The Genesis of the War
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THE GENESIS OF THE WAR THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH THE GENESIS OF THE WAR by THE RIGHT HONOURABLE HERBERT HENRY ASQUITH PRIME MINISTER OF ENGLAND 1908-1916 ^ . ' ':.,..><'• <''/• NEW SUflr YORK GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY COPYRIGHT, 1928, BY GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY COPYRIGHT, 1923, BY THE CURTIS PUBLISHING COMPANY THE OENESI9 OF THE WAR. I PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA PREFACE This book is in no sense an autobiography. Nor does it include within its scope a review of the con duct of the War, of the Armistice, or of the Peace negotiations, and the Treaties which resulted from them. Its purpose is to trace the genesis of the war through all the antecedent stages up to its actual outbreak, with especial references to the pol icy pursued by Great Britain, for which during the nine preceding years I had myself a large measure of responsibility. The recent publication by the ex-Kaiser of his Memoirs seemed to make this an opportune moment for attempting such a task. Though I have made use of all the relevant and authentic materials which are now accessible, and been careful to rectify statements of fact, I have been as sparing as was possible in references and foot-notes. An exhaustive analysis of the docu mentary matter which has been brought to light since the War is to be found in Mr. G. P. Gooch's "Recent Revelations on European Diplomacy." * * Journal of British Institute of International Affcrirs, Jan., 1923. [v] PREFACE I have to acknowledge many obligations for kind assistance in my undertaking. I am particularly indebted to Mr. Alexander MacKintosh (of the Aberdeen Journal) for the pains and skill which he has expended in disentangling the story of the negotiations immediately preceding the War. Among others to whom I owe my best thanks are Sir William Tyrrell, Assistant Under-Secretary, and Mr. Headlam Morley, historical adviser to the Foreign Office; Sir J. E. Masterton Smith, Under- Secretary for the Colonies; Lieutenant Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey; Mr. Montague Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England; Dr. Walter Leaf, Chairman of the Westminster Bank; Mr. W. M. R. Pringle, M.P.; Major General Sir Fred erick Maurice; and my old colleagues Lord Hal- dane and Mr. Churchill. tH^^/L [vi] CONTENTS FA8I PREFACE • CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION 15 II THE EARLY YEARS—1888-1900 . 26 III THE CHANCELLORSHIP OF BULOW . 37 IV THE END OF BULOW REGIME .... 50 V THE "ENCIRCLEMENT" OF GERMANY— Part I 54 VI THE "ENCIRCLEMENT" OF GERMANY— Part II 74 VII BETHMANN-HOLLWEG—1909-1917 . 84 VIII DEVELOPMENT AND WORKING OF THE ENTENTE 92 IX THE PART OF GREAT BRITAIN IN THE ENTENTE 104 X NAVAL EXPANSION Ill XI MOROCCO 142 XII THE HALDANE MISSION—1912 ... 153 XIII THREE GERMAN AMBASSADORS . 161 XIV PRE-WAR PREPARATIONS—Part I: The Financial Aspect 166 [vii] CONTENTS CHAPTER PAOB XV PRE-WAR PREPARATIONS—Part II: Com mittee of Defence 173 XVI PRE-WAR PREPARATIONS—Part III: The Dominions in Council 185 XVII PRE-WAR PREPARATIONS—Part IV: The Dominions in Council (Continued) . 198 XVIII THE EARLY MONTHS OF 1914: RETRO SPECT AND PROSPECT 217 XIX MR. PAGE—COLONEL HOUSE . 233 XX SERAJEVO ANI/ AFTER—Part I: Before the Ultimatum 246 XXI SERAJEVO AND AFTER—Part II: The Ultimatum 257 XXII SERAJEVO AND AFTER—Part III: Ger man Knowledge of the Ultimatum . 266 XXIII A CALENDAR, JULY-AUGUST, 1914 . 270 XXIV SIR EDWARD GREY'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE —Part I: Mediatory Negotiations . 278 XXV SIR EDWARD GREY'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE —Part II: Obduracy of Austria . 286 XXVI SIR EDWARD GREY'S EFFORTS FOR PEACE Part III: Germany Precipitates the Conflict 292 XXVII THE EVE OF THE WAR 300 XXVIII AT WAR 319 [viii] CONTENTS CHAPTER PAOB XXIX ALIGNMENT OP STATES: THE DOMINIONS 329 XXX THE KAISER—Part I: A Character Sketch 344 XXXI THE KAISER—Part II: His War Prepa ration Charges Analysed .... 351 XXXII THE KAISER—Part III: His Claims to Scholarship 359 APPENDICES (A) FRANCO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION . 369 (B) ANGLO-FRENCH AGREEMENTS, 1904 . 372 (C) ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION, 1907 . 377 (D) GREY-CAMBON FORMULA, 1912 .... 384 (E) THE HAGUE CONFERENCE AND THE LIMITA TION OF ARMAMENTS 387 (F) WAR IN THE BALKANS: STATEMENT BY SIR E. GREY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS . 