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A REPORT ON THE COMBAT OPERATIONS YJJ£ c XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

S 1 JUL 1945 /Jo

A REPORT CN THE COMBAT OPERATIONS OF THE XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND ******* ^ w s.AUTH: CG XIX TAC: r C *1X335 $*(%!£& COMMAND :DATES 30 May »45: I" Ivi H&till ILu ,iI,IT! z2^nMk>

APO 141, U S Army 30 May 1945

INTRODUCTION

In nine months of intensive air operations in coopera­ tion with the Third US Army on the Continent of Europe, the experience of the XIX Tactical Air Command proved the con­ cepts of Field Manual 100-20, "Command and Employment of Air Power," to be basically sound. Tactical missions were planned and executed in the order of priority laid down in that document: (1) Attainment and maintenance of air su­ periority. (2) Isolation of the battlefield. (3) Close air cooperation with ground units in combat. The following report, which includes pertinent standing operating procedures and other detailed documents, has been prepared with a view to showing clearly the methods of or­ ganization and operation employed to carry out the fundamen­ tal doctrine. Much of this material was compiled in the last two weeks of the war in Europe in response to a request fl*om the Army Air Forces Evaluation Board for a report on the effectiveness of close-in air cooperation. As revised, expanded, and presented here, the report deals with opera­ tions of all three types® The procedures set forth were evolved during months of combat and were in use at the close of the successful campaign in Europe. / / 0. P. WEYLAND, M«Jor General, USA, Commanding. TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECTION I Organization and Composition; Page Organization and Composition 1 Command and Control 2 Resume of Operational Activities 3 SECTION II Personnel and Equipment* Personnel 4 Aircraft 5 Armament^ Bombs and Fuses 6 Chemical Warfare Munitions 8 Rockets 14 Toss Bombing 16 Rear-looking Radar 17 SECTICH III Technical and Tactical Aids and Procedures* Communications IS Radio Intercept 22 Visual Identification 23 Marker Plans 24 Tac/R Cooperation with Fighter-Bombers 25 Night Fighter Operations 25 Airdrome Defense 26 Qnployment of Airdrome Squadrons 27 Aircraft Movement Liaison 27 Movement to Forward Airfields 30 Reconnaissance 31 SECTION IV Operations* Factors Influencing Air Operations 36 Climate and Weather 36 Airfields 38 Terrain 39 Bombline Location 40 Flak 41 Air-Ground Briefing and Planning 41 Planning of Close Air Cooperation 43 Conduct of Tactical Operations 44 Briefing, Takeoff, Assaibly 4 4

Air-Ground Cooperation 47 Air to Air Encounter ^ IiS'liASSiHEOi - SECTION IV (CONT'D) Page

Escort Procedure 48 Ascent, Descent Through Overcast 48 Evaluation of Results 49 SECTION V Chronicle of Campaign.

Major Joint Air-Ground Operations 51 Preplanned Operations 51 Drive Across FRANCE 52 Protection of LOIRE Plank 54 Effect Upon Progress of Attack 54 Reduction of BREST 55 MOSELLE Stalemate 57 Breaching the DIEUZE Dam 58 Operation "Madison" 60 Envelopment of METZ 61 Reduction of ARDENNES Salient 64 Examples of Air Cooperation with Infantry 65 Drive to the RHINE 67 SAAR-MOSELLE-RHINE Trap 68 Campaign East of the RHINE 70 The Final Assault to the Southeast 72 Facing Page

1 - Organizational Chart, XIX TAC 2 2 - Personnel Table, XIX TAC 2 3 - Fighter-Bomber Requests and Orders 2 4 - Fighter-Bomber Results 2 5 - Channels for Control of Close Cooperation 2 6 - Control System Ground-Air Communications 2 7 - D/F Nets 2 8 - TCC - FDP Links 2 9 - Deployment of Control Equipment 2 10 - Representative Circuit Diagram 22

ANNEXES 1 - Consolidated SOP, XIX Tactical Control Group (Prov). 2 - Operation "Madison" (Air Plan, Field Order and Opera­ tions Summary)• 3 - Operation "Tink" (Air Plan)• 4 - Signals SOP. 5 - Signals SOI. 6 - XIX TAC Operations SOP. 7 - XIX TAC Intelligence SOP. 8 - Organization for the Control and Operation of Tac/R and P/R Facilities, XIX TAC. 9 - Third U.S. Army SOP for Counter-Flak Fire. 10 - Field Orders and Operations Summary for Static Situa­ tion. 11 - Field Orders and Operations Summary for Fluid Situation. ORGANIZATION AND

1. Organization and Composition of the Command a. See organizational chart (Appendix 1, facing page 2). b. During the entire period of operations on the Con­ tinent, 1 August 1944 - 9 May 1945, the Headquarters of this Command operated in two echelons: Advanced and Rear# (1) All combat operations were planned and direc­ ted by the Commanding General from Advanced Headquarters, which consisted chiefly of Operations, Intelligence and Signals personnel, plus a minimum of administrative facili­ ties, and was located as close as possible to the Advanced Headquarters of the Third US Army for maximum cooperation. Planning and direction of operations centered in the Combined Operations room or tent, where the general situation map and other operational maps were maintained. Here the day's op­ erational reports were received, compiled, evaluated and presented to the Commanding General and his staff at the daily evening briefing in which Weather, G-2 (Air), A-2, G-3 (Air), A-2 Reconnaissance and A-3 participated. On the basis of this information the detailed plan for employment of air units on the following day was developed. (2) Administration was centered at Rear Headquar­ ters, which was located in the vicinity of the bases of tac­ tical units of the Command. Supply, personnel, training, inspection and other administrative functions were performed by this echelon. In certain instances when the Command had eight or nine Groups and only one Wing, Rear Headquarters also assumed some of the functions of a Wing, notably the transmission of orders and the receipt and relaying of mis­ sion reports.

c. Experience showed that the present T/0 is inade­ quate for the Headquarters of a Tactical Air Command coop­ erating with an Army of three to five corps. Appendix 2 shows the number of officers and enlisted men authorized under the manning table provided by consolidation of the Tactical Air Command T/0 and one-third of the Fighter Com­ mand T/0, as compared to the number actually employed. d. Headquarters of the Wing (or Wings), usually lo­ cated between the Command Advanced and Rear Headquarters, was the center of the communications net. This enabled the Advanced Headquarters to move forward with Army Headquarters and maintain communication to Groups with a minimum of new ' * * * **• f~ ft £,» V f ?r f!

'signal installations. All operational orders and reports to and from Groups and Squadrons were normally relayed through Wing. Wing also assisted the Rear Headquarters in the performance of its functions, acting as relay point be­ tween Rear and the Groups and other units assigned or at­ tached to the Command. The Commanding General of the Wing made numerous personal inspections of Groups and Squadrons to assist them in overcoming the many difficult problems of operations and maintenance under field conditions. e. The Tactical Control Group (Provisional) was formed approximately 45 days after the Command bepame operational. It consists of fighter control, air warning and requisite communications facilities, which formerly operated under Wing Headquarters in the airdrome area. It was necessary that these units operate as far forward as possible to pro­ vide complete radar and radio coverage of target areas. The Group was accordingly formed and placed under opera­ tional control of Advanced Headquarters, with materially increased effectiveness in controlling tactical aircraft and directing air defense of the Army area. Aircraft, when air­ borne. are controlled by the Tactical Control Group under the direct supervision of Combined Operations, Advanced Headquarters, XIX TAC. The Tactical Control Group operates through the Tactical Control Center, focal point of all radar and radio navigational aids and control facilities. 2. Command and Control of Air Operations. a. See schematic diagrams (Appendices 3,4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) and consolidated SOP, XIX Tactical Control Group (Prov), Annex 1. b. Control of aircraft in flight is exercised through the Tactical Control Center and the Tactical Air Liaison Officers with the Army Corps, Divisions and Combat Commands. (1) When the daily field order from Advance Head­ quarters, XIX TAC, is received at the Tactical Control Cen­ ter, the Controller analyzes the missions, taking into con­ sideration the task and the operational area. He then as­ signs missions to the forward director post in the best lo­ cation to give flights aid in locating targets, warn them of enemy aircraft, and provide any other assistance. (2) The FDP's are deployed so that close cooper­ ation with ground troops may be given anywhere along the Third Army front. The MEW, because of range advantages, usually is assigned the handling of long-range arjDeid^eclses and escort missions. It also is e^ecti^^^oi^CQ^i^fttion missions when required. I .J*,

r- f t A|^ r * r - fi ? • f j r y ORGANIZATIONAL CHART APPENDIX- I XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

COMMANDING GENERAL Aide de Comp

AIR CHIEF OF STAFF INSPECTOR

MILITARY GOV. LIAISON DEPUTY CHEF OF STAFF

STATION COMMANDER AIR DISARMAMENT HQ. COMMANDANT (LIAISON)

HQ SQUADRON

I A-l A-2 A-3 A-4 SIGNAL ADJUTANT GENERAL Service Com'd.Uoison

P ft PW CIC TALO G- 3 AIR Detach. Detach. Altchd.

TECH.INT. PRO PLYWG Detach. CONTROL

G-2 AIR 6th. HIST. Attchd. UNIT X DEFENSE CHAPLAW SPECIAL JUDGE SURGEON INFORMATION WEATHER PHOTO ORDNANCE CWS ENGINEER FINANCE QM STAT. POSTAL a ADVOCATE a SERVICE 2nd.Motion CONTROL PM GENERAL EDUCATION Picture Unit

3 FIGHTER XIX TACT. H.CN BN SEP SIGNAL TACT AIR TACT. AIR PHOTO GR LIAISON SQ. Attcfetf. to WING CONT. GP. BN OONT. SQ. CONT SQ. RCN. 3rd ARMY

FTRBOMB. FTRBOMB. FTRBOMB. FTRBOMB. FTRBOMB. FTR.BOMB. FTR.BOMB. AW BN AW BN DET-C- FTR.CONT. FTR.OONT. let a.l5th. 20th. PHOTO SQ. TACT. SQ. TACT. SQ. ONE SERV. GP. GP. GP. GR GP. GP GP. 3rd.RADIO SQ. SQ. PTU PID RON RCN GP. TEAM

REFERENCE NTFTR9Q FTRBOMa FTRBOMB. FTRBOMB. ONE SERV SQ SQ SQ. GPTEAM .COMMAND CHANNELS =USUAL COORDINATION CHANNE LS,RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION. HEADQUARTERS XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND APPROVED BY 'V . •«. i/ DRAWN BY S/SGT LEWtS DATE 2 JUNE 1946 PERSONNEL, HEADQUARTERS, XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND The following table shows the number of officers and enlisted men authorized Headquarters, XIX Tactical Air Command, under consolidation of T/0 1-500-1 and Det "A" 1-50-ls per Ninth Air Force GO 222 (1944), 1 December 1944, and also the actual strength on the last day of the war in Europe, 8 May 1945. This table does not include Army G—2 (Air) and G-3 (Air) personnel on duty in this Headquarters or attached personnel from higher or lower Air Force units#

OFFICERS ENLISTED MEN UNIT AUTHORIZED ACTUAL AUTHORIZED ACTUAL Command 2 2 3 1 Chief of Staff 3 4 3 0 A-l 6 7 15 15 A-2 12 17 16 15 A-3 12 14 16 16 A-4 7 8 14 11 Air Inspector 5 • 9 9 Ad.i General 4 4 30 24 Chaplain 1 3 2 2 Chemical 2 1 3 2 Def & Prov Mars 2 1 2 1 Engineer 1 2 3 2 Fiscal 0 0 2 0 JAGD 4 4 9 6 Medical 3 5 5 3 Ordnance 4 5 8 5 Photo 1 1 10 10 P.R.O. 1 3 2 3 QM 3 2 6 5 Signal 12 12 18 11 Special Service 2 5 3 1 Stat. Section 2 2 7 6 Weather 2 2 2 2 Hq Comdt 0 0 20 3 So Ha 3 5 35 57 Mess 1 1 34 32 Transport. 1 1 26 59 Supply 1 3 8 11 Medical 1 2 9 Flight (Tech S) 1 6 18 S3 Liaison 0 8 0 0 Unassigned 0 3 0 0 TOTALS 99 140 336 360 APPENDIX-3 FIGHTER-BOMBER REQUESTS a ORDERS

TWELVE NINTH ARMY AIR GROUP FORCE

THIRD

XIX TAC COMBINED OPS

TACTICAL FIGHTER CONTROL WING CENTER

F/B GP P/B GP F/B GP F/B GP F/B GP F/B frP F/B GP

ORDERS, TELEPHONE 8 COURIER

RADIO

REQUEST, TELEPHONE ft COURIER RADIO

* WING RELAYS ORDE*RS TO F/B GPS APPENDIX- 4

FIGHTER-BOMBER RESULTS

TWELVE NINTH ARMY AIR GROUP FORCE

THIRD PHONE X. RADIO XIX US ARMY TAC

1 XIX TAC COMBINED! OPS COURIER 1 t ITACTICALJ CORPS CONTROL FIGHTER CENTER Wlf^G

TALO

TALO

1 t it WS GP F7B GP F/B GP F/B GP F/B GP F/B GP F/B GP

NF

F/B F/B F/B SQ SQ SQ

LEGEND

WING RELAYS RESULTS RESULTS- TELEPHONE d COURIER RESULTS1 RADIO APPENDIX-5 CHANNELS FOR CONTROL OF CLOSE COOPERATION

THIRD 33X1 U.S. ARMY T.A. C.

CORPS TALO

TCC

OIV. TALO

FDP

LAND LINES-TELETYPE a TELEPHONE H F RADIO-GROUND RADIO NETS VHF RADIO- AIR TO GROUND a AIR TO AIR p p| f £" n CONTROL SYSTEM GROUND-AIR COMMUNICATIONS

COMMAND COMBAT OPS

WING O A/F TACTICAL CONTROL CENTER

'

MEW FDP FOP FDP ~x. ~w~ 11 »\ ,r.\ 4 CHANNELS,< "/ ! » \ i l i N 6 CHANNELS BACU BACU1 BACU A —7*— —A— / \ / \ / / \< / \ / \ 2 CHANNELS APPENDIX- 7 D/F NETS

TACTICAL CONTROL CENTER

// /// \\^\x // /// \ // / // Vs \ \ \ // // \\ \ \ \ / / / / / \\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ v cm cs / / / ! \ \ / / \ \ \ \ / / \ / / \ / / \ \ / / \ \ / / \ \ / FDP I j jn3P-2| |FDP-3| |BAGU-I| |bacu-2| |BACU-3| |BACU-4|

PRIMARY NET-RED SECONDARY NET-BLUE BACU D/F S-BLACK Four SCR -675 units made up the primary net. When primary- stations were off the air for moves or because of emergency, at the discretion of the TCC controller, a secondary or BACU station was substituted. As a result of excellent communications and skilled crews, a shift normally took less than two minutes. When the situa­ tion demanded emergency fixing on two frequencies simultaneously, primary and secondary nets were used with BACU stations added to whichever net needed additional stations. * r f*i ?s % APPENDIX-8 ICAL CONTROL CENTER - FDP LINKS

TACTICAL CONTROL CENTER

00 6b GROUND OBSERVERS 1. Controller's wire (when possible) 2. Filter Officer-plotting wire (when possible) 3. Controller's FTW net 4. Filter Officer-plotting FM 5. HF standby for plotting 6. FM to FDP D/F (when required) APPENDIX-9

DEPLOYMENT OF CONTROL EQUIPMENT

10 20

A'Z XtX T-A-C- (3) When flights on cooperation missions are turned over to Corps Tactical Air Liaison Officers for tar­ gets and assignment to Tactical Air Liaison Parties with divisions, the FDP's stand by to assist when possible. Bo­ gies heading into the area where the flight is working are called out even though the friendly flight may be so low that the FDP controller cannot see them on his scope. (4) Tactical Air Liaison Officers with Corps or Divisions have direct VHF radio communication with the fighter-bombers and reconnaissance aircraft operating on their front. (5) When cloud formation and poor visibility pro­ hibit fighter-bombers from giving normal close cooperation with ground troops, the TCC controller alerts the battle area control units. These units make it possible for pilots to do blind pin-point bombing. The FDP's get the flights into position for the BACU's and the latter station guides the planes on the bombing run. The MEW, in addition to a BACU, has a close control device for blind pin-point bomb­ ing. The CCD has a range up to 70 miles while the BACU's range is 35 to 40 miles. The CCD also is used to assist night fighters on intruder missions. (6) Fixing and homing carried on at the TCC is done by the employment of D/F stations. A primary net of four stations reports to the TCC. In emergencies, the duty senior controller may request the D/F stations at any of the FDP's or BACU's to report to the TCC. 3. Resume of Operational Activities of the Command. a. Operations of the Third US Army and XIX Tactical Air Command during their nine months and eight days in joint action on the Continent were conducted under widely varying combat conditions which required frequent changes in tactical employment of air power to meet new situations. These operations, covering the period 1 August 1944 through 8( Kay 1945, fall into the following nine phases: (1) The drive across FRANCE® (2) The buildup along the MOSELLE River. (3) The envelopment of METZ and the advance to the SIEGFRIED LINE. (4) Attacking the SIEGFRIED LINE. (5) Reduction of the ARDENNES Salient. (6) The drive from LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM to the RHINE. (7) Springing of the SAAR-MOSELLE-RHINE trap. (8) The campaign east ofHHINE. (9) The final drive CZECHS SLOVAKIA. **% f*® %J \# r pbssokhM^S* PMENT

4* Personnel

a. Training of Replacement Pilots.— Although reinforce­ ment pilots have always been adequate as to numbers, in every instance they have not been qualified as combat pilots or even as fighter plane pilots when assigned to the Command* An out­ standing example of this deficiency oocurred during December 1944 when 11 pilots were assigned who had no experience in flying fighter-type planes. Although all of them had acquired abundant flying time in AT and BT type aircraft, their exper­ ience was of no use to the Command in the absence of facilities for their training for combat* It is recommended that prior to departure from the UNITED STATES all reinforoement pilots be given, in addition to OTU training, training in bombing, straf­ ing and rocket firing* Pilots requiring training when a unit is engaged in active combat are of little or no value* b* Availability of Qualified Group, Squadron and Flight Leaders*— The availability of qualified fighter group comman­ ders and executives, squadron commanders and flight leaders has diminished markedly during combat. This was partly due to oombat losses and partly to the- fact that during the period from August 1944 to October 1944 the only method of returning pilots to the Zone of Interior for rest and recuperation was by direct transfer and reassignment in the Z of I* As a result, potential Squadron and Group Commanders with a large amount of combat experience were lost upon completion of their combat tour, Had some provision been made for returning this type of person­ nel to the Z of I for leave, as was authorized prior to that time and is now again permitted, these valuable losses would not have occurred* c* Bound-trip Air Travel Recommended for Combat Personnel on Leave to US*— While the present policy of returning key com­ bat personnel to the Zone of Interior for rest and recuperation is considered wise, the time spent in transit to a great extent nullifies the advantages. Evacuation to the Z of I is very ra­ pid and efficient from FRANCE to any point in the US, generally requiring only seven days* The chief difficulty is in the re­ turn* Since no air priority has been allotted, all personnel are required to travel by water* The difficulties and time involved (approximately 40 days) tend to dull the keen combat spirit and desire of the pilots to return for another oombat tour* The total period of absence is approximately 2V2 to 3 months* Upon return the pilots are rusty in flying technique and require considerable time to learn changes in tactics and technique* It is recommended that they be provided with trans­ portation both to and from the UNITED STATES by priority air*

\J ^ t • h *** hS*® 1•JBP,|*ll|si d. Rest Facilities Periodic short-term rest facilities for combat personnel are a necessity and should be pre-planned for all theaters of operations, to enable flyers— enlisted men as well as officers — to get away from their surroundings and relax under favorable conditions.

