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THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
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AiCHi Aircraft Company (Aichi Kokuki K K)
CORPORATION REPORT NO. V (Airframes and Engines)
Aircraft Division February 1947
THE UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY
AiCHi Aircraft Company
(Aichi Kokuki K K)
CORPORATION REPORT NO. V (Airframes and Engines)
Aircraft Division February 1947 g^ X-^^"
Tliis report was written primarily for the use of the United States Strategic Bombing Sm'vey in the preparation of further reports of a more comprehensive nature. Any conchisions or opinions expressed in this report must be considered as Hmited to the specific material covered and as subject to further interpreta- tion m the light of further studies conducted by the survey. FOREWORD le United States Strategic Bombing Survey military segment of the organization was drawn established t)y the Secretary of War on 3 from the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and ember 1944, piirusant to a directive from the from the Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both President Roosevelt. Its mission was to con- the Army and the Navy gave the Survey all pos- an impartial and expert study of the effects sible assistance in furnishing men, supplies, trans- ir aerial attack on Germany, to be used in port, and information. The Survey operated from ection with air attacks on Japan and to estab- headquarters established in Tokyo early in Sep- a basis for evaluating the importance and tember 1945, with subheadquarters in Nagoya, itialities of air power as an uistrument of Osaka, Hiroshima, ary strategy, for planning the future devclop- and Nagasaki, and with niobOe of the United States armed forces, and for teams operating in other parts of Japan, the mining future economic policies with respect islands of the Pacific, and the Asiatic mainland.
e national defense. A summary report and It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime 200 supporting reports containing the find- Japanese military planning and execution, engage- of the Survey m Germany have been ment by engagement, and campaign by campaign, shed. and to secure reasonably accurate statistics on 15 August President 1945, Truman requested Japan's economy and war-production, plant by the Survey conduct a similar study of the plant, and uidustry by industry. In addition, s of all types of air attack in the war against studies were conducted on Japan's over-all stra- 1, submitting reports in duplicate to the tegic plans and the background of her entry mto tary of War and to the Secretary of the Navy, the war, the internal discussions and negotiations officers of the Survey during its Japanese leading her were: to acceptance of unconditional sur- render, the course of health and morale among the Franklin D'Olier, Chairman. civilian population, the effectiveness of the Japa- Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, nese civilian defense organization, and the effects Vice Chairmen. of the atomic Harry L. Bo\nnan, bombs. Separate reports will be J. Kenneth Galbraith, issued covering each phase of the study. Rensis Likert, The Survey interrogated more than 700 Japa- Frank A. McNamee, Jr., nese military. Government, and industrial officials. Fred Searls, Jr., It also recovered and translated many documents Monroe E. Spaght, which not only have been usefid to the Survey, but Dr. Lewis R. Tliompson, also will furnish data valuable for other studies. Theodore P. Wi-ight, Directors. Arrangements have been made to turn over the Walter Wilds, Secretary. Survey's files to the Central Intelligence Group, Survey's complement provided for 300 through which they will be available for further Ins, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The examination and distribution.
Ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
orporation and it:< Importance in the Aircraft Industry _ .^ . . 1
UrAttacks _. . 11
let ion Statistics 11 lation of Prc-attack Intelligence _. .- 14
iidix: Geographical Locations of Plants 18
i. Supply of Parts for Judy , 19 Aiehi Aircraft Production l. Facing 20
). Total Aircraft Production _- ^__. 21 cu Plant, Aichi Aircraft Company (Plant Report No. V-1) '__ 22 TA Plant, Aichi Aircraft Company (Plant Report Xo. V-2) 38
THE CORPORATION AND ITS IMPORTANCE IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION A separate aircraft firm, Aichi Aircraft Co., was
founded in ]\ larch took over le Aichi Aircraft Co. (Aichi Kokuki K K) in 1943 and the aircraft
'ity of Nao;oya produced both airplanes and and aero-engine production from Aichi Clock &
R-s for the Japanese Navy. In February 1944, Electric Co. peak month of its air])hine production, this Foreign experience appears to have had little produced 7 percent of the total production of influence on plant design or operations of this utire industry for that month. During ]\Iay company. German teclmieians did consult with peak of Aiclii engine production, plant officials during the war with regard to ])ro- , the month jfoportion of the total production \vas 3 duction problems but their efforts primarily con-
lit. sisted of studying aircraft designs to elimmate
le principal airplanes produced by the com- "bugs" which would prevent mass production of included the dive bombers Val (type 99 the particular model and of studying the avail-
er bomber, Models 11 and 22) and the later ability and use of machuie tools. The Atsuta (Suisei, Models 11, 12, 33, and 43); tor- engine, being similar to the Daimler-Benz, was bombers Kate (type 97 carrier attack, produced under a German license.
el 12) and Grace (Ryusei, Alodel 11); and The Eitoku and Funakata plants, the princii)al seaplanes, Paul (Zniun, Model 11) and plants engaged in final airframe assembly, and
n, jNIodel 11. Aichi also was experiment- the Atsuta plant were all ui Nagoya city (ap- on the twin-engine night fighter Denko, pendix A). Grace was assembled at Funakata
el 11, at the close of the war. while Judy, Paul, and Seiran were assembled at principal products of the engine section of Eitoku. company were Atsuta in-line licjuid-cooled After the first air attacks on the Eitoku plant lesof the 20 (1,185 horsepower) and 30 (1,380 experimental assembly of the twin-engine night power) series. fighter Denko was continued at the Ogaki plant e Aichi Clock & Electric Co. (Aichi Tokei at Ogaki in Gifu prefecture. At the Atsuta engine
:i K K), forerunner of Aichi Aircraft Co., assembly plant the prmcipal product was . the ed the aircraft industry in 1920 when it be- Atsuta in-line liquid-cooled engine. he production of airframes at the Funakata This corporation received much assistance from in Nagoya. Production of engines was the Japanese government. Most of the land on leneed at this same location in 1927. In which the Eitoku plant was built was loaned to engine production was transferred to the the corporation by the government in early 1940. r completed Atsuta plant across the street The majority of the buildings of the Eitoku plant the Funakata plant in south central Nagoya. also were constructed at government expense e site for the Eitoku plant, in southwestern and many of the machine tools were furnished by ya, was acquired in February 1940; the first the government. Durmg 1945 the company was lings were completed in May 1941, and in the assisted in its dispersal program by the Navy.
1 1941 production of the type 2 training flying The tunnels for the underground machine shops
k H9A1, was begun at the Eitoku plant. As near Seto, ten miles east of Nagoya, were dug by the litoku plant was expanded more and more of Na\'y to accommodate the dispersal from the •I's total airframe production was attributable Eitoku plant. The Navy assisted in dispersal of tjs plant until by late 1943 it was the principal engine production from the Atsuta plant by allot- eibly plant of the company. ing space to this corporation in the Tsu Naval Arsenal and by liclj)ini;- with the tunnel develop- (including Mitsubishi, Nakajima, and K ment southwest of Tsu. ishi), Aichi at Eitoku appeared the best orguj,
In January 1945 the company was ap|)ointed a for mass production. Schmidt referri'd i (j
"War Industrial Enterprise", which meant that the machine shops and parts fabrication io| operation of the i)lant was more directly con- Equipment in this part of the plant appearet^ trolled by the government. Government super- of good quality and many American m Lj visors and inspectors were present in the Aichi tools were used. Schmidt was not permit Ji plants. In conducting its research and experi- see the final assembly buildings, however jp mentation the corporation worked in close coopera- sibly to maintain his illusions as to the ju tion with the First Naval Air Technical Arsenal ability to mass produce. None of the || at Yokostdva and made use of some of the testing assembly plants used a production line iifjj facilities at that place for its experiments. assembly. Each airplane was assembled o place with parts and subassemblies being b ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION in and added as required.
The key personnel of the corporation were per- AVing jigs were substantially l)iiilt with & sons with strictly Japanese backgroimds and no steel pipe varying from 5 to 12 inches in dis foreign experience or travel. The corporate or- and anchored in pits in the ground. Th( ganization was highly departmentalized with IS type jig was used in the semiimdergrouii separate departments in the airframe division ])ersal plant at Seto (Photo 1). The adequ (Figure 1) and 11 departments in the engine jigs and tools used in the Aichi airframe division (Figure 2). may have resulted from the efforts of Fran; Within the corporation the Sanno plant supplied a Henschel technician in Japan as an adv; fuel tanks and radiators to both the Eitoku and mass production to the Aichi Co., althoug Funakata airframe assembly plants. The Enokido poration officials stated that Pohl only ex£ plant fabricated and assembled wings for Paul aircraft (k'signs to improve them for the p and Judy for the Eitoku plant. Juichigochi was of mass prodtiction. the fiy-a-way field for both the Eitoku and Funa- EMPLOYMENT kata plants, from which completed aircraft were flown to the aii-field at Ibo for test flight and A peak employment for the aircraft sec delivery to the Navy (Figure 3). Kofu, Aotsuka, 2ti,240 persons was reached in Septembei Hotel, Tsushima, Seto, Hokuriku, Ogaki, Mino, Employment continued at approximate! and Yoro were all dispersal plants and are dis- figure until March 1945 when a downwaro cussed below. in employment began as a result of air atta Within the engine section, the Chikusa plant the corporation's plants and a loss of av did the casting for the Atsuta plant, and the labor due to the urban area attacks on the Imamura plant assisted in machining and finishing Nagoya beginning in March (Figure 4). of engine parts. The Yongochi plant consisted The number of women employees inc only of test cells which, with the test cells at the from al)Out 8 percent of the total work Atsuta plant, provided the testing facilities for Janiuiry to 15 percent in July 1944 and engines produced at the Atsuta plant. The Tsu percent m January and July of 1945. A plant was a dispersal of engine assembly facilities number of employees were classed as ii from the Atsuta plant. or nonproductive, the percentage figure Some plants of subcontractors were taken over total varying from 37 to 39 percent durin by the corporation in its dispersal program. Part and 1945. Soldiers, students and conso of Tokai Aircraft Co. became the Ogaki plant; labor were used by the airframe division. part of Tono Aircraft Co. became the Mino plant; Plant Report No. V-1.) and part of Mizuno Aircraft Co. became the Yoro All plants of the airframe section opera plant. A completed Aichi airplane contained parts only one shift except for the Eitoku plant from many different subcontractors and suppliers used two shifts from June through Decembeij (appendix B). The number of employees o:i the second Kurt Schmidt, a Heinkel technician in Jai)an varied from 5.5 percent of the total in Ji as an adviser to Hitachi Aircraft Co., stated that 2.1 percent in December. of all the airframe assembly ])lants he had visited Labor tum-over appears not to have tj
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' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' ' problem, at least in the latter stages of the war. EITOKU AND ATSUTA PLANT REPORT!
