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Home , Federalist, Publius (journal), The Federalist Papers

The by JEAN YARBROUGH

n September 17, 1787, after er possibilities had fallen through, the natural rights of man. Moreover, four months of deliberation invited to their work is circumscribed by the and compromise, the Federal join them. Madison, a leading force knowledge that a republican gov- Convention0 concluded its business at the Convention, was now in New ernment, organized on federal prin- York as Virginia's representative to ciples, is the only form of govern- in Philadelphia and forwarded a ment Americans will accept. The copy of the proposed Constitution the Congress. Be- to Congress for further action. Ac- tween October 1787 and May 1788, purpose of The Federalist, then, is cording to the new plan of govern- the three produced eighty-five es- to persuade the people, by reason ment, nine states would have to says under the title, The Federalist. when possible and by appeals to ratify the Constitution before it It is now generally agreed that passion and prejudice when neces- Hamilton wrote fifty-one papers, sary, that the Constitution estab- could go into effect. Immediately lishes a , and that this re- after adjournment, Alexander Ham- Madison twenty-six and Jay (owing ilton, delegate to the to illness) five. The remaining three public is "sufficiently federal" to Convention and one of the Consti- papers, tracing the history of past secure their rights. confederacies, are the joint collabo- But if The Federalist has a practi- tution's chief supporters, launched is by no an ambitious newspaper campaign ration of Madison and Hamilton. cal political agenda, it to secure ratification in his home Following a common eighteenth- means simply a tract for the times. Indeed, it is doubtful that The Fed- state. century practice, the authors did Both supporters and opponents not reveal their identities but eralist had much of an impact upon the ratification drive in New York. of the Constitution recognized the signed the papers under the pseud- pivotal importance of New York. onyms, "Publius." Americans of As the political scientist Clinton Not only did New York provide the that day recognized that the refer- Rossiter has written: "Promises, crucial link between the New En- ence was to Publius Valerius Pub li- threats, bargains and face to face gland states and the rest of the cola, who, according to the account debates, not eloquent words in even country, but it was the seat of gov- in Plutarch's Lives, had saved the the most widely circulated newspa- ernment under the Articles of Con- Roman Republic. The choice of pers, won hard-euned victories for . A negative vote in New "Publius" suggested that, like their the Constitution in the crucial York would surely affect the out- ancient namesake, the authors of states of Massachusetts, Virginia come in other states. Yet, important would save and New York." Ultimately The as New York was, it would not be in America by recon- Federalist's claim to greatness lies an easy state to carry. Both Robert stituting it on sounder principles. in its authoritative exposition of the Lansing and Robert Yates, New Although The Federalist is the new Constitution and of the princi- York's other two delegates at Phila- most important writing in ples underlying it. delphia, had walked out of the Con- political thought, it is, more precise- vention in protest, while Governor ly, an exercise in political rhetoric The Federalist's View of George Clinton organized the oppo- than . Unlike Human Nature: sition at home. Unanimously elect- the great treatises of political phi- "If Men Were Angels ..." ed president of the New York Rati- losophy by, say, Aristotle or fying Convention, Clinton would 'Hobbes, Publius is not engaged in a At the bottom of The Federalist's defense of the proposed Constitu- use his considerable influence in- disinterested pursuit of the truth. side the Convention and "out of The authors of The Federalist do tion is a view of human nature doors" in an effort to defeat the not explore such questions as which may best be described as realistic. The authors of The Feder- proposed Constitution. "What are the proper ends of politi- Because time was short, Hamil- cal life?" or "What form of govern- alist rejected the popular Enlight- ton enlisted the aid of fellow New ment best promotes these ends?" enment view that man was basical- Yorker, , in preparing the Rather, they take as their starting ly good, and corrupted only from point the principles set forth in the without by faulty institutions such essays. Jay, though not a delegate Over- to the Federal Convention, was a Declaration of Independence as or mercantilism. prominent New York statesman (which are themselves derived throw these institutions, it was who had served as Secretary for from Locke, the Scottish moral phi- widely believed, and men can live losophers and others), that the pur- together in harmony with little or Foreign Affairs under the Articles Publius of Confederation. After several oth- pose of is to protect no government. Although