5. Aircraft a* At present three types of fighter-bomber aircraft are in use in American tactical air operations in this theater: the P-47» P-51| and P-38. The B47 is used now almost exclusively, because of its many advantages over the others in this type of employment. Among these advantages are its ruggedness, bomb- carrying oapacity, ease of maintenance and operation, and its comparatively low vulnerability to AA defenses. The P-51 and the P-38, because of their liquid-cooled engines, are much more susceptible to flak and are found unsatisfactory for employment in areas where such defenses are strong* b. The ideal aircraft for close cooperation work would be one meeting the following specifications: (1) Weights Not over 10,000 lbs. (2) Armaments 8 cal. 50 MG's A1BR (or similar type) bomb release mechanism. HVAR racks. Disappearing bomb racks with cluster attachment that will provide for drop­ ping frags in train.

(3) Radius of actions 300 miles (without external tanks).

(4) Speeds Cruising 250 Indicated at 10,000 ft. (5) Fuel Consumptions Not over 80 gal/hr at cruising*

(6) Camera Equipments 70-mm installed in wing to take strike photos and BSA's.

(7) Radios 8-channel receiver VHP with beacon to be used in conjunction with HEW close control.

c. ReReconnaissance aircraft types are discussed in para- graph 20 c.

i ? \ i f 0 fs- r* * * f /J 6. Armament a* In fluid situations such as existed during the push through France and again in the reduction of the ARDENNES sali­ ent, the most potent and flexible weapon at the Air's disposal was the .50-oalibre firepower of the fighter-bomber. This fire­ power, consisting of eight streams of straight armor-piercing- incendiary ammunition, proved to be most successful in attacks on motor transport, locomotives and other railroad rolling stock, ammo dumps, oil storage dumps, troop concentrations, and enemy airdromes. Attacks on light flak positions, supply depots, river and canal traffic had generally some success. Against armored targets, strafing gave only occasional success, while bombing and rocket attacks were more successful but less accu­ rate. One project that would be of considerable interest to this Command is experimentation on installation of a minimum number of light cannon on P-47 aircraft to be incorporated with# or to be interchangeable with, existing .50 cal. machine guns for more successful attacks on armored targets. b. Use of the firepower on P.47 Thunderbolts of this Com­ mand has Increased almost ten-fold since "D" day. Figures show a definite trend toward a maximum expenditure of ammunition available, with partifcularily steep increases in periods when the enemy was being flushed from cover and hotly pursued. It seems logical therefore to suggest the possibility of increasing the amount available. Two possible ways of accomplishing this are apparent: first, by increasing the ammunition-carrying capa­ city (impractical in a using theater); second, by addition of more guns by use of droppable gun packages. Firing these guns prior to firing of permanent guns would, in effect, increase the ammunition available in the aircraft. Droppable gun packages are now being used experimentally in one of our groups. c. With regard to the choice of aircraft machine-gun pat­ terns for battle area air cooperation: Most units, at their own leader's discretion, are "harmonized in" at some sort of a spread rather than point harmonization, preferring the accuracy at ex­ tended ranges to bullet concentrations at a given point. It has been the policy of this Command to allow group leaders to deter­ mine their own alignment with the thought that such actf. on would better conform to their own particular technique of attack. All units are harmonized within established limits and there is no indication that any given system has been more successful in destruction of the enemy than any other*

7. Bombs and Fuses

a. The M1A1 frag c drawn from use by M vr| * CC,r' r U(• UL1 1v* this Command, either single or trigfl^pWOTTTered. This cl-aster, as well as the M-4 parafrag cluster, is not considered to be a safe or efficient package for external suspension on fighter- bombers owing to lack of detonator-safe fusing and lack of pro­ per clustering method. In extensive use for close cooperation missions during the drive across FRANCE were the 260-lb M-81 frag bomb and 500-lb CP. These along with Napalm, HVAR's and primarily strafing, provided considerable flexibility of attack in cooperation with advancing columns. In later operations re­ quiring fragmentation-type bombs, the 260-lb M-81 frags were partially withdrawn from use and the more effective M-27, 585- lb frag cluster was introduced. This cluster proved to be ex­ tremely effective; it is considered to have twice the fragmen­ tation effect of a 500-lb GP, fused instantaneously and to be some four times as effective a frag bomb as the 260-lb M-81* This Command intends to withdraw from general use the M-81 as soon as M-27's become available, assembled and modified, in sufficient numbers. In many cases during the drive across PRANCE and later in the reduction of the ARDENNES salient, the 50®-lb GP, fused instantaneously, was used in preference to the M-27 and M-81 because of its good frag effect coupled with a supe­ rior "shock" effect useful in flushing out MT, armor and per­ sonnel from protected and concealed concentrations» b» For specialized targets the Command has found it pro­ fitable to set up a committee made up of representatives of the Operational Research Section, A-2 Targets, A-3 Operations, Che- mioal Warfare and Ordnance, to determine and recommend appro­ priate loadings and fusings. One load that has been particu­ larly successful in attacks on troops in wooded areas has been the M-27 frag cluster which detonates with lethal air burst when individual bombs hit treetops. For attacks on rolling stock, oil storage depots and ammo dumps, the Command has found GP's, fused instantaneously or non-delay, to be most effective. Under conditions where cratering is desired, longer delays of •01 and «025 are found most effective. Heavily-built struc­ tures are generally attacked with GP!s fused .01 if less than two stories high and *025 if more than two stories high,with maximum demolition occurring when detonation takes place 10 or 15 feet above ground floor. c. During the"Battle of the Bulge" in the ARDENNES, in many cases juicy targets were found by fighter-bombers which would partially clobber the area, only to have to pull out be­ cause of low gas and ammunition. Another squadron would be vec­ tored into the same general area a few minutes later and in many cases would be unable to find the original target. We visualize need for a marker bomb of some type to be carried on the belly rack of a couple of ships per squadron to mark parti­ cularly lucrative target areas. Such a marker bomb might be used to advantage also by tactical reconnaissance aircraft* 8. Special Weapons

a* Chemical Warfare Munitions. (1) HaPalm Fire Bombs.-- During XIX TAC's first eight months of operations on the Continent, by far the most widely used Chemical Warfare weapon consisted of auxiliary gasoline tanks filled with NaPalm jellied gasoline, designated as "Fire Bombs"« The sizes of tanks used in Fire Bomb operations were dictated for the most part by availability of supply, and at different times U S 75» 150, and 165-gallon tanks, British 108- gallon tanks and German 41 and 75-gallon tanks were used. The smallest Fire Bombs, therefore, weigh 300 pounds, while the largest weigh 1100 pounds. The tanks were equipped with inter­ nal or external igniters, or both, made from thermite or magne­ sium incendiary bombs and white phosphorus grenades, all equip­ ped with instantaneous fusing. The Fire Bomb is essentially an unaimable low penetration weapon with large fire-effective area. (a) For use in close cooperation, Fire Bombs have proven effective against troops in slit trenches or in hasty log and earth fortifications, gun positions, concentrations, of UT and armor usually found in wooded areas, and especially against troops in partially demolished small towns and crossroad villages used as strong points. In other fighter-bomber oper­ ations, Fire Bombs have been of value when used on warehouses, supply dumps and marshalling yards. The limiting factor in these operations is the Fire Bomb's characteristic low penet­ ration effect, and for this reason warehouses, supply dumps and other industrial targets are often attacked with 500-lb M-76 Incendiary Bombs instead of Fire Bombs. (2) M-76 500-lb PT Incendiary Bombs.— M-76 500-lb Incendiary Bombs are identical to 500-lb GP Bombs in so far as the casing and fusing are concerned. The bomb contains 180 lbs of plastic jellied gasoline mixed with colloidal magnesium to form a grayish paste. (a) This weapon is a standard-design aimable bomb possessing a small fire-effective area on ground impact but characterized by a relatively high penetrating effect. It is used on warehouses, supply dumps, marshalling yards and in­ dustrial installations. It is an economical fighter-bomber load and can be employed, in mass, with delay fusing on large-multi- storied targets. (3) M-47 100-lb White Phosphorus' Bombs.— The M-47 * White Phosphorus-filled Bomb is a thin-cased projectile con­ taining 98 lbs of solid White Phosphorus,-ds\^uipped with an

/ "v- 4.W.' % * internal burster and is usually fused instantaneously to avoid cratering.

(a) Ground force personnel, both here and in other theaters, have long considered WP to be an excellent anti­ personnel incendiary weapon and it has been used in both mortar and artillery shells. The largest WP-filled artillery projeq- tile is the 155-mm howitzer shell and this contains only 15*35 pounds of filling, P-47 aircraft normally carry two clusters of three WP bombs each, using the Ordnance M-12 Cluster Adapter, The total WP load per aircraft is therefore 588 lbs, or roughly equivalent to 39 rounds of 155-mm howitzer WP shell fire.

(b) Upon impact, WP Bombs produce a burst about 50 feet high, accompanied by a shower of burning WP par­ ticles and the production of a column of dense white smoke seve­ ral hundred feet high. The WP particles vary in size from a fraction of an inch to several inches in diameter and one air­ craft load will normally produce particles completely dispersed through a rectangular area 90 yards long by 60 yards wide. All personnel not protected by overhead cover in the impact area will generally become serious casualties owing to the fact that WP particles will burn through several layers of clothing to produce extremely painful burns. The smoke screen is not par­ ticularly effective for ground-to-ground screening because of the fact that it rises in the air, but it is effective for ground- to-air screening and is useful in reducing the effectiveness of fire from flak and other gun positions.

(4) Employment of Chemical Warfare Munitions by XIX Tactical Air Command,

(a) CW Munitions in Operations in Western and Central Prance (1 August 1944 to 15 September 1944).

i During this period 133.2 tons of Fire Bombs were used in cooperation with VIII Corps in the BHEST cam­ paign. In practically all cases, Fire Bombs were used against targets previously demolished or at least partially destroyed by GP bombing.

3 One typical Fire Bomb operation in cooperation with the 29tH Infantry Division was the bombing of a strongpoint previously practically destroyed by GP bombs and then made untenable by Fire Bomb attack. Enemy troops in the strongpoint were forced to withdraw to a small woods nearby which was then attacked by 8 P-47 aircraft carrying 150-gallon Fire * Bombs. A platoon of infantry, entering the woods 12 hours after the second Fire Bomb attack, met no enemy resistance, and a PW taken at this time stated that the main force of the unit had withdrawn from the woods af1^fr|r,#j»1^4jnrfoxholes had re­ ceived many casualties from

3 In several operations during the BREST campaign, fire-bombingnbj was followed by an artillery con­ centration and then an attack on the ground if necessary. An? example of these tactics is found in the attack on the FORT PONTE AZEN barracks used as an enemy strongpoint. A Fire Bomb mission was employed on the barracks late in the afternoon and resulted in large fires, upon which a heavy concentration of artillery was laid down during the night. The enemy surrendered during the artillery fire.

(b) CW Munitions in Operations during the MOSELLE Stalemate (15 September 1944 to 8 November 1944)* 1 During this period 96.7 tons of Fire Bombs were used, the bullc of the attacks being on fortified positions in the METZ area.

2 The METZ PORT operations in particu­ lar offer an example of Targets against which Fire Bombs had little or no effect. The METZ PORT missions were in cooperation with the 5th Infantry Division and the bulk of the operations were carried out on 28 September 1944* Advice from technical agencies in the TJnited States indicated that Pire Bomb attacks on enclosed concrete fortifications and pillboxes might be ex­ pected to produce casualties by anoxia or suffocation. Front­ line units of the 5th Infantry, observing the bombing, reported that large fires were started and lasted approximately thirty minutes. However, shortly after the bombing mission, a recon­ naissance patrol attempting to penetrate the outer defenses of one of the forts was pinned down by accurate and intense auto­ matic -weapons fire from the installation. It is apparent, therefore, that installations as extensive as the METZ forts (equipped with mechanical ventilators) are not vulnerable to Pire Bomb attack unless almost direct hits are made on embra­ sures, ventilating parts or other apertures. (c) CW Munitions in Operations from METZ to the SIEGFRIED LINE (8 November 1944 to 1 December 1944). 1 During this period 140.2 tons of Fire Bombs were used, principally in cooperation with the XII and XX Corps drive to the SIEGFRIED LINE. 2 One important development in the employment of CW munitions by fighter-bombers in close cooper­ ation was evolved during Third U S Army's advance from the METZ

ir t L'V •VMS** .*

area daring November* It is at this time that operations call­ ing for mixed loads of Pire Bombs and GrPfe or frags in 8-aircraft flights were first used on any considerable scale* Terrain in the assault areas was rugged and hilly, and many small towns, isolated groups of buildings and road junction sites were used by the enemy as strongpoints containing goodly numbers of troops in hasty fortifications complete with outlying gun positions* Furthermore, many of the towns contained CP's of enemy units of all sizes* Targets of this nature, often flattened or partially destroyed by GrP bombing, were repeatedly made untenable for the enemy by means of Fire Bomb attacks* 2 On the first day of the advance, 8 November 1944, HAMOHT was fire-bombed by aircraft flights coop­ erating with units of XII Corps and on the following day BIZANCE and MANDERAN in front of the XX Corps! 90th Infantry Division were given similar treatment. On eight other flyable days dur­ ing the remainder of November, 12 other towns were similarly attacked. Other claims from operations during November indi­ cated that Pire Bombs are useful against MT and armored concen­ trations, and against gun positions* (d) CW Munitions in Operations during the Assault of the Siegfried Line (l December 1944 to 20 December 1944o) 1 During the assault of the SIEGFRIED LINE, 148*9 tons of Fire""Bombs and 45 tons of M-76 500-lb In­ cendiary Bombs were used by groups of XIX TAC* The oharacter of ground operations was somewhat similar to that during Novem­ ber except that some of the defended strongpoints were well- prepared SIEGFRIED LINE components instead of hasty fortifi­ cations and defended toons* Operations involving CW munitions were therefore rather similar to those described in paragraph (c) above, with the additional use of a munition then new to XIX TAC operations, the M-76 500-lb Incendiary Bomb, employed against marshalling yards and installations in towns* 2 A combined Pire Bomb and frag attack against SCHWALBACH on 12~~December drew the following comment from Gr-3 (Air) of TUSA: "XX Corps reports that the 512th Squa­ dron rendered excellent air support in hitting woods and town of SCHWALBACH, which is considered destroyed"* On the same day, 24 105-mm and 210-mm gun positions in the area of the 90th In­ fantry Division SIEGFRIED LINE bridgehaadwere attacked with Pire Bombs and other munitions and were 'e^thei^destroyed or at least ceased fire after being attacked**? I ,

- 11 - (e) In OperaVxdlfs'in the ARDENNES (20 December to 22 January 1945)# 1 During the Battle of the Bulge a record load of 451.2 tons of Pire Bombs and 109 tons of M-76 Incendiaries was used by XIX TAC groups. A substantial portion of these totals was dropped in operations between 23 and 30 December 1944.

20 Very nearly every town and oross- roads in the BASTOGNE area was subjected to Pire Bomb or M-76 Incendiary attacks* Thirteen towns received two to four fire attacks each* 2 A typical example of a town subjected to combined GP, frag and Pire Bomb attacks is described in a report by the G-3 (Air) of the 10th Armored Division as follows: "Ground observers proceeded to ASSENOIS for the purpose of in­ specting the village for NaPalm damage. The town is estimated to have had approximately thirty-five to forty buildings in what might be termed the center of activity of the village# Of these buildings eight were completely gutted by fire and two or three others showed evidences of limited damage by fire* The masonry walls of these buildings were intact, but the interior was a mass of rubble caused by fire. The supporting wooden members of the inner frame, where they extended into the masonry, were burned out. The town of ASSENOIS shows no great damage that might be attributed to artillery fire".

£ Many attacks with GP, frags, rockets and Fire Bombs against wooded areas in the Bulge paid profit­ able dividends in destroyed armor, MT, supplies and gun positions. The Tactical Air Liaison Officer with the 101st Airborne Divi­ sion reported that enemy gun positions were constantly moved from one clump of woods to another in an effort to keep the positions safe ;£rom fighter-bomber attack. (f) CW Munitions in the Drive to the RHINE (22 January 1945 to 13 March 1945). 1 During this period 82.7 tons of Pire Bombs, 126.5 tons of M-75 bombs and 21.3 tons of M-47 White Phosphorus bombs were used by XIX TAC Groups in cooperation with Third U S Army's drive to the RHINE RIVER. With the exeption of certain special targets, Pire Bombs were used against small towns, strongpoints and concentrations of enemy MT, armor and supplies in the same fashion as previously employed in the BAS­ TOGNE BULGE and elsewhere. WP Bombs were used for the first time by our fighter-bombers during this period and at the same time our P-61 night fighters initiated the use of Pire Bombs in thei* operations^ The .WP,3ombs were used as an anti-personnel f • 11 t * * f> + «r-- e r?> JH , i*' , ft. v V I * V1 ! ;.' V 1, r. .11 ,J f ' i i f inoendiary weapon and for their ground-to-aW>fat)4eJ^fcrifefinizig effect against enemy flak positions. Fire Bombs founa Tne* use in combination with rockets in night fighter attacks on ware­ houses, supply dumps and marshalling yards. g The purpose of the WP operations was to see whether this munition would be effective against gun and flak positions by means of its dual anti-personnel incen­ diary and ground-to-air smoke-screening effects. On 15 February 1945f 24 WP Bombs were dropped on artillery positions near FREI- LINGEN with excellent results and on 23 February 1945» 24 WP Bombs caused a cessation of fire from gun positions in the MAYEN area. 2 While WP Bombs are effective against personnel not under cover, these targets are not found in suffi­ cient numbers to justify everyday use of the munition. Therefore WP operations were soon cut down and later abandoned. Our fields are still stocked with a minimum supply of WP Bombs and the mu­ nition can be used on special targets containing large numbers of personnel in slit trenches, foxholes or hasty fortifications but not protected by overhead cover. £. During the drive to the RHINE a speoial target, the enemy counter-espionage school near RAUEN- THAL, was substantially destroyed by using ten 1,000-lb GP bombs and six 165-gallon Fire Bombs. All the GP's and four of the Fire Bombs were effective(two Fire Bombs were returned on a mec­ hanical abort). Pilots' reports indicated that the buildings in the target area were demolished while smoke from four fires was seen to 4,000 f.eet. The PI reports 04 this mission showed the main building of the school group damaged by a direct hit and completely gutted by fire while two smaller buildings we're entirely destroyed and the remaining two buildings in the area severely damaged. (g) CW Munitions in Operation in the SAAR- MOSELLE-RHINE TRIANGLE (13 March 1945 to 23 March 1945). 1 During the ten days of highly suc­ cessful ground operations~"in the PALATINATE, 17.1 tons of Fire Bombs and 108.5 tons of M-76 Inoendiaries were used, but not principally in direct cooperation with the ground action. Oper­ ations in this area can be summarized as the springing of a trap behind the SIEGFRIED LINE, resulting in the envelopment and destruction of two German armies. The period covers an excell­ ent example of operations in which there was not much taotioal use for inoendiary munitions. As previously pointed out, Fire Bombs are most effective where the enemy establishes troop and supply concentrations in every small town and defendable posi­ tion along the line of advance, and this was not the case in the SAAR-MOSELLE-RHINE operations. GP special mission was executed against the CP of the enemy C in 0 WEST near ZIEG-ENBURG on 19 March 1945* Two squadrons load­ ed with 1,000-lb GP Bombs were immediately followed into the target area by one squadron loaded with 11 150-gallon Fire Bombs. The bombing was done from minimum altitude and the accuracy was excellent. The PI report was as followst "Building supposedly housing Gen Von Rundstedt and staff has been completely gutted by fire» Eastern end of building destroyed by direct hits. Ga­ rage has 1/3 of roof burnt off and approximately 11 vehicles seen in yards near garage. The mess building and underground shelters are not damaged. Approximately 8 small buildings E of Hq have been gutted by fire". (PW interrogation indicated that Field Marshall Kesselring had succeeded Von Rundstedt as C in C WEST prior to 19 March 1945 and that Kesselring was slightly injured by this attack). (h) CW Munitions in Operations East of the RHINE (23 March 1945 to 1 April 1945). 1 During the first week of Third U S Army's operations east o7 the RHINE, 196.7 tons of Fire Bombs were used, principally in cooperation with XII Corps. Night fighter operations stressed the use of M-76 incendiary bombs and 17 tons of this munition were expended in four flyable nig­ hts during the week. 2 Direct cooperation missions followed the now familiar pattern7 using GP and Pire Bomb, and frag and Pire Bomb combined loads on 8 aircraft flights and some mis­ sions loaded solely with Pire Bombs. During the period, enemy opposition was not as tenacious as that experienced in the drive to and through the SIEGFRIED LINE or in the BASTOGNE Bulge. Accordingly there were fewer targets on the immediate front and a larger proportion of marshalling yard, supply dump and simi­ lar objectives. Tp, Rockets.— The following comments on the employment of High Velocity Aircraft Rockets have been made by the Commanding Officer, 406th Fighter Group, pioneer rocket group in the thea­ ter and an outstanding unit of the Command during the period covered by this report. It is based on experience gathered in the expenditure of more than 1500 ro'ckets since D-day:

