The Chinese System of International Relations in Early Modern East Asia: China at the Center in the Eyes of the Periphery
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THE CHINESE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EARLY MODERN EAST ASIA: CHINA AT THE CENTER IN THE EYES OF THE PERIPHERY A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Government By Ji-Young Lee, M.A. Washington, DC August 17, 2009 Copyright 2009 by Ji-Young Lee All Rights Reserved ii THE CHINESE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN EARLY MODERN EAST ASIA: CHINA AT THE CENTER IN THE EYES OF THE PERIPHERY Ji-Young Lee, M.A. Thesis Advisor: Kathleen R. McNamara, Ph.D. ABSTRACT What explains the longevity of the China-centered international order in early modern East Asia? Why did Japan and Korea continue to stay below China in the periphery position instead of forming alliances to balance against Chinese power, especially when China was weak and divided? Contributing to the current debate on the stability of a unipolar world, the dissertation asks which domestic or international conditions bind secondary states to support the existing order at times of power transition. My answer to the question focuses on the strategic of soft power. Building on insights from the historical institutionalist and constructivist literatures, I argue that the hegemonic structure of an international system is likely to persist longer when the hegemon’s institutional innovations are turned into sources of international authority, allowing the hegemon to use its legitimizing ideas for realpolitik purposes. A systemic model of stability reproduction is presented to elucidate how hegemonic power, ideas, and social dynamics interact with one another over time to have bearings on international order. To test the model, I look into the system-changing challenges that could iii have disrupted the hierarchical structure but did not in early modern East Asia: 1) the Mongol invasions of Korea and Japan in the thirteenth century; 2) the Hideyoshi Invasions of Korea, 1592-98; and 3) the rise of the Qing Empire in the 17th century, isolating the mechanisms that glued East Asian states to the China-centered international order. iv To Daisaku Ikeda who inspired me to take the courage to pursue a Ph.D. in international relations v ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Taking this first step into the world of scholars, I am indebted to many people for their teaching, guidance and encouragement, especially to each of my dissertation committee. I wish to thank Professor Kathleen McNamara for being such a wonderful mentor and a scholar for me to learn from, and for training me to think more clearly and deeply. Professor Andrew Bennett has helped me travel along all my graduate school years as a good teacher, and his Qualitative Research Methods course remains as one of my favorite courses at Georgetown. My thanks also go to Professor Victor Cha. He probably does not know this, but it was his East Asian Security class that led me (then an MA student) to choose East Asian security as my main focus at the Ph.D. level. I am deeply grateful to Professor David Kang for his generous advice, a good humor, and a breadth of knowledge on Asia. If it were not for his pioneering works on bringing Asian history to our theorizing of international relations, this project might not be here. I consider myself fortunate having been able to study international relations theory and state formation with Professor Daniel Nexon. I am thankful that he always pushes me to broaden my horizon, to aim higher and to think clearer in conducting my research. Although any remaining mistakes of this dissertation are solely mine, many political scientists, historians, and colleagues have given me invaluable advice for this project along the way. I would like to thank Ariel Ahram, Dal-choong Chang, vi Ja Ian Chong, Michael Glosny, Michael Green, Daeyŏl Gu, Myŏng-ki Han, Victoria Hui, Stuart Kaufman, Christine Kim, Han-gyu Kim, Tae-gyun Kim, Kirk Larsen, Chŏng-ch‘ŏl Lee, Guen Lee, James Millward, Paul Musgrave, Jin-hyun Paik, Tae- gyun Park, Wŏn-ho Park, Lynn Ross, Sŭng-ch‘ŏl Son, Howard Spendelow, David Steinberg, Yuan-Kang Wang, Hyon-joo Yoo, and Keun-ho Yu. My special thanks go to Julia Lau Bertrand for her friendship and support during this process. My participation in the Institute for Qualitative and Multi-Method Research in January 2007 helped me to think harder to address some of the methodological issues of the project. The Gill Hopper Fellowship of the Department of Government, Georgetown University allowed me to teach a course based on this project titled, “Power Politics and Culture in East Asian Foreign Policy” in the fall 2008 semester, and to focus on the dissertation writing in the following semester. I’d like to thank my students who took the class for exploring the topic together with me. The POSCO Visiting Fellowship with the East-West Center, Hawaii has made the final stage of the dissertation writing in the summer of 2009 a pleasant experience. I am grateful for the support and friendship that Dr. Denny Roy and the EWC staffs have shown me during my residence there. I could have not finished this dissertation without the loving support of my parents, So-geum Chung and Bang-keun Lee. I am forever grateful for their trust in me. I also want to say ‘thank you’ to my grandmother, sister Ji-sun, brother Ho-tan for their love. vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction………………………………………………………..