this Constitution 4 124 As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a cer- tain degree of circumspection and distrust: So there are other qualities in human nature, which justify a portion of esteem and confidence. Republican govern- ment presupposes the existence of these qualities in a higher de- gree than any other form. Were the pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, faithful like- nesses of the human character, the inference would be that there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government, and that nothing less than the chains of can restrain them from destroying and devouring one another (No. 55). Yet although republican govern- ment "presupposes" a certain ca- pacity for virtue, elsewhere in The Federalist Publius makes it clear that republican The first Seal of the , 1782. . government cannot rely on morality for its preserva- tion. All too often, these "better agreed that these institutions were dente with the most motives" fail just when they be- flawed, the authors of The favorable ex- come most necessary. Moreover, Federal- ternal conditions (No. 2), must ist* held that the causes of human learn that man is the promotion of virtue by the na- no better in the tional government would quarrelling could not be blamed New World than in the require a simply on external conditions. Old. Publius degree of political interference in The is one of the first to deny "the myth roots of discord and faction are of American private matters inconsistent with exceptionalism." republican liberty. "sown in the nature of man" (No. Americans, he warns, have 10). Thus, in answer to the question, no claim Instead, The Federalist seeks to "Why has government to "an exemption from the imper- ground republican been institut- fections, weaknesses, and government on ed at all?" Publius evils inci- the most reliable aspect of human replied: "Be- dent to society in every shape" (No. cause the passions of man will not 6). To believe otherwise nature: self-interest. By self-inter- conform to the dictates is to in- est, Publius means that most men, if of reason dulge in "the deceitful dream of a and justice without restraint" (No. golden age." left alone, will naturally seek to 15). Since no satisfy their ovtn interests arrangement of the But if men are not good, and de- social order could neither sires, rather than look to the well ever make men does Publius regard them as simply good, government, with its ultimate evil. In one of the being of the whole. In a society threat of coercion, would longest state- such as the always be ments on human nature in The one Publius hopes to necessary. Fed- s, ipe, this means that most men eralist, Publius suggests that human Americans, blessed by Provi- will seek a comfortable material nature partakes of both the admira- ble and the base and existence. Although some men will that repub- continue to pursue the more aristo- The Federalist essays will be referred lican govenunent would be inde- to by their numbers in parentheses cratic desires for glory and power, after fensible if men were simply degen- quotations. erate. Publius understands that the desire for material well-being is the mod- this Constitution 0 t 125 s `cei A . Library of Congress. John Jay. Library of Congress. James Madison. Library of Congress.

tween majority faction and majority em democratic passion par excel- Federalist No. 51 to turn the small republic argument on its head. In rule. lence. Publius does not condemn But for social pluralism to work any of these selfish impulses, or that paper, he argues that "the larg- is not er the society, provided it lie within to maximum advantage, it even try to moderate them. For The enough simply to extend the sphere Federalist is confident that im- a practicable sphere, the more duly capable it will be of self-govern- of republican government; the Con- provements and discoveries in "the stitution must encourage a large new science of " (No. 9) will ment." For The Federalist the chief danger to republican government commercial republic. By com- enable them to channel these de- merce, Publius does not mean unre- sires toward the public good. comes not from the decline m civic virtue but, on the contrary, from the stricted laissez faire, for he regards the "the regulation of these various and The Classical Republican all too active involvement of majority in schemes of oppression interfering (economic] interests" as Tradition and "the Extended "the principal tool of modern legis- Republic" against the minority. According to Publius, the great advantage of the lation." (No. 10). What The Federal- extended republic is that it permits ist has in mind, very loosely, is a Chief among these discoveries is system of free enterprise, in which "the enlargement of the orbit" of majority rule while discouraging of government and social mo- republican government. Opponents majority faction, or the tyranny the many over the few. The minor- res encourage the people to ac- of the Constitution, citing the au- quire, possess, and most iii.portant, thority of the French political phi- ity Publius had in mind was princi- pally the propertied few, but it ap- increase their property and wealth. losopher Montesquieu, had insisted In its defense of a commercial that republican government could plies with equal force to religious, racial and ethnic minorities. republic, The Federalist challenges not be expanded beyond