INFORMAL NORMS AND PROTEST SPACE:
WHY THE CHINESE REGIME REMAINS STABLE DESPITE RISING PROTESTS
by
Yao Li
A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Baltimore, Maryland
February 2015
© 2015 Yao Li All Rights Reserved
Abstract
Scholarship has tended to see that rising protests in authoritarian states signal the decline of a regime. China abounds with protest, but the regime’s hold on power and capacity for governing remains strong. Why does the Chinese regime remain resilient amid mounting social protests? In my research, I distinguish two types of protests: regime-engaging and regime-threatening protests. In regime-engaging protests, both the state and protesters accept the legitimacy of the other side and are open to negotiation; whereas in regime- threatening protests, both authorities and protesters reject the legitimacy of the other side and close the door to negotiation. The two kinds of protests are ideal types and a protest may move from one to the other. Yet the distinction matters: regime-engaging protests help maintain regime legitimacy and resilience, whereas regime-threatening protests undermine them. Based on an original dataset, I conducted binary and multinomial logistic regression analysis to show that regime-engaging protests are prevalent in China.
Further, case studies demonstrate that in regime-engaging protests, informal norms of contention play a role in regulating actions of both authorities and protesters and promoting both sides to work on resolving conflicts through dialogue not force. By contrast, case studies of regime-threatening protests exhibit a vicious cycle of conflict escalation and pose a great challenge to the regime.
The above investigation has relied on both quantitative analysis and in-depth case studies.
I have generated and analyzed a dataset of 1,418 protest events in China from 2001 to
2012, the largest nationwide dataset on protests in China. I also conducted seven case
ii studies of regime-engaging protests along with three cases of regime-threatening protests, relying on 18-month fieldwork and rich accounts from journalistic and academic sources.
My dissertation contributes to explaining the resilience of the Chinese regime by showing how the regime is able to handle and contain protests. It helps deepen our understanding about complicated relationships between politics and resistance in authoritarian regimes.
The conceptual model of regime-engaging and regime-threatening protests that I have developed can be employed to monitor the trajectory of political contention not only in
China but also in other authoritarian regimes.
Key words: informal norms, policing, social movements, regime resilience, authoritarian regimes.
Committee: Joel Andreas (Chair), Ho-Fung Hung, Lingxin Hao, Erin Chung, and
William Rowe
iii Acknowledgments
It is a great pleasure to acknowledge that many people have contributed to this research project. My dissertation would have been impossible without incredibly generous support from Joel Andreas, my advisor. As an extremely devoted mentor, Joel continually offered invaluable guidance and encouragement throughout this research. I am deeply indebted to him for his insightful advice and for reading numerous drafts and other works related to this research. Special thanks are due to Erin Chung for her thoughtful comments and constructive suggestions on several versions of this research and considerable encouragement. I am also grateful to Lingxin Hao, Ho-fung Hung, and William Rowe for their critical readings of the entire dissertation and providing expert advice on strengthening it.
At various stages of the project, feedback from Rina Agarwala, Paul Y. Chang, Peggy
Fan, Melissa Forbis, Giovanni Arrighi, Michael Levien, Melvin Kohn, Ray Madoff, Dana
Moss, Stephan Plank, Woody Powell, Wayne Santoro, Evan Schofer, Rogers Smith,
Beverly Silver, Chan S. Suh, Anne Thurston, Kellee Tsai, and Lu Zhang were extremely valuable. I have benefited considerably from tough questions and constructive suggestions from Erin’s writing seminars and I would like to thank Burak Gurel, Karyn
Wang, James Flowers, Daisy Kim, Hirofumi Kawaguchi, Emily Mokros, Sansar
Tsakhirmaa, Chunman Zhang, John Bandy, and Samson Lin. At the early stage of this project, I also learned tremendously from Giovanni and Beverly’s PGSC seminars. I thank Sahan Savas Karatasli for his excellent advice regarding data coding. Charlie
Mitchell and Daniel Pasciuti’s invaluable comments on my quantitative chapter are
iv especially appreciated. I am grateful to Burak Gurel, Sika Koudou, Anne-marie
Livingstone, Mike Reese, and Nazish Zafar for their emotional, intellectual support and encouragement of my research. Thanks also go to Yin Yue and Shaohua Zhan for their advice on IRB application, the permit for conducing my fieldwork.
I am thankful for feedback from participants and audiences at annual meetings of
American Sociological Association, Eastern Sociological Society, and North American
Chinese Sociologists Association, as well as seminars or workshops held at Columbia
University, Stanford University, Stony Brook University, and University of Pennsylvania.
Findings from the East Asian Studies, Department of Sociology, and PGSC at Johns
Hopkins University are greatly appreciated.
Special thanks go to friends of non-governmental organizations in China, who provided invaluable help in my fieldwork (I don’t mention their names to keep their privacy). I enjoyed the experience of doing interviews together with Wang Jingzhi (in January 2012), who was also doing doctorate research on anti-incineration protests. I am especially thankful to my interviewees, who took time to share their stories and views with me.
I would like to express my gratitude to my husband Wu Huixuan, who is always keen on discussing my research and giving me inspirations. Huixuan’s unlimited patience and constant faith in me help ease the writing process. Finally, I am indebted to my parents,
Yao Shuchun and Li Chensheng for giving me a loving family. I thank them for always respecting my choices and being supportive in my life. This dissertation is dedicated to them.
v Table of Contents
Abstract ...... ii
Acknowledgments...... iv
Table of Contents ...... vi
List of Tables ...... viii
List of Figures ...... ix
Chapter 1 Introduction: Protests and Regime Stability...... 1
1.1 Formal Institutionalization of Contention and Regime Resilience ...... 4
1.2 Informal Norms of Contention and Underenforcement of the Law ...... 9
1.3 Categorizing Protests: Regime-Engaging vs. Regime-Threatening ...... 13
1.4 Explaining Regime Resilience in China ...... 19
1.5 Overview of the Dissertation ...... 24
1.6 Broader Implications ...... 26
Chapter 2 Mapping the Space for Protest ...... 28
2.1 Research Design: Methodology, Data, and Measurement ...... 31
2.2 Estimation Techniques and Results ...... 61
2.3 Discussion ...... 75
Chapter 3 Regime-Engaging Economic Protests ...... 83
3.1 Introducing Three Cases ...... 84
3.2 Legitimating Protest Claims ...... 88
3.3 Protest Actions and Informal Norms ...... 92
3.4 Enforcing the Limits on Protest Organization ...... 111
vi 3.5 Using Carrot and Stick to Maintain Regime Resilience ...... 115
3.6 Handling “Contradictions among the People” ...... 120
3.7 Conclusion ...... 132
Chapter 4 Regime-Engaging Environmental Protests ...... 134
4.1 Introducing Four cases ...... 134
4.2 Legitimating Protest Claims ...... 143
4.3 Protest Actions and Self-Censorship ...... 148
4.4 Enforcing the Limits on Protest Organization ...... 168
4.5 Authorities Emphasizing the Limits of Protest Space ...... 172
4.6 Regime-Engaging Protests ...... 174
4.7 Impact on Regime Legitimacy ...... 180
4.8 Conclusion ...... 189
Chapter 5 Transgression and Repression: Regime-Threatening Protests ...... 192
5.1 Uyghur Unrest in Xinjiang...... 194
5.2 Falun Gong Protest Movement ...... 207
5.3 Charter 08...... 227
5.4 Conclusion ...... 237
Chapter 6 Conclusion ...... 240
6.1 Informal Norms, Protest Space, and Regime Stability ...... 245
6.2 Monitoring the Trajectory of Political Contention and Regime Stability...... 246
APPENDIX I ...... 251
APPENDIX II. List of Interviewees ...... 256
REFERENCES ...... 260
vii List of Tables
Table 2.1. Police Presence (=1) vs. Absence ...... 40
Table 2.2. Policing Actions ...... 40
Table 2.3. Police/thug Presence (=1) vs. Absence ...... 41
Table 2.4. Policing/thug Actions ...... 41
Table 2.5. Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Police Presence at Protest
Events in China, 2001 to 2012 ...... 63
Table 2.6. Multinomial Logistic Regression Model Predicting Police Reactions at Protest
Events in China, When Police were Present, 2001 to 2012 ...... 69
Table 2.7. Comparing Hypotheses with BLR and MLR Results ...... 71
Table 2.8 Claims by Minorities ...... 75
Table 4.1. Four Anti-Incineration Protests ...... 138
viii List of Figures
Figure 1.1. Conceptual Framework of Regime-Engaging and Regime-Threatening
Protests ...... 18
Figure 2.1. Police Reactions: A Substantial Protest Space in China (N = 1,418) ...... 42
Figure 2.2. Protest Claims ...... 52
Figure 2.3. Protest Actions...... 54
Figure 2.4. Protest Organization ...... 55
Figure 2.5. Protest groups by class ...... 57
Figure 2.6. Protest groups by ethnicity ...... 59
Figure 2.7. Mapping the Space for Protest in China ...... 77
Figure 3.1. Three Cases on a Continuum of Regime-Engaging and Regime-threatening
Protests ...... 88
Figure 4.1. Four Cases on a Continuum of Regime-Engaging and Regime-Threatening
Protests ...... 143
Figure 5.1. Three Cases on a Continuum of Regime-Engaging and Regime-Threatening
Protests ...... 194
ix Figure 6.1. All Ten Cases on a Continuum of Regime-Engaging and Regime-Threatening
Protests ...... 242
x List of Abbreviations and Acronyms
BLR: binary logistic regression
CAP: contradictions among the people
CBEP: contradictions between the enemy and the people
LAPD: Law on Assemblies, Processions, and Demonstrations
LSAP: Law of Security Administration and Punishment
MLR: multinomial logistic regression
NGO: non-governmental organizations
PSB: public security bureau
SOE: state-owned enterprise
xi Chapter 1 Introduction: Protests and Regime Stability
China has witnessed a remarkable rise of social protests since the early 1990s. According to official statistics, the annual number of “mass incidents” 1 such as demonstrations, strikes, and road blockades, grew from 8,700 in 1993, 87,000 in 2005, 90,000 in 2006, to
100,000 in 2007. 2 Afterwards, mass incidents kept increasing and the number doubled in
2010 compared to the one in 2006 and grew up to 182,500 in 2011.3 In the face of mounting protests, why does the Chinese regime not collapse? As scholars argue, when authoritarian regimes face greater protests, we expect that either the government is democratizing or losing its capacity for repression, or both. Ultimately, we expect to see regime change, as happened with the Soviet Union from 1987 to 1992 and the 2011
“Arab Spring” in the Western Asia and North Africa. Will China follow suit?
1 The term of “mass incident” is coined by the Chinese government. The official definitions of mass incidents have been inconsistent. The latest definition refers to "the masses making collective petitions in the forms such as illegal gathering and blockade to express opinions and make claims to related government departments or agencies due to contradictions and disputes among the people.” (The General Office of the Chinese Communist Party, 2004). Mass incident is interchangeable with social protest in many cases, but may have a broader connotation (Tong and Lei 2013). 2 These statistics were provided by the Ministry of Public Security and cited by Blue Books of Chinese Society. The series of Blue Books are annual assessments of the condition of Chinese society, including employment, income, health care, education, and social inequality. They have been published since 1993 by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), a large state-run think tank. 3 These numbers were not reported by the Ministry of Public Security, but were estimated by individual scholars who worked in official academic institutions. “From 2006 to early 2010, mass incidents doubled.” Zhu Lijia. 2010-01-25. Oriental Outlook. http://focus.news.163.com/10/0125/12/5TSHTDGF00011SM9.html. “Mass incidents will be the largest challenge to governance in the coming ten years.” 2012-02-09. New Express Daily. http://gz.ifeng.com/zaobanche/detail_2012_02/09/149899_2.shtml. Both accessed by September 24, 2013. 1
Moreover, there is widely shared view among social scientists that authoritarian regimes like China typically rely on repression to deal with protests, resulting in a constricted environment of political contention characterized by violent repression and transgressive resistance. By contrast, democratic regimes are much more tolerant and/or inclined to negotiation and greater concessions (Davenport 1995; Gurr 1986; Goldstone and Tilly
2001). This is at odds with the current situation in China. While many protests in China face severe repression, numerous studies indicate that although practices vary by regions, protests taking nonviolent and lawful or at least not quite unlawful forms have been increasingly tolerated by the Chinese state (Cai, 2002 and 2010; Bernstein and Lü, 2000;
Hurst, 2008; Mertha, 2008; O’Brien and Li, 2006; Perry 2012; Selden and Perry, 2010).
This scholarship seems to suggest that some political space exists for protest in China. To what extent does the Chinese regime permit the existence of a protest space and why? Is the regime in decline or going through democratization?
A wide array of research suggests that the Chinese regime is neither in decline nor moving towards democracy. Instead, the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power and capacity for governing remains strong (e.g. Gallagher and Hanson 2013; Tsai 2013).
Then why does the Chinese regime remain resilient amid mounting social protests? Some scholars highlight the improvement of formal institutions — such as the legal system — to explain regime resilience. This is true, but can hardly explain the puzzle. China still does not have a very effective formal institutional apparatus for containing contention and according to the laws, there is very little room for protest in China.
2
I argue that it is critical to make distinctions between two types of protests: regime- engaging and regime-threatening protests. In regime-engaging protests, both protesters and authorities accept the legitimacy of the other side and strive to engage the opposite party in negotiation. By contrast, in regime-threatening protests, both protesters and authorities reject the legitimacy of the other side and refuse negotiation. A regime is in a precarious situation when regime-threatening protests are prevalent in the country, while regime-engaging protests actually help maintain regime legitimacy and resilience.
In regime-engaging protests, protesters pressure the government for dialogue but they also self-censor their actions; on the other hand, authorities relax law enforcement and allow some space for negotiations with protesters. As the formal laws severely constrain citizen rights of association and assembly, many protest activities go beyond the law.
Regime-engaging protests may involve illegal or extralegal activities, yet as long as they do not go too far, they are usually tolerated by the state. In the process, informal norms of contention play a role in regulating actions of both authorities and protesters and promote both sides to work on resolving conflicts through dialogue not force. The authorities’ informal practices to handle contention leave a protest space. This protest space, I will argue, is larger than that stipulated by formal laws and regulations. While authorities may not always tolerate protests even if protesters follow all the norms and protesters may fail to restrain from transgression at times, in general, I will argue that informal norms play a vital role in containing conflicts and preserving regime legitimacy and resilience. By contrast, regime-threatening protests enjoy little protest space, often fall into the vicious cycle of transgression and repression, and pose a severe challenge to regime legitimacy
3
and resilience. In what follows, before fleshing out this theoretical framework, I examine the relationship between institutions and regime resilience.
1.1 FORMAL INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CONTENTION AND REGIME
RESILIENCE
Through a perceptive and influential model of political contention, Charles Tilly and
Sidney Tarrow have systematically examined the character of contentious politics across regime types (Tilly, 2006 and 2008; Tilly and Tarrow, 2007; Tarrow, 2011).4 They argue that in high-capacity democratic regimes, most contention is contained by institutions created precisely to structure and contain conflicts, and therefore it is common to see the relatively contained forms of contentious politics. One manifestation is the enormous concentration of social movements in the United States, which depend on regime-backed rights, notably rights of association, assembly, and speech.
Some scholars have advanced the concept of a “movement society” to describe the institutionalization of movements in today’s Western democratic regimes, in which most contentious actions take the form of peaceful, orderly routines that break no laws and violate no boundaries (e.g. Meyer and Tarrow, 1998; Oliver and Myers, 1999; McCarthy and McPhail, 1998). When protests are contained within institutions and engage the regime in a "legitimate" way, they actually contribute to regime resilience. For example,
4 In Tilly’s (1978) earlier work, he does highlight that the repressiveness of a government is always selective: “governments respond selectively to different sorts of groups, and to different sorts of actions” (106). Yet in his more recent works, Tilly is more concerned with analyzing distinctions between regimes than within a government. 4
Giugni and Passy (1998) argue when modern democratic states are able to incorporate social movements and their organizations within the existing institutional arrangements, this improves the flexibility and adaptability of regime responses to the complexity of society. In the same vein, Dingxin Zhao (2010) argues that when contentious politics are channeled into highly institutionalized expressions, as in the United States and other mature democratic nations, revolutions are precluded, and riots and public disturbances are rare.
By contrast, according to Tilly and Tarrow’s model, strong nondemocratic regimes, such as China, have few institutions designed to contain conflict, lack regime-backed rights as in democratic regimes, and rely mainly on repression to deal with contention. Because authoritarian states in general outlaw most kinds of protests and political contention and have a much weaker capacity to institutionalize social conflicts, contention in these states is much less open, such as in the form of hidden transcripts (Scott, 1990), oppositional speech (Johnston, 2006), and underground opposition organization, or takes largely transgressive forms, to use the terminology of Tilly and Tarrow, such as armed attacks.
As transgressive contention challenges the regime, its institutions, and laws all at once, it imposes considerable threats to regime legitimacy (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). As these contentious activities contest the regime’s monopoly of power, repression is likely to be the main response to protests; yet if the repressive capacity of authoritarian regimes declines, such regimes are vulnerable to a massive eruption of protest (Goldstone and
Tilly 2001: 193). Unable to incorporate these protests and manage them in a flexible way rather than to employ coercion tends to escalate conflicts and exacerbate confrontation. In
5
short, authoritarian regimes have a weaker capacity to institutionalize social conflicts than democratic regimes and tend to use coercive means, which undermines regime resilience.
What implications do the increasing number of popular protests in China have for its regime legitimacy and stability? Most research on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes has shown that a rise of political contention has led to regime crisis and possibly to regime change. Symptoms might include democratization, revolution, militarization, and civil war (e.g. Chang and Vitale 2013; Kim 2002; Almeida, 2003; Slate, 2010;
Seidman 2009; Kurzman, 1996; Beissinger, 2002; Pfaff and Yang 2001; Opp 1994).
Even though some pro-democracy movements are peaceful, the nature of the movements makes them transgressive (Shock 2005). These protests tend to be zero-sum games: either the authoritarian regimes are overthrown, or the protests are stifled. According to Tilly
(2008), when authoritarian regimes face greater protests, we expect that either the government is moving toward democracy or its capacity to use repression has been weakened, or both. Eventually, this rising protests will lead to regime change, as happened with the Soviet Union and allied states in the late 1980s and early 1990s and in some Middle Eastern States during and after the 2011 Arab Spring. As an authoritarian regime, China lacks robust, legal institutions to contain protests. Do growing protests, therefore, signal the decline of the Chinese party-state?
A wide array of research suggests that the Chinese party-state is not in decline. On the one hand, it is widely acknowledged that China remains its fundamentally authoritarian character and is not going through a democratization process (e.g. Li, 2012; Minzner
6
2011; Perry, 2012; Heilmann and Perry, 2011; Pei, 2006). On the other hand, while it is debatable, there is growing consensus that the Chinese state has been resilient or maintained popular acceptance up to the present (e.g. Dickson, 2008; Dimitrov, 2013;
Gallagher and Hanson, 2013; Heilmann and Perry, 2011; Holbig, 2009; Naughton and
Yang, 2004; Perry, 2007 and 2012; Shambaugh, 2008; K. Tsai, 2007 and 2013; Whyte
2010; Wright 2010; cf. Pei, 2006; Shirk, 2007). Many types of explanations have been offered. A 2004 national survey led by Martin Whyte finds little evidence that China is heading to a “social volcano” owing to rising inequality; instead, Whyte contends that
Chinese attitudes to current inequalities “probably are more conducive to political stability than to instability” (2010: 197). Bruce Dickson (2008) argues that the
Communist Party’s strategy of integrating itself with the private sector, both by encouraging current party members to go into business and co-opting entrepreneurs into the party, has worked to sustain the existing authoritarian political system so far.
Centering on private entrepreneurs, Kellee Tsai (2007 and 2013) maintains that the capacity of key political institutions to adapt to popular innovations that originate from informal interactions between state and nonstate actors have helped maintain regime durability. Mary Gallagher and Johnathan Hanson (2013) stress that the Chinese state’s ability to maintain an appropriate mixture of carrots and sticks, promoting the general welfare and using repression, have fostered regime resilience.
The above studies have their merits and provide sound explanations for the resilience of the Chinese regime from various aspects. Nonetheless, they do not directly address the question: Why does the Chinese regime remain stable despite mounting protests? This is
7
at odds with the expectations of scholarship on contentious politics discussed previously.
My research concentrates on tackling this puzzle.
To seek an answer to the puzzle, one group of studies has concentrated on the role of institutional factors. Following Samuel Huntington’s (1968) suggestion that institutionalization of contention is critical for the long-term survival of authoritarian regimes, scholars have underscored the significant role of institutionalization in strengthening the resilience of the Chinese regime. For instance, institutional adaptations and political reform — the improvement of channels of political participation such as village elections, legal system, petition system, local people’s congress, and the media — creates legitimacy and resilience by increasing the responsiveness of leaders (Dimitrov,
2013; Nathan, 2003; Schubert, 2008; Stockmann, 2014). Undoubtedly, since the reform era starting in 1978, the regime has made efforts to improve institutions for channeling grievances and containing social conflicts. As a result, these institutions contribute to directing grievances and conflicts into officially sanctioned channels and preventing extreme actions (Chen 2010; Cho, 2008; Diamant et al., 2005; Luehrmann, 2003;
Minzner 2006).
Despite progress in institutionalization, China still does not have a highly effective formal institutional apparatus for containing grievances and conflicts (Gilley 2003; Li
2012; Michelson 2008; Pei 2006). Village elections, even when they are free and fair,
(which is often not the case), cannot ensure democratic and effective governance due to powerful obstacles by formal institutions, social forces, and the lack of rule of law
(O’Brien and Han 2009; Yao 2012). Considering that the law is treated as a mechanism
8
by which political power is exercised and protected (Potter, 1998), legal institutions are still expected to be secondary to Party policies (Lubman, 1999; O’Brien and Li, 2006; Pei,
2006). Likewise, all trade unions are part of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions
(ACFTU), which is controlled by the party. Legislation in the reform era has emphasized individualized labor relations, which has further hindered the effectiveness of trade unions in handling workers’ grievances (Gallagher, 2006). In addition, the petition system, composed of a set of governmental agencies handling requests, complaints, and suggestions from citizens, is considered largely ineffective, which tends to intensify the resentment of petitioners (O’Brien and Li, 2006). This leads to the escalation of social conflicts, which undermine the authority of institutions and the central government (Yu,
2004 and 2005). Finally, the media still fall far short of becoming an effective avenue for citizens, especially disenfranchised social groups, to express discontent, as the conventional media remains under the control of the Party and the Internet is heavily censored by the government (Zhao and Sun 2007; Pei 2006). Hence, simply focusing on institutionalization of contention cannot fully account for regime resilience.
1.2 INFORMAL NORMS OF CONTENTION AND UNDERENFORCEMENT
OF THE LAW
Instead, a large body of scholarship suggests that flexibility and informality in governance has enhanced the resilience of the Chinese regime amid popular unrest. Sebastian
Heilmann and Elizabeth Perry (2011) hold that a “guerrilla-style policy-making approach,” which favors continual experimentation, improvisation, and adjustment in policy-making rather than institutional consolidation, plays a key role in China’s adaptive
9
governance. Research shows that the division of power between the central and local governments (Cai, 2008) or the multilevel responsibility structure of the government hierarchy (Tong and Lei, 2013) permits inconsistent state policies towards protesters, which prevent both excessive repression and unconditional concessions, and protect the legitimacy of the central government. Xi Chen (2011) maintains that it is precisely the conversion of the petition system into a vehicle facilitating protests and contentious bargaining that contributes to sustaining political stability. Other scholars stress that a series of techniques adopted by grassroots officials to manage popular unrest, especially protest bargaining, serve to depoliticize state-society confrontation and bring about political stability in times of unrest (Lee and Zhang, 2013). Robert Weller (2012) highlights a vital technique of governing, namely “blind-eye governance,” which demonstrates the informal politics of a “don’t ask, don’t tell” attitude toward many social forms that lie outside the law but are nevertheless mostly tolerated, contributes indirectly but importantly to “responsive authoritarianism” and helps to explain state resilience.
Others highlight that uncertainty about the boundaries of permissible political action encourages self-censorship among public professionals, hardens limits on activism, and assists in building regime resilience (Stern and Hassid, 2012).
This line of research points out a number of important components of flexibility in governance and helps explain regime stability despite deficiencies in formal institutions.
Building on this strand of scholarship, my research centers on informal norms of contention to unravel the puzzle of regime resilience among rising protests.
10
While social movement literature pays overwhelming attention to formal institutional structures to examine political contention, a few scholars also call for attention to informal structures. For instance, in addition to the formal structures, Hanspeter Kriesi
(1995) emphasizes that informal procedures and strategies to handle challenges are a crucial part of political contention and they have been typically employed by European democratic regimes. Informal procedures and prevailing strategies include shared implicit or explicit understandings that emerge from political processes and guide the actions of the authorities. These informal procedures and strategies can be either exclusive
(repressive, confrontative, polarizing) or integrative (facilitative, cooperative, assimilative). Kriesi’s research indicates that examining informal norms of contention is indispensable for a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of contentious politics and its outcomes.
Informal procedures and strategies to handle challenges are clearly present in protest policing in Western democracies, which according to several scholars has resulted in underenforcement of the law since the 1980s (della Porta and Reiter, 1998; Waddington,
1994; Fillieule and Jobard, 1998). According to della Porta and Reiter (1998), when dealing with protests, law enforcement is usually considered as less important than peacekeeping; police tend to avoid coercive intervention as much as possible and to tolerate a degree of law-breaking in protests. Fillieule and Jobard (1998) have pointed out that according to the French law, protesters are obligated to give the police three days’ notice of a march; yet prior notification is the exception rather than the rule in many places in France. Instead of using the whole set of legal means to maintain order, the
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basis of police actions is essentially informal negotiation. In other words, authorities handle illegal protests in a relatively soft manner and there is a gap between legal regulations and informal practices.
This gap, however, is not unique to Western democracies. Informal politics and flexibility in governing does not seem to be rare in China as discussed above. In this sense, simply focusing on legal framework would present an inaccurate picture of contentious politics in China: since most contentious activities are forbidden by laws and regulations, rising popular resistance would be expected to lead to widespread repression.
Since repression can backfire and stimulate more protests (Almeida 2003 and 2008;
Jenkins and Schock 2004; Ondetti 2006; Francisco 2004 and 2005; Hess and Martin
2006), radicalize movement participants (Lee 2007), and strengthen solidarity between activist groups (Chang 2008), rigid law enforcement regarding political contention may threaten the durability of a regime.
Therefore, my research centers on informal norms of contention, examining the actions of both authorities and protesters and exploring the actual impact of social unrest. In my paper, informal norms refer to socially acceptable standards of behavior that serve to guide, control, and regulate actions outside of legally sanctioned channels.5 Although
Chinese laws impose strict limits on protest activities, in practice, authorities often relax law enforcement. Hence, actions conforming to informal norms, though illegal or extralegal, are more often than not tolerated. In this way, informal practices to handle
5 For relevant definitions of informal norms or institutions, see Helmke and Levitsky, 2004. 12
protest demonstrate the actual extent of space for protest in China. This informal political space for protest extends beyond the formal and legal boundaries, but not too far.
Studying informal norms is crucial to understand contentious politics in China. In democratic states, the institutionalization of contention produces contained contention, which contributes to regime resilience. In China, while the formal institutionalization of contention is less developed than in democracies, I propose that informal norms of contention play a critical role in preventing contentious actions from becoming transgressive and radical, which helps build regime resilience.
Why is a strong authoritarian state lenient towards some illegal or extralegal protests?
There are numerous possible answers, including to allow people to let off steam, to gain information about grievances, to resolve conflicts before they lead to greater tensions, or to keep the discontented engaged with the state in ways the state can control. To answer this question and to assess the effectiveness of regime strategies in achieving these possible outcomes, it is necessary to distinguish between different kinds of protests and analyze their distinct effects on regime durability.
1.3 CATEGORIZING PROTESTS: REGIME-ENGAGING VS. REGIME-
THREATENING
Unsatisfied with the dichotomy between institutional and unconventional politics,
McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly (2001, pp.7-8) divide contentious politics into two subcategories: “contained” and “transgressive.” The first refers to those cases of contention in which all parties are established political actors and employ normalized
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methods, while the second refers to cases in which new actors are involved and some parties use innovative methods. As they recognize, these two kinds of politics “interact incessantly” and it is not easy to locate the border between them. In their later work, Tilly and Tarrow (2007: p60) further specify that contained contention takes place “within a regime’s prescribed6 and tolerated forms of claim making,” whereas transgressive contention “crosses institutional boundaries into forbidden or unknown territory.”
Nonetheless, this dichotomy is unable to classify contentious activities that are neither clearly transgressive nor clearly contained, that is, “boundary-spanning” contention, which operates near the boundaries of authorized channels and is tolerated by some officials but not by others (O’Brien, 2003). Since many protests in China today are boundary-spanning activities (O’Brien and Li, 2006), the contained-transgressive dichotomy is not sufficient to describe protests in this country. The concept of boundary- spanning activities is crucial, because it not only provides insights into studying protest actions in contemporary China, but also enriches the contained-transgressive classification and advances our understanding of the dynamics of contention.
When examining new religious movements, Roy Wallis (1984) differentiates world- rejecting movements from world-affirming ones to describe the degree or amount of change sought. To him, world-rejecting movements condemn the prevailing social order as a whole, including both its underlying values and institutional arrangements; whereas world-affirming movements are less contemptuous of and hostile toward the prevailing
6 For instance, regimes prescribe mass pledges of allegiance. 14
social order and only seek relatively modest modifications. This is a very important categorization as it brings in the idea of the legitimacy of the social order. Yet this categorization merely focuses on claims of movements, not their actions or organization.
The latter, however, are also crucial dimensions of movements.
The typology of contained and transgressive contention and its later development of the boundary-spanning contention center on protest boundaries set by regimes, whereas
Wallis’ categorization concentrates on movements’ goals. In fact, I will show that both protest boundaries and movement goals are a product of dynamic interaction between protesters and authorities. In these interactions, the boundaries of contained and transgressive contention can shift. It is authorities who set the limits of permitted space, yet protesters test and push the limits constantly. Authorities may be lax in law enforcement and the space of contained contention may expand. On the other hand, the state may shrink its contained space and be especially tough to some protests.
Additionally, the amount of change sought in a protest movement may change and this change is often affected by the interaction between authorities and protesters. Thus, it is critical to include both protesters and authorities as well as their interactions into the categorization of protests in order to develop a dynamic analysis of contentious politics.
Existing typologies of contention do not concern much about the dynamic interactions between protesters and the state as well as how the protest boundaries can be pushed by protesters and change; neither do they discuss how informal norms are in place when protesters push the boundaries.
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Inspired by these current conceptual frameworks, but seeking to overcome their limitations, I have developed a framework for analyzing contention that is intrinsically dynamic. My framework is composed of two analytical types: “regime-engaging” and
“regime-threatening” protests.7 Regime-engaging protests seek state help or concessions; thus, protesters endeavor to engage the state in negotiation and accept regime legitimacy.
On the other side, to manage and control protests, authorities are open to negotiation and also recognize the legitimacy of protests. Examples of regime-engaging protests include migrant workers gathering in front of the city hall to claim back pay and urban residents taking to the street against the construction of a waste-incineration plant in their neighborhood. To legitimate their contention, protesters frame their claims according to official rhetoric, formalized rights, established norms, and conventions. Regime-engaging protests encompass both fully contained contention that takes place within legal channels, such as filing lawsuits, and more confrontational activities, such as demonstrations and rallies. On the other hand, authorities may be lax in law enforcement and are tolerant of some protest activities that are outside the bounds of legal regulations. In this way, informal norms place a key role in regulating the actions of officials and protesters.
In contrast, in regime-threatening protests, both protesters and authorities treat each other as enemies, reject the legitimacy of the other side, and close the door to negotiation.
7 This categorization is different from “state-engaging” and “state-resistance” protests, put forward by Ho-fung Hung (2011). Modifying Tilly’s classification of “reactive” and “proactive” protests, Hung divided protests into state-engaging and state-resistance categories. State-engaging protesters aim to “request new rights or the extension of existing rights,” while state-resisting protesters aim to “stop the state from infringing on protesters’ rights” (Hung, 2011: pp.58-59). In this sense, Hung’s classification centers on distinguishing protest claims, whether to expand new rights or protect exsiting rights. 16
Regime-threatening protests challenge regime legitimacy and condemn the prevailing social order as a whole, including its institutional arrangement and dominant ideologies.
In some cases, protesters may use harshly violent methods, operate in a clandestine fashion, or even when they use peaceful, open methods, they may press for ending the current political system. Regime-threatening protests include separatist movements in frontier regions and pro-democracy movements that call for the elimination of one-party rule. They can be clandestine activities or planned violence by formal independent organizations. The fundamental differences between regime-threatening and regime- engaging protests are authorities and protesters’ attitudes toward each other.
The two types of protests have critical implications for regime legitimacy and resilience.
Regime-engaging protests reflect and enhance the legitimacy of the regime and are akin to (though not the same as) social movements in liberal democracies, as they can be generally “contained” by the state; thus they help build regime resilience. By contrast, regime-threatening protests reflect the lack of legitimacy of the regime and the rise of this kind of protest and its repression undermine regime legitimacy and resilience.
It is noteworthy that the two kinds of protests are ideal types and are two ends of a continuum (see Figure 1.1). In practice, a protest may move from one to the other. A protest can begin as regime-engaging, but shift to regime-threatening. This takes place, for example, in the “agenda shift” described by Beetham (1991, p.216) in which “what starts out as a protest against a particular policy escalates rapidly into a challenge to the political order as a whole.” Even the Falun Gong protest movement, which later escalated into an exceptionally bitter and protracted struggle between the spiritual sect and the state,
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began with humble requests and submissive petitions (Perry, 2010). On the other hand,
for instance, it is possible that an anti-government rebel group decides to give up violent
resistance and enters into peace negotiations with the government. This fluidity depends
on interactions between protesters and authorities, especially how the state deals with
resistance. Despite the fluidity, the distinction matters: regime-engaging protests reflect
and embrace regime legitimacy and help reinforce regime resilience, whereas regime-
threatening protests reflect the lack of legitimacy and undermine regime resilience.
Informal norms
Protest Regime-engaging Regime-threatening (E.g., peaceful strikes) State & protester (E.g., separatist movements) interaction
Figure 1.1. Conceptual Framework of Regime-Engaging and Regime-Threatening Protests
Current research on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes other than China
generally focuses on regime-threatening protests and how they contribute to regime
instability or collapse. Scholarship on contentious politics in China, on the other hand,
has investigated both types. This scholarship, however, has either solely focused on
regime-engaging protests or only on regime-threatening protests. There is very little
systematic comparison of the two. Therefore, my research is intended to take the first step
to scrutinize both regime-engaging and regime-threatening protests and examine their
implications for regime durability.
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1.4 EXPLAINING REGIME RESILIENCE IN CHINA
To understand the resilience of the Chinese regime despite mounting protests, I have conducted both quantitative analysis and in-depth case studies. Gathering data from a wide variety of sources, I have generated and analyzed a dataset of 1,418 protest events in China from 2001 to 2012. This is the largest nationwide dataset on protests in China.
These events took place in all 31 provinces and provincial-level municipalities in mainland China, and consist of a wide array of forms of protests, including peaceful and violent encounters. The issues at the center of these protests ranged from economic and environmental grievances to political claims.
Through statistical analysis of this dataset of protest events, I will show that regime- engaging protests are prevalent in China today. On the one hand, the vast majority of protests in my dataset restrain from advancing radical political claims, using violence, or linking organizationally with other protests. Over two thirds of protests center on economic or environmental issues and the great majority involved disruptive yet peaceful actions. On the other hand, in face of these types of protests, the state permits a relatively broad protest space in China: nearly two-thirds of protest events in my dataset were tolerated by the state. These findings are particularly striking because my dataset may have potential biases for exaggerating the proportion of protests that are repressed.
Toleration, albeit not equal to negotiation, suggests that the state does not close the door to negotiation and does not deny the legitimacy of a protest. By contrast, repression suggests that the state rejects negotiation and the legitimacy of a protest.
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These statistical results provide important insights into the discrepancy between formal institutions and informal norms of contentious politics. As a strong authoritarian regime,
China has made a series of institutional arrangements to restrict or forbid contentious actions. Thus, by law the boundaries that cannot be transgressed for protest are narrower in China than in many other countries. In practice, however, the boundaries are not as narrow as they appear to be in law, and the space within these boundaries is full of protest activities. My analysis suggests that peaceful disruptive actions, such as demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, are de facto tolerated by authorities, though such actions often go beyond the limits of formal laws and regulations. This gap between formal rules and informal practice of contentious politics in China suggests an informal protest space, defined by contentious interactions, with protesters constantly pushing the envelope and the state’s daily practice of dealing with protests.
Here, I should highlight a fundamental distinction between the space for “claims” and the space for “actions” and “organization.” The state basically sets the boundaries for protest claims and there is no give and take. The public simply has to accept these boundaries and they know that they can only make claims within the boundaries. Efforts to test the boundaries of protest claims, such as pro-democracy movement, no matter how peaceful, are expected to suffer crackdown. Informal organization is tolerated, but authorities restrict formal organization and links by arresting open organizers. Protests have to be presented as spontaneous, especially when they take actions that are close to or cross the borders of protest space. The space for actions, in contrast, is more flexible and there is a
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constant tug of war between protesters and authorities on the boundaries. In this situation, informal norms can come into play.
What is missing in previous research on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes is the analysis of the actual informal practices of contentious politics. To have a more comprehensive understanding about the impact of protests on regime durability, we should take account of how protests are actually carried out and how they are handled by authorities. To do this, I conducted seven case studies of regime-engaging protests along with three case studies of regime-threatening protests. The first seven cases include both economic and environmental protests. My fieldwork was conducted in four locations.
Some protests took place in the north, whereas other in the south; some in urban areas, whereas others in rural. During 18 months from 2007 to 2013, I collected data through participant observation and 82 interviews with protesters, officials, interested third parties, and informed observers. Interviewees shared with me official or nonofficial text and multimedia documents related to these cases. I also draw on data from homeowners’ online forums for the affected communities in the urban cases. I use pseudonyms for the research sites, protesters’ workplaces, and interviewees’ names to protect their identities.
My case studies of regime-engaging reveal a series of informal norms of contention. For instance, when protesters skip the application procedure of permits for collective actions or when they evade the regulations on the maximum number of petitioners, authorities usually acquiesce. Furthermore, when a protest such as a demonstration takes place, officials frequently do “mass work,” which includes law and policy education, persuasion, and negotiation; on the other hand, when taking contentious actions, protesters often
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cautiously self-censor their words and actions. While pushing the limits of the existing protest space, protesters are also aware of red lines and usually refrain from crossing them. For instance, they usually do not contact foreign media so as not to embarrass the regime in the international world. For civil disobedience, including gatherings and demonstrations, protesters often strive to avoid severe disturbance of social order and bitter confrontation with authorities. My case studies show that a regime-engaging protest may turn violent at some points. Nonetheless, as long as the protesters and authorities can return to the negotiation table through efforts of both sides, it is still considered regime- engaging. My case studies also uncover that the informal norms and protest space may vary among local authorities and differ across regions. For a single protest, the protest space can expand or contract over time. On the whole, the existence of informal norms and protest space plays a role in promoting dialogue, alleviating conflict, containing contention, and helping maintain regime resilience.
By contrast, an investigation of the three cases of regime-threatening protests — 2009
Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang, Falun Gong (a spiritual group) protest movement, and Charter
08 pro-democracy movement — displays different mechanisms and dynamics of contentious politics. Scrutiny of these cases shows that in regime-threatening protests, tension and conflicts frequently escalate and these protests usually fall into the vicious cycle of transgression and repression. Thus, these protests have a detrimental impact on regime legitimacy and resilience. Data about these regime-threatening protests came from analyses of primary and secondary documentary sources including more than 100 articles
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in Chinese and English-language newspapers and websites such as People’s Daily, BBC, and Reuters, as well as more than 80 journal articles and 30 monographs.
It should be pointed out that regime-engaging protests always have the chance to move in the regime-threatening direction. Officials have the upper hand to determine whether or not to engage in negotiation or to use coercion to handle contention. It is the state that sets the basic criteria for toleration and the criteria for underenforcement of the law differ among officials. They do not always tolerate protests even when protesters following the informal norms. It is not rare that officials employ selective punishment of protest leaders and activists to deter further protest. Authorities can also hire thugs or put protesters into
“black jails.” Meanwhile, protesters are always pushing the envelope. It is this force that has opened the informal protest space in the first place and keeps it open and expanding.
In the process, protesters sometimes lose self-control. Therefore, a regime-engaging protest can move towards transgressive and challenge regime legitimacy and resilience, which depends on interactions between authorities and protesters. As James Scott (1985) argues, “Peasant petitions to the feudal baron in Tokugawa Japan were frequently a prelude to riots and insurrection. Petitions were invariably cast in deferential terms, appealing for the ‘mercy of the lord’… (Yet) Everyone involved knows, certainly, that the petition carries a threat, as virtually all such petitions do.”
Regime-engaging and regime-threatening protests are ideal types based on observation of empirical reality. They are not ultimate causes of regime stability/instability, but rather critical indicators of regime stability/instability. I am identifying and drawing attention to these types and attempting to help determine the causes that lead protests in one direction
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or the other. In addition, I recognize that regime capacities—both to repress and to buy off protesters—are critical factors in ultimately explaining regime stability/instability. In this research, I am not investigating regime capacities. Rather, my aims are to: 1) Clearly define my two indicators of regime stability/instability; 2) Analyze the characteristics of actual protests of both types and how actors engaged in both types act in practice; and 3)
Determine the extent of each in China in recent years.
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE DISSERTATION
My goal is to explain the resilience of the authoritarian regime in China amid rising protests. To give us a broad picture about the character of protests and how they are handled, Chapter 2 presents my large dataset analysis of protest events. As social unrest is a sensitive issue in China, studies on popular resistance have long been constrained by being short of datasets of protests across the country. By generating the largest nation- wide dataset, this research makes effort to have a more comprehensive examination of social protests and state responses.
Chapters 3 through 5 present my case studies of regime-engaging and regime-threatening protests. Through an analysis of three economic protests, Chapter 3 demonstrates how informal norms of contention come into play in protest and its handling. This chapter elaborates how authorities and protesters understand the boundaries of protest space, how actions and interactions of both authorities and protesters are guided by informal norms, how protesters push the limits of protest space, and how authorities use carrot and stick strategies to reassure the limits. In Chapter 4, I examine variations in the boundaries of
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protest space by scrutinizing four environmental protests. Due to differences in local political environments and resources that protesters have, the protest space may vary across regions and social groups. It may also differ over time during interactions between authorities and protesters. When examining interactions between protesters and authorities in Chapters 3 and 4, I analyze authorities’ attitudes toward protesters and how they deal with protests in practice; in the meanwhile, I examine how protesters self- discipline their actions accordingly. By comparing cases that ended with different outcomes, I am able to show how informal norms operate to facilitate and constrain the interactions of officials and protesters, as well as when and how these norms fail to work.
Ultimately, the detailed analysis in these chapters contributes to revealing the impact of regime-engaging protests on regime resilience.
Chapter 5 scrutinizes three high-profile regime-threatening protests: Uyghur unrest in
Xinjiang, Falun Gong protest movement, and Charter 08 pro-democracy movement. By reviewing the interactions between protesters and authorities over historical periods of time, I analyze how these protests moved in the regime-threatening direction. Three case studies underscore how the dynamics and mechanism of these protests challenge regime legitimacy and resilience.
In the concluding chapter (Chapter 6), I summarize my main arguments, discuss the theoretical and empirical implications of my model of regime-engaging and regime- threatening protests, and discuss what might be learned from cross-national comparisons between China and other authoritarian regimes.