On armed reconnaissance missions, one or two flightsof the squadron would carry a bomb load and the cover flight would carry rockets. However, in close ground cooperation missions, all planes would carry bombs and rockets, thus enabling their attack on many and varied targets. Some specific operations utilizing the rockets were* (1) During the advance through the ST. LO (ERANCE) }* V P- o

breakthrough, the squadron was flying cover for armored columns using four-ship flights. One element would attack the target* whioh in most oases were armored vehicles, The lead ship would observe the damages, or tell the pilot firing, where his rocket had gone* Then this element would drop down and the other two planes would-act as cover. This method was a great help in evaluating damage done, as the pilots firing would break away from the targets to avoid the blast and debris, .this tactio pre­ venting the gun cameras from photographing the rocket strike and also preventing the pilot from witnessing the damage. All during the support of armored colupns the semi-armor-piercing nose plugs were used, thus utilizing the base fuse with its slight delay* (2) During the.HOLLAHD invasion, the squadron was sent out to destroy flak installations that fired on troop carriers and gliders. When a flak installation was seen the planes in the flight would fall in an extended string formation Then while one plane was on its firing run and pulling up, the next plane would be in position to attaok any other flak guns that fired on the lead plane* Machine guns were fired on the same dive to discourage or destroy personnel in the positions attacked* (3) In operations on or near the SIEGFRIED LIVE, the squadron carried both rockets and either 500-lb General Pur­ pose or fragmentation bombs under the wings. The bomb load was dropped first on targets, followed by an attack employing the rockets* Sinoe many attacks have been made against flak posi­ tions and towns near the SIEGPBIED LINE, the squadron has been loading the rockets with super-quick nose fuses in place of semi-armor piercing nose plugs. These fuses have also been found practical against lightly armored vehicles, motor-trans­ ports, and locomotives as the rockets have a large and heavy fragmentation pattern, thus enabling a near-miss to cause con­ siderable damage* In all, the type of attack to be made is de­ termined by the target, the amount of light flak and the ter­ rain* Against tanks, or vehicles in open country, low-level attacks are very good, but ill wooded areas a 30-degree dive at­ tack is more desirable as the target is more easily looated and attacked* Por locomotives it is better to attack parallel with the tracks so that the rocket will bo under the cars and explode, thereby serving a dual purpose by destroying the cars and the tracks. Also, there is less chance of a miss, caused by a range error, while using this tadtic. After the rocket has been fired, either in a dive or low-level attack, a quick break to one side ia considered the best recovery since the rooket ex­ plodes in front of the plane and fragments and debris are thrown up and battle damage will result if the line of flight goes through and over the blast* c. Toss Bombing:-- Only one group has been equipped with the A.I.B.R. installation, or toes bomb sight. The follo­ wing is a report submitted by the unit employing this equipment:

(1) Introduction.

a. This report will include an analysis of toss bombing from the viewpoint of desirability in tactical air forces. The data is limited, as only a few missions have been run* Ho attempt will be made to cover any technical as­ pects of the sight. (2) Use of the Sight, a. Up until the present time all A.I.B.R* missions have been assigned by the T.A.C. Operations. Fourteen operational missions have been flown« There have been no toss bombing missions for about three weeks. (3) Advantages of the Sight. a. The first major advantage of the sight is that it has increased the accuracy on fixed targets. The average error on operatonal missions has been reduced from about 300 feet to about 200 feet, including dive, buzz, and glide bomb­ ing. As the effectiveness decreases in direct proportion to the square of the distance from the target this represents doubling the effectiveness.

b. The second major advantage is that it requires less skill and training of the pilot for commensurate results.

(4) Disadvantages of the Sight.

a. It takes two men three days to install the present sight in one plane.

b. It requires four trained men per squa­ dron for maintenance. (Possibly with new equipment this will be reduced to two men).

c. With the present bomb shackle releases, thousand-pound bombs will not release because the solenoid is not powerful enough.

d. The altitude of the target must be known for optimum results with the si^ht. This,reduces its ef­ fectiveness on armed reconnli|Ili3b§ i$|rf\rf?get8 "of* Importuni­ ties. This same disadvantage if <|r ll4&e>BriPPPrt coiildj be over­ come by the air support paxC? w^l^iiet»r >4jMhi8 tank. /• v/ f" k ;]

(5) Summary, (a) It would require considerable time, effort, and training to install and use A.I.B.R. equipment* (b) Under present conditions, most targets being targets of opportunity, optimum results could not be ob­ tained from the sights* (c) A.I.B.R.. equipment will definitely increase accuracy of bombing. With future improvements in the equipment, its use in initial stages of pilot training, and training of competent maintenance personnel, the sight will definitely prove practical. This will particularly be true in operations such as the pre-invasion air offensive against tar­ gets which were briefed, or under other similar conditions.

d. Rear-looking Radar.— This equipment is used on night photo aircraft (P-3's) and night fighters (p-6l''s). In the former it serves as an effective tail-warning device? P-3's so equipped rely entirely upon radar warning and subsequent eva­ sive action for protection, their guns having been removed* In the P-61 the rear-looking radar on occasion has served an offen­ sive purpose by supplementing the AI. For example, in a recent instance a night fighter over-ran its quarry but almost immedi­ ately picked it up with the rear-looking radar, did a 180-degree turn, and again got on its tail.

i> ti i y/ f j v ^ ? rar •?>' ay ?. ccyrim

TECHNICAL ANyJFtJgCi*»AIDS AND PROOEDURES

9* Communlcations a* General.— During this period of operations there de­ veloped in the XIX Tactical Air Command four communications networks, utilizing five means of communication. (1) The Networks: (a) Command Net* Command-Wing-Group® Plus laterals to adjacent jinits* (b) Control Net. Tactical Control Center-Por- ward Director Posts and Radio Intelligence Unit-Light Warning Radars and Ground Observers* Plus laterals to adjacent units*

(o) Liaison Neto Command-Tactical Air Parties at Corps, Divisions and Combat Command* (d) Air-Ground Net* Aircraft-ground stations at airdromes, control points and Tactical Air Parties* (2) The Means t (a) Point-to-point 1 Landline telephone and teletype. ? PM radio telephone and teletype* 3 E/9 W/T radio. J Motor couriers. Air couriers. (b) Air-Ground

1 VHP R/T radio. b. Communications Networks. (1) Command. Squadrons normally pooled equipment and person­ nel in a Group Communications Center. The Fighter Group Center was connected to Wing by the above four point-to-point means* The Photo Recce Group and the Night Fighter Squadron were con­ nected to Command* Little difficulty was experienced in main­ taining excellent communications below Wing level, but from Wing to Command was a different story* Throughout the Campaign every effort was made to loca.tA factlcflil AiyT Command Headquarters in the vicinity of * ' „ * * ;" 4 ' j I f .^ \ * V r .X '• r*' - « -!i * - .: ^ Army* as it was fourid ground coordination. However, during mobile phases, Army Headquarters moved very rapidly in order to maintain contact and communications with ground combat elements, the latter often moving twenty miles a day. While Army moved forward to shorten its circuits, airdromes remained fixed. Thus Tactical Air Command circuits got longer and longer until it became impossible to construct high-grade lines rapidly enough for Tactical Air Command to stay with Army. As an illustration of the over-extended communications system: Tactical Air Command Headquarters were located at CHALONS, while some Groups were still operating from the CHERBOURG PENINSULA, a main axis distance of 600 miles. On one occasion, Tactical Air Command moved forward with Army in advance of its landlines, but through lack of suf­ ficient comirunications, resultant operations were very un­ satisfactory. General Weyland ruled that never again would Tactical Air Command advance ahead of adequate landline communications. In order to maintain liaison with Army on such rapid ad­ vances, Tactical Air Command X-Ray was established to move with Army. This echelon was composed of a few key opera­ tions personnel and a small Signal detachment. One cable was rushed forward and this, plus FM radio with W/T standby, proved sufficient to maintain excellent communication, and hence liaison, between Army and Tactical Air Command (Main). (2) Control. In the Tactical Control Group, Ground Obser­ vers and Light Warning Radars were connected to Forward Di­ rector Posts by FM radio with standby H/F W/T radio5 FDPs to the Tactical Control Center by FM r^dio, standby H/F W/T radio, and wire during static phases; Tactical Control Center to Command by all four point-to-point means. No great difficulty was experienced in maintaining FM communi­ cations from the TCC to its units, although circuits were often strained to the limit. But maintaining wire lines from Command to TCC was nearly as difficult as from Command to Wing. (3) Liaison. - • Great strides have been made in the field of communications from the Tactical Air Parties located with ground force unit headquarters to Tactical Air Command, and between these parties and aircraft. T/O and E 1-547, dated 18 October 1943, has been found totally inadequate for Tac­ tical Air Communications Squadrons which provide the par­ ties# The system as it is now operated provides radio equipment as follows: Armored Division Combat* Commands:

: ; .v rf -7T , = ii*v t; .. f! " One AN/7RC-1 (75-wt*4,^tUlelaHil^Mp set) in a jeep and one in a half-track*

Armored Divisions: One AN/VRC in a deep and one SCR-399 (400-watt, mobile B/f set) and SCR-624 [VHP set operating on 11Ov) in a half­ track* Infantry Divisions: One AN/VRC in a jeep and one SCR-399 and SCR-624 in a 2V2 ton track* Corps: Same as Infantry Division with an additional SCR-624*

Corps Artillery: One AN/VRC in a jeep and one unmounted SCR-624* The above H/F sets are netted by Corps with NCS at Tactical Air Command and are used during mobile situations for request­ ing air missions, passing bomblines, weather reports, field orders, operations summaries and miscellaneous information* A spare receiver at each Corps monitors the Tac/R W/T broadcast* During static situations, most of the above traffic is handled by Ground Force landlines and the B/l? radio is held for stand­ by. Special air support nets to airdromes have been eliminated, it being found that the normal Command radio and landline sys­ tem was sufficient* The VHP radio is employed for contact with aircraft to direct them to targets, adjust artillery, and receive flash recce reports* A flying officer is provided with each party to advise the Ground Force Commander on air matters and to contact the air­ craft by radio* The present system is heartily indorsed by Third Army, which is enthusiastic over the liaison and communications provided by the Tactical Air Liaison Officer and the Tactioal Air Party* (4) Air-Ground * The air-ground net consists of a VHP set in each aircraft; a homer, transmitter and receiver at each airdrome; two fixer systems, of 4 or 5 D/P stations each, operating under the TCC; 2 to 12 channels of transmitter-receiver at each con­ trol point and 1 or 2 transmitter-receivers with each TAP* r s it ?t f%% f«rn ^- f fy-fpd \ f v* p;h f * ' 1 " V. f , UNCI ISSFRI[ A/C sets, except reconnaissance, are crystallized as

"A" Channel. Group frequency for local control, homing control from TCC and contact with Divisions' TAPs. "B" Channel. Command common No* 1. Alternate control from TCC and contact with Corps TAP* "C" Channel. Air Force Common for contact with escorted bombers and special uses. "D" Channel. Command Common No. 2. Alternate Control from TCC, contact with Corps TAP, and fixing. c. Means of Communication. (1) Wire. Increased use was made of rehabilitated exist­ ing landline facilities. This broad network of former commer­ cial circuits, made available by the combined efforts of numer­ ous organizations, is utilized largely for lateral and rearward communications. Forward axis and temporary landlines were pro­ vided primarily by the use of spiral-four (two-pair) cable. This cable proved of extremely great value under varied con­ ditions. Improved construction practices now -being used will increase its reliability still more. Where special situations warranted, use was also made of open wire facilities on per­ manent pole line systems* (2) VHJ/FM Radio. The use of radio lines for both telephone and teletype, employing carrier equipment CF-1 and CF-2, was ex­ panded to include circuits from Command Headquarters to almost all of our tactical units, as well as to parallel and higher headquarters. This type of communication proved especially valuable where landlines were overloaded with traffic, or were temporarily out of order.

Within the 19th. Tactical Control Group9 FM radio "push-to-talk" oirouits were extensively used, to provide links for controllers, filter officers, D/F fixing of aircraft, AAA gun battalion warning, and reporting by radar and ground obser­ ver units. In many cases these links are the only means of communication available. It is recommended that the 111 radio facilities be further increased. British type lOytquipment, whioh operates at extremely high frequencies with vew SSfjectional antenna, has recently been put in operation. ' sible for the enemy to pick up iand jLmtejPpf MOM. PCUSSiriED this latter set, the seourity of radio telephone conversation is almost completely ensured. (3) E/I W/T Radio. Extensive H/P W/T radio nets were established within the Commaind and to adjacent units; however, beoause of good wire and IK radio circuits, H/P radio saw little service except during very mobile phases. It proved a valuable emer­ gency link when occasionally required* (4) Courier* Courier service proved a valuable supplement to the electrical communication system* Soheduled courier service was provided twice daily between connecting headquarters. Motor courier service was expanded by special couriers and liaison plane couriers. (5) VHP R/T radio. Very little difficulty was experienced with VHP communication. All airborne sets were modified so that for fixing the pilot throws a switch which causes 1,000-cycle tone modulation of the channel in use. D/P operators can obtain a much better bearing on this tone than on a count by the pilot. SCR-542, 12-volt VHP sets, used by the TAPs, were found unsatisfactory for continuous use. SCR-624» 110- volt VHP sets were provided and proved most satisfactory. They are powered from the PB-95 furnished with SCR-399s. Sixty-foot aerial masts and remote control were normally used. See SOP (Annex .4 ). SOI (Annex 5 ). and representative circuit diagram (Appendix 10).

10. Radio Intercept.— Interception of enemy radio messages by the 3rd Radio Squadron (Mobile), Detachment WCW, proved especially valuable during the period of temporary resurgence of the Luftwaffe in connection with the ARDENNES counter-offen­ sive. This information* has frequently resulted in warning our squadrons of impending attack or enabled them to surprise enemy formations operating in the vicinity. Provision should be made in the T/0 of the Tactical Control Group for two offi­ cers and two enlisted men to handle this information on a 24- hour basis. It is felt that the "Y* Service would operate more effectively if it were an integral part of the Tactical Control Group. It is therefore recommended that the radio intercept personnel be assigned, rather than attached, to this Command. See Standard Operating Procedure, Detachment WC" 3rd Radio Squadron, Mobile, in Annex 1 W-'C! ASSIfJL APPENDIX- 10

D*"U C Lt/f/Jti ,V :r* #/>• »> e**

' 4 I... f. - $% V V * f i *8PISPITFIRE SW »• g 8 * fl fl •«% p* I4 •••• * FM • * ^ l * fh - • ^ %& %*->* 4 & i> ftutti rfi >o]XI X ~ I«* & SPITFIRE

SPEARHEAD FM GANGWAY AOV U' LUCKY WIREHEAD SPEARSPEAI HE AO yFM

p GANGWAY ADV SPEEISPEEDWAY MAGNOLIA FM 316 F C S F « GANGWAY 8W QUICKSAND ¥ _J lT:17 •aA GALOSH

°^1tcc h SPEEDWAY

«L, SPITFIRE SPITFIRE SW T FM -J'

m -SYS 0PCH2- SPITFIRE M — SY8 OH CHI -CxC = «6:: HERMESKEIL BADKREUZNACH MAINZ T" m. c -a *1 Jn <«^ J 'M SYSTEM TYPE 10

"^llOOTH SPEARHEAD =~1 SPITFIRESPITFI M

LUXEMBOURG IsSPITFIREPIT FM

ul ^

SYSTEM TYPE 10 THONVILLE 4- LONGWY 10TH PR I qq~1 384 OANDER , SPEARSHAFT FRISKY

"^1S«7 HTURROW m

-fi­

i~]36e FORTRESS

"°°1 3 6 2 "^q] 368 367 rTPEARBOX (h fh FORTRESS FURROW ADV •Si th £h

CIRCUIT DIAGRAM XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND y st I ;• -] . •. •: ;f to APRIL l>48 > si it-**' 1"'.# -'*•« v? ^ • -y < + PREPARED BY DRAWN BY IX- H/y -i ~ 3S£ UWCtASSIFJE

11. Radar, During this period two new types of ground radar equipment were introduced into the fighter control system* (a) The MEW (Microwave Early Warning equipment), an American set, with radar scopes for four controllers, became operational in FRANCE during the third week of September 1944* The inherent accuracy of the MEW proved to be much greater than that of any other search radar yet used by XIX Tactical Air Command, and, therefore, MEW has been used to a large ex­ tent for placing fighter-bomber missions accurately over tar­ get areas. In addition, the control of all night fighters and night photo aircraft in the XIX Tactical Air Command area has been done from the MEW* (b) A second piece of equipment introduced during this period was the SCR-584, modified for close control* Two sets became operational* and although their full capabilities have not yet been realized, they proved of great value in taking fighter-bomber aircraft to obscure pinpoint targets, which were then attacked visually* In addition, bombing through the over­ cast by SCR-584 control has proved successful and it is now pos­ sible for aircraft flying above an overcast to use their bombs to effect rather than jettison them on unknown points* Because of its limited range, this equipment is most useful on a sta­ bilized front and has relatively little value in a highly mobile situation.

See SOP's in Annex 1 .