the size of still another tenet of the republican the states. Smallness was essential The Extended Republic creed. For the classical tradition because it preserved a sense of eschewed commerce and insisted community and made it possible for and "The Multiplicity of Sects that and Interests" that its citizens remain poor so citizens to discern the common nothing could distract them from good. In an extended republic, the This proposition, that a large re- their singleminded devotion to the people would be too remote from common good. the centers of power to participate public is better able to protect liber- ty and hence to govern itself, rests Having substituted self-interest in public affairs, and government for virtue as the ground or "spring" would fall into the hands of private on two premises. First, by extend- ing the size of the country, the of republican government, Publius interests. is more sanguine about the pros- Publius responds in Fenralist number of religious sects, political parties and economic interests pect of a commercial republic. As No. 9 by arguing that the states are he explains in Federalist No. 10, the far too large to meet the require- would be so multiplied that no one group could force an unjust major- cure for the evils of majority faction ments of classical republicanism. lies in the division of society into Strict adherence to this principle ity to oppress others. As Publius explains, in a large, pluralistic soci- different kinds as well as amounts would require that the states, too, of property. Rich and poor must be broken up into city-sized repub- ety, a coalition of the majority "could seldom take place on any view each other not simply as op- lics. Having demonstrated the inap- the posing classes, but as members of plicability of the small republic ar- other principles but justice and general good." (No. 51). Here again, different economic interests and gument to the Anti-Federalist occupations: creditors, debtors, cause, Publius then proceeds in we note the crucial distinction he- this Constitution 6 126 In one of the longest statements on human nature in The Federalist, Publius suggests that human nature partakes of both the admirable and the base and that republican government would be indefensible if men were simply degenerate.

farmers, merchants, manufacturers, the large republic encourages, self etc. Since only commerce can give branch of governmentand not government becomes good govern- just the lower house of the legisla- this "variety and complexity to the ment. It is for this reason that Pub- affairs of a nation" (No. 56), Publius turerepresents the people. Within lius makes representation the sine this wholly democratic framework, seeks to encourage a commercial qua non of republican government. republic. Publius hopes to secure the advan- Republican government is nothing tages of a mixed regime. As he moreand nothing lessthan a "Inventions of Prudence": explains in No. 37, by creating a government in which "a scheme of single , independent of Representation and the representation takes place" (No. the , the Constitution en- 10). courages energy and dispatch in If the extended republic makes that branch. Similarly, by reducing The second reason that a large possible a certain kind of represen- the size of the Senate and extending republic is more capable of self tation, representation in turn makes its term of office, the Constitution government is that it attracts more possible the principle of separation qualified representatives. In small promotes certain other aristocrat- of powers. In a pure , ic qualitiesstablity, wisdom, dig- , such as the states, repre- where the people exercise all politi- nityso often lacking in popular sentatives were drawn from small- cal power directly, no such division er, more homogeneous constituen- . In this way, the sepa- of legislative, executive and judicial ration of powers by itself approxi- cies and frequently did nothing powers is possible. Publius, citing more than mirror the "local and mates the virtues of a mixed regime , regards the con- while remaining true to its republi- particular" views of the majority. centration of political power in the can form. By contrast, in the extended repub- same hands as the very "definition lic, electoral districts would Still, the main purpose of the neces- of despotic government" (No. 48). separation of powers is to prevent sarily be larger, increasing the like- Publius does not claim to have one branch from encroaching upon lihood that only the most "fit discovered the separation of pow- the powers of the others. According characters" would be elected. And ers, but the Constitution does modi- to Publius, the greatest danger to once in office, these representatives fy the principle significantly. Prior liberty in a "representative repub- would "refine and enlarge" rather to 1787, the separation of powers lic" comes not from the executive, than merely "reflect" their constitu- was part of the theory of the mixed ents' views. On the political level but from the legislature. Because its regime. According to this older constitutional powers are broader, then, the advantage of the large view, which was given its fullest republic consists in "the substitu- and because it controls the