YSBISS is to develop into a state* ?h» best hopes of the BSIS reglra© were in joining^ Federation of S@pt. Syria and Iraq, - 16-

It seems that President Sallal is not trying to force, in the foreseeable future, a conflict with the United Kingdom about Aden and the Southern Arabian Federation. Yemen, at least for the tine being, is turning its back on Aden and trying to use the port of Hodeida to develop its own export and import business. However, the proportionately huge Yemeni commnity in Aden, unanimously opposed to the Federation, tdll fee a permanent cause of friction. Yemen and the Southern Arabian Federation Gould co-exist until a clear proof is given of which of the two is best suited to the Yemeni people. If the new Republic of Yemen develops advanced economic and polifleal structures it will be only a matter of time before what is called "occupied Yemen8 joins the Republic, But if, on the other hand, there is no such progress in the new Republic, Aden continues to flourish, and the Federation of Southern Arabia to prosper, instability will be the rule in Yemen, unless the H&B leaves behind a strong police army to impose order and so contribute heavily to the financial burden of the country. Another alternative is the one ths Republicans are dreaming of s to join the Arab Federation (Egypt, Syria and Iraq.)* The Government of Yemen was un- doubtedly surprised by the decision taloen in Cairo to go ahead with a tripartite federation which excluded Yemen j more a liability than an asset. In the agreement signed for the establishment of that Federation, a favourable vote of two-thirds of the representatives to ths Assembly is required to accept a new member state to the Federation. As the Federation Assembly will not be convened for at least twenty-four months, this means that, for a minimum period of two years, the Arab Republic of Yemen has to go along by herself. From the terror of the past Imamate any country should be glad to escapef Ttet tha Yemenis must wish now is that they could see more clearly what lies ahead. The ssift^ massive and continuous support from the UAR un- doubtedly saved the Yemen Republic. Whatever changes the new Government may now introduce, the simple Jact remainss "the Yemen Imamate was the most despised regime in the Middle East0. The taste ahead are formidable. If they are to be completed, a complete change in the mental attitude of the large majority of the population will be required* The writer would not like to finalize these remarks without a few words of warning. Foreign aid in Yemen is taken for granted. This creates an atmosphere of passivity, based on the false belief that all problems, present and future, will be solved by outside friends. The idea tlet tha future of the country depends primarily on the will and efforts of the Yemenis, in a concerted action which calls for hard work and sacrifices, is yet entirely alien to the people, with the exception of a small bunch of inspired and altruistic leaders* AMEX I couircn.

El Sayed Abdel Hahman Al- Colonel Hassan jEL-Staari EL Sayed Abdel Qhani $L Hottahar * Mohamed Mahmoud la Zobe5ri » 4,Mel latif Beif 11 Abdel Salara Sabra " Hohamed Ahmed El Golonel Mohamed Kaed Self

El * n Jt*L± Kassem Moayyad » AliMohamed $ad& n Abraed Ben Ahmed » Al-Bassoiuni Ahmed All

" Abdel Eerim Bl-Houri " Mohamed Moitaher Zeid " Hussein Sioaraf Al-Kabsii

Five Sbeljcs representing the Belbes will be appointed as of the Presidential fhe President of the Republic, Field Marshal Abdullah SI Sallal is the Chairman of the Presidential Council. THE COMGIL

B3L Abdul fcatif Beifulah Chairman Mohataed A3y Qsman Minister for tribal Affairs Mohamed Sl-Boeingr Minister of the Interior Mustafa Yaacub Minister of Foreign Affairs rt Hussein Bl-Bafei Minister of War H Abdul Ghany Aly Staled Minister of Sreastary tr Mohamed Iba A3y Hussein Minister of Justice n Mohamed Anaam Minister of Education

H Hussein Minister of Health Makiy Minister of Bconoicy II Minister of ¥akfs Abdullah El-Karshamy Minister of Public Works and Oommunioations Mobazned Abdo Minister of Agriculture

Other appointments include those ofs il Sayed Mohamed Abdul Wassei Deputy Xoterior Minister " Abdo ifoman Ata w Foreign Minister tt Ahmed Sabet tt fpeasury Minister * A3y Abdul Haq ® Justice Minister n Ahmed El-Shajany « Education Minister n Aly Mohamed El-Seneidar rt Hconomy Minister

POPOSE0 MXTED SATXGMS C83KRTBR «&0U1» FOB SAUDI AfiABIA-TSMEH FHCNTISS

19 ffaffl paper is teased ®B peints' discus»«d by Ambassador Bunker dajii &S.8 last visit.