General use of conscripted labor prevented the Detailed reports on the operations o problem from arising. The monthly average Eitoku plant, the most important air percentage of new to old employees at the Eitoku assembly plant of Aiclii Aircraft Co., an plant was 5 percent during 1943 and 1944, shrinking Atsuta plant, the primary plant of the ( to 2 percent during the first 6 months of 1945. At section of the corporation, are given in lat( the Funakata plant this monthly average was 4 tions of this report. (Plant Reports V-1 and percent during 1943 falling to 1 percent during THE DISPERSAL 1944 and the first half of 1945. Total employ- PROGRAM ment of the engine section reached a peak of 9,415 Dispersal of the airframe assembly oper in April 1944 but declined shortly thereafter to was planned in Feliruary 1945 by the corpo about 8,500 and then diminishing very graduallj' and approved by the government. Dispers until the end of the war (Figure 4). ordered by the Mmiitions Ministry on 4 Apri The use of women employees remained fairly The plan consisted of the establishment ol constant in the engine section but at a lower main-dispersed complexes, Gifu, Hokurik percentage than in the airframe section after Seto, each to be a separate production January 1945. Women comprised 14 percent of and the establishment or enlargement of au total employment of the engine section in January plants to supply the original Eitoku and Fui 1944, 15 percent in July 1944 and 16 percent in plants for as long as the latter plants con January and July 1945. A smaller ])ercentage of functioning.
employees was classed as nonproductive . hi the The Gifu complex included three existing engine section than m the airframe section of the at Ogaki, Mino, and Yoro, taken over froi corporation. Of the total, 18 ])ercent of employees contractors. The Hokuriku aiul Seto con of the engine section were classed as nonproduc- were to be more extensive, including unde tive in Januaiy 1944, and 17 percent in July 1944, shops and dispereed, semiunderground sb January and Julv 1945. well as converted plants.
1'hoto 2.— Seiuiuiidcrgrouiid dispersed storage building at Seto.
8 Photo 3. — Interior of semiunderground wing assembly shop at Seto. be Seto plant was much further developed dirt covering became damp the roof woukl often the Hokuriku plant and affords a good cave in. In the Seto vicinity approximately pie of the type of development that was 220,000 scjuare feet of this type of building was d for both localities. The towii of Seto was planned of which about half had been completed tteiy manufacturing center, located approxi- by the end of the war. y 10 miles east of Nagoya and connected Plans called for a similar type of dispersed devel- Nagoya by an electric railroad and a good opment north of the airfield in the western part way. In the hills north of Seto the Navy con- of the town. The latter development was planned ted a series of five separate tunnel develop- for final aircraft assembly and the airfield to the
ts for Aichi to serve as shops. Two of these south was being impi'oved for fly-away purposes. I shops were in operation at the end of the Within the town itself some ceramics factories fabricating wing spars for Judy. The other were converted to machine shops (Photo 4). tunnel developments were completed but Homes, schools, and business offices in the town. yet ui operation. Total underground work were taken over for quarters and offices. A pro- equaled 108,000 srjuare feet, duction of 40 Judys per month by March 1946 the same area were some semiunderground, was planned for this complex. No production of iset-type buildings in which were located heat complete aircraft actually residted. ment and welding shops as well as some The auxiliary plants included the Aotsuka, ge space (Photo 2). South of the town of Seto Hotel, and Ibo plants, constituting direct dispersal larger development of these same dispersed, of the Eitoku plant. (Plant Report V-2.) The mderground buildings which was engaged in Enokido plant was to be used for final assembly of assembly for Judy at the end of the war Seiran should the Eitoku plant become inoperative. to 3). These buildings wei-e dug into the The auxiliary plants to the Funakata plant id from 1 to 6 feet and covered with a curved included the Tsushima and Kofu plants. On 20 en roof which was in turn covered over with February 194.5 some buikUngs of Showa Foundry rcr of dirt and sod. The company had diffi- Co. at Tsushima were taken over by the Aichi
'1' ill building strong enough roofs and when the corporation and machines and labor were trans- 10 fn.l iTcd liuiii I lie FiiiiakiitH plant for inii('liinin<>; mikI Mud 17 May 1945. In the first attack the
[lis' mp; of fiisola^i' ])arls foi' (Iracc. On 1 and oil tank assembly shop was damaged togethiu- pril 1045 some l)uil(liii<;s of Aichi Tool Co. at with 24 machine tools. The 17 May attack dam- ofii were ulilized as a fiiiisliiiijr shoj) for the aged th(^ radiator assembly plant and 13 motors, iinakata j)lant. It was cont'_'m])lale(l that if final 3 generators and an air comiiressor. There were isenihly of Graec beeame impossible at no casualties. iiKikiita, it should be ca' ' l on at the Juiehiiio- The Ogaki plant was attacked on 29 -fuly 1945. li lianpirs at the airfiek. outh of the Eitokii The plant was almost completely destroyed aiil and later at the Ibo airfi(>ld development. (Photo 5). Fourteen machines were damaged,
\\r ilis])ersal program of the engine section of the two men were killed and one injured. The ipiiiation contemplated engine production at prototype of Denko was burned and the sched-
,11 (Plant Report V-2). uled completion of the first model of this experi- Tlie corporation expended a great amount of mental night fighter was delayed 1 month— ter- (Oil in prosecuting its tiispersal program and at mination of the war preventing completion of the ic same time endeavored to maintain as much model. |(i(liiction as possible at the original assembly The Hokuriku plant was attacked on 19 July uUs. Although exact assessment is impossible 1945. One machine shop was damaged with its effort expended in dispersal appears to have contents of 24 lathes, 10 milling machines, 3 drills, atributed as much to the declming production in 1 shaper and 1 grinder. There were 4 men killed 45 as did the air attacks on the plants themselves. and 7 injured. The Ibo plant was hit m three tactical attacks
THE AIR ATTACKS on the airfield on 7, 24, and 30 July 1945. Part ATTACKS ON PLANTS of the rigging hangar, the compressor room, and dormitory were burned. Five men were killed The Eitoku plant was damaged by fire in the and two injured in the attacks. 3an area attacks on Nagoya on 12 March and The Atsuta plant of the engine section was May 1945. Two direct attacks were made on damaged by earthquake on 7 December 1944 and
3 plant on 26 June and 24 July 1945, the second by fire during urban area attacks on Nagoya on ack doing the most damage. (Plant Report 19 ]Marcli and 17 Alay 1945. The most damaging .V-1.) was a direct attack on the plant on 9 June 1945. The Funakata plant was attacked three times: (Plant Report V-2). March, 17 May, and 9 June 1945. In the The Chikusa and Tsu plants of the engine sec- endiary attack of 12 March a machine shop and tion also suffered air attacks. The Chikusa plant contents of 19 milling machines, 1 friction press was attacked on 25 March 1945 and the plant
I an air compressor were damaged. In the was completely destroyed by fire. Seven of a ack of 17 May two small subassembly work total of 15 machine tools in the plant were de- ps containing 13 electric motors, 1 bench stroyed and all casting production was stopped. Uing machine and an air compressor were One man was killed and one injured. The Tsu naged. The attack of 9 June was the heaviest, plant was attacked on 24 July 1945 with slight teen high explosive bombs struck the plant damage to production facilities. Six men were a and there were 4 hits on buildings. More killed. II 50 percent of the buikting area was PRODUCTION STATISTICS Wtroyed. Of a total of 14 major machine tools P'^i'nt in the plant prior to this attack, 4 were A total of 1,660 engines were produced by Aichi iiciyed and the remaining 10 were damaged. fi'om December 1941 to the end of the war. The tenuities from this attack were considerable, Atsuta plant produced all but 8 of these which were ii lading .366 killed and 500 wounded. Plant manufactured at Tsu, 3 in July and 5 in August lials estimated that the man-hours required to 1945 (Figure 5). The capacity for production riiair the plant after the air attacks would have of aircraft increased from less than 30 airplanes k'n equivalent to a production of 4 airplanes in per month in the third quarter of 1942 to a peak of ^ ich 1945, 3.6 in April, 3.2 in May, 8.6 in June, 179 airplanes per month in June 1944 (appendices 'i'S in July, and 1.6 in August. C and D). Most of the increase was due to the The Sanno plant also was attacked on 12 March utilization of tlie new Eitoku plant. A temporary
700583—!7- 11 .-.£.,>-*-» »i^ic