raising practical embodiment in the Roman and spending of money, the legisla- tion of representatives whose en- Republic and later the British Con- lightened views and virtuous senti- ture stands in need of the greatest stitution, political power was par- checks. "The provision for defense ments render them superior to local celled out to diff-rent hereditary must ... be made commensurate to prejudices and schemes of injus- classes in society. For example, in tice" (No. 10). Nevertheless, Pub- the danger of attack" (No. 51). Ac- England, the monarch exercised ex- cordingly, the Constitution divides lius does not believe the large re- ecutive power while the legislative power between the two public guarantees the of and democracy shared legislative houses of Congress, each elected "enlightened statesmen." He recog- powers. By distributing political nizes full well that such leaders independently of the other and re- powers among these hereditary sponsible to different (though dem- "will not always be at the helm." classes, the theorists of the mixed Thus an additional advantage of the ocratic) constituencies. As a further regime hoped to secure the benefits precaution, the Constitution equips large electoral district is that even if of monarchy, aristocracy and de- less qualified men are chosen, the the executive with one-sixth of the mocracy while avoiding their de- legislative power through the veto. sheer diversity of interests and fects. Finally, the Constitution encour- opinions which they represent, as What makes the American Con- well as the necessity to ages an independent to compro- stitution unique is that it severs the insure the impartial administration mise in order to obtain a legislative separation of powers from the sep- majority, will compel them to of the laws. By giving to each en- aration of classes or orders. Instead branch "the necessary constitution- large their views. So, by virtue of the Constitution establishes a dem- al means, and personal motives the "refined" representation which to ocratic republic in which every resist the encroachments of the this Constitution 127 7 l{VtiCA'1 1141 CJ. In Norfolk, OR. 91 17137 (6w.) 0. Ut In the PRESS, and fpeedily will be publifhed, T I-1 E FEDERALIS7, others" (No. 51), the Constitutio;s puts teeth into the principle of sep- A Collekr,tion of Eflays writtcn in fa. aration of powers. Here again Pub- lius reiterates his view that the Con- vor of the New Conflitution. stitution cannot rely primarily upon the "better motives" of moral and of 'By a Citizen of New-lark. patriotic leaders to maintain the Jl eorrctlat by the Author, with Additions proper separation of powers, but must appeal instead to each individ- arid AlteratAons. ' ual's self interest. In perhaps the ig This (work twill be printed cn a fine Paper most famous passage of The Feder- and good 13,pe, in one handfinse Velum( duo- alist, Publius connects the separa- tion of powers with his realistic ilecimo, and delivered to frbfrribers at the view of man: moderate trice of Dne dollar. A few copies Ambition must be made to coun- quill be ruled On freprfine royal (writing ta- teract ambition. The interest of the man must be connected with ter, price ten Pilling:. the constitutional rights of the al No money required till deli vet place. It may be a reflection on To render this (work more complete, human nature that such devices to should be necessary to control added, (without any additional alma, the abuses of government. But what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on hu- PHILO-PUBLIUS ) man nature? If men were angels, no government would be neces- -A N D TR E sary. If angels were to govern 1 (4.., . men, neither external nor inter- ArticlesI of Me onvention, nal controls on government would be necessary (No. 51). it- As agreed upon at Philadelphia, &plan. bey 1 qtly 1787. The Compound Republic: "Partly Federal, Partly id 6-4tA As vet y few more copies twill be pub, National" lifted than firbicribed fur, thrfe twho are deft- The Constitution not only divides reus qt. poliffug the Federaiitt through all its power horizontally among the three in numbers, twill be as expeditious as poffibk in different branches of government, it ns tcurfinittin atir names to ohn Lean, also divides power vertically be- is printer, Norfolk, and to A. Davis, (winter, tween the federal government and rls the states. This vertical distribu- Richmond, the qvork being already far in pro tionor federalismin which '11 grefir, and may be e.vpeaed out in a very power is constitutionally distribut- 1Y jinni time. ed between two levels of govern- t. ment, each of which is supreme in Norfolk, January 16, 17M its own sphere, is the most novel of the Framers' inventions. Prior to 1787, was synonymous with confederalism. Federalism in P Allerr e 11 m01/71^fir this more traditional sense referred to a league of small republics, unit- Advertisement for The Federalist in book form, published in The Virginia Independent Chronicle, 13 February ed for limited security purposes. 1788. Library of Congress. 128 this Constitution Though written in haste, under the pressure of editorial deadlines, The Federalist was from the outset regarded as the most authoritative explication of the princples underlying the Constitution.

