BIOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE RACIAL CONTRACT

Jason David Grinnell

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

August 2006

Committee:

Michael Bradie, Advisor

Mark H.Gromko Graduate Faculty Representative

Sara Worley

Christopher Morris ii

ABSTRACT

Michael Bradie, Advisor

The publication of works such as Why Race Matters, by Michael Levin (1997) and The Bell Curve, by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray (1994) suggests that despite broad agreement that racism is unacceptable, racial thinking is still a powerful force in moral and political decision making. These authors work from a racialist perspective, arguing that biologically distinct races do exist, that the races differ from each other in socially important ways, that these differences are difficult if not impossible to attenuate, and that these differences should thus be considered in social policy decisions. This dissertation documents some of the reasons for rejecting each of those claims, and argues that the concept of the racial contract as developed by

Charles Mills provides a useful framework for understanding why the positions defended by Levin, et al, remain influential despite their many flaws. iii

To my parents, whose anonymity led to the"What are you really?" questions that

originally sparked my interest in race. iv

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am grateful to all who offered comments, encouragement, and assistance in the preparation of this manuscript. I would especially like to acknowledge Michael Bradie, who has been a wonderful teacher and mentor. He has taught me more than I would have believed possible about philosophy, writing, and teaching. I would also like to thank Sara Worley and Christopher Morris for their insight, comments, criticism, and patience. Mark Gromko has contributed more to the project than expected of a

Graduate College Representative, and been very helpful in refining my understanding of biology. Margy DeLuca has been a constant source of aid and comfort since my first day of graduate school. James Stacey Taylor, in addition to his regular encouragement, has been an invaluable critic and foil. John Walton read multiple drafts of the entire manuscript and provided me with a variety of helpful comments and suggestions.

Finally, I would like to thank my sister, Lindsi Remer. She has been unflagging in her support for my educational aspirations, and I would never have succeeded without her.

v

Table of Contents

CHAPTER ONE. INTRODUCTION

Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 1

The Racial Contract………………………………………………………… 2

Appiah’s Racisms…………………………………………………………… 9

Chapter 2: The Bell Curve…………………………………………………… 10

Chapter 3: Why Race Matters……………………………………………… 12

Chapter 4: The Biology of Racial Differences……………………………. 12

Chapter 5: What Follows?...... 13

CHAPTER TWO. RICHARD HERRNSTEIN AND CHARLES MURRAY’S

THE BELL CURVE

Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 16

The Argument………………………………………………………………… 19

The “g” Factor………………………………………………………………… 21

Measuring “g”………………………………………………………………… 23

“g” (and thus IQ) is a Function of Genetic Endowment…………………... 25

Intelligence and Success…………………………………………………… 27

Race Differences in Economic and Social Success……………………… 30

Implications…………………………………………………………………… 33

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………. 37

CHAPTER THREE. MICHAEL LEVIN’S WHY RACE MATTERS

Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 40

Distinct Human Races Do Exist…………………………………………….. 42

The Races Do in Fact Differ in Mean Intelligence………………………... 43 vi

The Difference in Mean Intelligence Between the Races is the

Result of Genetic Factors and not the Result of Any

Discriminatory Practices……………………………………………….. 47

This Difference in Mean Intelligence Has Normative Implications……… 54

The Injustice of Affirmative Action………………………………………….. 57

Crime and Racial Profiling…………………………………………………... 61

Conclusion……………………………………………………………………. 62

CHAPTER FOUR. THE BIOLOGY OF RACIAL DIFFERENCES

Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 65

Biologically Distinct Human Races Exist………………………………….. 66

Essentialism…………………………………………………………………... 66

The Geographic Model……………………………………………………… 68

Cladism………………………………………………………………………... 69

Race According to the Racialists…………………………………………… 76

Heritability, Race, and Essentialism……………………………………….. 81

Conclusion…………………….……………………………………………… 91

CHAPTER FIVE. WHAT FOLLOWS?

