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THE Capture of Mubo Enabled General Savige to Press Nearer

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THE Capture of Mubo Enabled General Savige to Press Nearer CHAPTER 6 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RIDGE S HE capture of Mubo enabled General Savige to press nearer Salamaua , T which he regarded as his ultimate goal . The airfield, the isthmus and the peninsula could now be seen from several high points along the Allied front. But although the 17th Brigade had fulfilled its immediate task , the 15th Brigade had been unable to capture Bobdubi Ridge. Savige now ordered Brigadier Moten to exploit north towards Komiatum and north - east towards Lokanu ; and Brigadier Hammer to carry out his original task. As early as 3rd July Savige had warned his brigade commanders abou t a possible "exploitation phase" to follow the Mubo fight . A day later he sent General Herring a plan asking for an extra brigade which coul d be used to control the Wampit and Watut River Valleys in place o f the 24th and 57th/60th Battalions which could then rejoin the 15t h Brigade. He suggested that, "although it may not be intended to attack Salamaua . action should be taken to isolate the garrison and preven t them receiving further supplies or reinforcements by land" . He considered that this could best be done by harassing the Lae-Salamaua coastal trac k from a battalion base west of Malolo . Herring's view of all this forward planning was expressed later : "There is a great need in war as in other things for first things first and no t worrying too much about the distant future . You cannot exploit until you have broken through ." He decided that it was time to apply the brake , and on 11th July informed Savige that it was not considered desirabl e at that time to lay down a policy regarding Salamaua and that the role of the division remained "to drive the enemy north of the Francisc o River". Politely, however, he did request an outline plan for the capture of Salamaua. Not knowing that Lae was to be a goal before Salamaua , Savige was at some disadvantage in framing the plan which he sent to Herring on 17th July . It provided that the Australians would attack fro m the north-west, west and south-west towards the airfield and Samoa Har- bour, while the Americans secured the south bank of the Francisco Rive r from Logui 2 to the first bend of the river . The combined force would then capture the isthmus and peninsula . While Savige was busy with these plans, Herring was busy ensurin g that Salamaua should be a means of helping the drive to the north . The problems of today, however, pressed more urgently upon the commander s and staffs of New Guinea Force and the 3rd Division than did the prob- lems of the future. The main one was supply . Because of its distance from the coast, the 3rd Division had to be fed mainly from the air, a n inaccurate and expensive method . The problem became more burdensom e as it became necessary to build up reserve dumps for the operations against Lae. Herring considered that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, 138 THE STRUGGLE FOR THE RIDGES 3-14 July to maintain any further units in the Salamaua area unless they were base d on the coast. Savige's outline plan for the capture of Salamaua, involvin g the use of an additional brigade, was therefore pigeon-holed in Por t Moresby . The immediate and practical problem facing Herring was how t o establish a coastal base whence he could supply the main part of the 3rd Division and bring more artillery against the enemy . Early in July General MacArthur was in Port Moresby. Like other Australian leaders who had served in the Papuan campaign Herring had got to know Mac - Arthur well. On 3rd July he had conferred with him at G .H.Q. and obtained permission to use at least one other battalion of the 162nd Regiment for the coastal move . Herring then summoned General Savige , and General Fuller of the 41st American Division, to Port Moresby , where on 5th July Herring discussed with them his plan to move a bat- talion of the 162nd Regiment along the coast to Tambu Bay and to instal guns there. Himself a gunner, Herring realised that Tambu Bay was th e only possible site whence the guns could support the 3rd Division and shell Salamaua . They were of no use at Nassau Bay and they could not be dragged forward via Mubo . As Savige's headquarters were a long way from the coast and as Fuller was responsible for supplying both MacKechnie Force under Moten and the troops who would move up the coast, Herring decided that the coastal move should be under Fuller's com- mand. This decision about command was apparently not clear to Savige, who made "brief notes" of the conference and