12 13 just beginning to become miportant and decline in capacity in September 1943 was caused was production was i)lanned but by the abandonment of production of Kate at much larger p Eitoku and the conversion of faciUties there to the vented by air attacks. production accounted for the ma production of Judy. Funakata the total production until July 11 The total capacity dropped to 112 airplanes portion of the expanding production at EitolvU s in Jidy 1944 when the production of ^'al was when the Funakata output (Figure 7). Thcreal abandoned at Funakata and the facilities con- passed accounted for the major portion of verted to the production of Grace. Since Grace Eitoku except during September and October l! wds a new type and more difficult to build than total abandonment of production of K Val, conversion was slow in completion and the when the and the conversion of facilities to mcrease in production correspondingly slow after at Eitoku j resulted in a tem])orary loss the type change. It had reached only 16 planes duction of Judy Since Judy was the major t per month by May 1945 (Appendix C) and the production. produced by Aichi, it was the type of pi total capacity suffered accordingly during the last being production was numerically most afl'ec d half of 1944. whose development of the t\ From December 1944 to August 1945, as a result by the attacks although night fighter Denko also was preventec of December earthqiuikes and air attacks in engine uicendiary attack in March March and later months of 1945, total capacity In the first in which the Denko' prototype was declined except for the month of April 1945 when Iniilding at Eitoku was burned, forcing e the utilization of a large, newly completed liuild- ing assembled experimentation to the Ogaki plant, ing at the Eitoku plant resulted in a substantial nation of Ogaki plant late July again ha capacity increase for that month. After April attack on the m Denko with the result that the pr 1945 total capacity continued to decrease, reach- work on not completed by the end of the ing 71 airplanes per month in August. type was Actual production expanded in line with the Inasmuch as production of Grace at Funa. uicreasing capacity until March 1944 when it was very small at the time of the air attacks, pote began to decrease prunarily because of the taper- effect of the attacks was to destroy the rather tha: ing off of production of Val at Funakata. for greater production capacity Actual production decreased in August 1944, in reduce significantly the actual production. A( in spite of mcreasing capacity, as a result of the fail- production did fall from 13 in April to 8 2 as a r ure in supply of in-line engines from the Atsuta 3 in June, 2 in July, and zero in August the Funa. plajit. Production increased thereafter, exceed- of the May and June attacks on ing capacity in December 1944 because of the plant. completion during that month of a few Judys which had remained unfinished from the expected EVALUATION OF PRE-ATTACK November production. During 1945 production INTELLIGENCE
fell off more or less in line witli tlic decreasing Intelligence was incorrect in assuming the capacity. continuance of final assembly functions at Government orders were less than the capacity Funakata plant upon the commencement of ( of the Aichi corporation during most of 1943 and ations at Eitoku; consequently, all of Aichi'f the first half of 1944. Thereafter, government craft production was incorrectly attributed t( orders greatly exceeded capacity in spite of re- Eitoku plant. In fact, Val was assemble.! peated downward revisions of orders. The gov- Funakata untU mid-1944 and thereafter C ernment-planned production was less than Aichi's was assembled at the old ])lant, Intelligence actual production from May 1943 tlu'ough March generally accurate as to the type of aircraft 1944 but thereafter exceeded actual prochiction engines produced by this cor])oration. by a wide margin in spite of downward revisions Differences are apparent in a comparison o from time to time (Appendices G and D). production rates with intelligenc(> produ Numerically, tiie dive l)omber Judy was the tual bomber, and reconnaiss most important plane type ])ro(hKed by Aichi, estimates for fighter, (Figure 8). The divergence of estimates followed by tbe older dive bomber Val (Figure 6). planes production became marked after mid- Next were the seaplane Paul and tbe torpedo actual point on the actual proihiction ol, bomber Kate. The new torpedo bomber Grace from whicb 14 15 16 corpoiation, especially of bombers, was overesti- timated 47 percent, or 290 estimated compai mated. with an actual production of 197. Intellige) From April 1942 through June 1945 actual pro- estimated a small production of fighters dur duction of bombers totaled 3,047 agauist an esti- the later months of the war when in fact t mate of 3,383, or an ovcrcstim'ation of 11 percent. corporation produced only a single fighter whji Production of reconnaissance planes was overes- was produced in July 194.5.
«FUKUI HONSHU HqKO_R!!a)| S L A N D
) aMINO "t. J I XVD
LEGEND *IRFII*UC SCCTIOII ENOINE SECTION GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF PLANTS.
U-S. STRATtOIC BOM« »l
AICHI AIRCRAFT CO
APPENDIX «
18 Appendix B. SUPPLY OF PARTS FOR JUDY
RAW MATKIUAL Tail mirfiicrs: J-'ropcllors: Aiclii, Eitoku. Sumitomo, Kanzaki. Sheet Aluminum: Ooe Aircraft Co., Nagoya. Sumitomo, Shizuoka. Sumitomo' Metals Co., Nagoya. Cotvlings: Sumitomo, Tsu. Furukawa Electric Co., Ama^asaki. Mitsubishi lii^ht Alloys Co., O.saka. Radiators: Tubing: Fuel, Oil, and iru/<7' Tiiuks: Nitto .Aircraft Equii). Co., Kobe. Sumitomo Metals Co., Osaka. Tokai Aircraft Co., Ogaki. ."Vichi, Sanno. Tono Aircraft Co., Gifu Prefecture. Oil Coolers: Exlrusions: Taiyo Aluminum, Shizuoka. Toyo Radiator, Nagoya. Sumitomo Metals Co., Nagoya. Aichi, Saniio. Electric Motors: Kobe Steel Co., Chofu, Shimonoseki. Bullet Proof Tanks: Shibaura Electric Co., Kawasaki. Fujihura Works, Tokyo. Electric Equipment: AIRFRAME PARTS AND SUB- Rudder Bars: Mitsubishi Electric Co., Nagoya. ASSEMBLY Nagoya Nut & Bolt Works, Nagoya. Fuel Metering Equipment: Flap Rollers: Fuji Aircraft Meter.'* Co., Tokyo and Fuselage Sectiofis: Kinzo Rock Drill Manufacturing Nagano. Aichi, Eitoku. Co., Nagoya. Final Assembly: Showa Sheet Metal Works, Nagoya. Airframe Assembly: Aichi, Eitoku. !\Iiura, Kanazawa. Aichi, Eitoku. Fly-a-way: Wings: Engines: Juichigochi. Aichi, Eitoku. Aichi, Atsuta. Test Flight and Delivery:
Aichi, Enokido. Mitsubishi No. 4, Nagoya. Ibo.
19
APPENDIX C. AICHI AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
-
TOTAL AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION
285
270
240
2 10
180
150
120
90
60
30
iiJ I I I I JFMAMJJASONDJFMAMJ JASONOJFMAM JJASONOJFMAMJJASCMJJ_ 1942 I 1943 1944 I 1945 U.l STRATtatC BJjmwjKWI
AICHI AIRCRAFT CO.
APPENDIX D )
21 :
EITOKU PLANT, AICHI AIRCRAFT COMPANY (Plant Report No. V-1)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Plant and its Function in the Aircraft Industry 1 Effects of Bombing Intelligence Check .' General I mpressions Appendix A. Plant Layout Fac,
B. Flow Chart ' Fa< C. Government Planned and Actual Production Fa( D. Bomb Plot and Damage Fai E. Dispersal Program
22 r
THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION The Eitoku plant received much assistance The Eitoku plant of the Aichi Ah-craft Company from the govei'nment. Most of the land on ichi Kokuki K K) was located on Nagoya which the plant was built \yas loaned by the irboi' in the southwestern part of the city of government and the majority of the buildings igoya. The site for the Eitoku plant was ac- were built at government expense with many of ireil on 18 February 1940 and the first buildings the machine tools being furnished by the govern- re completed the following May. The plant ment. In January 1945 the Aichi company was ne into limited production in April 1942 when appointed a "War Industrial Enterprise" which ne of the aircraft assembly functions of the meant that the operation of Eitoku became more nakata plant were transfen-ed to Eitoku. By directly controlled by the government with gov- 14 the plant had gi-own to approximately 95 ernment supervisors and inspectors being placed ildings exclusive of dormitory and school build- in the plant. (appeudix A). These buildings provided The principal product of the plant was the dive 22,170 square feet of floor space and were bomber, Judy (Suisei Models 11, 12, 33 and 43) ited in an area of approximately 197 acres. (Photo 1). The plant had also assembled the July 1944 the Eitoku plant accomrted for 4 type 2 Traming Flying Boat and the type 97 cent of the total Japanese aircraft production torpedo bomber, Kate, and at the close of the
I in December 1944 produced 6 percent of the war was producing the sea planes, Paul (Zuiun) and Seiran (Photo 2).
Photo 1.— Judy's Model 43 outside of rigging hangar.
23 i : : -
Photo 2. — Seiran in final assembly building.
ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION Medical afl'airs department: Director: Chikayuki Hotta. Following are, the departmental organization Responsibilities: Physical examinations, r and key personnel of the Eitoku plant cal services and factory hygiene. President: Kaniataro Aoki. Utilities department: Vice president; Taneo Morishima. Director: Tadashige Suzuki. Managing director: Tsuneki Hirano. Responsibilities: Construction and ma General afl'airs department: nance; water, gas, electricity and s Director: Kunio Okinnura. service; and appliances. Responsibilities: Archives and records, plan- Technical department: ning and executing all matters not under other departments. Du-ector: Tokuichiro Gomei. Responsibilities: Design and experiment Protection department on ti'ial aircraft. Director: Genichi Shibata.