12* Visual Identification*

a. Colored Panels and Plares.— The most effective means of identifying friendly troops is the use of fluorescent panels* They should be displayed by all vehicles, gun positions, and friendly installations within two miles of the front lines. The use of these panels by armored spearheads is particularly important; however, these units seem reluctant to make use of this panel when far out in front because of the possibility of disclosing their position to hostile aircraft. It has been pro­ ven in this campaign that the possibility of being attacked by our own aircraft if they do not identify themselves is greater than the chance of attack by hostile aircraft if they do display these panels* To reduce the possibility of compromise and use of these panels by hostile vehicles, a panel code has been in effect since January 1945* Yellow, red, and white panels are used, either singly or in combination, in accordance with an SOI issued weekly. Pilots are briefed on this color combination to assure identification of friendly elements* The shortage of panels has made it impossible to furnish all vehicles a complete set* At present the issue is based on fqe£"every ten vehicles in a convoy and one.per armorel

JIM i •f f>< j r»»- *1 "• *st •*

'(i)4anks are not ftd&nti* o:f identifica­ tion in all oases, since the German has at times been known to use our panels In an attempt to avoid air attack* Whenever any doubt exists as to the validity of the panel display, pilots have been instructed to dry-run the subject and make positive identification. If the subject is then definitely identified as enemy, attack is made despite the panels after obtaining approval from the Tactical Control Center. (2) Yellow flares are used for identifying friendly troops when attack by our own aircraft seems imminent. Too often this flare is depended upon to replace the panel. This it cannot do, since usually by the time a flare can be released the attack has already been made. b. Colored Smoke for Aerial Target Identification.~ Colored smoke has been used effectively in marking targets close to forward positions. R$d smoke has proven to be best, since it is least likely to be confused with the smoke of battle and stands out well in any terrain. Harking targets in this manner has been a great help to the pilots, and is SOP for any targets within the bomb line* Smooth air-ground cooperation of this type has been greatly facilitated by evolution of the combined operations office at Corps and Division level, and to a certain extent at Combat Command level. Here the ground re­ presentative (Gr-3 Air) and the air representative (Tactical Air Liaison Officer) work closely together in the same room. The former has a direct wire to the Artillery FDC while the latter is in contact with the aircraft in the air by VHP radio, and these communications have proved invaluable in arranging for marking close-in targets and also in coordinating counter-flak fire. c. Marker Plans.— In planning an air attack involving the use of medium or heavy bombardment in close cooperation with ground troops, due consideration must be given to safety measures to insure proper identification of front-line positions. Colored AA bursts and radio beams have been used for this pur­ pose, as well as ground panels and flares. (1) When it has been decided that medium or heavy bombers will be used, the Command furnishing the force sends a representative to the Tactical Air Command concerned to study the position of the ground troops and possible directions of approach, and to furnish the AA commander of the army with suit­ able information on altitudes and directions of approach. With this information, a plan for establishing a line of AA bursts, to be used as a reference line in the air, is developed. Since the most suitable type of burst requires use of red smoke shells, sufficient time prior to the operation must be avail­ able to prepare the ammunition. Illicit * *. (2) With the guns £fld alti­ tude precomputed to establishNk**&$m1' m^Miefair, bat­ teries are notified by the liaison officer from Cd^ri^w of the approach of the bomber stream# Orders for commence firing and cease firing originate from the representative of the medi­ um or heavy bomber force who is in radio contact with the for­ mation in the air. (3) Following is a sample order for establishing a "line of flak"* "24 90-mm AA guns will be placed in three sections of eight guns on a line from 653650 to 768650® Outer guns on each section will fire red bursts. Commence fire order will be given from Corps CP, at which time the most easterly gun will open fire followed at two-second intervals by each gun in succession toward the west. Fire will continue in this se­ quence until cease fire orders are received or until bomber stream has passed and flare from last a/c is sighted. Bomber formation will be at 20,000 feet. AA bursts will be at 17,000 feet. This 'line of flak' will coincide with SCS-51 beam (radio marker device)." (4) This method of marking a given line in the air insures an accurate reference point regardless of cloud con­ ditions.

13. Tactical Reconnaissance Cooperation with Fighter-Bombers.-- This Command has made greatly increased use of tactical recon- naissance for spotting targets and leading fighter-bombers to the attack. The Tactical Control Center monitors all recon­ naissance frequencies. As soon as a suitable target is sighted it is reported to the Control Center} there a fighter-bomber unit is ordered to contact the recce plane directly and at the same time is guided to a point of rendezvous with it. If neces­ sary, the reconnaissance ship indicates the target by making the first pass. This practice has proved so successful that it is now standard for one aircraft of a fighter-bomber squadron on a routine armed reconnaissance to be listening on the proper frequency to receive directly any hot target located by recce pilots. Such cooperation has greatly increased the speed, ef­ ficiency and flexibility of fighter-bomber operations.

14. Night Fighter Operations.— Except during the Luftwaffe*8 brief resurgence in connection with the AKDENHES counter-offen- eive, German night operations in the XIX TAC area have not justified much effort in defensive patrols. Offensive intruder missions have proved a far more profitable employment of our night fighter squadron. Several of the P-6ls have been equip­ ped to carry high-velocity aircraft rockets as well as high- explosive bombs, incendiaries or HaPalm? A popular and effec­ tive employment is to bomb any suitable? iaJ®fo|j|yitb two 165- gallon tanks of NaPalm, then return and "us||-^^'r^^b4n|-blaze as an aiming point for rocket fire. The maiori4jf|g^j^6#&|Llht - 25 - • MCUSS.IFIE UMIASSIFIF!) fighter operations ooneiat of armed reconnaissance along routes known to be active, with primary attention to motor transport showing lights and to rail targets. Active marshalling yards and factories are secondary targets. Considerable damage has been done to road and rail movement, as well as to industrial sections where furnaces and lights furnish an aiming point. In addition to the actual damage done, these attacks have had a hampering effect upon enemy movement and activities by forcing a stringent blackout* Night intruder operations form an impor­ tant and necessary complement to daylight fighter-bomber acti­ vity, giving the enemy no rest.

a. In all the squadron's P-6ls the radar operator-navi- gator has been moved from the rear of the plane to a place be­ hind the pilot in the nose; this facilitates coordination, particularly in the event of failure of the inter-com or the killing or wounding of one of the two members of the crew.

15. Airdrome Defense. a. Active.

(1) Anti-aircraft.— In the defense of an airdrome against ground attack and airborne troops, the first line of defense .is the anti-aircraft units which are assigned to the protection of the airdrome* The normal ratio is one AW battery for each group, but the most vulnerable airdromes, with two groups^ are protected by three batteries. The anti-aircraft units usually place their 40-mm guns and quadruple mounts in a ring around the airdrome, taking into consideration the terrain and field of fire against aircraft. The weapons are so sited as to give an interlacing field of fire, both to the air and to the ground. It is desirable to place the 40-mm guns so that they are able to cover road intersections, open roads, fields or any terrain that lends itself to use by the enemy in making a ground attack. However, in the choice of locations to cover terrain features or air, the air position takes precedence, in­ asmuch as the anti-aircraft units' primary role is defense against attack by enemy aircraft.

(2) Smoke Pots.— A method of concealment by the use of HC type HI Smoke Pots was developed after a strafing attack by enemy aircraft. This method has not been tested nor used during an actual attack but was given a thorough test by one of the fighter groups. In this test 120 smoke pots were used, placed upwind from the hardstandings on which the airplanes were parked. The attacking flight was spotted by AAA observers and

If*' *. *•?r* UNCLASSIFIED. warning was given by means of three rounds of 40-mm AAA fire. This warning was picked up by flying control and disseminated by means of sirens and multiple red flares# When the alarm was 8oundedt crew chiefs rushed to the smoke pot positions and ignited the pots before taking cover. Within two minutes after the alarm sounded the field was completely obscured and pilots who participated in the test stated that it would have been im­ possible to conduct aimed fire on any of the parked airplanes* Approximately 25 percent of the anti-aircraft guns were covered and would have been unable to fire. It was found that the effec­ tiveness of the smoke screening exceeded all expectations and this was adopted as the prime method of passive defense*

16. Employment of Airdrome Squadrons.

a. Airdrome Squadrons were first employed on the Conti­ nent to service aircraft landing for rearming and refueling during the first days of the invasion. As the Groups moved across the Channel and replaced the services of the Airdrome Squadrons, the latter were displaced forward to new sites. As soon as these new fields became operational - but before the ground echelons of the Groups could move forward - the Airdrome Squadrons again were employed to rearm and reservice squadrons ranging out ahead of the advancing armies*

b. By placing these separate Airdrome Squadrons on ad­ vanced fields which could only be stocked by air transport, the effective operating range of the tactical units was considerably increased. In a number of instances an Airdrome Squadron housed and fed up to a hundred pilots who were forced to land at the advanced base because of bad weather at home fields*

o. In addition to providing the ground personnel for Nroulementn operations, these squadrons were employed as the ground echelon for tactical units temporarily attached to this Command for operations and for the service and repair of air­ craft of other Commands that were forced down by battle damage, weather or shortage of fuel*

d* The experience of this Command indicates that a minimum of two Airdrome Squadrons should be assigned per six tactical Groups*

17* Aircraft Movement Liaison.— There exists an imperative necessity for timely and comprehensive knowledge of activity of all friendly aircraft in the Army area in order to control AA and employ night fighters intelligently.

cus$?ni2. IWClASS/flF

a* Air defense of the Third US Army Area is the responsibility of the Commanding General, *1* Tactical Air Command. This responsibility is delegated to the duty Chief Controller who carries out his duties in the Tactical Con­ trol Center in close cooperation with the duty AAA Liaison Officer, a representative of the 38th AAA Brigade. The de­ fenses consist of night fighter patrols, inner artillery zones and "blank check" areas, which are similar to IAZ's, but fire only during periods- specified by the Controller. The AAA defenses are situated around important towns, supply dumps, etc. Control of both types of defense is centered in the Tactical Control Center under the direction of the Controller and the AAA Liaison Officer.

b. To enable these officers to carry out their du­ ties efficiently, it is necessary for their, to have complete and comprehensive knowledge of all aircraft present in the area at all times. Without this there is no possibility of the defenses being used intelligently and economically. Both the airborne and the ground defenses are completely ineffec­ tive when lacking the information, and any orders governing the defenses can only be based upon a guess. To protect friendly aircraft which must pass through the inner artillery zones, a system of safeguards has been set up, one of which is the "hold fire" order given by the Controller. The elaborate system of defenses is rendered practically impotent during the period of such a "hold fire", and it is readily seen why the Controller must have advance knowledge of friendly aircraft movements. c. Advance information should includes (1) Number of aircraft operating. (2) The course the flight will follow, with a sufficient number of check points along the way. together with the estimated times and altitudes of the formations at each check point. (3) The approximate time the bomber stream will take on outward and return journeys, and the approximate front it will cover. d. When flights fail to conform to advance plans it creates an element of uncertainty and hence danger. It is ob­ viously futile to warn inner artillery zones in the path of a proposed flight when the bombers do not follow advance plans. A certain amount of deviation from plans must be expected and can be allowed for, but a flight varying from a plan by as much as several hours and 60 to 70 miles makes intelligent handling of a defensive situation virtually impossible.

e. When operations H|i® MCUSSIFltti system to be used for passing movements had been set up by high­ er headquarters. Roughly, it was to have been the responsibili­ ty of IX Air Defense Command to receive movements from Hill House in the UK and to pass them along to the various Tactical Control Centers. This system, for some reason not known, never functioned, and the Tactical Control Center of this Command found it necessary to use radio equipment to monitor Hill House broadcasts for identification purposes® This was not satisfac­ tory due to the inability to get repeats on messages not wholly received or understood, and because no certainty was present that all pertinent messages had been received. f. A system since has been devised for the passing of movements from Hill House to a Central Continental Plying Control Office at LeBourget, which re-broadcasts to the various Tactical Control Centers. In an attempt to assure full re­ ception of movements, XIX Tactical Control Center also monitors the Hill House broadcast. The system still is not foolproof, but great improvements have been made* g. The attempt by the bombers to jam enemy radar with "window" and "carpet" or "chaff" has, in some instances, blanked out or reduced efficiency of radar of this Command, hampering the early warning net. Some types of jamming also foul FM nets, forcing the use of standby equipment with a loss of efficiency. h. There also have cropped up discrepancies in brief­ ing or proper dissemination of information pertaining to AAA safe-guards and restrictions. When questioned, the crew of a British bomber shot down had 40 knowledge of the Third Army AAA Area or the height limits involved. It was further dis­ covered that for a while RAP bomber pilots were not permitted to show IFF, and the equipment was locked up to prevent access. When a flight is operating below the existing height restriction Third Army AAA depends on an IFF signal for identification. i. To prevent future mishaps, liaison officers should be exchanged between bomber and fighter headquarters. j. Hight fighter defenses involve essentially the same problems. It obviously is a terrific waste of effort to be continually sending aircraft in chases after unidentified planes which turn out to be friendly. k. Four factors are needed to insure general effi­ ciency and cooperation for air defense of the Third Army Area. These are: (l) Complete knowledge and understanding by the Bomber Commands of defense rules an(t^fltf%gu£rds. , .

* ® % 9 Pi f ^ • fm m mm tnv , t ! \ \?"'f UNCLASSIFIED (2) passed in advance of all operations indicating th^ inten­ tions of the Bomber Commands. It is imperative that any changes in the flight plans be passed promptly.

(3) A fool-proof two-way communications system between defensive installations and the Bomber Com­ mands over which such flight plans and alterations may be passed.

(4) A similarly fool-proof two-way communi­ cations system between the Tactical Control Center and the Anti-Aircraft Operations Room over which orders governing the inner artillery zones may be passed quickly.

18. Movement to Forward Airfields. a. When the decision is made to move a group to a •forward location the Command Engineer furnishes a report of available airfields, together with an estinate of the date they can be placed in operational condition. A re­ connaissance by the AC of 5, A-3, is normally made to con­ firm engineering estimates and selections are made based on operational requirements. Sites selected may be re­ habilitated airfields or merely property which readily lends itself to development as an airfield. While not always pos­ sible, it is considered desirable from a communications standpoint that all airfields in use by the Command be re­ latively close together. b. After the new airfields have been selected, ap­ proximate dates on which groups will move are determined and all groups and interested staff sections informed. When the tactical situation will permit, dates on which groups will move are scheduled so as not to produce an ex­ cessive transportation requirement.

c. Prestockage and tranportation for the unit to be moved are •frhen scheduled by the AC of S, A-4. Efforts are made to pre-stock the new field at such time as the "A" Party of the group has moved on the field to receive it. Service Command commitments do not always make this pos­ sible, in which case it may be necessary to move an Air­ drome Squadron to the airfield to receive the supplies.

d. Additional transportation required to move a group is obtained from a pool formed of transportation from other groups which is not required for operations. This transportation is placed under the control of the Transportation Officer of the group moving until the move (WlfiSS vwimtFtt is completed. In addition, $>DI#£$&<%%* from Air Force Service Comrrand depending on I I The tactical situation may also require that moventfit jjf made entirely or in part by air. In such situations the AC of S, A-4, coordinates the movement witl> Air Force Ser­ vice Command.

e. Group Commanders, upon beiqg advised of a pending move, reconnoiter the new site for facilities, accommoda­ tions and such additional minor (engineering work they re­ commend to facilitate operations. The "A* Party, which nor­ mally consists of the minimum of personnel and equipment necessary to operate the field for a limited period, then mares to the new field on the prescribed date. As soon thereafter as servicing facilities will permit, which is usually the following day, aircraft land at the new field upon completion of the day's operations. The remainder of the group then moves to the new field prepared to resume operations.

f. The movement of a fighter-bomber group, together with all ancillary units, requires approximately one hun­ dred and twenty 23-ton truck loads or two hundred and fifty transport aircraft loads. These requirements vary, however, depending upon the number of ancillary units and the amount of equipment within the group.

19. Other Special Devices, Procedures cr Aids.

Nothing to report.

20» Tactical and Photographic Reconnaissance.

a. Ground Force Requirements.— Reconnaissance re­ quirements of the cooperating Army and its Corps and Divi­ sions are received through the Army G-2 (Air) Officer on duty at Command Headquarters. The reconnaissance plans, both Tac/R and P/R, are prepared by the Command's Staff Reconnaissance Officer after consultation with the G-2 (Air) officer. Requests from Corps and Divisions for Mer- ton obliques, town plans, river strips and other aerial photography are screened and incorporated in the P/R plan. Needs of the Corps and Divisions are anticipated in pre­ paring the Tac/R plan, which is drawn up on an area and route basis. Special requests by Corps and Divisions for specific information within any Tac/R area or route are transmitted through Army G-2 (Air) channels to the Staff Recce Section, where, if approved, the request is immediate­ ly telephoned to the 10th Photo Group for execution by the next mission flown in that particular area. Corps and Divisions receive copies of the plans and have direct VHF 31 - — .il If* I i UW'it#*iii IjLiJ radio communication with reconnaissance pilots operating in their area; by this means urgent information can be passed to them directly. Requests for artillery adjustment mis­ sions follow the same channels as requests for photography, being coordinated by the Army G-2 (Air), passed upon by the XIX TAC Staff Reconnaissance Officer, and sent to 10th Photo Group for execution. b. Adequacy of Recce Force Available.— It is believed that two Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons and one Photo Re­ connaissance Squadron are normally adequate to supply a Tac­ tical Air Command and an Army of two or three Corps with all the Tac/R and P/R required, provided that the requirements of Air Force and Army Group are handled elsewhere. Two Tac/R and 1 P/R squadrons are adequate only if their entire re­ sources are available to the Tactical Air Command and its cooperating Army. They are not always adequate if required also to provide bomb damage assessment and other photog­ raphy required by higher headquarters. c. Suitability of Equipment. (1) Tactical Reconnaissance* (a) Aircraft. 1 The F-6 (P-51 Mustang) type aircraft, now in use for tactical reconnaissance, has proved highly satisfactory. The F-6 can be flown at a reasonable speed for visual observation and for confirming photographic work. Also, it has the speed and maneuverability to cope with at­ tacks by enemy aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery. 2 The armament and pilot's armor are definitely adequate,"but a weak point is the vulnerability of the coolant system. Ninety percent of the losses to AA are caused by hits in the coolant system. 3 The fuel supply is adequate under all conditions but one; this being reconnaissance for a rapidly moving Army when advance bases cannot be prepared quickly enough to keep the unit within range for satisfactory cov­ erage. The most desirable solution would be an increase in range without the necessity of retarding the speed with drop tanks or changing the center of gravity with a fuselage tank. (b) Cameras. 1 The ideal camera installation in the Mustang is the K-22 aircraft camera in the vertical position, with the 12M cone. This gives excellent scale for photo

J#*11*'-"'- interpretation from the altitudes flown by tactic! naissance pilots. Photos are sharp and the desired over­ lap is obtained. Using slow shutter speeds and Class IT film, photos can be obtained early in the morning, late at night and under poor light conditions. The 12" cone should be installed in all ships; two 6" cones and two 24" cones should be held in stock in case they are required for great­ er coverage at specified altitudes or where higher altitudes are deemed necessary. (The K-17B aircraft camera equipped with 12" cones would also be suitable.) 2 The K-22 aircraft camera, with the 12" cone, mounted in the fuselage, is the ideal oblique camera for ordinary requirements. This camera gives ex­ cellent results for Merton gridded obliques, oblique strips and pin points. There should be 6 K-22 cameras mounted as obliques per squadron. The rewind cycle is too slow for low level obliques and it may be necessary to lave 3 K-24 cameras mounted as obliques per squadron, for shooting ob­ liques of river banks, etc. Care should be taken not to obstruct access to these cameras by installing IFF or other radio equipment in front of them as is sometimes done. The access doors here should also be as large as is practicable. (2) Photo Reconnaissance. (a) Aircraft. 1 The P-38 (F-5), being a heavy and steady aircraft, is almost ideal for this type of work since practically no vibration is encountered. The nose compart­ ment, as it stands, however, is not sufficiently weather­ proof, allowing water to accumulate in cameras at the de­ pots, and making the problem of camera heating rather dif­ ficult. The F-5's speed and maneuverability have enabled us to out-run and evade all of the conventional types of German aircraft. The German jet planes present more of a problem because of their amazing climb and speed. However, if the first attack is unsuccessful the photo pilot can easily outmaneuver the jets. (b) Cameras. 1 The P-38 (F-5E) used for Photo Re­ connaissance work, equipped with 24" split vertical and one other camera (6" or 12" vertical) is almost totally satis­ factory, so long as that one type of installation is needed. If a special type of installation is necessary to fulfill a certain photographic coverage request, very often the stand­ ard installation must be removed and|t|h^,|%^,iwunts and - 33 /I xCJnrri ii-p- cameras installed, requiring anywhere from two to three hours. This delay is sometimes very critical and if the installation is required often the ship must be permanently modified, grounding it, therefore, for routine operation. In most cases we have found that if the aircraft had more room in the camera compartment, it would be more versatile and easier to work with. If possible, a larger compartment with at least one, maybe two, more vertical camera ports, a change­ able nose port and two on each side for varied angle oblique cameras, would aid considerably in meeting all requests with the best possible camera installations in the quickest time. (3) Facilities for Processing and Disseminating Photo Intelligence. (a) Facilities for reproduction of photo­ graphs are inadequate to meet Army needs. A daily capacity of 40,000 prints is needed, and accordingly the present fa­ cilities should be approximately doubled. There is also a need for equipment for making enlargements. (b) More photo interpreters are needed in the Photo Intelligence Detachment and in the reconnaissance squadrons. An increase to approximately twice the present number is recommended. (c) In view of the amount of photographic work which is now required of tactical reconnaissance, Tac/R squadrons should be provided with photographic facilities and personnel comparable to those of P/R squadrons#

d« Channels for Transmitting and Screening Recce Requirements. (1) G-2 (Air), Third US Army, maintains a sec­ tion consisting of ttiree qualified officers and five enlis­ ted men as part of Combined Operations Section, XIX Tactical Air Command. This section coordinates the requests of all Third Army units for Tac/R and P/R and submits approved re­ quests to the XIX TAC Staff Reconnaissance Section* (2) The Staff Reconnaissance Section coordinates and consolidates the requests from Third US Army, XIX Tac­ tical Air Command and Ninth Air Force and prepares the plans for the employment of the Tac/R and P/R units. These plans are submitted to the Commanding General, XIX Tactical Air Command, for approval, and are then transmitted to the 10th Photo Group for execution* See diagrams showing^l|an|^

