Briefing Paper December 2018

HSBA

IDENTITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION The Fertit opposition in South Sudan Sarah Vuylsteke

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 1 Credits and contributors

Editor: Claire Mc Evoy About the author Production coordinator: Sarah Vuylsteke is a humanitarian aid worker who has lived and worked in South Rebecca Bradshaw with Olivia Denonville Sudan since early 2015. She initially worked with Médecins Sans Frontières and Copy-editor: Alex Potter subsequently as the humanitarian access negotiator for the UN Office for the Coor- ([email protected]) dination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Food Programme. She has spent most of her time since 2016 working on and in former Western Bahr el Ghazal state Fact-checker: Tim Jolin and other hard-to-reach areas, interfacing directly with actors from both sides of ([email protected]) the conflict and on both sides of the front line. She has authored and co-authored Proofreader: Stephanie Huitson numerous reports on the post-2013 conflict in South Sudan. Prior to working in ([email protected]) South Sudan she was employed in various other capacities in the aid world across Africa. Cartography: Jillian Luff (www.mapgrafix.com) Design: Rick Jones ([email protected]) Acknowledgements Layout: raumfisch.de/sign The author would like to thank members of the Fertit community in South Sudan in both government-controlled and opposition-held territories for allowing her un- Communications coordinator: paralleled access to interlocutors at all levels and for their willingness to engage Emilia Dungel with her. In particular she is grateful to AK, A, G, J, C, O, DG, and T for their partici- Print: nbmedia, Geneva pation in and facilitation of key meetings and interviews, without which she would have been unable to grasp the complexities of the region and the Western Bahr el Ghazal conflict. JA provided support, guidance, insights, and vivid story-telling over the past three years, while remaining objective and introspective about the Fertit history and current situation. This paper would not have been written without him. John Draper deserves a special mention for his constant support through the writing of this paper. The author and Small Arms Survey would also express their thanks to the United States Government for its financial support to the HSBA project.

Front cover photo Lt. Gen. Ashab Khamis (right), a repre- sentative of the Fertit opposition, meets with the SPLA’s Division 5 commander Gen. Keer Kiir Keer (left) at the governor’s office in Wau town, South Sudan, ­­ 22 November 2018. Source: Sam Mednick/AFP Photo

2 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 Overview Introduction The conflict that started in South Sudan in December 2013 has deep Wau state is extremely polarized historic roots and is highly complex. It is driven by a struggle for exis- on tribal lines and tribalism has tential survival for some; a demand for fairer representation for others; reached a level whereby the social and the desire for power, access to resources, and ultimate control for fabric of society has been affected many. Grievances are not only born of the current civil war, but date (GRSS Commission of Inquiry,­ 2016, pp. 18–19). back to previous events, linking historical issues to the post-2013 conflict. On the evening of 24 June 2016 shooting The above is true for the Fertit, a minority ethnic community in South started in the south-western neighbour- hoods of Wau town.1 The residents of Sudan that inhabit the former Western Bahr el Ghazal state. Like others these areas are known to be predomi- across the country, they are currently opposing the current regime in nantly from the ethnic Fertit community.2 Juba. However, while some of the Fertit’s aspirations fit into the wider The attackers were reported to be armed opposition’s national agenda, some are specific to them. The reasons Dinka youths in civilian clothes supported for their opposition are individual and personal to their perception of by others in military uniform who moved the history and developments of power dynamics across South Sudan. from house to house attacking civilians Understanding the Fertit’s perception of historical events and how these with machetes, firearms, sticks, and events affect them in the present is therefore key to understanding the spears, and engaging in widespread rape.3 root causes of their opposition to the government, which in turn is cru- The violence continued throughout the night and scores of bodies could be cial to any attempts to establish sustainable peace and coexistence seen in the streets the next morning.4 for the inhabitants of South Sudan. Those who were able to escape fled to the nearby United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) base and local church compounds (known as collective centres). Over the following days more Key findings people arrived at these sites as the inse- The Fertit opposition to South Sudan’s government is rooted in their curity continued, and large numbers of reports detailing atrocities and the killing belief in their right to security and self-preser­va­tion, to control their of civilians were gathered (Nield, 2016).5 own land, and to defend their identity. The Fertit opposition was born Thousands of civilians fled from Wau town out of a fear of marginalization and the long-held perception that and sought refuge in Baggari, an area to members of the Dinka tribe are attempting to seize control of former the south-west under the control of the Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBEG) state. This fear has intensified more Fertit Lions, an opposition group that had recently by the reorganization of South Sudan into 28 states in 2015, joined the SPLM/A-IO platform led by Riek which has tilted the demographic balance of parts of the former Machar the previous year. WBEG in favour of the Dinka, making the indige­nous Fertit a minority Opposition to the government in South in their ancestral lands. Sudan is long-standing and is rooted in a perception among minority communi- The Fertit opposition joined other groups in the Sudan People’s ties, such as the Fertit, that members of Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) under Riek the Dinka tribe are attempting to seize Machar in 2014. The Fertit theorized that any resolution of local power over and control of these commu- grievances in the context of the current civil war would have to be nities and their land—in this case in former brokered at the national level. The subsequent evolution of the WBEG state (see Map 1).6 This decades- conflict and the balkanization of the opposition since 2017 call old perception was born out of events during the second Sudanese civil war into question the effectiveness of the Fertit’s use of this platform. (1983–2005) and the birth of the Sudan The 12 September 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution People’s Liberation Movement/Army of the Conflict in South Sudan (RARCSS) between the government (SPLM/A) under the late John Garang and and opposition parties continues to undermine the effective reso- Riek Machar, and has led to the current lution of the conflict. Despite recognizing a grass-roots demand for conflict becoming deeply ethnicized. For decentralized decision-making, the agreement entrenches power the Fertit, the fear of domination has been reinforced by events in the past decade, dynamics put in place during the war. As a result, the likelihood including the moving of the Wau county that it will deliver sustainable peace across the country is low, in capital to Baggari; tensions between the particular in the new Wau state and former WBEG, where opposi- Fertit and neighbouring communities over tion and armed struggle are likely to continue if the local issues the movements of the latter’s cattle; and that fuel armed resistance are not addressed. the reconfiguration of the ethnic make-up

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 3 of former WBEG through the creation of of the conflict, which are entrenched in ­umbrella, and the prospects for a resolu- 28, and then 32, states in South Sudan an array of local grievances and a wide- tion of the conflict at both the local and since 2015. This has led to the Fertit taking spread fear of Dinka domination among national levels. The prospects for peace up arms against what is perceived as a minority groups in South Sudan.8 Sec- seem slim at both levels and it is likely Dinka-dominated governance system on ondly, while representing a solid block that armed opposition will continue. multiple occasions, most recently under of opposition across the country, the the umbrella of the SPLM/­A-IO. SPLM/A-IO has had to contend with It is unclear how long their allegiance heavy military losses that have occurred The opposition in Western to this organization will last, however. As simultaneously with the emergence of Bahr el Ghazal: roots and the conflict has spread across the county, these other parties and platforms at the drawing in a variety of communities and negotiation table. Alternative avenues of current causes interests, the SPLM/A-IO has expanded armed resistance are now open if factions The origins of a rebellion: to encompass a broad range of actors, as feel that their key issues are not being other parties have joined both the con- addressed. In this context the relevance the Qwat Salem flict and the negotiation table. This has of the SPLM/A-IO for the Fertit has be­ The origins of the opposition movement had two effects. Firstly, the space at the come questionable. in Wau and WBEG date back to the 1970s negotiation table has become crowded, This Briefing Paper9 examines the and the earliest days of the SPLM/A in and the lack of a unified opposition has roots of the Fertit opposition in former the 1980s. They are rooted in the Fertit weakened the opposition’s leverage in WBEG and demonstrates how the current community’s struggle to protect its land negotiations and made compromise resistance is a continuation of previous and identity from a perceived encroach- harder. As a result, negotiations have unresolved grievances. It discusses key ment by the more dominant Dinka ethnic often focused on brokering power-sharing events from the Fertit perspective be- group,10 members of which control the formulas and attempting to enforce cease- tween the 1970s and mid-September Bahr el Ghazal states.11 Indeed, tensions fires that have routinely been broken 2018, and examines the internal make-up between the Fertit and the Dinka have shortly thereafter.7 This has ­occurred at of the Fertit Lions, the Fertit opposition’s been recorded as far back as the 1950s the expense of addressing the root causes current status under the SPLM/A-IO (Blocq, 2014, pp. 713–14).

Map 1 Former Western Bahr el Ghazal state, pre-2015

b) r el Ara Kiir (Bah SUDAN

Abyei Abyei

Bentiu

Lol NORTHERN Aweil UNITY BAHR EL GHAZAL Jur Raja l a e Kuajok aj h R C WESTERN WARRAP BAHR EL GHAZAL

Dem Zubeir Mboro Wau CENTRAL Protection of civilians site

Bringi B AFRICAN Ngisa a

Faranjallah h r

REPUBLIC e Mapel barracks Mapel Tonj l

G

Numatima B a z h B i a a a z International boundary g a a l Former state boundary r r i Former state capital Rumbek Other town Signicant road 50 km WESTERN EQUATORIA LAKES

Source: Logistics Cluster (2017)