Responsibilities: Police, fii'e service, and air- Manufacturing department: raid precautions. Director: Kozo Yonezawa. Accounts department Responsiljilities: Planning and product supply of parts materials, superv Director: Tsuneki Hirano. and of sub-contracting program. Responsibilities: Accounting, finances, costs, purchasing, and transfer of finished prod- Material testing department: ucts. Director: Tsuruo Araki. Labor department: ResponsibUities: Testing of materials. Director: Asajiro Kashiro. Inspection department: Responsibilities: Hiring and dischai'ge of work- Director: Isaburo Okamura. ers; wages and allowances, and employees' ResponsilJilities: Inspection of compoi welfare. parts and assemblies. 24 Flyiiiji' (IcparUncnl: the second shift; in -fuly 5.2 percent; in August Diioetor: Kisliiro Matsuo. 3.1 percent; in September 2.6 percent; in October Rc's])onsil)iliti('s: Tosl llio'hts, rio'fjiug- of air- 2.1 i)ercent; in Novembei- 2.1 percent and in craft for (iy-a\vay and dclivci'v. December 2.1 percent. The second sliifl was abandoned aliei- the air attacks connnenccd in The Eitokii ])laiit did not employ a production Decembei' l)ecause of the difTlculty encounlcr-ed lino ovc>n in final assembly but airplanes were built in concealing the illumination. from the gioinid up in a single spot with smaller sub-assemblies feeding: into the final assembly MATERIALS AND COMPONENTS buildings from adjacent shops. There were three The major portion of the raw materials and final asseml)ly buildings, each receiving parts and components used at the plant was allocated by sub-assemblies fronr its satellite shops. Judy the government. Special steels came from Daido and Seiran were assembled together in one Steel Co., Nagoya; Nippon Steel Co., Yawata; building, Paul in another and experimental Nippon Pipe Co., Ishikawa; and Hitachi Plant at aii'craft in the third (Appendix B). Shimizu. Aluminum alloy was obtained from EMPLOYMENT Sumitomo Light Metals Co., Nagoya; Kobe Steel Co., Chofu, Shimonoseki; and Tokushu Light At the peak employment jx-riod, February 1945, Metals Co., Ogaki. Copper alloy came from Kobe this plant employed a total of 22,683 workers of Steel Co. at Moji and nonmetallic raw materials whom 520 were soldiers and 4,570 were students. were obtained from Fujikura Industries, Tokyo; Of this total 8,963 were indirect workers. Con- Yokohama Rubber Co., Yokohama; and Kitagawa scripted labor was used to a large extent after the Maiuifacturing Co., Shiinada, Shizuoka Prefecture. beginning of conscription on 2 October 1941. At Components allocated by the government in- the employment peak of the Eitoku plant a total cliuled electric motors from Shibaura Electric Co. of approximately 6,900 male conscripted workers at Kawasaki and other electrical equipment from Hrere employed as well as 1,900 members of a Mitsubishi Electric Co., Nagoya. Bulletproof HTomen's army auxiliary comprising, in total, tanks came from Fujikura Industries, Tokyo; approximately 50 percent of the regular em- automatic fire extinguishers and fuel metering ployees. The male conscript came from all walks equipment from Fuji Aircraft Instrument Co. at
)f life not considered essential: farmers, shop- Tokyo and Nagano; cowlings from Mitsubishi ieepers, craftsmen, clerks, waiters, and tailors, Light Metals Co., Osaka; radiators from Nitto iecause of their inexperience and the enforced Aircraft, Kobe; oil coolers from Toyo Radiator egimentation, the efficiency was estimated by Co., Nagoya; and bomb-release mechanisms from )lant officials to average 15 percent less than that Chuo Industries, Tokyo.
)f regular employees. Subcontractors, obtained through direct nego- Employment totals showed a rising trend from tiations, included Showa Sheet Metal Works at he beginning of 1943 until October 1944 when Nagoya and Miura Works at Kanazawa, supply- he total employment figure became relatively ing fuselages; Taiyo Alummum Co. at Shizuoka, table (Figure 1). Maximum employment at this Taiyo Aircraft Co. at Toyohashi, Ooe Aircraft ant continued through February 1945 when the Works at Nagoya, and Miura Works at Kanazawa, ffects of an- attacks and the dispersal program supplying wings, ailerons, and taU surfaces; Taiyo esulted in a rapidly decreasing total employment Aluminum Co. at Shizuoka, Tono Aircraft Co. gure. The number of workers was increased in Gifu Prefecture, and Tokai Aircraft Co. at uring the last half of 1944 and early 1945 by the Ogaki, supplying fuel, oil, and water tanks; and mployment of large numbers of students. Taiyo Aluminum Co. at Shizuoka and Takata Prior to June 1944 the plant operated on a Aluminum Co. at Nirehara, Toyama, suppljnng ingle shift except for cooks who worked on two floats. its. In June 1944 a limited two-shift system The only fabrication from raw material con- as adopted for the purpose of delivering the in- ducted at the ])lant was the casthig of aluminum. reasing production demanded by the Nav-y. No components nor subassemblies were made for hifts were 11 hours long, beginning at 7:40 a. m. other plants.
'r p. m.) and ending at 6:40 p. m. (or a. m.). Substitutes were employed for scarce or un-
I June 1944 5.5 percent of the employees were on obtainable materials. Aluminum alloys, or cad- 25 ez.500 .
a- or cliromc-platod stool woro used for non- Peak production was achieved in December 1944
)siv(' parts of tho fuel systoni after Deeoniher and the doci'easing |)ro(iuction Iheroafter resulted when copper became scarce. Nickel chrome from oartli(|uakcs, air attacks, and dispersal
3 wore replaced with silicon majincsium activities. no steels or carbon steels in fuselage j)arts The oxpandiug pi'odiictivi' capacity dui-iiig 1943 February 1943. Aluminum alloy sheets and for most of 1944 was the result of plant ex- replaced in May 1944 Ijy tin plate or plywood pansion dviring that time (Figure 2). The indicated e ailerons and tail surface controls and i)ly- loss of capacity in July 1944 was explainetl as re- also was used after February 1944 in place sulting from plans and preparations to commence iminum alloy in some fuel tanks. Research assembly of the new dive and torpedo bomber, conducted in the substitution of aluminum Ryusei (Grace), at Eitoku. It was subsequently icred mild steel plate for 18 Co-8 Ni steel in decided to assemble Grace at the Funakata plant ist pipes and this was used after April 1945. and this decision, allowing concentration on as- Dver the shortage of casein glue in June 1942 sembly of Judy, afiordod an increased capacity. ompany tried using urea-formaldehyde con- Another large building was completed in August ition resin as a binder for wood parts. and peak capacity of 145 airplanes per month, principally Judys, was reached in October 1944. PRODUCTION STATISTICS After October some of the facilities used for the Eitoku plant had a total capacity for assembly of Judy were switched over to assem- iction of 2,88.3 aircraft from April 1942 bly of the newer Seiran. Consequently, total igh August 1945. Actual production totalled capacity declined. Capacity continued to decline compared to Government orders for 3,291 as a result of earthquakes, air attacks, and dis- ift during the same period (Appendix C). persal until the end of the war except for a tempo- records prior to April 1942 were not avail- rary increase m April 1945 resulting from the uti- but production before this time was in- lization that month of a large now shop building. icant, consisting only of a few Type 2 ing Flying Boats (H9A1). REBUILDING AND REPAIR the close of the war, there were outstanding The plant did not repair damaged or defective for 80 Judys, Model 43, to be delivered aircraft but did send some of its engineers and tember and to bo followed by 50 per month technicians to naval air bases for such purposes. fter until the end of March 1946. Orders The principal defects encountered were with oleo 16 Navy fighter, George, also were out- struts, fuel tank selection valves, wheel brakes, ing with 15 to be delivered in September, and leaking fuel tanks on Judy and air brakes, October, 25 in November, 40 in December, flaps, and floats on Paul. January, 70 in Febriuiry, and 90 in March 6. The gov^ornment orders apparently con- DIVERSION TO EXPERIMENTAL AIRCRAFT ated abandoning production of Seiran and experimental twin-engine night, fighter, The plant had two large shops (Buildings 02 0, and the concentration of these facilities and 03, Appendix A) devoted to manufacture of production of Judy and the Kawanishi parts for and assembly of experimental aircraft. ed George (Appendix C). Work was in progress on the experimental twin- al production figures show a normal increase engine night fighter, Denko, prior to the de- 1942 until mid-1944 in line with the cxpand- struction of the major portion of these shops by air pacity of the plant (J'igure 2 and Appendix C). attack in March 1945. The first Denko was rop in production in September 1943 resulted scheduled for completion on 30 September 1945. abandonment of the torpedo bomber, The plant also had planned to fabricate main which loss was made up in subsequent wings and tail surfaces for Oka IVIodel 43, the 18 by increased production of Judy. The tia-bo-jet propelled, ground-launched suicide bomb. ised production in August 1944 coincided The schedule called for completion of 2 sets in production difficulties at the Atsuta engine September and 10 in October 194-d. but recovery of aircraft production later ac- The plant worked in close cooperation with the mied the use of a radial au--cooled engine in First Naval Technical Research Laboratory at of the Atsuta in-line licjuid-cooled model. Yokusuka and used facilities at the latter place for 27
V!irial)lr (Icnsilv liiniU'l tests, liii^li-speud tests, and Paul, and the iical ticatment and casting 5). il repealed tests for spars, etc. shops were com.])lelely destroyed (Photos 4 and Building 1, foi- sheet metal [)arts and subassem- EFFECTS OF BOMBING blies; Building 2, for nuichining and sul)asseml)ly; ATTACKS DIRECT Building 5, Judy wing assembly; Building 6,
Tlie first (liiniagiiio; attack on the Eitnku ])linit Judy subassembly shoj); and Building 7, final curred diiriiij; the Naj^oya urban area attack of assembly shop for Judy, were all ])artially de- March 1945. The phnit was hit heavily hy fire stroyed as was the boiler house and one of the han- iinhs. liiiihiing 02, making; parts for experi- gars used in adjusting the planes for flight (Photos sntal ])laiies, an office building and several store- 6 and 7). Officials estimated that production uses in the vicinity were entirely destroyed by equal to 3 airplanes was lost during July because e. Approximately one half of Building 13, of damage caused by air attacks. Casualties were iking parts for Judy, was destroyed in the 30 persons killed. me raid as were a number of offices, storehouses, Dispersal was well under way by the time of the d other small buildings in the southeastern sec- last attack. Of a total of 1,033 major machine in of the plant. Of a total of 1,033 major ma- tools in the plant prior to the first attack in March ine tools in the plant, 265 were damaged al- and as a result of intervening attacks and disper^ ugh none were totally destroyed. Most of these sal, only 363 remained in the Eitoku plant on 24
)ls were in the Building 02, the mold shop and July 1945. Of these tools, 10 were damaged and
3 material-testing laboratory (Photo 3). 2 were totally destroyed by the attack.