Introduction…………………………………………………………………… 93

The Racial Contract………………………………………………………….. 95

The “Race Gap” in IQ………………………………………………………... 101

Relationship Between the “IQ Gap” and the Possibility of Raising

Mean IQ Scores………………………………………………………… 102

Non-Compensation Based Arguments for Social Policy………………… 108

Conclusion………………………………………………………………...... 113 vii

BIBLIOGRAPHY…………………………………………………………………………. 116

1

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

European humanism usually meant that only Europeans were human

Charles Mills, The Racial Contract

Introduction

Racial thinking retains a toehold in the academy. Works such as Why Race

Matters, by Michael Levin (1997), and The Bell Curve, by Richard Herrnstein and

Charles Murray (1994) defend the reality and relevance of race as a biological and

political category.1 These works each defend a view of society and political systems that attributes a powerful causal role to the reality of race. These authors share three basic tenets. First, they contend that despite the conventional wisdom among biologists,

‘race’ is a biologically real concept. Second, they contend that biological differences between the races explain current and predict future racial differences both on tests designed to measure intelligence and in socioeconomic status. Third, they contend that these biological realities justify particular social policies. This dissertation is an attempt to clarify, analyze, and understand the theoretical foundations and purpose of their work.

Throughout its history, Western society has witnessed many attempts to argue for socially relevant genetic differences between races of humanity. There are good reasons, both biological and social, for rejecting them, yet they persist. Despite scientific evidence and arguments, and despite the arguments of moral and political philosophy, they persist. Why? Why won’t these tired, old, and discredited arguments

1 Other examples include the work of J. Phillipe Rushton and that of H.J. Eysenck. Going back a bit further, Arthur Jensen and William Shockley stand out as defenders of this general view. 2

go away? They continue to be rehashed and recast under the auspices of biological

determinism, sociobiology, IQ theory, race theory, genetics, heritability, and a variety of

other doctrines. A particular set of errors and misrepresentations plagues them all, yet

they continue to appear in any number of debates about the existence and role of group

differences in social policy.

I shall argue that the persistence of these arguments is due to an adherence to

what Charles Mills calls the “Racial Contract”, and its need to argue for fundamental

differences among races in order to justify differential treatment of those races. I shall

look at the recent instantiations of the racialist arguments in the work of Levin,

Herrnstein, and Murray and argue that they are best understood as a clear example of

the phenomenon Mills is critiquing. A careful examination and analysis of these racialist

arguments will show how these arguments attempt to buttress the racial contract, and

show how, in fact, they fail. Furthermore, it will be argued that these authors, in contrast

to their claims of being driven only by science, are in fact engaged in a particular type of

racist thinking.

The Racial Contract

Drawing on traditional political theory and its emphasis on a social contract that is understood as an agreement among persons to limit their liberty in exchange for security, Charles Mills suggests that greater explanatory power can be had by understanding this not as a social contract, but as a racial contract (Mills [1997]).

Rather than a social contract construed as an agreement among citizens to limit their liberties vis a vis each other, the racial contract is an agreement among citizen 3

persons to limit the liberties of non-citizen subpersons. Rather than a mechanism for

preserving liberty, therefore, the actual social contract is a mechanism for maximizing

the liberty of some at the expense of others. “The terms of the racial contract mean that non-white subpersonhood is enshrined simultaneously with white personhood” (Mills

[1997], p. 55).

This difference in liberty was and continues to be defended by arguing that the others in question are not fully capable or worthy of full participation in the society created by the contract.

From Aristotle and his doctrine of the natural slave on, Mills attempts to show how the entire history of European political thought is one in which groups are regularly cast as fully human vs. sub-human (Mills [1997], p. 53). For Aristotle, of course, the natural slave was marked by a deficiency of reason. As we shall see, it is this need for a deficiency in reason that causes the modern racial contractors to ascribe deficient intellect and by extension something less than full membership in society to members of certain races. Beyond what Mills himself argues is necessary for the racial contract, the modern contractors seek to craft ‘scientific’ proof of the sub-personhood of these groups.