4 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 Wau town was originally established to the Fertit (Johnson and Prunier, 1993, around 1985 when the SPLA began to act as a French fort in the 19th century,12 p. 132, fn. 14). As a report from the Com- violently towards civilians who were per- which was followed by its establishment mittee for the Redivision of the Southern ceived as hostile, taking resources (in- as a military camp set up by commercial Provinces from this period noted: cluding food, water, ammunition, and slave traders (Rone, 1999, pp. 235–341). houses) by force. Like the Fertit, the Murle There is the intense feeling of the It was an ethnically mixed town combin- (from Boma), Toposa (from former Eastern Fertit of Wau and Raga [Raja, a pre- ing Arab slave traders from the north, ex- Equatoria) and Mundari (from former dominantly Fertit town in WBEG] soldiers, and former slaves with people Central Equatoria) were targetted by the against the Dinka and there is the from the rural areas around Wau. To the Dinka for being seen to oppose the SPLA strong aspiration for a separate north, east, and south-east the area was (Johnson, 2003, p. 83). The SPLA carried province for them. The Fertit, they inhabited by the ethnic Dinka (this area out violent looting raids in areas south- said, are afraid of being dominated made up former Northern Bahr el Ghazal west of Raja, while rape and killing be­ by the Dinka (Thomas, 2010, p. 106). (NBEG), Warrap, and Lakes states), and came widespread. Tribal leaders reported to the south by the Azande (in what is now Statements made by local Fertit politi- that the perpetrators were of Dinka origin, Western Equatoria). WBEG’s proximity to cians regarding their belief that the HEC’s and believed that ethnic grievances in- what was then northern Sudan, combined plan was to increase Dinka hegemony also fluenced the violence used in the raids with the arrival of commercial traders illustrate these fears. Tom al Nur, then a (Blocq, 2014, pp. 714–15). from Darfur and South Kordofan and the member of President Jaafar Nimeiri’s At the same time the SPLA carried out presence of Italian missionaries, led the Sudan Socialist Union, stated that: violent raids targeting Fertit communities area to be­come largely Arabic speaking, in and around Wau town. Fertit leaders Abel Alier’s idea was to take Raga with both a strong Muslim and Christian strongly believe that the SPLA’s reasons [Raja] and make it part of Aweil, put presence. In the mid-20th century, Wau for doing this were threefold: as a punish- Tonj with Wau. After 50 years Fertit was also an important trading hub that ment for the Fertit’s failure to join the would be no more. They would all was linked to Khartoum by rail. This shared SPLM/A; as a way to settle old scores re- marry Dinkas. We studied this whole history with the north has resulted in the lated to land and resources; and as part issue (Thomas, 2010, pp. 110–11).16 Fertit retaining strong relationships with of a Dinka plan to take over Wau (Blocq, Sudan, even after South Sudan’s inde- Ethnic tensions in Wau were not appeased 2014, p. 716).20 This last belief was rein- pendence in 2011.13 by comments supposedly made during a forced by the circulation of a ‘secret’ The first fears of a Dinka-dominated debate by the speaker of the state parlia- paper by an unknown author allegedly Southern Sudan surfaced at the end of ment at that time. He reportedly described entitled ‘Dinka Policy against Fertit the first Sudanese civil war in 1972, with the Fertit—specifically those from around Groups’. The premise was that to take the establishment of the autonomous Raja—as not ‘belonging to Sudan’.17 This control of the Fertit, Dinka men would Southern Region14 governed by a High is not the only time such allegations were marry Fertit women, thereby eventually Executive Council (HEC). Abel Alier, a made about the Fertit. When the Dinka subjugating the Fertit (Thomas, 2010, Dinka politician from the south, had initially approached them to join the p. 106). become vice president of Sudan in 1971 SPLM/A, a Dinka officer reportedly stated: Fertit leaders appealed to the then and was thus appointed as the first presi- ‘if you don’t join us in the movement we (Dinka) governor of Bahr el Ghazal, Albino dent of the HEC in the following year. will send you [back] to Central Africa’ Akol Akol, for their communities to be pro- Dinka representatives subsequently filled (Thomas, 2010, p. 116). tected. He reportedly refused the request over half of the cabinet posts across the Therefore, when the SPLM/A was and instead withdrew police and security Southern Region, thereby effectively gain- formed in 1983 few Fertit joined, seeing services from Fertit-inhabited areas ing control of both policy and administra- it as a predominantly Dinka movement (Blocq, 2014, p. 717). As a result, following tive decisions (Willems and Deng, 2015, that would be used to further establish a request from Fertit leaders, Tom al Nur pp. 7–9). This sparked rumours of corrup- Dinka hegemony across Southern Sudan18 and Ashab Khamis21 established a locally tion and nepotism and instilled wide- (Ali, Elbadawi, and el-Batahani, 2005, organized self-defence force or militia spread fears of a move towards a one-tribe pp. 200–1). This perception was en- called the Qwat Salem,22 constituting the hegemony over other groups in Southern trenched by tactical mistakes made by birth of the first official Fertit opposition Sudan (Johnson, 2003, pp. 52–53).15 the SPLM/A leadership during the recruit- in Wau in the mid-1980s.23 Fertit leaders For the Fertit, these fears were not un- ment of supporters to the movement. around Raja also convened to mobilize founded. In Wau, for example, the police While the original idea had been to send local defence forces to protect their com- force was made up almost exclusively of local mobilizers to different areas to re- munities from the raids (Blocq, 2014, pp. Dinka officers (Rone, 1999, p. 25), and cruit, the SPLM/A leadership did not use 715–16). Fertit leaders argued that the Dinka re- Fertit or Luo (the Luo are also indigenous The resulting clashes in and around ceived a disproportionate number of to the area) to carry out this task in WBEG. Wau devastated the town and communi- government jobs (Thomas, 2010, pp. Exacerbating matters, Dinka mobilizers ties in the late 1980s in a spiral of violence 105–6). Dinka-appointed personnel also sent by the SPLM to the region reportedly fed by reprisal attacks. Both the Dinka and began to take up administrative and used aggressive tactics (Pinaud, 2014, Fertit committed atrocities (Rone, 1999, clerical positions that had earlier gone pp. 197–98).19 The situation deteriorated pp. 26–30), increasing resentment on

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 5 the move in 2011. He formed a committee to consult the residents of Wau county The first fears of a Dinka- on the proposal in an attempt to obtain popular support. The committee deter- dominated Southern Sudan mined that the people rejected the idea, however. They found that the Fertit per- ceived the proposal as a way to increase ­surfaced at the end of the first Dinka political dominance by extending central government control to the sur- ­Sudanese civil war in 1972…” rounding areas. Some Fertit even believed the impetus for the move to have come from Tonj, linking it to the Jieng Council both sides. During this time the Khartoum ­officially integrated into both the Sudan of Elders (JCE), a group of Dinka elders government exploited the Qwat Salem, Armed Forces and the SPLA in line with who were influential in national decision- using it to its advantage to contain the relevant protocols (GoS and SPLM/A, making and were often linked to major SPLA without having to dedicate its own 2005, arts. 3(d) and 7, pp. 88–90; 2004, policy changes (the JCE continues to serve forces to controlling the area. It supplied art. 11, pp. 100–2). In March 2005 the the same function to this day).32 Yet de- the militia with both material and tactical Cross-line Peace Recovery and Reconcili- spite the clear popular rejection of the support (Blocq, 2014, pp. 717–18).24 As a ation Conference was held in Mapel29 to plan, the governor issued a decree in result, a common misconception among address outstanding tensions among ­October 2012 to implement the move to the Dinka today is that the Fertit fought the Fertit, Luo, and Dinka communities; Baggari, leading to significant anger against the independence of South and to deal with security, administration, among the Fertit in Wau town (Sudan Sudan25 and even voted against it in the and social relations. Although the con- Tribune, 2012). Such was the importance 2011 referendum.26 ference was lauded as a success at the of this event that Fertit opposition mem- A local (non-SPLA) peace deal be- time, the Fertit have always had reserva- bers often cite the events surrounding the tween the militia and the Dinka communi- tions regarding its outcomes. Their main move as being a trigger of their current ties was finally brokered in 1988, although criticism was that mostly Dinka represent- struggle.33 the militia was not disbanded. Ethnic ten- atives of the SPLM/A attended the con- After the decree was issued, Fertit sions continued to linger and occasion- ference and that the discussions were, youths organized a public forum in Wau ally surfaced in violent episodes. These therefore, not well balanced.30 that questioned whether it had been were exacerbated after the collapse of Despite these reservations and linger- passed by the state parliament in accord- the Derg regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam ing tensions, Wau and WBEG remained ance with the 2009 Local Governance in Ethiopia in May 1991, which had been calm for the most part until over seven Act.34 Parliamentarians then denied that supporting the SPLA for years. The SPLA years later. the state parliament had approved the and thousands of refugees were forced decree, but the security services (acting to move back to Southern Sudan from on behalf of the governor) nevertheless Ethiopia, many of whom settled around Resurgence of ethnic arrested some of the Fertit youths and the garrison towns of Wau and Aweil in ­tensions and violence: the removed some local members of parlia- SPLA-controlled areas. In turn, the mass proposed move of county ment (MPs) from their positions (AI, 2013, arrival of SPLA members and their fami- headquarters in 2012 p. 6). In protest at the arrests, youths lies from Ethiopia, many of whom were blockaded the roads west, south-west, Dinka, ­further entrenched the belief In late 2012 tensions between the Fertit and south of Wau on 5 December. Three among the Fertit that the Dinka were plan- and Dinka communities reignited over the days later security forces forcibly ended ning to take over Wau and its environs,27 proposed move of the Wau county capital the blockade on the orders of senior leading to occasional violent flare-ups from Wau south-west to Baggari, in line government officials35 by shooting at the (Rone, 1999, pp. 45–50). with the SPLM’s policy of ‘bringing the town protesters, killing two people and injuring However in 1991, following overtures to the people’ (SPLM, 2008, sec. IV 24). several more (AI, 2013, p. 6). The killings from the SPLA, which had learned from its At the time Wau was serving not only as led to further protests in Wau town by earlier mistakes and undertaken a more the capital of WBEG state, but also as the Fertit women and youths, but these were nuanced campaign to unite the south in capital of Wau county, leading to compe- met with violence: when protesters were its quest for autonomy from the north, tition over scarce resources. Moving the on their way to ­deliver a petition to the the Fertit finally joined the fight for inde- capital of the county was seen as a solu- governor, security forces opened fire on pendence (BBC, 1991). They were crucial tion to this problem because it would re­ them without any provocation (Cavell, in the capture of major towns such as sult in the development of the more rural 2012).36 At least eight people were killed Rumbek, Tonj, Raja, and eventually Wau.28 area of Baggari, with the added advan- and over 20 were injured (AI, 2013, p. 8). After the war, during the Comprehensive tage of fulfilling a national agenda item. On 15 December the bodies of six Peace Agreement period (2005–11) the The then Fertit governor of WBEG Dinka farm workers were discovered in Qwat Salem was even demobilized and state, Rizik Zacharia,31 had first proposed Faranjallah, further heightening tensions