2e Tfe.® United KAtlMM OMKwm Qro&p (a) responsible for 20 tons* ea ©Ithsr sid© of the frontier; (b) paraittsd to ch^k airports ®n4 ports furfelier ins ids tfes

(c) headed by Major S^iwsil ¥«a Hoam and will consist of sose 50 0bs©rT®rs ffon afeout 3^ ©r 4

CJSAJSEgjTItl . 3

important a.reas6 84'dais sppaas*s to bt tfe* ccssamaaifSatioaa centre sic to the frontier iss Teme^j wbil© Bh&fesran is sisaalarly located ia Saudi ©as the coastj the two aeereat isz^xjrtant towns either side of the I'ruaiia and Ji-zaa.- la ets© of Yeffiesj, Al Huday<3ah is the largest port of with several smaller port® to Jits ssoith which could bs used by aiss^X 1 Ls and dhcws0 In Saudi Arabias CJlssa is. ttis isiportar.t r-ort cf sat?! is the ar«a with several ssall ports to it© aort-h and, of course., ths iMportant pilgr5.m ports of eatry yet f^rtlaer Rcrfch» All i;ia;>e factors suggest the following ®2vgsui§ati©2« (a) HQ UHOG premaaably to be located at S'ana, tha Capital of Ysjaejs^ the stain complainant la this sit«atic»se Here the Chief of St&ff of SJMQS • can foe located with & small Staff which will control the o^sryer ope rat loss©

provide logistic sispp^rt jfeo the group0 Alternatively^ S^'dah cculd tes - 2 -

a possible location for this HQ with a liaison officer located at S'ana» Siailarlj, a liaison officer would be required at the Saudi Arabian capital asid in Calm. (b) Observer group should b© divided in. two halves for deploy-sent la Teaen and Saudi Arabia. reejMsetivaly. Eseh side would probably further require two subdivisions to take car© of the Jisan and lajan areas frcm 'tfa*lr aides.

(e) Aerial reconrnaiesaKce would b© an. essential factora Four helicopters capable of flyirig over lights of 9^000 ft. should be A fltiet of Otters consisting of 3 or 4 plasms would provide the added advantage of longer range aerial reconnaissance which could be a for longer periods over suspected areas « These alreraft sh^ld pref

©gtsrate under centralised controle They epuld be based on any suitable airfield in the area*. (d) Jeeps ., which can be easily transported to DC-3 t'yp« aircraft, £ltt«d with radio vrauld be essential for ground reeonnai?sar:e* inspscti and investigation. One of two W«»3 type of aircraft would be- required feo provide logi&tic support to the observer group and air transport for VIP and passenger traf£ie«

4a Th«rc are several outstanding queetloaa vMoh B.esd to be settled with the Govenaaieat [email protected] and are «snsasrated in suee^pilnj rjara graphs* 5» A status agreement gho'dld bs reached concerainf, ths obs«rn"*r group with the Gover-nmeRts concerned parfeieularlj' Yemen and Saudi Arabia wher© tjae group is to be deployed. While it is wndarstandable that the main would be located within the d

zone to sustain its operations* Sijailai»l^rs agreemssnt should be arrived at oa arrar.g€ffi«iiits for access to air and s©a, ports which have tc be ehscked withia the operational rsspdiasibilit^1 'tot th© group*

60 l-ocatloa of obserirGf gro'up headquarters n.e8cscars>ft!l ronsldoratlcss diacussion with th® garti@s iavolved. Furthermore , should the - 3 - group be located within or near the demilitarised sone, or at ths capital of Temen, which is ths laain coEplalnant, What should be ths arrangements for liaison with th« parties involved and the charter duties of liaison personnel, 7e CoGsnauiieations between fifewYork and observer group h»a^ ni.-xrtprs need to be established and consent of the partlss involved obtained . It nay be preferable to connect observer group headquarters with Jerusalem or direet to Geneva, 8, There are iraHi8&fabl e • aspects of th® administrative support. required for the observer grou^« Satisfactory arrangcnisTjts should br» arrived at with the parties involved in regard to- thess questions ^rd channels agreed to for any futur« diaeussiea»e 9« The exact nature of responsibilities of the observer ,rrc«p should be drawn tip within practical capability of the size of th* group envisaged. t It is quite apparent that an observer group of about 50 v-'ould not «ffcetitf»Iy be able to stop infiltration. Its presence would be a deterrent and it© effectiveness would b© parallel to tho degree of coops rot. ion prodded by the parties involved,