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1.6 BROADER IMPLICATIONS
This dissertation addresses important questions about the impact of rising protests on the durability of authoritarian regimes. It challenges the conventional wisdom that a growth of popular unrest in authoritarian states necessarily signals regime instability. Taking
China as an example, my research shows that it is crucial to distinguish regime-engaging protests from regime-threatening protest, as the former help build and maintain regime resilience, whereas the latter undermine it. Existing research on social protests in authoritarian regimes pays overwhelming attention to regime-threatening protests and how such protests contribute to regime change; whereas regime-engaging protests and their impact to regime stability are understudied. My dissertation contributes to explaining the resilience of the Chinese regime by showing how it is able to handle and contain protests.
More broadly, this study helps deepen our understanding about the complicated contentious politics in authoritarian regimes through showing how harsh government coercion can be combined with more subtle coercion, toleration, negotiation, and concessions. Studies of contentious politics tend to stress the role of formal institutions, such as legal systems, and informal norms of contention do not receive as much attention.
By stressing the Chinese regime’s coping strategies and analyzing interactions between protesters and officials, my research echoes McAdam and Boudet’s (2012) recent call for putting social movements in the broad social and political contexts. I hope to bring the
China case to a broader audience interested in the dynamics of state control and the outcomes of political mobilization.
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My dissertation also develops a conceptual model of regime-engaging and regime- threatening protests that highlights their distinct impacts on regime resilience. This model can be employed to monitor the trajectory of political contention not only in China but also in other authoritarian regimes. The mounting protests in China are in step with rising contention in the world today, especially in the Middle East, Latin America, and South and Southeast Asia. I hope this theoretically-informed study of political contention in
China will help cross-national comparison of contentious politics among authoritarian states, and will contribute to a broader understanding of multiple means by which such regimes deal with protest.
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Chapter 2 Mapping the Space for Protest
To understand the resilience of the Chinese regime in face of mounting protests, it is critical to examine the main character of protests and how they are generally handled by the state. Especially, to what extent does the Chinese state tolerate social protests? What kinds of protests are repressed and what kinds are tolerated? These require a large-dataset analysis to depict a broad picture of contentious politics in China. To date, most studies on protest in China are case studies and their biggest concern has been why some protests succeed while others fail (e.g. Cai 2010; Chen 2011; Mertha 2008). A handful of scholars have attempted to discern what kinds of protests are repressed and what kinds are tolerated (Zhao 2010; Selden and Perry 2010; Reny and Hurst 2013), but they have not followed up with any quantitative test. Drawing the lines between government toleration and repression is critical, because it not only helps predict state reactions to protests, but aids in advancing our understanding about complex relationships between the state and society as well as politics and resistance in authoritarian regimes.
To draw the lines between government toleration and repression, I have generated a dataset of 1,418 protest events across China from 2001 to 2012. Based on the largest nation-wide dataset of protests in China, I set out to map the boundaries of protest space.
Statistical results show that regime-engaging protests are prevalent in China today.
Approximately two-thirds of protest events were tolerated, that is, police neither used violence nor made arrests; meanwhile, most protesters are not transgressive. Binary and multinomial logistic regression results reveal the lines between state toleration and repression, according to different types of protest claims, actions, and organization. I find 28
distinct patterns in the ways authorities handle different kinds of protests. Protests that do not raise radical political claims, use violence, or link organizationally with other protests are more likely to be tolerated. Thus, I have been able to identify the boundaries of protest space in China today, although these boundaries remain fluid and fuzzy. This is the first quantitative study investigating state toleration and repression of protests in
China.
As discussed in Chapter 1, according to Tilly and Tarrow’s framework of contentious politics across regime types, in high-capacity authoritarian regimes — such as China, opposition is largely clandestine and protest takes mainly transgressive or forbidden forms, such as armed attacks, which invite a harsh response from the regime. Research on contentious politics in China, however, implies a different picture. Chinese protesters often express their claims openly and go beyond the legal boundaries but they are careful not to go too far. Some collective actions go through the official channels first and then move beyond them, while others simply bypass the official channels and directly take to the street and create public disruption (Lee 2007). Usually, protesters prefer to restrict their confrontation and violence to specific local officials while affirming their recognition of the legitimacy of central authorities and the larger political system (Hung
2011; O’Brien and Li 2006). Many protest actions are “boundary-spanning” (neither clearly transgressive nor clearly contained) — combining lawful tactics with disruptive but not quite unlawful actions (O’Brien 2003), or conjoining legal challenges to injustice with extra-legal forms of civil disobedience and collective protest (Zweig 2010). To be
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effective, protesters strive to keep a balance between defiance and obedience when taking quasi-legitimate “troublemaking actions” (Chen 2011).
A number of these protests are tolerated and some induce government concessions (e.g.
Chen 2011; Johnson 2013; Li 2013). A prevalent means to manage contention by officials is through “protest bargaining”, namely, market-like exchange of protesters compliance for benefits (Lee and Zhang 2013). In contrast, other protests are repressed or end with a combination of repression and concessions (e.g. Cai 2010; Su and He 2010).
Local officials have also designed softer forms of repression, such as employing social networks to demobilize protesters (Deng and O’Brien 2013) or selective punishment targeting protest leaders or activists (Cai 2010; Pei 2006). The boundaries of acceptable political actions appear fuzzy and local officials are granted discretion to judge if a boundary has been crossed (O’Brien 2003; Stern and O’Brien 2011; Stern and Hassid
2012).
No doubt, this one-party state responds to some types of protests far less ambiguously.
For instance, it frequently shows an iron fist to anti-government protests, including pro- democracy movement and separatist movements by ethnic minorities. Apart from these non-negotiable types of protests, a “gray zone” seems to exist in which some kinds of protests tend to be tolerated. What are the boundaries of the tolerated space for protest?
The following sections will find answers to this question.
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2.1 RESEARCH DESIGN: METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND MEASUREMENT
To date, there is no nation-wide dataset available to serve a systematic analysis of protest space in China. The Chinese government, Ministry of Public Security, has statistics about mass incidents, yet they are not open to the public. Previously, it occasionally publicized the total number — not details — of mass incidents for certain years, including the widely cited figures of 8,700 in 1993 and 87,000 in 2005. In recent years, with the surge of social unrest, the government has no longer reported these numbers. As in other authoritarian regimes, social protest in China is a sensitive issue concerning state legitimacy and social stability. The Institute of Sociology at Chinese Academy of Social
Sciences (CASS) has made effort in establishing a dataset of mass incidents since 2010.
Yet the dataset website is still in construction thus far.8
To overcome the lack of an available dataset, several scholars have compiled their own datasets, but each has significant limitations that make them unsuitable for a systematic analysis of protest space. Yongshun Cai collected 266 cases of collective actions from multiple sources and provides a sophisticated explanation of why some protests succeed in pressing the state for concessions while others fail. These cases cover a wide range of issues of protests that took place in a majority of provinces in China. Cai’s cases, however, only concentrate on nonpolitical protests in which protesters do not challenge the political system. Yet those excluded protests may contribute to repression. Thus it is vital to include them in studying the boundaries of toleration and repression. Xi Chen
8 Dataset of Mass Incidents: Website is in construction. Institute of Sociology, CASS. http://www.sociology2010.cass.cn/cate/1800.htm, accessed by November 13, 2014. 31
(2011) compiled 902 petition events drawing on a municipal government’s internal publications. This is an exceptional data source, considering the lack of transparency of the Chinese government on issues of protests. Based on this dataset, Chen performs a statistical analysis on the efficacy of protests taking troublemaking tactics (which include but are not restricted to disruptive activities) to gain government concessions. While his data is systematic, it is only about a single city. Further, it merely comprises petition events, whereas other types of protests, especially those more challenging to the regime such as riots and pro-democracy movement are not studied. Lastly, from a diverse array of sources, Yanqi Tong and Shaohua Lei (2013) generated a dataset of 548 large-scale social protests (each with more than 500 participants) between 2003 and 2010 in China.
According to them, this dataset provides the most extensive list of large-scale social protests up so far, but smaller cases are excluded. Since the size of protests may help predict repression, it is necessary to include both large and small protests to draw the lines between toleration and repression.
My research departs from prior work in important ways. First of all, I generate the first nation-wide dataset of protest events that consists of political and nonpolitical, large and small protests in China. Second, the study for the first time identifies the boundaries between state repression and toleration. Below, I introduce the data and methods.
2.1.1 Data
I adopt the method of “protest event analysis” (PEA) to generate my dataset. In the past decades, PEA has been “developed to systematically map, analyze, and interpret the
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occurrence and properties of large numbers of protests by means of content analysis, using sources such as newspaper reports and police records” (Koopmans and Rucht 2002:
231). Thus far, PEA has been widely employed in studying contentious politics in diverse regions, such as Britain (Tilly 1995), the United States (McAdam 1982; Olzak 1992; Earl et al. 2003), Italy (Tarrow 1989), the Soviet Union (Beissinger 2002), and Japan (White
1995), as well as in cross-national research (Paige 1975; Kriesi et al. 1995). Yet PEA has never been employed to analyze protests in contemporary China. As a method that allows for the quantification of many properties of protest, including its claims, forms, size, duration, location, as well as government reactions, PEA serves as a useful tool kit for this research.
Due to state censorship, a great many protests were not reported in the mainland media.
The Chinese regime is particularly sensitive about protest and considers it a threat of social stability. By contrast, overseas media serve as a better source of information. When constructing my dataset, I rely on data collected by Boxun.com, which is an overseas
Chinese community website founded in the United States in 2000. Boxun was blocked in mainland China in 2011 after publishing articles calling for a “Jasmine Revolution” 9 in the country. Boxun provides nearly 2000 incidents of resistance across China from
January 2001 to December 2012, gathered largely from journalistic sources. Of these,
1,418 protest events have been selected according to the definition of “social protest” to be discussed below. These selected events include protests by various social groups,
9 Jasmine Revolution refers to the 2011 pro-democracy protests in China that were inspired by the Tunisian revolution. 33
comprising peasants, workers, students, homeowners, veterans, investors, ethnic minorities, Falun Gong activists, pro-democratic activists, and even police officers. These protests vary in forms, such as mass petitions, filing lawsuits, gatherings, road blockades, sit-ins, marches, and violent clashes. The issues at the center of these protests range from economic, environmental, anti-corruption, nationalist, religious, legal, to pro-democracy demands. My dataset comprises protests that took place in all of the 31 provincial administrations in mainland China.
Using news reports as a source of data has drawn critics, who raise concerns about selection bias and description bias (Davenport 2010; Earl et al. 2004; Oliver and Myers
1999). Selection bias means that the sample of events covered by the news media is probably not representative of all events that took place. Description bias questions the quality of a news report – how accurately the report describes specific details of the event.
Below I will discuss each of these potential biases in detail.
2.1.1.1 Reliability, selection bias, and description bias
Besides reprinting news from other media sources, Boxun takes the form of citizen journalism: citizens play an active role in collecting, reporting, analyzing and disseminating news and information (Bowman and William, 2003). While Boxun editors attempt to confirm and verify its reports, not all information on the website is reliable. In my dataset, a total of 308 events do not clearly list their information sources other than
Boxun, whereas the remaining 1,110 protest events are reprinted news or confirmed by reports from other media channels, including the Western media (e.g. BBC and VOA)
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and websites of human rights groups (e.g. China Labor Bulletin and Information Center for Human Rights & Democracy 10). Reports of these 1,110 events are more reliable. For the other 308 events, a number of them include attached photos or videos, which usually display protesters’ demands and the sites of events. These help confirm the basic information of the events. As a robustness check, I ran regression analyses on two different sets of events: one including all 1,418 events and the other exclusively comprising the 1,110 events. Their results are almost identical.11 Therefore, I am confident that the accuracy of my dataset is acceptable for the research purpose.
With regard to selection bias, my dataset is probably not representative of protests in
China during the researched period because events are not selected based on random sampling but largely rely upon news reports reprinted by Boxun and citizen journalists’ contributions. Boxun is critical of the Chinese regime and inclined to collect more repressive events in China. Thus, it is likely that my dataset is skewed towards protests that are repressed.
The sources of my dataset may have description bias as well. Even for the 1,110 more reliably documented protest events, they remain susceptible to error. For most of the
1,110 events, especially those reported by human rights groups, the sources of information are mainly from protesters. These reports are likely to exaggerate the severity of state repression. Yet this is not a severe problem for this research. For one thing, most
10 Both are non-governmental organizations founded and based in Hong Kong since 1994, focusing on issues of human rights and/or workers’ rights in China. 11 All the variables that are significant in the full model remain significant in the sub- dataset and in the same directions. See Table 2.5 and Table C in Appendix I for comparison. 35
studies that assess description bias find that the “hard facts” of the event are generally accurately covered by newspapers (Soule and Davenport 2009). In this study, I draw on hard facts of the events (protest groups, claims, actions, organization, location, etc.) not on “soft facts” (such as comments or analysis on the issue).
Both selection and description bias may exaggerate extent of repression. This selection bias actually reinforces my argument. Provided that I find considerable protest space despite employing a dataset that may be skewed to exaggerate the population of repressed events, I feel more confident to conclude that there exists a substantial protest space in
China. Moreover, this selection bias helps detect the limits of government toleration, since it is the more repressive events that demarcate the boundaries between toleration and repression. In addition, if using a dataset that is likely biased against the authorities I can still find that a great many protests are tolerated, then my argument will be strengthened.
2.1.2 What is a Social Protest?
In my research, a social protest refers to a collective action by citizens who express criticism or dissent and raise claims bearing on someone else’s interests in the public sphere. Examples of social protests encompass demonstrations, marches, sit-ins, armed attacks, and collecting signatures for protest letters. To be included in my dataset, a protest should satisfy the following criteria:
a. The protest should be staged by citizens, not by government institutions.
Nonetheless, officials or officers acting on their own accord are included. 36
b. Participants must have articulated some claim, either a grievance against a target or
an expression of support. Cases with no clear demands or grievances are excluded.
c. The protest must take place in mainland China. Protests by foreign citizens in China
are included, whereas those by Chinese citizens outside this region are excluded.
d. The protest should have happened in the public sphere. Any event that occurred in
private space or a space difficult to attract public attention is excluded.12
e. The protest should include no less than five participants.
The unit of analysis of this research is the protest event. A social protest can include one protest event or multiple protest events. Following the guidance in the Dynamics of
Collective Action Project,13 a single event in my research should satisfy ALL the following conditions: a. It includes action that is mostly continuous---no gaps of more than 24 hours in time (weekend gaps are acceptable for labor and school protests); b. It is located within the same city or the same part of the city; c. It includes the same (or a subset of the same) participants whose goals are not different.
2.1.3 Dependent Variables: Toleration and Repression
12 I acknowledge that protests should also include clandestine activities. Nonetheless, such activities are more difficult for police to detect and respond to than overt protests. The fact that police do not react to covert contention does not necessarily mean toleration. Putting clandestine and open protests together could overstate toleration. Therefore, clandestine contention is excluded from my dataset. 13 It is a project that adopts PEA method to document social protests in the United States between 1960 and 1995. The DOCA project is run by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Susan Olzak, and Sarah Soule. Accessed June 28, 2014 (http://www.dynamicsofcollectiveaction.com). 37
To study state repression, this chapter focuses on protest policing, or the police handling of protest events (Della Porta and Reiter 1998). Authorities may employ a variety of repressive strategies, including coercion, channeling (e.g. tax restrictions on targeted groups), overt and covert repressive actions (Earl 2003 and 2011). Policing, of course, is merely one of a wide array of repressive strategies, but it represents the most public and one of the most common forms of repression (Earl et al. 2003). Protest policing is critical for enhancing understanding of the relationship between protests and the state, since police embody the objectives of the broader political-economic elite (Davenport et al.
2011) and they can be “conceived as ‘street-level bureaucrats’ who ‘represent’ government to people.” (Lipsky 1970: 1)
Protest policing literature has blossomed through investigating contentious politics in
Western democracies (e.g. Della Porta 1995; Della Porta and Reiter 1998; Della Porta and Fillieule 2004; Jaime-Jimenez and Reinares 1998; McCarthy and McPhail 1998; Earl and Soule 2006). Policing in non-democratic regimes, however, remains understudied.14
This chapter seeks to advances the protest policing literature by scrutinizing police response to protests in an authoritarian state.
My goal in this chapter is to analyze variations in state repression of protests through examining protest policing. While most of the existing scholarship has analyzed protest policing in a dichotomous manner, that is, recording whether or not police showed up at a protest event, a handful of studies have analyzed a wider range of options and strategies
14 One exception is Chang and Vitale (2013). 38
that police use to handle protests (Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003). Following Earl,
Soule, and McCarthy (2003), I treat protest policing as a two-stage process: police must first decide whether to attend a protest event and then decide what actions to take once they are present. Accordingly, my analysis consists of two steps. First, I focus on police presence or absence. Second, given that police have shown up, I divide policing strategies into four mutually exclusive categories: (1) taking no or limited action; (2) using violence;
(3) making arrests; (4) using violence and making arrests together. Specific policing actions included in the categories are defined as follows.
Limited action comprise erecting barricades, maintaining the order of traffic, observing, monitoring or recording protesters’ action, negotiating with protesters, and coordinating conflicts between protesters and the third-party.
Violence refers to all violent physical actions taken to obtain or achieve something. It includes pushing, shoving, hitting, grappling, or beating. Moreover, violence takes place if police use weapons or equipment, such as guns, tear gas, and batons, to attack protesters or cause damage to property. Dispersing a crowd is also counted as violence, unless news reports explicitly state that no police-protester conflicts occurred. Coercive interrogation after arrest is also treated as violence.
Arrest includes house arrest or any other actions restraining the freedom of protesters.
Being summoned for interrogation is also included. Being taken away by police from the protest spot and sent back to the residential community is not treated as arrest.
Nevertheless, being taken away but no mention of the destination is considered as arrest.
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Table 2.1 illustrates a high rate of police presence at protest events: 63.5 percent of events. This is in accord with the state regulations,15 which require that police have the missions of timely discovering, reporting, and controlling a mass incident. Further, after the police showed up, they took limited or no action at 36.1 percent of events, used violence at 16.7 percent, made arrests at 19.5 percent, and used violence along with arrests at 27.8 percent (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.1. Police Presence (=1) vs. Absence
Police Presence Freq. Percent 0 517 36.46 1 901 63.54 Total 1,418 100
Table 2.2. Policing Actions
Police Actions Freq. Percent 1 = no or limited action 325 36.07 2 = violence 150 16.65 3 = arrests 176 19.53 4 = violence and arrests 250 27.75 Total 901 100
In authoritarian regimes, it is common for local agents to employ thuggery (Johnston,
2012; Moss 2014). China is no exception. Some Chinese grassroots officials occasionally hire thugs to harass or attack protesters (Cai 2010; Yu 2004). Thus, this research also takes extra-legal methods of repression, i.e. hiring thugs, into account. If thugs were employed but not reportedly deployed by the third party, they are treated as part of the police violence. Thugs appeared in a total of 33 events of my dataset; in 20 of these
15 Regulations of Public Security Institutions on Handling Mass Incidents were issued in 2008 by the Ministry of Public Security. 40
events it seems that they were dispatched by the government. This number is small and for some events both thugs and police appeared in the same events. Thus, adding thugs into protest policing does not substantially change its distribution. According to Table 2.3, police or thugs turned up at 64 percent of events, 0.5 percent higher than not considering thugs. When the police/thug were present, they took no or limited action at 35.5 percent of the events (0.6 percent less than not considering thugs), used violence at 17.6 percent
(0.9 percent more), made arrests at 19.3 percent (almost no change), and used violence along with arrests at 27.6 percent 16 (nearly no change) (see Table 2.4). In brief, policing became slightly more aggressive after including thugs. In what follows, protest policing also includes thugs’ activities.
Table 2.3. Police/thug Presence (=1) vs. Absence
Police Presence Freq. Percent 0 510 35.97 1 908 64.03 Total 1,418 100
Table 2.4. Policing/thug Actions
Policing Actions Freq. Percent 1 = no or limited action 322 35.46 2 = violence 160 17.62 3 = arrests 175 19.27 4 = violence and arrests 251 27.64 Total 908 100
2.1.3.1 A Substantial Protest Space in China?
16 The percentages are rounded off, so a total of them may not added up 100 percent. More precise figures are available in the tables. 41
In light of conventional wisdom, we would expect to find a high proportion of protests to draw repressive police responses in a strong authoritarian regime. Nonetheless, Figure 2.1 demonstrates a considerable protest space in China: in all, 59 percent of protest events were tolerated, that is, police either did not show up at the event or when they were present, they did nothing or only took limited action. The other 41 percent of protest events were met with some kind of coercive measures: police employed violence alone at
11 percent, made arrests alone at 12 percent, and used violence in conjunction with arrests at18 percent (see Figure 2.1). This result coincides with Tong and Lei’s (2013) statistical findings on large-scale social protests, in which the government tolerated 65.7 percent of protest incidents.17
Violence and arrests 18% Absent Arrests 36% 12% Violence 11% Do nothing/limited actions 23%
Figure 2.1. Police Reactions: A Substantial Protest Space in China (N = 1,418)
17 Tong and Lei’s definition of toleration is a bit different from mine. In their definition, toleration means that the government refrains from using force in response to protests. Detention or arrests are considered as toleration. In this sense, their definition is wider than mine. 42
I should note that Figure 2.1 may not represent all social protests in China between 2001 and 2012. My dataset may have selection bias and is probably skewed to the repressed events as previously explained. On the other hand, it is fair to doubt that protest policing may be underreported. For some events, there is a chance that reporters omitted to mention police presence because they took no or limited action and thus were almost invisible. This scenario would not change the result of toleration, since no/limited action by police is also regarded as toleration. It is, of course, possible that police employed coercion after the news reports. This is a cause of concern for this analysis, but this concern is mitigated by the fact that such repression is likely to attract further attention by journalists and other observers, as connections between sources and reporters do not end with one news report. My dataset includes a number of protests with follow-up reports on repression. Overall, based on a dataset with a potential bias to include a higher proportion of the repressed events, I still find a considerable protest space.
Then is it reasonable to conclude that the space for protest in China is broad? Probably not. The strikingly high proportion of state toleration cannot be taken at face value. It does not speak for a liberal environment in which protest activities are not risky and seldom receive repression. Because if most protesters confine their claims, actions, and organization within the narrow range regulated by the state, given a majority of protests are tolerated, the space for protest is still quite limited. Hence, it is crucial to examine the character of protests.
2.1.4 Independent Variables and Hypotheses: protest characteristics
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A large body of literature has addressed the question as to how and why authorities respond to protests in the way they do. Among this literature, two factors stand out: the character of protest and the power of social groups.
2.1.4.1 The character of protest
Extensive research stresses that the character of protest and the level of threat posed to authorities sheds light on repression (Earl 2011; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009). This strand of research highlights the extent of threats felt by authorities in the face of social protests. More serious threats to political elites predict greater repression in terms of both frequency and severity. Protests that are more likely to suffer state repression in terms of both frequency and severity may be larger in protest size, or may contain certain types of claims, actions, and organization that are regarded as more threatening.
Mass political behavior directed against the state, its policies and its practices is generally viewed as being a threat to authorities (Davenport 1995). Authorities are more likely to quell challengers who wish to displace current political leaders, dismantle the political– economic system, or pursue other revolutionary or radical goals (Davenport 2007;
McAdam 1982). By contrast, challenges with modest demands usually result in less repression (Gartner and Regan 1996). Moreover, behavioral threats posted by challengers also predict state efforts to control. Noninstitutional, confrontational, or violent forms of contention generate strong repression (McAdam 1982; Tarrow 2011). Quantitative research confirms that protesters’ violence at an event nearly always draws police
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presence and actions (Davenport 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Earl and Soule 2006; Soule and
Davenport 2009). In addition, studies show that large protests are more threatening and more likely to lead to repression than small ones (Ayoub 2010; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and Davenport 2009; Davenport, Soule, and Armstrong 2011). Finally, authorities may prefer to tolerate challenges that appear to be ephemeral, but feel more compelled to act against the lasting ones (Franklin, 2009; Tilly 1978).
Most of these studies focus on liberal democracies. Yet not only in liberal democracies, but also in authoritarian regimes, such as a dictatorial regime in South Korea during the
1970s, the state responded discriminatively to protests with varied characters (Chang and
Vitale 2013). China scholars also make propositions on varied state responses to different types of protests.
Claims. In line with democracies, protests that do not purse radical goals seem to be increasingly tolerated. Nonetheless, what is considered as “radical” differs critically in
China from democratic regimes. The political reform initiated during the 1980s was put on hold ever since the 1989 Tiananmen uprising. By law, claims for democracy, rights concerning civil and political citizenships, any effort to contesting the Communist Party’s monopoly on political power are prohibited or strictly constrained. That said, the state seems more lenient to protests with no political goals. In the reform era since 1978, as the state assumes less responsibility for running the economy, it has become more willing to tolerate protests addressing economic, environmental, and even anti-corruption issues
(Selden and Perry 2010). Divides between different levels of government sometimes lead to government concessions to protesters (Cai 2010; Chen 2011; Tong and Lei 2013). For
45
instance, the gap between policymaking by the central government and policy implementation by the local government may empower protesters to legitimate their claims and contentious actions (O’Brien and Li 2006). In fact, contentious actions with moderate goals may even help the central government collect information regarding cases of power abuse and corruption by local cadres of which the central government might otherwise not be aware (Cai 2004; Luehrmann, 2003). Therefore, the central government may be more lenient to these kinds of protests than to those contentious political activities that directly challenge its rule (Zhao 2010; Reny and Hurst 2013).
Actions. Similar to liberal democracies, disruptive actions such as road blockades and strikes can become weapons of protesters in China (Selden and Perry 2010). Though some protests are repressed or end with a combination of repression and concessions, many of these disruptive protests are tolerated and can even induce government concessions (Cai 2010; Chen 2011; Su and He 2010).
Organization. In democratic regimes, protests with more social movement organization
(SMO) involvement are considered stronger than the ones with fewer or no SMO involvement, because they have access to more organization vehicles for pursuing grievances (Earl et al. 2003). In China, however, the presence of autonomous formal organizations does not seem advantageous to protesters. The Chinese laws severely restrict the right to freedom of association. Research shows that the regime remains intolerant of any organized activity — even activity with ostensibly non-political goals — not controlled by some branch of the Party (Bovingdon 2002). One case in point is the crackdown on underground efforts in forming labor unions (Lee 2007). Moreover, since
46
the state is well aware of the dangers inherent in cross-class, cross-regional, or cross- nationality associations, it has usually swiftly and severely crushed attempts to forge such bonds (Selden and Perry, 2010).
2.1.4.2 Power of social groups
In addition to protest character, governments also respond selectively to different sorts of groups. Authorities can be seen as opportunists that will repress when they believe they can win (Gamson 1990). Thus, subordinate groups—such as racial and ethnic minorities—are subjected to harsher repression, as they may be perceived as less able to resist repression or less able to retaliate politically against repressive agencies (Stockdrill
1996). Recent quantitative research, for instance, has shown that African American protesters have been more likely to suffer repression in the U.S. during some time period
(Davenport et al. 2011). By contrast, the persecution of mainstream, entrenched groups is likely to meet powerful resistance from elites and fail to succeed in stifling dissent
(Goldstein, 1978). By and large, the more powerful the group, the less repression it receives (Tilly 1978). On the other hand, Tilly (1978) also emphasizes that groups with a little power suffer more repression than do the completely powerless, because the latter pose no threat to the government and their small-scale collective actions are too weak to bother with.
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In China, peasants and ethnic minorities are conceived of as subordinate groups.18 The gap between urban and rural is exceptionally large in China. The average income of rural residents is not only far less than that of the urban residents,19 but rural dwellers also rarely attain the entitlements of urban citizenship and have fewer privileges than urban residents (Naughton 2007; Solinger 1999). Collective resistance staged by weak groups, such as land protests by peasants, tends to end in failure and it often requires extra support or leverage to achieve success (Cai 2010). In addition, despite affirmative action type policies, scholars argue that minorities in China are treated as peripheral peoples, marginal to power and politics (Bulag 2010; Gladney, 1998). Within minorities, the state also has disparate attitudes. It is, for instance, more tolerant of Hui protests than Uyghur unrest20 (Gladney 2004). Uyghur and Tibetan relations with Han are considered the worst among the minorities (Mackerras 2004) and the Chinese government has been criticized for human rights abuses in Xinjiang or Tibet. In reality, there is no dearth of cases in which protests by peasants or minorities (especially Uyghurs and Tibetans) meet ruthless repression. On the other hand, neither peasants nor minorities are completely powerless groups. Instead, the Chinese regime has been deeply concerned with rural unrest and minority protests, especially those deemed to threaten social stability or the unity of the country (Bernstein and Lü 2000; Mackerras 2004).
18 Here, I acknowledge that these two groups do not make up a comprehensive list of subordinate groups in China. They are treated as important examples for analysis. 19 For instance, the average income per capita of urban residents in 2012 is 24,565 yuan ($3,899), whereas that of rural dwellers is only 7,917 yuan ($1,257) (Dai 2013). 20 Along with Uyghurs, the Hui also fall into the category of Muslim minority. 48
In sum, with regard to protest character, we would expect that large, long protests, making radical claims, using violence, or establishing formal, cross-region, cross-class organizations, tend to suffer repression. In respect to subordinate groups, it is reasonable to expect that protests by peasants or ethnic minorities are more likely to incur repression.
In the following sections, I will conduct statistical analysis to examine the impacts of these factors on repression. One point is worthy of mention. It is not my intention to adjudicate between these two strands of literatures; rather, I argue that both are useful in demarcating the boundaries of protest space in China.
Based on the above discussions, to identify the boundaries of protest space, it is necessary to examine whether police treat distinct characters of protests and protest groups differently. Accordingly, independent variables are categorized along the two dimensions, which constitute different types of protest claims, actions, organization, protest size, and the social groups involved.
1. Claims
I divide protest claims into the following categories: Economic, environmental, moderate political, radical political claims, and a residual “other” category. Economic claims include (1) defending material goods, monetary resources or property rights and (2) calling for increasing economic resources. Examples include laid-off workers demanding higher severance pay and homeowners opposing house demolition.
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Environmental protests include resistance to any project that is expected to impair or endanger the local environment or anything that has caused environmental damage. It can be an objection to a power plant or a demand to relocate a polluting factory.
Political claims concern demands with an explicitly political nature. However, protesters with moderate rather than radical goals may receive distinct responses from the state.
Moderate political claims are issue-specific and usually target particular government decisions, officials, or officers, which include disclosing corruption of an individual official, unveiling misconduct of a specific government department, and demanding to improve the performances of a certain institution (e.g. the court system). By contrast, radical political claims target the central government, seek comprehensive political change, regional autonomy, autonomous political participation, and challenge the regime as a whole. Examples of radical political claims include a call for the independence of
Tibet and a demand for an end of one-party rule.
In some events, protesters may put forth more than one sort of claim. Environmental claims are sometimes mixed with economic claims. For instance, residents in the vicinity of a factory causing pollution advance both economic and environmental claims when they seek compensations and demand pollution reduction. Moreover, not all protests targeting political authorities raise primarily political claims. As a high-capacity authoritarian regime, the Chinese state controls many resources and exerts great control over people’s lives, and thus it often generates state-centered grievances (Zhao 2010).
Even if grievances arise from the wrongdoings of third parties, protesters are frequently inclined to invite government intervention. Hence, economic and/or environmental
50
claims are often combined with moderate political claims. In my analysis, any event that expresses at least one radical political claim is coded under the radical political category, even if other sorts of claims are also raised. Other than this categorization, I attempt to ascertain the foremost claim and use it to categorize a protest. To decide which claim is foremost, I rely on the one mentioned the most in protesters’ banners, slogans, and accounts.
In my dataset, 63 percent of events had predominantly economic claims, the figures for environmental, moderate political, and radical political claims are 7, 18, and 5 percent, respectively, which compose 93 percent of all protest claims (See Figure 2.2). It is noteworthy that my dataset may disproportionately comprise protests with radical political claims. Since Boxun disapproves of the Communist regime, it is inclined to collect protests with radical political claims. The Western media and human rights groups are also keen to report such kind of protests. Even so, only 5 percent of events fall into this category.
The residual category, “other” claims, include pro-Chinese nationalist, religious protests,21 and medical disputes22 (see Figure 2.2). While nationalist protests are also
“political” in nature, they are not categorized into political claims because I have decided to focus on political claims that target the Chinese government, whereas nationalist protests target foreign governments.
21 Monks’ protest against mining their holy mountain is a case in point. 22 Here is one example: after a patient died allegedly by a medical accident, families of the patient did not expressly raise economic claims in their protest. 51
I create several dummy variables for each kind of claim. For instance, a dummy variable for an environmental claim is coded 1 when the predominant concern of a protest is regarding environment issues and no radical political claims are raised. The dummy variable for a radical political claim is treated as a reference group in regression analysis.
Hypothesis 1: Economic, environmental, and moderate political claims are less likely to draw police response, whereas radical political claims, are much more likely to suffer repression.
environmental 7% moderate political 18% Protest radical political Claims 5% economic other 63% 7%
Figure 2.2. Protest Claims
2. Actions
Protest actions are classified into the following categories: Violent, peaceful disruptive, and peaceful non-disruptive actions. Violent actions refer to using physical force (such as hitting, shoving, and beating) or weapons (such as rocks, bombs, guns, and bricks) to take
52
confrontational actions (e.g. attacks, riots) or other actions that cause damage to people or property. There are 287 events in my dataset that involved violent actions (see Figure 2.3).
Twenty percent of protest events involved protester violence. I employ a dummy variable for violent protests that is coded 1 when at least one of the above violent actions taken by protesters.
Peaceful disruptive actions include civil disobedience, demonstrations, strikes, rallies, marches, sit-ins, etc. When both violent and peaceful disruptive activities took place in an event, this event is counted as violent. A total of 1086 events fall into the category of peaceful disruptive actions (see Figure 2.3), which is coded 1 in a dummy variable.
Peaceful non-disruptive actions include circulating petition letters, publishing protest letters, and innovative contentious actions such as shaving one’s head bald. It is also a dummy variable that is coded 1 when protest actions are neither violent nor peaceful disruptive.
I treat violent protests as the reference group when doing regression analysis. Figure 2.3 shows that the vast majority protests take peaceful disruptive actions.
Hypothesis 2: Peaceful, disruptive or non-disruptive actions are less likely to receive police coercion. Violence generally prompts repressive policing.
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1,200 1,086 1,000 800 600 400 287 200 45 0 Peaceful Violent Peaceful Non- Disruptive Disruptive
Figure 2.3. Protest Actions
3. Organization
I use two dummy variables to describe two types of protest organization: Isolated and formal organization. Isolated organization is coded 1 when no linkages across regions, work places or social groups are established. Examples include peasants of a single village opposing land appropriation and workers of one factory calling for higher wages.
Figure 2.4 shows that 60 percent of protests are organized in an isolated way, which is in accord with state confinement.
Hypothesis 3: Protests linked organizationally to others increase the likelihood of protest policing compared to those not linked.
Formal organization is coded 1 when a protest is organized by an autonomous formal organization with a recognizable name and clear leadership. Figure 2.4 reveals that 96
54
percent of protests are organized in an informal way, which largely follows the stringent limits of association imposed by the government.
Hypothesis 4: Protests organized in an informal way reduce the probability of protest policing compared to those with formal organization.
Isolated 844
Linked 574
Informal 1,363
Formal 55
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 Figure 2.4. Protest Organization
4. Protest size
Protest size is measured by the number of protesters reported at the event. In my dataset, a specific number of protesters were reported in a news article for 62 percent of events (N
= 878). As to the events for which there were no news reports, I estimated the number of protesters based on verbal cues in the news articles, numbers specified in similar events, numbers of police officers dispatched at the events, the scale of the community (e.g. a village or a factory), and so forth. As a robustness check, I ran regression analyses on two
55
different sets of events: events for which the number of participants was specified in the news articles and the full dataset. In both sets, the substantive findings are almost the same.23 I use logged count of the number of participants as a measure of protest size, a continuous variable. The measure is logged to correct for heteroskedasticity (Earl et al.
2003; Davenport et al. 2011).
Hypothesis 5: A large protest is more likely to produce police presence and response than a small protest.
5. Social groups
I take peasants and ethnic minorities as examples to ascertain whether police treat subordinate groups discriminately. In line with existing literature, descriptive analysis of my data demonstrates that protests by peasants and minorities are policed more heavily than their own protests by other groups. To be specific, I compare workers and middle class protests with peasant protests to explore any discrepancy in protest policing.24 A peasant protest refers to a protest exclusively launched by peasants, with no presence of protesters from other social groups. This distinction addresses the concern that with other social group presence, police attitudes towards this protest might be different from peasants only. Likewise, worker protests are defined by protests only attended by workers;
23 See Table 2.5 and Table D for comparison. 24 The 2010 China Census Data show that the Chinese population is largely composed of workers and peasants, with an increasing middle class. Yu (2007) estimates that most of mass incidents in China are protests staged by peasants, workers and other urban citizens. 56
middle class protests are exclusively made up of protesters from middle class.25 In my analysis, I code managers, cadres, police, veterans, hospital employees, bank staff, professors, teachers, journalists, etc., as “middle class.” According to Figure 2.5, protests exclusively by peasants, workers, and middle class compose 21, 20, and 7 percent of the whole dataset.
Peasants 21%
Other 52% Workers 20%
Middle Class 7%
Figure 2.5. Protest groups by class
In my data, police were present at 74 percent of all peasants protest (N = 293), 57 percent of worker protests (N = 289), and 39 percent of middle class protests (N = 110).26 After
25 Peasants and workers were usually explicitly pointed out in the news reports, whereas “middle class” is an aggregated concept and requires definition. Following Erik Wright (1997), this research defines middle class as people who do not own their own means of production, who sell their labor power on a labor market, and yet do not seem part of the “working class” in terms of their relationship to authority within production and their possession of skills or expertise. 26 The number of protest events by the three groups account for nearly 50 percent of the total. This is probably underestimated. In the news reports, many protests were launched by homeowners, urban/local residents, families of victims, petitioners, or nationalists, etc. Lack of information concerning protesters’ occupations and employment relations made it difficult to identify these protesters as peasants, workers 57
showing up, police used coercive means (violence and/or arrests) at 72 percent of events by peasants (N = 218), compared to 64 percent by workers (N = 162) and 46 percent by middle class (N = 48). In other words, peasant protests seem to be the most likely group to draw protest policing among the three social groups.
This result rasies another question: Do peasants adopt more threatening forms of protests than the other two groups? Statistical results are mixed. While the probablity of peasants to use violence (33 percent) is higher than workers (22 percent) and middle class (7 percent), peasants did not put forth more radical claims than the latter two. Radical political claims were not raised in peasant or worker protests, but appeared once in middle class protests. Also, peasants were not more likely to organize in a linked or formal way than the other two classes. To ascertain whether police single out peasants for harsher treatment regression analysis is needed which puts together a number of variables for test.
I create dummy variables for each of the groups mentioned above.
Hypothesis 6: Protests by peasants are more likely to be policed aggressively than protests by other groups.
Similar to the way in which I define peasant protests, I define minority protests as protests staged only by ethnic minorities. A protest by ethnic minority peasants is treated as a minority protest. The majority of Chinese in China are ethnically Han Chinese
or middle class. Therefore, I only count events that explicitly reported the class bases of protesters. 58
(constituting 91.51 percent of its population). The rest (8.49 percent) are classified as ethnic minorities (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011), which are categorized into 55 subgroups. As Figure 2.6 shows, Han staged 93 percent of protests in my dataset and the figure for minority protests is only 7 percent. Police were more likely to attend protests by minorities (78 percent out of 98) than by Han (63 percent out of 1320). Once they were there, police were more likely (75 percent out of 832) to repress minorities than
Han (64 percent out of 76). That is to say, minority protests increase the probability of protest policing. Not surprisingly, among all minorities, Uyghurs and Tibetans staged the most protests (87 percent out of 98). Police appeared at most protest events by Uyghurs and Tibetans (80 percent out of 85), but less at events by the other minorities (62 percent out of 13). Yet when police were present, they used less coercion at protests by Uyghurs and Tibetans (45 percent out of 68) than at protests by the other minorities (75 percent out of 8).27
Minorities 7%
Han 93%
Figure 2.6. Protest groups by ethnicity
27 This unexpected result is probably due to the small sample size of protests by the other minorities (N = 8). 59
Then, do minorities adopt more threatening forms of protests than Han? Descriptive findings are mixed as well. Radical political protests make up 59 percent of minority protests, whereas the number for Han is merely 1 percent. Yet the percentages of employing violence (20 percent) and using peaceful disruptive actions (77 percent) by minorities are the same as Han. In respect to organization, while minority protests were more likely to establish links than Han (49 vs. 40 percent), they were less likely to have formal organizations (1 vs. 4 percent). Further, the forms of protests by Uyghurs and
Tibetans resembled the forms of protests used by other minority groups (results available from the author upon request). On the whole, to ascertain whether police discriminate against minorities needs regression analysis which puts together a number of variables for test. I will run the regression analysis in the following sections.
I create dummy variables for each of the groups mentioned above.
Hypothesis 7: Protests by ethnic minorities (especially Uyghurs and Tibetans) are more likely to receive harsh repression than protests by other groups.
6. Control variables
Besides the dimensions of protest character and social groups, the location of a protest might also have an impact on protest policing. Harsh crackdowns on a protest taking place in a city are usually easier to receive public attention and have a more negative effect on regime legitimacy than quelling a rural protest. This, perhaps, is explained by the higher concentration of population and media institutions in urban areas, among other reasons. I employ dummy variables for protests in cities, counties, townships, and 60
villages,28 respectively. When a protest occurs in multiple-level locations, such as in both a city and village, I select the higher level location (city in this case) in coding. The dummy variable for protests in cities is treated as a reference group when doing regression analysis.
Hypothesis 8: Protests in cities decrease the odds of police presence and reaction.
Additionally, a control variable for the duration of a protest, measured by hours, is included in the model. Authorities usually have more time and opportunities to respond to long events. It is logged to reduce heteroskedasticity (Earl et al. 2003; Davenport et al.
2011).
Hypothesis 9: Extending the duration of protest increases the probability of protest policing.
2.2 ESTIMATION TECHNIQUES AND RESULTS
My analysis takes two steps to assess how the state, represented by police (or thugs), responds to different kinds of protests. First, I use binary logistic regression (BLR) to examine under what conditions police are likely to show up at the event. Next, I adopt the multinomial logistic regression model (MLR) to scrutinize multiple forms of policing strategies given police presence.
28 Protests taking place in townships and villages are not highly correlated with peasant protests. The correlation coefficients between townships and peasants and between villages and peasants are 16 percent and 53 percent, respectively (see Table A in Appendix I). Except for peasants, protesters that staged protests in townships and villages are categorized as minorities, workers (employed in the rural factories or state- owned mines), homeowners, and the like. 61
2.2.1 Police Presence at Protest Events
In the first step, the dependent variable, whether police attend an event or not, is a binary variable. I employ BLR, the most popular model for binary data (Agresti, 2007), to analyze my data. In this model, the dependent variable is the log odds of police presence at a given protest event. To ease the interpretation of BLR results, I present the odds ratios (rather than coefficient estimates), which represent the odds of observing police presence at a given event versus not observing its presence. An odds ratio for a particular independent variable with a value higher than 1 indicates an increase in the odds associated with a one-unit increase in the particular explanatory variable. An odds ratio for a particular independent variable between 0 and 1 indicates an increase in the odds associated with a one-unit decrease in the particular explanatory variable (Davenport et al. 2011).