' - 341-41* lei f4c| IWCUSSIFIFD of requests, orders and results, Annex 8. e. Delivery of Photographs.-- Finished prints are de­ livered by 10th Photo Group to the Third Army Photo Center (located on the same field) which is responsible for dis­ tribution to all Army units. This is accomplished by ground and air courier. f. Appreciation of Effectiveness of Air Reconnaissance in Close Cooperation.— See paragraph 13 in this report, also special XIX TAC report "Reconnaissance in a Tactical Air Com­ mand" and comment on XIX TAC reconnaissance by General George 3. Patton, Jr. in Annex 8. UNCUSSlFlfO ION IV. OPERATIONS

21. Factors Influencing the Conduct of Air Operations.

a. Amount of Close Air Cooperation Varies witfo flate of Advance.— The amount of close cooperation rendered to ground forces is directly proportional to the speed of the advance. In working with rapidly moving armored columns, very close-in obstacles to the advance of the aimor are proper fighter-bomber targets, since moving up artillery and encircling the local defense would be too cosily in time. In a stabilized situation, artillery has opportunity to move up and should take on the majority of targets within artil­ lery range. The maximum air effort can thus be devoted to the maintenance of air superiority and to isolation of the battlefield in preparation for the next offensive phase. (1) Strong Fixed Fortifications Are Improper Targets for Fighter-Bomber Attack.— The experience of this Command has demonstrated clearly that employment of fighter- bombers against strong fixed fortifications such as those of BREST and &ETZ is relatively ineffective. Far greater destruction and loss can be inflicted upon the enemy by em­ ploying these aircraft against proper fighter-bomber tar­ gets, such as troops, transport, and materiel on the move, supply depots and lines of communication. An example was the series of fighter-bomber attacks on enemy forces south of the LOIRE in early September 1944. These attacks culmi­ nated in the surrender of a major general and his 20,000 troops which had been cut off from escape into GERLANY through the closing gap between the Third and Seventh US Armies." The fruits of the program of interdiction and harassment would have been considerably larger had it not been interrupted "by concentration of the fighter-bomber effort at BREST as a result of the pressure for more and more air in the assault on that strongly fortified port. b. Climate and Weather*— After several weeks of ex­ ceptionally good weather for air cooperation, an abrupt change occurred in the latter part of Sfeptember, and fighter- bomber activities decreased sharply. November had 30 per­ cent more rain than normal, and in January 1945 more snow fell than in any January for 175 years. Even though the weather conditions have been generally worse than normal since September, except for the latter half of December, the scale of fighter-bomber operations during the nine months^ from 1 August through.30 April has, with equalled or surpassed the mean pfOBjftMT I'M?? 4 eight years (1931-1938) of historical maps. The one excep­ tion was November. (1) Minimum Weather for Operations.-- Our opera­ tions norirally require at least a 3,OCO-foot ceiling with broken cloud and three miles visibility. In cases of great urgency our fighter-bombers have operated when ceilings over target areas were down to 1,500 or 1,000 feet. For take-off from base, minimum conditions are 1,000-foot ceiling and three miles visibility.

(2) Increase in Aircraft Strength in Winter is Recommended.— In spite of winter weather which decreased our operational rate, the flow of reinforcement aircraft has been inadequate to maintain groups at full strength. It is recommended that a constant flow of 20 percent per month of unit equipment aircraft be given to units in combat, and that the aircraft strength in combat groups be permitted to go to 100 airplanes per group in the winter. Under conditions of restricted operations, the maintenance and flying personnel can efficiently operate this number of airplanes, with the result that a greater effort can be put forth when weather conditions permit operations. (a) One important factor is ferrying of re­ inforcement aircraft. Weather has definitely caused erratic delivery of reinforcement aircraft from Base Depots* Assem­ bly points have been closed in for periods of two to three weeks. As a result, the tactical groups drop far below auth­ orized strength in aircraft with a proportional drop in the weight and effectiveness of fighter-bomber operations. (b) Fall and winter weather conditions have been such that the number of days when tactical groups can operate has been reduced by as much as 50 percent at certain times and in certain localities. To take full advantage of the limited number of flyable days, every available aircraft is used. Accepting the fact that targets are available (and this has been proved in operations on the Continent), an increase of 25 percent in the number of aircraft per group would allow a 25 percent increase in sorties against the enemy. (c) Aircraft maintenance increases by 20 to 30 percent during winter months because of added inspections and winterization precautions on aircraft and because of the effect of cold weather upon the working conditions of the ground crews. Thus the turnover of aircraft from first and second-echelon maintenance is increased considerably, with the result that fewer aircraft are available for operations. The number of aircraft out for maintenance in squadrons and UNCLASSIFIED service teams has Mich as fifty percent. By increasing the allocation of aircraft during winter months, units would be enabled to concentrate on the minor maintenance items during days when groups can operate and leave third-echelon maintenance for relatively slack periods during bad weather. (d) This recommended increase is not the answer to all the difficulties encountered in winter oper­ ations, but by compensating for the handicaps of cold-weather operation it will make possible the maintenance of a maximum air effort even under these difficult conditions.

c. Location and Condition of Airfields.— Although our operations were curtailed by the coming of fall and winter, with shorter days and relatively poor flying weather, we were able to compensate for this to some extent by bringing our bases closer to the front, thus cutting approximately in half the time required for a mission. In the long days and fine weather of August and early September the Army's advance had been so rapid that preparation of new fields and movement of groups could not keep pace. Another factor had been the necessity of operating simultaneously on fronts as far apart as BREST, on the ATLANTIC COAST, and InETZ, on the MOSELLE. The fall of BREST and the more stable conditions of autumn enabled us to move our groups well forward, thus increasing the number of missions flown in the limited hours of daylight and good weather available. (1) Hessian Strip Impractical in Winter.— Con­ struction and use of Prepared Hessian Strip airfields proved highly successful in the summer but impracticable in weather involving excessive rain, snow and frozen ground* For the latter conditions, Pierced Steel Plank was used and is re- commended# (a) Through the efforts of the IX Engineer Command and the 2nd Engineer Aviation Brigade (Prov), 29 airfields were constructed or rehabilitated for this Command during its first 6 months of operations; 4 old German con­ crete strips, 3 sod fields, 11 of Prepared Hessian Strip, 5 of pierced Steel Plank, and 6 of Square Mesh Track.

1 During the period of good weather, the PES strips, 5,000 feet long by 120 feet wide, were ideal, giving us a firm smooth runway, relatively free from dust dnd water-proof immediately after a rain. 2 In the summer, by use of PHS, we found it possible to occupy %.field in approximately ten days from the time the Engineers first -started work* A

a m e I!•' '1 i ' UflCUSSWEft field could then be called operational t3tpo4|iqpm| the runway and a taxi-way on one side of the iPiieidl planes could be parked on the sod without hardstandfe^ 3 In addition, some excellent sod fields were found and operation from them could be started in a couple of days by merely protecting the sod with a runway of Square Mesh Track. 4 As the rains of October came, more and more difficulty was experienced with PHS strips. Grad­ ing and compaction of soil was hampered by the rains, and the laying of the PIS was often held up waiting for the earth to become sufficiently dry. The PIS surface is es­ sentially a watertight roof laid over a prepared base to keep this base dry. As long as the roof remained intact the runway was good. When this roof cracked, soft spots would develop. It was therefore a constant problem of re­ pair, and Engineer Maintenance Crews were assigned to each field to accomplish this. 5 As the rains increased and the ground became soft, airfields could be considered operational only after the runway, taxiways, and a sufficient number of hard- stands had been constructed. It became more and more ap­ parent that the construction of an airfield was more than just the preparation of a runway. Too much emphasis cannot be placed on the necessity of having complete and all- weather taxi tracks, hardstands, and service roads. 6* The continued rains, snow, and mud conditions of October, November, and December forced the adoption of PSP as the standard runway. Other than the few good concrete strips in use, the PSP is the only type of surfacing found practical under the adverse weather condi­ tions; even then, a rock base had to be placed under the plank. 7 Weather conditions forced the aban­ doning of six airfields. Three of these were sod or a com­ bination of sod and SMT and three were PHS. Unexpected ad­ verse weather conditions held up the forward movement to four PHS fields. d* Terrain.— Terrain was a particularly important factor during the intensive winter operations over the rugged ARDENNES country of BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG and the EIFFEL region to the east in GERMANY. Deep valleys, steep slopes and peaks often hidden by fog or veiled by poor vi­ sibility made operations especially difficult and hazar­ dous for fighter-bombers, reconnaiss®nee/kii^raft and night

- 39 - If>jrj <*c*ocJ* m I »i u Lb v». irNCUSSIFIEO fighters alike, often operating at low altitudes on vital missions in the Battle of the Bulge which followed the Ger­ man breakthrough. Winter conditions of snow-covered ground and limited visibilities greatly increased the difficulties of navigation, orientation and recognition of activity on the ground. This in turn necessitated closer control and greater care in briefing in order to prevent accidental at­ tacks on friendly installations and to permit fighter-bombers to reach their targets with the minimum delay.

e. Bombline Location.-- The Army*s G-3 (Air) determines the bombline in accordance with his intimate knowledge of the fluctuations of the front lines and of future intentions. This responsibility is fixed at the Army-TAC level, where, however, specific recommendations from divisions and corps affecting bombline changes on their fronts are universally honored, so long as they can be suitably integrated with the combined Army-TAC plan. Close contact with the G-3 (Air) of Army Group-Air Force permits continued tie-in with the bomb- lines of armies on the flanks. Bombline changes are dissem­ inated from Army-TAC headquarters to subordinate air units to include groups, and ground units to include corps, and to the Army Group-Air Force headquarters; normal means of transmission being teletype. (1) No arbitrary rule prevails here as to how far ahead of frontline elements the bombline should be lo­ cated, the decision in each case being made in the light of existing tactical situations, air and ground. Aircraft are forbidden to attack targets within the bombline, except when they are working with a Tactical Air Liaison ground control station directly on the front of the unit to which that station is assigned. This exception is frequent, a high degree of co-ordination between Tactical Air Liaison Officers and G-3 (Air) of combat elements permitting a great deal of immediate direction of air attack upon tar­ gets of opportunity inside the bombline without danger to friendly troops, and without the necessity of the time- consuming and more ponderous mechanics of changing the bombline. This, system has worked most successfully. (2) For fighter-bombers not working with such a ground-control station, experience indicates that a safety distance of 600 yards or more should separate frontline and bombline, although for special situations this can be re­ duced to 100 yards, especially where ground troops and air­ craft are used to operating together. When a ground con­ trol station is directing aircraft, discretion of the TALO and flight leader is the only limiting factor. In fast- moving situations, bomblines are often prescribed 5 to 35 miles ahead of known front positions. For medium bomber fiM"• f *ffT"W cooperation, a minimum of TCT^REiJeS and bombline is generally cons fthe minimums are 3,500 yards (daylight) !d#kni " f. Flak. (1) Complete photo coverage, with ground source reports, visual reconnaissance and air crew experience, afford adequate flak intelligence which is carefully cata­ logued and indexed by the Command A-2 Flak Section. (2) All proposed targets are carefully screened for flak before acceptance. When plans are completed, de- - tailed flak information on all targets to be attacked is sent to units concerned via teletype. This information in­ cludes coordinates of all flak in the target area, notes neighboring flak concentrations to be avoided and recom­ mends courses into and out of the target area. Since flak constitutes the major threat to successful attack by fighter- bombers, these recommended courses are generally flown. (3) Where the nature of a flak defense dictates, attempts are made to neutralize the most important gun po­ sitions. This neutralization may be accomplished by use of. frag bombs, white phosphorus, strafing or a combination of these methods. When attacks are made on front line enemy targets, counterbattery fire against flak positions is al­ ways provided by Army artillery.

See SOP, Annex 9 . 22. Procedure for Mutual Air-Ground Situation Briefing and Operating pianqjpg. a. Contact Between Commanders.— It is the policy of the Commanding General to keep his Advance Headquarters adjacent to the Advance Headquarters of the Army. This makes close daily contact between commanders and their staffs most practical. The Commanding General and Chief of Staff, plus certain other members of the staff, attend the daily briefing at Army Headquarters and, in turn, members of the Ground Commander's Staff attend the Air Commander's briefing held each evening. This, plus the fact that mem­ bers pf the G-2 and G-3 section of the Army are on duty in the Headquarters, makes possible a full exchange of infor­ mation. b. Joint Staff Planning.— The Army and kir Comman­ ders, prior to each major operation, hold a conference at which all interested staff sections are present. Such con­ ferences are usually followed by a series of meetings be­ tween the Army G-3 and G-2 andgthe CcfSmapfl A-3 and #»•£« at „ . *r* - 41 i •* «r n ^ 8 f** I If* 1*1 i^^iiyu^ a.j-4# which the basic details of the Army-Air plan are evolved. By this means the Air Commander and his staff have full knowledge of Army plans, intentions and capabilities. with this information and background the Air Commander, in con­ sultation with his staff, determines the type, amount and technique of air effort best suited to assist the Army to reach its objectives. ¥o ground plan, either at Corps or Army Headquarters, is prepared without an air plan. The requirements of the ground forces are evaluated from an airman's point of view and a plan drawn up for approval by the Air Commander. Usually, higher Air Headquarters will indicate what priority this particular ground plan holds. This aids in estimating what additional air effort may be expected. In almost every case a ground plan will be so developed as to permit sufficient flexibility of "H" hour and "DH day to insure Air participation. c» Armv Information to Air Force Units.— Close co­ operation and exchange of information at Command and Army level are achieved through the Army G-2 (Air) and G-3 (Air) staff sections, which maintain representatives in the Com­ bined Operations Section at Command Headquarters. From these sources the Command receives information concerning the enemy and the progress and disposition of friendly forces. This information reaches the Command through the various routine and special reports prepared by G-2 and G-3. Urgent or special information is automatically dis­ seminated to the appropriate staff sections by the most expeditious means, usually telephone or teletype. Army in­ formation is distributed to tactical air units through the Ground liaison officers (GLO) attached to each fighter- bomber group, Tac/R and P/R squadron and the Tactical Con­ trol Group. Such information is essential if tactical air units are to possess an understanding of the current ground situation and realize the significance of the part they play in the general plan. d. Air Information to Armv Units.— Information ob­ tained by tactical air units is transmitted to higher headquarters through two channels. The Army GLO attends the interrogation of pilots returning from combat missions and transmits pertinent information- of interest to the Army through the GLO communications net. The complete interrogation report prepared by the unit S-2 is transmitted by telephone to Command where it is immediately distribu­ ted to all interested agencies including G-2 (A) and G-3 (A) who then disseminate it to the appropriate Army units. Army Group has attached to Command a GLO who is responsible for the collection and transmission of significant information of interest to Army Group. UNCIASSIF

e. Command Briefin? and Planning? Conferences evening a briefing and planning conference is held in XIX TAC Combined Operations" for the Commanding General and his principal staff officers. Information obtained during the past 24 hours is presented and evaluated, and the results of air action and the progress of ground forces are pre­ sented by representatives of the following sections: Wea­ ther, G-2 (Air), A-2, A-2 Recce, G-3 (Air), A-3. Base

23. Planning of Close Air Cooperation.

a. Static Situation.— As stated elsewhere in this report, the ground situation very definitely affects the planning of close cooperation. In a static situation, ground forces are able to bring up artillery which can be brought to bear on the majority of targets that would other­ wise be assigned F/B in a mobile situation. In such a sit­ uation very little of the available force is placed in close cooperation with ground elements, the greater part being assigned missions of the counter-air-force or isolation type. (See Field Orders for 4 November and 1 December in Annex 10 .)

b. Assault*— The air plan for a large-scale ground offensive generally includes the employment of heavy and/or medium bombers to attack the most formidable defensive po­ sitions facing our forces. In furtherance of this, fighter- bombers are assigned such missions as attacks on CPs, re­ connaissance of all roads and rails in the battle area, and air alert to attack targets requested by ground units launching the attack. (See Field Order for 8 November in Annex 2 .,) In addition, a certain small part of the fighter-Domoer force available must be employed in afford­ ing area cover for the bombardment force attacking.

c. Fluid Situation.— In a fluid situation, first consideration is given to covering the armored spearheads and the roads in their immediate front. Secondly, the entire battle area is covered by armed reconnaissance flights attacking all road or rail movement. Flexibility of plans and close control are oif*p4'ra&oyr&^a^oritance in this type of operation, since aIf INP6^f f|

1 i'M * t< %} «\ 5./ be brought to bear against any buildup of resistance that is discovered. (see Field Orders for 1 August, 15 August, 10 September, 25 December and 22 January in Annex 11)«

24. Conduct of Tactical Operations. a. Briefing.— Upon receipt of the field order, which assigns each group a specific mission, or missions, the group commander in turn assigns each squadron a specific task. All squadrons are briefed approximately one hour, wherever possible, before time to start engines. The in­ formation given to all pilots on a specific mission in­ cludes the front lines and the bombline of friendly ground troops in the area they are briefed to fly over. At this time, also, they are given all available flak information, number and type of flak installations known, weather data, enemy aircraft defense zones and airdromes, and any other intelligence information pertinent to the success of the mission. If a specific target is assigned, photographs and detailed maps are studied. It is of the utmost importance that each pilot on the mission knows thoroughly the assigned job. b. Take-off Procedure.— Each group commander has placed upon the squadron commanders the responsibility of having the pilots briefed and in the aircraft in sufficient time to check the planes* preparedness to perform the mis­ sion. At an established time, the engines are started and power checked. It is important thart the aircraft move from the dispersal point to the take-off point in prearranged order, as this prevents confusion at the end of the runway and greatly facilitates assembly in the air. The squadron leader is the first to take off, followed by the remainder of his flight, the other flight leaders and their flights. It has been found that a flagman stationed at the take-off point is highly desirable in order to synchronize the take­ off at approximately 20 to 30 second intervals. Owing to the restricted forward visibility of the P-47 type aircraft, the flagman is also valuable to halt the take-off of follow­ ing aircraft if a belly-tank or bomb falls off the preceding plane, or in the case of an aircraft accident. c. Assembly Procedure.— Time allotted for the assem­ bly of the squadron, from take-off to "set course", is usually ten to twelve minutes, depending upon the number of aircraft. As each flight becomes airborne, the flight formation is formed as quickly as possible and climb§ ,,tjo 1500 to 2,000 feet altitude, unless the weather s*'ifria1Sipn prevents this altitude. Wher}, the and is ready to set course, t|jjInildBhtSls

- •*' * - 44 - IWCIASSIF Wm fcliaWr'MK•.* the fact over the R/T, and the Hlights move into posltrion of line abreast by flights for the climb-out to the alti­ tude at which the mission is to be flown.

d» Formations.— The basic formation used by all groups is the two-plane element. Under no circumstances should there ever be less than two aircraft covering one another. While over enemy territory or subject to attack, the two aircraft fly in mutual support; that is, in line abreast and at a good turning radius apart. This basic formation is used for all types of missions. The four- plane flight is the foundation formation for squadron or group missions, and comprises a part of the whole.