6 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 and triggering revenge attacks by Dinka The Fertit opposition among them. Fertit opposition cells were youths on Fertit neighbourhoods in Wau ­regroups and joins the established around Wau, on the roads a few days later. Seven people were leading south and west out of Wau town, killed, many more were injured, and over SPLM-IO and in the areas south-west of Wau, with 400 homes were destroyed (AI, 2013, In the aftermath of the arrests tensions an initial headquarters established in 43 pp. 11–12). It remains unclear if or how continued to simmer. These tensions Numatima. These cells, under the local security forces were involved in the were not helped by the sentences handed ­auspices of the Fertit Lions, were quickly violence. Some Fertit believe that the down by a special court made up of three reinforced by groups from the Golo, ­incident at Faranjallah, and subsequent judges from Juba who were brought in to Ndogo, Bai, Kresh, Banda, Yulu, Forogi, rumours regarding the mutilation of the investigate the events that led to the Shere, Bongo (Bussere), and ­Balanda bodies and more murders in the area, ­arrests and try the accused. A total of Viiri/Boor communities from the areas were fabricated to justify the Dinka silenc- 11 Fertit youths were sentenced to death south-west of Wau, Dem Zubeir, and Raja ing opposition to the move to ­Baggari by hanging, the chief of Faranjallah was (see Map 1). (AI, 2013, pp. 11–13). sentenced to ten years in prison, and While the mobilization and establish- After these incidents the (Dinka) presi- several MPs and other youths were given ment of Fertit opposition cells outside of dent of South Sudan, Salva Kiir, visited prison sentences (Sudan Tribune, 2013). Wau town were inspired by local con- Wau and made a speech at the Wau Meanwhile, in December 2013 the cur- cerns and events, they were also heavily ­National Stadium on 24 December 2012 rent civil war began with clashes in Juba, influenced by the ongoing civil war and (GreenAcity Media, 2012). Although the leading to the deterioration of security the realization that some issues were re- official message of the speech was related across the country and a heightening of lated to the wider national agenda. The to peaceful coexistence between commu- tensions between communities of differ- Fertit recognized that any solution would nities, most of the Fertit community inter- ent ethnicities, particularly between the need to be brokered at the central level, preted it as a threat. This perception was Dinka and the Nuer: at the political negotiation table. based on the president’s stating that he Shortly after the outbreak of the civil Therefore, the then deputy speaker of could destroy the town in an hour, that he war Paul Malong (a Dinka from Aweil) was the Wau state parliament, Peter Tingo,44 himself would have fought the protesters appointed SPLA chief of general staff. contacted SPLM/A-IO leader Riek Machar ‘who had created the problem’ if he had The appointment created anxiety among via contacts in Sudan and an agreement been there, and that the Fertit should ‘go SPLA Nuer soldiers, because Malong was was made in 2014 for the Fertit to join back to their place’. He also stated that the SPLM/­A-IO. The deal was seen to be he would ‘give all the power to the army alleged to have played a key role in organ- mutually advantageous. The SPLM/A-IO and allow them to run the place’ if there izing the killing of Nuer civilians in Juba 41 would be able to broaden its representa- was any further dissent.37 in December 2013. Fighting broke out tion across the country, use additional Regardless of Kiir’s intended mean- between Dinka and Nuer soldiers on 25 garrison sites and other resources, and ing,38 the WBEG state government inter- April 2014 in the Mapel barracks close to bring another group under its umbrella in preted the speech as giving it carte Wau (see Map 1). This had a direct impact support of its claim to be a non-ethnic and blanche to crack down on the Fertit oppo- upon the Fertit, and some 800 civilians inclusive movement, thereby increasing sition. In 2013, in the weeks following the fled to the UN base in Wau (OCHA, 2016). deaths of the six Dinka, police and officers While the exact reason for the clashes its leverage in negotiations with Juba. For from the National Security Service (NSS) remains contested, it is likely to have their part the Fertit saw two fundamental arrested over a hundred people. These been triggered by Dinka community advantages to joining the SPLM/A-IO: they arrests included youths, politicians, civil members attacking a Nuer SPLA trainee would be included in national political society actors, community members, in a local market (Small Arms Survey, negotiations through the Agreement on media workers,39 academics, and mem- 2014). After the clashes 100–500 Nuer the Resolution of the Conflict in South 45 bers of the police, prison services, and SPLA soldiers deserted their posts, fear- Sudan (ARCSS) peace process, with a fire brigade accused of failing to stop the ing further attacks.42 federal system of government as their protest, or of having acted in support of After these events, and a marked end goal; and they would gain access to the protesters who blocked the roads ­increase in the repression by state and resources. They viewed national inclusion (Radio Tamazuj, 2013; Committee to Pro- national security services of local media as particularly important following the tect Journalists, 2013). All but one of those and civil society, the Fertit began to quietly presidential decree increasing the number arrested were Fertit (HRW, 2013), which mobilize, activating old networks and of states in South Sudan from ten to 28 further heightened ethnic tensions in the preparing for what they considered to be (GRSS, 2015; Mayom, 2015), thereby sig- town. After these events many (male) the inevitable conflict with Juba. The exact nificantly altering the ethnic balance in Fertit youths fled to areas surrounding timeline of events remains unclear, but in some areas, including WBEG (see Box 1, Wau, fearing arrest and reprisals. These late 2014 several prominent Fertit fled and Maps 2 and 3).46 Access to resources— youths make up some of the core forces Wau under the threat of arrest by security in particular military resources—would of the current Fertit opposition.40 forces. Ashab Khamis, a founding mem­ also be necessary to ensure the survival ber of the Qwat Salem and currently a of the opposition and the protection of leading opposition commander, was its territory.

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 7 At the same time as the civil war began ing crops and terrorizing the local popu- The campaign intensified with the arrival to spread to previously untouched areas lation.49 Letters and verbal statements of of the new Commander of Division 5, Maj. in 2015, land insecurity spread rapidly protest were sent to the Fertit governor, Gen. Thayip Gatluak Tai Tai,52 and new and would eventually contribute to a crisis Rizik Zacharia, in Wau state, but as the troops mainly from Aweil, Aweil East, Twic, in Wau in 2016. Livelihoods in former cattle belonged to senior Dinka SPLM/A Gogrial, Tonj, Eastern Lakes, Western WBEG depend mostly on sedentary agri- members from (former) Warrap state, the Lakes, and Gok states (formerly NBEG, culture, and the annual migration routes complaints were ignored.50 ­Violence broke Warrap, and Lakes states). These troops of cattle from formerly NBEG, Warrap, and out between the farming communities and were mainly badly clothed and armed Lakes states into farming land around cattle keepers, with government-aligned youths.53 Reports of violence, character- Wau has historically caused tension be- militia reportedly joining the cattle keep- ized by the widespread destruction of tween the predominantly Fertit and Luo ers with support from the SPLA’s 5th Divi- property, the looting of food stores, the farmers and the pastoralist Dinka. Ten- sion.51 As a result, communities from the burning of crops, and the displacing of sions between farmers and cattle keepers affected areas fled into the bush, with local populations, emerged from villages are not uncommon,47 and elders have many seeking support from or joining south and south-west of Wau town, and brokered numerous accords designed to the Fertit Lions. In May 2015 these local tens of thousands of civilians fled into the regulate these movements and control tensions led to the first recorded direct town (HRW, 2016). The SPLA then sub- access to grazing land, but they are often clashes between SPLA forces and the stantially increased its presence in Fertit broken. Indeed the tensions sparked a Fertit under the umbrella of the SPLA-IO areas of Wau town54 at the start of 2016 confrontation that put Wau and former (Deng, 2015). and residents began to report increased WBEG at the centre of the civil war: Although the government and SPLM/­ harassment and sexual violence.55 At the In 2015 cattle from the former Warrap A-IO had signed the ARCSS peace deal in same time the number of Fertit being and Lakes areas began to arrive in the Juba in August 2015 (Al Jazeera, 2015), the ­detained by security forces increased area of Bazia, south of Wau town, accom- government used the farmer-pastoralist (HRW, 2016). Civil society members pro- panied by well-armed Galweng cattle clashes as a pretext to launch counter- tested, which led to further arrests, based keepers.48 These cattle keepers failed to insurgency operations in the areas south on accusations of their supporting ‘rebels’ uphold local accords, reportedly destroy- and south-west of Wau in December 2015. (Radio Tamazuj, 2015).

Map 2 The 28 States of South Sudan as of 2015

SUDAN SOUTH BLUE KORDOFAN NILE SOUTH EAST WEST DARFUR DARFUR KORDOFAN EASTERN WESTERNWESTERN NILE NILE Abyei RUWENG AWEIL EAST TWIC NORTHERN LIECH LATJOOR WESTERN GOGRIAL LOL AWEIL BIEH (FANGAK) EASTERN TONJ SSOUTHERNOUTHERN BIEH ETHIOPIA WAU LIECH GOK JONGLEI EASTERN CENTRAL WESTERN LAKES BOMA AFRICAN LAKES REPUBLIC GBUDWE TEREKEKA AMADI MARIDI NAMORUNYANG Juba IMATONG International boundary JUBEK South Sudan state boundary as of 2015 DEMOCRATIC YEL KENYA Sudan state boundary REPUBLIC RIVER National capital 100 km OF THE CONGO UGANDA Source: OCHA (2015)