2.2.1.1 Results
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Table 2.5. Binary Logistic Regression Models Predicting Police Presence at Protest Events in China, 2001 to 2012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Protest Character Social Group Character Full Uyghurs Character +Control Groups +Control +Groups Model &Tibetans Protest character ClaimsR1 Economic 0.800*** 0.811*** 0.795** 0.800** 0.808* (0.0461) (0.0503) (0.0646) (0.0655) (0.0720) Environmental 0.844* 0.849* 0.829* 0.835* 0.844 (0.0598) (0.0635) (0.0753) (0.0766) (0.0836) Moderate political 0.832** 0.842** 0.833* 0.836* 0.844 (0.0514) (0.0546) (0.0683) (0.0688) (0.0746) Other claims 0.816** 0.829* 0.826* 0.830* 0.837 (0.0576) (0.0610) (0.0712) (0.0719) (0.0775) ActionsR2 Peaceful disruptive 0.745*** 0.748*** 0.754*** 0.751*** 0.751*** (0.0235) (0.0240) (0.0239) (0.0240) (0.0240) Peaceful non-disruptive 0.657*** 0.666*** 0.661*** 0.665*** 0.666*** (0.0493) (0.0507) (0.0497) (0.0505) (0.0506) Organization Isolated 0.926** 0.924** 0.918** 0.920** 0.920** (0.0245) (0.0247) (0.0244) (0.0246) (0.0246) Informal 0.978 0.970 0.967 0.964 0.964 (0.0611) (0.0610) (0.0605) (0.0606) (0.0605) Protest size (log) 1.034*** 1.035*** 1.032*** 1.034*** 1.034*** (0.00681) (0.00733) (0.00685) (0.00734) (0.00733) Social groups Peasants 1.157*** 1.124** 1.103** 1.118** 1.118** (0.0364) (0.0453) (0.0342) (0.0433) (0.0427) (Continued )
63 (Table 2.5 continued) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Protest Character Social Group Character Full Uyghurs Character +Control Groups +Control +Groups Model &Tibetans Minorities 1.194*** 1.149* 1.017 1.030 (0.0600) (0.0672) (0.0684) (0.0745) Uyghur&Tibetan 1.042 (0.0871) Control variable LocationsR3 County 1.016 1.055 0.983 0.982 (0.0451) (0.0529) (0.0471) (0.0469) Township 1.042 1.096 0.997 0.996 (0.0527) (0.0609) (0.0533) (0.0532) Village 1.058 1.010 0.976 0.977 (0.0434) (0.0527) (0.0486) (0.0480) Duration (log) 0.994 1.014 0.993 0.993 (0.00751) (0.00729) (0.00749) (0.00749) Log likelihood -876.917 -875.565 -956.089 -952.294 -871.927 -871.323 -871.282 N 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418 1,418 Note: Main entries are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. R1 reference group: radical political claims; R2 reference group: violence; R3 reference group: city. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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Table 2.5 reports a series of BLR results. In Model 1, police presence is estimated simply by measures regarding the character of protest. Most of the character measures (except informal organization) are significant and in the expected direction. These results hold after entering the control variables — protest locations and duration (Model 2). Model 3 only examines impact of social groups on policing; it indicates that both peasants and minorities increase the odds of police presence as expected. This result remains constant after entering control variables (Model 4). The influence of social groups, however, is weakened after incorporating measures of protest character. As Model 5 shows, the effect of minority protests becomes insignificant, which suggests that the character of minority protests is more important in predicting police presence. By contrast, the impact of peasant protests remains significant.
Building on Model 5, Model 6 adds control measures. The two models show striking continuity and the impact of protest character and social groups hold in Model 6. Overall, the full model confirms most of the hypotheses associated with protest character and protest groups. Below, I report the regression results in Model 6 in details. First, radical political claims are more likely to prompt police attendance than other claims. Compared to the former, protests advancing economic, environmental, or moderate political claims, significantly reduce the odds of police presence respectively by 20, 16 and 16 percent. In respect to actions, peaceful disruptive protests are 25 percent and peaceful non-disruptive protests are 33 percent less likely to draw police presence than violent protests. With regard to organization, isolated protests decrease the odds of police presence by 8 percent compared to protests that are linked organizationally with other protests. The forms of organization, unexpectedly, have no influence on police presence. Duration also shows
65 no impact. Yet, protest size significantly increases the likelihood of police attendance. In addition, peasant protests are 12 percent more likely to draw police presence than others; whereas minority protests do not predict police attendance. Finally, protests outside of cities and duration have no influence on police presence.
As I am also interested to know whether police discriminate against Uyghurs and
Tibetans, I ran regression analysis for them as well. Model 7 resembles Model 6 except that environmental and moderate political protests become non-significant. That is to say,
Uyghurs and Tibetans, like minorities as a whole, do not significantly invite police presence.
To sum up, regarding police presence, BLR analysis suggests that my hypotheses with respect to measures of protest character are mostly supported. While police are more likely to attend peasant protests, they do not show such interest in minority protests, even by Uyghurs and Tibetans. As for the unexpected BLR results, I will provide explanations in the following section, along with a comparison of multinomial logistic regression results.
2.2.2 Police Actions at Protest Events
What do police do, once they are present at protest events? Simply showing up without coercive response is still a relatively tolerant response. Therefore, it is important to distinguish the types of police reactions to protests. I divide protest actions into four categories as listed above. Then I use multinomial logistic regression models (MLR) to estimate coefficients for the impact of explanatory variables on particular outcomes of the 66
dependent variable, relative to a baseline outcome (Long, 2012). Like the BLR analysis, I also present the odds ratios (rather than coefficient estimates) for the MLR model. In my analysis, police doing nothing or taking limited action is treated as the baseline.
2.2.2.1 Results
The MLR models shown in Table 2.6 illustrate consistent results to the BLR models.
Models 8 and 9 lend strong support to a series of hypotheses regarding protest character.
Compared to Model 8, protest character in Model 9 becomes even more important after entering the control variables, for the effect of moderate political claims becomes significant and in the expected direction and the effect of the rest explanatory variables remains constant. In what follows, I report results in Model 9 in details. First, in line with hypothesis 1, radical political claims are more likely to result in police coercion than other claims. In comparison to the former, protests putting forth economic, environmental, and moderate political claims decrease the probability of arrests alone by 82, 90, and 75 percent respectively, compared to police taking no or limited action. Economic protests also reduce the odds of arrests in conjunction with police violence by 78 percent compared to police taking no or limited action. With regard to actions, violent protests, as expected, increase the probability of coercive reactions compared to other types of actions. When protesters take peaceful disruptive actions, compared to violent ones, police are 84 percent less likely to use violence alone, and also 84 percent less likely to use violence in combination with arrests than they are to take no or limited action. The effect of peaceful non-disruptive actions is not significant. In respect to organization, regression results show that the scale and degree of organization do not contribute to 67
police actions. The number of participants also has no significant effect. Regarding subordinate groups, the regression results demonstrate that both peasants and ethnic minorities fail to achieve significance. For control variables, Model 9 reveals that protests taking place in townships and villages increase the likelihood of police violence along with arrests by 132 and 163 percent, which are remarkably high. Lastly, the duration of protests also increases the probability of police violence in conjunction with arrests.
As I am also interested to study police reaction to Uyghurs and Tibetans, I ran MLR analysis for them as well. Results of Model 10 resemble Model 9 except that the impact of moderate political protests on arrests alone becomes insignificant. That is to say,
Uyghurs and Tibetans, like minorities as a whole, have no influence on police coercion.
To sum up, these findings suggest that advancing radical political goals and taking violent actions in protests are triggers for police repressive response; prolonged and rural protests also predict police coercion.
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Table 2.6. Multinomial Logistic Regression Model Predicting Police Reactions at Protest Events in China, When Police were Present, 2001 to 2012
Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Protest character+social groups Full model Uyghur&Tibetan Protest character Violence & Violence & Violence & Violence Arrests Violence Arrests Violence Arrests ClaimsR1 Arrests Arrests Arrests Economic 1.013 0.204* 0.310* 0.971 0.177* 0.218* 0.597 0.186* 0.220* (0.767) (0.136) (0.182) (0.743) (0.120) (0.132) (0.514) (0.130) (0.140) Environmental 1.515 0.124** 0.487 1.359 0.100** 0.292 0.839 0.104** 0.299 (1.236) (0.0977) (0.316) (1.128) (0.0806) (0.196) (0.777) (0.0858) (0.212) Moderate political 1.117 0.280 0.424 1.100 0.253* 0.333 0.693 0.267 0.336 (0.848) (0.187) (0.249) (0.841) (0.171) (0.201) (0.591) (0.184) (0.210) Other claims 0.248 0.105** 0.240* 0.233 0.0905** 0.165** 0.158 0.0939** 0.169** (0.212) (0.0756) (0.148) (0.202) (0.0661) (0.105) (0.149) (0.0700) (0.111) ActionsR2 Peaceful disruptive 0.152*** 0.571* 0.157*** 0.155*** 0.587 0.163*** 0.158*** 0.587 0.163*** (0.0379) (0.161) (0.0357) (0.0390) (0.166) (0.0377) (0.0396) (0.166) (0.0378) Other actions 1.54e-14 3.641* 0.271 2.10e-15 3.467 0.232 3.81e-17 3.474 0.233 (4.56e-08) (2.372) (0.221) (1.66e-08) (2.287) (0.195) (2.27e-09) (2.291) (0.195) Organization Isolated 1.179 1.195 1.019 1.181 1.169 0.981 1.208 1.161 0.986 (0.266) (0.252) (0.203) (0.269) (0.248) (0.199) (0.275) (0.246) (0.200) Informal 0.957 0.605 0.956 0.973 0.628 1.021 1.007 0.621 1.028 (0.597) (0.282) (0.498) (0.610) (0.295) (0.539) (0.630) (0.291) (0.542) Protest size (log) 0.967 0.949 1.113* 0.940 0.920 1.067 0.945 0.919 1.069 (0.0565) (0.0509) (0.0574) (0.0597) (0.0541) (0.0602) (0.0599) (0.0540) (0.0603) (Continued)
69 (Table 2.6. continued) Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
Protest character+social groups Full model Uyghur&Tibetan Social groups Peasants 1.430 1.094 1.632* 1.158 0.833 0.942 1.098 0.849 0.919 (0.349) (0.276) (0.367) (0.358) (0.265) (0.279) (0.336) (0.267) (0.269) Minorities 1.758 0.444 1.848 1.631 0.396 1.699 (1.001) (0.273) (0.849) (0.992) (0.260) (0.862) Uyghur&Tibetan 0.897 0.432 1.686 (0.684) (0.296) (0.952) Control variable LocationsR3 County 1.003 0.985 0.630 1.112 0.966 0.640 (0.388) (0.377) (0.232) (0.430) (0.371) (0.238) Township 1.703 1.398 2.322* 1.803 1.376 2.355* (0.735) (0.655) (0.891) (0.778) (0.645) (0.905) Village 1.412 1.718 2.632* 1.490 1.680 2.715** (0.592) (0.747) (0.998) (0.621) (0.725) (1.020) Duration (log) 1.069 1.081 1.151* 1.069 1.082 1.150* (0.0725) (0.0652) (0.0673) (0.0725) (0.0653) (0.0673) Log likelihood -1108.991 -1097.303 -1097.303 N 908 908 908 Note: Main entries are exponentiated MLR coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. R1 reference group: radical political claims; R2 reference group: violence; R3 reference group: city. Police doing nothing or taking limited action is the reference category. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) Below I provide a detailed discussion on unexpected regression results and discrepancies between BLR and MLR results illustrated in Table 2.7 (in bold and italic).
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Table 2.7. Comparing Hypotheses with BLR and MLR Results
Police Presence Violence Arrests Violence & Arrests Protest character Claims (hypothesis 1) Economic - 0 - - Environmental - 0 - 0 Moderate political - 0 - 0 Actions (hypothesis 2) Peaceful disruptive - - 0 - Peaceful non-disruptive - 0 0 0 Organization (hypothesis 3 & 4)
Isolated - 0 0 0 Informal 0 0 0 0 Protest size (log) (hypothesis 5) + 0 0 0 Social groups (hypotheses 6 & 7) Peasants + 0 0 0 Minorities (Uyghur&Tibetan) 0 0 0 0 Control variable (hypothesis 8 & 9) Locations: rural 0 0 0 + Duration (log) 0 0 0 + Note: “0” means the regression result is not statistically significant; “-” refers to significantly reducing policing, whereas “+” indicates significantly increasing it.
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Below I provide a detailed discussion on unexpected regression results and discrepancies between BLR and MLR results illustrated in Table 2.7 (in bold and italic).
Surprisingly, protests with formal organizations do not predict protest policing. This is at odds with the existing rigid restraints on freedom of association in China, illustrated in many cases that the state has cracked down on protests involved with formal organizations. I speculate several scenarios to explain this contradiction. First, protesters may have had a formal organization, but police may not have been aware of it and thus did not respond. Second, perhaps no formal organization actually existed, but rather, police imagined its existence and used repression. Both scenarios can blur the boundaries between police repression and toleration, and thus contribute to the insignificant result of formal organization. Figure 2.4 shows that only 4 percent of protest events have been involved with formal organization, which is in accordance with the rigid constraints imposed by the government. The fact that the vast majority of protests do not reportedly have formal organizations provides two insights. In the first place, some protests might have established formal autonomous organizations. Yet to avoid repression, protesters did not disclose such information in the news reports. Second, the strict constraint and severe crackdown on independent associations might have deterred protesters to establish formal organizations. Both situations suggest the state’s repressiveness on formal organizations.
If either of them is true, it would indicate that the political space for formally organized protests is still quite limited. On the other hand, the contradiction between regression results and my hypothesis perhaps suggests that the restriction on organized protest may not be as severe as often thought, since there is not lack of evidence that in some cases
72 non-state organization publicly took the lead in protest mobilization and did not end with repression (Deng and O’Brien 2014).
A discrepancy between BLR and MLR models is that larger protests and protests linked to others tend to attract police presence than smaller and isolated protests, yet they are not more likely to suffer coercive response than the latter. I assume that police place a high priority on monitoring large and linked protests which impose a greater threat on maintaining order and controlling protests; on the other hand, police officers may often handle these protests with caution in case of escalating conflicts, since it is more costly and difficult to repress large and linked protests than small and isolated ones. Therefore, police may frequently show up at large and linked protests for monitor and control, but are wary of employing coercion.
Why do peasant protests tend to bring police presence but not coercion compared to protests by others? This might be explained by the relatively high incidence of violence in peasant protests. In my dataset, violence occurs in 33 percent of peasant protests, compared to 22, 7, and 20 percent of protests by workers, middle class, and minorities, respectively. Hence, police may perceive peasant protests as potentially violent and tend to attend their events and take precautions against violence. On the other hand, if no violence takes place afterwards, police would then not adopt coercion in these events.
This may explain why police did not single out peasants for repressive measures.
Inconsistent with hypothesis 7, regression results find no support that minorities are targeted for harsher punishment, which seems counterintuitive. This is true even when the
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regression was re-run with minorities with Uyghurs and Tibetans (the two sub-groups frequently subjected to repression) in place of minorities. This, perhaps, is because minorities (Uyghurs and Tibetans especially) engage in protests that have exceedingly high proportion of radical political claims. In my dataset, among protests by minorities (a total of 98 events), only Uyghurs and Tibetans made radical political claims (58 events; see Table 2.8). In protests by Uyghurs and Tibetans, 68 percent of them involved radical political claims. When controlling for protest claims, the effect of minority protests may become insignificant. This speculation is corroborated after I ran regression analysis that only included measures of protest claims and minorities (see Table E in Appendix I).29
These results, however, do not suggest that minorities, especially Uyghurs and Tibetans, are not singled out for repression. First of all, it is the state that defines what claims are radical political and off the limits. Uyghurs and Tibetans’ protests are usually interpreted by protesters and authorities through ethnicity lens. Even if it may stem from economic or environmental grievances, it can easily switch to separatist claim (Hastings 2005), and thus tends to result in crackdown. In contrast, ethnicity and separatism are not an issue among Han Chinese in mainland China. In this sense, when separatism is regarded as off the limits, the protest space for Uyghurs and Tibetans is much narrower than Hans. In
Chapter 5, I will elaborate on the dynamics of Uyghurs protests and demonstrate why there is a narrow protest space for Uyghurs.
29 I also ran regression analyses by adding forms of actions alone and forms of organization alone respectively into the model of social groups. In both models, the impact of minorities remains significant. 74
Table 2.8. Claims by Minorities
Uyghurs & Tibetans Other minorities Total
Radical political claims 58 0 58
Non-Radical political claims 27 13 40
Total 85 13 98
In addition, locations do not predict police presence, but show significant influence on police arrests along with violence. A possible explanation is that the state keeps a watchful eye on protests and usually dispatches police to attend a protest event wherever it occurs, urban or rural. On the other hand, authorities, in line with hypothesis 8, are less hesitant to use coercion in rural than urban areas.
Finally, regression results find no support that protracted protests tend to bring police presence, but they do increase the probability of police violence along with arrests. There are at least two possible explanations for this discrepancy. First, police may be quite familiar with a lasting protest which is not considered threatening and they feel they can afford to neglect it. On the other hand, once the patience of authorities runs out, police would then use whatever means to end it. A prolonged protest is assumingly difficult to terminate. Thus police are more likely to employ violence in combination with arrests to reach its goal.
2.3 DISCUSSION
The quantitative analysis presented in this chapter about state reactions to protests in
China challenges the conventional wisdom that protests are characterized by 75
transgression and repression in this type of state. Instead, regime-engaging is the dominant pattern of protests at present in China.
2.3.1 Mapping the space for protest
In this chapter, through binary and multinomial logistic regression analyses, I have drawn the boundaries between state toleration and repression in China. The character of protest is confirmed to be key to predict police response, which is in line with existing literature
(Ayoub 2010; Chang and Vitale 2013; Davenport et al. 2011; Earl et al. 2003; Soule and
Davenport 2009). In light of claims, actions, and organization — the important variables to measure protest character — my regression results can be illustrated on a continuum of toleration and repression. As shown in Figure 2.7, on the left end of the continuum, protests raising economic, environmental, and moderate political claims, and taking peaceful disruptive actions increase the odds of toleration; on the right end, protests advancing radical political claims, taking violent actions, and linked organizationally with other protests predict repression. In short, Figure 2.7 exhibits the general boundaries of protest space in China.
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Isolated organization Formal or informal organization Economic claims Radical political claims Environmental claims Moderate political claims Violent actions Peaceful disruptive actions Linked protest
Toleration Repression
Figure 2.7. Mapping the Space for Protest in China
This continuum assists in locating transgressive protests, namely, protests that violate the boundaries of toleration. Transgressive protests should be featured by those on the right end of the continuum in Figure 2.7. In Tilly and Tarrow’s view, in authoritarian regimes, protests take largely transgressive form which challenge “the regime, its institutions, and its laws all at once” (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007: 61). This, however, is not the case in China.
In my dataset, only 5 percent of protest events put forth radical political claims, 20 percent use violence, 40 percent have linkages with other protests, and 4 percent involve formal organizations. In this way, non-transgressive protests are prevalent in today’s
China. This is true even if my dataset may disproportionately comprise transgressive protests due to potential selection bias.
2.3.2 Rethinking the space for tolerated protest in China
Based on the largest nation-wide dataset of 1,418 protest events from 2001 to 2012 in
China, I have found that the space for tolerated protest in China is broad: nearly two-
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thirds of protest events were tolerated by the police. This is true even though the dataset may have potential biases for exaggerating the proportion of protests that are repressed.
Nonetheless, the remarkably high proportion of state toleration cannot be understood at face value. In terms of protest “actions,” the space is fairly broad: even disruptive actions yet as long as they are peaceful tend to be tolerated. But in terms of “claims,” it is narrow: a whole range of political claims that are permitted in many democratic regimes (rights to establish an independent party, to democratic elections, to regional autonomy, etc.) are all described as “radical” and are off limits. The low percentage (5 percent) of protests raising radical claims suggests that the great majority of people confine their protest activities to this narrow space. With regard to “organization,” the low percentage (4 percent) protests having open formal organization suggests that most protests seem to follow the laws that seriously limit the rights to freedom of association. As long as they do so, they are likely not to be repressed. Therefore, the tolerated space for protest in
China shown in my descriptive statistics should not be exaggerated. The space for protest is limited in very important ways, as grassroots claims to citizenship rights, freedom of association, and challenge the one-party’s monopoly of power all fall into the forbidden zones. Since among all social groups, only Uyghurs and Tibetans demand regional independence or autonomy in mainland China, which is regarded as transgressive by the regime, the protest space for Uyghurs and Tibetans are narrower than other social groups.
On the other hand, it is also inaccurate to underestimate the protest space. My statistical analysis provides important evidence that a large proportion of protests in present-day
China are tolerated and most protesters restrict themselves to this space. Since the
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majority of protests are non-transgressive, it is clear that regime-engaging protests are prevalent in China. According to my definition, in regime-engaging protests, both the state and protesters recognize the legitimacy of the other side and they are open to negotiation. State toleration and non-transgressive protest suggest that both sides do not deny the legitimacy of the other and do not reject negotiation.
Additionally, statistical results provide important insights into the discrepancy between formal institutions and informal norms of contentious politics. By law the boundaries that cannot be transgressed for protest are narrower in China than in many other countries; this is part of its authoritarian character. In practice, however, the boundaries are not as narrow as they appear to be in law, and the space within these boundaries is full of protest activities. In other words, this unexpectedly meaningful protest space suggests a gap between formal rules and informal practice of contentious politics in China. This research has defined the informal boundaries of protest space.
As a typical strong authoritarian regime, China has made a series of institutional arrangements to restrict or forbid contentious actions. If we simply focus on the formal institutions, we would believe that almost all contentious actions taking place through forbidden performances will be repressed (Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). By contrast, my data have shown that while disruptive actions commonly violate laws or regulations,30 they
30 According to the Law on Assemblies, Processions, and Demonstrations, these collective actions are required to apply for a permit to the public security bureau (PSB) at least five days in advance. In reality, the PSB rarely authorizes such a permit. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that the majority of disruptive actions in China are illegal.
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tend to be tolerated as long as they do not go too far (e.g. remain peaceful and put forth moderate claims). Thus, the protest space cannot only be defined by formal rules but also by contentious interactions, which produce informal norms, with protesters constantly pushing the envelope and the state’s daily practice of dealing with protests.
In Tilly and Tarrow’s framework, they do not fully take into account informal practices of contentious politics, which leads to their underestimation of the space for protest in
China. To have a more comprehensive understanding about protest space, we should take account of how protests are actually handled. Are there informal norms for authorities to cope with protests? If so, how do they work? Are protesters aware of these norms and do they act accordingly? How are these forms established and changed? Hence, we need to go deep into the interactions between authorities and protesters, and explore how informal norms play a role in shaping behaviors of both the state and protesters. This is the focus of Chapter 3.
The protest space seems to be determined by back-and-forth pushing in practice, and can only be identified by analyzing what kind of behavior actually brings about police repression. Thus this space is fluid and ambiguous, with boundaries fuzzier in some fields and regions than in others. Moreover, it is likely that there is periodic change in official attitudes. For instance, while the state has enlarged the scope of official tolerance for intellectual activities, in practice, official guarantees are periodically circumscribed
(Selden and Perry, 2010). Further, official reaction to protest may also differ at politically sensitive moment. The occurrence of significant events — such as the 2008 Beijing
Olympic Game and Arab Spring — also promoted the regime to exert tighter control over
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civic engagement including social gatherings, grassroots elections, and the media (Li
2012). As Christopher Rootes (2004) has argued, states are not merely structurally either open or closed but are contingently open or closed to particular issues and movements at different times. This is true of all states, and it is certainly true of China.
Despite variation over space and time, this chapter shows that we can identify distinct patterns of state responses to varied kinds of social protests in China. This is not to say that my analysis encompasses a complete list of factors leading to diverse state reactions to protests. Moreover, this kind of statistical analysis certainly does not definitively predict how a particular protest will be policed. Rather, it maps state reactions to protest in a way that gives us a broad picture of how protests are policed in China today.
It is worth pointing out that I have no intention to paint a rosy picture of contentious politics in China. China is unquestionably a repressive regime that permits less space for protest than in many other countries. And protest is still a risky endeavor and most protesters have to contain protests within the narrow space. Besides the heavy-handed repression, the regime can also employ softer, subtle means to handle protests as many other regimes, such as channeling and covert repression (Earl 2003 and 2011).
On the whole, mapping the space for protest in China is important not only for advancing our understanding of the complex relationship between the state and society in the world’s most populous country, but also because it poses questions about broader comparative models of contentious politics. China remains an authoritarian regime, which shows no sign of either growing weaker or moving towards a democratic transition.
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Nevertheless, there is a meaningful space for tolerated protest and this space does not seem to be closing up. The effect of organization is in disaccord with common sense and raises further questions. Is it true that organization does not have an important impact on state response? Or information about organization is not disclosed in news reports because it is too dangerous to do so? To answer these questions, I need to conduct case studies and examine the actual limits enforced by the state on protest organization and how protests are organized in reality.
This research raises further questions: Why is a protest space allowed to exist in China?
How do protesters understand the boundaries of protest space and react accordingly?
What leads to transgressive claims and violence? What contributes to local variation in the tolerated pace for protests? What impact do protest activities have on the regime?
The following chapters will seek to answer these questions by analyzing the dynamic interactions between protesters and authorities through case studies.
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Chapter 3 Regime-Engaging Economic Protests
In Chapter 2, quantitative study reveals the prevalence of regime-engaging protests in
China and suggests a gap between legal regulations and law enforcement in dealing with protests. Then why does such a gap exist and how does it work? Is it allowed because the
Chinese state is too weak to strictly implement the law? It seems not. Prior discussion indicates that the Chinese regime still has a strong grip of power and it harshly clamps down protests raising radical political claims, taking violent actions, and with organizational links with other protests. Then, why are authorities more tolerant of other types of protests? To answer this question, we need to delve into the mechanisms and dynamics of protests and its handling.
Statistical results have revealed that the regime tends to tolerate economic and environmental protests, and thus permits a space for negotiation. In my case studies, I have selected seven cases: three protests predominantly motivated by economic grievances which I will discuss in this chapter, and four protests primarily resulting from environmental grievances which I will discuss in Chapter 4. These cases were largely regime-engaging. In this chapter, I will take the three economic protests as examples to scrutinize how informal norms guide interactions and actions of authorities and protesters.
In the following sections, I will briefly introduce the three cases first and then explore informal practices adopted by authorities to handle contention as well as protesters’ actions. I will also consider local discretion and the impact of the protests on regime legitimacy and resilience.
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3.1 INTRODUCING THREE CASES
The three economic protests comprise a struggle against privatizing a hospital that formerly belonged to a state-owned enterprise (SOE), a protest by workers of a state- owned factory demanding higher severance payments, and a taxi drivers’ strike asking for raising taxi fares. All cases took place during the 2000s in D City near Beijing. As a typical middle-sized city with a population of nearly three million, D City lies in the middle range of a number of important variables, concerning its size, economic performance, industrial structure, and the degree of its contact with foreign capital and culture. D City is the site of numerous large and small factories, built before 1949, during the first decades of communist power, and in recent years.31 To date, this city has experienced a reform of state-owned enterprises and has developed an Economic and
Technological Development Zone encouraging foreign and domestic private investment.
It shares characteristics of the “sunbelt” region in the south, an area of dramatic industrial rise in the post-Mao era, where a huge number of foreign-invested and domestic private factories are located, and the “rustbelt” region in the northeast, an area of industrial decline in the reform era, where many manufacturing factories built during the Mao era were congregated (Lee 2007).
D City is among cities with the largest amount of petitions per capita in H province,32 which indicates the existence of substantial social conflicts here. This provides a rich pool of protests from which to select cases. Finally, the city lies within a province that is
31 Reports of D City. 1999. Fang Zhi Press. 32 Interviews with officials of petition offices in D City (Interviewees 17 and 62). 84
overwhelmingly populated by Han Chinese, the ethnic majority. There is one rural county in D City with a population mainly composed of Manchu ethnic group. But ethnic conflicts are not severe there, not as in ethnic minority regions populated by Uyghurs and
Tibetans in Xinjiang and Tibet, where sharp ethnic tensions have resulted in protests taking much more transgressive forms.33 Ethnic unrest will be discussed in Chapter 5 on regime-threatening protests.
There is no reason to think that the dynamics of political contention in D City are significantly different than in other cities. Moreover, the purpose of this chapter is to illustrate the dynamics of political contention and interactions between authorities and protesters. My case studies provide examples to give us insight into the dynamics of contentious politics in China.
3.1.1 Stopping the privatization of a hospital
Shining Hospital, with around 350 employees and retirees, used to belong to Shining
Factory, a large state-owned enterprise (SOE) with over 10,000 employees. The hospital had to be split off from the factory at the peak of SOE reform across China in the early
2000s. In the process, the hospital could either be privatized or taken over by the government. Hospital employees and retirees were in favor of government takeover, as it would increase their salaries and pensions.34 The local government, however, leaned
33 There is one rural county in D City with a population mainly composed of Manchu ethnic group. But ethnic conflicts are not severe there. 34 Hospital employees and retirees treat municipalization as an opportunity to increase their income in light of the gap between themselves and their counterparts in city 85
towards privatization to avoid providing financial support to the hospital. Against this backdrop, hospital employees and retirees initiated a struggle in 2004, which lasted for a combined six years between 2004 and 2012. During its first phase, through petitions and demonstrations, protesters pressured the municipal government to take over the hospital in 2007. Through similar means of struggle, in the second phase, protesters peacefully pressured the municipal government to pay off allowances35 to retirees and employees in
2012, which indicated the final success of the struggle.
3.1.2 Winning higher factory severance pay
Similar to the hospital struggle, Hill Factory worker protest also resulted from the SOE reform. This protest is a familiar story among a great many SOE worker struggles in
China. Hill Factory was a state-owned enterprise (SOE) that had nearly 3,000 retirees and employees, located in D City near Beijing. Owing to the government’s push for SOE reform in the early 2000s, Hill Factory filed a bankruptcy in 2004. Workers expected to get severance pay from the factory for terminating their employment relationship. A standard of 1,200 yuan (190 dollars) per year of employment was set by the factory cadres. However, workers were discontent with it and demanded an increase. They also accused factory cadres of corruption, which in their view led to the factory bankruptcy.
hospitals. City hospitals belonged to state-run institutions (SRI, shiye danwei, 事业), while Shining Hospital belonged to an SOE that performed poorly. In recent years, salaries and pensions at SRIs on average grew substantially more than those at SOEs, owing to the national income redistribution policies (Li 2013). 35 There were discrepancies of allowances between city hospitals and SOE hospitals. After takeover, Shining Hospital employees and retirees required to receive the same level of allowances as their counterparts in city hospitals, whereas the government has paid only part of it. That was the major reason of their second-stage protest. 86
From 2004, workers began a two-year protest. After taking various contentious actions including petitions and railway blockade, the protest ended with a combination of government repression and concessions.
3.1.3 Taxi drivers’ strike
A district-wide strike started in H District of D City on November 18 2009. The strike with the participation of around 3,000 taxi drivers was mainly caused by the surging gas price and declining profits. Local officials realized the abnormal situation as early as the morning and promptly took measures to minimize its impact. Broadcasting over the radio, they urged taxi drivers to return to work, promising to redress drivers’ grievances.36
Through the taxi management companies, or TMCs, officials also informed drivers of a reward of 100 yuan ($16) per day to those who would resume to work. Moreover, the authorities rented taxis and ran them in the street, attempting to cover up the strike. They also asked TMCs to arrange drivers to park taxis at places such as the downtown and railway station, in an effort to cover up the news. Finally, the government decided to raise one yuan for taxi charge in the name of “gas surcharge.” The decision was implemented at once, and the printing factory worked overnight to produce a tab to notify consumers.
On November 21, most taxis in H District received the surcharge poster. Growing number of taxis returned to the street and the strike was virtually over. After everything was back to normal, several drivers were arrested.
36 Before the strike, officials knew taxi drivers’ grievances as drivers lodged complaint to the government. But the authorities did not do anything about it. 87
In light of protest actions, organization and state responses, I put these three cases on a spectrum of regime-engaging and regime-threatening protests as shown in Figure 3.1. To be specific, the hospital struggle and taxi strike were largely peaceful protests, whereas
Hill Factory workers’ struggle went transgressive at some moments. Moreover, no formal organization was established during the course of the three protests. Shining Hospital protests did not link organizationally with other protests, whereas Hill Factory workers were joined by workers from a brother factory. In the third protest, most of the district- wide taxi drivers participated in the strike, including nearly three thousand drivers. The number of participants in the hospital and factory protests were around two hundred and one thousand, respectively. Officials’ responses to these protests varied from concessions without repression to a mixture of concessions and repression.
2. Hill Factory worker protest 1. Shining Hospital Struggle
Regime-engaging Regime-threatening
3. Taxi drivers’ strike
Figure 3.1. Three Cases on a Continuum of Regime-Engaging and Regime- threatening Protests
3.2 LEGITIMATING PROTEST CLAIMS
In all three cases, protesters’ basic claims were within the space tolerated by the state; both protesters and authorities were aware of this. The protesters, without exception, made no attempt to challenge the state’s authority. They put forth economic claims. For
88
most of the time, protesters attempted to negotiate with officials. Meanwhile, authorities acknowledged that protesters’ grievances were reasonable, negotiated with them (under protesters’ pressure), and made concessions in the end.
To alleviate official suspicion of the legitimate purpose of protests, protesters in my three cases usually overtly expressed their respect and loyalty to the state. In their demonstrations in front of the city hall, each of the hospital participants held a small national flag in hand. Hospital protesters also showed their respect to leaders of D City when writing petition letters to them. As for the second case, representatives of Hill
Factory workers knelt down in front of the leader of Giant Corporation, the factory’s parent company, during their first meeting at the onset of the struggle. Taxi drivers largely took passive resistance. Their goal was economic, localized (restricted within H district), and had no intention to challenge the Party’s power monopoly.
Protesters went to great lengths to pressure the authorities for dialogues. They believed that their grievances could only be resolved through state involvement. During the six years, Shining Hospital protest representatives made numerous petitions to Shining
Factory, the district and municipal governments, and sent letters to the Mayor, factory leader to lodge complaints. They held two peaceful demonstrations in front of the city hall under the name of collective petitions. Each demonstration was joined by one to two hundred employees and retirees. Similarly, Hill Factory workers went through the petition system and visited a number of institutions including D City Federation of Trade
Unions (DFTU), the Municipal Petition Bureau, and the National Petition Bureau. Since
Giant Corporation had the ability to raise workers severance pay, workers visited the
89
corporation multiple times. Likewise, taxi drivers used strike as a tool to attract authorities’ attention on their grievances. Their representatives participated in price hearings held by the government.
Zhi, the leader of Shining Hospital struggle, framed their protest as facilitating the local government to implement the central and provincial governments’ polices of separating social responsibilities from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Also, in their first demonstration, hospital protesters displayed banners making legitimate claims, which read “We want to see the Mayor!” and “Strongly demand implementing the No. 19
Provincial Document37” (Zhi 2009). Likewise, Hill Factory workers adopted the government’s policies on SOE reforms to make their points and framed their protest as reducing the loss of state assets by exposing factory leaders’ corruption.38 They also emphasized workers’ contributions to the factory in the past decades to legitimate their claims.
Local officials did not deny the legitimacy of three protests, even for the two that brought repression. For the hospital struggle, petition officials explained the reasons of the protest in a similar way as protesters and the government made concessions by taking over the hospital and increasing pensions and salaries.39 No protesters were punished after the struggle. Government concessions without repression suggested that officials considered the protest legitimate. With regard to the other two cases, while they were considered
37A provincial government policy concerning Shining hospital’s takeover. 38 Interviewees 1, 2, and 3. 39 The degree of income increase varied. A majority of them doubled. Earnings of some high-level professionals’ tripled or even more. 90
permeated by “opposition forces” and their leaders and activists were penalized, on the whole local officials did not deny the legitimacy of this struggle. An official from DFTU admitted that it was quite normal and understandable for Hill Factory workers to demand more severance pay, though whether or not the government would agree to their demand was another issue.40 The fact that the government finally jailed the corrupt cadres and raised severance pay also indicated official recognition of workers’ demands. The government made it clear that this protest was repressed only for blocking the railroad and contacting foreign media, not for other actions. In the same vein, for the third case, officials admitted that the taxi drivers’ income was dwindling in the context of soaring gas price. Officials who had cars showed sympathy to the taxi drivers when explaining the reasons of taxi strike.41 The government’s increasing taxi charge indicated that they regarded drivers’ grievances reasonable. Recognizing the legitimacy of protests paves the foundation for negotiating with protesters.
Under the pressure of grassroots protests, officials had meetings or public hearings to negotiate with protesters. During Shining Hospital protesters’ frequent visits to Shining
Factory, the Municipal Petition Bureau, and Health Bureau, factory leaders and government officials held dialogue with them. In the Hill Factory case, the leader of the factory’s parent company, Giant Corporation, either met workers in person or sent his sectaries to receive workers’ visits. Some of these meetings played a role in exchanging opinions, mediating conflicts, and placating protesters for the time being. In the third case,
40 Interviews with two officials of DFTU, interviewees 6 and 31. 41 Interviewees 4 and 5. 91
the government held a public hearing that were attended by the Municipal Traffic Bureau,
Commodity Price Bureau, Traffic Management Companies, and taxi driver representatives. This meeting served as a channel for officials to learn the demands of drivers and resolve the conflict.
3.3 PROTEST ACTIONS AND INFORMAL NORMS
As an authoritarian regime, the Chinese state has employed laws and formal regulations to impose strict limits on the space of protests. On the other hand, protesters constantly push the envelope and expand the space for permitted actions. As my quantitative study suggests, there is a gap between formal laws and law enforcement and many extralegal actions are de facto tolerated. Thus, to understand contentious politics in China, it is critical to explore informal norms of handling protests. I have detected three informal norms that can be used as examples to examine the protest space and interactions between authorities and protesters within the space.
3.3.1 Maximum of Five Petition Representatives
The 2005 Regulations on Petitions specifies that petitioners should send no more than five representatives to the Party and government offices when presenting collective petitions.42 A petition with over five people would be regarded as a “petition incident”
(Chen 2012). Nevertheless, across China, the five-person limit has been frequently violated and large collective petitions have been routinely tolerated (Cai 2004; Chen,
42 The new Regulations on Petitions were issued by the State Council and took effect since 2005. 92
2008). This was the case in D City as well. Hai, a medium-ranking official of the
Municipal Petition Bureau remarked to me, “It is against the State Council’s regulations to organize a great number of people to petition. According to the Regulations on
Petitions, petitioners making the same claim should send no more than five representatives and the rest of them shouldn’t come. However, who can actually control the situation?! Generally speaking, we tolerate collective petitions with more than five people.”43 These accounts are confirmed in my two case studies. In the hospital struggle, collective visits composed by dozens of retirees and employees to the Municipal Petition
Bureau were routine practice. Hill Factory workers also visited the Petition Bureau and
DFTU with groups that numbered well over five. None of them suffered punishment for this. Officials usually received their visits and engaged in a dialogue with them. Out of the concern of maintaining social stability, officials took the petitions as an avenue to learn grassroots grievances, pacify disgruntled citizens, and prevent escalating conflicts.
3.3.2 Permits for protest actions
According to the Law on Assemblies, Processions, and Demonstrations (LAPD), 44 individuals who intended to engage in a collective action such as a demonstration and march are required to apply for a permit from the Public Security Bureau (PSB) at least five days in advance. Without a permit, the organizer or activist can be warned by police or detained for up to fifteen days. If these people go further to refuse following a
43 Interviewee 7. 44 Passed in 1989, Xinhua Net (a state-run news agency). http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/23/content_2608613.htm, accessed by May 17th, 2012. 93
dispersal order or severely disrupt social order, they can suffer more serious punishment in terms of the Criminal Laws.45 Actually, it is common knowledge that the PSB has hardly approved applications for parades or demonstrations. An official of a district petition office confirmed, “It is required that citizens should submit applications for demonstrations and parades. But will the PSB approve them? Never! ”46 Yan, a captain of a district PSB, even declared, “It is forbidden to take to the street and demonstrate.”47
This is nothing surprising, because contentious collective actions may create disorder and threaten social stability and are understandably rare to be approved by the government.
Nonetheless, lack of permits does not prevent the occurrence of disruptive actions. Nor do they definitely incur state repression. As Figure 2.3 reveals, the majority of protests took peaceful yet disruptive actions and they tend to be tolerated compared to violent protests.
In this sense, staging a demonstration or parade without a permit is de facto tolerated, which has become an informal norm of contention. Neither the hospital struggle nor the factory protest obtained a permit to demonstrate in front of the city hall or gather in the street, but protesters received no penalties for this. During the course of their protest, Hill
Factory workers took to the street several times. In the initial stage of their struggle, workers applied for a parade within their residential compound. Unexpectedly, this application was approved! Yet police also warned workers of arrests beforehand if their
45 Item 296 of the Criminal Laws, passed in 1979 and revised in 1999. 46 Interviewee 22. 47 Interviewee 19. 94
march went beyond the compound. According to the LAPD and the Criminal Laws, parades that do not follow the approved route should suffer punishment. However, this was not the case for these workers. After marching several rounds in the compound, workers felt that it was ineffective to draw attention of the public and officials, so they took to the street. The crowd of several hundred workers blocked a main avenue of D
City. It took two hours for police to disperse the crowd by persuasion and negotiations.
After the traffic was restored, no arrest was made despite police threat. Additionally, in their largest visit to the Giant Corporation, around 600 workers blocked a road in front of the Corporation headquarters in Beijing, because the Corporation kept these workers out and rejected further negotiation.48 Workers stopped the traffic to draw attention of the
Beijing municipal government, in the hope of promoting the latter to pressure the
Corporation leader to re-engage in negotiation. The action was disruptive but peaceful.
Though workers did not submit any application for a permit of the assembly in advance, they were not punished for this incident. These events indicate that peaceful disruptive actions without officials’ permits, though illegal, do not necessarily lead to repression.
3.3.3 Interaction matters in determining state response
Even though most disruptive actions are de jure illegal, they do not necessarily incur suppression. What matters then? My interviews indicate that once a disruptive action takes place, interactions between the government and protesters as well as the extent of disruption or damage created by protests are important factors to predict state reactions.
48 Interviewee 1. 95
3.3.3.1 Official side
In reality, after a protest takes place, more often than not, authorities simply consider it as inappropriate (bu heshi, 不合适) but do not attempt to quell it at the outset. Officials made clear distinctions between “inappropriate” and “illegal” activities. For instance, after hospital protesters’ first demonstration in front of the city hall and when they moved to the Petition Bureau for meeting with officials, the municipal deputy secretary-general criticized the demonstration as improper, but not unlawful (Zhi 200949). Likewise, road blockade by Hill Factory workers was considered as “inappropriate, though not illegal.”50
The informal practice of differentiating inappropriate from illegal actions is important because it leaves a tolerated political space for many civil disobedience actions.
As a medium-ranking official of the Municipal Petition Bureau noted, when dealing with petitions, “very few people receive sentences or are detained. Normally, we just do mass work (zuo qunzhong gongzuo; 做群众工作)” (emphasis added).51 The meaning of “doing mass work” varies with the context. But in regard to handling contention, it usually denotes education, persuasion, and sometimes connotes negotiation. In doing mass work, officials’ most common practice is to use laws, regulations, and policies to decline protesters’ demands. Yet in some circumstances, they also decide to make concessions and bargain with protesters, such as bargaining in terms of economic interests. A popular saying circulates among officials: “using people’s currency to resolve people’s conflicts”
49 A memoir written by Zhi, the primary protest leader of Shining hospital protest. 50 Interviewee 6. 51 Interviewee 7. 96
(Renminbi jiejue renmin neibu maodun; 人民币解决人民内部矛盾).52 In addition to economic interests, negotiations can also include other aspects, including environmental protection and developing local infrastructure. For example, officials made concessions to force a pollution plant to stop production for the time being in exchange of petitioners’ signing on a contract to terminate their petition. Or the government would develop local infrastructure (such as providing tap water to the locality) in return for the compromise of protesters.53
Whether the contention would be regarded as “illegal” depends on subsequent interactions between officials and protesters. According to the Law of Security
Administration and Punishment (LSAP), individuals who instigate or organize illegal gathering, parades, and demonstrations that do not yield to persuasion can be detained for ten to fifteen days.54 In other words, whether protesters follow authorities’ instructions or take extreme actions determine whether a protest would be repressed or not. Yan, the captain of a district PSB, told me, “It is forbidden to take to the street and demonstrate.
However, if they (protesters) do so, we would not arrest them as long as they listen to us.