LINE ABREAST

C

T T T T T T T

Battle formation is a modified line abreast. No. 2 air­ craft on No. 1 aircraft's wing is on the opposite side from the second element. Distance between the airplanes is about 200 to 300 yards, or one turning radius apart. Elements are free to cross over whenever it is necessary and the wingiren cross whenever the element does. The success of the forma­ tion depends upon the pilot's ability to work with the others. No set rule is laid down except that all airplanes must keep up with the leader and be in the best position to cover each other, and at the same time be able to initiate an attack* BATTLE FORMATION

B 1 2 1 2 1 2 T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T IITI T T T T

3 4 3 4 3 4 T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T T

Flights 3 and 4 in Squadron "A", ttBH, and "CM are 2,000 feet behind and 1,000 feet above flights 1 and 2.

e. Strafing.— Ground strafing has become one of the most important aspects of the role of the fighter-bomber. The toll taken of enemy transport by strafing has been far beyond the highest expectations. This is largely due to the tremendous firepower of the P-47 and its rugged construction, and to the skill and aggressiveness of the pilots. Methods •#>!• s-p,ft!nr iffiH. ft •?$ ya» $» H $• u i i of attack are determined by the types of targets presented^ and the defense of these targets by anti-aircraft artillery. The following methods of attack, on different types of tar­ gets, are used by one of the fighter-bomber groups and coin­ cide with the opinions of the other groups: (1) Targets with Unknown Defense.— Targets of opportunity, the defense of which is unknown, are attacked by the leading flight in line abreast. On order from the squadron leader, after a pass the remaining flights will attack in trail if target is undefended or lightly defen­ ded, by flights line abreast in trail if moderately or heavily defended. (2) Targets Known to Have Little or no Defense.— These are attacked by flights in trail, the degree of dive varying from 20 degrees to 40 degrees, with each aircraft firing a short burst at the most effective range of 300 yards. (3) Heavily Defended Targets.— These are attacked frorr tree-top level, after a study of the terrain, by flights in line abreast. Flights are sometimes directed to a target from an aircraft which remains at altitude and spots the at­ tacking flights on the deck, informing them of their course and position to the target, thus lessening the danger of being exposed as is the usual case during on-the-deck at­ tacks. (4) Railroad Trains.— Attacks are made on the engine first, to stop the train, after which the remaining sections are attacked, depending upon the character of the train. Attacks are from the side and rarely along the train's route. In the case of freight trains the attack continues from the side, whereas against troop trains, once the train has stopped, attention is usually directed to gullies and points along the side of the railroad tracks in which troops could conceal themselves. (5) Road Convovs.— Attacks are made against convoye at the head, if practicable, thus blocking the high­ way, after which the convoy is worked over. It must be borne in mind that on each pass the aircraft should not spray the area but concentrate on one vehicle at a time, effectively destroying it. (6) Withdrawal.— The withdrawal following a strafing attack is of prime importance, for it is during this tiir.e that the aircraft is most vulnerable. T] tack is followed through with a wj^hjdrafval flejj taking cover behind buildings, §:ee|js^ "l|Llg.if - 46 " MClWWt to block the view of the target defenses. If no screen is available, erratic weaving and bobbing at deck level proves the most effective evasion. After the initial attack, it can be ascertained whether an on-the-deck attack is most suitable, or, if not, the flight can reform and climb for an attack from altitude. f. Air-Ground Cooperation*— This type of mission has comprised the bulk of the work done by the groups. The suc­ cess of such a mission depends upon the knowledge each of the two parties has of the other's work, and the teamwork that each displays* It has been found that a 12-plane for­ mation, with two flights bombed up and the third flight acting as top cover, is a very effective force. However, if the range to the front lines is short and enemy air ac­ tivity is at a low ebb, four-plane flights enable ground units to have continuous air cover, which may be used to great advantage, especially when the unit is on the move. A line-abreast battle formation is flown on the way to the target. The first two flights are lined and the third flight, which is furnishing top cover, is down sun and 1500 feet higher. Prior to the bomb run, flights close to -a loose MVM formation which enables them to bomb faster. Flight leaders use the sun to advantage wherever possible. It is very difficult for squadron and flight leaders to brief just prior to the bomb run and for other attacks that will come during the mission. For this reason, R/T disci­ pline is essential in order that the flight leader can line up the target with the. ground controller and decide upon the attack while over the target. Depending upon the size of the target, the leader will dispatch airplanes indivi­ dually, by elements or flights. The terrain is also con­ sidered in planning the direction and angle of dive of the bomb-run. Bomb-runs, with a 90-degree or 180-degree turn into the targets, are usually started at about 8,000 feet and the pull-out started at about 1500 feet. The angle of dive most commonly used is between 30 degrees and 50 de­ grees, with direction either parallel to the front line or over the top of friendly troops in the direction of the enemy. It is important that the flight reform rapidly so that the squadron leader may assign a flight a strafing target without any time being wasted. g. Air-to-Air Encounter.— The success of air-to-air encounter depends upon alert flying, constant visual sweep of the air ahead, to the rear, and on the flanks of the formation, level with it, above, and below, and aggressive­ ness in the attack. The iron law of a flight is that the element will be maintained, for the lone bird is the dead bird. The enemy attack is turned into on each occasion, for, on the whole, if the >'enemWug altitude and surprise

4 I!Iff!1 jitwirn ' M * I* .. v' ' ' f'fT-fV5S •: .J ' II\\'$ £*.f f* I I $ %i? '$*£• '& S ItiJ m his favor he usually makes one attack followed by quick withdrawal toward the deck. Attack against enemy aircraft has been made from almost all points of the clock, from above, and up from below the enemy formation, but the most favorable position is from its rear. When a turning scrap ensues, the element is still maintained. The element lead­ er's job is to attack, and the wingman's responsibility is to afford his leader protection while he concentrates on the enemy's destruction, It has been found that elements, flights, and squadrons can attack vastly superior numbers of enemy aircraft when the air discipline of "no less than two together" is maintained. Attacks have succeeded through altitude, sun's position, and speed, seasoned with an eager­ ness to mix it up. A bounce is quick, decisive and thor­ ough, and with superior speed to permit recovery by climb­ ing to maintain the advantage of position. At the increased speed from altitude, a turn with the attacked aircraft is impractical. The advantage of turn can be made on the second bounce when the aggressiveness of the enemy is cased. h. Escort Procedure.-- Escort missions assigned to the groups usually call for close cover. Interpretation of close cover places the escort approximately 2,000 feet above the bombers and on both sides, with flights leading the first box and trailing the last. The 16-ship forma­ tion has been found most successful in performing escort missions. Upon reaching the bombers, the flights take up their assigned position in reference to the boxes of bomb­ ers, two flights on the right and two on the left in a modified line-abreast formation. The flights on either side are in trail so that both front and rear boxes are covered. Flights on the down-sun side are kept one to two* thousand feet above those on the up-sun side. While per­ forming close escort, sticking with the bombers is stressed* and investigating "bogies" is limited to those in the im­ mediate vicinity and those flying an intersecting course. When investigation is deemed necessary by the squadron leader, instructions are given over the R/T and one flight is dispatched for the purpose. In all other instances, unless actually attacked by enemy aircraft, all ships re­ main with the bombers. i. Ascent. Descent Through Overcast.— This type of procedure is approximately the same for all fighter-bomber groups inasmuch as all attempt to keep the flights together and ascend, in so far as possible, as a unit. The differ­ ences in the time element involved are the only variations in procedure. The following method is typical of the pro­ cedure used by all groupss "Squadron ascent throu£fiti|a> jovircJjs1^|i^^ plished by flights. When it is

- 48 - squadron will go up through an overcast, the squadron leader gives ample warning following which flights tighten up with­ in flights and spread out by flights, each flight staying on course. When through the overcast the normal formation is resumed. If a wingnan or element loses the flight leader during the ascent, he levels off for one minute and then re­ sumes his climb. The climb is usually flown at 200 i*PH 500'/Min. In the descent, the procedure for the flights is the same as for ascent. Ten degrees of flaps are usually dropped prior to entering the clouds as this gives greater stability at the increased speed, which is usually maintained at 250 fcPH indicated and lOOO'/Min. descent." 25. Evaluation of Results.

a. Accurate evaluation of the results of fighter- bomber ground claims is a problem of which this Command has been conscious since the start of its operations. The dif­ ficulty of compiling such claims accurately in view of the high speed of our aircraft, the short time pilots are over targets, the impossibility of readily distinguishing be­ tween tanks, self-propelled guns and other types of armored vehicles from the air, has been understood and every effort made to overcome it. b. The measures taken'by this Command to insure the greatest possible accuracy in reporting claims include the following: (1) Issuance of Ninth Air Force directive on subject of ground claims to all units. (2) Issuance of Command directive further de­ fining official basis for claims of tanks and armored ve­ hicles and other ground targets. (3) Thorough indoctrination of Group and Squad­ ron S-2s with the requirements of the above directives as well as their responsibility for insuring a similar indoc­ trination of all pilots and an adherence to conditions of directive on ground claims. (4) Constant check by Duty Intelligence Officers during receipt of Opflashes on validity of ground claims. (5) CarefUl review of basis for ground claims with Group and Squadron S-2s by Staff Intelligence Officers who visit subordinate units at frequent intervals. c. This Command has made contfi&pl.^attempts to check the accuracy of claims, but the aval.# uation are subject to certain inhe*®ty

'Iff 'V .7 O ! ti • uV.'ClA"$,'F!Ff) limitations which have made conclusive results impossible to obtain as yet. (1) Ground observation is unable to determine, in all cases, whether destruction or damage to tanks has been caused by air action, ground action, or demolition by the enemy because of shortage of fuel or mechanical failure. Furthermore, the enemy salvage and reclamation system has been very effective in many instances, further limiting the reliability of ground observation. (2) The credibility of P/W statements is doubt­ ful and, although a thorough study has been made of all available P/W reports of the effect of air action, so many discrepancies have existed that again neither conclusive proof nor disproof of claims has been forthcoming. (3) Gun camera photography is also inadequate, since targets are generally in gun sights for so short a time that unless an immediate explosion or flame results, damage or destruction which may eventually result will not be apparent. (4) The use of liaison type aircraft to obtain results of air attack is subject to many limitations. Enemy flak usually prohibit this type aircraft from flying very far beyond the front lines or over major installations at an altitude from which accurate visual observation can be made. (5) Tac/R and P/R aircraft have been employed to check the accuracy of pilot claims. In the case of fixed installations, bomb damage photographs provide accurate evidence upon which to evaluate pilots' claims, .tfith the exception of the BDA photographs taken under unusual cir-. cumstances, such as during the German attampt to move large convoys during daylight south of the LOIRE RIVER, in the ARD&ME3 salient and the 5AAR-MOSELLE-RHINE triangle, no attempt has been made to check pilot's claims of I'/T, ar­ mored vehicles and such targets by means of photographs. Where such photographs have been available they indicate pilot claims to be reasonably-accurate. d. Until fighter-bomber aircraft are equipped with suitable cameras so they can take "strike photographs", the problem of assessing the accuracy of pilots' ground claims will remain unsolved. UNCLASSIE SECTION MAJOR JOINT AIR-GROUND OPERATIONS INVOLVING' 26. Detailed Description of Ma.ior Operations* a* Introduction.-- XIX Tactical Air Command and Third US Army became operational on the Continent simultaneously on 1 August 1944. Their subsequent operations fall into • nine phases with respect to tactical employment of aircraft. These are as follows: (1) The drive across FRANCE, including the re­ duction of BREST and the liquidation of enemy forces south of the LOIRE (1 August to 18 September 1944). (2) The buildup along the MOSELLE RIV^iR (18 September to 8 November). (3) The envelopment of METZ and the advance to the SIEGFRIED LINE (8 November to 1 December). (4) Attacking the SIEGFRIED LINE (1 pecember to 20 December). (5) Reduction of the ARDENNES Salient (20 De­ cember to 22 January 1945). (6) The drive from LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM to the RHINE (22 January 1945 to 13 March 1945). (7) Springing of the SAAR-MOSELLE-RHINE trap (13 March to 23 March). (8) The campaign east of the UH1NE (23 March to 22 April). (9) The final Assault through bAVARIA into AUbTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA (22 April to 9 May). b. Operations Involving Long-range Planning.—Because of the rapidity of the advance of Third Army during the ma­ jority of the phases listed above, conditions were rarely such as to require or permit the preparation of elaborate pre-planned air-ground operations. Exceptions were the relatively stable conditions which preceded the envelopment and capture of METZ in November 1944 (See Operation "Madi­ son", Annex 2 ) and the assault on the SIEGFRIED LINE in December (Operation "Tink", Annex 3 ). Operation "Madison" was successfully carried out, but "Tink" was forestalled by Rundstedt's ARDENNES offensive against First US Army's VIII Corps shortly before the Third Army - XIX TAC operation was planned to begin. These specialoperations will be dis­ cussed at the appropriate pointsfliTi^Ul^ following account of close air cooperation during the various phases. It will be noted that in each case the employment was adapted to the ground situation which prevailed during the period. c. Description of Operations. (1) The Drive across France (1 August - 18 Sep­ tember)»— On 1 August the units of the Third U3 Army were streaming down through AVRANCEES, FRANCE, and turning west, south and east. Infantry units were moving as rapidly as possible behind the armored spearheads, consolidating gains. The VIII Corps went westward toward BREST while the XII and XV Corps went south and then east. By 15 September elements of the Third Army reached from BREST to NANCY, a distance of 500 miles. At the beginning of operations this Command was assigned five fighter-bomber Groups. By 10 August nine fighter-bomber groups and one reconnaissance group were assigned. All these groups were based on or near the CHERBOURG PENINSULA. As the campaign moved eastward airdromes were made available, so that by the tine the Army reached the fc-OSELLE most groups were within reasonable operating range of the front lines. In the planning of operations the following considera­ tions affected the employment of our fighter-bombers* (a) Weather. (b) Communications. (c) The type of Aircraft (P-47s or P-51s). (d) The supply status at each airdrome. (e) Current activity of the German Air Force. (f) Directives of higher Headquarters (escort, special targets, etc). (g) Distance of front lines from airdromes. During this phase the weather was not a major factor. While some bad weather was experienced, in the majority of cases operations could be maintained by flying around ra­ pidly moving rain squalls. Communications presented a major problem. As this Headquarters moved forward rapidly, every known means of communication was pressedfinto service. Spiral four, open wire, field wire, existing underground ( _ often necessary to complete one circuit. •' ^ f < Because of the difference in the operating range^ ^or &4* P-47 and the P-51, also their bomb-carrying capacity, the latter type was used, almost exclusively, for long-range fighter sweeps and attacks against lightly defended targets. The size of our formations, and often the number in each formation carrying bombs, was affected by the current acti­ vity of the German Air Force. Another factor that affected our planning was the direc­ tives received from higher headquarters. Often formations of medium or heavy bombers attacking targets in our area of re­ sponsibility required either close escort or area cover. Also, targets such as bridges, supply dumps, etc., were often included in the directives from higher headquarters. One of the most important factors to be considered was the relation of our airdromes to the front-line units. Ey assigning a task to the squadron closest to the line, les.s time was spent flying to and returning from the mission. A longer period could be spent in the target area, and there­ fore either more flights or longer coverage could be afford­ ed. This was particularly important in furnishing cover to the arirored spearheads. •V'ith these considerations the plan for the employment of fighter-bombers in cooperation with the Third Army was reached each night. First priority was the cover to the armored units. This normally comprised a.flight of four to eight aircraft maintaining a constant patrol ever the lead­ ing elements• Through our VHF equipment and our representative with that ground unit, continuous air-ground communications were established. The cover flights checked in with the ground radio upon approaching, to ask for any targets that might be attacked; then they ranged on ahead, scouting along the axis of advance and out to the side roads for any defenses that might slow or stop the forward movement of the column. On occasion, the flight leader asked the leading tank oo back up a few yards so that the aircraft could bomb a tank dug in along the side of a road in ambush or the planes bombed buildings containing hidden anti-tank guns, under the direction of our liaison officer in one of the leading tanks. Such instances attest to the perfect coordination that was necessary, and that existed, between the air and ground elements. UNCLASSIFIES - UNClASSfflfl)

(a) Protection of the LOIRE Flank.— As the VIII Corps moved in on BREST the rest of the Third Army cut south to the LOIRE and east to the SEINE River. General Patton delegated to this Command the responsibility of guarding his flank along the LOIRE while his tank columns continued the drive to the east. This is the first time that an Army flank of 400 miles has been protected by air. After a thorough recce of this with fighter-bombers once each day, tactical reconnaissance was given the responsi­ bility of surveillance of the territory south of the river. Whenever any activity was sighted in the area, fighter- bombers were immediately dispatched to attack. The effectiveness of our fighter-bomber attacks on enemy columns in this part of FRANCE is indicated by terms on which the German General Botho Elster agreed to surren­ der his twenty thousand troops. "Keep the 'Jabor off my men," he said in effect, "and they will march north to the BEAUGikCY Eridge and surrender." His decision followed fighter-bomber destruction of German columns in the area on the 1st and 7th of September and constant harrying by French Forces of the Interior. In addition to "column cover", armed recce flights as far as the RHINE River were conducted, scouting for and destroying rail and road movements in advance of the Army. These flights were generally of squadron strength, each air­ craft loaded with two 500-lb GP bombs. Few specific targets such as supply dumps were attacked, since the enemy had been so routed and our elements were moving forward so rapidly that they proved unprofitable targets. The German Air Force reaction was spasmodic. Their movement east was disrupted on several occasions when our aircraft caught them assembling for take-off to German bases. Because of the distance from our bases to targets in the final weeks of this phase it was necessary to use newly captured airdromes for "roulemont" operations. The two air­ drome squadrons assigned to this Command at that time were placed on the most advanced strips where our aircraft could land for service en route to base,. This appreciably exten­ ded the operating range and only with this facility could we have covered two fronts 500 miles apart. (b) Effect upon Progress of Attack.— During this phase the Third Army G-3 (Air) repeatedly reported that progress of the ground attack on all divisional fronts was materially aided by attacks on all types of targets, from boats to field guns. UNCLASSIFIED

In some cases our fighter-bomber pilots, srtfeiFSffcrafing motor transport and horse-dravm vehicles, observed white flags being displayed by the enemy as US troops closed in on the decimated columns. Another indication of the effectiveness of these opera­ tions was the use of US-type red panels by the Germans in an effort to prevent attack. Still another indication was an attempt by the Germans to send our squadrons astray by using our call-signs. A slight German accent aroused suspicion and one of our pilots proved the "controller" to be a fake by asking him to sing "Mairzie Doats". The Ger'man could not do so• Five miles northeast of ARGEKTAN, at 1100 hours on 14 August, 300 to 400 enemy soldiers surrendered by waving white flags as 405th Group's 511th Squadron circled. Said a junior officer of 363rd Infantry Division, who surrendered on 13 August: "You have bombed and strafed all the roads, causing complete congestion and traffic jams. You have also destroyed most of our petrol and oil dumps, so there is no future in continuing the fight." On the BREST PENINSULA, the citadel of ST. MALO sur­ rendered on 17 August while Third Army troops and circling P-47s of 53rd Sq, 36th Group, loaded with 500-lb bombs, awaited the answer to an ultimatum. After 35 minutes 83rd Infantry Div radioed the squadron that the invitation had been accepted. A white flag appeared over the citadel and the P-47s came home with their 500-lb persuaders. Frequently, armored columns were seen to move forward after bombing and strafing of anti-tank guns and infantry marked by the ground forces with smoke shells. "Due to the tireless efforts of your flyers," reported the Commanding General of Third Army, "large numbers of hostile vehicles and troop concentrations ahead of our ad­ vancing columns have been harassed or obliterated. The in­ formation passed directly to the head of the columns from the air has saved time and lives." By the end of the first month the ai r-ground team had conquered all of BRITTAiW except three stubborn ports, firmly secured the line of the LOIRE, and swept 140 miles beyond liberated PARIS to within 60 miles of the German border. (c) ReflvQtiQil 0£ BREST.— After an all-out air and ground assault, the port of 11 on 18 September. A call for air and more air had of the UNCLASSIFIED f,?cjnr presence of 31 battalions of artillery, in an effort to re­ duce this highly important seacoast bastion, one of the prin­ cipal harbors of FRANCE and the main port of entry for Ameri­ can fighting men and supplies in the First World rfar. Heavy and medium bombers pounded the strongpoints without much ap­ parent effect* Fighter-bombers circled overhead and attacked all types of targets, from infantrymen dug in along the-hedge­ rows to reinforced concrete pillboxes. Still the enemy held his position tenaciously. Finally, on 3 September, the capture of BREST was made the primary objective of the Ninth Air Force, and a high level decision was made to cover the area with fighter-bombers, in addition to continuing the attacks by bombardment aircraft*- Eight fighter-bomber groups, comprising approximately four hundred planes, were directed to provide air cooperation for the troops assaulting the city. All of these aircraft car­ ried either 500-lb or 1,000-lb GP bombs or NaPalm-filled tanks. This force, under the direction of the Tactical Air Liaison Officers at the Division CP's, attacked every con­ ceivable obstruction to the advance of our forcesj still little progress was made. Additional attacks by heavies and mediums were made on the seacoast batteries and suitable targets in the city proper, while ground forces increased their pressure, and the sky overhead continued to be saturated with fighter- bombers. Slowly the enemy was forced to withdraw into the city limits. In the final phases of the assault, fighter- bombers were directed to attack individual houses which were obstructing progress of the ground attack— in effect, street fighting with P-47s. iVhile this enormous air effort was being concentrated on such a small area, Third Army's eastward-pushing spear­ heads were covered very thinly with fighter-bombers because of the priority to the west- To show the extent of air op­ erations i a field order on 9 September directed our air­ craft to support units attacking BREST and at the same time ordered other groups to conduct armed reconnaissance in the area of SAARBRUCKEN, GERMANY, more than 500 miles to the east.