……....…..........1 Chapter 1: The Puzzle: The Longevity of the China-centered Order……...……....17 Chapter 2: Alternative Explanations for the Chinese System of International Relations………………………….………………………………………....……....27 Chapter 3: A Historical-Constructivist Theory of Hegemonic Order.……...……...54 Chapter 4: The Mongol Invasions of Korea and Japan in the 13th Century………..97 Chapter 5: The Hideyoshi Invasions of Korea, 1592-1598………...………….….134 Chapter 6: The Rise of the Qing Empire in the 17th Century….………….………182 Conclusion: The “Chinese World Order” and the Rise of China Today………….219 Bibliography……………………………………………………………...……….234 viii LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Japan’s and Korea’s Acceptance of the China-centered Order during the Mongol, Ming, and Qing Empires………………………………………………… 22 Figure 2: Gilpin’s Diagram of International Political Change……………………..60 Figure 3: Decision-Making Tree Version of Gilpin’s Theory of International Political Change…………………………………………………..………………... 60 Figure 4: A Historical-Constructivist Theory of Hegemonic Stability…………..... 72 Figure 5: The Extent of Secondary powers’ Acceptance of Hegemony.………….. 73 Figure 6: A Historical-Constructivist Theory of Hegemonic Stability in the context of early modern Asia………………………………………………………………. 74 Figure 7: The Acceptance Level of the China-centered Order……………………. 86 Figure 8: Return to the Mongol Hierarchy: Power, Interest, and Elite Socialization ……………………………………………………………………………………..115 Figure 9: A triangular China-Korea-Japan relationship in the fifteenth century… 141 Figure 10: Variance in the Acceptance Level of the Ming-centered Order……….150 Figure 11: Korea’s Acceptance Level of the Ming-centered Order……………... 156 Figure 12: Japan’s Acceptance Level of the Ming-centered Order……………….157 Figure 13: Pre-Imjin War: Japan’s Practical Acceptance of the China-centered Order……………………………………………………………………………….173 Figure 14: The Hideyoshi Invasions of Korea: Japan’s Challenge to the China- centered Order……………………………………………………………….…….173 Figure 15. Return to the Qing hierarchy: Power, Interest, and Elite Socialization 199 ix LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Gilpin’s Model and the East Asian States System in Historical Perspective…………………………………………………………………………..64 Table 2: Identifying the Events that Could Have Dislocated the System…………. 91 Table 3: Stability Mechanisms for the Persistence of Hierarchy in Early Modern Asia……………………………………………………………………………….. 148 Table 3-1: Stability Mechanisms for the Persistence of Hierarchy in Early Modern Asia……………………………………………………………………………….. 226 x INTRODUCTION Why do some international systems outlast periods of system-changing challenges while others do not? Which domestic or international conditions bind secondary states to support the existing international order at times of power transition? These questions are far from being only of academic interest and speak directly to the U.S. position in the world today with the rise of Chinese power. While the global financial crisis has fanned the talk of America’s decline, rising China’s new assertiveness and “Charm Offensive” strategy of using soft power to appeal to the world stage has further fueled speculations about Chinese behavior in the future. To ask the implications of these subtle yet intriguing observations reveals the limits to our understanding as to what makes a hegemonic order solid beyond the preponderance of power. My dissertation turns to the Chinese Empire for an answer. With China, whose record of history is longer than that of any other existing state, at the center, the East Asian states system had evolved its own system of international relations over millennia. When we extend our horizon further back into the history of East Asia, the empirical evidence is at odds with conventional wisdom of the field that the balance of power mechanism works effectively to prevent hegemonies from forming and maintaining. When standard European history books describe the one half century balanced state of power in the Concert of Europe as the heyday of Europe’s 1 peace, a far longer period of stability in East Asia’s history existed under the unbalanced power of the late imperial China. While the European states system experienced upheavals of the Renaissance, Thirty Years’ War, the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, and the French Revolution, the East Asian states system from the thirteenth through the end of the eighteenth century continued with the China- centered hegemonic order. If more international relations theory were built upon the recurring historical patterns of the East Asian states system, and not on the European experience of the past four centuries, the balance of power may not still be “the best known, and perhaps the best” theory in international politics.