Only when they do not listen, we would take forceful measures” (emphasis added).55 This was echoed by an official from a petition office of D City Political and Legal Affairs
52 This view is reflected both in my field work and news reports. A petition office official, Hai, clearly referred to this saying. “Zhu Minguo: Some leaders believe in ‘using people’s currency to resolve people’s conflicts.’” 2009-9-12. People.cn. http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2012/0912/c1001-18982484.html. “Overcoming the laziness in governance by using people’s currency to resolve people’s conflicts.” 2006- 6-19. Xinhua Net. http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2006- 10/19/content_5218882.htm. Both accessed by March 28, 2013. 53 Interviewee 7. 54Article 55 of LSAP, passed in 2005 and implemented in 2006. 55 Interviewee 19. 97
Commission (zhengfawei, 政法委), “When taking disruptive actions, such as besieging the party sectary or state agencies, protesters are not punished if they follow police instructions to disperse; those who refuse to follow are detained or even imprisoned according to the LSAP” (emphasis added).56 In a similar vein, an official of the Municipal
Petition Bureau elaborated, “Petitions in front of government offices that block the gate would be tolerated if petitioners are persuaded to leave the municipal government. After all, they are petitioners” (emphasis added).57 Here we see that the official acknowledged the legitimacy of the collective action, recognizing that the protesters were not enemies or anti-government. “Nevertheless,” he went on, “if our persuasion is ineffective and protesters continue waving banners and shouting slogans, I am afraid that the PSB will take measures.”58 In other words, forceful measures would be taken.
A convention to deal with demonstrations in front of the city hall is to move protesters to the municipal petition bureau, ask them to select no more than five representatives, and then hold meetings between officials and representatives. Government officials usually do not hold meetings on the street with a crowd of protesters. This was the case in the hospital case. In their demonstrations in front of the city hall, the protest group were asked to move to the Municipal Petition Bureau and send five representatives to have a formal negotiation meeting with officials from several government departments. None of the demonstrators were punished, for they were cooperative with authorities in the demonstrations. As the captain of a public security bureau commented, “Indeed, the
56 Interviewee 21. 57 Interviewee 7. 58 Ibid. 98
number of their (hospital) participants is more than usual when they went to the city hall first and then to the Petition Bureau. But they didn’t have extreme actions: they did not block the traffic or committed vandalism. Without these activities, you cannot punish them.” 59
3.3.3.2 Protester side
Understanding the risks of defying authorities’ instructions, when pushing the limits of state toleration, protesters also self-discipline their activities. In this sense, protesters have to strike a balance between defiance and obedience (Chen 2011). To make their claims heard by the authorities and the public, protesters may cause troubles and press the boundaries of protest space; but they strive to remain legitimate and avoid repression, so that they do not go too far.
3.3.3.2.1 Hospital Struggle
To avoid government repression and obtain the support from within the government, protesters made efforts to legitimize their claims and actions. They collected laws and regulations about petitions and demonstrations. Moreover, they used social networks to obtain copies of the local policies concerning the Shining Hospital separation, which were normally semi-secret to citizens. Thereafter, protesters spent a great amount of time studying these documents. Furthermore, hospital protesters generally obeyed Regulations on Petitions when going through the petition channel and followed the Law on
59 Interviewees 19. 99
Assemblies, Processions, and Demonstrations (LAPD) to apply the demonstration permits to the PSB ahead of their two demonstrations. Neither got approved, as protest leaders expected. Actually, their real purpose was to inform and threaten the local authorities, with the hope of having a dialogue with officials.60
Even their most dramatic collective actions, the demonstrations in front of the city hall, remained peaceful (Li 2013). At the onset of the demonstrations, protest representatives read articles from the Regulations on Petitions to emphasize discipline and preempt radical actions. Senior citizens were arranged to stand in the front row to confront the police.61 Owing to the tradition of respecting the elderly, police had second thoughts about using violence against them. Additionally, seniors were usually less threatening and tended to remain calm in confrontation with the police than young people. During demonstrations, protesters showed obedience to police instructions. For instance, in the second demonstration, hospital protesters prepared a big banner stating their claims.
When they were about to display it, they were timely stopped by the police. Protesters then did not insist and folded the banner, which revealed that they were respectful of police authorities.62
60 Interviewees 8, 9, and 10. 61 Interviewees 11, 12, and 13. 62 I participated in the second demonstration. The above analysis is from my observations. 100
3.3.3.2.2 Factory conflict
For most part of Hill Factory struggle, workers managed to avoid radically confrontational actions. Even after the railway blockade incident (which will be discussed later), they did not give up self-censoring their actions. Soon after the incident, the municipal government convened a meeting to mediate conflicts between the entire factory’s workers, Hill Factory cadres, and Fan, the leader of the Giant Corporation.
More than 1,000 workers were present and they were outrageous by Fan’s long-term neglect of workers’ grievances.63 Many loudly reproached him during the meeting and some threatened to beat him despite the presence of armed police. Before the outrage burst into action, a protest leader, Luo, timely calmed down the workers and asked them to abide by the law and to redress their grievances in light of policies.
Additionally, even with the absence of representatives (because they were arrested), workers could still restrain their actions from being too defiant. After their representatives were arrested by the end of the protest, a large number of workers gathered at a police station where they believed their representatives were detained, demanding their release. Workers several attempts to storm into the station were thwarted by a human barricade formed by police. While workers were emotional, jostled the police, and some threw plastic water bottles at police, no violent clashes broke out. A few workers yelled to turn over the police car, but this call was held back by other protesters who warned that once they did so, the police would begin arrest immediately. Before
63 Interviewees 1, 2, and 14. 101
long, workers shouted slogans for releasing representatives, chanted the Internationale, and stayed in front of the police station overnight. A doctor from a hospital attached to
Hill Factory witnessed the whole event. His comments suggested that he was acutely aware of the limits of toleration.
Fortunately, workers did not fight with police and did not smash or force into the
police station...Once you used force, you would break the law. If you beat a police
officer, unquestionably they would fight back. It was OK to shout slogans to free
representatives, as this belonged to individual claims. It was not a big deal to sing
the Internationale, since everyone can do so. It was not too big a problem to push
and shove with police. But it’s not OK to beat police or overturn their cars. What
were the police who stayed around waiting for? Making arrests! It was not worth
taking radical actions and getting arrested. Our purpose was simply to release
the representatives.64
After this besiege, those who threw bottles received police warning but were not arrested.
As the doctor explained, “The Public Security Bureau (PSB) attempted to make as few arrests as possible.”65 In this way, the state’s toleration of the besiege event and workers’ self-censorship prevent the protest moving towards transgressive.
64 Interviewee 15. 65 Ibid. 102
3.3.3.2.3 Taxi Strike
Similarly, taxi drivers were also alert to the boundaries of protest space. In their view, it would be fine “if you just park your car at home, do not instigate others to participate in the strike, and do not smash cabs of those who did not join the strike.”66 Furthermore, drivers made distinctions between different levels of contentious actions and their outcomes. One case in point is the difference between smashing cars and urging taxi drivers to participate in the strike. As a female driver put it, “Yong (a driver) was arrested… But it belonged to contradictions among the people. He just tried to dissuade drivers from running on the road. If he had smashed cars, he would have been put in criminal detention (xingshi juliu, 刑事拘留)” [instead of administrative detention
(xingzheng juliu, 行政拘留)].67 This quote reflects that the driver understood that using violence would go too far and incur more severe repression. Thus, most workers strived to avoid being transgressive. They stayed at home to wait and see how the strike was going and how the government would respond.
3.3.4 Why push the limits
Why did protesters take the risk of pushing the envelope and taking extra-legal actions?
The straight answer is that if they didn’t do so, the government would probably not take their objection seriously. The results of demonstrations, road blockades, and strike in above three cases proved that pushing the envelope worked. In the hospital struggle, after
66 Interviewee 16. 67 By law, criminal detention indicates that the detainees would expect to be subjected to a more severe penalty than administrative detention. 103
numerous petitions, protesters held two demonstrations in front of the city hall, each composed of 100 to 200 people. After the first demonstration in July 2007, the government made substantial concessions and took over the hospital shortly. In the wake of the second demonstration, the government responded promptly again and raised benefits of hospital employees and retirees, though not as much as what the protesters had demanded. In the factory case, only when workers took disruptive actions, road and railway blockades, they got the chance to meet with top leaders from their parent company and top officials from the municipal government, who began to value their demands. Likewise, the district-wide strike disrupted the normal city life. Although taxi drivers previously complained to the taxi management company, the government, and the media about the rising gas price and expressed demand to increase the taxi service charge.
These efforts got no response from the government. In contrast, when the strike took place, just in a couple of days, the government reacted rapidly and imposed the gas surcharge. In this sense, protests have been a weapon for citizens to win their claims.
3.3.5 Ambiguity in protest norms and local discretion
The above discussions demonstrate three prevailing informal norms of contention in
China. Due to their informal nature, it is natural that the limits of toleration among local officials may differ. Moreover, the flexibility inherent in the laws themselves also leaves leeway in law enforcement. Although the LAPD and the Criminal Laws have specified a series of articles on constraining disruptive actions and regulated how to punish actions that severely disturb the social order, the definition of “severely” is nebulous. In this sense, the ambiguity of law allows for the development of informal norms. For disruptive 104
actions that violate the law but in a less severe way, protesters receive lighter punishment according to the LAPD: police warning or detention of fifteen days or less. Actually, the authorities always have the upper hand in deciding whether or not to use coercion. The standard of severity is usually based on locally determined norms. For instance, in explaining why several protesters had been jailed after blocking a road during a housing protest, a petition bureau official, Hai, emphasized, “Blocking traffic is a severe disruptive action, whereas sit-ins in petition office are generally not handled by law enforcement, but dealt with through mass work.”68 These distinctions have not been written in the laws or regulations; they are established through local practice.
Different local authorities’ standards of severity may vary. For instance, though Hai considered traffic blockade as blatant law violation, Hill Factory workers were not punished for that. “Skip-level” petitions69 are another example. Petitions to higher-level governments, especially to the central government, affect the local leaders’ performance evaluation and may undermine their political careers (Li 2013). That is why local officials are nervous about skip-level petitions. Some officials incline to tolerate, whereas others towards repression. As an official remarked, even if petitioners bypass the city government and lodge complaints to the central government or in the sensitive places, such as Zhongnanhai70 and the People’s Congress Hall, the petitioners do not suffer punishment as long as they do not take extreme actions. 71 Nonetheless, others reveal
68 Interviewee 7. 69 For instance, petitioners bypassed the municipal government and directly complained to the provincial or central government. 70 The Beijing residential compound of the top Chinese leadership. 71 Interviewee 17. 105
harsh measures taken to handle petitioners. Two police officers specified punishments that skip-level petitioners would receive: a warning for the first time, an administrative detention for the second time, and labor camp for the third time.72 Similarly, a petition official frankly admitted that at sensitive moments, petitioners who went to Beijing would be taken back and detained in the so-called “study classes.”73 He explained, “They violated security regulations.” 74 I asked what they do in the study classes and the official answered ambiguously “study.” An old petitioner, who had the detention experience in these “classes,” was introduced by the official to me. He reviewed his experience and told me that they did nothing but sit idly (daizhe; 呆着).75 His experience differed from others who suffered torture in the “study classes” in other provinces, which have been reported by official media.76 Moreover, at politically sensitive moments,77 my interviews uncovered that some petitioners were under 24/7 watch at home by local authorities to forestall possible skip-level petitions.78 In some cases, local officials accompanied
72 Interviewees 18 and 19. 73 The term of “black jails” was coined by human rights groups. 74 Interviewee 21. 75 Interviewee 20. 76 In other places in China, there are reports by official media that detainees were tortured in such “study classes.” For details see “Jiangsu Xiangshui: Petitioners were put into study classes by force.” 2009-03-30. China Youth Daily. http://fanfu.people.com.cn/GB/140194/9047275.html. Also see “Shanxi Chenggu: ‘law training classes’ jailing petitioners and one starved to death. Jinan Daily. 2011-07-15. http://news.sohu.com/20110715/n313466094.shtml. Accessed by August 17, 2013. 77 Politically sensitive moments include the convening of important conferences or events and the celebration of major national festivals. Petitions are manifestations of the existence of social conflicts and grievances, which are inconsistent with the state’s goal of building a “harmonious society” as proposed by then President Hu Jintao in 2005. 78 Interviewees 22 and 23. 106
troublesome petitioners to tour to places wherever petitioners wanted, as long as they did not go to petition.79
The discrepancy in coping with protest is also reflected in the taxi strike. After strike activists were detained, the Municipal Traffic Bureau (MTB), which is in charge of the taxi industry, wanted to teach the activists a harsh lesson. MTB officials visited the public security bureau (PSB) and proposed to revoke the taxi operation permits of the detained drivers.80 At that time, such an operation permit was worth at least five hundred thousand yuan (around $80,000). Confiscating it would deprive the drivers of a tremendous part of their property. The revoking demand, however, was rejected by the PSB, which had no intention of pushing the drivers to the wall. Should the permit be rescinded, the drivers might take extreme means and make bigger trouble to threaten social stability. As Xu put it, “if I were deprived of hundreds of thousands of yuan, what would the meaning of life be? I would definitely risk my life to fight against them!”81 Yong added “Then (we would) go to steal or rob!” In the end, these workers were released after being detained 15 days or less and paying a fine at ten thousand yuan.82
Due to the fact that local officials have discretion to determine which actions are permitted while others are not, repression hangs like a sword of Damocles over the head of protest leaders when they organize collective actions. This is similar to Stern and
Hassid’s (2012) finding that uncertainty about boundaries of permitted actions
79 Interviewee 23. 80 Interviewee 24. 81 Ibid. 82 Interviewee 25. 107
encouraged self-censorship among public professionals. For instance, after hospital protesters finished the demonstration in front of the city hall and moved to the petition bureau, four blocks away, the protest leader, Zhi, particularly stressed in my interview that this move was not a parade, but a rightful withdrawal. Even though Zhi claimed that they have the right to demonstrate and march according to the Constitution, his caution in wording illustrated his anxiety to legitimate their collective actions and the vagueness of the boundaries of protest space.83
3.3.6 Contesting the boundaries of protest actions
My discussion thus far has depicted a quite contained picture of contentious politics: protesters perceive the limits of protest space and endeavor to self-discipline their activities. Nonetheless, regime-engaging protests can move towards transgressive at some moments, which is demonstrated in Hill Factory protest. After multiple rounds of ineffective negotiations with representatives of Fan, the head of Giant Corporation, workers got fed up, became desperate, and began to think about more defiant actions.
They took increasingly extreme actions to put pressure on Fan for dialogue. This was why they blocked the roads in D City and Beijing and finally blocked the railway tracks.
In 2005, the key route between Northeast China and Beijing was paralyzed for several hours, which brought economic losses of as much as a billion yuan ($159 million). It also caused two casualties. When workers were staying on the railway track, a train ran towards them. Although the train eventually managed to halt, two workers holding a huge
83 Interviewee 8. 108
flag across the railway track in front of the crowd were swept towards the train and severely injured. One died after being taken to hospital and the other’s arm was broken.
After the railway incident, authorities and officials returned to the negotiation table, illustrated in a meeting held by D City government and attended by Fan, factory cadres, and workers. During the meeting, Fan agreed to pay compensations for the families with casualties, yet workers’ severance pay was not raised. Then after waiting for a period of time, workers intended to cause even bigger trouble: exposing their grievances to the world. They got in contact with a journalist working for an American media.84 This action was again moving towards transgressive, as it had the intention to embarrass the
Chinese state and reveal its callousness about worker well-being in front of the international audience, which challenged the legitimacy of the Communist regime. This effort was foiled by police when all six protest representatives were arrested right before their meeting with the journalist.
Did protest leaders understand the risk if they turned to transgressive actions? For the railway blockade incident, my interviews depicted a mixed picture.85 Dai, a Hill Factory doctor who was close to the main protest leader, Luo, recounted that Luo did not explicitly direct workers to block the railway tracks, but she probably had the intent. She
84 Interviewee 3. 85 None of my interviewees of the Hill factory workers or cadres would like to introduce the protest leader, Luo, to me, which will be explained latter. So my answers to the question relied on other workers’ understandings. 109
led the workers to march along the railway tracks in the name of walking to Beijing.86
Then, they took a half-an-hour break beside the track, waiting for the officials’ response.
It is unclear what Luo was thinking at that moment, yet having the break at least suggests that she hesitated about escalating the conflict. In Dai’s view, Luo seemed to believe that they could only get their grievances redressed by pushing the envelope. Finally, it appeared that Luo was determined to sacrifice herself to achieve their goal. Dai expressed this by referring to the traditional insurgent maxim: “He who does not fear death by one thousand cuts dares to pull the emperor from his horse” (shede yishengua, ganba huangdi laxiama; 舍得一身剐，敢把皇帝拉下马). 87 In short, while Luo was aware of the risk of turning transgressive, she was willing to take the risk. On the other hand, Dai and other two interviewed workers also admitted that when workers were waiting beside the railway tracks, it was difficult for Luo to control a crowd of thousands of workers and bystanders. Somebody, but not Luo, yelled “Go ahead!” and at once the throng stormed the railway tracks bypassing the security forces.88
While the railway blockade was an audaciously confrontational action and it led to great loss of life and property, it did not change the regime-engaging nature of this protest. For one thing, blocking the railway tracks aimed at pressing the authorities for dialogue, and it succeeded, as both workers and authorities went back to the negotiation table
86 Chinese protesters have coined the terms such as walking (sanbu; 散步) or traveling (Lüyou;旅游) to legitimate their marches or demonstrations in order to elude the severe constraint of collective actions. 87 This was a popular quote during the Mao’s era. Mao used this sentence to encourage people to rebel. Interviewee 15. 88 Interviewees 26 and 27. 110
afterwards. Moreover, though later on workers’ action became transgressive again when they contacted the foreign media, their action was preempted by arrests and no further transgressive actions were taken. On official side, authorities were lenient toward the great majority of protesters and made concessions in the end.
3.4 ENFORCING THE LIMITS ON PROTEST ORGANIZATION
Prior experience have told citizens that officials usually inflict punishment on protest leaders and activists, whereas tolerate the majority of ordinary participants. Protesters, therefore, are mindful of risks in leading or actively participating in a protest. Yet, the protesters must have some kind of organization to make collective actions possible.
When they took actions that were close to or cross the boundaries (blocking the railway tracks or the taxi strike), revealing their organization was risky. The state enforced this by arresting leaders, activists, and “representatives,” which strongly discouraged formal organization. In this way, some rules were developed among protesters to self-discipline their actions.
3.4.1 Safety Rule No. 1: Don't be identified as an organizer!
Avoiding being identified as a strike organizer by authorities was a rule prevalent among taxi drivers. Xu, a detained driver, felt fortunate that he went through police interrogation and did not concede that he was an organizer. Police had threatened to use electric sticks and confiscate his taxi operation permit with a value of 550,000 yuan if Xu continued denying that he had organized the strike. In Xu’s retrospect, “If I admitted that I was the organizer, then there was no way that I could be released in a couple of days. Instead, I 111
would face court trial. Who knows how many years I would be in prison?!”89 Here, Xu was vigilant about the harsh punishment to be meted out to the organizer. In fact, drivers have learned lessons from their previous strikes. Gao, a male driver, in his early thirties, remarked in detail.
Honestly speaking, no one organized the (2009) strike…If it was known that you
or I incited the protest, things would screw up…In the 2000 strike (in which
drivers parked their cars to demonstrate in front of the city hall), six people
including drivers and so-called “layabouts” were jailed for as long as half a year.
After the 2006 strike, a driver was detained for three months. I actually know this
guy. He was bailed out at 60,000 yuan in the end. He was not even an organizer,
but may have played a relatively active role in the strike and considered as a
typical one (dianxing, 典型). The government’s purpose was to kill a chicken to
scare the monkeys (shaji gei hou kan, 杀鸡给猴看). Nobody would bother you if
you just park your car at home during the strike. But it’s prohibited to lead a
demonstration in front of the city hall…No one dare to admit oneself as an
organizer… Because everyone is aware that this is illegal. For gathering you,
have to report to the government from one level to another.90
If it was true that nobody dared to take the lead, then how could a strike be made possible?
Gao illustrated the mobilization process, “When drivers chatted with each other during the break time, A asked B: ‘somebody said tomorrow there would be a strike. Have you
89 Interviewee24. 90 Interviewee 16. 112
heard about it?’ B answered: ‘No.’ Later on, B asked the same question to C; C then to others. In this way, the message spread out. On the planned strike day, when drivers found no taxis on the road, the strike message was confirmed and other drivers would not go out to work.”91 A female driver in her late forties also recognized that there was no organizer in the 2009 strike. Yet her explanation of the initiation of the strike had nuanced differences from Gao’s: she suggested that there was coercion in the call for strike. “During the break time, it was said that on which date, we should not go out for work. In 2009, half a month in advance of the strike, somebody came and required me to stop working (on a particular date)” (emphasis added).92 This coercive call for strike is clearly reflected in the account by a 42-year-old female driver, a laid-off worker from a big state-owned factory. “There was no strict organization in the strike. It was rumored to have a strike the next day, but no one was certain about this. As a result, on the first morning of the strike, my husband (who was also a taxi driver) found no cabs running on the street. Then he did not dare to go out for work either.” What was he afraid of? The female worker explained, “In the previous strikes, if you continued working while others were on the strike, somebody would follow you on the road and then smashed your car.
Or they remembered your license plate number and got you into trouble afterwards. It did happen in the past.”93 In this sense, despite the absence of a clear leadership, the fear of being treated as a traitor and suffering retaliation by other taxi drivers persuaded most drivers in the H District of D City to join the strike.
91 Ibid. 92 Interviewee 28. 93 Interviewee 33. 113
3.4.2 Safety Rule No. 2: Don’t be identified as an activist!
Drivers also learned a second lesson from prior strikes: actively participation could be risky as well. Previously, there were two taxi strikes in D City in 2000 and 2006, respectively. Both originated from economic grievances. During those strikes, drivers parked their cars in front of the city hall, and sent representatives to negotiate with government officials. Shortly afterwards, representatives were arrested. These outcomes taught taxi drivers a lesson: do not gather in front of the city hall and don’t be representatives. This was reflected in the 2009 strike. Most drivers parked their cars at home and no show in front of the government offices. Yet still a few drivers were arrested. Take two of them as examples. Xu was arrested because he made a phone call to a local radio program, which has a large audience of taxi drivers. In the phone call, Xu complained about the skyrocketing gas price and warned that if the government was not going to do something about it, they drivers would take actions. A few days later, the strike took place. So Xu was accused of instigating and organizing the strike. He was arrested under the allegation of “disturbing the social order” and held in criminal detention. A second driver, Yong, a friend of Xu, was also detained and accused of
“disrupting the social order,” but he was placed in administrative detention. Yong was accused of attempting to dissuade other drivers from working. Both of them were released within fifteen days, with a bailout of ten thousand yuan ($1600).
After the 2009 strike started, traffic management officials came to ask drivers for grievances, but nobody explained or lodged complaints to them in case getting into
114
trouble.94 The passive reaction among drivers was in contrast to the other two regime- engaging protests, in which protesters openly put forth their claims and endeavored to engage authorities in negotiation. But still, the taxi strike belongs to regime-engaging protests, because there was negotiation between the government and drivers during the public hearing. While drivers that I interviewed considered that the representatives who attended the hearing were selected by the taxi management companies and were pro- government, the government did make concessions and initiated the surcharge.
My discussion in Chapter 2 showed that state restrictions to protest organization are not as rigid as to claims. This reflects in my factory case. Hill factory protest was joined by another factory workers. The two people who were killed or injured came from the second factory. Authorities must have known this. Nonetheless, Hill factory protest was not subjected to repression for establishing cross-factory alliance.
3.5 USING CARROT AND STICK TO MAINTAIN REGIME RESILIENCE
What influence do regime-engaging protests have on the regime? Do government concessions encourage further protests? Or can the state repression backfire? Previous sections have touched upon these issues but have not provided straightforward answers.
This section centers on the impact of regime-engaging protests. In O’Brien and Li’s
(2006) analysis of the outcome of rightful resistance, which I consider as a kind of regime-engaging protests, they find that some activists feel empowered and become more
94 Interviewee 28. 115
likely to take part in future challenges, whereas others feel disillusioned and lapse into passivity (p112). The latter situation is more of the truth demonstrated in my three cases.
3.5.1 Hospital struggle
The hospital struggle ended in success and most of protesters’ demands were satisfied.
Retirees and employees’ income were increased substantially and they were generally content about the results, with little motive to fight for a small portion of benefits that were not granted. On the other hand, though the hospital protest ended with government concessions without repression, it was achieved at the expense of constant anxiety of repression and time-consuming devotion of protest leaders and activists. The main protest leader, Zhi, a retiree, moved to another city to stay with his daughter in the spring of 2014.
Therefore, further collective action led by Zhi is highly impossible. This, however, does not exclude the scenario that other hospital employees or retirees, heartened by this hospital struggle, would participate or lead a future protest demanding further economic interests. Yet as long as they follow the pattern of the existing hospital struggle, it would not impose severe threat to the regime resilience.
3.5.2 Factory conflict
At times, repression can backfire and escalate conflict (Brockett, 1991; Davenport, et al.
2005). This was true right after police arrested representatives of Hill Factory workers.
Out of anger, workers besieged the local police station, demanding to free their representatives. Following the siege, some workers sat in outside of the police station day and night for two weeks. But further confrontation events did not take place. While they 116
were besieging the police station, police videotaped workers’ actions. For those who were observed throwing plastic bottles at police, police visited their homes the next day and threatened arrests should they took further radical actions. The threat worked and no more arrest was made.
Subsequently, authorities also made concessions to pacify workers: the Corporation raised workers’ severance pay substantially and allegedly corrupt cadres were arrested.
Moreover, the municipal government also dispatched dozens of officials from pertinent departments95 to Hill Factory, who stayed for two months to help resolve the conflicts.
Several dozen officials were divided into working groups. Each was composed of four or five officials and paid door-to-door visits to workers’ homes. They framed such visits as making apologies to workers and collecting their opinions and suggestions regarding the factory’s bankruptcy. Some workers rejected officials’ entrance to their homes. Still, many others received these visits. During these visits, officials showed sympathy to workers and candidly blamed a few cadres whose dereliction of duty contributed to the escalation of conflict. These officials also acknowledged that workers’ economic demands were understandable, their accusations of cadre corruption were convincing, and all their actions were acceptable except blocking the railway tracks and contacting foreign media.96 The latter part was condemned by authorities and became the major justification for imprisoning worker representatives. Besides appeasing workers, the boundaries of protest space were reiterated through these visits.
95 The departments include the municipal State-owned Assets Supervision and Administrative Commission (SASAC), Labor Bureau, Public Security Bureau, and DFTU. For instance, DFTU sent as many as 16 officials to the community. 96 Interviewee 15. 117
Eventually, the workers’ struggle ended with a combination of concessions and repression. Workers’ severance payments were increased by more than 60 percent (e.g. for ordinary workers, increasing from 1,200 yuan to 1,970 yuan per year employed). Six protest leaders were put into jail, with maximum sentences of three years. Several factory cadres, convicted of corruption, were also sentenced to a maximum of five years in prison.
The government’s carrot and stick strategies appeared to be effective. Some workers accepted the official’s definition of acceptable and forbidden contentious actions and admitted that it was wrong for them to block the railway tracks. Here is a worker’s distinction between blocking the road and blocking the railway tracks, “Blocking the road also violated the law, but it did not cost much in lives and money. By contrast, interrupting the railway, which led to two casualties, was a way more radical and costly action.”97
Ultimately, officials’ responses to the struggle reinforced the legitimacy of the state. In my fieldwork, I made several attempts to interview Luo, the protest leader, but all the workers I contacted declined to introduce me saying that nobody in the residential community talked about the protest anymore, especially Luo. Dai, who was a close friend of Luo, explained that it was such a heartbreaking experience that Luo no longer mentioned anything related to the struggle after she got out of prison. She stayed in jail for three years and endured all the hardships as a prisoner. She did not benefit from the raise of the severance pay, which was only for incumbent employees; Luo had already
97 Interviewee 1. 118
retired by the time of factory bankruptcy. She got involved in the struggle simply owing to her fellow workers’ encouragement and support. Luo’s pensions were not paid during the three years of jail time. In terms of her personal interests, what was the point of participation? Dai speculated that while Luo expressed no regret, she must feel somewhat regretful.98
Today’s silence about the two-year dramatic struggle actually reflects the success of the government’s carrot and stick approach. In the post-struggle period, former Hill Factory workers have been busy earning money and a rich-poor divide has been growing among the workers. The residential compound today is full of an air of jealousy, mistrust, and animosity. The better off have left or plan to move out.99 Many apartments have been rented out and the security condition in the community is deteriorating. Currently, not a trace of workers’ solidarity can be found. That is to say, further collective actions by these workers are very unlikely.
3.5.3 Taxi strike
With regard to the taxi strike, the government’s divide and control strategy also seemed to have been effective in deterring the 2009 strike activists from participating in future strikes. First, most of the detained drivers quit their jobs as taxi drivers. Some rent their cars out. All of the arrested drivers were bitterly disappointed when other drivers did not support them and continue the strike when they were in jail. Xu, the only one who
98 Interviewee 15. 99 Interviewees 1 and 3. 119
remained driver, told me that after this experience, he would never want to make further comments on the radio about the government or taxi industry any more. In addition, taxi drivers risked losing their operation permit during their detention. Although none of drivers’ permits were confiscated this time, who knows whether the nightmare might come true for future activists? That being said, while the 2009 strike activists became passive, there is always a chance that new activists might stand up and take actions in the future when fresh grievances grow and opportunities occur.
The effect of my three cases may not include all possible outcomes of regime-engaging cases. Previous regime-engaging protests that have ended with success may set an example and encourage similar protests. Another scenario is that experienced activists feel empowered and are more willing to take part in future protests as O’Brien and Li argue.
Given these scenarios are real, as long as these protests remain regime-engaging, they do not threaten regime resilience, because these protesters often have to play by the rules and self-discipline their behavior.
3.6 HANDLING “CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE PEOPLE”
Why do informal norms of contention exist in this strong authoritarian state? This phenomenon is beyond the expectations of scholarship on contentious politics. In fact, since the Mao era, due to the concern of social stability, the Chinese leaders have been calling for officials to softly handle “contradictions among the people” (renmin neibu maodun, 人民内部矛盾) while harshly treat “contradictions between the enemy and 120
the people” (diwo maodun, 敌我矛盾). Contradictions among the people are conflicts based on the common interests of the people;100 despite the existence of contradictories, those who are categorized into the “people” (instead of “enemies”) embrace and support the Party and its policies.101
3.6.1 The Mao era
In 1956, massive protests in socialist Poland and Hungary plus growing domestic social unrest unnerved the Chinese leaders. Workers’ demonstrations in Poznan, Poland and students’ marches in Budapest, Hungary promptly developed into large-scale protests joined by tens of thousands of people, who called for reforms in their own countries.
Parallel to the tense international context, social unrest arose in China between the second half of 1956 and early 1957. Dozens of strikes and petitions were staged by a total of over ten thousand workers, college and high school students in dozens of cities went on strikes and petitions, tens of thousands of peasants petitioned, rioted, and withdrew from cooperatives, such as in Zhejiang and Guangzhou Provinces (Bo, 2008).
The Chinese leaders worked round the clock during the Hungarian revolution period (Bo,
2008). In merely twenty days between October 21 and November 9 in 1956, the Central
Standing Committee and Political Bureau of the Central Committee held fourteen
100 Mao Zedong . February 27, 1957. Key note speech in the Supreme State Council. https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao- 19570227AA.htm, accessed by October 23, 2013. 101 Jiang Zeming. December 24, 1993. Speech at the national meeting of political and legal work. http://www.qstheory.cn/zl/llzz/jzmlyzgts/201003/t20100320_24653.htm， accessed by October 29, 2013. 121
conferences and a number of more meetings among the leaders to discuss about the
Poznan and Hungarian protests. Then the leaders came to a conclusion: A key lesson that can be learned from the protests by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was whether to correctly distinguish and handle CBEP and CAP concerns the life or death of the communist regime (Bo, 2008: 407).
In the Supreme State Council Meeting attended by 1,800 people on February 27, 1957,
Mao Zedong highlighted that any social class, status, group who support, embrace, and participate in socialist undertakings belonged to the category of “people”; whereas all social groups who resisted socialist revolution, were hostile, and undermined socialist construction were the “enemies” of the people. CAP should be treated in only democratic and peaceful means, such as education, critiques, and persuasion; repressive methods should be avoided. By contrast, the party state should exercise dictatorship over CBEP, i.e. coercive methods.102 In short, the party state should be more tolerant in dealing with
CAP while ruthlessly repress CBEP. Mao also saw the transition between CAP and
CBEP, which depended on how to deal with them. Mao’s arguments about handling CAP were considered as one of the most important theories after the CCP took power in 1949.
This theory, however, was not implemented in the following twenty years. From the anti- rightists movements (1957) to the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), large quantities of
CAP were treated as CBEP (Bo, 2008).
102 Mao Zedong . February 27, 1957. Key note speech in the Supreme State Council. https://www.marxists.org/chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao- 19570227AA.htm， accessed by October 23, 2013. 122
3.6.2 The reform era
During the post-Mao era, Mao’s theory on CAP has been reemphasized by his contemporary successors, from Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, to Hu Jintao, and has served as a critical guideline to deal with contention. No doubt, the boundaries between the people and enemies have been redrawn; also, the methods of dealing with CAP have experienced change. Yet the principle has remained the same: adopting peaceful means to handle CAP, whereas forcefully suppressing CBEP.
In a speech of the second Plenum of the 14th Chinese Communist Party Congress on
March 7, 1993, then President Jiang Zemin underscored that leaders and cadres of various levels should study Mao’s CAP theory and associate it with the current situation to improve abilities in handling CAP. Likewise, in 2010, then President Hu Jintao pointed out that Mao’s CAP theory remained highly instructive today.103 The reemphasis of correctly handling CAP has also been written in the Party’s important documents, including the Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the 16th CCP Congress in 2006 and
Report of the Fifth Plenum of the 17th CCP Congress in 2010.
Like Mao, the later leaders embraced his theory on CAP because of their concerns of regime stability. As Jiang put it, leaders of various levels should be competent to analyze and deal with all kinds of CAP so that the masses would support the leadership whole-
103 Hu Jintao. September 29, 2010. Speech at the 23rd collective study of the Politburo of CCP. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010-09/29/c_13535934.htm, accessed by November 2, 2013. 123
heartily and that the country’s stability and solidarity could be maintained.104 Both Jiang and Hu spoke straightforwardly that unable to appropriately handling CAP would undermine social stability and harmony as well as endanger the undertakings of the Party and state.105
Nowadays, Chinese leaders admitted that the vast majority of social protests were CAP.
In a national economic conference of 1993, Jiang Zemin made it clear that large quantities of new conflicts created in the economic growth and reform process belonged to CAP, though the Party should also be alert to CBEP. Similarly, in a public speech of
2002, Hu Jintao stated that with the number of CAP growing in China, most of the mass incidents taking place in various places recently were caused by CAP.106 Zhou Yongkang, then Secretary of the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission,107 echoed that the majority of petitions and mass incidents were CAP in a national meeting in 2009 (2010).
Why were CAP created in China today? According to the leaders, their occurrence resulted from the changes in interest relations and interest distribution owing to the reform as well as bureaucratism, cadres’ irresponsibility and power abuse, Party members’
104 Jiang Zemin. January 1, 1994. Speech at the new year meeting of the National Committee of the Political Consultative Conference. Peoples’Daily. 105 Jiang, Zemin. March 7, 1993. Speech at the second plenum of the 14th CCP Central Committee. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66685/4494247.html, accessed by October 24, 2013. Hu Jintao. September 29, 2010. Speech at the 23rd collective study of the Politburo of CCP. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2010- 09/29/c_13535934.htm, accessed by November 2, 2013. 106 (Hu Jintao. 2002. Speech at the 2002 new semester ceremony of the Central Party College. http://www.people.com.cn/GB/paper83/7656/732032.html, accessed by November 3, 2013. 107 The Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission is a powerful organ overseeing the judiciary system and law enforcement in China. 124
corruptions, which infringed the interests of the masses.108 In other words, the leaders candidly acknowledged that some problems inside the Party should be to blame for the generation of CAP. And they recognized that a majority of CAP resulted from problems related to the masses’ personal interests.109
As for dealing with CAP, besides Mao’s means which concentrated on persuasion and ideological education, the contemporary Chinese leaders also stressed employing multiple means, such as economic and lawful means, to resolve conflicts and sustain social stability .110
The leaders frequently emphasized that the Party should be tolerant of CAP. As early as
1993, Jiang stated that incorrect methods such as coercion, the methods employed to deal with CBEP, should be resolutely avoided in coping with CAP.111 In the 2000s, the regime repeatedly called for local government to be prudent in the use of force to handle
108 Jiang Zeming. December 24, 1993. Speech at the national meeting of political and legal work. http://www.qstheory.cn/zl/llzz/jzmlyzgts/201003/t20100320_24653.htm， accessed by October 29, 2013. Hu Jintao. November 2003. Speech at the 20th National meeting of Public Security. http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2012/0919/c349398- 19052942-2.html, accessed by November 2, 2013. 109 Hu Jintao. October 2003. Speech at the second plenary meeting of the third plenum of the 16th CCP Central Committee. http://dangshi.people.com.cn/n/2012/0919/c349398-19052942-1.html, accessed by November 1, 2010. 110 Jiang Zemin. December 18, 1998. Speech at the 20th anniversity of third plenum of the 11th CCP Central Committee. Selections of Major Literature Since the 15th National Congress of CCP, pp. 689－690. The Central Committee of CCP’s Resolution about Major Issues on Constructing the Socialist Harmonious Society. Accessed by October 10, 2006. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-10/18/content_5218639.htm, accessed by November 5, 2013. 111 Jiang, Zemin. March 7, 1993. Speech at the second plenum of the 14th CCP Central Committee. http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64184/64186/66685/4494247.html, accessed by October 24, 2013. 125
peaceful contradictions among the people. For instance, the 2000 Regulations on How
Public Security Institutions Should Handle Mass Incidents112 specified the principles of
“three cautions”: cautions to employ police forces, coercive measures, and weapons
(shenyong jingli, shenyong qiangzhi cuoshi, shenyong wuqijingxie; 慎用警力、慎用强
制措施、慎用武器警械).113 This three-caution principle has been reemphasized in a series of policies and regulations. For instance, the Recommendation about Appropriately
Handling Mass Incidents issued by the Central Committee of the Party and central government in 2004 reiterated the three caution principles. With an increase of unprecedented mass incidents such as the Weng’an incident in June 2008, the Minister of
Public Security, Meng Jianzhu, repeated the three caution principles. He highlighted that the main tasks of police were to maintain the order at the scene, resolve contradictions, prevent extreme actions, and keep the situations under control, rather than to escalate the confrontation; incidents leading to death and injuries should be firmly prevented. Meng required that the reporting system should be reinforced: officials who wanted to deploy the police force must report to the higher-level government (Meng 2008).
3.6.3 Local practices
How do local officials understand the three-caution principles? Following the central government’s directives, officials of D City made distinctions between contradictions among the people and with the enemy. In my interviews, local officials employed similar
112 The Regulations were carried out by the Ministry of Public Security in 2000. 113 “How to enforce the principle of cautions to use force in practice?’” 2008-11-05. Guangzhou Daily. http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2008- 11/05/content_10308685.htm, accessed by December 18, 2012. 126
terms to refer to contradictions among the people, such as the issues concerning common people (laobaixing, 老百姓), the masses (qunzhong, 群众), or petitioners (shangfang de ren, 上访的人).114 My interviews revealed that officials had a softer tone to contradictions among the people. For instance, “Issues regarding laobaixing should not be escalated… My feeling is that when handling matters about laobaixing and qunzhong, our government generally follow the principle that better to be relaxed than to block, better to be lenient than harsh.”115 By contrast, “Contradictions with the enemy include attacking people, damaging property, and violent riots in ethnic minority regions such as in Xinjiang,” as a PSB officer told me. He emphasized that contradictions with the enemy were much more common in Xinjiang or Tibet than D City.
With regard to petitions, officials accept the legitimacy of most petitions and admit their demands reasonable, though officials also proclaim that some petitioners may take illegal actions. Zhou Zhanshun, the former director of the National Petition Bureau, recognized that greater than 80 percent of petitions throughout China have valid reasons, should and could be resolved by the government.116 D City officials shared this view. Some officials reasoned that most protests were caused by interest conflicts, which implied that these
114 Interviewees 17, 29, and 30. 115 Interviewee 17. 116 In 2003, Zhou argued that over 80 percent of petitions reflected problems created during the reform and development process; over 80 percent of petitions are reasonable and should be resolved by the government; over 80 percent of petitions can be resolved by the government, if efforts are made. China Comment, November, 2003, http://www.southcn.com/news/china/zgkx/200311200686.htm, accessed by November 3th, 2012. 127
protests had no political intentions.117 Instead, these officials criticized the misconduct of local government and lack of rule of law for creating protests. According to an official of
H District Petition Bureau, many protests resulted from problems generated by the local government, including its ineffectiveness, inaction, and lack of awareness of serving the people. Similarly, the former deputy director of the Municipal Petition Bureau maintained that the occurrence of a number of protests originated from officials’ seeking prompt economic success and instant benefits while neglecting the people’s interests.118
He also contributed a number of petitions to unfair court verdicts, power abuse of local officials, and corruption. An official from the petition office of the City Political and
Legal Affairs Commission pointed out that the lack of fairness in the judiciary system contributes to a quantity of petitions.119 An official from K District Petition Office boldly complained about the current system from the perspective of petitioners: “Channels for the people to express claims are very limited. In fact, the state does not at all encourage collective petitions. However, if you do not block the gate of the government, how can you get your problems resolved? How contradictory this is (duo maodun a, 多矛盾
啊)!”120 Not only government officials, but police officer also echoed this view. The captain of a public security bureau (PSB) acknowledged that most claims by ordinary people had rightful reasons and only very few were unreasonable.
117 Interviewees 7 and 17. 118 Interview with the former deputy head of petition bureau of D City, Interviewee 17. 119 Interviews with a former deputy head of the petition bureau and an official of petition office concerning law suits. 120 Interviewee 22. 128
The attitudes were also reflected in the 2004 updated definition of mass incidents,121 that is, gathering events in which resulting from contradictions among the people or the masses consider that their interests are inflicted, and they take illegal methods of gathering and blockade to express opinions or raise demands to related government departments or divisions. This definition points out that the reasons of mass incidents fall into contradictions among the people, though the methods they take are illegal. Since the central government requires leniency towards contradictions among the people, as mentioned before, this definition allows space of tolerance. If local officials disobey this central government’s guideline and lead to detrimental outcome in handling a mass incident, officials might be punished as harshly as being removed from office.122 In addition, it is increasingly more difficult for local officials to get away with using excessive coercion and escalating mass incidents by blaming a handful of people with
“ulterior motivation” (bieyou yongxin, 别有用心). Once attached with the symbol of ulterior motivation, these people are usually considered as state enemies, with evil purpose to undermine the regime and to pursue political goals. Such an excuse has been increasingly criticized by official media and high-level officials, including the Party
Sectary of Guizhou Province.123 The critics reprimanded the local officials for hiding their own mistakes or attempting to evade responsibilities.
121 The General Office of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) (2004). 122 “Temporary Regulations about Enhancing Accountability of Party and Administrative Leaders and Cadres.” 2009-07-13. People’s Daily. http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/101380/9640147.html, accessed by October 27, 2012. 123 “Use Less ‘Not Knowing the Truth’ in Dealing With Mass Incidents.” Xinhua Net. http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-07/28/content_11788078.htm. 129
Restrained by the central government’s call for being lenient to contradictions among the people, how do local officials justify their repression? Can they simply condemn them as contradictions with the enemy? In reality, a common practice is to frame the contention as contradictions among the people yet penetrated by oppositional forces, such as those with ulterior motivation. Accordingly, only those who are considered oppositional forces will be punished. As a PSB captain explained, contradictions among the people can be utilized by hostile forces or anti-government forces, who organize the masses to “make trouble” (naoshi, 闹事).124 When a protest is identified a contradiction among the people mingled in which enemies are involved, the majority participants are usually termed as
“the masses unaware of the truth” (buming zhenxiang de qunzhong, 不明真相的群众).125
One case in point is the Hill Factory protest. It was defined as being penetrated by international (foreign media) and domestic oppositional forces (the protest leader and activists), whereas the vast majority participants were innocent and taken advantage by the former.126 Similarly, the taxi strike was also framed as being instigated by “people with ulterior motives,” who were the arrested taxi drivers.