H»» *f '* *» . * O- :•

- 5' UKCLASSinisa

(2) The Stalemate along the MOSELLE (18® 1944 to 8 November 1944). t

As the Third Army reached the MOSELLE and crossed the MEURTHE at NANCY in mid-September, taking up defensive posi­ tions, the employment of oar fighter-bombers changed consider­ ably. There was no more column cover to be furnished. All ele­ ments of the Army were abreast along a 135 mile front. Bases for our Groups had been developed and occupied so that all Groups were within 50 miles of the front lines.

Weather, during this second phase, became pro­ gressively worse. However, this was offset to some extent by the fact that our Tactical Control Center had now caught up with us and was able to furnish control for bad weather operations that would have been impossible otherwise. Proximity of the bases to the target area permitted short penetration in rela­ tively bad weather.

The German Air Force now was particularly inef­ fective in the Third Army area of operations. Since the ground situation dictated employment of air power in second-phase (interdiction) operations, many missions were flown in support of medium or heavy bombers attacking targets within 100 miles of the front lines, while the preponderance of our fighter-bom­ ber effort was placed on interdiction of rail movement and at­ tacks on supply installations. It was found that rail-cutting was not an effective method of interdiction, since increasing bad weather did not permit our daily policing of the cuts once made. For this reason, bridges suitable for destruction by fighter-bombers were chosen and attacked with moderate success. Here the average squadron comprised 12 aircraft all bombed up with two 500-lb GP bombs.

During this period experimental attacks, using NaPalm, were made against some of the forts surrounding METZ. While the execution of the missions was successful, it was learned that the size of the forts as against the effort placed on them was out of proportion. A direct hit covering one gun might put it out of commission, but the effort of a full group could not be expected to put on a sufficient concentration to neutralize such a large target. Thousand-pound GP and SAP bombs were also tried on this type of target without succe'ss«

Because of the relatively stable ground situa­ tion, the percentage of effort assigned to close cooperation with ground units was much lower than in the previous period. However, in several instances Third Army reported that the figh- ter-bombers were instrumental in breaking up tank counterattacks, notably one in the LANEUYEVILLE-EKr^ULNOIS area east of NANCX UNCLASSIFIED against the 4th Armored Divisions.#Division] % jth| reported that one of our groups destroyed 11 tanks, damaged 2, and contributed to the destruction of 6 others by forcing them oat into the open where artillery could hit them, 'in other instances air attack drove the enemy out of defended towhs, such as WINCHERINGEN, on the east bank of the MOSELLE, and U S troops moved in.

On 8 October 405th Group1s 510th Sq cooperated with the XII Corps in a limited-objective attack east of NANCY, breaking up a projected counterattack by striking a column of enemy ve­ hicles and several troop concentrations. Later, the Corps re­ ported that these fighter-bomber attacks had facilitated the capture of 2,500 prisoners with practically no losses. Priso­ ners stated that their casualties were extremely severe.

One enemy company commander declared the bombing was the worst thing he had experienced in five years of war and that only 20 men in his company had survived. As our troops ad­ vanced through the woods, they found German soldiers hiding be­ hind trees and logs, stunned and unable to offer resistance®

(a) Breaching the DIEUZE Dam.

By the middle of October plans were well under way for breaking the MOSELLE stalemate by a new offensive. An initial limited objective attack would be made by XII Corps in the di­ rection of DIEUZE, southeast of NANCY, to secure suitable posi­ tions and a straightened Corps line for the forthcoming jumpoff.

But one enemy capability in particular had to be considered: Possible demolition of the ETANG DE LINDRE dam, which lay three miles southeast of DIEUZE, controlling a lake approximately six­ teen miles east of the battle line. If the enemy was permitted to demolish the dam while an attack was in progress, the SIILLE Hiver would overflow, inundating the area; forward elements would be completely cut off and the entire Third U S Army advance impeded if not halted®

After considering these facts, XII Corps commanders de­ cided to beat the enemy to the punch and accordingly requested that aircraft accomplish destruction at a decisive moment. The mission was originally planned for heavy bombers, but because of the high degree of precision-required, the assignment was undertaken by P-47's of XIX TAC.

It was planned that just before the dam was breached, one « division, with enough supplies for two weeks, would be pushed across the floodable area without displaying evidence of a major offensive. Engineers would have bridging materials ready, and * ?r--sr*rn UNCIAS after the breaching of the dam a follow-up force would cross to support the division on the other side.

Photo recce missions were flown to obtain information for planning the air attack, and these indicated that the dam was of granite block construction, bolstered by earthworks# Ac­ cordingly, 1,000-lb semi-armor-piercing, as well as general pur­ pose, bombs were usedo Later ground observation proved that the face of the dam was of soft limestone with a twenty-foot earth fill behind} hence GP bombs would have accomplished the job*

Since a large concentration of bombs was'to be dropped on a very small point, each member of the attacking force had to be briefed thoroughly. Every pilot had to see all available photographs and drawings of the target in order to insure max­ imum coordination.

The bombs were to be skipped at fifteen degrees to the tar­ get. Compilation of supplies had been completed; engineers had obtained the necessary bridging equipment, and the air was mar­ shalled for action. On 20 October the Army Commander gave the "go ahead" signal to blow the dam*

The mission was assigned to XIX TAC's 362nd Group. It was the first time Thunderbolts had been given such an assignment and was an experiment to determine the capabilities of fighter- bombers on this type of target® Therefore they were accompanied by recce aircraft to take photos before, during and after the bombing.

The P-47's dived from 7,000 to 100 feet into intense flak dropping their bombs on the dam and then machine-gunning the flak positions. At least six direct hits were scored with 1,000 pound bombs and the damw as breached. The break spread to al­ most 90 feet and flood waters soon were observed pouring over the lowlands and surrounding the town of D1EUZS*

The inundation was so complete and executed at such a de­ cisive moment that many enemy units were trapped and subsequently captured# German tanks were bogged and general mobility of many elements reduced. Prisoners taken afterward reported that some units, moving laterally, were forced to withdraw to the rear areas in order to reach points only a few miles away* The whole German scheme of maneuver in this area had been disrupted.

As a result of this air operation, carried out with no losses, Third U S Ai tive attack which wa ibPp&Pf*!t-r (3) The Envelopment H A , ri 8 T :.'i Advancfe% p "Xvtg ** .•fei' SIEGFRIED LINE (8 November - 1 December)

(a) Operation "Madison"

In preparation for the coming offensive, a detail'ed air plan, Operation "Madison", was prepared jointly with the ground plan# It provided for a large-scale attack by heavy bombers on the most formidable of the forts surrounding ME!fZ, the area bombing of a heavily defended hill overlooking the point of intended crossing of the MOSELLE RIVES, and the attacking of all known CP's by fighter-bombers simultaneously. Fighter-bombers also were to work in close cooperation with advancing elements of the ground forces®

(see Air plan, Field Order and Ops Summary in Annex 2 )

Air crews were provided with complete photo coverage of all targets to be attacked, and for pilots attacking CP-te, enlarge­ ments and sketches were included# To provide a reference point in the air to guide heavy bombers, a "line of flak" was arrang­ ed with Army artillery. This comprised the siting of heavy AA guns so that they could throw up a line of red smoke shells to burst 3»000 feet below the bombardment formation. The barrage was to be maintained during the period of bombing by the heavies. This was in addition to radio marker beacons placed to mark the front lines.

On 8 November the attack jumped off, with fighter-bombers making simultaneous onslaughts on enemy nerve centers as planned and attacking anything that moved or fired back. Particularly successful was an attack on the headquarters of the 17th SS Pan­ zer Division at PELTRE, southeast of METZ. Through various sour­ ces the exact location of the headquarters and the communications center had been obtained, along with details of meal hours, times when the Commanding General held his conference, and the like. These buildings were attacked with 500-lb delay-fuse bombs from zero level and completely destroyed. Information from prisoners later revealed that a number of high-ranking officers were in the CP at the time of attack. Further, it was learned that this disruption greatly affected the organization of any defense against the ground attack. The Division was unable to react as a unit until two weeks later.

Bad weather on 8 November prevented the heavies and mediums from operating as planned. On the following day, however, bom­ bardment formations came over in force, and 1,223 heavy bombers of Eighth Air Force hit targets in the area: 679 on the METZ forts, 47 on the THIONVILLE area, 432 on the SAARBRUCKEN mar­ shalling yard, 34 on SAARLAUTERN, and 31 on targets of oppor­ tunity. IX Bombardment Div dispatched 514 medium bombers, but

- 60 -

> J fir *jr "ii i because of the cloud conditions only 74 attack Weather for the offensive was bad, not only £&on the ground, where heavy rains had turned the MOSELii]#»»g^[ other rivers into torrents swollen far out of their banks.

Although the bombing of the METZ forts by the heavies was non-visual and produced few hits, the ground forces reported that the attack caused reduction of fire from the forts while the by-passing proceeded and that bombs were seen to fall, with high­ ly destructive effect, upon enemy-occupied towns in their path#

(a) The Advance from Village to Village.

The employment of the fighter-bomber now entered a new phase. Mud was knee-deep and the going was slow on the ground. Although tanks as well as infantry were in action, there were no columns of armor racing across the country as in August and September. Road blocks and extensive mining made progress slow, as traffic was confined almost entirely to the roads. Woods had become un­ tenable, and both friendly and enemy troops were concentrated in villages.

At this point a great number of our attacks were against the small villages immediately in front of our advancing troops. Fighter-bomber squadrons loaded with 500-pounders, frag clusters and NaPalm fire bombs attacked these villages one by one, then . strafed any vehicles that were driven out by the attack. Our troops followed up by occupying the town and waited for the at­ tack on the next small village.

Bomb loading found to be very effective at this stage was as follows for a 12-plane squadron: four aircraft loaded with two 500-lb GP bombs, four with frags and four with fire bombs, The flights attacked in that order. The GP bombs served to open up the houses, the frags to cause casualties among those driven into the open, and the NaPalm to set fire to combustible material exposed by the GP bombs. This combination worked quite success­ fully.

During the buildup for this attack, the enemy had brought up a terrific amount of AA defense, mostly light weapons. This resulted in a high rate of damage to our aircraft by flak. To counteract this, the Army artillery developed a counter-flak fire on all known gun positions while our fighter-bombers were working within artillery range. This proved very effective and most pop­ ular with the pilots. When a flight took off to work in close cooperation with a ground unit, the artillery was alerted and a liaison plane was dispatched to spot enemy flak positions and to direct fire on them. This has become SOP with all units of the Third U S Army now. (See SOP, Anneal £,).

To bring about the closest i^Le| ration of air- ground effort, there evolved the Coirfol^Ml Office at pr.U$$!F!F.O

corps and division level, and to a certain extent at combat command level. Whenever possible, the ground representative (G-3 Air) and the air representative (now known as the Tactical Air Liaison Officer) were placed in the same room and were pro­ vided with certain facilities which in the past had frequently been more a hope than an actuality. The air remoted its VHP (air-ground communication) equipment into the Combined Opera­ tions Office and was thereby able to integrate the air effort into the ground plan as he studied the latest ground information.. The ground ran a direct wire to the artillery FDC, finding this communication invaluable when arranging for marking close-in targets with smoke and for coordinating counter-flak fire. In this way the TALO and G»3 Air worked as a close team, and counter-flak fire grew from a small beginning into a well-defined program.

(4) Attacking the SIEGFRIED LINE (1-20 December)

Despite the worst possible weather conditions, with fre­ quent heavy rains, the Third Army drove steadily forward, across soggy ground and swollen rivers, to4cross the German border, enter the industrial SAAR VALLEY and establish bridgeheads across the SAAR at DILLINGEN and SAARLAUTERN, while far in the rear the hopelessly bypassed fortress city of METZ surrendered.

The necessity of crossing a swollen stream in the face of the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses had presented a most difficult pro­ blem. Consideration was first given to the crossing of the SAAR RIVER in the vicinity of MERZIG. An air plan was evolved which employed an attack by eight groups of medium bombers on the de­ fenses overlooking the proposed point of crossing. The plan was developed in XIX TAC Headquarters, presented to Ninth Air Force for approval, ahd carried out by IX Bombardment Division*

Here a very definite lesson in the employment of medium or heavy bombardment in conjunction with a ground attack was learnedo Carpet bombing of a defensive area must be exploited by ground forces as soon after the last bomb has fallen as possible# The German has shown exceptional recuperative powers. Overnight he can reorganize and repair destruction and be prepared to offer almost equal resistance the next day. At MERZIG, ground forces found that road blocks and mines held them up so that 48 hours after the bombing they had not reached the area subjected to attack. The air effort proved absolutely wasted®

It was decided at this time that in the future any plan for such an attack would be preceded by a ground attack right up to the area of proposed bombing* In this way, road blocks and mines can be cleared and terrain for the forthcoming assault With these lessons in mind and a new point of crossing decided upon, another plan was laid on, with mediums attacking the SIEGFRIED LIHE defenses on the east bank of the SAAR River in the vicinity of SAARLAUTERN. This time troops established a bridgehead and finally captured the town, although resistance was extremely heavy. One incidental result of the bombing by the mediums was the cutting of wires to demolition charges in the bridge, thus preventing its destruction*

Fighter-bombers played an important part in this operation. Although low ceilings made flying over enemy territory very ex­ pensive, attacks against heavy artillery positions with NaPalm and frags proved quite successful. Here, close coordination with the division artillery greatly assisted the pilots. Just as the aircraft approached for the attack, the artillery marked the targets with colored smoke shells, thus helping to reduce the time normally required to spot the target and assisting in picking out the right one. This coordination was accomplished through close liaison between the division Tactical Air liaison Officer who was in radio contact with the flight overhead, and the division Artillery Officer who could direct the fire of smoke shells against the target at the desired time.

At this bridgehead it was planned to use fighter-bombers to lay smoke over the enemy observation fiosts controlling the artillery fire on the bridge across the river. However, hi'gh winds during the period made this impossible. Several squadrons equipped with smoke tanks were dispatched, but each time weather prevented completion of the mission*

While only one real penetration into the SIEGFRIED LIHE was made during this period, plans for subsequent attacks were drawn up (Operation nTinkM, Annex 3 ). For planning pur­ poses, all the fighter-bomber effort that could be employed in the limited area was assigned the task of keeping the enemy off balance after the bombing by the mediums or heavies. Shoud targets be scarce, then each flight would conduct an armed recce in the immediate vicinity to discourage any reorganization or reinforcement of this portion of the line. Since the SIEG­ FRIED LIHE is extremely deep in places, it was considered ad­ visable that the carpet bombing of all defenses be continued for a second and perhaps a third day iiM^dgtajkfly in front of the ad­ vancing infantry. In the event th^^ f^j^lAng block was en­ countered, then,as on the first da^lfc^gflPback far

63 - enough to permit a repeated air strike to soften up the resis tance.

In addition to attacking the actual defensive positions, all communications centers immediately behind the proposed point of assault were scheduled for attack. It was planned to have these targets attacked immediately following the attack on the defended positions. In this way, it was hoped that the enemy would presume that the attack was still in progress while in effect the aiming points were several miles to the rear. This, it was hoped, would give our infantry elements an added advan­ tage. Escort for medium or heavy formations participating in these attacks consisted only of area cover over the target. It was found here that the mere presence of our fighter-bombers considerably reduced the amount of enemy artillery fire, evi­ dently because the flash of a gun was thought to draw an attack*

(5) Reduction of the ARDENNES Salient (20 December 1944 - 22 January 1945)

Preparations for smashing the SIEGFRIED LINE in a large- scale air-ground operation were interrupted in mid-December by Rundstedt's counter-offensive into the ARDENNES. This sudden thrust into BELGIUM and LUXEMBOURG in the sector lightly held by First U S Army's VIII Corps forced Third Army and XIX TAC to stop their assault along the SAAR RIVER, wheel quickly to the north, and strike at the southern flank of the dangerously swelling bulge along a line from ST. HUBERT, BELGIUM, to ECHTER- NAOH, LUXEMBOURG.