A.S a result of this attack, the capacity of the The direct effects of the air attacks on the pro- nt dropped from 110 aircraft per month in duction of this plant are difficult to assess with bruary to 106 in March. Plant officials esti- accuracy because of the concurrent disruption ted that the loss of production directly attrib- brought al)out by the earthquake in January and ible to damage caused by the air attack ap- the disruption of production brought about by )xiniated 7 airplanes in March and 6 in April. the dispersal program which began in the sprmg sualties from this attack were 3 killed and 42 of 1945. The largest single decrease occurred in unded. January as a result of earthquakes on 7 Decemlaer The second fire attack of 17 May destroyed 75 and 13 January. Although dispersal activities •cent of the main office building in addition to were can-ied on up until the closing months of the le other office buildings and storehouses in the war there was never any plan for the complete inity. No major machme tools were damaged abandonment of the Eitoku plant and officials had destroyed. Casualties during this second planned as late as mid-1945, to continue produc- ack were 3 killed and 13 woundetl. tion at Eitoku as long as possible. ^he third attack on this plant was on 26 June Total production decreased from a peak of 126 h 346 tons of GP high explosive bombs being airplanes per month in December 1944 to 52 ah-- pped by radar. There were 8 hits in the plant planes m June, 29 in July 1945, and only 5 air- a and 1 hit on a building used as a storehouse. planes were assembled at Eitoku durmg the first ;ept for 2 hits in the vicinity of the school to 2 weeks of August. Capacity production de- northeast of the plant proper, the bombs fell creased from 78 to 77 planes in July and to 71 in le same general area burned out m the March August 1945. The fire bomb attack of March attack. No new damage to machine tools decreased production slightly during that month reported by plant officials. Production loss and a slight recovery in April was followed by a ibuted to air attack damage was estimated as sharp decrease m May as a result of the second roximately 3 airplanes but includes the con- fire bomb attack. A slight recovery in June was ing effect of earlier attacks. Casualties were followed by a sharp continuing decrease during iUled and 27 wounded. July and August following the late June and July 'he attack of 24 July 1945 was the heaviest attacks. The qualitative effect of each attack can Q the point of view of building damage (Appen- be observed in the production curve; however, D). A total of 451 tons of high explosive there can be no mathematically exact assessment lbs were dropped again by radar. There were of the eft'ect of attacks on production during 1945 lits in the plant area and 12 hits on buildings, because of the earthquake and the coincident ex- ding 14, manufacturing wing spars for Judy ecution of partial dispersal. 29 30 Photo 4.— Interior view of damage to No. 14 shop, wing spar manufacture.
Photo o. — Interior view of heat treatment siiop.
31 ijg H nillliBii *
Photo 6.— Exterior view uf ^>l. l r^iu,^., olieet metal working, destroyed storage building in foreground.
Photo 7. — Exterior view of No. 6 shop, Judy subassembly. 32 COUNTERMEASURES ininiber of woi'kers available it becomes evident that tile area fire bond) attacks on the city of departments were |)lnc("(l iiii(1(M';j;iouiuI oi- in Nogoya in M.-irdi iind May bad a \>cvccf)t\\>\c iciits at llic original |)lant location alliioiifih eM'ect on |)r()(iuetion by keeping the remaining basement space was used foi' storat;o. A workers from (licir ])laces of employment. tnictures were dismantled as fire-hreaUs and
sclieduled to b(> dismantled but actual s were INTERRUPTIONS TO SUPPLIES ition had not begun (Appendix A). Area attacks had no perceptible edcel on the ' plant bad its own air attack ])r(>cautions supi)ly of raw materials. In fact,
1 1 officials estimated the production lost quantities at various periods throughout the war.
> inadequate transportation facilities and One of the largest of these suppliers was Mit- iition of worker's' homes during 1945 was subishi Electric Co. whose plant, located in Slent to the following number of planes: northeast Nagoya, supplied electrical equipment January; 11.3, February; 22.1, March; 21.1, for the aircraft produced by Aichi. During 1943 ill9.8, May; 17.3, June"; 11.7, July and 11.1, the supply of this equipment expanded at a
I . As total employment began to drop slower rate than the ever mcreasing requirements, 'fh of 1945 the labor factor became more but as the requirements became more or less Viewed in the light of the decreasing stabilized in 1944, supply caught up and by May
33
\V!is exceed iiiij: tlie iiniouiits re(|iiire(l (FJiiiire parts priid- to the end of I he war. Some work on A sharp deeivase in available supi)ly Ix'caiiie the Carnpini jet-propelled suicide boirib Oka 22, eahle in Sepleinher 1944 and eontimied to was (lone at the Mino plant after M;iy 1945.
iilil the end of the war (h'spite decreashig Production of the Kawniiislii-(lesign<'d fightei- ireinenis durmg 1945. George was plaiuied foi- the Kitoku plant and
1( first indications of faihire in the snpply of also for the Tlokuriku plant on the north coast of
ical e(|nipnient in September 1944 are iniri>- Japan in Fukui City, Fukui Prefecture, which was to air attacks on the suppHer which began acquired 24 April 1945. Other jjlants were the sup])ly had ah'eady begun to fail. There planned for tlu- Fukui area to hv either under- be no exact assessment of the effects of later ground or semiunderground and the entire com- bing on this supplier because of the continued plex was ])lanne(l to produce 75 Georges per lation with the other factors which caused month by March 194(). Sonic labor and machines ies to decrease prior to the first air attacks. were tratisferi'cd to the main Hokuriku plant but, ectric motors for Judy were furnished by aside from a small amount of nuichined parts, no aiu'a Electric Works in Kawasaki and a per- production was accomplished at the Iloktu'iku
)le reduction in the supply came after April dispersal. following area attacks on Tokyo. Similarly, A third major planned dispersal complex was to matic fire extinguishers from the Fuji Aero- be situated around Seto City just east of Nagoya ic ^feter Co. in southwestern Tokyo became in Aichi Prefecture. One plant had been acquired er in supply at about the same time. New on 13 February 1945 and an underground plant of iers of this specialized ecpiipnnMit wei'c very approximately 110,000 square feet was completed
ult to find, even with government assistance. l)ri()r to the end of the war. Men and machines had been dispersed to the Seto complex and wings DISPERSAL for Judy were assembled there. Although hi had planned for dispersal during February production of 40 Judys per month by March and had acquired buildings and sites in dis- 1946 was planned for this complex no final assem- d locations beginning the middle of February. bly was actually accomplished. Munitions Ministry ordered dispersal on 4 In adiUtion to the tln-ee self-contained dispersal 1945. complexes discussed above, Aichi planned to con- e Yoro plant in the town of Takada, Gifu tiiHie production at Eitoku as long as possible. cture, was acquired on 15 February 1945. At With this in mind and as an emergency dispersal ame time the Ogaki plant in Ogaki City was measure the plant on 27 March 1945 dispersed ed from Tokai Aircraft Co. These 2 plants some men and machines to some spare buildings of ijunction with the Alino plant in the town of Niky Machine Manufacturing Co. in Aotsuka,
Gifu Prefecture, which was acquired 1 June slightly west of Nagoya in- Aichi prefecture, for constituted the Gifu complex. Completion sheet metal working. Similarly on 1 April 1945, le experimental twm-engine night fighter part of the plants of Aichi Foundry and Aichi and eventual production of between 100 Light Alloys Co. in the town of Hotel north of 100 wings and tail surfaces per month for the Nagoya in Aichi Prefecture were converted for jet-propelled suicide bomb Oka 43 were forging and casting of parts for the Eitoku plants. ed at this location. The au-field at Ibo, where the Aichi land planes )or and equipment began moving to the dis- were usually delivered, was developed for final complex in March 1945 but none of the assembly although its facilities were never used for ed production had been achieved prior to that purpose. Assembly of Sehan was sched- ly 1945 when an air attack almost com- uled for the Enokido plant after August 1945 and leveled the Ogaki plant. Ogaki did, how- subsequently George was to be assembled at the roduce a few wings and fuselage sections for Enokido plant. The Enokido plant on the Chita during its short career. peninsula south of Nagoya was acquired in June
s Yoro plant also began receiving workers 1944 and was used for wing assembly until the ihe March attack on Eitoku but more man- end of the war. was expended in dispersal and repair activi- Aichi Aircraft Co., beginning dispersal at the han in production of Denko and Oka Eitoku plant in February 1945, expended a gi-eat