Once the government recognizes a protest as contradictions among the people penetrated by oppositional forces, it would single out the organizer and activist for punishment whereas leave the majority participants untouched. This principle is also in line with the
124 Interviewee 19. 125 Interviewee 17. 126 Interviewees 15, 17, and 31. 130
law.127 As a petition official said, “We take legal actions128 against individual activists and organizers in dealing with illegal petitions. Of course, very few people receive sentences or are detained” (emphasis added).129 A police captain elaborated their divide and control strategy in handling protest:
We have a division of labor to deal with collective petitions. We, the criminal
investigation division, are mainly in charge of taking activists away from the
protest spot. But our action should not be noticed by the masses (to avoid trouble),
as this is a contradiction among the people, not contradiction with the enemy.
After taking activists away, we ask them who the organizers are. Once convicted,
the organizer would possibly be placed in either criminal detention or
administrative detention in light of the laws and regulations. At the same time,
officials and police are responsible to educate the masses to contain the collective
petition and prevent it from expanding.130
According to law enforcement officers, they are cautious in defining a case as a contradiction with the enemy or a contradiction among the people penetrated by opposition forces. Before making such conclusions, they need to find evidence. The officer continued, “When we don’t have concrete evidence, all mass incidents are treated
127 For instance, Article 29 of LAPD regulates that if collective actions of occupying public place, intercepting vehicles, passengers, and blocking the traffic severely disturbs the public order and traffic, people who are responsible collective actions should be punished according to the Criminal Laws. In other words, protest leaders and activists are singled out to be repressed. 128 Implies coercive means. 129 Interviewee 7. 130 Interviewee 19. 131
as contradictions among the people... We can only be suspicious but draw no conclusion that hostile forces take advantage of mass gathering to create impact. Therefore, it is critical to obtain evidence that who incited the protest. Sometimes, protest participant admitted who have said something to him (which started the protest)”131 This, then, can be treated as a proof of instigation. After identifying the protest leader, coercive measures will be taken. But such investigation is not done for all protests. “For collective petitions that lead to severe outcomes, the public security department would investigate who the organizers are, who would then be taken law enforcement measures. Yet for normal petitions, nobody bothers to look into who the organizers are.”132
3.7 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have taken three regime-engaging protests in D City as examples to illustrate how informal norms of contention come into play in protest and its handling.
My goal is to shift our attention from formal institutions to informal norms to advance our understanding of contentious politics in China. While regime-engaging protests sometimes incur repression, as my case studies reveal, the state treats this type of protests with more leniency and officials follow informal norms to deal with them. In this sense, the state allows the existence of an informal protest space, in which some illegal or extralegal protest actions are de facto tolerated by the government. The protest space, therefore, is not as narrow as it appears to be in law. Meanwhile, regime-engaging protesters continuously push the envelope while also self-censoring their actions.
131 Interviewee 19. 132 Interviewee 32. 132
Occasionally they may turn transgressive. Yet as long as both officials and protesters can return to the negotiation table, these protests are still regime-engaging. In the process, both the state and protesters in general recognize the legitimacy of the other side and for most of the time, they are open to negotiation with each other. In a nutshell, both the state and protesters work on resolving conflicts through dialogue not force. Hence, regime- engaging protests help maintain regime legitimacy and resilience.
The three case studies illustrate dynamic interactions between authorities and protesters and demonstrated informal norms reflected in underenforcement of laws. These three cases, by no means, represent all regime-engaging protests in China. Informal norms revealed in this chapter cannot be said to be representative, but illustrative. It should be noted that the struggles in this chapter were allowed a considerable amount of leeway in terms of protest action, because their (economic) claims fell within the state-set boundaries. With regard to the factory case, both the state and the protesters saw the Hill
Factory struggle not in isolation, but rather as part of a larger category of protests against state-owned enterprise reform. The norms for such protests were set by broader context despite local variations. Neither the Hill Factory workers nor the local government were setting the standards. Thus, local transgressions and repression did not lead to the
“regime-threatening” cycle because both protesters and authorities had the broader norms of engagement to return to. However, for these broader protest categories, even in the economic and environmental terrains, there could be national tipping points that lead authorities and protesters to enter a vicious cycle of transgression and repression.
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Chapter 4 Regime-Engaging Environmental Protests
The quantitative analysis in Chapter 2 has exhibited that apart from economic protests, environmental protests also tend to be tolerated by the state, which permits space for negotiation. In this chapter I take four cases of environmental protests as examples to further study regime-engaging protests. Regime-engaging cases of Chapter 3 all took place in a single city. This chapter analyses the same type of environmental protests — protests against garbage incineration — occurring across regions, from the North to the
South, urban to rural. This chapter focuses on how regime-engaging protesters perceive protest space and push its limits as well as how authorities reiterate the boundaries of protest space. I also analyze the influence of these protests on regime resilience.
Regional variation will be the main theme of this chapter. In all four cases the basic claims were the same, but the protest trajectories were different because of geographic and social differences. Briefly speaking, urban middle-class protesters had more resources (such as media access and social capital) to engage in tolerated protests and had more space to act. The village protesters had fewer resources and less space. There is also variation within urban areas and within rural.
4.1 INTRODUCING FOUR CASES
In 2004, China surpassed the United States as the world’s largest generator of waste.
Currently, China is estimated to produce more than 220 million tons of municipal waste annually and the amount is projected to reach 533 million tons by 2030, according to the
134
World Bank.133 To cope with the rapidly rising mountains of trash, the Chinese government has decided to rapidly develop incineration into one of the main methods of waste management. In 2002, less than 1 per cent of garbage in China was incinerated.134
In 2011, 15 percent to 20 percent of garbage is incinerated, and it is projected that the proportion will jump to 30 percent by 2015 and 40 percent by 2020.135 It is predicted that
China will have over 300 waste incinerators by the end of the 12th Five-Year Plan in
2015 compared with 103 in 2010.136
Incineration as a method of waste disposal is widely debated in the world. Incomplete burning in an incinerator may create highly toxic and persistent environmental pollutants, such as dioxins, which can cause cancer, severe reproductive and developmental problems, among others.137 As elsewhere, construction of incineration plants in China has aroused a growing number of protests by local citizens and environmental activists.
Between 2006 and 2011, residents of more than 30 cities across China have launched objections to incineration for fear of its severe environmental consequences.138
133 “Trash Planet: China.” Marie Look. August 10, 2009. http://earth911.com/news/2009/08/10/trash-planet-china/, accessed by February 12, 2012. 134 Asian Development Bank 2009. 135 “Report on garbage disposal industry: waste incineration is facing opportunities to develop rapidly.” 2011-11-30.Xinhua Net. http://stock.jrj.com.cn/hotstock/2011/11/30041211680046-4.shtml, accessed by February 12, 2012. 136 New Century 2012. 137 “Dioxins and their effects on human health.” World Health Organization. http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs225/en/, accessed by February10, 2012. 138 China Central Television (the state television broadcaster). “Residents Oppose to Build the Planned Project of Asia’s Largest Incineration Plant in Beijing.” 135
I have selected four anti-incineration protests that have taken place in different regions across China. Two of the sites are in rural areas (see Table 4.1). The first case, Plain
Village, is located in a rural county of D City. All my three economic cases in last chapter were in this city. As introduced before, D City is a middle-sized city with a population of nearly three million located in H Province, close to Beijing. Like other
Chinese municipalities, D City includes both rural and urban areas. It has seven county- level units: three urban districts and four rural counties. In 2012, the annual net income per capita of the rural county to which Plain Village belongs is 8,691 yuan, slightly higher than the national level of 7,917 yuan (China County Statistics). The rural country has a population of 495,900 in 2012 and the Plain Village has a population close to 2,000.
The other rural site, Water Village, it has a much larger population: more than 10,000 people, including migrant workers who work in village factories and other enterprises.
The administrative district that the village is attached to had 423,000 people. Water
Village is a prosperous southern village in J Province, proximate to Shanghai. The annual net income per capita of Water Village in 2007 was 14,000 yuan, far above the national level of 4,140 yuan that year. The village has more than 100 industrial enterprises and some were owned by the villagers.
The two urban sites are in large cities. B City has a population of over 19 million, where the number for C City is 12 million (China Census Data 2010). The annual net income per capita of B City is over 36,000 yuan and the number for C City is more than 38,000
http://news.sohu.com/20100626/n273097403.shtml, June 26, 2010, accessed by June 16, 2013. 136
yuan. Both were much higher than the national average level of 24,565 yuan.139 They are among the most affluent cities in China. In B city, the incinerator was planned to be located in Park Community, with 260,000 people living and working in a number of commercial residential compounds and high-tech industrial parks. Spring Community, the scheduled location of the incinerator in C City, was also a densely populated area with 300,000 residents.140 Compared to the two villages, the two urban communities were more prosperous and populous.
The four cases were selected for illustrating regional variation. I do not claim that they are representative of all anti-incineration protests or all sorts of regime-engaging protests across China. Neither do I argue that these cases are typical of rural/urban or north/south cases. My goal here is to use the four cases as examples to demonstrate regional difference when protesters make the same claims.
139 http://baike.baidu.com/view/2332455.htm, accessed by June 28, 2013. 140 “Panyu will build incineration plant and 300,000 homeowners are worried about its health risks.” New Express Daily. 2009-09-24. http://gz.house.163.com/09/0924/08/5JVBCIFH00873C6D.html, accessed by June 28, 2013. 137
Table 4.1. Four Anti-Incineration Protests
Claims Cases Time Protesters Locations Major protest Outcome Urban/ North/ actions Rural South Environmental B City 2006/6- Professionals Urban North Petitions, Project protection: 2007/7; lawsuits & removed objection to 2008/10- demonstration incineration 2011/2 plants C City 2009/9- Largely Urban South Petitions and Project 2012/7 professionals demonstration removed
Plain 2009/4 - Peasants Rural North Lawsuits & Project Village present petitions suspended Water 2011/1- Peasants and Rural South Petitions, sit- Project Village present rural ins &violent suspended entrepreneurs clashes with police
4.1.1 Park Community, B City
The protest in Park Community of B City (short for B City protest) is the first significant anti-incineration protest in China. A series of later protests have learned methods and strategies adopted in this struggle. B City protesters’ sole objective was to prevent the project from building in their neighborhood, a typical “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) protest. The protest was largely composed of middle-class professionals, including retired cadres from the government, academic institutions, and state-owned enterprises, lawyers, engineers, entrepreneurs, etc. Around sixty people actively participated in the protest routinely and their ages ranged from in the twenties to the seventies. The protest started in late 2006 when local residents learned an incineration plant was planned to be constructed beside a landfill plant in their neighborhood. Learning from various sources about the environmental and health hazard of waste incineration, local residents started a
138
prolonged struggle to remove the incinerator from their community. Many of the activists were well educated and had stable income. With the help from outside experts, they were able to explain their objection reasons in a sophisticated and professional way. They took both the virtual and traditional means for mobilizing and organizing collective actions, including the homeowners’ Internet forum, text messages, displaying posters and banners, daily conversation such as encountering while walking dogs, and the like. Based on their social networks, they were able to obtain endorsement from a great many important figures, including prominent environmental protection experts and retired high-ranking officials such as the former head of the National Environmental Protection Bureau
(NEPB), members of the National Political Consultative Conference, etc. During the course of their two-stage protest, they largely made petitions, filed lawsuits against the local governments, and staged a one-thousand-people demonstration to press government concessions.
4.1.2 Spring Community, C City
Similar to B City protest, the protest in Spring Community of C City (short for C City protest) was also staged by middle-class professionals, including white-color workers employed in private or foreign owned companies, civil servants, journalists, entrepreneurs, and retired cadres.141 A small number villagers in the community also participated in the protest. All C City protesters objected to construct the incineration
141 “Panyu people: We don’t want to be represented.” Nandu Weekly.2009-12-31. http://www.nbweekly.com/news/people/200912/11200.aspx, accessed by October 24, 2012. 139
plant in their neighborhood; some also opposed building incinerators anywhere and taking incineration as a method for garbage disposal. Since the professionals composed the majority of protesters, if not pointed out, protesters for this community protest meant the middle-class professionals. This struggle started in the fall of 2009 when residents learned that an incineration plant was scheduled to be built in October 2009 in their community. During a period of four years, residents made numerous petitions and a one- thousand-people demonstration to make their voice heard. Compared to other cases, C
City protesters had a unique advantage: they enjoyed massive media coverage. Because as many as 200 journalists who lived in the area also feared that the incineration project would affect their life and the value of their housing. Compared to the B City case, residents here more intensively used the homeowners’ Internet forum to mobilize residents and coordinate actions.
4.1.3 Plain Village
Several peasants of Plain Village initiated the anti-incineration protest from April 2009, when they first found out that an incineration plant was to be constructed in their village.
After peasants’ persistent petitions to the local government, officials called a halt to the incineration project in fall 2009. Nonetheless, nine months later, the project resumed.
Searching online, peasants found the case of B City protest and their lawsuits against the government. Learning from B City’s experience, protest leaders of Plain Village went to
B City find the same lawyer who served this urban case. Then they filed lawsuits against the local government and the environmental evaluation institute. During the course, from the environmental evaluation report, villagers found that in surveys on local residents’ 140
opinions about the incineration project, their signatures of supporting the incineration project were forged. Protest leaders then collected evidence in this regard and provided it to the court. Subsequently, the Provincial Environmental Protection Department in June
2011 admitted that it lost the lawsuit and withdrew its permit for the incineration plant. In other words, the peasants won the lawsuit, which was hailed by environmental activists as a precious victory. Since then, the project has been in suspension. To date (fall 2014), there is no sign of restarting its construction and it was said that the government was considering dismantling the constructed part. Besides hinging on petition and the legal system, this protest also gained support from anti-incineration experts and environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs), similar to all the other three cases. Protest leaders also actively reach out for media support. Several journalists reported the case and their news articles were circulated widely online. Even journalist from official media, such as People’s Daily, came to the village and used the Plain Village case to castigate misconduct of many environmental evaluation institutes.142
4.1.4 Water Village
Water Village committee collected villagers’ signatures in the name of building an ancestral temple in 2007, which were later used as evidence of villagers’ support for an incineration project. Subsequently, the incineration plant was constructed under the name of a power plant. When the plant was on its trial operation in January 2011, it gave off
142 “How dare an Environmental Assessment Institute create fraud in this way!” Yang Liu. People.cn. 2013-01-29. http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2013-01/29/nw.D110000renmrb_20130129_4- 04.htm, accessed by October 16, 2013. 141
terribly nauseous smell. Until then, villagers found out that the power plant was actually an incineration plant. They strenuously sought an end to the project. As in other cases, villagers searched online to learn about incineration and then they displayed posters and distributed brochures to disseminate the environmental hazards and health perils of incineration within the village. Villagers also made a number of collective petitions to the local government and staged sit-ins by thousands of people in front of the incineration plant. Their struggle remained peaceful until a violent clash between law enforcement and villagers broke out in May 27, 2011. Different from the other cases in which incineration projects stayed merely in the site selection period or was still in construction, the project in Water Village had already been completed and the incinerator was ready to be in use. It was said that a total of one billion yuan — half from the government and other half from a large state-enterprise — had been invested in the project.143 Therefore, the cost of removing the plant would be huge. This may explain state repression. That being said, after the clash, the project has still been under suspension thus far.
143 “Why was an incineration plant, invested huge amount of money, lying idle?” Chinese Environmental News. 2014-07-07. http://gx.people.com.cn/n/2014/0707/c347804-21597325-4.html, accessed by October 16, 2014.
142
Anti-incineration in Plain Village Anti-incineration in Water Village
Regime-engaging Regime-threatening
Anti-incineration in B City Anti-incineration in C City
Figure 4.1. Four Cases on a Continuum of Regime-Engaging and Regime- Threatening Protests
Based on the characters of these cases, I display them on the spectrum of regime-
engaging and regime-threatening protests in Figure 4.1. As Plain Village did not make a
big trouble as other cases in which protesters either made large scale demonstrations
(Park and Spring communities) or violent confrontation with police (Water Village), I put
Plain Village at the far left side, close to the end of regime-engaging protests, Water
Village is located closest to transgressive among the four, though it is largely regime-
engaging. The following sections will flesh out these points.
4.2 LEGITIMATING PROTEST CLAIMS
In all four cases the basic claim was the same, i.e. environmental protection. The
protesters understood that environmental claims were tolerated, so they endeavored to
desensitize their claims and carefully distinguished claims from those off the limits, such
as democracy. Yet there are regional differences. Unlike other cases, C City protesters
raised higher demands regarding garbage disposal and made moderate political claims,
accusing a high-ranking local official of corruption.
143
4.2.1 Desensitize protests
My statistical analysis uncovered that protests raising radical political claims are considerably more likely to bring repression than environmental and economic protests.
Protesters in my cases were aware of this and devoted effort to avoid touching the red line of radical political claims. They did so by connecting their grievances with people’s livelihood. A leader of an environmental non-governmental organization, Xiang, who gave support to a number of anti-incineration protests (including my four cases), told me,
“No matter whether waste incineration is a good or bad method, we should make it desensitized (qu minganhua, 去敏感化) and not set a red line (hongxian, 红线) for ourselves to restrain from talking about it. We should make it from a sensitive topic to a non-sensitive one. Waste disposal itself is an issue about livelihood, not involving problems of state security” (emphasis added).144 Desensitizing strategy also reflected in careful selection of the date to take to the street. This was why B City protesters chose
June 5, the World Environment Day, to stage demonstration instead of the sensitive date of June 4, the anniversary of the crackdown on Tiananmen Square movement of 1989.
Just one day difference, yet the meaning differs dramatically. The former date could be framed as environmental protection, as one organizer put it, “Since that day was the
World Environment Day, we said we would like to participate in celebrating this great
144 Interviewee 34. 144
occasion.”145 By contrast, protest actions on June 4 would have the whiff of pro- democracy movement, the forbidden zone.
In their forty-thousand-word petition letter submitted to the central and city governments in March 2009, B City activists wrote, “We have no intention to run against the government. Opposing incineration is not against the government, but to help the government to improve decisions that do not conform to public opinion.” A leader of the protest stressed, “Nowadays, our central government is so much concerned with people’s livelihood. Our (protesters and officials’) objective should be the same…Even if we have some different opinions, we can exchange ideas to reach a common goal: to appropriately resolve this problem.”146 By linking their claims with the central government’s rhetoric of people’s livelihood, the protest leader made effort to construct consensus between officials and protesters and legitimate their claims.
Likewise, in the Water Village case, an activist elaborated how he deliberately limited his claims to preempt state repression when he wrote a brochure that explained the hazardous effects of garbage incineration. As he put it, “When I wrote the material, I discussed about the advantages and disadvantages of incineration plants and I merely targeted the incineration plant. At that time, I was thinking about evading any excuse of repression. I would not violate the law. Neither did I treat the government as the target. The central
145 Interviewee 35. 146 Interviewee 36. 145
idea of the brochure was that incineration was toxic and my purpose was to educate villagers. These were very clear.”147
In the same vein, C City protesters made clear distinction between anti-incineration protest and radical political protest. In their homeowners’ online forum, a post read,
“How can this event (their protest) be compared with the one over 20 years ago (the 1989
Tiananmen Square Movement)? We are not against the Party or the society. We are merely saving the twisted souls such as that of Xu Haiyun.”148 Xu Haiyun was a key pro- incineration expert, influential in China’s waste disposal policies. In this quote, the activist made an explicit distinction between the 1989 movement with political agendas and their anti-incineration protest. Making such distinction was important, as the former suffered harsh repression and anti-incineration protesters certainly did not want to have the same fate.
4.2.2 Local variation
In other cases, protesters’ sole goal was to remove the incineration project from their own communities. Not only confined to this single claim, C City protesters raised multiple claims, which were all tolerated by the state. C City protesters had divergence in their claims: some against incineration solely in their neighborhood while others opposing incineration anywhere. The first belonged to the category of “not in my back yard”
(NIMBY), whereas the second could be classified as "not in anyone's backyard" (NIABY)
147 Interviewee 37. 148 http://www.rg-gd.net/forum.php?mod=viewthread&tid=187719&page=24. 146
and advocated alternative ways of waste disposal, especially emphasizing developing waste sorting and recycle. Compared to NIMBY, NIABY protesters raised a higher demand on the government: to fundamentally change the policy in favor of incineration rather than merely opposing a particular project. C City government tolerated both claims and even made a gesture to follow the protesters’ suggestions of promoting waste recycle within the city. After this anti-incineration protest, a protest activist founded an environmental NGO specialized on waste recycle and classification. By contrast, the protesters in B City solely made the NIMBY demand. Xie, a protest leader even got upset when an official from the EPB of B City thought protesters would had higher demands if the government made concessions by removing the incinerator form their neighborhood.
The protesters clarified and reconfirmed that they simply thought it inappropriate to build the incinerator in their neighborhood. In face of less protest space in B City than in C
City, limiting demands was a pragmatic choice. Likewise, the two village protesters’ claims were specific as well: simply to remove the incineration project from their own villages, a NIMBY demand.
In addition to the NIABY demand, protesters in C City also raised anti-corruption claim.
With the development of the protest campaign, protesters charged that Yi, a vice secretary-general of the city government, had a personal interest in promoting incineration, because his brother and son worked in the incineration industry. Yi dismissed the accusation as nonsense when answering a journalist’s phone call. Yet afterwards critics and derision of Yi continued to flourish in the homeowners’ online forum. Some protesters devoted serious attention to finding evidence to confirm Yi’s
147
power abuse. In contrast, B City protesters intentionally avoided to touch anti-corruption issue. Xie attributed concentrating their goal solely to environmental protection as a vital reason of the success of their struggle. “We had no intension to oppose corruption. Our aim is merely environmental protection. You should not broaden the scope of a struggle; instead, you must be focused... Don’t hit out in all directions. (For instance,) At some moments, you attack corruption; at others, you demand democracy and freedom. Don’t do it! You cannot deal with so many things at all. We just aimed at environmental protection” (emphasis added).149 Similarly, protesters in my rural cases did not target official corruption, either, though in my interviews, protesters in both villages complained about embezzlement and power abuse of local officials. By limiting their goal to a single issue, environmental protection, protesters can concentrate their energy and resources. More importantly, they were able to make fewer enemies within the state, reduce officials’ hostility, and decrease the likelihood of repression.
4.3 PROTEST ACTIONS AND SELF-CENSORSHIP
While making legitimate claim on environmental protection, protesters push the envelope to pressure the government to value their opinions. On the other hand, protesters also strive to distinguish their contentious actions from clearly transgressive ones. No doubt, this primarily results from the fear of repression. A chief engineer who provide professional and technical consultancy to the two urban protests said frankly in the interview, “We should face China’s reality: the government is very oppressive. It doesn’t
149 Interviewee 35. 148
treat you seriously and would like to do whatever it wants.”150 Additionally, in different places, the permitted space for protest actions may vary.
4.3.1 Distinctions between “taking a walk” and march
The freedom of assembly is severely restricted in China. Demonstrations, gatherings, and marches are required to be approved by police;151 yet police seldom do so. To circumvent this legal constraint, citizens are innovative to use different words to name their contentious collective actions. For instance, they choose words such as “taking a walk”
(sanbu, 散步) or “taking a tour” (lüyou, 旅游) to evade the accusation of illegal demonstration or march. An activist of B City explained the difference, “Taking to the street was illegal previously, but permitted nowadays. Yet till now, you still cannot march, since it requires a registration…Taking to the street refers to sit-ins or taking a walk. Taking a walk is not a march. A march is organized, with slogans, banners, and purposes. By contrast, taking a walk is not organized and you cannot find an organization.
This is a strategy devised by people to bypass laws. According to the laws, a march is allowed but needs registration and application, yet application usually cannot get approved” (emphasis added).152 This distinction was confirmed by another protest activist.
“Taking a walk is not an open confrontation. I just stand on the road, without unified
150 Interviewee 47. 151 Law on Assemblies, Processions, and Demonstrations. 152 Interviewee 38. 149
slogans, organization, and leader. You have no idea who the leader is. It is mobilized via the Internet and then people stand in the street.”153
In light of this standard, the gathering in front of C City government by Spring
Community residents was more akin to taking a walk. One thousand people went to petition to a newly established government agency in charge of projects concerning incineration on its first reception day on November 23, 2009. Hundreds of residents arrived at the agency one after one and each of them filed their own individual petition, not collective ones. Dozens of villagers from Spring Community also joined the petition.
The agency didn't expect to receive so many visits and were short of officials to receive them in a timely manner. Thus, a long queue was formed and a great many petitioners had to wait outside of the agency. After waiting for a while, petitioners marched to the city hall nearby, chanted slogans, and held banners against garbage incineration in front of the city hall. They also demanded to meet with municipal government leaders. In this way, the original petitions turned to a de facto demonstration, which lasted for several hours and ended peacefully. On the whole, while activists played a role in mobilizing residents to present a personal petition on that morning, it seems that they did not plan a demonstration in advance and the demonstration was more like a spontaneous collective action.
By contrast, the gathering in front of the National Environmental Protection Bureau
(NEPB) by B City protesters was more overtly a demonstration. Around a thousand B
153 Interviewee 39. 150
City protesters gathered in front of the NEPA on June 5, 2007, on World Environment
Day. They wore the uniform T-shirts with slogans opposing incineration in their community and advocating environmental protection. Each person held a piece of poster board with similar slogans. Residents also chanted such slogans. This collective action was planned ahead and well organized, as reflected in the uniform T-shirts. There were identifiable activists who announced discipline at the beginning of the demonstration.
Before that day, activists also informed NEPB about their collective action. Therefore, this event should be categorized as a demonstration according to protesters’ own presentation. Nonetheless, emphasizing that it was a “walk” could help skip the rigid law constraints and protect protesters. In the demonstration, a number of police were dispatched and a young man was arrested for a scuffle with police. Other residents refused to leave until the police released the young man. Soon, the man was freed at the spot. The demonstration concluded peacefully by the police “escorted” the group back home.
4.3.2 Differences between expressing opinions and disturbing social order
When drawing the boundaries between repression and toleration, protesters consider that the extent of disruption created in collective actions is a critical factor. One example is to differentiate gate and traffic blockades from less disruptive actions. Organizers of B City protest repeatedly required participants to self-censor their actions in the June 5 demonstration. As one organizer put it, “It is OK to stand by the gate, not blocking it.
Don’t interrupt their (officials’) work. It is illegal to storm into government buildings, but you can stand outside to express opinions.” He emphasized, “When leaving, we should 151
put away all our staff. Don’t hold small banners when waling on the road and don’t block the road…You have already achieved your goal that is simply a kind of claim making. If you go beyond and disturb the traffic and public order, then it is you that cross the red line.” 154
Demonstration in front of the NEPA was illegal according to the law, because B City protesters did not have a permit. Notwithstanding, protesters did not interpret it in that way. Instead, they treated it as a way to express their grievances. They carefully restrained from standing in the gate of NEPB or blocking the road to avoid disturbing the public order and to reduce the chance of police repression. Prior to this large-scale demonstration, B City protests had held two gatherings before. One was blocking the gate of the landfill plant in their community and demonstrated on its opening day for public visit. They also gathered in front of the municipal EPB (MEPB) once because they thought MEPB officials lied in a television interview. These two events were not of large scale as the June 5th demonstration and they both ended peacefully, without suffering repression.
4.3.3 Giving Face to Authorities and Preventing Bitter Confrontation
Leaders of B City protest frequently emphasized that participants should not speak carelessly, offend authorities randomly, made trouble or violated the law.155 In my interview with several leaders and activists, they all highlighted the importance to show
154 Interviewee 35. 155 Interviewee 47. 152
respect or give face (gei mianzi, 给面子) to authorities. In B City protesters’ largest collective action, demonstration in front of the NEPB, they had notified the bureau in advance.156 Xie, a protest leader recalled an episode in which he had pre-empted trouble- making behaviors among residents. In a negotiation meeting in July 2009, an official took his assistant came to the community. Two residents, who seemed to be drunk, swore at and attempted to approach the official. Xie promptly stopped the two residents and kept them away from the official. In his retrospect, “It would be a disaster if they took a fight.”157
Besides protesters, their outside supporters also gave face to local authorities to avoid escalating conflicts. When villagers from Water Village invited Wang, a prominent anti- incineration expert, to give a speech on environmental protection, he agreed but he also asked villagers to communicate with local officials. Wang felt relieved when the local official agreed to invite him as well. He explained, “At least, my safety is guaranteed.
Otherwise, what if police came to intervene my speech? It would be terrible if they had a fight with villagers.”158
In the B City case, Xie was considered as the key leader to prevent their campaign from going radical.159 Xie had a clear understanding about the role of police, which was a tool of law enforcement. As he put it, “Both sides (police and protesters) should not embarrass each other. My long-standing position is that you should be considerate and do not make
156 Interviewee 36. 157 Ibid. 158 Interviewee 40. 159 Interviewee 47. 153
trouble. We should do things in legal and legitimate ways, though we are not afraid of taking responsibilities for conflicts. In fact, the police are in an awkward position to handle illegal actions. Sometimes, I find that both sides should be to blame for the occurrence of a conflict. Police brutality is one thing. On the other hand, the police have their dignity. If you offend them, they do not care much then. He is the tool of law enforcement.”160
Even the Water Village protest, which ended with a tragic clash between villagers and police, began and remained peaceful for most of the time. As a female villager, whose brother-in-law was severely beaten by police in the May 27 Incident, commented on their protests, “In fact, we don’t intend to revolt (zaofan, 造反). We’ve been mature enough
(mid-thirties) to have some knowledge in this regard. (To redress our grievances,) We could only go to the village committee to make claims” (emphasis added).161 In this villager’s account, she intentionally distanced their protest from “revolt,” a transgressive action.
4.3.4 Variation across regions and social groups
The space for permitted protest activities varies across regions and between urban and rural areas. Some protest actions that are tolerated in one location may be treated as taboo elsewhere. My case studies show that protests space in the urban is generally wider than in the rural, while within each category there are differences as well.
160 Interviewee 35. 161 Interviewee 41. 154
4.3.4.1 Rural vs. urban differences
The tolerated space for protest in the rural areas is more limited and police tend to treat protesters in the rural more harshly than those in the urban. This has not only been revealed in my statistical analysis in Chapter 2, but reflects in my case studies. There were incidents in B City and Water Village in which protesters assaulted police. However, the results differed drastically: the former was tolerated, while the latter received brutal suppression.
Although B City protest was mostly peaceful, it was not completely without violence: protesters beat a police officer. Activists organized a mobilization meeting in the residential compound on June 4, 2007, one day before the one-thousand-people demonstration in front of the NEPA. During the meeting, a policeman took photos of the attendants. Residents, largely composed of middle-class professionals, were agitated.
They grabbed the police’s camera and hit him, who was not seriously injured though.
Then “the policeman ran away with his tails between his legs (jiazhe weiba paole, 夹着
尾巴跑了).”162 While the policeman was assaulted, he did not come back for retaliation and nobody was punished later. More ironically, the next day when police escorted protesters back after their demonstration at the NEPB, on the bus protesters met the same police officer who protesters had assaulted. Recognizing him, many protesters criticized the residents who hit the policeman. Interestingly enough, the officer responded “Never mind! Never mind!” On the bus, the police confided to the demonstrators that they also
162 Interviewee 36. 155
lived and worked in the same neighborhood and were not happy about the incineration project, but they did not dare to oppose it because they wore the police uniform.163
In contrast to authorities’ leniency in B City, in Water Village, police-resident relationships turned much more strained and ugly. On May 27, 2009, after two elderly villagers were arrested and villagers identified a police captain as the one who took the lead to try to arrest a protest activist two months ago, they vent their outrage on the policemen and beat him up. It was said that he was severely injured and hospitalized thereafter. This incident sparked a large-scale police-villager clash. Indeed, the assaulted police officers suffered distinct extent of injury in the two cases. Yet it was still striking that the violent actions in the B City case, though to a much slighter degree, did not get any protester into trouble at all.
Generally speaking, police in the two city cases were more tolerant than in the two village cases. Police in C City took the “negotiated management” style of protest policing
(McPhail, et al. 1998: 51-4) or “soft” police style (della Porta and Fillieule, 2003), where negotiations and protest rights prevail. When C City protesters demonstrated in front of the city hall, the police told them, “We are doing our job. You have your rights and lawful claims. But you should be rational. We should abide by the law and should not get each other into trouble.”164 Thus, the police admitted the legitimacy of the protest. Their principle in handling the protest was not to escalate conflict, but to maintain order. In the
B City case, the local police showed sympathy and even some kind of support to
163 Ibid. 164 Interviewee 43. 156
protesters. As an activist recalled, “When the police came to our compound, we explained to them why we opposed incineration. We said to them, ‘You are also citizens and victims.’ Finally, the police officers [were persuaded by us and] told us in private that we should get more people involved [to be effective].”165
Villagers usually lack resources in terms of official connections and expertise. In B City protesters had official connections and took full advantage of them. In C City, they had fewer official connections but considerable professional connections and support
(including the media). The villagers had fewer connections and less expertise. Power abuses were less monitored in rural than in urban areas. Without effective channels to lodge complaints, disgruntled and desperate peasants might resort to violence and incur repression, demonstrated in Water Village protest.
Water Village protesters had little access to the media. Although they had invited journalists to their village and broadcasted their grievances on the internet, largely due to local government intervention, no mainstream media had reported the protest. Plain
Village protest, instead, had received some mainstream media coverage, especially after protesters won the lawsuit against authorities. The successful lawsuit was often cited as showcase to criticize irresponsibility and low credit of some environmental evaluation institutes. Many of these critical voices came from state media and circulated widely online.
165 Interviewee 36. 157
In contrast, my two urban cases both received extensive media coverage. More than 200 media staff resided in Spring Community of C City. They had the convenience of using media as a weapon to attract public attention, influence public opinion, and monitor government actions. In my interview, several activists considered that their protest was mobilized by the media in the beginning. The media first learned the incineration plan and publicized it. Massive reports about the incineration project with concerns about its environmental consequences unnerved local residents and ultimately stimulated protest activities. Except for a short period of silence due to the government’s ban on media coverage, a series of newspapers, magazines, Television stations, and mainstream websites, at both local and national levels, closely watched the protest campaign, the incineration project, and local government’s reactions. Further, C City protesters also intensively used the homeowner’s online forum for the sake of oppositional mobilization and watch police reactions. When police inquired an activist, people quickly posted the news online to attract concerns among residents. After being released, the activist posted in the forum his/her experience at the police station. Any police brutality can be quickly learned by the local residents and the media. Against this backdrop, authorities were especially wary of using force and the protest space can be wider. B City protest, although it did not receive the news coverage as massive as the C City case, did attract substantial media attention. The national television program, China Central Television, also reported their case for several times, which put a great pressure on the municipal government and encouraged local resistance. Many later anti-incineration protests, including the other three cases, have learned experience from B City protest through media reports on the protest.
158
4.3.4.2 Protest space across phases
In effect, the wider space for the urban protests may not exist at the outset. Authorities may initially be harsh and nervous about these protests and attempt to impose tight control over them. However, the middle-class professionals are able to expand the protest space. In other words, the protest space is not static. In a single protest campaign, the space can expand or shrink over time. As time goes on, the protest space may increase.
One scenario is that protesters gradually gain trust of authorities, who recognize that their claims are more or less reasonable, protesters have no anti-government intention, and have low chance of taking radical actions. This is the case for the B City protest. Another scenario is that media’s massive coverage of the peaceful protest campaign hinders authorities from employing coercion. A case in point is the C City protest. Therefore, the tolerated space varies even for the same protest, hinging on the dynamic interactions between protesters and authorities.
A B City protest activist recalled, “At the beginning, both sides were nervous about the resistance. Later on, we both become more relaxed because we were familiar with each other.”166 Moreover, protesters detected officials’ attitudes shifting: from initially trying to resolve the dispute by pressure, then gradually attempting to persuade protesters, and finally to treating protest representative as equals in negotiations. As a protest leader recalled, “Later, officials felt that what we said made sense and they began to rethink
166 Interviewee 44. 159
about it. We even talked to each other like friends at the later stage.”167 Police intervention occurred mostly at the beginning period, which included giving warnings to activists and forbidding third parties to rent protesters the auditorium as discussed earlier.
With regard to the C City case, authorities initially dealt with grassroots opposition harshly. At the outset, the local government imposed three bans on media report regarding incineration and protest activists were summoned to police station, which was called “white terror”168 by protesters.169 At this moment, the C City government effectively banned media coverage on anything related to incineration to demobilize anti- incineration campaign. Planned collective action by activists was also cancelled due to police intervention. The movement came its nadir. Frustration and pessimistic view pervaded among residents. To reverse the situation, Bai, a white-collar employee in her twenties, spent several hours touring the subway wearing a gas mask and displaying anti- incineration banner to attract the public’s attention on the hazard of incineration. She was finally taken to the police station for questioning and released soon. Subsequently, Bai posted her experience online in witty words and her post went viral in the Internet.
Traditional media also followed suit, interviewed Bai, and reported this event. After Bai’s subway touring, two girls who disseminated anti-incineration pamphlets in the community, were inquired by police. This incident also created quite a stir in the community’s online forum. Gradually, the ban on reporting incineration was gradually
167 Interviewee 35. 168 “White terror” is a CCP term, which refers to counterrevolutionary repression before 1949. 169 Interviewee 45. 160
broke down. The brave actions of Bai and the two girls encouraged Spring Community of
C City residents. The protest movement moved on.
4.3.4.3 Variation within urban areas
Across the cities, the protest space may differ as well. A protest activity that was tolerated in C City may be penalized in B City and C City protesters clearly knew they had more protest space. C City protesters felt relatively free to accept foreign media interviews. B City protesters, however, treated contacting foreign media as a red line that they should never cross. Chinese laws are restrictive of protesters developing foreign contact.170 In Hill Factory worker protest of Chapter 3, one excuse of repression was workers’ contact with foreign media. B City protesters took this red line seriously. In my interview, a leader of B City protest stressed, “What I said just now is to gain outside support. Note that it is not foreign support! You know we (protesters) are particularly clear about this, right? This red line we do not dare to step over even a little bit. We declined all foreign media [interview invitations].”171 Similarly, another leader doubted that it would do any help to resort to foreign media. He was concerned that, “Some foreigners may have political purposes. We should not get involved in this.”172 Therefore,
B City turned down a series of interview invitations by foreign media.
The situation in C City was a bit different: protesters accepted some overseas media’s interviews. Yet they avoided the media that “attempted to induce us to express discontent
170 Law on Assemblies, Processions, and Demonstrations. 171 Interviewee 35. 172 Interviewee 46. 161
against the government.” In those interviews with foreign media, protesters underscored,
“We are not against the government, but simply oppose garbage incineration.”173 The careful employment of overseas media reflects protesters’ self-control even in a more tolerant political environment like C City.
Juan, the chief engineer, observed regional differences in B and C Cities: “The two places differ in terms of social culture and societal forms. Anyhow, C City is more opening and it is more liberal in politics than B City. Relatively speaking, it can tolerate different opinions…C City has a longer history of opening to the outside world… In this context, she (Bai) took a more radical method to take the subway by wearing a gas mask. In B
City, she must have been arrested. No doubt about this! She could be detained for 15 days in an excuse of causing trouble. Yet in C City you could express opinions in such means.”174
Protesters of C City also recognized that this city was different from other regions. As one explained, “Like in Hong Kong, we (C City citizens) have an awareness of service.
The quality of service industry in C City is relatively higher, including in the grassroots government. If you give red envelopes [small cash bribes; hongbao, 红包], officials do not dare to accept them…Because somebody could get you into trouble if you accepted them. You are finished after media exposure. Not only the media but also citizens dare to
173 “Panyu homeowners: using rationality and taking actions to protect their homes.” 2010-01-02. Nanfang People Weekly. http://focus.news.163.com/10/0102/11/5S16TJ5H00011SM9_3.html, accessed by February 15, 2012.
174 Interviewee 47. 162
expose the corruption. So the whole environment is fairly tolerant… The forces of market, society and the government sometimes parallel. Sometimes the market force even exceed other forces.” He further expounded the toleration by going back to the history. “In history, C City was like the saying ‘the mountain is high, the emperor is far away’
(shangao huangdiyuan, 山高皇帝远). Additionally, C City was an essential place for the
Marine Silk Road and influenced both by the Western and traditional Chinese cultures.”175
Apart from regional political environment, protesters’ occupations also made a difference in terms of expanding protest space. In the B City case, several protest leaders used to be cadres working in the central government and thus they were familiar with official institutions. Taking advantage of this, they often directly visited the government offices in charge of environmental protection to express their opinions. They called their actions
“visiting” (baifang, 拜访) not “petitioning” (shangfang, 上访). By visiting, they meant that they paid visit to officials without making appointments or through the petition system. They would “open the door and just enter” the officials’ office (tuimen jiujin, 推
门就进). In these visits, representatives considered themselves as equals with the state officials. Admittedly, they could not visit all government institutions in this way. They could paid direct visits at the NEPB, but not the municipal government as it was much more heavily guarded.176
175 Interviewee 48. 176 Interviewee 36. 163
Furthermore, B City protesters utilized their vast networks to mobilize political and social resources, which was enviable by protesters in other cases. This protest has received wide-range external support: members of the National Committee of the Political
Consultative Conference, the former head of NEP, other prominent environmental experts, and senior engineers all expressed objection to building an incineration project in the Park Community of B City. The endorsement of these political elites no doubt helped enlarge the tolerated space for this protest.
4.3.4.4 Variation within rural areas
No only villagers had less protest space than urban middle class, but the space for protests between villages varied. Plain Village protesters felt constrained to the legal sphere, not staging disruptive collective actions as Water Village protesters. Plain
Villager protesters had a more conservative attitude towards public gathering and demonstrations. When I asked the protest leaders whether they had a gathering in front of the city hall. One promptly, “You cannot do it. That belongs to trouble-making behavior and you would get arrested…You cannot pressure the government by using the masses.
You may try to take several people to petition the government. If it doesn’t work, you can only go through the legal channel.”177
In addition, Plain Village protesters consciously restrained from direct confrontation with third parties or thugs. In the case, when the incineration plant initiated its construction, thugs had been employed to guard the construction site. They stayed around the plant
177 Interviewee 49. 164
holding sticks and knives in case of disruptions from villagers. In this circumstance, villagers did not resort to direct confrontation. Instead, they petitioned to the township and country governments. In petitions, officials asked the villagers: Why didn’t you stop its construction? Deng, the leader responded, “I didn’t have the power.” He further remarked, “They were anxious about being unable to arrest you. If you came to the plant, you would get caught.” Another leader echoed, “No matter who went, we wouldn’t go!”178 Deng continued, “Let them build. Ultimately, it should follow the lawful procedure. The law has the final say in whether the plant should be built or not. We would wait and see! ”
In the Plain Village case, even going through the petition channel might incur repression.
The county head, who had a good relationship with Deng’s brother, admitted that if the peasants simply relied on the petition channel, they would have long been arrested.179 A possible scenario would be that the county government would have procrastinated to respond to petitions and peasants would have no better choice than petitioning the municipal government. As a result, the county government would have arrested peasants in the name of skip-level petition, a kind of violation according to Regulations on
Petitions.
