Aircraft Carriers What Are We Trying to Fix? and How Does Getting Rid of Our Carriers Fix It? by ADM Scott Swift USN Commander U.S
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Wings of Gold Feature Aircraft Carriers What are we trying to fix? And how does getting rid of our carriers fix it? By ADM Scott Swift USN Commander U.S. Pacific Fleet From where I stand, the aircraft carrier, when combined ing world. In the Pacific theater, Naval Aviation and the air- with its air wing and surface escorts, remains the core of a craft carrier have proven their value in controlling the sea, and flexible naval force structure capable of massing power when American Naval Aviators have proven their mettle in project- and where needed to deliver strategic, operational, and tactical ing their power. Since the end of WWII the carrier strike group level effects. It is the most flexible option to fulfill the Sec- has served as the “go-to” capability for a Navy increasingly retary of Defense’s pledge to “fly, sail, and operate wherever called upon to support our national objectives. This capability international law allows.” was further enabled as sea control was progressively assured As Pacific Fleet Commander, I oversee naval operations in and all but guaranteed in the wake of the Cold War. In today’s the Indo-Asia-Pacific region – including those of aircraft carri- maritime environment, where real threats lurk beneath, on, and ers and strike groups. The ships’ execution of port visits, Dis- above the seas, however, U.S. dominance of the maritime en- tinguished Visitor (DV) fly-outs, partner-nation engagements, vironment can no longer be taken for granted. freedom-of -the-seas and presence operations, and myriad Looking ahead, it is fitting and proper to reexamine our other activities make news, but what they really provide the future Navy’s design. The future of Naval Aviation and the nation is an ability to project power and control the sea as part aircraft carrier is inevitably central to that discussion. As the of an integrated system of systems. The capacity and capabil- world changes and technology advances, policy makers, plan- ity they deliver are in balance with the other weapons systems ners, and pundits are right to scrutinize the relevance of aircraft of a fleet designed to support our national security objectives carriers and the design of our fleet. They are also well-served in every domain. by asking fundamental questions such as, “Why do we as a Though I consider the aircraft carrier central to our fleet, I am country need a Navy?” and “What do we need our Navy to also duty bound to continually do?” followed by “What capa- examine and critique our fleet bilities are needed to do it?” design. I have been watching, In considering different listening, and at times directly views, managing risk, and as- participating in the on-going sessing our forces’ perfor- dialog about the value and vi- mance, it is useful to contem- ability of the carrier in today’s plate the larger national security current and tomorrow’s pro- strategy and the effects, capa- jected threat environment. I bilities, and functions needed applaud and actively encourage to fulfill its goals. The U.S. this debate. But such debates, National Security Strategy and regardless of view, lose value our enduring national interests if not well-founded. We can no In January 2012, USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) and USS John serve as imperatives for naval longer sit back and let the high C. Stennis (CVN 74) join for a turnover of responsibility in the power. The strategy acknowl- Arabian Sea. (MC2 Colby Neal. demand for these versatile forces edges that in maintaining the serve as proof of their worth as they deploy forward, execut- security of the U.S., protecting its citizens, assuring allies and ing every task the National Command Authority requests. We partners, providing air and maritime security, and preserving must likewise not allow their value to be diminished by poorly the international order, our obligations extend well beyond our reasoned arguments. It is imperative to ensure truthful and ac- borders and shores. It further declares that as a nation we must curate information about their value drives the debate. I write maintain the capability to ensure the free flow of commerce, not to support one side or another. Rather, my intent is to hone to respond quickly to those in need, and to deter aggression. the debate. Clearly, our national interest – as well as our Constitution – Naval Aviation’s value is firmly rooted in history. In a 1914 calls for a capable maritime force to deliver military power, Proceedings magazine article on “Naval Aviation: Its Value at sea, under the sea, and in the air, wherever and whenever and Needs,” LTJG R. C. Saufley observed: needed - in short, a global Navy, which has and still today cen- “Aviation, though still fraught with dangers, is no longer ters on Naval Aviation and the carrier strike group. the occult science that for years baffled Langley, Dumont, and Analyzing the validity of the various capabilities is certainly Wright, nor is it merely an aerial acrobatics feat performed for within the scope of my role as Fleet Commander. That said, exploitation… Aviation has taken a definite status as an ele- my natural inclination is to manage risk thoughtfully and as- ment of maritime warfare.” sess the performance and validity of our means to fight and Saufley’s article proved prophetic as the decades unfolded. to win our nation’s wars. I often hear that the value of carrier As Naval Aviation matured – from fleet reconnaissance and strike groups has come and gone. I would say that is not the coastal patrol to land and surface strike, to sub-hunting and case in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region, and, based on the demand command and control – the last century has seen technologi- for more of them, neither is it the case for the rest of the Geo- cal advances enable greater capabilities demanded by a chang- graphic Combatant Commanders. Summer 2016 13 Summer WOG.indd 13 7/11/2016 2:17:34 PM I assess our fleet design, to include the centrality of the air- The last thing we should do is “buy into” such a strategy by in- craft carrier, as valid and relevant. But do not mistake me for a vesting in all-new concepts and trying to spend our way out of Fleet Commander so committed to a singular path that I am un- the dilemmas these strategies are designed to create. So, what able or unwilling to consider other options. Though I believe to do? Hint, though phenomenal new capabilities are being de- in – and depend on – CVNs, I invite well-conceived countering veloped today, getting rid of carriers might be a bit premature. views and remain open-minded to thoughtful and well-argued Some have rightfully described A2/AD as a game-changer. I alternatives based on serious analysis anchored on relevant and think they have it exactly right. Step one, decide to change the purpose-driven metrics that go beyond their costs. What’s a game. The first step in that process is to thoughtfully consider better alternative to maneuvering 4.5 acres of American sov- what must be accomplished and how best to go about it, and ereignty and firepower anywhere and everywhere international think differently about how to negate an adversary’s defensive law and conditions permit? What is the better choice? Why is counters to what should be recognized and branded as “the old it a better choice? plan.” This is hard. My experience is as humans, we don’t “do I don’t write simply to defend the continued validity of change” well. Part of step one is to think differently. Embrace carriers. Given the massive investment required to build and change, but do so thoughtfully and not just for its own sake. sustain them, their validity must stand on its own merits. That As alluded to earlier, some have argued that change should said, it seems a fool’s errand to discard their utility without come in the form of smaller, and my experience leads me to ensuring we get something better, and with at least as much believe what would be, less capable carriers. Frankly, though bang for the buck. I am skeptical of those who say we should open to it, I don’t understand the “smaller is better” argument steer away from our carrier strike groups as a key element of as it pertains to aircraft carriers. If the thought is that “smaller our naval power. Current is cheaper, therefore we can arguments against aircraft procure more,” well, that carriers tend to rest on one proposition is arguable as it of two theses: First, there stands, but only if made in are those who argue that context of a pervasive prev- carriers should be replaced alence of “Phase 0” (peace- by smaller carriers, presum- time engagement ops) based ably to reduce costs, so the thinking.The requirements U.S. can field more of them. for our fighting forces must Second, there are those who be grounded in the ability suggest that with the advent to persevere in “Phase II/ of Anti-Access/ Area De- III,” or war-fighting op- nial (A2/AD) capabilities, erations. I’ll grant that the a carrier strike group is vul- “less is more” argument nerable and thus no longer has validity, but think of it viable. I have not heard a Naval vessels from five nations sail in parade formation for a rare photo- in context of firefighters compelling argument for graphic opportunity at sea. From top row, left to right: the Italian Navy and smoke detectors.