391 INDEX 401 [ix] THE GENESIS OF THE WAR THE GENESIS OF THE WAR CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION HE object of this book is to trace the Great T War to its real origins, and to set out in due perspective causes and their consequences. The materials for such a survey are by this time abundant and adequate. The contemporary docu ments, which are the best evidence, have now be come public property. M. Poincare, President of the French Republic throughout the War, has pub lished his book, "Les Origines de la Guerre." The statesmen who were directly or ostensibly respon sible for German policy, the two Chancellors, Price von Bulow and Herr von Bethmann-Holl- weg, have given their confessions and vindications to the world. And we have lastly (November, [15] THE GENESIS OF THE WAR 1922) in "My Memoirs 1878-1918," by the Ex- Kaiser William II, the personal apologia of the principal actor. Shortly before his death (1898) Bismarck is re ported to have said to Ballin, who was showing him over the Hamburg-Amerika Liner which was to bear his name: "I shall not see the World War, but you will; and it will start in the Near East." The great Chancellor saw that the forces which make for war were already at work, and (whether by prescience or good luck) he predicted the quar ter of the horizon which would let them loose. I am particularly concerned to set out the pur poses-and methods of British policy during the 10 years which preceded the War. When the Lib eral Government of Sir Henry Campbell-Banner- man came into power in December, 1905, there were on the continent of Europe two groups of Allies; the Triple Alliance which dated from 1882; and the Franco-Russian Alliance which dated from 1893. Great Britain had no part in either combi nation. She had recently established an under standing with France, which, beginning with the friendly settlement of long out-standing differences between the two countries, developed in cordiality [16] INTRODUCTION and intimacy as the years went on. But it was not and never became an Alliance. I myself was a responsible Minister of the British Crown, first under King Edward VII and then under King George V, for eleven consecutive years (December 1905-December 1916): for the first two of those years as Chancellor of the Exchequer, and for the remaining nine as Prime Minister, and head of the Government. Throughout I had as my colleague at the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey. Between him and myself there was daily inti macy and unbroken confidence. I can hardly re call any occasion on which we had a difference of opinion which lasted for more than half an hour. This was not because we were specially bound to gether by the common profession of an esoteric creed (sometimes called "Liberal Imperialism") which was not shared by all or even the majority of our colleagues. Important questions of foreign policy were always laid before the cabinet, where they were open to the fullest investigation and dis cussion before final and binding decisions were taken. In particular, the various written agree ments and "formulae" which, as will appear from [17] THE GENESIS OF THE WAR my narrative, were from time to time exchanged between ourselves and other Powers were the sub ject of close debate and of almost meticulous scrutiny. The formula contained in the corre spondence between Sir E. Grey and M. Cambon in November, 1912, which defines the mutual obliga tions imposed upon France and ourselves by the Entente, was canvassed and sifted by the Cabinet, word by word. I do not of course suggest that during all these years there was always complete unanimity among us. It is sufficient to say that, until our final decision to go to war in August, 1914, no Cabinet Minister resigned his office upon any question of foreign policy. I will add that after a long experience I am satisfied that Cabinet Government (in the estab lished sense of the term) is the best instrument that has yet been devised for the daily conduct of na tional affairs. The Cabinet might well be some what reduced in numbers, though in practice I have rarely experienced any inconvenience from its size. During the War, on one of our periodical visits to Paris, I had the honour with three or four of my colleagues of being invited to attend a meeting of the French Cabinet at the Elysee. My recollec- [18] INTRODUCTION tion is that the number of members (who at that time included four, if not five, ex-Prime Ministers) was much the same as our own, and, except that the chair was occupied, not by the Prime Minister, but by the President of the Republic, the character and method of the proceedings reminded me very much of what goes on in Downing Street. It is (or was) an exceptional thing in the British Cabinet to take a division. It is left to the Prime Minister to collect and interpret the general sense of his colleagues.* The value of the Cabinet system is often con spicuously illustrated in the sphere of Foreign Policy. The heavy and always increasing pressure of departmental duties makes it impossible for the majority of Ministers to follow from the study of telegrams and despatches the vast variety of com plicated matters which are being handled day by day at the Foreign Office.