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ONGOING CONFLICT in YEMEN: a PROXY WAR?1 İrem Aşkar KARAKIR2

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ONGOING CONFLICT in YEMEN: a PROXY WAR?1 İrem Aşkar KARAKIR2 İrem Aşkar KARAKIR / Ongoing Conflict in Yemen: A Proxy War? TESAM Akademi Dergisi - Turkish Journal of TESAM Academy Temmuz - July 2018. 5(2). 121 - 149 ISSN: 2148 – 2462 ONGOING CONFLICT IN YEMEN: A PROXY WAR?1 İrem Aşkar KARAKIR2 Abstract It has been almost three years since the eruption of the civil war in Yemen by March 2015, leading to high political instability and severe humanitarian crisis. This article elaborates on the civil war in Yemen by focusing on the interests of main actors, who are involved war in Yemen, mainly questioning the liability of describing the tensionin the ongoing as a proxy conflict. war The between article Saudi also evaluates Arabia and the Iran. nature In ofrecent civil the lens of a religious struggle between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shi’ayears, Iran there in has order been to a reinforce tendency their to explain control Yemeni over conflictthe region. through It is argued in this study that it would be misleading to call Yemen’s ongoing crisis as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The tension did not emerge as a result of clash of interests by these two countries. Rather it would be fair to suggest that involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen’s civil war further triggered and complicated the already existing tensions in the country. The article argues is indeed different from a proxy war. outcome is a complex pattern of conflict which the author of this Keywords: Yemen, Civil War, Proxy War, Saudi Arabia, Iran 1 Makalenin Geliş Tarihi: 15.04.2018 Makalenin Kabul Tarihi: 18.06.2018 2 Dr. Öğr. Üyesi, Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İşletme Fakültesi Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü. Atıf:e-mail: [email protected] Tesam Akademi Dergisi, 5 Karakır İ.A. (2018). Ongoing conflict in Yemen: A proxy war?. (2), 121- 149. http://dx.doi.org/10.30626/tesamakademi.456008 120 TESAM 121 TESAM Akademi Dergisi/ Turkish Journal of TESAM Academy İrem Aşkar KARAKIR / Yemen’de Devam Etmekte Olan Çatışma: Bir Vekalet Savaşı mı? Öz Mart 2015’de patlak vermesinin üzerinden yaklaşık üç yıl geçen Yemen’deki iç savaş, yoğun siyasi istikrarsızlık ve vahim insani krize neden olmuştur. Bu makale, Yemen’deki iç savaşı, savaşta yer alan aktörler ve çıkarlarına odaklanarak detaylı olarak incelemektedir. Makale ayrıca Yemen’deki iç savaşın doğasını, temel olarak bu gerilimi Suudi Arabistan ve İran arasında bir vekalet savaşı olarak tanımlamanın geçerliliğini sorgulayarak değerlendirmektedir. Son yıllarda, Yemen’deki çatışmayı, bölge üzerinde kontrollerini güçlendirmek amacıyla, Sünni Suudi Arabistan ile Şii İran arasında yaşanmakta olan dini bir mücadele olarak açıklama eğilimi vardır. Çalışma, Yemen’de devam etmekte olan krizi, Suudi Arabistan ile İran arasında bir vekalet savaşı olarak tanımlamanın yanıltıcı olacağını savunmaktadır. Burada; gerilim, söz konusu iki ülkenin çıkarlarının çatışması sonucu ortaya çıkmamıştır. Daha ziyade, Suudi Arabistan ve İran’ın Yemen’in iç savaşında taraf olmaları, ülkede devam etmekte olan gerilimi daha karmaşık hale getirmek suretiyle arttırmıştır. Sonuç karışık yapıda bir çatışma olsa da, bu makalenin yazarı bunun kesin olarak vekalet savaşından farklı olduğuAnahtar görüşünü Kelimeler: savunmaktadır. Yemen, İç Savaş, Vekalet Savaşı, Suudi Arabistan, İran 122 TESAM 123 İrem Aşkar KARAKIR / Ongoing Conflict in Yemen: A Proxy War? Introduction It has been almost three years since the eruption of the civil war in Yemen by March 2015, leading to high political instability and severe hadhumanitarian not attracted crisis. much Until attention the launch of the of internationalSaudi-led operation community. to Yemen With externalsupported actors’ by the involvementUnited States in(US), the the country ongoing accompanied conflict in the with country the alarming rise of casualties and epidemic diseases, and famine along with water shortage, the country began to capture the interest of international media. In fact, it is not the first time that Yemen has seen a civil war. Between 1962 and 1970, North Yemen experienced a civil war, whereas 1994 witnessed the first civil war in Yemen after the unification of the North and the South. Besides, a major insurgency occurred in the country by 2004, in which Shi’a Houthis played the leading role. institutions, economic decay, poor infrastructure and great levels of Yemen is described as a failed state by commentators with its weak state drug addiction. Due to high unemployment rates, many Yemenis have had no choice, but to seek for jobs in other countries in the region. In the meantime, lack of opportunity has pushed some of desperateunder Yemenis Ali Abdullahinto extremist Saleh’s terrorist leadership groups. Three chronic themes have had their mark hason Yemen. occurred First in ofthe all, country even though either Yemen in political was unifiedlevel or in in 1990 societal level. , it is difficult to suggest that a real unification of political culture. Saleh, who had remained in power as