3DCKIESTED PIAH • 10. Major General ?on Horn has already been warned to ;rr-.?»d to tha when ordered to do 'so to carry out personal reconnaissance and submit a plaa. 11 • Th© followin countries should be considered to p^--«d'ip ob

Swsden, NoiVay, Denmark, Canada,, Belgit® and Holsunde C«nc^a t.o provM® Otters with &rew arsd USA to provide helicopters and DC-?r; with drew,

120 A small adad.nistrativa staff would ba necessary to 'v.ir;rort the It wou3,d therefore be useful to hav® Field Service to plryc accord 13 e An observer is usually paid $10 p$r day per diem. This say an increase bscaxise of the hard, service conditions). Heveve-r^ 50 observers would cost $60jOCO for four raonths Including the adsaini'nrative staff, th cost for personnel should not be more fhan about $10C/>OC for thf duratiea The cost of flying should 'bo about $200^900 -> $300,000 for th® period, Equipment and various other miscsHaneous Itejas nxi^ht CQJIJ** -i\. to another $100,,,000» The estimated budget for the four-zonth dura tiers sr.c-ula r.ot exceed $5O)j01iOil Comparing this to UJJTSO budget, this .;^.lj hv a little acre than double but the extra cost Involved would cover setting up a new group and additional fijdjtig necessary in this case. COEPIDEKPIAL 6 September 1963

TO: Secretary-General

FROM: Bamses Nassif

At the request of Gobi Obhrai, I called Mr. Dammann of the Chicago Tribune, who is accredited to our European office. He had called Mr. Obhrai earlier regarding the question of poison gas in Yemen and the re- sult of the UH investigation.

He proved to "be a most aggressive and obnoxious individual who started the conversation by claiming that he haet the whole story from top sources in the European office whom he knew personally and who, according to him, conducted the investigation of those charges. I explained to Mr. Dammann that all matters pertaining to the Yemen problem are being conducted by you and your staff here and that to the best of my knowledge there is no one in our Geneva office who is authorized to handle it. The unpleasant conversation ended by Mr. Dammann urging me to convey to you the following: You just tell the Secretary—General that he made some serious statements on the -aUnqged use of poison gas in Yemen. My last words were: I just don't know what you are talking about.

cc Dr. Bunche, Boom 3853 Mr. Obhrai, Eoom 1027B cJip:i:Hi b>' British

Sh-.k. it «nlUyc'-;: • •..'.

. Fui. n!' < -.-iH jge-..

I'v.'ti r v iH,Lj?e . . '..

As -S.i^da v'tUci^e1 ,'; ;'

•K.i.i.Hwvif.-As -SaqafV/'

Af -K!' tiMtiot v iil.Jge.:';

D.i'ri-j Al-Alm TuhaJf.

"Lit, . H,j.rih'.Road-:

• til .^nv"' Vise Lht>"ar'.-::i,S:H'cupieU b} t'ht- Brir;i^li ^i'Ter rl.-. ,0lit! t.-j'-.:U' !->• verified by the rvyo'parties if tiic British irH^rriMn. , Jiidicuji;^ t:; wti.ji. rliey werc'-prini" tu 2t> Seprt-mhor..' IV)n2, JRB/nb 19 August 1966

Note for the Record

1) On 19 August 1966, the Secretary-General, upon his request, had separate meetings with the Representatives of the United Kingdom, the U.A.R., and Yemen in order to have a preliminary exchange of views with them concerning the consensus arrived at "by the Security Council at its 1300th meeting on 16 August 1966.

2) None of the Representatives had received, by that time, any instructions from their Governments concerning the implementation of the consensus. All of them, however, undertook to consult with their respective Governments and call again on the Secretary-General in order to pursue the matter further. On his part, the Secretary- General also informed the Representatives that after hearing their views he may have some suggestions to put forward to them concerning the responsibility entrusted to him by the Security Council "to continue his good offices in an endeavour to settle the outstanding question in agreement with the parties concerned".

cc: The Secretary-General Mr. C.V. Narasimhan Dr. R.J. Bunche