By contrast, Water Villagers managed to push the limits of protest space and were able to wage large-scale sit-ins to stop the incineration plant from operating, which was considered as transgressive and could incur arrests by Plain Village protesters. On April 1,
178 Interviewee 50. 179 Interviewee 49. 165
2011, villagers started 10,000 people sit-ins and blocked gates of the incineration plant to prevent garbage trucks from entering the plant. They even built shacks and stayed there
24 hours a day for the following two weeks. This brought the plant operation to a complete halt. On April 8, leaders of the district government, joined by experts, held a meeting with villagers in the village committee, aiming at dispelling any fear and anxiety about incineration. Around two hundred villagers were permitted to attend the meeting, while thousands more waiting outside. Around 300 police were present to maintain the order. In the meeting, officials were accused of having no intention to listen to villagers’ views. Outrageous villagers forced officials to stay in the meeting site for several hours until they promised to cancel the project. In the evening, the leader of the district government had to make compromise and announced by loudspeaker that the plant would not operate until the masses agreed.180 On April 12, the district government issued a document to suspend the incineration project. On April 15, villagers’ shacks were dismantled and the two-week sit-ins were over.
Intervening the operation of the incinerator and stopped the district officials from leaving had both pushed the limits of state toleration. Yet no villagers suffered repression for these actions. Villagers stressed that their actions were peaceful and they did nothing to damage the property of the plant. In their sit-ins, they displayed Mao’s picture and collective signatures under the slogan of environmental protection claims, in the hope of avoiding repression. At this point, the government did not resort to coercion, either.
180 Interviewee 37, 51, and 52. 166
4.3.5 Contesting the boundaries of protest actions
While protesters usually endeavor to self-control their actions, this is not an easy task in face of collective actions by a large crowd without a formal organization. To maintain protest actions peaceful, protests leaders and activists go to considerable lengths to call for patience and calmness among protesters. B City protesters took full advantage of the homeowner online forum to communicate information, mobilize opposition, sustain morale, appease anxiety, and so forth. For instance, one activist posted an essay in their forum reporting a recent petition experience. In the end, s/he wrote, “May I ask everyone to be patient please? On the one hand, we will continue to express our claims; meanwhile, we will have to wait according to the government procedure. We should walk step by step and eat one bite after another. Believe in ourselves and the government. Believe tomorrow is going to be better!!!”181
In my three cases of anti-incineration struggles, protesters were largely able to self- discipline their actions and stay within the permitted space for protest. Only in the Water
Village case, the conflict between authorities and villagers escalated to a bloody confrontation. The details about the entire clash incident varied according to different sources, yet they all agreed on some basic elements, which are summarized as follows.
On the morning of May 27, 2011, a group of twenty or thirty elderly villagers walked toward the township government for petition. On their way, a mini-bus approached them
181 A post on homeowners’ online forum, by Zhufeng dingshang de huoyu (a homeowner’s nick name). http://house.focus.cn/msgview/1396/202724868.html, accessed by June 12, 2013. 167
and pulled over. Several policemen jumped off the vehicle, attempting to stop the seniors from going. This led to gathering of more villagers in the street. Then police arrested a female and a male villagers — both in their fifties — in an excuse of road blockade. The arrest took villagers by surprise and they treated it as “illegal” because they thought the arrest was set up for retaliation against local protest. When police coercion was considered “illegitimate,” it prompted a backlash and escalation. Learning about the arrest, at noon a growing number of villagers came to the street, indignant and outraged.
Some villagers recognized the police captain who two months ago came to their village and led the failed arrest of a protest activist. Villagers then vent their anger on the captain and beat him up. This incident sparked a large-scale police-villager clash. Thousands of police forces were dispatched to the village shortly. Riot police drew batons to beat villagers; villagers, weaponless, responded with punches and kicks. Around a hundred villagers were injured and two were serious. One of them was a 35-year-old male villager, who was beaten to cripple; the other was an old man, whose hand was broken.
Forty villagers were arrested. A handful of policemen were injured as well. At this point,
Water Village protest turned transgressive. Neither authorities nor protesters recognized the legitimacy of the other and they resorted to force.
4.4 ENFORCING THE LIMITS ON PROTEST ORGANIZATION
Protesters are cautious about the ways in which their struggle are organized to preempt suppression. In all three protests that staged large-scale demonstrations or sit-ins, protesters carefully stressed that these were totally spontaneous actions to avoid being identified as protest leaders or activists, and suffer suppression. Among four cases, C City
168
protesters enjoyed the widest protest space and they ventured beyond the others to make general demands beyond their community and established an environmental NGO in the end.
B City protesters’ gathering in front of NEPA was clearly well organized, as demonstrators wore the same T-shirts with anti-incineration slogans and appeared at the same time. Yet activists of the protest still emphasized that the principle of their struggle was “no organization but with disciplines.” The reason for stressing no organization was to “avoid arrest,” as Juan said, “Generally speaking, the Chinese government is not a liberal regime and it is oversensitive. Whoever takes the lead (in civic activism) would be arrested.”182 The group meetings organized by activists were open to all homeowners, because as activists underscored underground meetings would bring trouble.183
Similarly, in my interviews with activists and participants of C City and Water Village cases, they intentionally underscored that nobody organized the large-scale gatherings.
During the demonstration in front of the city hall, a vice Mayor of C City expressed willingness to meet with representatives of C City residents and asked demonstrators to select five representatives. But this proposal was rejected by demonstrators who were afraid that this would provide the government the targets of repression. As an activist argued, “We (demonstrators) don’t know each other and have no organization. How can we send five representatives? Also, we do not want to be represented by others (women
182 Interviewee 47. 183 Interviewee 35. 169
buyao bei daibiao, 我们不要被代表).”184 Another key activist shared the view, he underscored that “I went there solely standing for myself. Nobody can represent me, and
I cannot represent others, either.”185 Instead, demonstrators required the government to choose five official delegates first. The interviewed activists all expressed that the demonstration originated from spontaneous individual petitions to a government agency in charge of waste disposal, which was close to the municipal government. They emphasized that the decision to move to the city hall was totally spontaneous, a sudden decision. This spontaneity protected the anonymity of protest activists and made it difficult for police to make arrest.
In Water Village, their actions were more radical, so they had to make their protest seem more spontaneous. In this sense, from local entrepreneurs to peasants, they all told me that nobody organized the sit-ins in front of the incineration plant, not to mention the clash with police. These protest events took place just because everybody in the community opposed the incineration plant.186
But there are exceptions. Plain Village, three villagers stood out and took a lead in suing an environmental evaluation institute and the local government agency that was responsible for the incineration project. They also led dozens of peasants to collectively petition to the local government and the law agency of NEPA. During the course of their struggle, the protest leaders had endured tremendous pressure from the authorities, who
184 Interviewee 42. 185 Interviewee 48. 186 Interviewees 37, 51, 53, and 54. 170
employed “soft” tactics of repression in an effort to press protesters for concessions. The primary leader, in his sixties, suffered a stroke and became paralyzed, at the peak of government pressure for withdrawing the lawsuit.
On the other hand, the state tolerated some involvement by environmental NGOs. At least one environmental organization had involved in all four protests, e.g. providing consultancy of incineration, getting protesters in touch with lawyers and experts, and journalists. This external support from a formal organization did not receive forceful treatment. In the later stage of C City protest, activists went so far as to form an environmental NGO, advocating garbage sorting and recycle in order to reduce the necessity of incineration. The NGO was approved by the municipal government and since then it regularly provided suggestions concerning garbage disposal to the city government.
The government also allowed low level of alliance of protesters from the two urban cases in the form of meeting and online information communication. Besides extensive communications through the homeowners’ online forums, activists of Spring Community in C City also attended a meeting held by protesters in B City. Anti-incineration experts were also invited to the meeting. Further, at the peak of sit-ins in Water Village, over
10,000 people participated, included people from neighboring villagers and townships who also opposed incineration. The sit-ins did not draw coercive response. In short, pushing the limits of protest space regarding organization, with low involvement by formal organizations and cross-region, cross-community alliance by protesters, was sometimes tolerated by authorities.
171
4.5 AUTHORITIES EMPHASIZING THE LIMITS OF PROTEST SPACE
In face of protests, local authorities regularly reminded protesters of the limits of protest space. Protest activists received police warnings through phone calls or home visits, regarding protesters’ active role in collecting residents’ signatures opposing incinerator, broadcasting hazards of incineration, etc. Residents who attempted to organize a car demonstration in a public space in C City were summoned to police station. After they were released in the midnight, the demonstration organizer posted a message in the homeowners’ Internet forum to announce the cancelation of the planned event. Police also intercepted buses that peasants took for collective petition to the municipal government on November 23, 2009 in the C City case.187 Additionally, when local residents invited anti-incineration expert to give a speech within the residential compound, police prohibited the third party to rent an auditorium to the residents.188
Police also forbade homeowners to hang banners on the residential building and display posters against incineration in the community compound. Local media, such as newspapers and TV programs also frequently received bans on reporting negative opinions about incineration.189 Police could also take tech-savvy means to impede mobilization among residents by hacking homeowners’ online forum website.190
It is also common for authorities to use “soft” repression means, such as “relational repression” in terms of Deng and O’Brien (2013) to demobilize activism. They could
187 Interviewee 56. 188 Interviewees 40, 36, and 55. 189 Interviewees 40, 35, and 34. 190 Interviewee 45. 172
press protesters’ relatives, friends, advisors, employers, and the like, to persuade protest leaders and activists to withdraw. A protest activist in the Plain Village quit the resistance, because his wife worked in the public security bureau. She was threatened to lose her job if her husband continued participating in the protest. Sometimes, high-ranking officials came to visit protest activists in person to dissuade their opposition. A vice mayor of D
City paid a visit to homes of Plain Village protest leaders and endeavored to persuade them to withdraw the lawsuit targeting the incineration project. During the visit, the vice mayor tried to bribe the protest leaders and promised economic benefits to them and their families, from job opportunities to new houses.191 Protest leaders’ lawyer, Qiu, also endured pressure from his former advisor and D City officials, who made effort to persuade him to give up the lawsuit.192 Nonetheless, all these efforts went in vain. Protest leaders and their lawyer stuck to winning the lawsuit in the end.
No doubt, police can also take the traditional “hard” repression methods, such as making arrests, fighting with protesters, among others. In the Water Village case, police in March
2011 detained an activist who made posters and leaflets to disseminate the formidable effects of incinerator on people’s health and local environment. Soon thereafter, they attempted to arrest a second protest activist, Meng, who was the cousin of the detained protesters and also produced the posters and leaflets. In an early morning, three policemen in plain clothes and driving a non-police car came to the village. They tried to
“kidnap” Meng according to villagers. When the arrest was stopped by a crowd of
191 Interviewees 49 and 50. 192 Interviewee 57. 173
villagers, the policemen were required to show an arrest warrant. However, they didn’t have one with them at that point. Several hours later, when an arrest warrant was delivered to the village, villagers still did not let the police take away Meng and their crowd continued surrounding the policemen till the evening. Eventually, the arrest effort ended with a failure.193
4.6 REGIME-ENGAGING PROTESTS
In all four protests, for most of the time, protesters went to considerable lengths to promote negotiations with officials. Meanwhile, authorities acknowledged that protesters’ grievances were reasonable, negotiated with them (under protesters pressure), and made concessions in the end. In this sense, they belonged to regime-engaging protests.
4.6.1 B City, C City, and Plain Village
By and large, the three cases were immune from violence and neither protesters nor officials denied legitimacy of the other side. C City protesters disrespected a vice Mayor and accused him of corruption in promoting the local incineration project. Yet residents did not challenge the authority of the government. Instead, protester made effort to find alternative ways of garbage disposal to supplant incineration and showed effort to help the government deal with garbage problems. Plain Village protesters largely relied on the legal channel to redress their grievances. In the reform era, the Chinese regime has
193 Interviewees 51, 58, 59, and 60. 174
increasingly stressed the rule of law and treated the legal system as a tool to improve governance, collect on-the-ground information, and monitor local officials (O’Brien and
Li 2005). Therefore, employing the means encouraged by the state to resolve disputes also proved that Plain Village protesters respected the state authority. B City protesters emphasized giving face to officials, indicating their respect to regime legitimacy. On official side, all three protests ended with government concessions without repression, which was a proof that the state admitted these protests reasonable. NEPB suspended the
B City incineration project in the first stage. During the second stage, residents won their lawsuit against the local government regarding the use of land on which the incineration would be built. The government finally announced moving the incineration project to another place. Similarly, Plain Village protesters won their lawsuit against an environmental evaluation institute and the Provincial Environmental Protection
Department, which led to the long-standing suspension of the incineration project. In the
C City case, the government eventually terminated the incineration project and moved it to another region.
With regard to negotiation, all the three protests made effort to engage officials in dialogue. Despite no lack of soft repression or threats of repression, in these cases, there was a great deal of negotiation going on between protesters and officials. The government established a communication channel in the B City and C City cases, named the “liaison system,” appointing a few local residents as liaisons to bridge communication between officials and residents. Residents in all the communities considered the channel only served in the interest of the government, with a purpose of persuading local people.
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Nevertheless, it revealed the government’s intent to communicate with residents and preempt radical actions. Under the pressure of grassroots opposition, local government also held negotiation meetings with local residents. Pro-incineration experts and officials of environmental protection departments were often invited in the meetings to disprove protesters’ claims, demobilize resistance, and prevent residents from taking to the street.
As discussed earlier, besides going through the petition channel, B City protester leaders also frequently paid direct visit to NEPB and other government sections to create opportunities of face-to-face dialogue with officials in charge environmental protection.
As an expert endorsing the B City protest commented, “These (communication opportunities) are what B City always wanted to create: I want to communicate with you and you should listen! If you listen every day, you will share my view.”194 Besides negotiation meetings held within the government, the local government also entered the residential compound for dialogue. For example, in the summer of 2010, the Vice Head of the District Government came to B City and held a meeting with over 200 residents.
He transferred the message that the government was examining the issue as to whether to continue the incineration project, asking for patience among protesters, which suggested that the government was softening its tone, according to protest leaders’ interpretation.195
Negotiation meetings were not rare in the C City case, either. For instance, at the beginning period of the C City protest, the district government held a press conference and invited four experts to discourage opposition. After a thousand-people-demonstration
194 Interviewee 47. 195 Interviewee 35. 176
in front of the city hall, the government’s attitude gradually leaned toward compromise.
The district party sectary convened a meeting with residential representatives in the C
City. During the meeting, the party sectary listened to residents’ opinions and in the end announced that the incineration project would not be constructed unless majority residents agreed. Subsequently, the local government called a temporary halt to the incineration project on December 23, 2009. Yet in spring 2011, the local government reconsidered the incineration project in the neighborhood, which re-ignited resistance.
During the second stage of the projects, after a series of negotiation meetings and with efforts by the urban residents and villagers in the community, the government finally moved the project to another place.
In the first stage of Plain Village protest, protesters resorted to the petition channel and visited different levels of the government, from the township to the municipal governments. The government attempted to discourage opposition by sending environmental protection officials to educate peasants. Nonetheless, the plan backfired and officials lost their debate with protest leaders, which made local opposition even stronger. Under great pressure from below, in September 2009, the county government reached a bilateral responsibility agreement with the protesters: the government would order a suspension of the incineration project under the condition that villagers would give up petitions. The agreement was in place until the incinerator project restarted nine months later. During the second phase of protest, collective petitions composed of dozens of villagers did not work out when the incineration plant had obtained all the required certificates of construction during the nine months and there were no legal reasons in this
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regard to stop its construction. From the Internet, protesters found the successful B City protest. Following that case, villagers began to rely on the legal channel. Their victory in the lawsuits contributed to the suspension of the project.
4.6.2 Water Village
Considering the violent clash between protesters and law enforcement officers, is Water
Village case a regime-engaging protest? By and large, yes. First, despite the harsh repression, the government made concessions and did not continue the incineration project afterwards. Until the fall of 2014, the project was still under suspension and showed no sign of resuming soon. After the clash, the government soon sent in working groups of 300 hundred cadres to Water Village to help resolve the conflicts.196 After a journalist from a national official newspaper visited the suspended incineration plant of
Water Village in 2014, the journalist’s article, published in the newspaper and copied by the Party website, attributed the long-term suspension mainly to mistakes of the local government, which either overlooked the masses’ questions or shunned responsibility and did not do adequate work to explain to the masses.197 The article did not blame villagers at all. In other words, the state media accepted the legitimacy of grassroots protest. On protester side, villagers did not resort to further violence thereafter. Instead, they used their social connections to report their grievances to the central government and also
196 Interviewee 52. 197 “Why an incineration plant, invested huge amount of money, was lying idle?” Chinese Environmental News. 2014-07-07. http://gx.people.com.cn/n/2014/0707/c347804-21597325-4.html, accessed by October 16, 2014. 178
thought about filing lawsuits against the local government, though it did not work out because lawyers saw little chance of winning the lawsuit after the bloody clash with police taking place. From villagers’ efforts after the clash, we see that while protesters lost faith in the local government, they still had hope for the central government.
Prior to the May 27 confrontation, there were a great deal of communication between officials and villagers. Three hundred villagers collectively petitioned the township government for multiple times. The local government outwardly agreed to stop the incineration project but secretly resumed it. Then villagers started to petition the district and municipal governments and also turned to the media for help. However, these efforts were of no effect. After villagers blocked entrance to the incineration plant, the district government held a hearing and several negotiation meetings with protesters. As in the two city cases, a coordination group was also established in Water Village, made up of representatives of villagers, entrepreneurs, village head, township officials, etc. Villagers told me that villager representatives received monthly salaries from the government and they took sides with the government. Even so, the government made a gesture of dialogue and showed that they regarded villagers’ opposition as legitimate. On May 5, the prominent anti-incineration expert, Wang, came to Water village and gave a speech on incineration and public health. Instead of impeding the expert’s speech, the district government co-sponsored the event. More than 400 villagers and officials attended the speech. The following day, several famous pro-incineration experts, invited by the local government, arrived at the village to evaluate the Water Village incineration project. On
May 8, 2011, evaluation results were reported at a meeting presided by a secretary-
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general of the municipal government and attended by these experts and villager representatives. According to the pro-incineration experts, the incineration plant could reach the national standard after improving equipment.198 Upon hearing this, the secretary-general announced that the incineration project should definitely be resumed.199
This firm stance signaled state repression half a month later.
On the whole, the local government and villagers had dialogues and meetings before May
27, though these were not enough to prevent conflict escalation. Authorities did not deny the legitimacy of protesters and protesters still had faith in the central government.
Bearing all this in mind, on the continuum of regime-engaging and regime-threatening protests, I put the Water Village case on its midpoint leaning towards regime-engaging. It is the case closest to regime-threatening protests among the four cases (see Figure 4.1).
4.7 IMPACT ON REGIME LEGITIMACY
Negotiations instead of force contribute to building regime legitimacy and resilience. In my three cases, no violent confrontation broke out between authorities and protesters and the government also made concessions by relocating or postponing the incinerator project.
Does making compromise indicate the weakness of the state? It seems not. Government
198 According to environmental activists, these pro-incineration experts would benefit from developing garbage incineration. Therefore, in their view, these experts did not have an independent stance and could not provide impartial evaluation results. Moreover, environmental activists also suspected that the experts must have received money from the local government because it is a norm that experts in China get paid by those who invited them for evaluating a project. According to Wang (Interviewee 40), the preeminent anti-incineration expert, it was nothing surprising that the experts achieved evaluation outcomes in favor of inviters, as it was expected. Otherwise, the expert would not be invited in the future and lose a way to earn extra money. 199 Interviewees 37 and 52. 180
concessions in these cases were interpreted in favor of the regime. Both protesters and the media framed the successes of the two city cases as showcases that the governments were accountable to the masses and accepted grassroots opinion.200
In Plain Village, the fact that villagers beat the government through the court was tempting to give credit to progress of rule of law in China. The lawyer in charge of the lawsuit did not think so, though. In my interview, he attributed the success to enlightened officials. In his view, the provincial government and D City municipal government were fairly liberal, for they did not use illegal means to repress the protest. To the lawyer, the law was useless. The court, lack of independence, could have always picked out reasons to make villagers lose their lawsuit. Eventually, it was leader of the Provincial
Environmental Protection Department (PEPD) who did not insist on their approval of the incineration project, which was based on fraud environmental evaluations. The PEPD leader’s decision to withdraw the approval eventually led to peasants’ success. In other words, even though the government lost the lawsuit, the state legitimacy was maintained.
In the aftermath of the two urban protests, participants expressed their acknowledgement of progress in governance and an increasing accountable government, which suggested that regime legitimacy has been strengthened. An activist of the C City protest told me,
“The government would allow non-political protests, regarding people’s livelihood.
Indeed, this (their anti-incineration protest) is for the sake of public affairs.”201 Other interviewees found that protest space was open in comparison to the past. As the chief
200 Interviewees 35 and 48. 201 Interviewee 48. 181
engineer put it, “Fortunately, the society is becoming gradually opening up. Government officials have gradually realized that you cannot neglect the masses (laobaixing, 老百姓).
In the past, they could discount them, be repressive, impose a martial law in a village, and then made arrests. These were the routines previously, but they do not dare to do so now.
Why? Because the Party also feels that she could not always do it in this way and has to communicate with people. If they (citizens) would like to lodge complaints, let it be. At least let them talk about it, even though the problems cannot be solved.”202
Why is there such a change? The engineer explained, “The government don’t think that they can always block (people’s opinion) because the results were truly devastating. Such a violent event that took place some years ago [the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement] is the last thing that the government wants to see. The government no longer dare to do so
[meaning repression] now. Therefore, both sides make some compromise. One side says
‘I don't cause serious trouble,’ while the other side says ‘I don’t totally impede you to voice discontent.’ Everyone takes a step back. Therefore, they all have a certain buffer space. At least, it is not as in the past we shouted at each other and whatever each side said turned to deaf ears. At least, we can do face-to-face dialogue now. So there seems to be some communication opportunities.”203
Similarly, a prominent environment expert who publicly spoke against incineration and endorsed a series of anti-incineration protests (including all four cases) also detected the growth of protest space. As he elaborated, “The Chinese citizens have changed from
202 Interviewee 47. 203 Ibid. 182
fearing to speak out to daring to express a voice and then further to insist. I was worried when the protest events took place because ten years earlier, the protest could have not ended in this way. As everyone knows, our country is led by the Communist Party, one- party rule. The Party is in charge and citizens are scared to speak out. The Chinese people are hardworking and kind, with great patience. However, in recent years after the reform and opening up, with an increasing contact with the outside world, citizens’ awareness of environmental and rights protection has been increasing…They have taken rights protection more and more seriously. The government is improving as well, and it decreasingly dares to be insolent.” On the whole, he said, “China is making progress. At least, these environmental NGOs are permitted to exist. Before, they were all banned.
This is the sign of social progress. Many articles that could not be publicized in the past can be now.”204
Likewise, a protest activist of C City frankly admitted, “Many activities today would have been doomed (wandan le, 完蛋了) if they took place twenty years earlier, even in C
City. It is the broad social background that is changing. Nowadays, even the government realizes that it is necessary for transition. This is critical. Ten or twenty years ago, the government had no awareness of this. So they might use traditional methods. Yet to date, they realize the importance of transition and thus they may allow a certain degree of change. This historical background, coupled with the growth of traditional media and the birth of online media, form a joining force. In this context, these activities [protests] are able to take the greatest effect.” Moreover, he put it, “Although we had a lot of
204 Interviewee 40. 183
complaints against the C City government. On the other hand, we have to depend on it.
[After all,] They have the generosity (xionghuai, 胸怀) to accept and listen to our suggestions, many of which have been accepted. Even though they did not give clear response when we provided advice, they would take your advice back and study on it. If it was feasible, they would follow it.”205
From these quotes, we clearly see that the environmental protection activists, urban middle class, perceived an enlarging protest space in China and gave credit to regime progress in becoming more literal, which helped build regime legitimacy.
4.7.1 Repression and regime legitimacy
By contrast, harsh repression threatens regime legitimacy. Resentment against the May
27 repression still lingered in the villager one year later when I was conducting my fieldwork. A number of villagers made comparisons of the Communist Party with the
Japanese invaders who ruled the region during the late 1930s and early 1940s. An old male villager, who was highly respected in the locality, told me, “The government was just as bad as bandits and the Japanese… The Communist Party made just as much trouble that used to be made by the Japanese.”206 Similarly, an entrepreneur, a protest activist in his forties, remarked, “Let me make a joke, partly true, partly false. Previously, the Japanese or the Nationalist Party did not beat the masses. The masses helped the
Communist Party to seize the state power. Now, the Party beat the masses up!!!...Didn’t
205 Interviewee 42. 206 Interviewee 51. 184
you see the scene last year (May 27 incident). Really cruel! At midnight or 2am, the police forced into people’s house and made arrest. Bandits AND robbers! I have never thought that the Communist Party could be even worse than the Japanese!”207
As for those who were arrested or wounded in the crackdown, they and their families felt even more aggrieved and indignant. Bing, an elderly male villager who was detained for several days said, “I loathe to see the words of the Communist Party [today]. My brain has been poisoned. I know it is not appropriate to think so, but I can barely control myself…If the incumbent cadres and the Communist Party are good, how come fifty and sixty thousand people208 came here (Water Village) to make trouble?! If we (he and his wife) are not good and anti-revolutionaries, then the fifty and sixty thousand people should be anti-revolutionaries as well! The country is filled with bad guys. Very few are good!”209 His wife, Qian, who was the first elderly female arrested in the May 27
Incident, told me that both her and her husband could not fall asleep whenever thinking about the humiliating and painful experience. When she was arrested, police raised her clothes to cover her head, which exposed her breasts and stomach. Qian also recalled that four policemen threw her into the vehicle and stepped onto her shoulders. The pain lasted for several months afterwards. Her husband was put into criminal detention, as he was accused of leading the protest. Bing had high blood pressure and suffered stroke within the prison and was released soon, but restrained from going far away from the locality.
207 Interviewee 37. 208 Residents in the neighboring county, township, and villages came to Water Village to show support for the anti-incineration protest. Some joined the sit-ins in April and clash with police on May 27, 2011. 209 Interviewee 54. 185
Qian told me that Bing cried every day after getting back home.210 He felt so much wrongly treated, as he remarked, “Indeed, all through my life, I have worked so hard in the collective farms. I am not a bad guy. I have never done a bad thing in the history of my life… In the prison, you were not treated as a person. You were required thumbprint, footprint, and pictures from every side, like a criminal.” When asked whether the couple would continue resist the incineration plant, the answer was a definite “yes.” As the husband put it, “We would not be afraid of opposition. If the plant continued operating, we would take the iron sticks or other staff with us. If you hit us, we will hit you too. Just like that. Why? You beat us first and we fight back!”211 All these comments suggested that the Communist Regime had lost its legitimacy in the minds of the arrested couple.
Villagers were irritated when witnessing that old people in their sixties and seventies were beaten by law enforcement. Some condemned, “Where is the justice?! Don't forget this is a Communist regime!” Right now, local people’s grievances and anger haven’t been vented. One criticized the government, “In our small village, over a hundred people went to arrest a woman at night. Are you bandits or robbers? If you (the government) are so strong, why do small countries in the South China Sea dare to bully China? Why not turn your force against these countries?”212 In this quote, it is interesting to see that the interviewee was making nationalist rhetoric to satirize state authority.
210 Interviewee 53. 211 Interviewees 53 and 54. 212 Interviewee 37. 186
Nevertheless, it is largely the local government—especially the municipal government— that lost legitimacy, not the central government. Activists shared the view that the central government was kept in the dark about repression before it took place. The local government deceived the higher-level government and reported that local residents started a riot. According to the villagers, this explained why as many as five or six thousand police could be deployed to the village. An entrepreneur from the village expected that the government would not dare to crack down future opposition because if the central government knew about further crackdown, local leaders would be removed from office. Thus, when distinguishing the local from the central government, the legitimacy of the Center could be maintained for the time being. This confirms Yongshun
Cai’s (2008) thesis that decentralization preserve regime stability by blaming the local government when repression occurs. In addition, interviewees sometimes singled out corrupt officials for blame: “The Communist Party is good, yet corrupt officials are bad.”213 It is fair to argue that protesters express such views out of the concern of self- protection while venting discontent about the government. Anyhow, criticizing particular officials did not fundamentally question regime legitimacy.
Moreover, despite the violent clash, some protesters still recognized that many policemen were good. They divided the police into “real” and “fake” ones (thugs). Some argued that law enforcement officers were not allowed to have tattoos. But villager said that they saw some men in police uniform had tattoos on arms. In their view, the real policemen disapproved the brutal suppression, yet they could do nothing about it. “Of course, they
213 Interviewee 58. 187
didn’t express objection to repression verbally, but you can tell so from their faces. When
I saw them on the road, I greeted them, ‘You’ve had a hectic day.’ They smiled to me.”214
When the masses cursed the police, one activist disagreed: it was the fault of the municipal government and the incineration plant, not the police.215
In some protesters’ eyes, particular leaders of the municipal government and investors of the incineration plant should be to blame. In my fieldwork in the village, I asked the detained and injured villagers or their families what they would want. Many of them answered that they wanted justice: economic compensations and rehabilitation. The family of the man who was beaten into disability petitioned different levels of the local government and eventually got loans from the village committee for his treatment and recovery. However, the government did not accept the family’s demand of a full-package of compensation. The family would like to file a lawsuit but no lawyers would take the case as they saw no hope of winning. On the other hand, we see that even after the crackdown, the victims still turned to the government for help and the government provided some economic support, an indication that the protest still belongs to regime- engaging protest. Nonetheless, if the government resumed the incineration project and employed force again in the future, it would further push the protest toward transgressive.
Villagers might resort to violence against the repression, as the arrested elderly male said.
Another scenario, however, is that due to the “white terror” in the language of villagers— dozens of arrests and interrogation—villagers may become too scared to continue their
214 Interviewee 37. 215 Interviewee 61. 188
struggle and give up. After witnessing their fellow villagers being arrested owing to speaking out about police assault, many villagers did not dare to talk about it and a few villagers declined my interviews. Both scenarios would threaten regime legitimacy and resilience in the long run.
4.8 CONCLUSION
Taking anti-incineration protests as examples, this chapter has illustrated how protesters perceive the enlarging protest space and push the limits while self-constraining actions.
Meanwhile, authorities monitor actions of protesters continuously, use hard or soft repression to reassure the boundaries of protest space; but they also make concessions at times. Due to differences in local political environments and resources that protesters own, the protest space varies across regions and social groups. It also differs over time during interactions between authorities and protesters.
While all four cases demonstrated considerable negotiations between authorities and protesters, they were achieved under persistent local protests. Protesters in these four cases employed different types of resources that they could mobilize. C City protester more relied on the media, while B City more on social capital and connections with the political elite. These resources were not easy to obtain by other protesters. Plain Village’s victory of lawsuit was probably not replicable to other cases, because in this case, villagers were able to find powerful evidence of local government misconduct in faking local support and environmental evaluation institute’s severe negligence. Yet in other cases, local government’s misbehavior might be not as apparent and audacious as this one.
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As for the Water Village, it was not easy that majority of local residents could be mobilized and actively participated in a protest. All of these cases had attracted more or less media attention (with Water Village the least), and gained support from the prominent anti-incineration expert and environmental NGOs. Therefore, each case had its uniqueness and took advantage of outside support. These cases’ experience might not be replicable to other cases.
Bearing these distinct sources, the tolerated space for protest in four places differed. In general, compared to urban middle class, villagers had fewer resources such as political connections and media access, which left them a narrower space for protest. C City protesters had the largest protest space, with a relatively liberal political environment in the city and convenient access to the media. Plain Village felt such a limited protest space that ultimately they could only resort to lawsuits to address their grievances.
While protesters in all four cases made efforts to push the envelope, they strived to push the limits of protest space regarding actions and organization, not for claims. C City protesters enjoyed the largest protest space among all cases. Yet in this case, protesters at most raised NIABY and anti-corruption claims. The other three cases strictly confined their goal to do away with the incineration project from their own neighborhood, no more other demands. As for actions, each case involved some extra-legal actions (with the
Plain Village the least), such as demonstrations, sit-ins, and collective petitions exceeding the maximum permitted number of representatives. With regard to organization, environmental NGOs and anti-incineration experts from Beijing got involved in all four protests. Two urban cases also established connections with each other. Thus, these cases
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were linked and with the involvement of formal organization. C City protesters went as far as establishing a formal organization, an environmental NGO in the aftermath of the protest. These boundary-pushing efforts were generally tolerated by the state, though local authorities regularly reminded protesters of the limits of protest space and took various soft and hard repression means to demobilize protests.
In general, these cases were regime-engaging protests and played a positive role in building regime legitimacy and resilience. For the Water Village protest, police arrests of the elders — considered illegal by villagers — led to the escalation and triggered the police-villager clash. State crackdown created resentment among local people.
Nonetheless, it was largely the local government that lost legitimacy and many villagers still had faith in the central government. The mechanisms and dynamics of this protest were quite different from those in regime-threatening protests, to be introduced in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5 Transgression and Repression: Regime-
Threatening Protests
Chapters 3 and 4 have analyzed regime-engaging protests and their effect on regime stability. This chapter will examine regime-threatening protests, which have distinct dynamics and mechanisms in terms of state-protester interactions. Unlike cases in previous chapters, protesters in this chapter did not confine their claims within the narrow space for protest. Instead, they all raised political claims that challenged the Party’s rule in one way or another. The tolerated space for these protests was very limited and protesters often took transgressive actions to challenge the regime and deny its legitimacy.
Informal norms barely played a role in guiding the actions of authorities and protesters.
Instead, these regime-threatening protests were characterized by transgression and repression, which was in accord with Tilly and Tarrow’s framework of contentious politics in authoritarian regimes. Since transgressive protest “challenges the regime, its institutions, and its laws all at once” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007: 61) and repression may be self-defeating (Shue 1991) and backfire and inspire more protest (Jenkins and Schock
2004; Hess and Martin 2006), regime-threatening protests are detrimental to regime stability.
I take three high-profile political struggles as examples to illustrate the interactions between the state and protesters in regime-threatening protests and their impact on regime legitimacy and resilience. The selected cases reflect important characteristics of regime- threatening protests in light of types of claims, actions, and organization. As illustrated in
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Figure 5.1, the cases include 2009 Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang, Falun Gong (a spiritual discipline and quasi-religious group) protest movement, Charter 08 pro-democracy movement. In contrast to the regime-engaging cases examined before, cases in this chapter each transgressed boundaries that the Communist Party has made "red lines."
Uyghur protesters desired independence from the Chinese rule and turned violent. Falun
Gong formed an autonomous national organization and at some points became political and staged protests targeting the Chinese leaders, albeit peacefully. Charter 08 movement, in a peaceful, non-disruptive manner, called for the elimination of the one-party system.
All the three cases established connections across regions and Falun Gong protest were mobilized and organized by its own autonomous organization. Therefore, each of these regime-threatening protests involved one type of political grievance or another that the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has deemed transgressive, even though their types of protest actions and organization varied. In each case, officials responded in the same way
— severe repression. All the cases have received extensive media coverage and academic discussion inside or outside of China, which provides a good foundation for a systematic analysis. Studying these different types of regime-threatening protests will help distinguish them from regime-engaging protests and advance our understanding of the boundaries of protest space in China.
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1. Xinjiang ethnic unrest 3. Falun Gong movement 2. Charter 08
Regime-engaging Regime-threatening
Figure 5.1. Three Cases on a Continuum of Regime-Engaging and Regime- Threatening Protests
My analysis of these cases is very different than my analysis of the regime-engaging protests. Not only I rely on secondary sources, but I examine the interaction between protesters and authorities over historical periods of time in order to analyze how these protests moved in the regime-threatening direction. That is, protests characterized by moderate claims and actions developed into protests that made more fundamental political claims and targeted the rule of CCP.
5.1 UYGHUR UNREST IN XINJIANG
5.1.1 2009 Uyghur Unrest in Urumqi
On the afternoon of July 5, 2009, hundreds of Uyghur young men took to the streets of
Urumqi.216 The demonstrators called for a full investigation of the Shaoguan Incident, a violent fight between Han and Uyghur workers at a factory in southern China on June 25
216 “Scores killed in China protests.” July 6, 2009. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8135203.stm, accessed by July 18, 2014. 194
and 26 that left at least 2 Uyghurs dead and 118 people injured.217 After a few hours, protesters’ confrontation with police turned violent. The protesters attacked Han residents, battled security forces, set vehicles on fire, and broke into shops; while police officers used fire hoses, batons, and live ammunition to control protesters.218 On July 7, hundreds of Han Chinese marched through the streets in Urumqi armed with homemade weapons to take revenge on Uyghurs. Smaller fights frequently broke out between Uyghurs and
Han. Police used tear gas and roadblocks in an attempt to disperse the demonstration.219
Government sources claim that the riots in July left 197 dead and 1,721 injured. Most of the victims were Han Chinese.220 Property damage included 331 shops and 1,325 motor vehicles destroyed or burned, and many public facilities were damaged.221 According to official statement, Chinese police shot dead 12 Uyghur protesters.222 In the ensuing weeks, more than 1,500 people (another source says 4,000) were arrested and mosques
217 “Man held over China ethnic clash.” June 30, 2009. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8125693.stm, accessed by July 18, 2014. 218 “Civilians die in China riots.” July 5, 2009. Aljazeera.com. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/07/200975175832600179.html, accessed by July 18, 2014. 219 "Riot police battle protesters as China's Uyghur crisis escalates". Macartney, Jane. July 7, 2009. The Times (London), accessed by January, 6 2010. 220 Initial figures counted 156 dead, 123 of them Han Chinese and 33 Uyghurs. The breakdowns by ethnic groups disappeared soon after (Bovingdon 2010). “Chinese President Visits Volatile Xinjiang,” Edward Wong and Jonathan Ansfield. New York Times, August 25, 2009. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/26/world/asia/26china.html?_r=0, accessed by July 28, 2014. 221 The Information Office of the State Council, Development and Progress in Xinjiang. 222 “Xinjiang widens crackdown on Uyghurs.” Kathrin Hille. July 19, 2009. Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/5aa932ee-747c-11de-8ad5-00144feabdc0.html, accessed by July 28, 2014. 195
were temporarily closed.223 By November 2009, over 400 individuals faced criminal charges.224 Nine were executed that same month, and by February 2010, at least 26 had received death sentences, 24 Uyghurs and 2 Han Chinese.225 Fourteen thousand security personnel were deployed in Urumqi from October 11, 2009.226 Security was tight in
Xinjiang and Internet access within Urumqi remained restricted for nearly a year following the riots.227
5.1.2 A brief history of protests in Xinjiang
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is one of China’s 31 provincial administrations and lies on the northwestern frontier of the country. As the largest administrative unit in the country, Xinjiang occupies a sixth of China’s landmass. It has abundant oil reserves and is China’s most important energy base (Becquelin 2000).
According to 2010 China Census, Xinjiang has a total population of 21.82 million. Its largest ethnic group is Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group, most of whom are Muslims. The
223 “Xinjiang arrests 'now over 1,500'.” August 3, 2009. BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8181563.stm, accessed by July 28, 2014. 224 "Riot woman sentenced to death for killing". Cui Jia. December 5, 2009. China Daily. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2009-12/05/content_9122992.htm. Accessed December 13, 2013. 225 "Nine executed over Xinjiang riots." BBC News. November 9 2009. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8350360.stm, accessed by July 29, 2010. "China sentences four more to death for Urumqi riot". Reuters. Le Yu. January 26, 2010. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2010/01/26/uk-china-xinjiang- idUKTRE60P3HM20100126, accessed April 11, 2010. 226 “Six Sentenced to Death over Xinjiang Riot”, Xinhua news, Chinaview.cn, November 12, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-10/12/content_12217174.htm, accessed April 11, 2010. 227 “Security Tight in Xinjiang.” Radio Free Asia. 2011-06-24. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/uyghur/security-06242011134728.html, accessed April 16, 2013. 196
Uyghurs’ population numbers about 10 million today. In the past six decades, Han
Chinese, the ethnic majority in China, have been migrating to the region and Han population numbers 8.83 million. Kazaks, with 1.42 million people, are the third largest ethnic group. The majority of Uyghurs live in southern Xinjiang, while northern Xinjiang is mainly inhabited by Han and Kazaks (Hao and Liu 2012). While Uyghurs are the largest ethnic groups in the province (45.83 percent), Han Chinese outnumber Uyghurs in
Urumqi, the capital city located in northern Xinjiang. Urumqi has a total population of
3.11 million and 74.91 percent are Han.228 Since the early 1990s, tensions between
Uyghurs and Hans have intensified and a series of violent political disturbances have occurred in Xinjiang. Today, Han relations with the Uyghurs are worse than with any other ethnic minority, including Tibetans (Mackerras 2004). The tension accumulated and then broke out into the largest violent protest in China in decades on July 5, 2009.
In fact, prior to July 5 unrest, Uyghurs have staged numerous protests since the1980s.
Most major protest episodes have not concerned economic matters. In these protests, they frequently challenged the very incorporation of Xinjiang into China (Bovingdon 2010:
P110). Some called for more autonomy of Xinjiang, while others aimed to establish an independent state by means of armed force and to drive out the Han Chinese. Still others took the form of demonstrations or riots and shouted slogans such as “Down with the
Han/Chinese government,” “Han out of Xinjiang,” and “Long Live Xinjiang’s
Independence” (Dillon 2004: P59). With regard to protest actions and organizations,
228 “Bulletin of the Major Data about 2010 China Census of Urumqi.” Tianshan Website, September 16, 2011. http://news.ts.cn/content/2011- 09/16/content_6173591.htm, accessed by April 20, 2014. 197
although not every Uyghur protest was violent or initiated with violence, many of them were armed insurrections or violent demonstrations, premeditated, involved with formal organizations, or with linkages across regions. In the latter half of the 1980s, students and other citizens organized major demonstrations in which the protests lasted several days and spread to other cities (Bovingdon 2010). By 1997, protests could draw participants from across district and county boundaries and demonstrations could shift from remote rural settings to Xinjiang’s major cities. Planned actions have grown in scope. Growing number of police actions to round up suspects culminated in gun battles with well-armed holdouts. The most hardened partisans had received military training, at first in camps in rural southern Xinjiang and then in Pakistan or Afghanistan after the public security bureau closed those camps (Bovingdon 2010: P122).
To understand the characteristics of Uyghurs’ unrest, we must take the history, geopolitics, socioeconomic conditions of Xinjiang, and most importantly, state reactions into account. Before Xinjiang became a province of the newly established People’s
Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, in the Republic Era, two short-lived East Turkistan
Republics existed in the region during 1933-1934 and 1944-1949 (Dillon 2004;
Bovingdon 2010). Apart from history, geopolitics also matters. Bordering with the former
Soviet Union, Xinjiang has 5,500 km of international borders and lies near the center of the Eurasian landmass (Becquelin 2000; Bovingdon 2010). Since the fall of Soviet Union and independence of the Central Asian countries, cross-border trade has increased. Closer political and religious connections are being forged with Turkic Muslims throughout
Central Asia, which reinforces Uyghurs religious and ethnic identity as well as their sense
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of distinction from the Chinese (Dillon 2004: P166). Additionally, in spite of a modest absolute rise in living standards in recent decades, Uyghurs have a strong perception of ethnically based exclusion and relative deprivation in Xinjiang (Hann 2011). Growing economic inequalities between Hans and Uyghurs have been coupled with a dramatic increase of Han migration into the region, government restrictions on religion practices, and anxiety over the survival of Uyghur cultural attributes in a Han-majority society.
More importantly, the feature of Uyghur protests is closely related to the repressive political environment in Xinjiang. The political climate here is distinctly chillier than most of the rest of China and protest space is narrower for Uyghur protests. With very few exceptions, the regime has shown no tolerance for open protests by Uyghurs and refused to negotiate, whatever the claims of the protesters (Hastings 2005: P131;
Bovingdon 2010: P153-4). Officials “equate any expression of dissatisfaction…even metaphorical or ironical, with separatist thought” (Becquelin 2004: 44). Ethnic or nationalist disturbances, whether motivated by political or religious issues are usually depicted by the Chinese authorities as riots, hooliganism or sabotage (Dillon 2004: P51).
In almost every case in which protesters explicitly raised such matters as the perceived disrespect for Islam and Muslims and the imposition of family planning, official insisted that they openly challenged the Party rule or aimed at secession (Bovingdon 2010: P119).