wrote of the new troops from the 162nd Regiment who were soon to arrive at Nassau Bay : "These troops then under my command . ." Of the proposed move agains t Tambu Bay and the high ground overlooking it he wrote : "Operations would be directed by 3rd Aust Div." On receipt of a signal from Moten that conditions at the Nassau Ba y beach-head were chaotic, Savige signalled Herring after his return on th e 6th suggesting that Fuller should consider replacing MacKechnie. On the same day the first company of the American III/ 162nd Battalion, selected to establish an area at Tambu Bay for the guns, arrived at Nassau Bay . Major Archibald B. Roosevelt, the battalion commander, arrived on th e 8th with another company ; the remainder of the battalion assembled a t Nassau Bay by the 12th. Fuller had no doubts about the decisions of 5th July. On the 11th he issued a "letter of instruction" to his artillery commander, Brigadier- General Ralph W . Coane, who had been chosen to lead the American advance up the coast. Coane would "have command of all troops in th e Nassau Bay-Mageri Point-Morobe area,2 exclusive of MacKechnie Force" , and would "be prepared to conduct operations north as directed b y G.O.C. New Guinea Force, through this headquarters" . "Coane Force" would be created on 12th July . Thus, when the regimental commander, MacKechnie, returned from Napier to Nassau Bay on 14th July he foun d a The troops listed by Fuller comprised mainly : II/162nd Battalion, a battery of 218th Fiel d Artillery Battalion and "D" Troop, 2/6th Australian Field Regiment at Morobe ; and th e III/162nd Battalion and "A" Company, Papuan Infantry Battalion at Nassau Bay. 12-14 July A CONFUSED SITUATION 139 that two-thirds of his former command had been assigned to an artillery - man. On 12th July Savige began to have misgivings about the command situation and repeated to Herring a signal from MacKechnie to Mote n stating that Fuller had instructed MacKechnie that Roosevelt's battalion was no longer under MacKechnie's command but responsible directly to Fuller himself . This appeared absurd to Savige who was not yet eve n aware of the formation of Coane Force . Accordingly he asked for definit e instructions clarifying the command of American troops in the Nassa u Bay area and stated that dual control would cause confusion . Herring that day signalled "for clarification of all concerned all units Mack Force are under operational control of 3 Aust Div" . Savige chose to believe that this signal meant that the 3rd Division commanded all troops of MacKechnie's 162nd Regiment—not merel y MacKechnie Force . Herring, however, obviously meant MacKechni e Force. Had the ambiguity been overcome at this stage, some dis- agreements and difficulties which temporarily marred Allied efficienc y and the relationships between the Australian commanders in New Guinea would not have occurred . Trouble soon began. Savige placed Roosevelt under Moten's command for his northward move, but, replying to a signal from Moten, Roosevel t signalled on 14th July : Regret cannot comply your request through MacKechnie Force dated 14th July as I have no such orders from my commanding officer . As a piece of friendly advice your plans show improper reconnaissance and lack of logistical understanding . Suggest you send competent liaison officer to my headquarters soon as possible t o study situation . For your information I obey no orders except those from my immediate superior. Having sent this billet-doux to the startled Moten, Roosevelt then reported to Fuller: I received orders by 17 Aust Bde that I was assigned to 3 Aust Div . I also received orders from 17 Aust Bde to perform a certain tactical mission and hav e informed them I am under command of 41 Div and will not obey any of thei r instructions . If you are not in accordance with this action request that I be relieve d of command III Bn. In my opinion the orders show lamentable lack of intelligenc e and knowledge of situation and it is possible that disgrace or disaster may be th e result of their action . On 14th July Savige decided to bring matters to a head . He signalled MacKechnie and Roosevelt (and repeated the signal to Herring, Moten and Fuller) that New Guinea Force's latest instructions clearly indicate d that Roosevelt's battalion was under the command of MacKechnie Force which was under command of Moten for the time being . Roosevelt replied : "I do not recognise this signature . I take orders only from my command- ing general 41 US Div and will hereafter be careful to certify hi s signature ." Savige then wrote to Herring, stating that a confused and impossible situation has now arisen which makes it impossible t o coordinate control of operations .
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