8 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 On 18 February 2016 clashes broke out to the west of Wau town, following ru- Box 1 The demographic shift in WBEG mours that several Dinka had been killed. Dinka youths attacked local civilians, and The 2015 national decree that increased up new Lol state. With the inclusion of the soldiers returning from operations outside the number of states from 10 to 28 (GRSS, two more densely populated Aweil coun- town came to their support, setting 2015; see Map 2) and then 32, signifi- ties, the new boundaries of Lol state tilted cantly shifted the ethnic power balance in the demographic balance in favour of the ­numerous houses alight in the area of South Sudan. It has been a key point of Dinka (Map 3, green shading), making the Hai Lokoloko (see Map 4). Soldiers fired contestation during the peace negotia- indigenous Fertit tribes (blue-grey shading) indiscriminately on civilians, killing two tions, and has been blamed for fuelling a minority in what they see as their ances- 56 men in front of a police station. Further much of the conflict (HRW, 2017). Analy- tral lands.60 killings and executions were reported and sis of its impact indicates that the new This is not the first time that Raja county security deteriorated, forcing civilians to national structure essentially reorganized has been politically penalized. In 1973 it abandon their homes and seek refuge in the country along ethnic lines, with a civil lost its headquarters to Aweil and its par- other parts of town (HRW, 2016). Follow- society member calling it ‘a form of gerry­ liamentary constituency to a Dinka politi- ing an SPLA raid on the hospital that led mandering that will exacerbate South cian (Thomas, 2010, p. 105). This latest to the reported ‘disappearance’ of Sudan’s problem of tribalism over nation- change is viewed locally as yet another alism’ (Su, 2016). wounded patients (on the grounds that part of a series of attempts to change the any wounded person was likely to be a Like other parts of the country, the crea- structure and ethnic make-up of this part of former WBEG. rebel),57 patients and staff alike aban- tion of the 28 states affected former WBEG doned the hospital. By mid-March over significantly, particularly the newly created Local communities widely rejected the Lol State (see Map 3). Under the new con- 60,000 civilians from in and outside the creation of Lol state. Fertit chiefs in Raja figuration WBEG was split into two: Wau met shortly after the decree appeared town were displaced in Wau (OCHA, 2016). state and Lol state. Wau maintained its and issued a statement contesting what By the end of May 2016 governor Elias status as the capital of Wau state, which they viewed as the ‘annexation’ of Aweil 58 Waya Nyipuoc confirmed that SPLA sol- consisted of what used to be Wau, Jur North and Aweil West counties to Raja, diers had killed at least a hundred civil- River, and Baggari counties (previously citing cultural differences (Marcello, n.d.; ians, and that he had reported the cases Wau county), but Raja county was put Sudan Tribune, 2015). Dinka chiefs from to the government (Wani, 2016; HRW, together with Dinka dominated Aweil Aweil North and Aweil West also opposed 2016). The SPLA leadership denied that North and Aweil West counties to make the move (Agoth, 2016). any SPLA soldiers had committed abuses (Wani, 2016). Meanwhile, there had been Map 3 The demographic balance of Lol state, 2018 no enforcement of the ceasefire signed in August 2015 between the SPLA and local SPLM/A-IO groups. In an attempt to SUDAN block the establishment of garrison sites for SPLA-IO forces in former WBEG, the government then denied that SPLM/A-IO forces were in the region altogether, fur- ther complicating matters (Ali, 2016). AWEIL Meanwhile, in Wau town tensions con- Aweil North Gok Machar EAST tinued with multiple violent incidents re- Marial-Baai Nyamlell Wanyjok corded on a daily basis.59 With security Raja Aweil Malualkon forces unable or unwilling to stop the vio- West lence that was targeting civilians in Fertit LOL Aweil areas of the town, the latter began to take Raja AWEIL security into their own hands, fighting back by attacking perceived perpetrators SOUTHSOUTH SUSUDANDAN in self-defence. This further increased CENTRAL the cycle of revenge killings, as security AFRICAN in Wau town and its surroundings deterio- REPUBLIC Dem Zubeir Wau rated even more. More densely inhabited These tensions eventually escalated area/mostly Dinka Less densely inhabited WAU into the violence described at the begin- area/mostly Fertit ning of this paper on 24 June 2016. It is International boundary widely believed that troops of the SPLA’s LOL New state Raja Former county 5th ­Division supported the attack on the Capital towns Fertit in Wau town and that the then divi- Other towns GBUDWE 50 km sional commander, Maj. Gen. Thayip Gatluak Tai Tai, ordered it, with the sup- Source: Pomarico (2018) port of top-level government officials in

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 9 Juba (Golla, 2016).61 The Fertit and the in- ternational community interpreted the Box 2 Conflict dynamics in Raja attack as a collective punishment and retaliation for an SPLM/A-IO attack on Although it has been highly affected by generally—it is unacceptable that the JEM Raja nine days earlier (Sudan Tribune, the 28/32 state structure (as detailed in would fight them at the behest of the 2016a; also see Box 2), and that it was Box 1; see also Map 3), the issues of the South Sudanese government, which, as wider Raja area are regularly overlooked the SPLM/A, fought against the JEM in the born of government frustration that efforts due to the low presence of humanitarian civil war. As a result of Zacharia’s actions, to push the opposition back outside Wau actors, the paucity of information about the Fertit in Raja are currently fighting not were failing.62 Raja, and the limited access to areas out- only the Juba government, but also the side of Raja town.68 Yet the conflict in Raja JEM. So much is Zacharia hated, that peo- plays a particular role in the history of, and ple say it is more likely that Raja town will the current conflict in, former WBEG. For be attacked when the governor is in town; The current state of affairs­ example it was the attack on Raja on 16 the Fertit opposition’s deep-seated per- and prospects for peace June 2016 (Sudan Tribune, 2016a) that sonal animosity towards make him a precipitated the violence in Wau that start- highly prized target.71 A creeping takeover: ed on 24 June, and the area around Raja The Raja area is also important to the has also been a strategic rear base for the changes to the ethnic SPLM/­A-IO for two other reasons. Firstly, Fertit oppo­sition. The area is vast and the area is home to many illegal smuggling make-up of Wau sparsely populated, and road infrastruc- routes and markets. Trade in diamonds, ture is poor, making it ­advantageous ter- gold, and arms among the Democratic Since June 2016 the situation in Wau and rain to surreptitiously operate from. It has Republic of the Congo (DRC), the Central its surroundings has remained largely in long been rumoured that various training African Republic (CAR), South Sudan, and flux, though events since November 2018 camps for Sudanese oppo­sition groups Sudan is all concentrated around the could give rise to cautious optimism fol- such as the Darfuri militia, the Justice and borders between CAR, South Sudan, and Equality Movement (JEM), and SPLM/A-IO lowing meetings between opposition Sudan,72 with the enclave of Kafia Kingi are located in the area and that supplies and government in Wau town under the near Raja being an important but disputed have been flown into remote areas of area for this trade.73 It is through these auspices of the RARCSS (Mednick, 2018a). Raja that are completely beyond the reach routes and markets that many of the The government continues to hold Wau of any authorities. Fertit’s weapons and am­­munition are and Raja towns and has recaptured pre- 74 Raja also poses an additional frustration obtained. viously held opposition territory in Baggari for the Fertit opposition. The current gov- The second reason is the linkage that has 63 in recent and ongoing offensives. These ernor of Lol state is Rizik Zacharia, the developed between the Western Equatoria offensives are undertaken in violation of former governor of WBEG state before it Azande opposition under the SPLM/A-IO multiple ceasefires that have been signed was split into two. Rizik is directly blamed based out of the Yambio area (former over the years, including a ‘permanent’ by the Fertit for the 2012 crisis and subse- Western Equatoria which is now Gbudwe 69 one that was signed on 27 June 2018 and quent events (see ‘Resurgence of ethnic state) and the Fertit opposition in the Raja tensions and violence: the proposed move area.75 Following events at the end of 2016, violated within hours (Al Jazeera, 2018).64 of county headquarters in 2012’, above). senior Azande commanders and their There have been sustained, extremely­ Although a Fertit himself, he is deeply un­ soldiers made their way to the Raja area, ­violent clashes following renewed SPLA popular with his constituency, members where they remained until ordered back to incursions into opposition territory around of which see him as a traitor and accuse their original positions at the beginning of both Wau and Raja. The most violent of him of having sold out to the Dinka in 2018. Although the circumstances of their these occurred in April 2017 when an SPLA return for his continued hold on power. stay in the Raja area remain disputed,76 it ­offensive into Baggari led to the deaths The Fertit’s distrust of Rizik is exacerbated is clear that the Fertit opposition hosted by his use of members of the JEM as per- the Azande and facilitated fresh supplies of several senior SPLA soldiers, including sonal bodyguards and as auxiliary forces of ammunition and firearms for them Maj. Gen. Matur Chut Dhuol, who was the to bolster local security services.70 JEM throughout their stay in the area.77 The co­­ head of military logistics and the brother members have been used by the SPLA and operation between the Azande and Fertit of the Western Lakes governor (Africans by the governor directly as personal mili- serve to form a strong block of SPLM/A-IO Press, 2017). As a result, government tias and bodyguards in offensives against opposition to Juba that spans the entire ­security forces in Wau carried out revenge the SPLM/A-IO in Raja as recently as 2018. western part of South Sudan. This opposi- killings and collective punishments, lead- For the Fertit—given the community’s tion displays significant strength, and pro- close ties with Darfur and Sudan more vides for greater leverage in negotiations. ing to the deaths of civilians, the burning of houses and neighbourhoods perceived to be Fertit, and the arrest of youths (CTSAMM, 2017, p. 5, sec. 3) and some IO forces have been pushed out of large Wau town (see Map 4). Many Fertit remain humanitarian aid workers.65 By September areas of Baggari since October 2018, but in the UNMISS PoC site, local collective 2018 the SPLA66 had pushed deep into still control areas to the south and far centres, and outside the town.78 Some the areas around Mboro and into Baggari, south-west of Wau town, as well as most sources, mainly government officials and often violently displacing civilians, of the area around Raja. the UNMISS leadership, who have a ­destroying civilian infrastructure such as The constant violence has led to con- vested interest in portraying normalcy in markets, and occupying humanitarian tinued displacement from and the steady order to be able to close the PoC site and infrastructure such as clinics.67 SPLM/A- depopulation of Fertit and Luo areas in collective centres, claim that things are