Yemen’s Tribalism and decentralization have remainedmanipulating to be main characteristics the country’s tribes and religious groups and external actors, which he referred to aspresident for 35 years was highly skilled at “dancing on the heads of snakes.” (Niarchos, 2018, p. 31). Secondly, the country is the poorest country in the Middle East and North Africa Lastly,(MENA) because region. ofRevealing its political a dismal vulnerability picture, Yemen’sand fragmented economy nature, has highly the depended on foreign aid and Yemeni workers’ remittances from abroad. Arabia as the leading interfering external actor. country has been subject to a number of foreign interventions with Saudi In recent years, there has been a widespread tendency to explain Yemen’s Saudi Arabia and Shi’a Iran to reinforce their control over the region. Portrayingongoing conflict the civil through war in theYemen lens as of a proxya religious war or struggle a shadow between war between Sunni Saudi Arabia and Iran is indeed an underestimation of the complexity of 122 TESAM 123 TESAM Akademi Dergisi/ Turkish Journal of TESAM Academy İrem Aşkar KARAKIR / areconflict deeper in the than country. that of Even a sectarian though religious Sunni-Shia differences tension. doInvolvement play a role inof the expansion of the conflict, the underlying causes of the Yemeni crisis simplyexternal grown actors out in Yemen’sof religious crisis sectarianism. such as Saudi Arabia and Iran just further complicated an already multifaceted crisis. Otherwise, the conflict has not At first sight, the ongoing conflict in Yemen seems to take place between Saudi-ledtwo main coalition, blocs. On whereas the one on hand, the other there hand is internationally the second bloc recognized consists of president of Yemen, Abdrabbo Mansour Hadi, who is supported by a from visible reductionism, since there are a number of other groups with differentthe Houthi political rebels claimedagendas to to be participate backed by in Iran. the Yet, war this including perception al-Qaeda suffers in These non-state actors are not under control the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), secessionists in the south and the Islamic withState their(Arraf, own 2017, interests p. 2). and have shifted their policies in line with their changingof the two interests main sides and alliances.in the conflict, as they have acted in accordance series of widespread uprisings in the Arab world commonly referred as Popular pro-reform demonstrations took place in Yemen following a voiced their demands for more rights and freedoms to be accompanied bythe serious‘Arab Spring.’ political Like and their economic counterparts reforms. in Salehthe region, regime’s Yemeni response people to demonstrators was not different from other regimes’ responses in the the demonstrations of the 2011 by different groups of Yemenis to trigger theArab civil world, war as in he the resorted country. to forceCivil warto repress in the the country uprisings. began But, in itthe was early not 2015, when the Houthis, a Shi’a group, who believed that they had been powersubject againstto discrimination government, by thepower government, vacuum in rebelled the country against was the started ruling Saleh regime in order to overthrow it. As the Houthis reinforced their Challenged by the instability in the country, Saudi Arabia-led coalition has thento be militarily filled not intervened only by the in Houthis,the country. but also by other non-state actors. This study aims to elaborate on the civil war in Yemen, which began in March 2015 by focusing on the interests of main actors, who are involved related with the unfolding of the civil war in Yemen will be addressed. Secondly,in the current actors ongoing and their conflict. interests In this will regard, be covered initially, inkey a developmentsdetailed way. TESAM 125 124 İrem Aşkar KARAKIR / Ongoing Conflict in Yemen: A Proxy War? involved, the study evaluates the nature of civil war in Yemen, mainly questioningLastly, in the the light liability of the ofoverview describing of the the conflict tension of as Yemen a proxy and war the between actors Saudi Arabia and Iran. It is argued that it would be misleading to call Yemen’s ongoing crisis as a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The tension did not erupt as a result of clash of interests by these two countries. Rather it would be fair to suggest that involvement of Saudi Arabia and Iran in Yemen’s civil war further triggered and complicated the already existing tensions in the country. Thus, the outcome is a complex from a proxy war. pattern of conflict which the author of this study argues is indeed different An Overview of Yemen’s Civil War following the overthrow of the Zaydi Imamate and the People’s The Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) was established in 1962 twoDemocratic different Republic states, aof military Yemen (Southdictatorship Yemen) in thewas Northestablished and a inMarxist 1967 after the departure of colonial Britain (Cordesman, 2017, p. 3). These In response to changing international dynamics, mostly due to ending of state in the South shared a common characteristic of being weak states.
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