The racial contract establishes a fundamental partition in the social

ontology of the planet, which could be represented as the divide between

persons and subpersons, Untermenschen. ‘Personhood’ has received a

great deal of philosophical attention in recent years because of the revival

in Kantian and natural rights moral/political theories and the relative

decline of utilitarianism (Mills [1997], p. 55). 4

As Mills argues, traditional social contract theory treats racism as a minor failure in application of the system. In reality, however, it is essential to the system. Members of subperson categories have a different set of rights and obligations than than do the contractors. Treating race as a deviation from the social contract is a response to white embarrassment regarding the terms of the contract. The work of Levin, et al, is best seen as an attempt to demonstrate the ‘true’ inferiority of non-whites, and thus alleviate the embarrassment.

Historically the paradigm indicator of subpersonhood has been deficient

rationality, the inability to exercise in full the characteristic classically

thought of as distinguishing us from animals. For the social contract, a

rough equality in men’s cognitive powers or at least a necessary ground

floor capability of detecting the immanent moral structuring of the universe

(natural law), or what is rationally required for social cooperation, is crucial

to the argument. For the racial contract, correspondingly, a basic

inequality is asserted in the capacity of different human groups to know

the world and to detect natural law. Subpersons are deemed cognitively

inferior, lacking in the essential rationality that would make them fully

human (Mills [1997], p. 59).

Mills here is pointing out that a key component for justifying the racial contract is to argue that the excluded groups are not fully rational. It is exactly this point that Levin,

Herrnstein, and Murray are dedicated to demonstrating, (ab)using modern conceptions of biology, heritability, and IQ to argue that African-Americans are genetically 5

predisposed to criminal behavior, short-sightedness, low educational attainment, and

other traits that undermine their capacity to participate fully in civil society.

Citing Emmanuel Eze, Mills describes how, on one reading of Kant, skin color is

evidence of particular moral traits. According to this interpretation, Europeans are

capable of the highest expressions of moral reasoning; Africans, on the other hand, are

only suitable to be educated to be servants and slaves. The personhood, and thus

moral standing, central to Kant’s position on the infinite value of all human beings, is

therefore absent in non-Europeans. It is no coincidence, then, that central to Levin’s

understanding of the modern world is the belief that Kantian morality (as he

understands it) is the cornerstone of a healthy, well-functioning society. He goes on to

argue that blacks, by virtue of their genetic endowments, are less “Kantian” than whites, and thus may be treated differently (Mills [1997], p. 71).

Mills provides a powerful tool for understanding the prevalence of work attempting to defend biological differences between races, and can help us to understand why those defenses often include an argument for differences in morally relevant factors among those races. A look at the work of Levin, Murray, and Herrnstein reveals an ideal model of what Mills is discussing. These authors seek to demonstrate that the genetic differences between races manifest themselves as differences in important behavioral and intellectual qualities. Furthermore, they contend that these

differences are resistant to change if not immutable, and that they leave us little choice

but to recognize that some races are not fully capable of participation in the social contract. Charles Mills’ The Racial Contract (1997) seeks to explain western political theory in terms of an implicit racial contract, arguing that, for all the arguments of 6

Hobbes, Locke, Kant, et al of the equality and dignity of persons, they are actually

working against a backdrop of racial bifurcation. The end result of this is a political

system in which the equality of persons is dependant upon the inequality of non-

persons. In Mills’ view, this account can do valuable explanatory work, articulating how

and why the European states and their derivatives were able to craft governments

dedicated to liberty while at the same time enslaving, exploiting, and oppressing those

non-European populations they encountered.

If we are tempted to argue that, whatever the accuracy of Mills’ claims, such

matters are ancient history and of no relevance to our modern attempts to bring about

social justice, we need look no further than Michael Levin’s Why Race Matters, or

Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray’s The Bell Curve and to their attempt to craft a modern version of a very old argument.