10 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 improving and that those who had fled Opposition fissures: National Unity (TGoNU). After the fighting their homes are returning to the town. in Juba in July 2016 Tingo made his way However the stark reality is that those the internal struggle for back to Khartoum and was subsequently entering the town are mainly women who leadership promoted to secretary-general of the depend on local markets and children SPLM-IO, which is one of the organiza- going to school. Many men, especially As the struggle continues at the national tion’s top internal political posts. Machar young men, still feel it is too unsafe to level, relationships between the Fertit has also ensured that the Fertit are direct­ leave the PoC site for fear of being tar- opposition and the SPLM/A-IO, and even ­ly represented at the negotiation table. 79 geted. In the evenings streams of among the Fertit themselves, could be Peter Marcello87 has been the top Fertit people return from town to the PoC site more frayed than publicly depicted. representative at the peace negotiations and collective centres because they are On the positive side, SPLM-IO prom- sponsored by the Intergovernmental Au- still too scared to sleep at home. Two ises to give the Fertit ­ac­cess to a political thority on Development (IGAD). This kind years after the June 2016 attacks there is platform and representation at the high- of participation is also advantageous to scant hope that the situation will improve est levels of governance have so far been the SPLM/A-IO: the Fertit occupy one of in the near future, especially taking into kept. Peter Tingo, who brokered the deal the last remaining significant blocks of account the recent offensives outside of for the Fertit to join the SPLM/­A-IO, was 88 Wau town, although recent meetings be- opposition-held territory in South Sudan, the first SPLM-IO governor of former WBEG tween the two sides have led to cautious and having Fertit representatives at the optimism from some. Those who have the and was part of the team that returned highest levels helps to create the impres- means have left Wau for Sudan and other to Juba with Riek Machar in early 2016 as sion of a broader, multi-ethnic South locations,80 while people seeking refuge part of the Transitional Government of ­Sudanese movement.89 in rural areas have little interest in return- ing to the town due to the security risks. As a result, there may now be a greater Map 4 Areas of residence in Wau town before the displacement to protected 81 presence of Dinka in Wau than of Fertit. sites since 2016 Indeed it has also become apparent that in the few neighbourhoods that are be- ginning to see an influx of people, these 95% of displaced Percentage of the from Wau town population in the residents are often neither the original PoC and collective inhabitants nor from among the Fertit 5% of displaced sites from each area community. Dinka, families of security from surrounding >11 force members, and to a lesser extent areas 5–10 1–4 members of other tribes brought in to Non-Fertit/Luo bolster the security services in Wau, have residential areas occupied many homes and are beginning Hai Bilpam Grinti to purchase commercial spaces, too.82 and Komlang Sources have also observed wealthy indi- viduals from the Dinka community buying Hai businesses and prime lots in areas such Protection Jedid of civilians Hai Sika as Wau market, the area of Aweil Jedid, site Hadid and around Wau airport,83 leading to their Hai Aweil Hai Daraja taking control of many of the main finan- Jedi Hai Dinka cial interests in the town. At the same time Hai Fatal and local security forces in Wau also remain Hai Zande Hai Kresh and under the command of a Dinka divisional Hai Kalavario Nimra Talata Hai Hai and Hai Falata commander from former Warrap state.84 Inwas Hai Bafra Hai Fears that a Dinka takeover of Wau is Korgana Jalaba Jedid Hai silently under way as the repression con- Mosephine Hai Mosephine tinues appear to be well founded. In 2017 Lokoloko Hai Jebel IshakIshak Ju the national government’s director gen- and Hai Jou PolicePolice r Hai Salam eral of internal security, Akol Kur Koch,85 had an angry meeting with a senior UN Hai Hai Khamsin Jazeera MotamediyaMotamediya human rights official regarding the crack- Hai Jebel down on and arrests of Fertit in Wau in Keer Hai Hai Nazareth 2017, including the arrest of humanitarian Kosti staff. During this meeting Koch reportedly shouted that ‘Wau belongs to the Dinka’, Hai Bazia a view that many Fertit and other national Hai Bagari Jedid Jedid New Site and international observers believe is 1 km common among Dinka elites.86

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 11 Ujang, in practice the command over the Wau area has been split. Khamis con- Perhaps more worringly ... trolled the area south-west of Wau—the wider Baggari area—while Ujang con- the Fertit also face challenges in trolled the Bazia areas directly south of Wau as well as the area around Mboro, their own military structure.” leading to tensions within the Fertit com- mand structure.98 This awkward division of command However, while the SPLM/A-IO’s polit- On the other hand, the actions of some is worsened by other problems, too. ical commitments have been upheld, their individuals have negatively affected the ­Although Khamis and Ujang are Fertit and military ones have not. The main frustra- movement. For example Lt. Gen. Ashab both hail from the Balanda tribe, they are tion voiced by Fertit opposition members Khamis, one of the founders of the Qwat from different clans.99 The Balanda from is related to the promised supply of weap- Salem in the 1980s, assumed initial com- Baggari, where Khamis is from, believe ons and ammunition from the SPLA-IO. mand of the Fertit Lions when they formed that they have borne the brunt of the Almost four years after the Fertit joined the in 2014 after the Fertit joined the SPLA-IO. suffering and invested the most in the umbrella adequate supplies have failed His objective has always been clear: to Fertit struggle;100 Khamis himself was part to materialize, the reasons for which are protect Fertit communities from violence of Qwat Salem and the original Fertit oppo- unclear.90 Organizing supply lines into and encroachment by other tribes, in sition in the 1980s. The change in opera- relevant areas has undoubtedly proved to particular the Dinka. For him, the current tional leadership resulting in the appoint- be complicated for the SPLM/­A-IO leader- struggle is a direct extension of the ment of Ujang, someone considered to ship; but resources intended for the Fertit struggle from the 1980s and a response be more junior, was thus deemed to be have often reportedly also been sold or to the events of 2012 (see ‘Resurgence unacceptable. Although there has been bartered by senior Nuer SPLM/A-IO mili- of ethnic tensions and violence: the pro- no direct confrontation between the two tary officials before they reached their posed move of county headquarters in commanders and their respective troops, intended destination.91 The Fertit oppo- 2012’, above).94 the situation has led to serious tensions. sition has therefore organized its own The SPLA-IO forces in former Western Indeed the fractious relationship be- supply lines, obtaining military supplies Bahr el Ghazal are structured within a tween the two ­officers and their ­commands from sources other than the SPLM/A-IO sector (Sector 7) with two divisions; 6A are not new, with tensions between the leadership. It has done this successfully, for Wau and 6B for Raja, each headed by two already appearing in January 2017 due to its extensive pre-existing networks a division commander.95 Following the following the killing of a national Cease- in Sudan and its ability to take advantage clashes in Baggari in April 2017 that led fire and Transitional Security Arrange- of smuggling networks linking CAR, South to the loss of the Fertit Lions’ forward ments Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) Sudan, and Darfur and related clandestine ­operating base in Bringi, the SPLM/­A-IO liaison officer101 in Wau town in January regional markets (see Box 2). That said, leadership restructured its forces in 2017 (Eye Radio, 2017). It is widely Lt. Gen. Khamis has clearly indicated former WBEG and Khamis was promoted ­believed that the Fertit Lions killed him during recent meetings with the Govern- from divisional commander of Division on suspicion that he was working with ment that his orders originate directly 6A (covering Wau) to the head of admin- Machar’s replacement as national first from Machar, and that at this point in vice president Taban Deng Gai,102 who time their affiliation continues to lie with istration and finance for Sector 7, and was attempting to recruit the opposition the SPLM/A-IO opposition faction.92 subsequently to overall sector commander 96 Perhaps more worringly than their for Sector 7. This promotion would have outside Wau town by sending in agents frustrations with the SPLA-IO leadership, required him to give up his command post with cash to incentivize their defection 103 the Fertit also face challenges in their as division commander in Baggari to Maj. (Joakino, 2017). It remains unclear own military structure. On the one hand, Gen. Abdalla Ujang. Khamis refused to whether the killing was ordered and by cohesion across the ranks in the Fertit leave the area and give over the division whom, but it led to confrontations be- Lions is relatively solid. Unlike in the commander post. For him, giving up his tween the two major generals and in- Equatorias, for example, where the senior role as commander would have meant creased distrust. As a result, in July 2017 SPLM/A-IO leadership contains both Nuer abandoning his leadership of and duty to Khamis had several of Ujang’s officers and Equatorian commanders, leading to his people and his constituency. Until his arrested on suspicion of treason as they tensions, the Fertit have maintained com- promotion to likely join the Joint Military were crossing Baggari to Bazia. All of plete command and control over them- Ceasefire Commission or Joint Defence them were executed after a military trial. selves, without any outside appointments. Board for SPLM/A-IO under the RARCSS in Since then, despite attempts to broker a Military orders are provided by a command November 2018, and his transfer to Khar­ reconciliation, the two commands have structure often referred to as ‘the radio toum, Khamis ­directly commanded the remained divided, with each side blaming room’, which is thought to be situated greater Baggari area.97 As a result, while the other. This has also affected the de- outside South Sudan.93 official command of the area belonged to livery of services to the local population.

