Identity and Self-Determination: the Fertit Opposition in South Sudan

Briefing Paper December 2018 HSBA IDENTITY AND SELF-DETERMINATION The Fertit opposition in South Sudan Sarah Vuylsteke The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 1 Credits and contributors Editor: Claire Mc Evoy About the author Production coordinator: Sarah Vuylsteke is a humanitarian aid worker who has lived and worked in South Rebecca Bradshaw with Olivia Denonville Sudan since early 2015. She initially worked with Médecins Sans Frontières and Copy-editor: Alex Potter subsequently as the humanitarian access negotiator for the UN Office for the Coor- ([email protected]) dination of Humanitarian Affairs and the World Food Programme. She has spent most of her time since 2016 working on and in former Western Bahr el Ghazal state Fact-checker: Tim Jolin and other hard-to-reach areas, interfacing directly with actors from both sides of ([email protected]) the conflict and on both sides of the front line. She has authored and co-authored Proofreader: Stephanie Huitson numerous reports on the post-2013 conflict in South Sudan. Prior to working in ([email protected]) South Sudan she was employed in various other capacities in the aid world across Africa. Cartography: Jillian Luff (www.mapgrafix.com) Design: Rick Jones ([email protected]) Acknowledgements Layout: raumfisch.de/sign The author would like to thank members of the Fertit community in South Sudan in both government-controlled and opposition-held territories for allowing her un- Communications coordinator: paralleled access to interlocutors at all levels and for their willingness to engage Emilia Dungel with her. In particular she is grateful to AK, A, G, J, C, O, DG, and T for their partici- Print: nbmedia, Geneva pation in and facilitation of key meetings and interviews, without which she would have been unable to grasp the complexities of the region and the Western Bahr el Ghazal conflict. JA provided support, guidance, insights, and vivid story-telling over the past three years, while remaining objective and introspective about the Fertit history and current situation. This paper would not have been written without him. John Draper deserves a special mention for his constant support through the writing of this paper. The author and Small Arms Survey would also express their thanks to the United States Government for its financial support to the HSBA project. Front cover photo Lt. Gen. Ashab Khamis (right), a repre- sentative of the Fertit opposition, meets with the SPLA’s Division 5 commander Gen. Keer Kiir Keer (left) at the governor’s office in Wau town, South Sudan, 22 November 2018. Source: Sam Mednick/AFP Photo 2 HSBA Briefing Paper December 2018 Overview Introduction The conflict that started in South Sudan in December 2013 has deep Wau state is extremely polarized historic roots and is highly complex. It is driven by a struggle for exis- on tribal lines and tribalism has tential survival for some; a demand for fairer representation for others; reached a level whereby the social and the desire for power, access to resources, and ultimate control for fabric of society has been affected many. Grievances are not only born of the current civil war, but date (GRSS Commission of Inquiry, 2016, pp. 18–19). back to previous events, linking historical issues to the post-2013 conflict. On the evening of 24 June 2016 shooting The above is true for the Fertit, a minority ethnic community in South started in the south-western neighbour- hoods of Wau town.1 The residents of Sudan that inhabit the former Western Bahr el Ghazal state. Like others these areas are known to be predomi- across the country, they are currently opposing the current regime in nantly from the ethnic Fertit community.2 Juba. However, while some of the Fertit’s aspirations fit into the wider The attackers were reported to be armed opposition’s national agenda, some are specific to them. The reasons Dinka youths in civilian clothes supported for their opposition are individual and personal to their perception of by others in military uniform who moved the history and developments of power dynamics across South Sudan. from house to house attacking civilians Understanding the Fertit’s perception of historical events and how these with machetes, firearms, sticks, and events affect them in the present is therefore key to understanding the spears, and engaging in widespread rape.3 root causes of their opposition to the government, which in turn is cru- The violence continued throughout the night and scores of bodies could be cial to any attempts to establish sustainable peace and coexistence seen in the streets the next morning.4 for the inhabitants of South Sudan. Those who were able to escape fled to the nearby United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) base and local church compounds (known as collective centres). Over the following days more Key findings people