In its broad outlines, we can see the ancestry of these modern positions as far back as Johann Blumenbach’s 1775 work De Generis Humani Varietate Natura. The father of anthropology, Blumenbach’s five varieties included Mongolian, Ethiopian,

American, Malay, and Caucasian races. By the mid 19th century, Arthur de Gobineau would explain that the adulteration of a people’s blood is a type of degeneration. In

1883 Francis Galton published Inquiries into the Human Faculty and suggested that a society which encouraged the breeding of ifs best citizens would derive great benefits from this policy. Karl Pearson, a contemporary of Galton’s, advocated a national program to breed greater intelligence. Levin picks up this very thread in his 1997 work, suggesting that society might wish to provide cash incentives for desirable (wealthy) 7

families to have more children ([Levin, 1997 ], p. 360). More than a hundred years

later, the eugenics theme is alive and well in these modern theorists of race.

This emphasis on differences in desirability, wealth, and value as functions of

differences in lineage is exactly what allows the traditional social contract view to claim

equality and freedom for some while simultaneously denying it to others. As Mills

argues:

In the Lockean state of Nature…Those who show by their actions that

they lack or have “renounced the reason of natural law and are like “wild

Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security” may

licitly be destroyed. But if in the racial polity nonwhites may be regarded

as inherently bestial and savage (quite independently of what they happen

to be doing at any particular moment) then by extension they can be

conceptualized as carrying the state of nature around with them,

incarnating wildness and wilderness in their person. In effect, they can be

regarded even in civil society as being potentially the at the center of a

mobile free-fire zone in which citizen to citizen/white-on-white moral and

juridical constraints do not obtain (Mills [1997], p. 87).

Once we have accepted that the purpose of social arrangements is to lift us out of the state of nature, and we have also accepted that some of us are more capable of leaving the state of nature than others, we are left with the terms of the racial contract.

According to Mills:

The Racial Contract is that set of formal or informal agreements or meta-

agreements (higher-level contracts about contracts, which set the limits of 8

the contract’s validity) between the members of one subset of humans,

henceforth designated by (shifting) “racial” (phenotypical / genealogical /

cultural) criteria C1,C2,C3…as “white,” and coextensive (making due

allowance for gender differentiation) with the class of full persons, to

categorize the remaining subset of humans as “nonwhite” and of a

different and inferior moral status…(Mills [1997], p.11).

As a result of this tension, the racial contract becomes “an agreement to

misinterpret the world” (Mills [1997], 18). Mills also contends that

White misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception

on matters related to race are among the most pervasive mental

phenomena of the past few hundred years, a cognitive and moral

economy psychically required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement

(Mills [1997], p.19).

Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray argue that they are not motivated by racism, but by objective science. The statistics, they claim, clearly show the existence of racial differences in a great many characteristics, including intelligence, rationality, and criminal behavior. I will show how and why the putatively scientific arguments of Levin,

Herrnstein, and Murray do not demonstrate what they claim. Their appeal to science and denial of racist intent suggests they are operating within a cognitive framework K.

Anthony Appiah describes as “extrinsic” rather than “intrinsic” racism (Appiah [1990]).

It seems far more likely, in light of their failure to demonstrate the scientific truth of their claims, that they are actually defending the intrinsic racism required by adherents to the racial contract. 9

Appiah’s Racisms

The arguments of Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray fit neatly into a classificatory scheme developed by K. Anthony Appiah. Appiah makes a distinction between what he calls racialism, intrinsic racism, and extrinsic racism. Racialism, argues Appiah, is the doctrine that there are distinct human races, each with characteristic tendencies. This is not necessarily a moral problem, however, as it deals with “how the world is, not how we would want it to be” (Appiah [1990]).