35 amount of effort in prosecuting its dispersal GENERAL IMPRESSIONS program, but although some of the dispersed The most widespread damage to the facilities were in advanced stages of completion, no \ buildings resulted from fires caused by the u completed aii-craft had been assembled at any of area raids of March and May, and subseq the dispersal locations at the end of the war precision attacks spent much of their fore (Appendix E). As a result of the dispersal pro- those sections of the plant already damage gram and the aii- attacks, the number of machine fire. Although much of the damage susts tools at the Eitoku plant decreased from 1,976 in could be classed as superficial, it appeare February to 55S in August 194.5. effective in halting production as complete des INTELLIGENCE CHECK tion because most of it was not repaired. Oi other hand, final assembly was carried on K Intelligence attributed production of too many remaining buildings, alljeit at a diminishing aircraft types to this plant upon the assumption until the end of the war. that the origuial Funakata plant had been entirely In the case of this plant it appears tha converted to parts production. Actually, the type threat of continued air attacks and consec
99 carrier boml)er. Val, and the newer torpedo dispersal efforts was much more effective i and dive bomber Ryusei, Grace, were assembled ducing production than damage from thi only at the Funakata i)lant. Production of Judy attacks themselves. and Paid at Eitoku were overestimated by 20 In connection with the question of effee percent and 47 percent, respectively. attacks on suppliers of components, the fi Photo intelligence and functional analysis of of the supply of electrical eciuipment befon the plant were fah'ly accm'ate but indicated the air attack nidicates that some parts of the Jap existence of four assembly imits when in fact there economy were already on the downgrade 1: were only three. the initiation of the intensive bombing progri
36
Appendix C. GOVERNMENT PLANNED AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION AT EITOKU PLANT
Appendix E. DISPERSAL PROGRAM—AlCHI EITOKU PLANT
anir of plant ATSUTA PLANT, AICHI AIRCRAFT COMPANY
(Plant Report No. V-2)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
The Plant and its Function in the Aircraft Industry Effects of Bombing and Earthquake Intelligence Check Vulnerability Appendix: A. Atsuta Plant Lay-Out B. Bomb and Damage Plot ^^
38 THE PLANT AND ITS FUNCTION IN THE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
INTRODUCTION Supply department: Chief: Yosliizo Ozawa. 'he Atsuta Engine Plant of Aiclii Aircraft Co. Responsibilities: Accounting, supply, pur- ;hi Kol\iiki K K) was located in south central chases, storage and transport. joya. It contained .31 i)rincipal l)iiildin 41 After the two-shift system got underway, approx- From 1930 to 1939 the engine division had imately 35 percent of the total number of em- duced 450 Type 91 500-horsepower, and Tyi ployees worked on the night shift. This percent- 600-horsepower liquid-cooled engines. The age continued with minor fluctuations until production at the present plant consisted o abandonment of the second shift in May 1945. Kotobuki 9-cylinder air-cooled 700-horse] Conscripted labor was used, and at the end of radial engine. During 1939 the plant produ the war the nvunber of conscripted laborers was total of 157 Kotobuki engines and from Jai Ivotobuki 58.7 percent of the total number of employees. through July 1940 152 and 3 A Plant officials stated that the efficiency of con- engines were produced. scripted laborers was much below that of regular Figure 2. — Production of Engine by Types workers for the first 18 months. The relative effi- ciency of a conscripted worker with respect to at 20 that of a regular workman was estimated Year Name and type percent during the first month of his employment, 70 percent after 6 months, and 100 percent only after the conscriptee had been working for 18 1939 Kotobulci" n, air- cooled radial months. Absenteeism among the conscripted la- ...do 30 bor averaged more than 20 pei'cent. Atsuta" 20, Water- cooled A J"Kotobuki" II COMPONENTS 1941 MATERIALS AND l"Atsuta" 20 2 4 1942 do 13 26 The plant did little manufacturing from raw ..do 35 48 materials. It did sonu- fight aUoy casting, prima- 1943 .\tsuta" 30, water- cooled A 3 rily of crankcases and cylinder heads. Other en- )".\tsuta"20 3 1944 gine parts were received in semifinished condition ["Atsuta" 30 101 80 1945 do - 21 27 from parts manufacturers: crankshafts from Su- Metals Co. in Osaka and Japan Special mitomo "Atsuta" 20 was also called "AKIA." Steel Co. in Tokyo; cylinder barrels from Smni- "Atsuta" 30 was also called "AEIP." tomo and Daido Steel Co. in Nagoya; connecting rods from Japan Special Steel Co.; and reduction Production of Atsuta in-line engines v 19^ gears and propellor shafts from Japan Special Steel capacity only for a short period in late Co. and Daido Steel Co. Important components early 1943 and agahi in May 1944 (Figure supplied by others included fuel injection pumps Figure 5, Aiclii Corp., Report V). Prod from Hitachi Aii-craft Co. at Chiba and Kawamshi difficulties kept output low during the early increase Aircraft Co. at Naruo; oil filters from Japan Air- of this engine but the rat(> began to approximately craft Equipment Co. in Tokyo; magnetos from last half of 1942, averaging Kokusan Electric Co. of Tokyo; and starters from month durmg 1943. There was a slump Tokyo Aircraft Meters Co. of Tokyo. turn of the year as preparations were m engine bi As certain types of materials liecame scarcer, protluce the improved Atsuta 30 substitutes were used. Aliuninum alloy was used duction rose again sharply in the sprmg oJ was reae in place of copper alloy for bushings, and as nickel Peak production of 107 engines became unavailable silicon-manganese-chrome steel May 1944, at which time the production of the was used in crankshafts, gears ant! connecting plant constituted only 3 percent for thei rods in place of nickel-chrome steel. Japanese aircraft engine production Production slumped markedly in Septemb PRODUCTION STATISTICS October of 1944 because of mechanical difiB The Atsuta plant was the only producer of in- encountered in machining crankshafts and negated i line engines for the Japanese Navy and the Atsuta jiartial recovery in November was difli in-line enghie was the only engine produced at months by the December earthquake, air attacks in this plant during the war. From December 1941 in obtaining components, and of 50 eng through Atigiist 1945 a total of 1,62.3 in-fine en- and thereafter. The production constit gines were produced at this plant compared with May 1945, as the year before, still production capacity of ,3,247 and Government oi'ders for .3,850 percent of the total engine engines. industry. 42 I'lic cjipacity of tlw plant increased gradiiallv tuiuu'ling imder |)arts of the i)lant which provided III (he commencement of production of in-line air attack shelters contributed to Uw destruction. ;ini-^ in 1941 till Dccend)er 1944, when the Plant officials estimated thai, as a result of the '( u of the earthquake reduced capacity for that earth Photo 3. — A second interior view of damaged m.-ii/lilm- sliop. 44 Tlw tool shop, asscmhly shop and some stoi'iijic INTICUUUPTIONS DUE TO AKIOA ATTACKS buililin<;-s were only slifilitly chunii^cd. 'J'iic elec- Plant olliciajs stated tric powei' |)liint, test cells, the adjacent labora- that after each area attack the electric power, tory an 1944 1945 U ». ST*«TMIC *OH».VmW REQUIREMENTS AND RECEIPTS Of FUEL AICHI AIRCRAFT CO. INJECTION PUMPS ATSUTA PLANT FI6URE 9 46 INTELLICENCE CHECK 50 engines in any oni' month, j'iioto intelligence failed to identify the presence of test cells at the [nlolligciicc )e (Jiuly) oi-dinarily powered by this engine some parts of the plant, such as the boiler house s foi-eed (o use a radial engine in late 1944 be- and transformer station, was illustrated by the ise of the failure of supply of in-line engines, earthcpiake of 7 December 1944 which put both duetion of Atsuta engines was estimated to out of operation and forced the closing down of itinue at approximately 115 per month into the plant for several days. The electric power 5. Actual production in 1945 never exceeded plant was not affected by later air attacks. 49 < X o •* o o 3 o o q: Q. 05 < _J Q. z o Z3 CD DESCRIPTION I MAIN OFFICE OFFICE BOMB AND DAMAGE PLOT OF ATSUTA PLANT G UARDIAN'S room"" STOWAGE CASTING SHOP " APPROXIMATE SCALE IN FEET StORAJE MATERIAL LABORATORY inm^^ PAC KING HOUSE ST ORAGE GAS GOVERNOR HOUSE LSl GA:; GOVERNOR HODS"~ MACHINE SHOP LA ?0 STORAGE HEAT TREAtMENr'SHg?' UNISHING SHOP DRAWING ROOM EL ECTRIC POWER PI ANT OOL SHOP ASSEMBLY SHOP STEAM HEATING PLANT ' LABORATORY SOP FOR F)(PER«,IENTAL EIIGIIIES TEST CELLS LABORATORY^ WOO DEN PATTERN SHOP WOODEN PATTERN SHOP STO RAGE STORAGE LEGEND I GUTTED BY FIRE, AIR RAID 19 MAR, 1945 " 17 MAY 19*5 " 9 JUNE 1946 I DESTROYED BY HE 9 JUNE 1945 ! DAMAGED BY EARTHQUAKE 7 CEC. 1944 BOMB PLOT 9 JUNE 1945 us STRATEGIC BOUBIWC SURVET AICHI AIRCRAFT CO. ATSUTA PLAMT 709583—17 (Faoe p. 60) UNITED STATES STRATEGIC BOMBING SURVEY LIST OF REPORTS Tlic folluwing is a bibliography of reports resulting from 21 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Hil(l<'.sheim, Ger- he iSurvey's studies of the P^iiropean and Pacific wars. many Certain of these rejjorts may be imrchased from the Siiper- 22 Metallgussgesellschaft G m b H, Leipzig, Gerniany iitendent of Documents at the Government Printing Office, 23 Aluminiumwerk G m b H, Plant Xo. 2, Bitterfeld, rVashington, D. C. Germany 24 Gebrueder Ginlini G m li H, Ludwigshafen, Germany European War 25 Luftschiffbau Zeppelin G m b H, I'rieflrichshafen on Bodenseo, Ciermanj' 26 Wieland Werke A G, Ulm, Germany OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN 27 Rudolph Rautenbach Leichmetallgiessereien, Solin- gen, Germany 1 The United States Strategic BomVjing Survey: Sum- 28 Lippowcrke Vereinigte Alumlniumw-erke A G, Lunen, mary Report (European War) Germany 2 The United States Strategic Bombijig Survej": Over- 29 Vereinigte Deutsche Metallwerke, Heddernheim, all Report (Euro))ean War) Germany 3 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German 30 Duerener Metallwerke A G, Duren Wittenau-Berlin War Economy & Waren, Germany AIRCRAFT DIVISION AREA STUDIES DIVISION (By Division and Branch) 31 Area Studies Division Report 32 A Detailed Study of the Effect.sof Area Bombing on 4 Aircraft Division Industry Report Hamburg 5 Inspection.. Visits to Various Targets (Special Report) 33 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Wuppertal Airframes Branch 34 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Dusseldorf 6 Junkers Aircraft and Aero Engine Works, Dessau, 3.5 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Germany Solingen 7 Erla Maschinenwerke GmbH, Heiterblick, 36 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Germany Remscheid. 