12 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 For example, military officers in Mboro the elites’ (SSOA, 2018; Radio Tamazuj, agreement, all state and local government and Besillia under Ujang’s command re- 2018) and thus offers little hope in terms control will be decided by a set ratio fused to allow referrals of malnourished of lasting peace. whereby the current government will children to a stabilization centre in Ngisa The SSOA’s statement does have remain in control of the majority (55 per in June 2018, which fell under Khamis’s some merit. The 2018 RARCSS deal fo- cent) of local government positions and command, citing problems between the cuses mainly on unrealistic power-sharing will be able to appoint people to fill two commands as the reason.104 In the arrangements and an unwieldy govern- these positions as it sees fit (IGAD, 2018, face of subsequent government offen- ance mechanism to be led by a president pp. 24–25, sec. 1.16). The SPLM-IO will be sives, however, the two sides of the Fertit (Salva Kiir), a first vice president (Riek given 27 per cent of positions, the SSOA opposition command in Wau have recon- Machar), and four additional vice presi- 10 per cent, and other political parties ciled for operational and practical reasons dents (IGAD, 2018, p. 7, sec. 1.5). The prac- 8 per cent. This set ratio does not bode On the 12th November 2018, with Khamis ticalities of such a model combined with well for groups such as the Fertit, given pending departure from the Baggari area, the personalities of the six post holders107 the government’s seizure of much of their a new division commander was appointed make the likelihood of successful govern- land and most of their political positions, to Division 6A; Maj. Gen. Daniel Joseph ance highly questionable. The security including governorships and commands Dongo. The new division commander was arrangements and other provisions also of security forces in Wau and Lol states. previously a brigade commander in the suggest a replication of the modalities of The provision stating that the 2015 ARCSS peace agreement,108 Baggari area and likely one of Khamis’s in sharing State and local govern- 105 which ultimately failed and heavily com- protégées and trusted soldiers. It re- ment positions the Parties shall take promised the security of the civilian popu- mains unclear what the role of Ujang is into account the relative prominence lation of South Sudan. Considerable scep- and whether this will continue to exacer- each Party has in the respective ticism thus surrounds the new RARCSS bate internal tensions within the Fertit State or county (IGAD, 2018, p. 25, deal, scepticism which has since been military. sec. 1.16.4) vindicated by the parties’ failure to adhere to the latest ceasefire (Mednick, 2018b; is also of concern. This incentivizes the Prospects for a mediated Fick and Dimo, 2018). seizure of contested areas before the peace in Wau Two other key issues—the creation of start of a transitional period. 28/32 states, and the opposition’s rep- In addition to the above, it is clear that To date, efforts to find a solution to the resentation in local government (and, by the RARCSS involves a trade-off between current South Sudan conflict have mainly extension, policy-making)—are also likely the parties if it is to work. The Nuer and focused on finding a national solution to re­main unaddressed. According to the Equatorians have the largest representa- through the IGAD-sponsored peace pro- RARCSS, the issue of the 28/32 states is tion and leverage, considering the territory cess. Four years after the start of the cur- supposed to be tackled through the crea- they represent. Their demands therefore rent civil war, however, most of the country tion of an Independent Boundary Com- have to be taken into account, but to do remains in a state of insecurity, with regu- mission (IGAD, 2018, pp. 21–24, sec. 1.15). this other issues and demands have to be lar confrontations between government The commission of 15 members will sacrificed. The Fertit are a minority; their and opposition forces despite the signing decide on the number of states and the demands and the issue of Wau could be of multiple ceasefires and peace accords. boundaries of each. If it fails to reach an sacrificed as a (relatively) small trade-off Sustainable solutions remain absent be- agreement, the matter will be put to a that would mean a lot to the Dinka, and cause none of the actors have been willing referendum (p. 23, sec. 1.15.14). However, may be enough to se­cure an agreement to implement the basics of any of the considering the long-standing deadlock on other interests.109 The continued agreements that have been reached. during peace negotiations on the issue ceasefire violations outside of Wau town The prospects of finding a solution to of the number of states, the likelihood (Fick and Dimo, 2018), and the perpetual the Fertit grievances as part of the Revital- that the commission will manage to come lack of accountability for them, are an in- ized ARCSS (RARCSS) signed on 12 Sep- to a consensual decision is small. Mean- dication of the extent to which the Dinka tember 2018 between the government and while, most territorial control rests with would like to dominate the former Fertit- opposition parties remain slim. Indeed the Juba government, with the areas most controlled areas. the the official statement by opposition affected by the boundary decision—such Despite the above and the markedly factions under the South Sudan Opposi- as former WBEG—remaining contested, slow process of implementation of the tion Alliance (SSOA)—most notably largely inaccessible, and volatile. How RARCSS, a first attempt at reconciliation Thomas Cirrillo’s National Salvation Front, representative any referendum would be between opposition and the Government Lam Akol’s National Democratic Move- under these circumstances is unclear. in Wau is taking place. On the 22nd ment, and part of the former detainees On the issue of representation, the ­November 2018, CTSAMM brokered a faction under Pagan Amum—rejected the RARCSS contains no attempt to reverse meeting between Khamis and his repre- agreement.106 According to the dissenting the Juba government’s control over South sentatives and Maj. Gen. Keer Kiir Keer parties, the accord ‘has remained a power Sudanese territory established since the and the governor of Wau, Angelo Taban. sharing agreement between elites and for outbreak of the civil war. According to the Though the meeting was filled with the

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 13 ing of different perspectives on history, the national conflict, and the local con- The prospects of finding a text, thereby breaking down some com­ mon misconceptions and prejudices. solution to the Fertit grievances ... This initiative has had some success, ­although it is understood that tensions remain slim.” outside of Wau between the Fertit oppo- sition and the SPLA have direct impact on security in the town. The need for ­political right words, commitments to peace, and church denominations have been Fertit, mediation is, therefore, also critical to a ceasefire, it was also clear that deep the leadership of the dioceses and the ensuring stability and peace.115 mistrust still exists between the two sides. bishops have largely been Dinka ap­ Reportedly the conversation was filled pointees.111 with accusations regarding responsibility This has led to tensions over the hand­ Conclusion for continued fighting, and after the meet- ling of the conflict in Wau and Lol states, ing Khamis indicated that he remains and disagreements as to how to approach The Fertit struggle is grounded in a desire wary of the government’s sincerity, stating mediation. The experience of the late for self-determination; that is, a wish to that “It’s trying to use force to gain more bishop of the Catholic diocese, Rudolph define their own political status, preserve their identity, and govern their land and ground in order to prepare for elections” Deng Majak, illustrates the challenge.112 people in the face of a fear of being mar- (Mednick, 2018a). Since then, more meet- Bishop Majak was accused internally and ginalized by political elites from the Dinka ings between opposition representatives by people in the community of failing to tribe. This fear has deep-seated roots in and government officials in Wau town have mediate in the 2012 crisis, choosing the the past that have been reinforced at key taken place. It remains to be seen whether side of the government, and failing his moments in more recent history. The crea- the fragile detente will continue to hold. constituency. As a result he lost credibility tion of the 28/32 state structure in 2015, Parallel to the slow progress made at and was unable to invigorate a local, for example, was in many ways a realiza- the national level, local peacebuilding church-led peace process. Bishops of tion of these fears. initiatives have been implemented across other church denominations have also The Fertit are not alone in fearing the country involving various actors and had similar problems. At the same time, Dinka hegemony. The Shilluk in Upper with varying degrees of success. There is there is a reluctance to hand over respon- Nile to the west have similar beliefs re- some hope that a civil society-led initia- sibility for mediation to local and indige- garding the takeover of their kingdom by tive could work in former WBEG in the nous church leaders. The suggestion of the Padeng Dinka, and the Equatorians future.110 The church, representing multi- making the Fertit administrator of the to the south have for decades demanded ple denominations, could also spearhead Catholic church, Father Marko Mangu,113 federalism for similar reasons. Develop- mediations. It plays an important role in responsible for a locally initiated peace ments since the formation of the SPLA South Sudan generally, and in Wau its dialogue was reportedly blocked by the and the second Sudanese civil war have influence is paramount. Even during the senior leadership of an interfaith council evidenced the conviction among minority height of the violence of June 2016, for in Wau due to personality clashes and tribes in South Sudan that they are at risk 114 example, church compounds where com- divisions based on ethnicity. The new unless they physically fight for their own munities had fled for protection were con- governor of Wau state, Angelo Taban survival, and it is these beliefs that are sidered off limits to attackers. Biajo, has put a request for a church-led fuelling the current conflict. Unfortunately, however, successful mediation on hold. As such, a church-led The current civil war has many ‘layers’ church-led efforts elsewhere, such as in mediated solution remains unlikely in or causes ranging from land insecurity Gbudwe state, have not yet been repli- Wau as of mid-2018. and fear of marginalization, to a desire cated in Wau. This is mainly due to the Despite these setbacks other positive for control over both power and local and diversity of ethnic groups in the former initiatives are taking place in Wau. Since central resources. Such a complex mixture WBEG region. Historically Wau was the 2014 civil society groups such as the of issues cannot be resolved by putting in capital of the Bahr el Ghazal region Community Empowerment for Progress place power-sharing arrangements among under the rule of Khartoum. Many of the Organization have been working on inter- the elites, nor by the imposition of top- churches that set up their dioceses in communal peace initiatives at a local down security arrangements that do not the region in the early 20th century used level, recognizing that a central challenge take into account the long-standing ani- Wau as a base, while also encompassing is the different and sometimes-conflicting mosity and distrust among the current congregations with a majority of Dinka perceptions of communities’ shared his- armed actors. Neither can peace be im- members in neighbouring states such as tory. Programmes have focused on bring- posed by (external) actors who have a Aweil, Gogrial, and Warrap (see Map 1). ing together elders, youths, and women limited understanding of the intricacies As a result, although much of the clergy from different ethnicities in various af- of the underlying causes of conflict in and those who administer the various fected locations to foster an understand- South Sudan.

14 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 Real, long-term peace will only be struggle will continue, including for the Abbreviations and achieved if all South Sudanese agree to Fertit. Even if Riek Machar returns to take accept one common history from the mul- up his post as first vice president, how acronyms­ tiple, sometimes competing, narratives. much influence he will have over policy ARCSS Agreement on the Resolution of It will be important to address these pre- decisions and the resolution of key the Conflict in South Sudan existing narratives head on by bringing issues—considering the new power- CAR Central African Republic local communities together to resolve sharing structure and split controls over CTSAMM Ceasefire and Transitional decades of violence and fear. Grievances portfolios—is unclear. Meanwhile, differ- ­Security Arrangements Monitoring must be resolved at the local level, there­ ent political avenues to oppose Juba have Mechanism ­by creating a solid foundation for peace become available since 2015. Thomas GRSS Government of the Republic of and for communities to live together Cirrillo—a well-respected Equatorian South Sudan ­harmoniously. Efforts in this direction are leader—is offering an alternative opposi- HEC High Executive Council currently under way through the church tion platform through his own movement IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on (­although not currently in Wau) and civil (the National Salvation Front) and the Development society, with potential for success. SSOA. Together with other political parties JCE Jieng Council of Elders The latest peace agreement (the and the former detainees, this opposition JEM Justice and Equality Movement RARCSS) is unlikely to provide solutions has focused more on politics rather than MP Member of parliament to the long-standing issues of the Fertit— ground-level insurgency, and could offer NBEG Northern Bahr el Ghazal or indeed any other minority communi- a more constructive and peaceful end to NSS National Security Service ties—as several parties who have dis- the conflict. PoC Protection of civilians (site) tanced themselves from it have recog- There are, of course, many unanswer- RARCSS Revitalized Agreement on the nized (SSOA, 2018). While the agreement able questions at this point. Will the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan recognizes that a federal system of govern- RARCSS hold, despite many observers’ SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation ance is a popular demand and that there reservations and the failure to implement Movement/Army is a need to devolve powers (IGAD, 2018, the ceasefire? Will the SPLM/A-IO be able SPLM/A-IO Sudan People’s Liberation p. 7), it remains unclear what this will to deliver on its promises to the various Movement/Army-in-Opposition change in practice while governance con- communities it represents? Will the oppo- SSOA South Sudan Opposition Alliance tinues to be top-heavy and revolve around sition parties manage to present a solid TGoNU Transitional Government of a power-sharing agreement among elites. front against the current government to ­National Unity Exacerbating matters, this recognition is push through policy changes, or will in- UNMISS United Nations Mission in also contradicted by the RARCSS’s provi- fighting undermine the agreement and South Sudan sions on local government, which are distract attention from the ultimate goal WBEG Western Bahr el Ghazal likely to consolidate the skewed power of peace in South Sudan? Will RARCSS, dynamics that have been put in place despite its shortcomings in addressing since the outbreak of the current civil war. local issues, still lead to the end of op- At the same time the allegiance of the position at the local level? And what will Notes Fertit to the SPLM/A-IO platform could those who have rejected it do in the 1 The areas of Hai Nazareth, Hai Ngobu, Hai also be on rocky ground. The Fertit Lions’ future? Kosti, Bazia Jedid, Jebel Rabi, Jebel Khier, allegiance was based on pragmatism and As it stands, the chances of a success- Hai Kamsine, and Baggari Jedid were par- the belief that the local grievances that ful end to the civil war and to local oppo- ticularly affected. inspired their opposition could only be sition to a centrally run governance system 2 The Fertit do not constitute a single ethnic- resolved at the national level. In 2015 the are slim. But the steps needed to allow ity, but are an amalgamation of various in­­ SPLM/A-IO under Riek Machar was the for local solutions to local issues (such as di­genous minority tribes. The term encom- only platform available that offered this introducing fair representation, decentral- passes the Balanda (Viiri, Boor, Baggari), opportunity in addition to the promise of ization to allow for local control, and me- Bongo, Ndogo, Bai, and Kresh tribes. 3 Author interviews with displaced civilians materiel support. Since then, however, diation alternatives from the church and in the protection of civilians (PoC) site and much has changed. The RARCSS has not civil society) are clear. It remains to be collective centres, Wau, June 2016. delivered solutions, resources have not seen whether those at the negotiation 4 This information was gathered from eye- been delivered, fighting continues on the table will pursue these steps, or—as has witness humanitarian personnel on the ground, and the negotiation table has happened in the past—favour short-term ground in Wau during the events described. become crowded. personal gain instead. 5 Multiple author interviews with civilians Continued Fertit allegiance and a suc- in the PoC site and collective centres, Wau cessful end to the fighting will, of course, town, June 2016. depend on the implementation of the 6 Technically, WBEG state no longer exists, RARCSS. If, in contrast, key demands on having been divided into Wau and Lol issues that have fuelled the conflict are states in 2015. It is used in this paper to not addressed, it is likely that the armed refer to events before 2015.