The states retained full and not the states. On the other between state and federal jurisdic- over their internal affairs and were hand, the Senate, especially represented equally in the federal as orig- tion has been more a political than inally conceived, is the most "feder- a constitutional issue. Nevertheless, alliance. Confederalism was a vital al" branch, since it component of the small republic represents each modern federalism preserves, how- state equally regardless of its size ever loosely, the division of tradition, according to which only or population. Because the presi- power the state governments could pre- necessary for republican liberty. In dent is chosen by the Electoral Col- this way, it accords with the serve republican liberty. lege, rather than by direct popular central But in 1787, a new generation of theme of The Federalist, that liber- vote, Publius regards the source of ty is best preserved not by limiting Americans, having witnessed first- executive powers as essentially fed- hand the defects of state sovereign- political power, but by properly dis- eral. Indeed, it is worth noting that, tributing it. ty under the Articles of Confedera- even today, there is no federal of- tion became convinced a fice which is elected by a simple Conclusion modification of the traditional fed- majority of the people as a whole. eral principle was necessary if lib- Turning next to the operation erty was to be secure. Accordingly, of Although the immediate aim of the new government, Publius con- the new federal principle invented The Federalist was to secure the cedes it is unambiguously national. ratification of the Constitution at the Constitutional Convention The federal government will have in forms a mean between confedera- New York, it remains unclear how the power to legislate directly over tion based on state sovereignty and successful the papers were in individuals. Publius regards this achieving this goal. On June a consolidated central government provision as essential, for the 21, based on national sovereignty. gov- 1788, while the New York Ratifying The ernment would not be a govern- Constitution, Publius concedes, is Convention was just beginning its ment if it lacked the power to legis- deliberations, New Hampshire be- "partly federal, partly national" late and enforce its decisions. (No. 39). came the ninth state to ratify the The amending power Publius Constitution. Shortly thereafter, But is it "sufficiently federal" to considers partly federal and preserve the republican liberty? In partly Virginia voted to join the Union, national. Although the states have and on July 26, 1788, with Federalist No. 39, Publius examines the power to alter the Constitution, the new the new government from five dif- Constitution already a certainty, the amendment process does not, New York followed suit. ferent perspectivesits founda- as traditional federal theory would tion, sources of power, operation But the enduring claim of The have it, require the unanimous con- Federalist does not rest primarily and' extent of powers, and the sent of the states By contrast with amendment processto on its role in securing ratification. convince the ratification process, the sover- his critics that it is "sufficiently Though written in haste, under the eignty of the dissenting states is pressure of editorial deadlines, The federal." His discussion makes it here breached. clear the extent to which Federalist was from the outset re- federal- Finally, "perhaps most impor- ismin its contemporary mean- garded as the most authoritative tantly, federalism provides some explication of the principles under- ingsuffuses the political order. check" upon the extent of Starting with the amendment national lying the Constitution. And two powers. Since the federal govern- hundred years later, there process, Publius argues that the ment is "an incomplete" national is no foundation of government is reason to revise this view. a fed- government, the states are neces- eral act since the Constitution rests sary to perform those tasks which it on the unanimous consent of the is inconvenient or undesirable Suggested additional reading: people in the states. No for state can be the federal government to perform. David F. Epstein, The Political 77teory of compelled to join the Union with- The federal principle holds that "The Federalist" (1986). out its consent. the , ed. Federalist Papers absorption of these powers by the (1986). Considering next the sources federal government would from which the ordinary danger- branches ously concentratc political power. of government are derived, Publius Jean Yarbrough is associate professor It is true that the Constitution of at Loyola University concludes that they are mixed. The does not explicitly of Chicago and director of the House of Representatives enumerate honors is nation- which powers are reserved to the program. She is now at work on a manu- al because it represents the people script entitled "Moral Foundations of states. For this reason, the division the American Republic." this Constitution .129 9