8 A T G Maschinenbau, G m b H, Leipzig (Mockau), 37 A Detailed Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Germany Darmstadt 9 Gothaer Waggonfabrik, A G, Gotha, Germany 38 A Detailed Study^of the Effects of Area Bombing on Focke Wulf Aircraft Plant, Bremen, Germany Lubeck Over-all Report 39 A Brief Study of the Effects of Area Bombing on Part A Berlin, Augsburg, Bochum, Leipzig, Hagen, Dort- Part B mund, Oberhausen, Schweinfurt, and Bremen i Appendices I, II, III 2 Dornier Works, Friedrichshafen & Mimich, Germany CIVILIAN DEFENSE DIVISION 3 Gerhard Fieseler Werke G m b H, Kassel, Germany Wiener Neustaedter Flugzeugvverke, Wiener Neu- 40 Civilian Defense Division—Final Report stadt, Austria 41 Cologne Field Report 42 Bonn Field Report Aero Engines Branch 43 Hanover Field Report 44 Hamburg Field Report— Vol I, Text; Vol II, Ex- Bussing NAG Flugmotorenwerke GmbH, Bruns- hibits wick, Germany 45 Bad Oldesloe Field Report 46 Augsburg Field Report ) Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha, Germany 47 Reception Areas in Bavaria, Germany 1 Bavarian Motor Works Inc, Eisenach & Durrerhof, Germany EQUIPMENT DIVISION Bayerische Motorenwerke A G (BMW) Munich, Ger- many Electrical Branch Henschel Flugmotorenwerke, Kassel, Germany 48 German Electrical Equipment Industry Report 49 Brown Boveri et Cie, Mannheim Kafertal, Germany Light Metal Branch Optical and Precision Instrument Branch Light Metals Industry /Part I, Aluminum of 50 Optical and Precision Instrument Industry Report Germany I Part II, Magnesium 51 Branch Abrasives Branch Submarine 51 The German Abrasive Industry 92 German Sulnnarine Industry Report 52 Mayer and Schmidt, Offenbach on ^Tain, Germany 93 Maschinenfal:)rik Augsburg-Xurnberg A G, Au} bvirg, Germany Anti-Friction Branch 94 Blohm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, Germany 95 Deutschewerke A G, Kiel, Germany Industry 53 Tlie German Anti-Friction Bearings 96 Deutsche Schiff und Maschinenbau, Bremen, G. many Machine Tools Branch 97 Friedrieh Krupp Germaniawerft, Kiel, Germany 98 Howaldtswerke A G, Hamburg, Germany 54 Machine Tools & Machinery as Capital Equipment 99 Sulmiarine Assembly Shelter, Farge, Germany 55 ^Machine Tool Industry in Germany 100 Bremer Vulkan, \'egesack, Germany 56 Herman Kolb Co., Cologne, Germany 57 Collet and Engelhard. Offenbach. Germany 58 Naxos Union, Frankfort on Main, Germany Ordnance Branch MILITARY ANALYSIS DIVISION 101 Ordnance Industry Report 102 Friedrieh Krupp Grusonwerke A G Magdebu 59 The Defeat of the German Air Force Germany 60 V-Weapons (Crossbow) Campaign 103 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, ] Rate of Operations 61 Air Force chum, Germany 62 Weather Factors in Combat Bomljardment Opera- Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, Germany tions in the European Theatre 104 Rheinmetall-Borsig, Dusseldorf, Germany 63 Bombing Accuracy, I'SAAF Heavy and :SIedium 105 Hermann Goering Werke, Braunschweig, Hallend^ Bombers in the ETO 106 Germany 64 Description of RAF Bombing Maschinenbau, Hanover, German 64a The Impact of the Allied Air Effort on German Lo- 107 Hannoverische Friedrieh Krupp, Essen, German gistics 108 Gusstahlfabrik MORALE DIVISION OIL DIVISION 64b The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Morale (Vol I & Vol II) 109 Oil Division, Final Report Final Report, Appendix Medical Branch 110 Oil Division, 111 Powder, Explosives, Special Rockets and Jet 1 Acid (Ministc 65 The Effect of Bombing on Health and Medical Care pellants, War Gases and Smoke in Germany Report #1) 112 Underground and Dispersal Plants in Greater ( MUNITIONS DIVISION manv 113 The German Oil Industry, Ministerial Report T Industry Branch Heavy 78 Report on Chemicals 66 The Coking Industrv Report on Germany 114 Ministerial 67 Coking Plant Report No. 1 Sections A, B, C, & D Oberliausen; Germany 68 Gutehoffnungshuette, Oil Branch 69 Friedrich-Alfred Huette, Rheinhausen, Germany Ei.senwerke G, Neunkirchen, Ger- A ' 70 Neunkirchen Merseburg GmbH, Leuna, manv 115 Ammoniakwerke Goering A G, Hallendorf, manv—2 Appendices 71 Reichswerke Hermann Gern Germany 116 Braunkohle Benzin A G, Zeitz and Bohlen, Luetzkendorf. Germany August Thvssen Huette A G, Hamborn, Germany Wintershall A G, 72 Farbenindu 73 Friedrieh Krupp A G, Borbeck Plant, Essen, Ger- 117 Ludwigshafen-Oppau Works of I G manv A G, Ludwigshafen, Germany 74 Dortmund Hoerder Huettenverein, A G, Dortmund, 118 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Germanv many. Vol. I, Vol II Harburgi 75 Hoesch -A G, Dortmund, Germany 119 Rhenania Ossag Mincraloelwerke A G, 76 Bochumer Verein fuer Gusstahlfabrikation A G, finery, Hamburg, Germany Bochum, Germany 120 Rhenania Ossag Mincraloelwerke A G, Grasb' Refinery, Hamburg, Germany Branch Wilhelmsi Motor Vehicles and Tanks 121 Rbenaria Ossag Mincraloelwerke A G, Refinerv, Hamburg, Germany 77 German Motor Vehicles Industry Report Gewerkschaft Victor, Castrop-Rauxel, Germany, 78 Tank Industrv Report 122 I & Vol II 79 Daimler Benz A G, L'nterturkheim, Ciermany Tanklager und Transport A G, B 80 Renault Motor Vehicles Plant, Billancourt, Paris 123 Europaeische Adam Opel, Russelshcim, Germany burg, Germany 81 Harburg Refinery, B 82 Daimler Benz-Gaggenau Works, Gaggenau, Germany 124 Ebano Asphalt Werke A G, Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nurnburg, Nurnburg, burg, Germany 83 Plant—' Germanv 125 Meerbeck Rheinpreussen Synthetic Oil 84 .\uto Union A G, Chemnitz and Zwickau, Germany & Vol II 85 Henschel & Sohn, Kassel, (iermany 86 Mavbach Motor Work.s, Friedrichshafen, Germany Rubber Branch 87 Voigtlander, Maschinenfabrik, A G Plaiien, Germany Germany 88 Volkswagenwerke, Fallersleben, on ft! 126 Deutsche Dunlop Gummi Co Hanau 89 Bussing XAG, Brunswick, Germany Brunswick, Ger- Germany 90 Muehlenbau Industrie A C! (Maig) Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany manv 127 Continental 128 Huels Svnthetic Rubber Plant 91 Friedrieh Krupp Grusonwerke, Magdeburg, <..er- Industryt j * ^ 129 Ministerial Report on German Rubber 52 Propellants Branch 182 Ship 'iards llowaldtswerke, Hamburg, Germany 183 Bliihm and Voss Shipyards, Hamburg, 30 Klcktiochemischewerke, Munich, Cicniiaiiv (iermany 184 DainiliM-Bcnz A G, Mannheim, (Iermany 31 Schooiichpck Explosive Plant, Lignoso Sprengstoff 18.-) Synthelic Oil I'la;it, Meerbeck-Hamburg," Germany WcrUo (; ni b II, Hail Sal/.onicn, Germany 18(i Gewcrkschaft Victor, Caslrop-Rau.xel, Germany 32 Plani.s of Dynaniit A (i Vornial, Alfred Xohcl ct Co, 187 Klockner Humboldl Deutz, Ulni, Troisdorf, Clausthal Druniniel and Dunebcrg, Germany 188 Ruhroel Hydrogenation Plant, Bottrop-Boy, Ger- Clerniany many 33 Deutsche Sprengcheniie G ni b H, Kraibiirg, Ger- 189 Neukirchen nianv Eisonwerke A G, Ncukirchen, Germany 190 Railway Viaduct at Altenbocken, Germany 191 Railway OVER-ALL Viaduct a( Arnsburg, Germany ECONOMIC EFFECTS DIVISION 192 Deurag-Nerag Refineries, Misburg, Germany 193 Fire Raids on German Cities 34 Over-all Economic Effects Division Report 194 I G Farbejiindustrie, Ludwigshaften, Germany, Vol I Gross National Product ISpecial papers & Vol II Kriegseilberichte 19.-) [ which together Roundhouse in Marshalling Yard, Ulm, Germany Herman Goering Works I compiise the 196 I G Farben Industrie, Leverkusen, Germany Food and Agiiculture J above report 197 Chemische- Werke, Huels, Germany 34a Industrial Sales Uutput and Productivity 198 Gremberg Marshalling Yard, Gremberg, Germany 199 Locomotiye Shops and Bridges at Hamm, Germany PHYSICAL DAMAGE DIVISION TRANSPORTATION DIVISION 54b Physical Damage Division Report (ETO) !5 ^"illacoul)Iay Airdrome, Paris, France 200 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on German Trans- i6 Railroad Repair Yards, Malines, Belgium liortation i" Railroad Reiiair Yards, Louvain, Belgium 201 Rail Operations Over the Brenner Pass iS Railroad Repair Yards, Hasselt, Belgium 202 Effects of Bombing on Railroad Installations in 19 Railroad Rejjair Yards, Namur, Belgium Regensburg, Nurnberg and Munich Divisions 10 Suhuiarine Pens, Brest, France 203 German Locomotive Industry During the War ;1 Powder Plant, Angouleme, France 204 German Military Railroad Traffic 2 Powder Plant, Bergerac, France 3 Coking Plants, Montigny & Liege, Belgium UTILITIES DIVISION 4 Fort .St. Blaise Verdun Group, Metz, France 5 Gnome et Rhone, Limoges, France 205 German Electric Utilities Industry Report 6 Michelin Tire J'aetory, Clermont-Ferrand, France 206 1 to 10 in Vol I "L'tilities Division'Plant Reports" 7 Gnome et Rhone Aero Engine Faetorv, Le Alans, 207 11 to 20 in Vol II "Utilities Division Plant Reports" FYance 208 21 Rheinische-Westfalische Elektrizitaetswerk A G 8 Kugelfischer Bearing Ball Plant, Ebelsbach, Ger- many Louis Breguet Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France Pacific War S. N. C. A. S. E. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France A. I. A. Aircraft Plant, Toulouse, France OFFICE OF THE CHAIRMAN ^' Weapons in London 1 Summary City Area of Krefeld Report (Pacific War) 2 Japan's Struggle Public Air Raid Shelters in Germany to End the War The Effects Goldenberg Thermal Electric Power Station, Knap- 3 of Atomic Bombs on Hiroshima and sack, Germany Nagasaki Brauweiler Transformer & Switching Station, Brau- weiler, Germany CIVILIAN STUDIES Storage Depot, Nahbollenbach, Germany Civilian Defense Division Railway and Road Bridge, Bad Munster, Germany Railway Bridge, Eller, Germany Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Gusfloff-\\'erke Weimar, ^\'einiar, Germany Allied Subjects, Tokyo, JajJan Henschell & Sohn G m b H, Kassel Germany Field Report Covering Air Raid Protection Area Survey at Pirmasens, and Germany Allied Subjects, Nagasaki, Hanoniag, Hanover, Germany Japan Field Report Covering M A N Werke Augsburg, Augsburg, Germany Air Raid Protection and Allied Subjects, Kyoto, Japan Friedrich Krupp A G, Essen, Germany Field Report Covering Air Raid Erla Maschinenwerke, G m b H, Heiterblick, Ger- Protection and many Allied Subjects, Kobe, Japan Field Report Covering Air A T G Maschinenbau G m li H, Mockau, Germany Raid Protection and Erla Maschinenwerke G m b H, jNIockau, Germany Allied Subjects, Osaka, Japan Bayerische Motorenwerke, Durrerhof, Germany Field Report Covermg Air Raid Protection and Allied Mittel-Deutsche Motorenwerke G m b H, Taucha, Subjects, Hiroshima, Japan—No. 1 Germany 10 Summary Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Allied Submarine Pens Deutsche-Werft, Hamburg, Ger- Subjects in Japan many 11 Final Report Covering Air Raid Protection and Multi-Storied Structures, Hamburg, Germany Allied Subjects in Japan Continental Gummiwerke, Hanover, Germany Medical Division Kassel Marshalling Yards, Kassel, Germany" Ammoniawerke, Merseburg-Leuna, Germany 12 The Effects of Bombing on Health and Medical Brown Boveri et Cie, Alannheim, Kafertal, Germany Services in Japan Adam Opel A G, Russelshehn, Germany 13 The Effects of Atomic Bombs on Health and Medical Daimler-Benz A G, Unterturkheim, Germany Services in Hiroshima and Nagasaki Valentin Suljmarine Assembly, Farge, Germany Volkswaggonwerke, Fallersleben, Germany Morale Division Railway Viaduct at Bielefeld, Germany 14 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale 53 ECONOMIC STUDIES 33 Nissan Automobile Company Corporation Report No. XVIII Aircraft Division (Nissan Jidosha KK) lo The Japanese Aircraft Industry (Engines) 16 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 34 Army .\ir .\rsenal & Navy Air Depots Corporation Report No. I Corporation Report No. XIX (Mitsubishi Jukogyo KK) (.Airframes and Engines) (Airframes & Engines) 35 Japan .\ircraft L'nderground 17 Xakajima Aircraft Company, Ltd. Report No. XX Corporation Report No. II (Xakajima Hikoki KK) (Airframes & Engines) Basic Materials Division 18 Kawanishi Aircraft Company Corporation Repoit No. Ill 36 Coal and Metals in Japan's War Economy (Kawanishi Kokuki Kabushiki Kaisha) (Airframes) Capital Goods, Equipment and Construction Division 19 Kawasaki .\ircraft Industries Company, Inc. Corporation Report A'o. IV 37 The Japanese Construction Industry (Kawasaki Kokuki Kogyo Kabushiki 38 Japanese Electrical Equipment Kaisha) 39 The Japanese Machine Building Industry (Airframes & Engines) 20 Aiclii Aircraft Company Electric Power Division Corporation Report No. V (Aichi Kokuki KK) 40 The Electric Power Industry of Japan (Airframes & Engines) 41 The Electric Power Indu.stry of Japan (Plant ! Metal Industries, Propeller Division 21 Sumitomo ports) Corporation Report No. I'/ (Sumitomo Kinzoku Kogyo KK, Puropera Seizosho) Manpower, Food and Civilian Supplies Division (Propellers) 22 Hitachi Aircraft Comi)any 42 The Japanese Wartime Standard of Living and Ut Corporation Report A'o. VII zation of Manpower (Hitaclii Kokuki KK) (Airframes Engines) & Military Supplies Division 23 Japan International Air Industries, Ltd. Corporation Report No. VIII 43 Japanese War Production Industries (Nippon Kokusai Koku Kogyo KK) 44 Japanese Naval Ordnance (Airframes) 45 Japanese .-^rmy Ordnance 24 Japan ^Musical Instrument Manufacturing Company 46 Japanese Naval Shipbuilding Corporation Report No. IX 47 Japanese Motor Vehicle Industry (Nippon Gakki Seizo KK) 48 Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding (Propellers) 2o Tachikawa Aircraft Company Oil and Chemical Division Corporation Report No. X (Tachikawa Hikoki KK) 49 Chemicals in Japan's War (Airframes) 50 Chemicals in JajJan's War—Appendix 26 Fuji Airplane Company 51 Oil in Japan's War Corporation Report No. XI (Fuji Hikoki KK) 52 Oil in Japan's War—Appendix (Airframes) Division 27 Showa Airplane Company Over-all Economic Effects Corporation Report No. XII V (Showa Hikoki Kog3''o KK) 53 The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's (Airframes) Economy (Including Appendix A: U. S. Econoi Comparis 28 Ishikawajima Aircraft Industries Company, Ltd. Intelligence on Japan—Analysis and Corporation Report No. XIII Appendix B: Gross National Product on Jaj (Ishikawajima Koku Kogyo Kabushiki and Its Components; Appendix C: Statist) Kaisha) Sources). (Engines) 29 Nippon Airplane Company Transportation Division Corporation Report No. XIV (Nippon Hikoki KK) 54 Tlie War Against Japanese TransDortation, 19' (Airframes) 1945 30 Kyushu Airplane Company Corporation Report No. XV Urban Areas Division (Kyushu Hikoki KK) (Airframes) 55 Effects of Air Attack on Japanese Urban Econo Report) 31 Shoda Engineering Company (Summary Corporation Report No. XVI 56 Effects of Air Attack on Urban Complex Tok; (Shoda Seisakujo) Kawasaki-Yokohoma (Components) 57 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Nagoya 32 Mitaka Aircraft Industries 58 Effects of Air Attack on Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto Corporation Report No. XVII Attack on the City of Nagasaki (Mitaka Koku Kogyo Kabushiki Kaisha) 59 Effects of Air (Components) 60 Effects of Air Attack on the City of Hiroshima 54 — MILITARY STUDIES 87 Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure I), Comments Military Analysis and Data on Effectiveness Division of Amnmnition 61 Air 88 Report of Ships Forces Allied with l,lio United Stales in the War Bombardment Survey Party (En- closure Against Japan J), Comments and Data on Accuracy of 62 Japanese Air I'ower rirmg 63 Japanese Air 89 Reports Weapons and Tactics of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- 64 Tlie Effect of Air Action on Japanese Ground Arniv closure K), Effects of Surface Bombardments on Logistics Japanese War Potential 5 r:mployment of Forces Under the Southwest Command Pacific Physical Damage Division 66 The Strategic Air Operations of Very Heavy Bom- bardment in the War Against 90 Effect of the Japan (Twentieth Incendiary Bomb Attacks on Japan (a Air Force) Report on Eight Citiesj Air Operations 87 in China, Burma, India—World 91 The Effects of the Ten Thousand Pound War II Bomb on Japanese Targets (a Report on Nine 38 The Air Transport ^ Incidents^ Command in the War Against 92 Effects of the Atomic Japan Bomb on Hiroshima, Japan 93 Effects of the Atomic Bomb on Nagasaki, 39 The Thirteenth Air Force in the War Against Japan Japan 94 Effects of the Four Thousand Pound 70 The Seventh and Eleventh Air Forces in the War Bomb on Japa- Against JajJan nese Targets (a Report on Five Incidents) Effects 71 The Fifth Air Force in the War Against of Two Thousand, One Thousanrl, and Five Jajjan Hundred Pound Bombs on Japanese Targets (a Report on Eight Incidents) Naval Analysis Division 96 A Report on Physical Damage in Japan (Summary The Report) Interrogations of Japanese Officials (Vols I and II) G 2 Division Campaigns of the Pacific War The Reduction of Wake Island 97 Japanese Military and Naval Intelligence The Allied Campaign Against Ralmul 98 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence The American Campaign in the Japa- Against Wotje, Maloelap nese Homeland, Part I, Comprehensioe Report IMille, and Jaluit (Vols. T^ II and III) 99 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the The Reduction of Truk Japa- nese Homeland, Part II, The Offensive Mine Laying Airfields Camjjaign Against Japan 100 Evaluation of Photographic Report of Ships Bombardment Intelligence in the Japa- Survey Party nese Homeland, Part III, Foreword, Introduction, Computed Bomb Plotting Conclusions, and General 101 Evaluation Summary- of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part iO Report of Ships Bombardment Survey IV, Urban Area Analysis Party (En- 102 Evaluation .closure A), Kamaishi Area of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Report of Sliips Bombardment Survey Party Part V, Camouflage (En- 103 closure B), Hamamatsu Area Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- Homeland, Part VI, Slapping 104 closure C), Hitachi Area Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- nese Homeland, Part VII, Electronics closure D), 105 Hakodate Area Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- nese Homeland, Part VIII, Beach Intelligence closure E), Muroran Area 106 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- Report of Ships Bombardment Survey Party (En- nese Homeland, Part IX, Artillery closure F), Shiniizu Area 107 Evaluation of Photographic Intelligence Report of Ships Bombardment in the Japa- Survey Party (En- nese Homeland, Part X, Roads and closures G and H), Railroads Shionomi-Saki 'and Nojima- 108 Evaluation of Saki Areas Photographic Intelligence in the Japa- nese Homeland, Part XI, Industrial Analysis 55 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE- 1947 BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY lllllillllllllllllllll ! MlY, ' ^ 3 9999 06313 352 2 |