For a week the weather favored the enemy, with low cloud and fog veiling his movements as he thrust through rough hilly country toward the MEUSE. Then, just before Christmas, it broke and in a five day period of wonderful flying weather the air- ground team turned the ARDENNES counter-offensive into a hasty withdrawal. Fighter-bomber targets had again changed to armor and motor transport. Bomb loads, however, remained the same: 500-lb GP's,M-27 frag clusters, and NaPalm. Flights were dis­ patched as quickly as they could be serviced and loaded, to at­ tack targets of opportunity in the salient#

Key to the situation was BASTOGNE, where the 101st Air­ borne Division and elements of several other units staunchly held out until reached by General Patton's columns, which then struck northward toward First U S Army and British units attack­ ing the northern flank of the bulge. Our commitments during the BASTOGNE battle included escorting of C-47s flying supplies to the encircled garrison. F-5 pilots of our reconnaissance group, at heavy cost, penetrated the wall of flak around the town to drop aerial photographs showing enemy positions. The work of our tactical reconnaissance won a letter of commei^dation from the 101st Airboaane Division. wi micussiHHP-u'fc *S3Sm employment of tactical reconnaissanB^^i^jg spo

fire as they attacked*

In this fluid warfare through snowy hills, XIX TAC re­ connaissance and fighter-bomber pilots found themselves faced with new difficulties. First, the snow cover was so thick that close navigation was most difficult; second, the restricted tar­ get area was surrounded on three sides by friendly forces and, third, Allied vehicles and identification panels were seen on both sides of the line* The remedy lay in careful briefing and in the closest possible coordination between air and ground* Here the liaison officers with the corps and divisions again proved their worth, and close control and direction of fighter- bombers paid off* (a) Examples of Air. Cooperation with an Infantry Divisioni By mid-January the enemy salient in the ARDENNES had been out in two as Third Army elements made contact with British troops northwest of BASTOGNE. The type and effectiveness of the close air cooperation afforded is indicated by reports received from a typical divi­ sion, the 90th Infantry. Said its G-2 Periodic Report for 11 January*

"PW Arty officers state that altho-ugh arty ammo is avail­ able at the dumps, there has been an acute shortage at the bat­ tery positions. They attribute this to our bombing and strafing attacks on supply lines, including bomb craterfe which have be- oome major obstacles,

"PsW, including officers, said that communications were completely disrupted yesterday and, as a consequence, few units were aware of the situation, which is in turn partly responsible for the great number of PsW taken". (1265 in the past 23 hours)

The Tactical Air liaison Officer with the Division added this comment: "The above results were obtained, according to ground officers, by the necessary withdrawal of the enemy units in » the closing pocket southeast of BASTOGHE. They began to move back towards themain road running through S0ITLEZ-D0HC0LS* The air attack on SONLEZ and on 15 vehiclatejbstween the two towns, followed immediately by concentrated iartill'e#|r^ire, blocked the road with wreckage* All that night and fh^?3^^pwing day artillery fire destroyed dozens upon dozens of* ----'-rrficiissm UN CIASS! of enemy equipment as it ran into the blocked main road0 Six undamaged field pieces were found in SONLEZ alone, among other booty such as undamaged trucks and sedans* The air claims no more than that it was in a coordinated operation which had profitable results in ground gained, PsW taken and equipment captured or destroyed*n The Division's G-2 Periodic Summary noted that many pri­ soners of war had not received food for three or four days prior to capture (which may have been a great inducement for them to become prisoners) and on 16 Jan it reported: "A PW stated thet in the recent air attack on BRACHTEHBACH (PT6959)I kitchen and QM stores were destroyed and a great number of soldiers were killed® For many hours after, chaos existed in the town*" The enemy attempted to counter-attack on 16 January but was repulsed with the aid of the air. On that day, the TALO reported, three excellent missions were flown by the 362nd Group:

"They hit armored vehicles, tanks, and flak positions, directed artillery fire, and located four small oo nvoys, very fat ones, northwest of ESCHWEILER, which were possibly moving against our flank. The squadron destroyed two of these convoys and stayed out until almost dark calling pinpoints on the other two targets to our artillery. T&e artillery of the 26th Div­ ision joined in on the shooting#"

"These missions pointed to the possibility that a Panzer Division was assembling, and that a movement possibly was being made in our direction. This was found to be true, as that night and the following day elements of two Panzer divisions took up positions on our front and counter-attacked. But we had hit them first, and very effectively. The 90th handled these attacks with their customary skill, beating them off with heavy losses to the attackers, without even giving ground."

The enemy was soon inf ull retreat toward the SIEGFRIED LIHE defenses, and on 22 January his desperate attempts to with­ draw his battered forces enabled XIX TACMs fighter-bombers to destroy or damage 1,713 motor vehicles — a new record for the Command.

t

f' *• * /** J f* n pA Pi* i.« K o ^CLASSIFIED (6) The Drive from LUXEMBOURG and BELGIUM to 'frt RHINE (22 January - 13 March).— This was the period during which Third Army fought its way through the SIEGFRIED LINE, then sent its armor on a swift dash to the RHINE. Thus it actually covers two sub-phases. The first, comprising the remainder of January and most of February, was character­ ized by hard slugging at pillboxes, defended villages and other strong fixed defenses in extremely bad weather, fhe second was marked by the capture of TRIER and by rapid ad­ vances beyond the shattered SIEGFRIED LINE. During the first sub-phase, close-cooperation missions were similar to those of November and December when Third Army was advancing slowly from village to village across wet, muddy terrain and was assaulting the SIEGFRIED LINE defenses in the SAARLAUTERN area. Defended villages and enemy vehicles, tanks and guns were frequent targets. The following is an excerpt from the G-2 Periodic Report, Headquarters, XX Corps, for the period ending 2000 hours 24 February: "An OP of the 10th Armd Div reported, at 1630, a column of vehicles, of which he could see only six, moving into the town of OBEREttsEL (L-2018). The information was immediately communicated by the G-2 of the division to the G-2 of XX Corps, who in turn informed XX Corps G-2 Air and requested that the movement be investigated as soon as pos­ sible by a Tac/R plane. The G-2 Air stepped across the room to convey the informaticm to the Tactical Air Liaison Offi­ cer. The TALO replied by handing him the headphones. "Hear 'em burning?" he asked. Fighter-bombers, already vectored to the spot by the Division TALO, had just finished destroy­ ing the vehicles, fifteen in all. The trucks had been spot­ ted, reported and destroyed in just under five minutes, an outstanding example of ground-air cooperation." Farther behind the enemy's front, successful attacks were made on rail and road transportation and on special targets, including two schools for training espionage agents. To protect Third Army's right flank, it was important that bridges across the MOSELLE River be destroyed. One of these, the important BULLAY railroad bridge, had been much bombed by mediums and also by fighter-bombers, but bore a charmed life until 368th Group's 395th Sq attacked it on 10 February. Subsequent photo interpretation and ground exam­ ination showed that the attack with 500-lb bombs had knocked down one span and left the othpM*Jhanging On 22 February the Comm. the enormous ?;CO?C'iCjfl- /! 'L ^ li :•] PCLASSlFIEn _ I III coordinated Allied air attack on enemy transportation facil­ ities and as a result of the paralysis which ensued, our squadrons on the following day found marshalling yards and rail lines ripe with military trains, many of them carrying armor and IvT. Pilots1 claims included 269 tanks and armored vehicles and 1,308 RR cars destroyed or damaged, surpassing the Command's best previous records in those two categories# *

During the drive to the RHINE in the latter part of this period the ground situation closely paralleled the eastward sweep toward the SEINE in August. Al^ principal supply installations had been bombed; bridges had been des­ troyed by a medium bomber program instituted during the AR- DENwilS breakthrough; and the right flank of the Army was protected only by a river — in this case the MOSELLE — and by the air.

Principal targets were found on roads and consisted chiefly of scattered motor transport. Armored column cover was furnished for the armored spearheads. However, the mopping-up infantry could not be afforded close cooperation because of the extremely fluid situation. The front was often made up of a series of pockets too small to permit employment of air power. (7) Springing of the SAAR-MOSELLE-RHINE Trap (13- 23 March).— With the reaching of the western bank of the RHINE near KOBLENZ by elements of the 4th Armored Division, the Sermans in the pocket formed by the MOSELLE on the north, the 3AAR on the west, and the SIEGFRIED LINE on the south were placed in a precarious position. The trap was sprung. as Third Army's armor, closely followed by infantry, slashed southward from the MOSELLE toward a junction with the Seventh US .Army, and other Third Army units pushed from the west across the SAAR. This forced a mass evacuation in broad day­ light, with the enemy using every conceivable means of trans- • portation. The result was a fighter-bomber's paradise. Tac­ tical reconnaissance played an important part in spotting large masses of men and materiel trying to escape and leading fighter-bombers to these targets. Reports of columns of a thousand vehicles, packed bumper-to-bumper, were not unusual. Here our aircraft carried very few bombs; since there were practically no armored vehicles in these columns, straf- 4 ing with machine guns proved to be the most effective weapon. The use of GP bombs in advance of our speeding armored col­ umns would have cratered the roads, causing delay. After our * attacks by strafing alone, the leading tank with bulldozer blade merely pushed the burned-out wreckage into the ditch, leaving a clear path for succeeding units. DNCLfcSS-'FIEfr*** V I • • u

The rate of advance was such that no brgah&%Qa; ae$Si&^T| could be made by the enemy. Sporadic small-arms firS^lbitli • a few tanks supporting road blocks, formed the principal op­ position. These few targets were attacked by our aircraft under direction of the Tactical Air Liaison Officers attached from this headquarters to the armored units spearheading the attack• As the RHINE River was the immediate objective and the only obstacle to further movement into central GSR^AKY, very close reconnaissance was made along the river to thwart any build-up and to discover, as early as possible, any defen­ sive construction. As elements of the Third Army closed up to the river, our aircraft ranged out farther to blast any reinforcements moving in the direction of the probable cros­ sing point. Here it was felt that the possibility of enemy air attack was such as to warrant continuous air cover. One flight of P-51s maintained a continuous air patrol along the river and P-61s maintained the same patrol at night. The enemy did put up quite a few flights, but none seemed anx­ ious to press the attack. A vivid description of the results of the destructive power of the fighter-bombers and the Third Army's artillery was presented in a report from Headquarters, XX Corps Ar­ tillery, dated-22 March, which follows: *1. , ENMY ARTILLERY ACTIVITY

"The enemy artillery west of the RHINE is 'Alles Kaput.' Only a few isolated guns are singing their swan song. It is believed that very little, if any, of his arty got away fto fight another day.r The swift encircling movements, the destructive power of the arty and air, com­ bined to eliminate the arty from the picture. "He had two choices: to sit and be overrun or to retreat and be destroyed on the roads. "On the road between FRANKENSTEIN and BAD DURKHEIM, two names faintly suggestive of the conditions on the road, the trains and the artillery of what appears to be a division were caught in a defile and massacred by the Air Corps. Running down the curving roadway, the passerby first notices a few scattered vehicles and dead horses; then it seems to grow in crescendo until finally he is in the midst of such a twisted mass of death and destruction that single items can no longer stand out. It is so enor­ mous that the mind cannotf>»easure it I The only impression made is that this is ultimate of death, des­ truction and chaos. ItAdJk Mesne 4hat should be photographed MASSIFIED UUClSSSIr!!. for the Master Race. Let thefrs^^Ke^Road to'dlory1 by courtesy of the Air Corps." During this period also occurred the successful attack on the Headquarters of the German Commander-in-Chief, West, results of which are described on page 14. (8) Crossing the RHINE and Disemboweling South- Central GERMANY (22 March - 22 April).— Bv 22 March. Third Army had occupied more German territory than all other armies on the Western Front combined, and taken more prisoners than any single Army on the Front. Without pausing, however, General Patton immediately followed up these successes by crossing the RHINE. On the night of 22 March, the 5th Infantry Division crossed the river in the vicinity of OPPENHEIE, near MAINZ, to begin the next phase of Third Army - XIX TAC operations. This crossing was made without the gigantic air prepara­ tion that preceded crossings by the armies in the north, because no such massed bombing was necessary. Third Army's dash to the RHINE at OPPENHEB/1 had over-run any unit which might have withdrawn to the east bank to make a stand, and the constant attrition caused by our fighter-bombers both east and west of the river gave General Patton confidence that no dangerous force could be brought against him. To make doubly sure, XIX TAC fighter-bombers on 21 March effected 57 rail cuts in an arc curving from LIMBURG south to MANNHEIM. The actual crossing was almost like a FORT BELVOIR maneuver, thanks to the bold and immediate e3q>loitation of the rapid advance to the river. Only light opposition was met. Not until late in the afternoon following the night of the crossing did the bridgehead attract any artillery fire? and this was quickly taken care of by fighter-bombers waiting for such targets. This sudden and rapid move forward from the SAAR RIVER line made the distance to the target area a serious problem in planning operations for our aircraft. To range out far enough in advance of the Army to neutralize effec­ tively any opposition developing required flight of at least one hour to the target area. This cost time* Long- range tanks were necessary on all missions, and the result was a sudden shortage which necessitated air resupply of this particular item. Also, elements of the Tactical Control Center experienced trouble in moving forward ra­ pidly enough to keep flights "in sight" on the radar scopes. FM radio links were resorted to exclusively to maintain communications as land-line wire laying was out of the question. Our occupation of the heart of the Germai^^iratr8me'#| area around FRANKFURT displaced many of the LuftW&ffe uflj&s to old training airdromes which were not provided witft«||£ defenses. Before -these defenses could be installed and adequate dispersals provided, our pilots claimed large numbers of enemy aircraft destroyed on the ground. Armored column cover, plus armed recces to the limit of endurance or to the tactical boundary between American and Russian forces, comprised the majority of our missions. Fine weather greeted the start of operations east of the RHINE. On 23 March ADC TAC flew 775 fighter-bomber sorties, and the day1 s claims included 70 locomotives and, 1,100 railway cars destroyed or damaged as our squadrons harried and hamstrung the enemy's rail reinforcement moves. Air counter-action likewise was broken up. Operating in the DARMSTADT area, 364th Group P-51s encountered 50 ME-109S and FW-190s flying west and carrying bombs — pos­ sibly to attack the bridgehead at OPPENHEIM. Bouncing the formation, our pilots destroyed 10, damaged 5 and forced the remainder to jettison their bombs and run for home. As the Army sent long spearheads knifing through the disorganized German defenses, our planes began to find the roads packed with convoys fleeing to the east* On 27 March they destroyed or damaged more than 1,000 motor ve­ hicles.

On 1 April the claims included 109 tanks and armored vehicles as the enemy assembled armor for counter-attacks. An abortive counterattack on 7 April, northwest of MaUL- HAUSEN, was repulsed by air-ground teamwork, the 362nd Group claiming 69 tanks and armored vehicles destroyed or damaged.

Crowded railroad yards were attacked with good re­ sults. On 10 April, for example, when P-47s bombed and strafed the marshalling yards at NEUMARKT, resulting ex­ plosions wrecked the yards, destroying 5 Iood motives and 350 boxcars. For the Luftwaffe this period was the "twilight of the gods". During the week of 11-17 April, XIX TAC pilots, in aerial combat, claimed 73 enemy planes destroyed, 1 probably destroyed and 11 damaged; on the ground their \ claims were 239 destroyed, jrrafebably destroyed and 162 #| damaged — or a grand tota^rVfiM^ #nemy planes destroyed / or damaged by XIX TAC in a UNCIASSIF

Tremendous destruction was also being done by other Allied air units, particularly the Eighth Air'Force. On 16 and 17 April, Allied claims totaled 2,340 German planes destroyed or damaged in the air and on the ground — a crippling blow which insured that the GAF would never again be able to mount a dangerous threat against us. Crowded onto comparatively few airfields, faced with a shortage of pilots and a critical shortage of fuel, chal­ lenged by the advance of Allied armies into the very heart of GERMANY, the once-proud Luftwaffe was neither willing nor able to attempt a single large-scale action. As Third Army reached the restraining line in the LEIPZIG-CHEMNITZ area, it ceased its eastward movement and, on orders from higher headquarters, shifted its axis of advance to the southward* The unspeakable horrors of OHRDRUF and other German murder camps, uncovered in the eastward advance, served as an added incentive as the war in EUROPE entered its final phase. (9) The Final Assault through aAVARIA into AUSTRIA and CZECHOSLOVAKIA (&> April -6 May).— On £2 April, Third Army attacked southeast with three Corps in line. The new mission was to strike into AUSTRIA, and CZECHOSLOVAKIA if necessary, to effect a junction with Russian forces advancing northwest from VIENNA. XIX TAC responsibilities included protection of the Army's left flank along the CZECH border. No serious threat ever materialized there, but on 29 April, a day of rain and sleet which restricted operations, a Tac/R section of the 10th Photo Group found a convoy of approx­ imately 1,000 vehicles of all types moving south on the highway between PRIBRAM and MIROTITZ, in CZECHOSLOVAKIA. The target was given to 362nd Group, and despite the bad weather its P-47s claimed 260 MT destroyed or damaged by their bombs and .50-calibre fire. The Luftwaffe was very nearly "kaput", but on 25 and 26 April our fighter-bombers found a few or the remaining airdromes crowded with a variety of enemy planes and sending up intense fire from reinforced flak batteries. Claims of enemy planes on the ground were 55 destroyed and 65 damaged on 25 April. That the last effort of the Luftwaffe was being made in our area was indicated by the figures of 26 April# Our ground claims on that day were 52-0-39, against total Al­ lied claims of 61-0-61# The Luftwaffe made an effort to challenge our operations during the day, giving us air claims of 1S-0-9, chiefly by the 354th Group P-51s, against total Allied air claims of 28-0-12. Our losses for the

*j < : \» i day were 3. UNCLASSIFIED - With fighter-bomber cooperation on every flyable day,* Third Army meanwhile advanced rapidly to the south and southeast, and by 30 April had reached PASSAU, crossed the DANUBE and ISAR Rivers, and penetrated the outer defenses of that much-advertised myth, the German National Redoubt. Our reconnaissance planes were flying nearly to VIENNA to observe progress of the Russian advance and making fre­ quent checks of the BRENNER PASS until the surrender of all German troops in ITALY made that no longer necessary. On 28 April, 4 P-51s of the 354th Group did slow rolls over the PW Camp at MOOSBURG, and the next day the camp was over-run, releasing approximately 110,000 Allied prisoners, including many XIX TAC pilots* While mass surrenders in ITALY and on the northern part of the Western Front began to put other armies out of business, Third Army's front continued active; but the ra­ pid disintegration of the once-proud Wehrmacht was spread­ ing rapidly. On 4 May, the entire 11th Panzer Division surrendered to the 90th Infantry Division, and it was ob­ viously just a question of time before the final surrender of GERMANY would be signed.

With low ceilings and visibility ranging- from 1 to 4 miles over the entire 290 miles of Third Army's front on 4 May, XIX TAC was limited to 150 fighter-bomber and 67 recce sorties, making modest claims against ground targets, destroying 14 and damaging 5 enemy planes on the ground and destroying another 4 in the air. On 5 and 6 May our operations were restricted by weather to a total of 9 re­ connaissance sorties, and by 7 May our activities were con­ fined to defensive patrols over the Third Ariny area and reconnaissance beyond the front iines to note the progress of Russian forces advancing rapidly from the east. As the war ended, our airfields became the "targets" of Luftwaffe pilots fleeing the Russians, and onr recon­ naissance and fighter-bomber pilots found themselves es­ corting formations of German planes flying in to surrender. One flight of the 354th "Pioneer Mustang" Group brought in 31 planes in one formation. The Germans came prepared to stay. Some brought wives or mistresses (or even both), and personal luggage included ev^cything imaginable, with baby carriages topping the list edictable equipment! 0 On 9 May 1945, General Wey ig&ed',vth§ following General Order, upon conclusion of € ^^^ c^xnpaign which ClASSIFIF began at AVRANCHES, in N0RMAND"J\ days before: 9 May 1945 GENERAL ORDERS) NUMBER 34) TO THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE XIX TACTICAL AIR COMMAND

At one minute past midnight this morning the German enemy's career of crime ended in unconditional surrender to Allied arms, the mightiest concentration of air, land and sea power ever assembled to curb and smash an aggres­ sor nation. To each of you, this is a personal victory, for the efforts of every officer and man have contributed to the effectiveness of the XIX Tactical Air Command - Third US Army team, which has carried air-ground cooperation to new heights of combat efficiency and beaten the enemy at every turn. Through the fortunes of war and the aggressiveness of our great comrade-at-arms, the Third Army, this Command has been continually in the forefront of the battle, from Normandy to the heart of the enemy's homeland and on across the borders of Austria and Czechoslovakia. For more than nine months we have had the Hun on the run, until at last he could run no farther. The day of victory finds us rounding up the last scattered remnants of the beaten foe and escorting his once-warlike pilots to our bases in ab­ ject surrender. Upon the successful conclusion of our mission. I want to express my heartfelt admiration and appreciation for all that each of you has done to make possible this victory. Your prowess and devotion are a credit to our country — and there is no higher praise.

/s/ 0. P. Weyland*ey /t/ 0. P. WEYLAND, Major General, USA, r Commanding• M fil J ** :? I!ii i I L* COMBINED ARMS RESEARCH LIBRARY FORT LEAVENWORTH KS ,>>