In short, the Chinese regime usually rejects the legitimacy of Uyghurs’ protests in
Xinjiang and barely permits informal norms of contention for these protests.
5.1.2.1 A vicious cycle of transgression and repression
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The characteristics of Uyghurs’ protests and the repressive atmosphere in Xinjiang suggest a vicious cycle of contentious politics between transgressive protests and state repression. In the 1980s, Xinjiang witnessed a brief period of political toleration of religious practice and social protests when Hu Yaobang was the General Secretary of the
Communist Party from 1982 to 1987. After the 1980 disturbances in Aksu, which involved inter-ethnic riots and Han youths’ protests to go back home in China proper229
(Clarke 2011), the state offered a concession by re-establishing the Xinjiang Islamic
Association and allowed the partial revival of traditional customs (Dillon 2004: 59;
Hierman 2007). Many mosques were constructed afterwards. The proportion of Uyghur officials in the government was also increased. On the Uyghur side, protests had been largely peaceful from 1979 through the 1980s (Bovingdon 2010: 106).
Over the 1990s, Han-Uyghur relations in Xinjiang deteriorated and political violence gradually spread throughout the region (Becquelin 2000; Mackerras 2004; Dillon 2004).
During the 1990s, small-scale violent protests became more common, following forceful suppression of protests beginning in the period after the crackdown on 1989 Tiananmen
Square movement (Bovingdon 2010: 106). Since then, the regime has been increasingly on high alert regarding protests in Xinjiang and regarded all assemblies in the region outside party control illegal and forbidden. Islamic practices among Uyghurs also received more restrictions. These coercive and restrictive measures further alienated
Uyghurs, escalated conflicts, and expanded the grievances among Uyghurs’ population.
229 Han youths had been sent from Shanghai and other major urban centers in China proper during the Cultural Revolution (Bovingdon 2010). 200
Through the 1990s, the conflict became increasing severe and more organized (Dillon
2004). For some moment, they took violent means, including assassinations, riots, arson, and poisonings (Hastings 2011). When repression was too intense, they turned to
“everyday resistance” during the 2000s before the late 2000s (Bovingdon 2002).
The most influential protest that contributed to the reversal of the government’s 1980s policy of relative tolerance in Xinjiang was the 1990 Baren Insurgency in southern
Xinjiang. A rebel group led by Zeydin Yusuf, with a name of Islamic Party of East
Turkestan, planned a series of synchronized attacks on government buildings (Millward
2004: 14; Dillion 2004: 93). On April 5, 1990, the uprising began with a march and then turned to battles with police. Armed with rifles, rebels took police officers hostage, killed and injured police, and attacked the town hall with hand grenades and other explosives
(Dillon 2004: 64). Issues underlying this uprising included Chinese migration to Xinjiang and the forthcoming family planning policy (Millward 2004: 15). Protesters during the
Baren Insurgency also seemed to have propagated separatist ideologies and organized the rebellion through the channels of local mosques (Dillon 2004: 73; Han 2013). After this insurgency, the political activities of Uyghur separatists became increasingly violent. The claim, actions, and organization of Baren Insurgency not only indicated that it denied the legitimacy of the Chinese rule, but also demonstrated the rebel group’s resolution and capacity to achieve its goal by force. No doubt, Baren Insurgency shocked the authorities.
In the aftermath, the state began to identify Muslim institutions and practices as a source of dissent.
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The suppression of the Baren Insurgency ushered in an era of transgression and repression. The ratio of premeditated violent protests to other forms of contentious events increased. Armed insurrections, bombings, assassinations of “pro-Chinese clergy” took place at times in pursuit of independence in the 1990s (Dillon 2004; Bovingdon 2010).
On the other hand, the state launched the “Strike Hard” anti-crime campaign in 1996. In
Xinjiang, its goal was not only to crack down on criminal activities in general, but also to target political dissenters and, in particular, Uyghur separatists and the violent incidents organized by them (Han 2010; Dillon 2004: P85). Mass arrests and confiscation of weapons were taking place across the region. Meanwhile, the Strike Hard campaign was coupled with increased pressure on the practice of Islam. All Islamic publications were required to get state approval. The authorities also closed down non-registered mosques and religious schools, requiring all imams to declare their loyalty to the government in writing (Hierman 2007).
On the heels of the Strike Hard campaign, the heavy-handed repression created a backlash, with escalating conflicts and increasing unrest (Hierman 2007; Bovingdon
2010). The peak of these protests was the Ghulja (Yining) Uprising in 1997. As a pro- independence protest, it started with a mass demonstration and developed into violence, attacking public security personnel and Han residents as well as destroying cars. The police fired live rounds into the crowd to put down the unrest (Bovingdon 2002: p66). In the wake of Ghulja Uprising, intensified level of state repression led to the eventual decline of open anti-state collective action in the region, yet it encouraged the formation of clandestine groups (Hierman 2007). There were many reports of clashes between small
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groups of Uyghurs and Chinese police (Dillon 2004: p110-111). Despite large-scale open protests were in decline in the region, the grievances and resentment against Han rule did not. Everyday resistance continued in Xinjiang (Bovingdon 2002). This was the background of the July 5 Urumqi unrest. It partly explains why a conflict between
Uyghurs and Hans two thousand miles away became the proximal cause of Uyghurs’ protest in Urumqi.
5.1.3 A regime-threatening protest
5.1.3.1 Actions
In the July 5 Urumqi unrest, violence towards Han residents and bloody confrontations with security forces stood out. Nevertheless, the protest actually started with a peaceful demonstration. At the onset of the demonstration, some of the demonstrators reported even waved large Chinese flags (Millward 2010). In this sense, at least some protesters were demonstrating their acceptance of state authority and expressing their desire to work within the system. At this moment, police did not use force either. In other words, the event began with a regime-engaging protest. Why did it soon develop into a deadly riot?
Whether it was caused by police force or by demonstrators attacking Han Chinese in the first place is still unclear. Some sources accounted that as the protesters marched around the city of Urumqi, their numbers swelled and they soon turned their attention to Han
Chinese. The violent confrontations escalated after police forces arrived at the scene
(Barbour and Jones 2013). Whereas other sources narrated that protesters might have planned to stage a sit-in in the People’s Square, security forces moved in to surround them and began beating, detaining and, according to some accounts, shooting at them. 203
Demonstrators then called friends and relations elsewhere in the city, and relayed the news that their demonstration was being violently repressed, and this sparked the rioting across the city (Millward 2010). No matter who initiated the violence, most sources agreed that Uyghur protesters attacked and killed Han residents and engaged in violent confrontations with security forces. Thus, July 5 unrest reflected the acute ethnic conflict between Uyghurs and Hans and also harsh state repression. In the process of the event, there were no negotiations between authorities and protesters. The state did not allow a tolerated space for Uyghur protests, nor did Uyghurs self-disciplined their actions throughout the process.
5.1.3.2 Claims
At the outset of July 5 unrest, Uyghurs demanded for government intervention for fairly handling the Shaoguan Incident and seemingly no separatist claims were raised at this stage. However, once the protest became violent, separatist claims were put forth thereafter. Actually, for many years, Uyghurs in Xinjiang raised many of the same grievances as Hans, including objections to the birth-control policy, cadre corruption, environmental destruction, and tax burdens (Hastings 2005). Different from Han protests, these grievances were usually seen through an ethnic lens by both protesters and authorities: Uyghurs interpreted these grievances in ethnic terms and authorities interpreted Uyghur protests ethnically as well. Of course, Uyghurs also have their grievances that are clearly distinct, including ethnic discrimination and lack of respect by the Han-dominated regime for Uyghur culture and religion. These grievances, combined with the separate Uyghur identity, increase the chance that protests will escalate if the 204
state does not respond to a legitimate grievance. While separatism is probably not the primary issue for most Uyghurs, it is there; once petitions for redressing grievances seemingly unrelated to separatism are rejected, it can come to the fore, leading to escalation (Hastings 2005: P33). This helps explain the swift move to putting forth the forbidden political claims in the July 5 unrest.
On the other hand, the state delegitimized the July 5 protest by focusing on the casualties and destruction of property, which it blamed on "extremism, separatism and terrorism."230
Instead of following informal norms to handle regime-engaging protests, the government showed no mercy on the protesters and dispatched security forces for relentless crackdown.
5.1.3.3 Organization
In the July 5 unrest, protesters’ initial demonstration was planned, mobilized through the
Internet, cell phone texts, and other media and the unrest was joined by Uyghurs from other parts of Xinjiang (Millward 2010). Following the June 26 Shaoguan Incident,
Uyghur websites and message boards were active, circulating information or rumor about the events and publishing writings to the people and authorities in Guangdong and China, calling for investigations of the incident and questioning the unpopular labor transfer policy that brought Uyghur workers from poor agricultural areas of Xinjiang to eastern
230 Eligen Imibakhi, chairman of the Standing Committee of the Xinjiang Regional People's Congress (The official Xinhua News Agency reported). http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/07/20/after-riots-china-promote- antiseparatist-laws.html, accessed by July 20, 2014. 205
China. In early July, Uyghurs planned a march to Urumqi’s People’s Square to demand a more thorough investigation of the Shaoguan Incident. Word spread about the demonstration over the Internet, cell phone message, and other media; the upcoming event was well-known in advance to the local people and throughout the world. Both
Urumqi Uyghurs and official PRC sources also reported that in the days prior to the demonstration, many Uyghurs from other parts of the region, especially southern
Xinjiang came to Urumqi. In a word, the Urumqi unrest had links across regions and probably across social groups.
In short, when both protesters and authorities rejected to engage in negotiations and
Uyghurs transgressed all the red lines in terms of actions, claims, and organization, July 5 unrest decidedly was a regime-engaging protest.
5.1.4 Impact on regime legitimacy and resilience
It is unclear to what extent the general Uyghur public supports either separatism or violence. Nonetheless, it is likely that the CCP’s harsh restrictions on their religion and culture, refusal to negotiate about any grievances, and brutal repression are increasing support for both. Increasing restrictions on Uyghurs’ religious practices resulted in a more unified Uyghur attitude towards the state: shared bitterness about Han rule and hopes for an independent state of their own. This was illustrated in their everyday resistance (Bovingdon 2002). Among many Uyghurs today, the CCP regime probably enjoys very little legitimacy.
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Moreover, the vicious cycle between transgression and repression unquestionably has worsened the relationship between Uyghurs and Hans, and Uyghurs and the state. The eruptions of violent attacks on Han residents, security forces, and properties have destabilized the social order, created economic loss, and ultimately undermined the rule of the Party-state. Harsh repression has had a radicalizing effect on Uyghur protests and there are indications that anti-state resistance had spread from small, dedicated radical groups to larger segments of the population (Hierman 2007). Constant reliance upon coercion to ensure popular compliance is not a long-term solution, as it is not only an inefficient and expensive strategy, but probably ultimately a self-defeating one (Shue
1991: 28). Hence, as long as the vicious cycle continues, it will further damage regime legitimacy and resilience.
5.2 FALUN GONG PROTEST MOVEMENT
5.2.1 April 25 besieging Zhongnanhai
On the morning of April 25, 1999, more than 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners from six provinces and municipalities gathered in front of Zhongnanhai, the central Party and state headquarters where China’s top central leaders live and work. The well-ordered crowd remained peaceful and silent, and did not hold placards or shout slogans, nor did they obstruct or occupy any part of the street. They stood close to one another in three or four rows along the street. Men in the outside row faced the street to maintain order and prevent outsiders from inserting themselves. Those behind sat on the ground, some resting while others reading the Zhuan falun (转法轮), the bible of Falun Gong.
Throughout the day, negotiations took place between the National Petition Bureau 207
officials and practitioner representatives who complained about the hurt feelings and other damages caused by criticism of Falun Gong and restrictions on fellow Falun Gong practitioners. Representatives demanded winning back the legal standing and official recognition of their religious association. In the process, Falun Gong practitioners waited patiently and quietly all day long and much of the evening; meanwhile, they were not harassed or dispersed by law enforcement. After they left in the late evening, they did not leave a single scrap of paper or a cigarette butt (Leung 2002; Chan 2004; Ownby 2008;
Palmer 2007; Perry 2002; Tong 2002).
5.2.2 A brief history of Falun Gong movement
Falun Gong, “Dharma-Wheel Qigong” or “Wheel of Law,” was founded by Li Hongzhi in May 1992, in Changchun, a northeastern city. It was initially a qigong (a practice of integrating physical postures, breathing techniques, and focused intentions for health and meditation)231 association focusing on body training and health healing. Practitioners usually characterize Falun Gong as a cultivation system, a practice involving physical movements, mental disciplines, and moral tenets that together can affect a positive change in the nature of ordinary human bodies (Penny 2012). Around 1994, Li began to change the nature of Falun Gong and use ideology to replace body training. He argued that the purpose of practicing Falun Gong was to purify one’s heart and attain spiritual salvation. Li Hongzhi’s writings stressed that master Li (himself) is the omniscient and omnipotent savior of the entire universe (Thornton 2010; Palmer 2007).
231 “What is Qigong?” The National Qigong Association.http://nqa.org/resources/what- is-qigong/, accessed by September 26, 2014. 208
As Falun Gong’s founder and leader, Li Hongzhi, enjoyed absolute authority. He was born in the early 1950s and graduated from junior high school at the age of eighteen. At the height of the Cultural Revolution, Li applied to join the Communist Youth League.
After graduation, Li spent eight years as a trumpet player in the army and police institute and then took up a position at a state-owned company. He received training from multiple qigong masters, some of whom were Buddhism, while others were Daoism (Thornton
2010; Palmer 2007).
Once founded, Falun Gong grew rapidly first in northeastern China and soon across the whole country. Between late 1998 and early 1999, the group reached its peak, with millions of adherents and thousands of practice sites (liangong dian) scattered all over
China (Chan 2004; Palmer 2007; Perry 2001). At that moment, the adherents of Falun
Gong included housewives, businessmen, government officials, party cadres, university professors, graduate students, and so forth (Chan 2013).
5.2.2.1 The cycle of protest and toleration
The state originally provided considerable support to Falun Gong, but from the mid-
1990s the winds of favor changed. Falun Gong faced official criticism, its formal organization was legally disbanded, and publications were banned (Ownby 2008: 165-74;
Palmer 2007: 249-56; Junker 2014a). In order to defend itself against state interference,
Falun Gong became politicized from being originally apolitical (Chan 2004; Chen et al.
2010; Ownby 2008). Such politicization began in the summer of 1996 when Zhuan Falun, written by Li Hongzhi became a national best seller (Chan 2004; Ownby 2008:165–74;
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Palmer 2007:249–56; Penny 2012; Tong 2002). In fact, protests by Falun Gong practitioners started several years earlier but climaxed in the April 25 gathering outside
Zhongnanhai.
In the face of more frequent negative reporting in the media, Falun Gong adherents mounted around 300 peaceful demonstrations between June 1996 and April 1999, some with over 1,000 participants (Ownby 2008: 169; Palmer 2007: 254). These protests targeted newspapers and government officials who criticized Falun Gong. And they were well organized. Thousands of disciplined adepts from multiple social strata and geographic areas gathered and demanded apologies, revisions, and the withdrawal of offending newspaper editions from circulation (Palmer 2007: 251-252). In the organization of these protests, the network of practice site supervisors was activated to mobilize the practitioners. Throughout the 1996–1999 period, Li repeatedly emphasized that followers publicly defend Falun Gong, while simultaneously stressing the importance that the practice of “cultivation” was the ultimate purpose of the movement and it was nonpolitical. In the six months prior to the April 25 event, Falun Gong adherents staged sit-ins demanding official recognition 18 times in 13 cities (Leung 2002).
Before April 25, 1999, Falun Gong protests were usually not immediately condemned or suppressed and most media institutions and government offices seemed to respond to
Falun Gong pressure and issued apologies (Ownby 2008: 16; Palmer 2007: 256). Reasons for toleration varied. A large number of the Communist Party members were Falun Gong adepts or sympathizers, some high-level officials saw Falun Gong as a healing
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organization, while others feared the true influence of Falun Gong and the risk of alienating Li Hongzhi’s tens of millions of disciples (Palmer 2007: 254-255).
Below, I single out three major protest events to illustrate the character of Falun Gong protests and interactions between practitioners and authorities prior to the April 25
Incident.
5.2.2.1.1 Guangming Ribao Incident
On June 17, 1996, an influential official newspaper, the Guangming Ribao (光明日报）, published an article denouncing Falun Gong, condemning Zhuan falun as a “pseudo- scientific book propagating feudal superstition,” deriding Li himself as a “swindler,” and calling on all right-thinking people to join in the fight against superstition (Palmer 2007:
249; Ownby 2008: 168). This article triggered wider anti-Falun Gong propaganda in the media. Around twenty major newspapers followed suit. On July 24, 1996, the Central
Propaganda Department issued an order banning all Falun Gong books.
Following the ban, practitioners mounted a letter-writing campaign, flooding the
Guangming Ribao against these measures. They also staged mass protests around the offices of media outlets that published or broadcast critical reports. Each of such gatherings frequently involved more than a thousand participants. Some reporters and government officials complained of being harassed by phone calls from defiant disciples
(Thornton 2010). Li Hongzhi encouraged such actions in a sermon on August 28, 1996 through the Internet and chided others who did nothing to respond to the attacks (Palmer
2007: 249). Li called the Guangming Ribao Incident a test of practitioners: those who 211
rose up to defend Falun Gong would be proven to be the true disciples (Li Hongzhi: 31;
Ownby 2008: 168; Palmer 2007:249–50). Around the same time, Li started spending most of his time abroad, giving lectures and workshops (Palmer 2007: 251).
Meanwhile, the Chinese authorities did not follow through on the Enlightenment Daily’s call for thoroughgoing criticism of Falun Gong, and the ban on Falun Gong publications was not implemented consistently. China's leadership remained divided on Falun Gong.
From 1996 onwards, Falun Gong no longer had a legal existence in China, but the organization continued to grow despite written attacks on Li Hongzhi and Falun Gong. Li directed the network from abroad (especially, the United States), by telephone, fax and email. Online bulletin boards became one of the preferred methods of communication between Li, the Central Gongfa Headquarters in Beijing, the regional training stations and the local practice points (Palmer 2007: 251-252; Ownby 2008).
5.2.2.1.2 Beijing Television Station Incident
On May 24, 1998, the Beijing Television Station, an official media, aired a program on
Falun Gong, including an interview with physicist He Zuoxiu, who called the group an
“evil cult” that propagated dangerous and unscientific practices and ideas. In response, several hundred practitioners proceeded to stage an eight-day sit-in at the Beijing
Television Station until the program director apologized, aired another report favorable to
Falun Gong, and fired the journalist who interviewed He Zuoxiu (Palmer 2007: 251-252;
Ownby 2008). Li Hongzhi encouraged practitioners to display their allegiance to Falun
Gong openly. He dismissed the chief assistant of the Beijing Falun Gong General
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Training Station for having stayed at home rather than taking part in a demonstration. Li described attacks on Falun Gong as trials that would test the sincerity of his followers
(Palmer 2007: 253-254).
5.2.2.1.3 Prelude to the April 25 Incident
In mid-April, 1999, He Zuoxiu wrote an article critical of Falun Gong that was published in a student magazine of Tianjin Normal University, a limited circulation journal. Falun
Gong practitioners considered the article highly offensive and gathered to protest — in meditation posture — around the university administrative building in Tianjin, a northern city close to Beijing. The number of demonstrators grew day by day, as the magazine editor refused to comply with practitioners’ demand to recall the magazine from circulation, publish official apologies, and ban any reproduction of the article by others.
By April 23, one day after Li Hongzhi arrived in Beijing en route to Australia, the number of protesters in Tianjin had increased to 6,000. When three hundred riot police were dispatched to disperse the demonstration, some Falun Gong followers were beaten and 45 people were arrested. Demanding their release, hundreds of practitioners marched to the municipal government. But the government claims it lacked authority because the police action had been carried out on orders of the Ministry of Public Security (Palmer
2007: 266-267).
The demonstrators thus decided to head for Beijing to obtain justice. At this moment, Li
Hongzhi flew from Beijing to Hong Kong. On the morning of April 24, to organize the next day demonstration in Beijing, each Falun Gong practice station designated a
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volunteer to ensure security, order and cleanliness; there were to be no slogans, no banners, no tracts, no aggressive language and no mention of the Falun Dafa Research
Society—the headquarters of Falun Gong—or of specific practice stations. Then the next day, the silent encircling of Zhongnanhai took place as described earlier (Palmer 2007).
The besieging of Zhongnanhai became a turning point in the Falun Gong movement and the state response. It triggered heavy-handed state repression and pushed the movement to become increasingly political and transgressive. In what follows, I show that both attitudes of the state and Falun Gong protesters reversed after April 25, 1999.
5.2.2.2 The starting of state crackdown
Following the April 25 besieging incident, authorities began to deny the legitimacy of
Falun Gong protests. The April 25 event was described by People’s Daily—the most important official newspaper—as “completely wrong” and was defined by authorities as
“the most serious political incident” since the Tiananmen Square uprising in 1989 (Leung
2002; Tong 2002). Soon after the April 25 incident, the political office of the People’s
Liberation Army issued a circular to forbide members of the armed forces from practicing Falun Gong (Palmer 2007: 272). Authorities claimed Falun Gong was seeking to overthrow the government and establish a theocracy (Ownby 2008: 179) and labeled it an “evil cult” in October (Perry 2002). The State Planning Committee characterized the fight against the Falun Gong as “an extremely complicated, life-or-death political struggle” (Chan 2004).
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On July 20, 1999, a massive nationwide crackdown on Falun Gong was launched on all media-television, radio and press. On July 21, the Central Committee of CCP, the highest authority within the CCP, declared Falun Gong an illegal organization and banned party members from participating in its activities. After the campaign got underway, government propaganda campaign against the practice of Falun Gong lasted for weeks
(Perry 2002: xv). Falun Gong Internet sites were blocked. Moreover, the Ministry of
Public Security prohibited Falun Gong practice and the sale or distribution of Falun Gong materials. Not only party members but also ordinary Chinese citizens were formally forbidden from taking part in Falun Gong activities. Law enforcement arrested a minimum of 150 Falun Gong practitioners by July 22 before the official ban was announced, including Falun Gong leaders in China's armed forces (Tong 2009: 54). On
July 28, the Chinese Public Security Bureau issued an international arrest warrant for Li
Hongzhi and asked for Interpol's assistance in extraditing him (Chan 2013; Ownby 2008;
Tong 2009). Thousands were reportedly sent to labor camps and hundreds to prison, in conjunction with the crackdown. Dozens may have died at the hands of police.
Meanwhile, a community-based intelligence network was built to monitor former Falun
Gong practitioners to ensure that they would not misbehave at their residence or work place, using local informants and special agents (Tong 2009: 54).
At dawn on July 20, the arrest of most key Falun Gong leaders and assistants in Beijing and the main provincial cities led to protests by thousands of Falun Gong disciples in several cities in the evening. This time, police showed no mercy on protesters and
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violently dispersed and arrested demonstrators; in Beijing, 2000 protesters were arrested near Tiananmen Square and locked in a stadium west of the city (Palmer 2007: 275).
5.2.2.3 The cycle of repression and transgression
At the onset of the nationwide anti-Falun Gong campaign, on July 22, Li Hongzhi issued a call to governments, international organizations, and “good people” from around the world to support Falun Gong and called on the Chinese government “not to treat the
Falun Gong masses like enemies” as this would cause the people would lose their trust in the government and leaders in China (Palmer 2007: 276). Soon afterwards, Li disappeared for over a year (Junker 2014b; Chan 2013). Meanwhile, Falun Gong followers reacted to the crackdown by more protests. Between April 25 and July 22, more than 300 demonstrations by Falun Gong adherents took place at various locations around
China (Thornton 2010), in only two days during July 20-22 nearly 100 Falun Gong protests occurred throughout China (Tong 2009: 52–53) and tens of thousands of followers staged protests at government offices in more than 30 cities232. In the ensuing year, petitioning to the government offices became the major form of the Falun Gong protest movement (Ownby 2008; Tong 2009). Apart from this, practitioners also mounted public displays of Falun Gong exercises, unfurled banners, and distributed pro-Falun
Gong literature (Junker 2014b). Throughout 2000, thousands of Falun Gong activists attempted to travel to Tiananmen Square in Beijing — the national symbol — from
232 Faison, Seth. 1999. “Chinese Officials Held in Campaign against Vast Sect.” New York Times, July 27. http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/27/world/chinese-officials-held- in-campaign-against-vast-sect.html, accessed by July 25, 2014. 216
locations all over China and even from diaspora (Junker 2014b). Most attempts were intercepted by authorities en route; those who made it were promptly detained by authorities. In the first five months of the crackdown, the authorities estimated that Falun
Gong followers had “more than 35,000 run-ins with the police.”233
At the outset, protesters were often treated relatively lightly by authorities and sent home with few lasting repercussions. As protesters continued to defy national policy, repression practices escalated, ranging from fines and job termination to multiyear incarceration at correctional camps, psychological hospitals, or occasionally prisons (Tong 2009; Junker
2014b). The practice of physical abuse and torture of Falun Gong inmates in labor reform institutions appeared to be widespread in many locations in China. Minghui, the Falun
Gong website, listed 2,371 instances of named Falun Gong practitioners who were tortured to death while in official custody or shortly thereafter between July 1999 and
December 2005 (Tong 2009: 123-125).
On October 30, 1999, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (NPC) passed a law on the suppression of heterodox religion (xiejiao, 邪教), which directly targeted Falun Gong and legitimized the government’s suppression. Falun Gong’s four chief leaders below Li Hongzhi were arrested in Beijing and received heavy sentences after a hasty trial on December 27, 1999. The arrest of local Falun Gong leaders then began to take place across the country. According to official statistics, by the end of 1999,
233 Rosenthal, Elisabeth. 1999. “Few Members of Large Sect to Face Trial, Beijing Says.” New York Times, December 2. http://www.radioradicale.it/exagora/nyt-china- few-members-of-large-sect-to-face-trial-beijing-says, accessed by July 27, 2014. 217
over 35,000 followers had been arrested in Beijing alone for participation in demonstrations. In February 2000, it was reported that more than 5,000 Falun Gong followers had been detained across China and the arrests and condemnations continued
(Leung 2002).
Facing increasingly intense repression, protests by Falun Gong practitioners turned radical. Some activists even saw more severe policing practices—especially incarceration—as a kind of martyrdom and a means of self-cultivation (Junker 2014b).
Facing growing severe repression, Falun Gong practitioners had been attempting ever bolder acts of protest. In January 2000, followers tried to hang a giant portrait of their guru, Li Hongzhi, over the painting of Mao Zedong hanging on the Tiananmen Square
(Perry 2002). This attempted action openly denied and directly challenged the authority of the Communist regime. Since February 2002, Falun Gong protests appeared to have decreased and gradually turned underground. Slogans were found painted on walls and lampposts. Activists hacked into the television cables and broadcasted pro-Falun Gong views, extolling Li’s “outstanding contributions.” Practitioners also distribute CDs and leaflets in favor of Falun Gong (Thornton 2010).
Abroad, Falun Gong disciples pursued high-profile activities such as lobbying foreign governments for support and launching international campaigns criticizing China’s human rights violations. Falun Gong activists started letter-writing and email campaigns directed at overseas governments and international organizations. Other efforts included a bid to nominate Li Hongzhi for the Nobel Peace Prize, the filing of formal lawsuits against various Chinese officials for their handling of the crackdown against the
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movement in People’s Republic of China (PRC), and attempts to encourage the mass resignation of past and present members of the CCP. Over the past decade, Falun Gong adherents have often charged that Chinese officials — including then President Jiang
Zemin — of an organ-harvesting scheme that particularly targeted imprisoned mainland practitioners (Palmer 2007; Thornton 2010).234
The Falun Gong organization also established and maintained a range of media outlets, including short-wave radio programming, television stations (such as New York based
New Tang Dynasty Television), and newspapers. Epoch Times, a newspaper associated with Falun Gong and established in New York in August 2000, has become one of the largest overseas Chinese news outlets in the world. The Epoch Times was highly critical of the Chinese government, especially the Communist Party. It routinely reported on issues pertaining not only to the official persecution of Falun Gong believers, but also more broadly on various negative phenomena and social problems in PRC (Thornton
2010: 231). Especially, in late 2004, the Epoch Times published “Nine Commentaries on the Communist Party,” a blanket condemnation of Communism in general and of Chinese
Communism in particular, and called on members of CCP and the Communist Youth
League to renounce their membership (Penny 2012: 222). This scathing attack on the
234 This organ-harvesting accusation has not been proved thus far. American officials had led teams to conduct two investigations on the Chinese facility charged by Falun Gong of organ-harvesting, but found no evidence. Veteran dissident Harry Wu, who spend 15 years gathering evidence on the harvesting of organs from excused Chinese prisoners, publicly expressed his suspicions that the claims were fabricated, based on unreliable sources. Falun Gong denied Wu’s investigation and launched a campaign against him (Thornton 2010). 219
legitimacy of the Chinese regime suggested a call for its overthrow—if by peaceful means (Ownby 2008: 221).
Additionally, in February 2005, Li Hongzhi denounced the Communist Party as an “evil cult” in an article entitled “Turning the Wheel towards the Human World.” In the article, he denounced the Party’s evil nature and Communism as an ideology. He characterized the official suppression as an “enormous sin of the ages” and called for any person to withdraw from the Party and any of its associated organization (Penny 2012: 222-223).
According to Li, practitioners must cleanse themselves of any taint of Communism, or they would fail to attain consummation or spiritual perfection (yuanman, 圆满), no matter what else they may do. In this sense, the Falun Gong movement has become forthrightly regime-threatening and overtly politicized. The leader of Falun Gong has bluntly rejected any legitimacy of the Communist Party and expressed his call to topple the regime. Falun
Gong adherents’ cultivation practice actions have become inextricably bound up with their participation in a political struggle through renouncing any affiliations with Party organizations (Penny 2012: 224). A direct confrontation with the Chinese leader took place in 2006, when Epoch Times reporter Wang Wenyi heckled then President Hu Jintao for three minutes during a White House appearance (Thornton 2010).
5.2.3 A regime-threatening protest
Why did the April 25 Incident trigger the massive repression? The features of the Falun
Gong organization, claims, and actions deserve special attention.
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5.2.3.1.1 Organization
The Chinese leaders were unnerved by the organizational and mobilization capacity of
Falun Gong. The government remained deeply fearful of cross-regional and/or cross- class actions (Perry 2002). The crowd of 10,000 Falun Gong adherents from different regions and all walks of life gathering outside the leadership compound of Zhongnanhai scared the top leaders. As mentioned earlier, Falun Gong had spread swiftly across the whole country since it was founded in 1992. The group hit its peak during the late 1998 and early 1999 with millions of Falun Gong practitioners and with thousands of practice sites scattered all over public parks in China. The Falun Gong also expanded globally and had “main stations” (zongzhan) in numerous other countries by the late 1990s (Chan
2004). The demonstration at Zhongnanhai exhibited its extraordinary capacity to mobilize a huge number of disciples from across the country to take part in an orderly and disciplined protest.
Such capacity was made possible by Falun Gong’s effective pyramid leadership structure and flexible networks. Falun Gong maintained an absolute centralization of thought, healing, and money, with Li Hongzhi at the top as the paramount authority. With the failure in attempt to obtain legal status in 1996, Falun Gong abolished some of its organizational infrastructure in 1997. At the end of 1997, Falun Gong representatives officially reported to the Civil Administration and Public Security Ministries that they would no longer apply to register a formal association in the face of repeated refusals.
Nonetheless, Falun Gong was not without any organization after 1997. The Falun Dafa
Research Society, the highest institution of Falun Gong, continued to issue notices and 221
circulars to the training stations until the end of July 1999. Moreover, the spiritual movement adopted a light and flexible model of networks through free practice groups in parks and public spaces. Falun Gong was composed of a vertical point-to-point connection, with the connection among the informal leaders of practice sites, guidance stations (fudao zhan), branch stations (fenzhan) and main stations (zongzhan). Before the crackdown, each city or town had a number of practice sites for the convenience of the practitioners (Chan 2004). Based on the informal organization structure, Falun Gong crystallized, reinforced, and radicalized notions of selfless discipline and sacrifice, triggering a strong force for individual and collective mobilization (Palmer 2007: 219).
Another irritation to the CCP leadership was Li Hongzhi’s world-wide recognition and overseas support, particularly from North America. In the late 1990s, Falun Gong expanded globally and had main stations in numerous developed and developing countries. In 1996, facing increasing official criticism and the banning of Falun Gong formal organization and its publications, Li Hongzhi immigrated to the U.S., where he continued to travel and preach. Li applied for investor immigrant status and definitively settled with his family in New York in 1998. Despite being abroad, Li exercised absolute control of Falun Gong (Ownby 2008: 165-74; Palmer 2007: 249-56).
It was further alarming to the Chinese leaders when they saw that an ideological competition existed between Falun Gong and the Communist Party. The unprecedented embracing of an alien ideology by CCP members, especially among senior officials, represented a direct challenge to the Party (Leung 2002). Around 1994, Falun Gong took a more explicitly religious transition: ideology had replaced body training as its chief
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object (Palmer 2007: 224). Falun Gong began to present itself as a doctrine with its own sacred scripture, Zhuan Falun, was superior to all philosophies, laws, teachings, religions and body cultivation methods in the history of humanity. Practitioners were required to be devoted exclusively to the doctrine of Falun Gong and all other spiritual, philosophical and religious dogmas and books were forbidden. Meanwhile, Li Hongzhi changed his birthday registration to May 13, 1951, traditionally celebrated as the birthday of
Shakyamuni Buddha. Such transition made Falun Gong a serious competitor of the official ideology, Communism. The fact that increasing CCP members practicing Falun
Gong would usurp the CCP’s teaching authority and put Falun Gong above the precepts of Communism (Palmer 2007).
Therefore, the regime found it disturbing and intolerable that many Party members, including high-level officials in the government and army, became followers of Falun
Gong. It was estimated that 15.6 per cent of the officially announced 2.3 million Falun
Gong followers were Party members (Chan 2004; Zong 2002). The Air Force was said to have 4,000 Falun Gong practitioners or 20 percent of the whole contingent. Also, growing numbers of scientists, university professors and retired officials joined the ranks
(Palmer 2007: 257). The five representatives of Falun Gong practitioners who surrounded
Zhongnanhai on April 25 came from the Ministry of Public Security, the Ministry of
Inspection Supervision, the Ministry of Railways, the Second Department of the General
Staff Headquarters, and Peking University (Chan 2004; Zong 2002).
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5.2.3.1.2 Actions and Claims: Targeting the Chinese leaders
On April 25, 1999, Falun Gong transferred its exceptional organizational capacity and its powerful attraction to protesters into an unprecedented large-scale demonstration at
Zhongnanhai, a political sensitive space, and directly targeting the top leaders. Shortly afterwards, Falun Gong’s warning messages against the imminent repression also made the Chinese leaders more resolute for a comprehensive crackdown. After members of the armed forces being forbidden from practicing Falun Gong and officials collecting names of Beijing participants in the Zhongnanhai demonstration, Li Hongzhi issued a threatening statement on June 2 in a “scripture” (jingwen) released on the Internet and wrote that the 10,000 Zhongnanhai demonstrators were nothing compared to the 100 million Falun Gong cultivators and hinted that the great mass of followers might rise up.
Even bolder words were written in the Falun Gong online bulletin board, “The authorities should quickly sober up to avoid an even more severe consequence… Isn’t the act of imperiously pushing one hundred million good people to the opposite side itself producing another ‘June 4th Incident?”235 (Palmer 2007: 272) These menacing messages were also followed up with actions. For instance, on June 13, Li Hongzhi authorized his followers to use legitimate means to claim justice. One thousand followers from Benxi, a northeastern city, set off for Beijing on June 18. Despite several police blockades, 500 of them managed to break through and to demonstrate outside the National Petition Bureau beside Zhongnanhai. A few days later, a petition signed by 13,000 Falun Gong cultivators
235 It means the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement. The movement eventually ended on June 4 due to the state crackdown, which will be discussed in more details in the following section. 224
was sent to Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji, demanding that the public practice of Falun
Gong be officially authorized (Palmer 2007: 273-274).
Overall, as Elizabeth Perry argues, “At time when CCP leaders find themselves ideologically adrift and presiding over an increasingly moribund party apparatus, the emergence of a large social movement whose diverse membership exhibits remarkable commitment and enthusiasm, has the capacity to mobilize on a nationwide scale, and maintains secure international communications, is anything but a welcome development.”
(2002: xxvii) State leaders felt serious challenge from Falun Gong movement — its mobilization power, ideological competition with Communist, setting the Chinese leaders as target, and threatening message by Falun Gong leader — led to a massive crackdown.
5.2.4 Impact on regime legitimacy and resilience
According to the above discussion, Falun Gong was initially tolerated by the state, but suffered ruthless repression once it became political and staged protests targeting the
Chinese leaders, albeit peaceful. Against the backdrop, many practitioners abandoned the
Falun Gong movement, while others remained loyal (Junker 2014b). In mainland China, the still loyal followers changed the means of protest and turned clandestine, such as covertly distributing pamphlets and CDs defending Falun Gong in residential compounds and marketplaces, printing pro-Falun Gong slogans on the Chinese currency, making anonymous phone calls to persuade people to withdraw from the Party.
Outside PRC, Li Hongzhi’s disciples, who were now campaigning against the repression from their base in the United States, were staging a public campaign to discredit and 225
overthrown CCP (Palmer 2007: 278). Since then, the Falun Gong issue has become a component of general discourse criticizing human rights violations in China by the international human rights groups and Western governments. Gaining international sympathy and support, Li Hongzhi became a star for various news media. Overseas Falun
Gong followers’ strategic move towards obtaining the U.S. government’s backing and
Li’s visibility in the international media further embarrassed the CCP (Chan 2004).
Continuing protests did not only limited in the physical world, but also expanded to the cyberspace. Since 1995, the Falun Gong movement has rapidly developed a series of websites capable of linking overseas practitioners to those residing in PRC. Despite their cyberwars with the Chinese government since the 1999 crackdown campaign, Falun
Gong thrived in the virtual world, emerging as a truly transnational group with a highly cosmopolitan membership. While Falun Gong websites have been blocked in China, practitioners could always find ways to circumvent Internet censorship. Apart from logging on to banned websites via proxy servers, more technologically savvy practitioners could deploy encryption programs and switch Internet accounts, operating systems, hard-disk drivers and telephone lines frequently to conceal their identities and obtained information from overseas Falun Gong websites (Thornton 2010).
Therefore, Falun Gong has barely been eliminated from the soil of PRC. What’s more, it has prospered overseas. Its increasingly radicalized and politicized movement played a role in jeopardizing the legitimacy and stability of the Chinese regime.
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5.3 CHARTER 08
Charter 08 is a manifesto for democratic reform initially signed by 303 Chinese intellectuals, lawyers, journalists, retired Party officials, and the like.236 It was published online on December 10, 2008, the 60th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Charter 08 called for 19 changes including an independent legal system, freedom of association, and the elimination of one-party rule.237 By October 2014, more than 13,000 people inside and outside of China have signed the charter.238 Charter 08 was hailed as the most significant act of public dissent against CCP and one of the boldest calls for political change since the Tiananmen Square demonstrations of 1989.239
Actually, many of the charter signers had participated in the 1989 protest movement.
State relentless crackdown on the movement had turned a number of movement participants into veteran dissidents ever since, including Liu Xiaobo and Zhang Zuhua, the main authors of Charter 08.
5.3.1 1989 Tiananmen Square Movement
236 “A Nobel Prize for a Chinese Dissident”, The New York Times, September 20, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/21/opinion/21iht-edhavel.html?_r=1, accessed by October 15, 2014. 237 “Charter 08”, Human Rights in China, 9 December 2008. http://www.hrichina.org/content/238, accessed by November 5, 2014. 238 “Charter 08.” http://www.2008xianzhang.info, accessed by October 3, 2014. 239 “Beijing strikes at dissidents,” David Stanway. January 3, 2009. The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/04/china-human-rights-charter-08. “Charter 08: a bold call for change,” Catherine Sampson, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2008/dec/12/china-humanrights. Accessed by September 20, 2010. 227
Disgruntled by the economic crisis, inflation, and corruption during the late 1980s, initiated and led by college students, as many as a million urban residents took to the streets and occupied the Tiananmen Square, the heart of Beijing. The movement lasted seven weeks between mid-April and early June and spread to hundreds of cities in
China.240 Protesters put forward claims regarding the economic crisis and pushed for pro- democratic political reform (Zhao 2001). During the movement, a series of student organizations were established. Some students leaders were more inclined to engage in dialogue with the government, while others were more radical and they organized hunger strikes to pressure the government for concessions. In general, student leaders all agreed to keep the protest movement peaceful (Zhao, 2001; Liu, 1992).
The government initially condemned student marches and demonstrations as anti-party, anti-government disturbances.241 The harsh attitude, unable to intimidate students, outraged them and stimulated several large-scale marches to the Tiananmen Square. Out of pressure, the government began to soften its tone and took a conciliatory stance toward the protesters. The state held several dialogues with student leaders. The Chinese leader,
Zhao Ziyang, confirmed the concerns of students legitimate and praised the movement as patriotic and supporting the Party.242 The state media also started to cover the movement
240 “5 Things You Should Know About the Tiananmen Square Massacre.” Noah Rayman. June 4, 2014. Time. http://time.com/2822290/tiananmen-square-massacre- anniversary/, accessed by November 12, 2014. 241 “ We Must Take a Clear-cut Stand against Disturbances.” April 26, 1989. People’s Daily. http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2005-02/23/content_2609426.htm, accessed by November 11, 2014. 242Zhao Ziyang’s speech in a meeting with officials of the Asian Development Bank. 1989-5-4. Xinhua news agency. 228
in a positive way. However, the government conciliation was unable to put a stop to the protest movement. Instead, a few hundred students took more radical actions and staged a hunger strike, which won them broad social support. At the peak of the movement, over a million people, including bureaucrats, police, and officers of the People’s Liberation
Army, demonstrated at the Tiananmen Square (Zhao 2001). Finally, the state sent troops and tanks to crush the movement. Most casualties took place outside of the Square when urban residents attempted to prevent the military force from pushing into the Square.
While on the Square, most of them were able to retreat safely after negotiations with troops. The death toll is in dispute since the events, ranging from several hundred to several thousand.243
Is the 1989 movement regime-threatening? On the one hand, the movement contained elements that were threatening to the Party rule, considering its scale and claims. At the height of the movement, over a million residents gathered at the Tiananmen Square and people in other cities also took to the street to show their support to the Beijing demonstrations. Additionally, a few radical activists did take democracy as a primary goal (Zhao 2001). On the other hand, while claims such as “democracy” and “free press” were raised in the movement, most of the protesters did not mean to overthrow the authoritarian state. Instead, many of them demanded to accelerate the political reform led
http://1989report.hkja.org.hk/site/portal/Site.aspx?id=A27-126, accessed by November 5, 2014. 243 “Hong Kong recalls Tiananmen killings, China muffles dissent.” Adam Rose and Ben Blanchard. Jun 4, 2014. Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/06/04/us- china-tiananmen-idUSKBN0EF0DV20140604, accessed by November 10, 2014.
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by the Communist Party, as Liu Xiaobo stated (1992). Most who participated in the movement were in reaction to the economic problems brought by the market reform
(Zhao 2001). Moreover, the movement maintained peaceful in most of the times.
Although the movement ended tragically, both government leaders and majority of protesters had made efforts for negotiations and concessions during the movement.
Therefore, the 1989 movement was not clearly regime-threatening.
However, relentless repression of the nonviolent protests not only severely undermined the legitimacy of the state and alienated the people, but also turned a number of protest activists and sympathizers into democracy veterans. Many of the dissidents, who were expelled from their original occupations or were imprisoned, became long-term fighters for democracy and ending the one-party rule, including Liu Xiaobo and Zhang Zuhua.