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 15 7 This applies also to the current peace deal: 16 Tom al Nur went on to be a founder of the and have been linked to decisions such as fighting continued in Baggari and parts of Qwat Salem, which is discussed below in the creation of the 28/32 states in 2015, former Central Equatoria, and sporadic note 21. as well as furthering a plan for Dinka domi- clashes in former central Unity state 17 Author interview with a senior UN national nation of South Sudan (author interview ­despite the RARCSS peace deal in Sep- staff member, Juba, May 2018; author with a senior Fertit representative, Wau tember 2018. ­interview with a Fertit civil society leader, town, April 2018; author interviews with 8 The recent establishment of the South Wau town, June 2018. While there is no three opposition members, Baggari, Sep- Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA), repre- written record of these proceedings, Fertit tember 2017). senting a diverse array of communities interviewees referred to this incident in 33 Author interview with a Fertit opposition that have come together in opposition to various conversations and the community leader, Baggari, December 2017; author the current government, illustrates the perceives it to be true. WhatsApp conversation with a senior point. While alliance members are united 18 Author interviews with UN officials and Fertit opposition representative, Septem- in a few common areas—the need for a multiple Fertit representatives from the ber 2017; official Fertit Lions Facebook different leadership in South Sudan and a opposition, the church, and civil society, page (not available since August 2018). new system of governance—all these Wau town and surroundings, 2016–18. 34 See the South Sudan Local Government groups have different, often-localized 19 Author interview with a senior Fertit repre- Act (GRSS, 2009). motivations and reasons for opposing the sentative, Wau town, June 2018. 35 The order reportedly came from the current system imposed by Juba. The same differ- 20 Author interview with a senior Fertit repre- governor of Wau town, Angelo Taban Biajo, ences also exist under the SPLM/A-IO. sentative, Wau town, June 2018. then serving as minister of local govern- 9 The author collected the information on 21 Tom al Nur was a Fertit government official ment and law enforcement (information which this paper is based as part of two- in Wau town at the time, with family links based on an author interview with a Fertit and-a-half years of fieldwork undertaken in Sudan. He later joined the government representative with direct knowledge of and has not participated in the recent op- in Wau and the wider region of (former) the events, Wau, June 2018). position. Ashab Khamis was part of a well- WBEG. She has spent extended periods of 36 Video footage of the protest shows that it respected family in Wau and later went on time in the field for operational reasons, was peaceful. to train at the Sudan Armed Forces college including before and during the crises in 37 A World Food Programme national staff in Khartoum, where he studied before re- Wau in 2016 and 2017, giving her privi- member unofficially translated the speech, turning to Wau and working with state tel- leged access to interlocutors on both sides which was given in Arabic. The speech is evision. He is currently one of the main of the conflict and allowing her to witness widely referenced by interviewees discuss- opposition commanders in Baggari. events at first hand. She undertook dozens ing the turning point of the conflict in Wau. 22 Qwat Salem is loosely translated as ‘Peace of formal interviews and informal conver- 38 Speeches in South Sudan often have Force’ in Arabic. The group is also referred sations with a variety of actors (from the ­hidden meanings and can be indicators to on occasion as al-Qwat al-Sadiqqa or opposition, government, civil society, the of violence to come (author interview with ‘Friendly Forces’. civilian population, and international an international analyst specializing in 23 Author interviews with Fertit representa- ­organizations) during this period, in both Upper Nile, Juba, June 2018). tives, UN national staff, and civil society former WBEG and Juba, as well as via 39 Ashab Khamis, a senior Fertit opposition representatives, Wau and Juba, 2016–18. phone and WhatsApp. commander and a former director of Wau 24 Author interviews with two senior Fertit 10 The Dinka are the largest single southern state television, was arrested. opposition representatives, Mboro, Nilotic group in South Sudan, making up 40 Author interview with a Fertit opposition ­September 2017. approximately one-third of the entire pop- member, Mboro, June 2016. 25 Author interview with a senior Fertit repre- ulation (Minority Rights Group Interna- sentative, Wau town, May 2018; author 41 The US government imposed sanctions on tional, 2008). interview with a national UN staff member, Malong and several others on 6 September 11 The Bahr el Ghazals encompass the for- Juba, April 2018. 2017 (US Department of the Treasury, mer states of WBEG, Northern Bahr el 26 In the 2011 referendum only 7,000 people 2017), accusing them of threatening the Ghazal, Gogrial, Lakes, and Warrap and the in Wau and Raja counties, or 4.5 per cent peace, security, and stability of South current states of Aweil, Aweil East, Eastern of voters, opted to remain with Sudan ­Sudan. The UN Security Council also sanc- Lakes, Gogrial, Gok, Lol, Tonj, Twic, Wau, (Southern Sudan Referendum 2011, 2011). tioned Malong on 13 July 2018 for being and Western Lakes (see Maps 1 and 2). 27 Author interview with a senior Fertit repre- responsible for, or complicit in, actions or 12 The original plaque of Fort Desaix (Wau) sentative, Wau town, April 2018; author policies that threatened the peace, secu- can be found in the Peace Hall at the gov- interview with an international policy ana- rity, or stability of South Sudan (UN, 2018). ernor’s offices in Wau town. lyst, Wau town, June 2018. He is also widely cited as being responsible 13 Fertit interlocutors repeatedly mentioned 28 Author interview with a senior Fertit repre- for war crimes and atrocities in UN Panel the closeness between the Fertit and sentative, Wau town, June 2018. of Experts reports and the final report of ­Sudan, which is illustrated by the many 29 The conference was followed by a meeting the African Union Commission of Inquiry Fertit opposition members who base them- in Khartoum in June 2005 to consolidate on South Sudan (AUCISS, 2014). selves in Sudan in general and Khartoum the resolutions (Gurtong, 2005). 42 For example, ‘A day after the events in in particular. 30 Author interview with a civil society repre- Mapel at least 61 Nuer troops and four 14 The South was divided into three adminis- sentative, Wau town, June 2018. commanding officers fled from an SPLA trative regions: Bahr el Ghazal, Upper Nile, 31 Rizik Zacharia is currently the governor of base at Wau’ (Small Arms Survey, 2014). and Equatoria. Lol state, with headquarters in Raja. The SPLA reported ‘that three people died 15 Author interview with a senior UN national 32 Members of the JCE are often rumoured to during clashes that occurred as the troops staff member, Juba, 2016. make decisions for president Salva Kiir deserted’ (Small Arms Survey, 2014).