arrived at these sites as the inse- curity continued, and large numbers of The Fertit opposition to South Sudan’s government is rooted in their reports detailing atrocities and the killing belief in their right to security and self-preser va tion, to control their of civilians were gathered (Nield, 2016).5 own land, and to defend their identity. The Fertit opposition was born Thousands of civilians fled from Wau town out of a fear of marginalization and the long-held perception that and sought refuge in Baggari, an area to members of the Dinka tribe are attempting to seize control of former the south-west under the control of the Western Bahr el Ghazal (WBEG) state. This fear has intensified more Fertit Lions, an opposition group that had recently by the reorganization of South Sudan into 28 states in 2015, joined the SPLM/A-IO platform led by Riek which has tilted the demographic balance of parts of the former Machar the previous year. WBEG in favour of the Dinka, making the indige nous Fertit a minority Opposition to the government in South in their ancestral lands. Sudan is long-standing and is rooted in a perception among minority communi- The Fertit opposition joined other groups in the Sudan People’s ties, such as the Fertit, that members of Liberation Movement/Army-in-Opposition (SPLM/A-IO) under Riek the Dinka tribe are attempting to seize Machar in 2014. The Fertit theorized that any resolution of local power over and control of these commu- grievances in the context of the current civil war would have to be nities and their land—in this case in former brokered at the national level. The subsequent evolution of the WBEG state (see Map 1).6 This decades- conflict and the balkanization of the opposition since 2017 call old perception was born out of events during the second Sudanese civil war into question the effectiveness of the Fertit’s use of this platform. (1983–2005) and the birth of the Sudan The 12 September 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution People’s Liberation Movement/Army of the Conflict in South Sudan (RARCSS) between the government (SPLM/A) under the late John Garang and and opposition parties continues to undermine the effective reso- Riek Machar, and has led to the current lution of the conflict. Despite recognizing a grass-roots demand for conflict becoming deeply ethnicized. For decentralized decision-making, the agreement entrenches power the Fertit, the fear of domination has been reinforced by events in the past decade, dynamics put in place during the war. As a result, the likelihood including the moving of the Wau county that it will deliver sustainable peace across the country is low, in capital to Baggari; tensions between the particular in the new Wau state and former WBEG, where opposi- Fertit and neighbouring communities over tion and armed struggle are likely to continue if the local issues the movements of the latter’s cattle; and that fuel armed resistance are not addressed. the reconfiguration of the ethnic make-up The Fertit Opposition in South Sudan 3 of former WBEG through the creation of of the conflict, which are entrenched in umbrella, and the prospects for a resolu- 28, and then 32, states in South Sudan an array of local grievances and a wide- tion of the conflict at both the local and since 2015. This has led to the Fertit taking spread fear of Dinka domination among national levels. The prospects for peace up arms against what is perceived as a minority groups in South Sudan.8 Sec- seem slim at both levels and it is likely Dinka-dominated governance system on ondly, while representing a solid block that armed opposition will continue. multiple occasions, most recently under of opposition across the country, the the umbrella of the SPLM/ A-IO. SPLM/A-IO has had to contend with It is unclear how long their allegiance heavy military losses that have occurred The opposition in Western to this organization will last, however. As simultaneously with the emergence of Bahr el Ghazal: roots and the conflict has spread across the county, these other parties and platforms at the drawing in a variety of communities and negotiation table. Alternative avenues of current causes interests, the SPLM/A-IO has expanded armed resistance are now open if factions The origins of a rebellion: to encompass a broad range of actors, as feel that their key issues are not being other parties have joined both the con- addressed. In this context the relevance the Qwat Salem flict and the negotiation table. This has of the SPLM/A-IO for the Fertit has be- The origins of the opposition movement had two effects. Firstly, the space at the come questionable. in Wau and WBEG date back to the 1970s negotiation table has become crowded, This Briefing Paper9 examines the and the earliest days of the SPLM/A in and the lack of a unified opposition has roots of the Fertit opposition in former the 1980s.

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