Liu Xiaobo, a former university professor, has spent the past 25 years cycling in and out of jails and prisons for championing democracy in China. By the end of the 1989 demonstrations, Liu initiated a four-intellectual hunger strike to revive and guide the movement. Like a great many movement participants, he was arrested in the wake of crackdown. He was detained in jail until January 1991 when he was convicted of
"counter-revolutionary propaganda and incitement" but exempted from criminal punishment for his "major meritorious action" (zhongda ligong biaoxian) for helping
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persuade the students to withdraw the Tiananmen Square to avoid the possible bloody confrontation on the Square.244
After coming out of jail and having been expelled from his profession, Liu resumed writing mostly on human rights and political issues as a freelancer. In 1995, along with other political dissidents who were also Tiananmen Square movement participants, Liu launched a petition campaign, calling on the government to reassess the movement, initiate political reform, and ultimately to achieve democracy in China. As a result, Liu was being held under residential surveillance for 9 months. Several months later after his release, Liu was arrested again for coauthoring a declaration calling for democracy and human rights in the reunification of mainland China and Taiwan.245 He was ordered to serve three years in the labor camp. After getting out, in the 2000s, Liu became the president and board member of the Independent Chinese PEN Centre (ICPC), dedicated to promote freedom of expression and publication to counter censorship.246 For years,
ICPC received funding from the National Endowment for Democracy, funded largely by the U.S. Congress.247
244 “Liu xiaobo desserves the Nobel Prize.” Chinese Contemporary Prisoners of Literary Inquisition (Case 64 of Volume 1). Independent Pen, Issue 13. http://www.penchinese.org/blog/archives/9653, accessed by november 5, 2014. 245 “Recommendations about Major National Affairs of Our Country—October 10th Declaration.” Wang Xizhe and Liu Xiaobo. 1996-8-11. The Independent Review. http://www.duping.net/XHC/show.php?bbs=10&post=1017959, accessed by November 10, 2014. 246 Independent Chinese PEN Center. http://www.penchinese.org/english/about-icpc, accessed by November 12, 2014. 247 National Endowment for Democracy. http://www.ned.org/where-we-work/asia/china, accessed by November 12, 2014. 231
In the past two decades, Liu wrote numerous articles harshly criticizing the Communist regime, demanded multi-party elections, advocated the values of freedom, and urged the governments to be accountable for its wrongdoings. When not in prison, Liu was the subject of government monitoring and put under house arrest during sensitive times.248
The 1989 movement also changed the life of Zhang Zuhua, the other primary drafter of
Charter 08. Zhang used to be a high-ranking official in the Communist Party Youth
League.249 Due to his actively participating in the 1989 protests and organizing fellow officials and staff to support the students, Zhang was stripped of his positions within the government. During the past twenty years, Zhang pursued a career of promoting human rights and democratic reform in China. He organized a great many civil society forums and wrote books on constitutional democracy, advocating democratic transitions in
China.250 Like Liu Xiaobo, Zhang often lived under police surveillance and was put under house arrest at sensitive moments, such as the anniversaries of the 1989 movement.251
248 Police Cars Waiting outside while Being under House Arrest for Years. 2010-10-09. Apple Daily. http://hk.apple.nextmedia.com/news/art/20101009/14535145, accessed by November 12, 2014. 249 “The life of the CCP’s Former Rising Star was Changed by the June 4th Incident.” 2010-12-08. Mingpao. http://dailynews.sina.com/gb/chn/chnpolitics/mingpao/20101208/13152065376.html, accessed by December 14, 2014. 250 “Charter 08 Co-Organizer Zhang Zuhua Abducted by Police ahead of Nobel Ceremony.” Chinese Human Rights Defenders. December 9, 2010. http://chrdnet.com/2010/12/charter-08-co-organizer-zhang-zuhua-abducted-by-police- ahead-of-nobel-ceremony/, accessed by December 12, 2014. 251 “Zhuang Zuhua, One Drafter of Charter 08 and the Constitutional Scholar, was Abducted.” Weiquan website. 12-10-2010. http://www.chinaaid.net/2010/12/blog- post_10.html, accessed by September 28, 2014. 232
Following twenty years of life as dissidents engaging in prolonged struggles against the
Communist Party’s power monopoly, Liu and Zhang started the most influential pro- democracy protest since the 1989 demonstrations, i.e. Charter 08.
5.3.2 A regime-threatening protest
Though the 1989 Tiananmen Square movement was not clearly regime-threatening,
Charter 08 was. While Charter 08 was a peaceful online protest, it denounced the legitimacy of the Chinese authoritarian regime. The document suggested that the
Communist Party rule "has stripped people of their rights, destroyed their dignity, and corrupted normal human intercourse."252 According to the charter, by monopolizing political, economic, and social resources, the CCP’s approach to modernization had proven "disastrous” and created various social problems and tensions. The solution to these, as Charter 08 stated, was to change the political system, from an authoritarian to democratic regime. To achieve the goal, the charter proposed for an amended constitution, direct elections, an independent judiciary, freedom of religion, speech and assembly, the right to form independent political parties, etc. Even though many of the rights it called for were already included in China’s Constitution, they were widely ignored. Advocating these rights in public could be seen as a perilous challenge to the Communist Party.253
Especially, promoting free and direct multiparty elections defied the one-party rule and undermined the fundamental interest of the Communist Party.
252 “Charter 08.” http://www.2008xianzhang.info, accessed by October 3, 2014. 253 “A New Call for Chinese Democracy,” Austin Ramzy, December 10, 2008 http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1865510,00.html, accessed by September 20, 2010. 233
The Chinese regime also rejected the legitimacy of the pro-democracy movement and considered it a "counter-revolutionary platform."254 The authorities responded with repression promptly. The evening before Charter 08 was published, Beijing police raided the houses of Liu Xiaobo and Zhang Zuhua and took them into custody. Zhang was released after 12 hours; but Liu remained in detention255 and on June 23, 2009, he was charged with “suspicion of inciting the subversion of state power.”256 Police also ransacked the Beijing home of Zhang Zuhua, confiscating his passport, computers, books and notebooks.257 At least 70 of the 303 original signatories were summoned or interrogated by police.258 Some were simply asked to withdraw their signatures.259 The central propaganda department warned all domestic media not to interview or write articles about anyone who signed Charter 08 and all mention of the document was barred
254 Beijing strikes at dissidents,” David Stanway. January 3, 2009. The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/04/china-human-rights-charter-08, accessed by September 20, 2010. 255 A New Call for Chinese Democracy,” Austin Ramzy, December 10, 2008 http://content.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1865510,00.html, accessed by September 20, 2010. 256 “A Manifesto on Freedom Sets China’s Persecution Machinery in Motion.” May 3 2009. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/world/asia/01beijing.html, accessed by September 21, 2010. 257 Beijing strikes at dissidents,” David Stanway. January 3, 2009. The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/04/china-human-rights-charter-08, accessed by September 20, 2010. 258 “Beijing acts to stifle dissident call for reform,” Jamil Anderlini. January 3, 2009. Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/705dc080-d938-11dd-ab5f- 000077b07658.html#axzz3F7YdjWDp, accessed by September 21, 2010. 259 “Charter 08: A call for change in China.” Michael Bristow. BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-pacific-11955763, accessed by September 21, 2010. 234
from emails, websites, and search engines.260 On December 25, 2009, Liu Xiaobo was sentenced to 11 years in prison for “inciting subversion of state power” activities by the court.261
5.3.3 Impact on regime legitimacy
When Liu Xiaobo was serving his prison sentence, he was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace
Prize for “his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China.”262
Liu became the first mainland Chinese citizen to win a Nobel Prize,263 and the third person to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while in prison or house arrest, after
Germany’s Carl von Ossietzky (1935) and Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi (1991).264
Liu’s Nobel award embarrassed the Chinese government, put China’s human rights issue on the International spotlight, and brought more criticisms about its human rights record and authoritarian political system. The announcement energized international calls for
Liu’s release, including the U.S. President Barack Obama, other politicians, Nobel
260 “Beijing strikes at dissidents,” David Stanway. January 3, 2009. The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/04/china-human-rights-charter-08, accessed by September 20, 2010. 261 “Chinese Human Rights Activist Liu Xiaobo Sentenced to 11 Years in Jail.” 25 December 2009, The Guardian, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/25/china- jails-liu-xiaobo, accessed by September 20, 2010. 262 “The Nobel Peace Prize for 2010.” http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2010/press.html, accessed by October 3, 2014. 263 “China's Liu Xiaobo wins Nobel Peace Prize,” Washington Post, John Pomfret, October 8, 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- dyn/content/article/2010/10/08/AR2010100801502.html, accessed by October 3, 2014. 264 "Liu Xiaobo Isn't the First Nobel Laureate Barred From Accepting His Prize," Paul Wachter. AOL News. November 18, 2010, accessed by October 3, 2014. 235
laureates and human rights groups.265 Inside China, Liu’s award news was censored.
Nonetheless, the Nobel award was an affirmation of the efforts of those who were seeking for democracy in China and a big morale boost for Chinese democracy dissidents.
Wang Dan, a prominent student leader of the 1989 movement, took a sanguine view that the prize would encourage more people to participate in the pro-democracy movement in and outside of China.266 Although majority human rights activists welcomed Liu’s award, a few objected it. Wei Jingsheng, a famous dissident known for his bold call for democracy and critique of Deng Xiaoping during the Democracy Wall movement in 1978, considered that other dissident more deserved the award than Liu Xiaobo.267 A group of
14 overseas Chinese dissidents called on the Nobel committee to deny the prize to Liu, who they argued would make an “unsuitable” laureate. 268 The different reactions by the dissidents reflected competitions and fractured relations among the dissident groups.
Anyhow, the Noble Prize played a positive role in gaining Chinese human rights dissidents more reputation and sympathy. A clampdown on the Charter 08 movement and jailing Liu Xiaobo have further tarnished the reputation of the Chinese regime in its
265 “Nobel Peace Prize Given to Jailed Chinese Dissident,” Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield, October 8, 2010, New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/09/world/09nobel.html?pagewanted=all, accessed by October 3, 2014. 266 “Overseas Chinese Dissidents had varied reactions to Liu Xiaobo’s Award.” 2010- 10-8. http://www.bbc.co.uk/zhongwen/simp/china/2010/10/101008_liuxiaobo_overseas_reacti on.shtml, accessed by December 8, 2014. 267 Ibid. 268 “Unusual Opposition to a Favorite for Nobel.” Andrew Jacobs and Jonathan Ansfield. October 6, 2010. New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/07/world/asia/07china.html?_r=0. “Different reactions: Behind Liu Xiaobo’s Nobel Prize.” Jinggang Station. 2010-10-9 http://www.backchina.com/news/2010/10/09/108629.html. Accessed by December 8, 2014. 236
human rights record. Liu’s Nobel Prize also delegitimizes the repression of political dissidents within China and casts a doubt on the legitimacy of the Chinese regime.
5.4 CONCLUSION
The above cases illustrate the major character of regime-threatening protests. Cases in this chapter confirm that the type of claim is the most rigid red line to determine state repression. While the type of actions and organization varied in the three cases, they were doomed to suffer repression once they put forth political claims that were regarded as challenging the CCP’s monopoly on political power. In each of these cases, because their claims were political, the space for tolerated protest was always much narrower and it was easy to move from tolerated to transgressive (“radical” instead of “moderate”). Once claims were seen as transgressive, then there was little tolerated room in terms of actions and organization. Thus, these protests moved in a transgressive direction. Although some of my regime-engaging cases pushed the limits of the space for organization and actions, they never pushed the boundaries of the space for protest claims. Instead, protesters in this chapter all put forth radical political claims, ranging from ethnic separatism to the elimination of the Communist Party rule. Even though some protests (Falun Gong and
Charter 08) remained largely peaceful or did not have informal organizations involved
(Charter 08), their claims left them a narrow protest space.
Uyghurs’ unrest and Falun Gong protest movement experienced a transition from regime- engaging to regime-threatening and this move hinged upon interactions between authorities and protesters. During the 1980s, Uyghurs’ claim for more autonomy in
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Xinjiang resonated with the top Chinese leaders, which created a relatively tolerant environment for Uyghur religious and cultural practice. Yet entering the 1990s, Uyghurs’ violent and organized uprisings correlated with relentless crackdown. While Uyghurs’ protests against Han rule turned mainly underground during the 2000s, the bitter conflict broke out on July 5, 2009 in Urumqi. With regard to the Falun Gong movement, hundreds of practitioners’ protests against media’s critics of Falun Gong across the country were usually tolerated. However, the April 25 Incident changed everything. With
Falun Gong becoming increasingly political and targeting the central leaders, the regime determined to completely crack down the movement. Persistent and numerous protests after the massive anti-Falun Gong campaign brought harsher repression. Still, repression could not eradicate practitioners’ protests, insider or outside PRC. From the two cases, we see that when a protest movement becomes regime-threatening, it tends to fall into the vicious cycle of transgression and repression, with both sides contributing to the escalation of conflicts. As the case of Charter 08 illustrates, state repression can radicalize opposition, create long-term fighters against the regime, and push protests to shift in the regime-threatening direction.
Massive crackdown failed to eliminate protests by Uyghurs, Falun Gong adherents, and pro-democracy dissidents. After 2009, Uyghur protesters frequently attacked law enforcement officers, Uyghur cadres and mawlas, and ordinary citizens in mainland
China. Outside China, Uyghur exile groups remained active in criticizing the Chinese government. As for Falun Gong, while its protests in PRC have turned underground, the movement prospered overseas. Drawing on its extensive media network abroad and
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endorsement from the foreign government, Falun Gong launched a long-term campaign to harshly condemn the legitimacy of the CCP and its leaders. Crackdown on Charter 08 did not scare pro-democracy dissidents; instead, Liu’s Nobel Prize heartened the dissidents and called regime legitimacy into question according to the Western standard.
Outside mainland China, all these protest movements consistently attacked human rights records of the Cheese government and embarrassed the regime in the international communities. All in all, regime-threatening protests jeopardized social stability and eroded regime legitimacy.
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Chapter 6 Conclusion
This dissertation explores an important issue: What is the impact of rising protests on regime stability in an authoritarian regime? Taking China as an example, my research challenges the conventional wisdom that mounting protests in authoritarian states indicate regime decline. Based on my investigation of the rising tide of popular protests in China,
I argue that it is vital to distinguish regime-engaging protests from regime-threatening protests, as the former help maintain and strengthen regime legitimacy and resilience, whereas the latter undermine them. My case studies exhibit that the dynamics of state- protester interactions in the two types of protests are quite distinct. In regime-engaging protests, both the state and protesters acknowledge the legitimacy of the other side and try to resolve conflicts through negotiation. By contrast, regime-threatening protests tend to sink into a vicious cycle of transgression and repression, with both sides contributing to the escalation of conflicts, which jeopardizes social stability and erodes regime legitimacy.
My quantitative research in Chapter 2 demonstrates that regime-engaging protests are prevalent in China today. This aids in explaining the puzzle why the Chinese regime remains resilient amidst mounting social protests. Based on the largest nation-wide dataset of 1,418 protest events from 2001 to 2012 in China, I have found that the space for tolerated protest in China is broader than the conventional literature about contentious politics under authoritarian regimes would expect: 59 percent of protest events were tolerated by the police. On the other hand, most protesters restricted their claims, actions, and organization within the state-set bounds. As my data reveal, 95 percent protests 240
refrained from putting forth political claims to contest the CCP’s rule, 80 percent were peaceful, 60 percent established no links with other protests, and 96 percent had no formal organizations involved. This is true despite the fact that my dataset may include a disproportionate number of protests that are transgressive and face repression.
The case studies of Chapters 3 and 4 show that when protesters confine their claims and organization within the state-set bounds, they are allowed a considerable amount of leeway in terms of protest actions. In this situation, informal norms can come into play.
The state sets the boundaries for claims: economic and environmental claims generally are fine, while political claims are more dangerous. The public simply has to accept these boundaries and they know they can only make claims within the boundaries or face repression. The boundaries for actions, by contrast, are negotiable and protesters push the limits to win their claims, which helps open up greater space for protest. Additionally, informal organization is tolerated, but authorities limit formal organization and links among different protests by arresting open organizers. Protests have to be presented as spontaneous, especially if they are pushing the boundaries of tolerated protest actions.
Within these boundaries, conflicts can be alleviated or resolved through negotiations, as is illustrated in cases of the struggle to prevent the privatization of Shining Hospital, the taxi strike, and the protests against garbage incineration plants in B and C cities and Plain
Village. In some of my cases, conflicts escalated and regime-engaging protests turned transgressive at some moments; nevertheless, in these cases both protesters and authorities returned to the negotiation table and the protests remained regime-engaging.
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This was what happened in the cases of Hill Factory and Water Village.
8. Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang 1. Shining Hospital protest 9. Falun Gong movement 4. Anti-incineration in 2. Hill Factory Plain Village workers’ struggle 10. Charter 08
Regime-engaging 5. Anti-incineration in Regime-threatening Water Village
3. Taxi drivers’ strike 6. Anti-incineration in B City 7. Anti-incineration in C City
Figure 6.1. All Ten Cases on a Continuum of Regime-Engaging and Regime- Threatening Protests
One element that is missing in mainstream research on contentious politics in authoritarian regimes is the discussion on informal norms of contention and how they are established and adjusted. Solely focusing on formal institutions that restrict citizen rights of protest merely reveals part of the whole picture of contentious politics in China, but overlooks a gray zone in which some actions bypassing the law are de facto tolerated.
This protest space is full of contentious activities and saves contentious politics in China from being largely transgressive and repressive, unlike Tilly and Tarrow’s expectation discussed in Chapter 1.
The Chinese state has very restrictive laws about protests. What makes regime-engaging protests possible in China is the existence and development of informal norms. Due to the concern about regime legitimacy, Chinese leaders have been calling for toleration in dealing with certain types of protests, i.e. “contradictions among the people,” and the 242
central government has issued a series of regulations to restrain the use of coercion to deal with protests considered to fall within this category. Being informed of the lenient principles promoted by top leaders, local officials are often cautious in their response to protests. Sandwiched between the leaders’ tolerant attitude and restrictive formal laws, local officials usually follow informal norms to handle protests that they identify as contradictions among the people. In other words, authorities relax law enforcement and tolerate some extra-legal or illegal contentious actions. The economic and environmental protests analyzed in Chapters 3 and 4 illustrate the kinds of informal norms that guide actions of local authorities in face of protest activities. Underenforcement of laws results in a political space for protest in China.
Recognizing that protest space is opening up in China, protesters always push the envelope. They know that if they do not do so, it is unlikely that officials will respond to their demands. Meanwhile, protesters are mindful of the informal lines that delimit the protest space. By and large, protesters self-discipline their actions and avoid transgressing the boundaries too far. On the state side, authorities constantly monitor protests, at times reminding protesters of the limits, and they can use soft and/or harsh repression methods to deal with protests.
The boundaries of the space for protest are ambiguous and can vary across regions and be interpreted differently by different authorities. This became clear in comparing my cases.
Officials in the same city, D City, had different criteria about whether or not road blockage was allowed. The political environment in C City is more tolerant than other cities owing to historical and geographical reasons, and because of this protesters were
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able to raise demands that would likely have been deemed transgressive in other places
— opposing official corruption and the construction of garbage incinerators anywhere.
Moreover, in the wake of protest, a protest activist established an environmental NGO that targeted garbage sorting and recycle to reduce the necessity of incineration. C City authorities also tolerated protesters who were interviewed by foreign media. In contrast,
B City protesters limited their demands to moving the planned incinerator from their community and intentionally avoided raising political claims. Here, protesters also treated contacting foreign media as red line that they should never touch.
Despite differences between cities, by and large urban areas tended to have a larger protest space. For instance, in the course of their separate protests, protesters in B City and Water Village, both assaulted a police officer. The former assault was tolerated, while the latter triggered a ruthless crackdown. In general, urban middle class protesters have more resources (access to the media, having expertise and social connections, etc.) than peasants to expand the protest space. Protests in C City and B City were widely reported in mainstream media. Protesters also extensively took advantage of the homeowners’ online forums to spread information, mobilize opposition, and organize collective actions. The close media attention made the local authorities cautious about using repression, because it would be rapidly exposed to the public. While Plain Village enjoyed some media coverage, its extent was not comparable to the urban cases. Water
Village was barely reported in the mainstream media. Apart from media access, urban middle class protesters also had more social and political connections than did peasants.
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This was especially the case for B City protester, who obtained endorsement from a number of political elites.
6.1 INFORMAL NORMS, PROTEST SPACE, AND REGIME STABILITY
Informal norms and protest space not only provide citizens with opportunities to express their grievances, but they also serve as a safety valve, provide information about grassroots grievances to the state, help monitor corruption and power abuse in the local government, improve policy implementation and help maintain effective governance, and aid in mitigating conflicts before they turn unmanageable and out of control. In this sense, the existence of informal norms and protest space help strengthen regime resilience in face of social unrest. The mechanisms and dynamics of informal norms and protest space only exist for regime-engaging protests, since the precondition of this type of protests is state toleration.
In regime-threatening protests, harsh repression leaves no room for informal norms of contention. This was true in the cases of the Uyghur unrest in Xinjiang, the Falun Gong protest movement, and the Charter 08 pro-democracy movement. They all suffered harsh repression after they put forth political claims regarded by the CCP as transgressive, ranging from ethnic separatism to elimination of the Communist Party’s monopoly on power. Even though the Falun Gong and Charter 08 protests largely remained peaceful and Charter 08 did not have any formal organization involved, their political claims left them very little protest space. Thus, cases in Chapter 5 confirm that the nature of protesters’ claims is the most critical element that determines state reactions to protests.
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During the interactions between protesters and the state, a protest movement can move from regime-engaging to regime-threatening. As the Falun Gong case has shown, authorities were relatively lenient towards protests by Falun Gong practitioners at the outset. As Falun Gong practitioners responded to criticism and restrictions by authorities with increasingly political and militant protesters, they were met by greater repression, culminating in the massive crackdown that followed the surrounding of Zhongnanhai on
April 25, 1999. Step by step, protesters and authorities fell into the cycle of repression and transgression, and Falun Gong was transformed into a regime-threatening protest movement.
There is always a danger of protests moving en masse from regime-engaging to regime- threatening. This is what happens in revolutionary moments. Protests are not isolated; they follow examples and patterns, or what Tilly calls “repertoires.” In China today, regime-engaging protest is the dominant pattern, but that could shift quickly with a negative cycle of repression and transgression that spreads, even with protests that begin with economic and environmental claims. The potential can be seen in the Hill Factory and Water Village cases. This seems to be more true for the lower classes, peasants and workers, than for the middle classes, who seem to have more protest space and more robust respect for the legitimacy of the state.
6.2 MONITORING THE TRAJECTORY OF POLITICAL CONTENTION AND REGIME STABILITY
In the introductory chapter, I cited scholarship that showed that informal practices and underenforcement of law in handling protests are prevalent in Western democracies.
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Other studies have also shown the importance of informal practices in authoritarian regimes. According to Dana Moss (2014), informal negotiations, which routinely take place between officials and reform-oriented activists in Jordan, help explain why the
Jordanian regime survived the “Arab Spring.” Before the Arab uprisings, studies indicated that some authoritarian incumbents in the Arab world periodically promoted political liberalization processes, engendered reasonable space for political activism and dissent, and avoided using repression as the main means to counteract challengers, which bolstered regime stability (Brumberg 2002; Albrecht 2007).
Despite these studies, on the whole, informal practices of contention in authoritarian regimes are understudied and their importance is not fully appreciated. Instead, current research on contentious politics in non-democratic settings has overwhelmingly centered on transgressive protests and harsh repression. These types of protests tend to be zero- sum games: either the regimes are overthrown or the protests are stifled. This strand of scholarship discloses only part of the story, as my research and others have shown. To enrich understanding of contentious politics in nondemocratic regimes, future research should devote more attention to informal interactions between the state and protesters, de facto protest space, and should distinguish different types of protests when analyzing their impact on regime durability.
The conceptual model distinguishing between regime-engaging and regime-threatening protests that I have developed in this dissertation can be employed to monitor the trajectory of political contention not only in China but also in other authoritarian regimes.
In order for a protest to be regime-engaging, both authorities and protesters must be open
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to negotiations. State toleration, which provides opportunity for negotiation, is the prerequisite of regime-engaging protests. It is critical that authorities relax law enforcement and permit some extra room for protest in order to allow for engagement and negotiation. On the protesters’ side, we can detect their attitudes toward negotiation from their claims, actions, and organization type and whether or not these touch the red line set by the state. Every political order is characterized in part by the size and features of a
“legitimate protest space.” Current scholarship highlights the difference of protest space between democratic on the one hand and authoritarian regimes on the other (Davenport
1995; Gurr 1986; Goldstone and Tilly 2001; Tilly 2006). The boundaries of protest space and tolerated types of claims, actions, and organization among authoritarian regimes may vary as well. Yet as long as protesters do not transgress the boundaries set by their own regime, this suggests that they are willing to negotiate and they still have at least some expectation that authorities will negotiate. When both authorities and protesters will talk to each other to mediate disputes, then protest is manageable. I would propose that a state is in relatively stable condition when it abounds with regime-engaging protests, whereas a regime is in danger when regime-threatening protests prevail. In China today, we see the former situation; in Eastern Europe in 1989 and in many Arab countries after 2010 the latter situation prevailed.
Regime-engaging and regime-threatening protests can shift from one to the other. This transition depends on interactions between the state and protesters. As the Falun Gong protest movement and Uyghur unrest demonstrate, both authorities and protesters play a role in escalating conflicts that turn regime-engaging to regime-threatening protests.
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Repression can backfire and stimulate more protests (Almeida 2003 and 2008) and radicalize movement participants (Lee 2007), pushing protest towards the regime- threatening direction. In the Water Village protest, arrests of elders were regarded by protesters as illegitimate, leading to transgression and violent confrontation. On the other hand, regime-threatening protests can become regime-engaging, if both authorities and challengers agree to return to the negotiation table. This has apparently been the case recently in Jordan as activists transformed softer repression into opportunities for communication with officials and responded to harder forms by publicizing repression, which persuaded the image-conscious regime to “temper its tactics and prompted both sides to return to bargaining” (Moss 2014). Although the Chinese regime remains stable today as the great majority of protests are regime-engaging, it is difficult to predict the regime’s future considering the fluidity of the two types of protests.
China certainly does not have a liberal environment for social protests. Public protest is still a sensitive issue for the government and a risky endeavor for protesters. Although the tolerated space for protest actions is relatively broad, the regime imposes sharp limits on the types of claims that can be made, and there is little room for formal organization or links among protests. Moreover, officials have the final say in dealing with protests and they may not respect the informal norms that have been established and instead decide to use much more repressive laws. In some cases, officials employ “extra-legal” means such as hiring thugs and putting protesters into “black jails” or “study classes” or they might torture detained protesters. On the other hand, protesters are always pushing the envelope.
In some of my regime-engaging cases, protesters took extra-legal actions, such as
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blocking roads, railroads, and incineration plant entrances, to attract attention. It is this kind of grassroots resistance that opens the informal protest space in the first place, and these kinds of actions keep it open and expand it.
My dissertation contributes to explaining the resilience of the Chinese regime by showing how the regime has been able to handle and contain protests. It also suggests that scholarship about contentious politics in authoritarian regimes, which has tended to focus on transgression and repression, would be advanced by devoting more attention to ways in which these regimes engage protesters in negotiation and attempt to manage, rather than simply repress, protests. My investigation into the China case, therefore, should be of interest to scholars interested in political contention not only in China, but also in other authoritarian states.
Overall, I hope this case study of China will inform cross-national comparison of authoritarian states with regard to interactions between the state and protesters as well as their implications for regime stability. I also hope that the conceptual model of regime- engaging and regime-threatening protests developed in this dissertation can help advance this kind of cross-national comparison and shed light on the causes of regime resilience and regime collapse.
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APPENDIX I
Table A. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation for Table 2.5
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Economic 0.628 0.484 1
Environmenta 2 0.073 0.261 -0.37 1 l Moderate 3 0.178 0.382 -0.6 -0.13 1 political 4 Other claims 0.073 0.261 -0.37 -0.08 -0.13 1
Peaceful 5 0.767 0.423 0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 1 disruptive Peaceful non- 6 0.031 0.173 -0.13 0 0.09 0.04 -0.32 1 disruptive 7 Isolated 0.595 0.491 0.3 0 -0.27 -0.08 0.06 -0.13 1
8 Informal 0.961 0.193 0 0.01 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 1
Protest size 9 5.526 1.982 0.09 0.09 -0.08 -0.12 -0.28 -0.05 -0.14 0.01 1 (log) 10 Duration (log) 2.089 1.792 0.15 0.07 -0.13 -0.08 -0.22 0.09 0.03 -0.05 0.39 1
11 Peasants 0.207 0.405 0.14 0.12 -0.1 -0.14 -0.14 -0.02 0.12 0.06 0.13 0.18 1
12 Minorities 0.069 0.254 -0.27 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 0 0 -0.05 0.04 0.05 -0.05 -0.14 1
13 County 0.095 0.294 -0.11 -0.06 0.01 -0.01 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05 0.05 0.09 0 0.04 0.41 1
14 Township 0.065 0.246 -0.08 0.1 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05 -0.09 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.16 0.13 -0.09 1
15 Village 0.104 0.306 0.06 0.11 -0.08 -0.07 -0.13 -0.01 0.12 0.03 0.07 0.15 0.53 0 -0.11 -0.09 1 Note: N = 1,418.
251 Table B. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation for Table 2.6
Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1 Economic 0.605 0.489 1
2 Environmental 0.083 0.275 -0.37 1
3 Moderate political 0.182 0.386 -0.58 -0.14 1
4 Other claims 0.069 0.254 -0.34 -0.08 -0.13 1
5 Peaceful disruptive 0.685 0.465 -0.01 -0.05 0.02 0.03 1
Peaceful non- 6 0.024 0.154 -0.12 -0.02 0.07 0.04 -0.23 1 disruptive 7 Isolated 0.554 0.497 0.25 0.01 -0.26 -0.05 0.02 -0.06 1
8 Informal 0.963 0.19 0.03 0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.03 -0.08 -0.05 1
9 Protest size (log) 5.859 2.013 0.1 0.11 -0.05 -0.13 -0.28 -0.13 -0.17 0 1
10 Duration (log) 2.183 1.851 0.15 0.08 -0.14 -0.04 -0.22 0.05 0.02 -0.06 0.43 1
11 Peasants 0.24 0.427 0.19 0.12 -0.14 -0.15 -0.12 -0.06 0.15 0.06 0.12 0.23 1
12 Minorities 0.084 0.277 -0.31 -0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.03 0 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 -0.07 -0.17 1
13 County 0.109 0.312 -0.13 -0.09 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 0.05 0.08 -0.02 0.02 0.44 1
14 Township 0.078 0.269 -0.05 0.11 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.15 0.1 -0.1 1
15 Village 0.118 0.323 0.08 0.13 -0.09 -0.07 -0.13 -0.01 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.18 0.55 -0.05 -0.13 -0.11 1 Note: N = 908
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Table C. Binary Logistic Regression Model Predicting Police Presence (Events Reported By Boxun AND Other Sources), N = 1,110
Police Presence Protest Character Claims Economic 0.801** (0.0686) Environmental 0.818* (0.0793) Moderate political 0.837* (0.0731) Other claims 0.847 (0.0766) Actions Peaceful disruptive 0.739*** (0.0249) Peaceful non-disruptive 0.653*** (0.0552) Organization Isolated 0.914** (0.0271) Informal 0.946 (0.0628) Protest size (log) 1.028*** (0.00819) Social groups Peasants 1.124** (0.0463) Minorities 0.991 (0.0757) Controls County 0.985 (0.0501) Township 0.976 (0.0563) Village 0.985 (0.0515) Duration (log) 0.993 (0.00834) Log likelihood -660.434 N 1,110 Note: Main entries are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
253 Table D. Binary Logistic Regression Model Predicting Police Presence (Only Including Events Reporting the Number of Participants), N = 878
Police Presence Protest Character Claims Economic 0.795* (0.0862) Environmental 0.871 (0.108) Moderate political 0.801* (0.0867) Other claims 0.921 (0.112) Actions Peaceful disruptive 0.720*** (0.0291) Peaceful non-disruptive 0.635*** (0.0645) Organization Isolated 0.910** (0.0309) Informal 0.951 (0.0802) Protest size (log) 1.025** (0.00920) Social groups Peasants 1.117* (0.0530) Minorities 0.974 (0.0970) Controls County 1.010 (0.0611) Township 0.958 (0.0638) Village 0.938 (0.0611) Duration (log) 1.006 (0.0103) Log likelihood -528.7878 N 878 Note: Main entries are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests) 254
Table E. Binary Logistic Regression Model Predicting Police Presence (Only Including Social Groups and Protest Claims), N = 1,418
Police Presence Social groups Peasants 1.160*** (0.0373) Minorities 1.086 (0.0757) Claims Economic 0.839* (0.0702) Environmental 0.914 (0.0859) Moderate political 0.886 (0.0760) Other claims 0.855 (0.0774) Log likelihood -952.006 N 1418 Note: Main entries are odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests)
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APPENDIX II. List of Interviewees
1. Zhang. A Hill Factory Worker. Male.
2. Weng. A worker from the other factory allying with Hill Factory in protest. Male.
3. Chen. A middle-ranking cadre of Hill Factory. Male.
4. Ye. A police officer of H district. Male.
5. Li. An official of D City People Congress. Female.
6. Wei. A middle-ranking official of D City Federation of Trade Unions. Male.
7. Hai. A middle-ranking official of D City Petition Bureau. Male.
8. Zhi. A leader of Shining Hospital protest. Retiree of the hospital. Male.
9. Hui. A leader of Shining Hospital protest. Retiree of the hospital. Female.
10. Liu. An activist of Shining Hospital protest. Retiree of the hospital. Male.
11. Fu. An activist of Shining Hospital protest. Retiree of the hospital. Male.
12. Cui. An activist of Shining Hospital protest. Employee of the hospital. Male.
13. Hong. An activist of Shining Hospital protest. Employee of the hospital. Female.
14. Mei. A worker from the other factory allying with Hill Factory in protest. Female.
15. Dai. A doctor from the hospital attached to Hill Factory. Male.
16. Gao. A taxi drive. Male.
17. Che. A retired deputy head of D City Petition Bureau. Male.
18. Pang. A vice-captain of K district police bureau. Male.
19. Yan. A captain of K district police bureau. Male.
20. Tou. A long-term petitioner. Male.
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21. Hao. A middle-ranking official of petition office of D City Politics and Law
Commission of the Communist Party of China. Male.
22. Bao. A low-ranking official of K district petition bureau. Male.
23. Xiu. The head of a residents’ committee. Female.
24. Xu. A detained taxi driver, accused of leading the taxi strike. Male.
25. Yong. A detained taxi driver, regarded by authorities as a protest activist. Male.
26. Ping. A Hill Factory Worker. Male.
27. Wu. A Hill Factory Worker. Female.
28. Niu. A taxi driver. Female.
29. Hou. The head of H district petition bureau. Male.
30. Jia. A middle-ranking official of H district petition bureau. Female.
31. Cao. A middle-ranking official of D City Federation of Trade Unions. Male.
32. Zhao. A middle-ranking official of D City Petition Bureau. Male.
33. Tong. A taxi driver. Female.
34. Xiang. A leader of an environmental NGO which gave support to all four cases.
Male.
35. Xie. A leader of B City protest. Male.
36. Tian. A leader of B City protest. Male.
37. Xing. An activist of Water Village protest, an entrepreneur who owned his factory.
Male.
38. Chang. An activist of B City protest. Male.
39. Shan. An activist of B City protest. Male.
40. Wang. A prominent anti-incineration expert. Male.
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41. Sao. A villager whose brother-in-law was severely beaten by police in Water
Village protest. Female.
42. Ju. An activist of C City protest. Male.
43. Xi. An activist of C City protest. Male.
44. Jie. An activist of B City protest. Female.
45. Bai. An activist of C City protest. Female.
46. Hou. A leader of B City protest. Male.
47. Juan. A chief engineer who provided professional consultancy to the two city
protests. Male.
48. Shi. An activist of C City protest. Male.
49. Deng. A leader of Plain Village protest. Male.
50. Qiang. A leader of Plain Village protest. Male.
51. Shang. An activist of Water Village protest, a rich businessman. Male.
52. Xia. A member of an environmental NGO which gave support to all four cases.
Female.
53. Qian. An elder villager who was the first arrested on May 27, 2011 in Water
Village protest. Female.
54. Bing. An elder villager, Bu’s husband, who was also arrested in Water Village
protest. Male.
55. Jiao. An activist of B City protest. Female.
56. Tu. An activist of C City protest. Female.
57. Qiu. A lawyer who filed lawsuits representing B City and Plain Village protesters,
respectively. Male.
258
58. Shuang. A villager whose brother was severely beaten by police in Water Village
protest. Interviewee 41, Sao’s husband. Male.
59. Jing. An activist of Water Village protest. Male.
60. Meng. An activist of Water Village protest. Male.
61. Duan. An activist of Water Village protest. Male.
62. Can. An official of a petition office of D City Disabled Persons’ Federation. Male.
259
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YAO LI
4500 Overland Drive 203C, Lawrence, Kansas, 66049 (443) 850-3202 • [email protected]
EDUCATION
Ph.D. (degree to be conferred in February 2015)
Sociology, Johns Hopkins University
Dissertation: Informal Norms and Protest Space in China—Why the Chinese Regime Remains Stable despite Rising Protests.
Defense date: December 3, 2014.
Committee: Joel Andreas (Chair), Ho-Fung Hung, Lingxin Hao, Erin Chung, and
William Rowe.
M.A. Sociology, Johns Hopkins University, 2010
M.A. Sociology, Peking University, Beijing, China, 2007
Thesis: “Self-Esteem Maintenance among Laid-off Workers in China”
B.A. Economics, University of International Business and Economics (UIBE), Beijing, China, 2004
RESEARCH AND TEACHING INTERESTS
Political sociology; social movements; development; comparative and historical sociology; China
PUBLICATIONS
“Fragmented Authoritarianism and Protest Channels: A Case Study of Resistance to Privatizing a Hospital.” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, Vol. 42, No 2 (2013), pp.195 - 244.
“Getting Back ‘Face’: Self-Esteem Maintenance among Laid-off Workers,” in Wen Fang (ed.), The Transition of the Chinese Society. Renmin University, 2013 (In Chinese).
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“Jewish Emigration and Ethnicity Maintenance.” Journal of Social Psychology, Vol. 65 (2006) (In Chinese).
WORKS UNDER REVIEW OR IN PROGRESS
“Mapping the Space for Protest: Social Protest and State Repression in China” (article under review)
Winner of Outstanding Student Paper Award, North American Chinese Sociologists Association Annual Meeting, 2014
“A Framework to Explain Regime Resilience Among Protests: Regime-Engaging and Regime-Threatening Protests in China” (article in preparation for submission)
Social Protest and Regime Stability: Informal Norms of Contention and Protest Space in China (book)
“Accountability and Protest: A Comparative Analysis of Grassroots Challenges to Waste Incineration between the U.S. and China” (article)
“Classifying Protests in Authoritarian Regimes: Regime-Engaging and Regime- Threatening Protests” (article)
“Environmental Campaign in China: Characters and Trend” (article)
SELECTED PRESENTATIONS
“Social Protest and State Repression in China.” March, 2015. Annual Conference of the Association for Asian Studies.
“Informal Norms and Protest Space in Contemporary China.” March, 2015. Annual Conference of the Sociology of Development section of the American Sociological Association, Brown University.
“Mapping the Space for Protest in China.” August, 2014.
American Sociological Association Annual Meeting. North American Chinese Sociologists Association Annual Meeting.
“Informal Norms of Contention and Social Protests in China.” June, 2014. Stanford PACS Junior Scholars Forum, Stanford University.
“Regime-engaging and Regime-threatening Protests in China.” April, 2014. Stony Brook Ethnography Conference, Stony Brook University.
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“Protest and Negotiation Space in China.” April, 2014. Asia Conference, SAIS, Johns Hopkins University.
“Protest Space and Regime-engaging Protests in China.” March, 2014. Penn Symposium on Contemporary China, University of Pennsylvania.
“State Repression and Toleration in China.” February, 2014. Eastern Sociological Society Annual Meeting, Regular Paper Session: Mobilization and Space.
“Informal Norms and Protest Space in China Today.” February, 2014. Eastern Sociological Society Annual Meeting, Mini-Conference on China.
“Protest Space and Informal Norms of Contention in China.” January, 2014. Williams College, Department of Anthropology and Sociology.
“Regime-engaging Protests in China Today.” December, 2013. Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism’s Workshop Series, University of Pennsylvania.
“Mapping Protest Space in Contemporary China.” August, 2013. North American Chinese Sociologists Association Annual Meeting.
“Regime-Engaging and Regime-Threatening Protests in China: 2001-2012.” April, 2013. East Asian Studies Symposium, Johns Hopkins University.
“Informal Norms and Regime-Engaging Protests in China.” February, 2013. Graduate Student Conference on East Asia, Columbia University.
“The Erosion of Participatory Paternalism in Chinese Factories.” (Co-authored with Joel Andreas) August, 2009. American Sociological Association Annual Meeting.
“Dynamics of the Countermovement in China—A Case Study of an Anti- Marketization Struggle in China.” August, 2009. North American Chinese Sociologists Association Annual Meeting.
SELECTED AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS
2014 Outstanding Student Paper Award of North American Chinese Sociologists Association Annual Meeting: “Mapping the Space for Protest in China”
2014 Stephen & Lynn Browne Teaching Fellowship: “Governance and Politics in China,” Johns Hopkins University
2014 Research Grant, East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins University 282
2014 Travel Grant, East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins University
2013 Dean’s Teaching Fellowship: “Social Protest in Contemporary China,” Johns Hopkins University
2012 Research Grant, Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University
2012 Research Grant, East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins University
2011 Research Grant, East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins University
2007-2012 Graduate Student Tuition Fellowship, Department of Sociology, Johns Hopkins University
2010 Travel Grant, Program in Comparative Sociology and International Development, Johns Hopkins University
2009 Travel Grant, East Asian Studies, Johns Hopkins University
TEACHING EXPERIENCE
Instructor at Johns Hopkins University
2014 AS. 310.307.01.FA14 Governance and Politics in China (Fall)
2014 AS. 230.372.01.SP14 Social Protest in Contemporary China (Spring)
Teaching Assistant at Johns Hopkins University
2013 AS.230.101.01.FA13 Introduction to Sociology (with Professors Stephen Plank and Rina Agarwala)
2013 AS.230.362.01.SP13 Migration and Development (with Professors Lingxin Hao and Rina Agarwala)
2012 AS.230.341.01.FA12 Medical Sociology (with Professor Emily Agree)
2011 AS.230.321.01.FA11 Revolution, Reform, and Social Inequality in China (with Professor Joel Andreas)
2011 AS.230.310.01.SP11 Becoming an Adult: Life Course Perspectives on School, Work and Family Transitions (with Professor Stefanie Deluca)
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2010 AS.230.318.01.FA10 State-Society Relations in Modern India (with Professor Rina Agarwala)
2010 AS.230.304.01.SP10 Social Control and Social Organization in Schools (with Professor Stephen Plank)
2009 AS.230.320.01.FA09 Education and Inequality (with Professor Stefanie Deluca)
2009 AS.230.341.01.SP09 Medical Sociology (with Professor Katherine Smith)
2008 AS.230.321.01.FA08 Revolution, Reform, and Social Inequality in China (with Professor Joel Andreas)
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE AND MEMBERSHIPS
Reviewer, Human Relations
Member, Political Sociology Section, American Sociological Association
Member, Collective Behavior/ Social Movements Section, American Sociological Association
Member, Labor and Labor Movement, American Sociological Association
Member, Comparative/Historical Sociology Section, American Sociological Association
Member, Political Economy of World-System Section, American Sociological Association
Member, Sociology of Development, American Sociological Association
FIELDWORK IN CHINA
2009-2014 “Protest and Negotiation Space in China”
2007-2009 “A Struggle against the Privatization of a Hospital in North China”
TECHNICAL SKILLS
Computer: Competent in use of STATA, ACCESS and SPSS
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