16 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 43 Author interviews with three Fertit opposi- 57 Author interview with hospital staff, Wau of the group as mercenary forces, and JEM tion members, Baggari, June 2016; author town, March 2016; author observations members engage in trade throughout the interview with a Fertit source, Wau town, during a visit to Wau hospital, March 2016. country (Small Arms Survey, 2013, p. 2). June 2018. 58 Governor Waya was dismissed from his JEM also controls the charcoal trade in 44 Peter Tingo went on to become the shadow post on 23 June 2016 and arrested by the Juba. governor of WBEG and was part of the ad- NSS two days later on the pretext that he 71 For example, clashes in Raja in June 2016 vance team for Riek Machar’s arrival in was responsible for the insecurity in Wau were a direct consequence of an assassi- Juba in 2016. After the Juba crisis he fled town (Sudan Tribune, 2016b; 2016c). It is nation attempt targeting governor Rizik. to Khartoum and was promoted to his widely believed that he was arrested for 72 Author interview with a UN national ana- current position of secretary-general of attempting to stop the orchestrated vio- lyst, Juba, April 2018; internal briefing by the SPLM-IO. lence in Wau of 24 June 2016. an international researcher, Juba, Septem- 45 At the time, joining the SPLM/A-IO was 59 The security incidents were widely reported ber 2018. the only option in order to gain access to in daily security situation updates from 73 Kafia Kingi is a mineral-rich border enclave national-level negotiations. The govern- the UN and the South Sudan NGO Forum. whose territorial control is disputed. For- ment, SPLM/A-IO, and former detainees 60 The former WBEG covered a vast but merly under the control of South Sudan signed the ARCSS peace agreement in sparsely populated area. Neighbouring as part of Raja, the area is currently under August 2015 (IGAD, 2015). NBEG and Aweil West and Aweil North the administration of South Darfur in Sudan 46 See Maps 2 and 3, and Box 1. The number counties, which are inhabited by the Dinka (Thomas, 2010, pp. 6–11). of states was further increased to 32 in Malual, are much more densely populated. 74 Author interview with a UN national ana- 2017 by Establishment Order 1/2017 (GRSS, 61 Author interview with a senior international lyst, Juba, April 2018; author conversation 2017). Because the former WBEG was not analyst, Juba, July 2016; author interview with an arms expert, Panel of Experts on affected by the increase to 32 states, the with a civil society representative, Wau South Sudan, March 2018. focus in this paper is on the change to 28. town, June 2016; author interview with a 75 The author witnessed first-hand the link- The number of states is referred to as security force member, Wau town, June ages referred to in the paper and the pres- ‘28/32’ states throughout this Briefing 2016. ence of Azande opposition in the Raja area Paper. 62 Author interview with a national security in December 2017 and June 2018 in both 47 Author interview with a UN expert on cattle forces member, Wau Town, June 2016; Lol and Gbudwe states. migration and land, Juba, May 2016. author interview with an opposition repre- 76 One version of events has senior Azande 48 The Galweng are the traditional armed se- sentative, Wau, June 2016; author interview commanders being arrested by the Fertit/ curity guards accompanying cattle keepers with a senior UN analyst, Juba, July 2016. SPLM-IO over atrocities committed against from Gogrial East and Tonj states (formerly 63 The recent fighting is well documented in civilians, while another version links the Warrap state). internal UN security reports and briefings. Azande presence in the former WBEG area 49 Numerous reports from the UN and civil 64 See The Economist (2018) on the consist- to economic necessity. society highlighted the tensions between ent violations of ceasefires since the cur- 77 Author interview with a senior UN national farmers and cattle keepers during this pe- rent conflict began. analyst, Juba, April 2018; internal briefing riod. 65 Reports from humanitarian agencies by an international researcher, Juba, Sep- 50 Author interview with a UN information through author interviews, as well as pic- tember 2018; author’s own observations analyst, Juba, March 2016; author inter- tures and reports shared by sources on the during field missions in Lol and Gbudwe view with a UN civil affairs analyst, Wau ground. The author was involved in the states. town, June 2018. As in other places in crisis response in 2017 and has first-hand 78 In August 2018 the PoC site in Wau hosted South Sudan, cattle belonging to senior knowledge of events. 17,732 people (UNMISS, 2018b), while in SPLM/A or government officials are fre- 66 On 2 September 2018 president Salva Kiir June the collective centres hosted 9,796 quently protected politically, including by issued a decree formally changing the people (CCCM, 2018). There is some doubt security forces (Copeland, 2016, p. 35). name of the SPLA to the South Sudan as to the accuracy of these figures, how- 51 Author interviews with a UNMISS civil People’s Defence Forces (Sudan Tribune, ever. Since the middle of 2018 drastic re- affairs analyst, Wau town, June 2016; 2018). ductions in the number of people in the author interviews with local community 67 Author’s observations based on a visit to PoC site and collective centres have been members, Bazia, June 2018. the Mboro and Baggari areas on 29 Sep- recorded, with little explanation of where 52 Tai Tai has been accused of being key in tember and 1 October 2018. people have gone. In July 2018, for exam- operationalizing mass violence in the 2015 68 Because the network of interlocutors in ple, over 29,000 people were registered Unity state offensive and of war crimes and Raja is small and communications are in the PoC site (UNMISS, 2018a); the dis- crimes against humanity (Panel of Experts poor due to the complete lack of mobile crepancy with the most recent figure is on South Sudan, 2016, pp. 19, 42). phone reception and the limited presence unaccounted for. 53 Personal observation made by the author of satellite phones on the ground, infor- 79 Author interviews with PoC site and col- during time spent in Wau in March and mation-gathering in this vast and under- lective centres residents, Wau town, June June 2016. populated area is very difficult. 2018; author’s observations. 54 Particularly in Baggari Jedid, Hai Khamsin, 69 Author interviews with multiple Fertit op- 80 Author interviews with PoC site and collec- and Hai Bazia Jedid. position members, 2017; author interview tive centres residents, Wau town, June 2018. 55 Author interviews with medical personnel, with a senior UN national analyst, Wau 81 Observation made by a senior UN analyst, Wau town, March 2016 (MSF, 2016). town, June 2018. Wau town, April 2018. 56 Author interviews with eyewitnesses, Wau 70 JEM has been present in South Sudan for 82 Author interview with several UN national town, March 2016. a long time. The SPLA has used members staff members who have returned to their

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 17 neighbourhoods, Wau town, May 2018; 100 Internal UNMISS report seen by the author interview with a civil society repre- author observations during visits to affect- ­author, September 2017. sentative, Wau town, June 2018. ed neighbourhoods, Wau town, June 2018. 101 CTSAMM liaison officers monitor areas of 115 Author interview with a civil society repre- 83 Author interview with a Fertit resident, Wau conflict in order to assess violations of the sentative, Wau town, June 2018. town, June 2018; author interview with a permanent ceasefire and report findings senior UN international analyst, Juba, May to the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation 2018; author observations during a visit to Commission. Monitors from both govern- Wau market and in discussions with shop ment and opposition parties are appoint- References owners. ed to ensure a balanced view. Africans Press. 2017. ‘S. 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Crisis Group 98 Until the August 2018 government offen- 112 Rudolph Deng Majak was a bishop from ­Africa Report No. 236. 25 May. sives Maj. Gen. Ujang also controlled the November 1995 until his death in March CTSAMM (Ceasefire and Transitional Security area of Mboro/Besillia directly west of 2017. To date he has not been replaced. Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism). Wau. This territory was lost in August 2018. 113 Father Marko Mangu is a Balanda Viiri 2017. CTSAMM Report 039—Killing of 99 Ashab is a Balanda Viiri from the Baggari from Baggari. ­Civilians in Wau. 15 May. area, whereas Ujang is a Balanda Bor from 114 Author interview with a former member of Deng, James Dimo. 2015. ‘SPLA Retakes Bazia Bazia. the Catholic clergy, Wau town, June 2018; Payam from Rebels.’ Gurtong. 1 June.

18 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 The Economist. 2018. ‘Ceasefires in South Sikainga, eds. Civil War in the Sudan. Lon- Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South ­Sudan Seldom Last.’ 10 July. don: British Academic Press, pp. 117–41. Sudan. 16 October. Eye Radio. 2017. ‘Ceasefire Monitor Killed in Logistics Cluster. 2017. ‘Transport Overview Southern Sudan Referendum 2011. 2011. ‘Refer- Wau.’ 26 January. (Accessed and Unaccessed Roads)— endum Results: Western Bahr el Ghazal.’ Fick, Maggie and Dennis Dimo. 2018. ‘South Western Bahr el Ghazal State.’ World SPLM (Sudan People’s Liberation Movement). Sudan Violence Blocking Food Aid, Says Food Programme. 2008. ‘The Manifesto of the Sudan Peo- U.N.’s WFP.’ Reuters. 29 October. Marcello, Peter Nasir Jelenge. n.d. ‘Raja County ple’s Liberation Movement.’ May. Golla, Rajiv. 2016. ‘A Fight to the Death? Calls Must Be a State of Its Own.’ Unpublished SSOA (South Sudan Opposition Alliance). 2018. for Peace Don’t Seem to Mean Much in article. 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Experts on South Sudan established pur- tion 2428 (2018), Security Council Extends HRW (Human Rights Watch). 2013. ‘South suant to Security Council resolution 2206 Sanctions on South Sudan.’ Press release. ­Sudan: No Justice for Protester Killings: (2015) addressed to the President of the 13 July. Full and Impartial Investigations Needed Security Council.’ United Nations Security UNMISS (United Nations Mission in South for Wau Deaths.’ 24 May. Council. S/2016/70 of 22 January. ­Sudan). 2018a. ‘PoC Update.’ 3 July. —. 2016. ‘South Sudan: Civilians Killed, Tor- Pinaud, Clemence. 2014. ‘South Sudan: Civil —. 2018b. ‘PoC Update.’ 13 August. tured in Western Region: Provide Justice War, Predation and the Making of a Mili- US Department of the Treasury. 2017. ‘Treas- for Army Abuses in Western Regions.’ tary Aristocracy.’ African Affairs, Vol. 113, ury Targets South Sudanese Government 24 May. No. 451, pp. 192–211. 1 April. Officials and Related Companies for Con- —. 2017. ‘South Sudan: Events of 2016.’ In Pomarico, Lorenzo. 2018. ‘Demographic Bal- tinued Destabilization.’ 6 September. World Report 2017. ance in Lol State, 2018.’ ALIMA. Wani, Darius. 2016. ‘Human Remains Discov- IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Develop- Radio Tamazuj. 2013. ‘S. Sudan Reporters and ered in Wau.’ The Niles. 30 May. ment). 2015. Agreement on the Resolution MPs Arrested in Wau.’ 3 January. Willems, Rens and David Deng. 2015. The of the Conflict in the Republic of South —. 2015. ‘Wau Authorities Arrest 7 Civil Society Legacy of Kokora in South Sudan: Inter- Sudan. 17 August. Activist Who Protested Abuses by Security sections of Truth, Justice and Reconcilia- —. 2018. Revitalised Agreement on the Reso- Forces.’ 30 November. tion in South Sudan. Briefing Paper. The lution of the Conflict in the Republic of —. 2018. ‘South Sudan Opposition Alliance Hague: University for Peace. November. South Sudan (R-ARCSS). Addis Ababa. Divided over New Peace Deal.’ 12 September. 15 September. Joakino, Francis. 2017. ‘CTSAMM Indicts Anti- Rone, Jemera. 1999. Famine in Sudan: The government Group over Killing of Cease- Human Rights Causes. Human Rights fire Monitor.’ Eye Radio. 10 March. Watch. February. Johnson, Douglas H. 2003. The Root Causes of Small Arms Survey. 2013. Justice and Equality the Sudan’s Civil Wars. Oxford: James Movement (JEM) (AKA JEM-Jibril). Human Currey. Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan — and Gerard Prunier. 1993. ‘The Foundation and South Sudan. 13 August. and Expansion of the Sudan People’s —. 2014. The Conflict in Northern and Western ­Liberation Army.’ In M. W. Daly and Ahmad Bahr el Ghazal States. Human Security

The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 19 About the HSBA project

Through the generation and dissemination of timely, empirical research, the Human Security Baseline Assessment (HSBA) for Sudan and South Sudan supports violence-reduction initiatives, including DDR programmes, incentive schemes for civilian arms collection, as well as security sector reform and arms-control interventions across Sudan and South Sudan. The HSBA also offers policy-relevant advice on addressing insecurity.

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