More troublesome are the two types of racism. Extrinsic racism, in Appiah’s account, is the belief that the distinct human races differ in morally relevant qualities. In other words, if one of the characteristics exhibited by members of race X is a tendency to dishonesty, and dishonesty is an appropriate basis for treating persons differently, then we are justified in treating members of race X differently than we would treat others. The differential treatment would thus be unjustifiable if the members of race X could be shown to have no such racial tendency.

Intrinsic racism, on the other hand, is a position that holds each race to have a different moral status, simply in virtue of being a member of that race. For the intrinsic racist, no amount of evidence of morally praiseworthy behavior can change the belief that members of a group have a characteristic status. This distinction can become blurred, however, as many intrinsic racists argue as though they are extrinsic racists, and point to putative differences between races to justify their positions. Extrinsic racists, too, seem to suffer from an inability to recognize that which might undermine their positions 10

Appiah is here concerned with attempting to show how racism is just that, an

“ism” or an ideology that controls and shapes what we are prepared to count as

evidence. The presentation and analysis of evidence by Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray

is symptomatic of this type of ideology. By pointing to statistical differences between

the races, they argue from an extrinsic racist position that we as a society are justified in

treating them differently, but when those statistics are challenged we see their retreat

into the mold of the intrinsic racism.

As I will argue, Levin et al fail in both their scientific and social policy arguments

and are left with the choice of admitting either a) their policy prescriptions are not

justified by their empirical observations or, b) they are in fact attempting to justify the

racial contract on the basis of what Appiah calls “intrinsic racism.”

The style of argument they deploy in service of their extrinsic racism is good evidence

that they are doing exactly what Mills predicts they will, i.e. cling to the doctrine of

inferiority necessary to preserve their political philosophy.

Chapter Two: The Bell Curve

Chapter Two of this work explores one of the more well-known modern treatments of the relationship between race, heritability and intelligence: The Bell

Curve, written by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray in 1994. In this work, the

authors argue that humans possess a type of general-purpose intelligence (termed “g”)

that is, a) measurable through tests of IQ and, b) largely genetically determined. They

further argue that, due to the high level of technology in modern culture, success is

dependent on this intelligence; therefore, differences in socio-economic status (SES) 11

are due primarily to genetic factors. Finally, since the mean IQ of blacks is roughly 15

points less than whites, the difference in socio-economic status between the races is

thus difficult (if not impossible) to alter, and social programs designed to minimize the

SES gap are ineffective and unjust.

Herrnstein and Murray’s work is a clear instantiation of Mills’ racial contract view.

It includes a taxonomy of humans, with some humans being described as less than full persons, it includes an analysis of how this subperson status does (and should) have a different impact on their lives, and it describes the innate basis for these differences, including their persistent (if not immutable) nature. In Chapter 2, I shall examine this

position in greater detail; and in subsequent chapters, I shall document its flaws, inconsistencies, and shortcomings.

Chapter Three: Why Race Matters

Chapter 3 examines a more philosophically rigorous and extensive defense of racial differences and their social implications. This is the defense offered by Michael

Levin in his 1997 book Why Race Matters. Levin makes four primary assertions: first, that distinct human races do, in fact, exist. He also asserts that these races differ in mean intelligence, and presents a similar set of arguments to Herrnstein and Murray regarding the genetic basis for the observed gap between the IQ scores of blacks and whites. His emphasis in making these observations, however, is in the role of blacks’ lower IQ scores as the root of many of our current social problems; in his view, since these differences are genetic, attempts to eliminate them are doomed to failure. 12

Levin’s racial contract position is even more explicit than that of The Bell Curve.

It too provides a taxonomy of human beings, argues for morally relevant differences between those taxa, and argues that these differences are persistent if not permanent.

Levin, however, goes so far as to endorse different legal codes and punishments for blacks and whites, thus fulfilling Mills’ prediction that under the racial contract only full

Kantian persons are entitled to the full spectrum of rights and liberties. In Chapter 3, I shall present a detailed examination of Levin’s position; later chapters will provide an analysis and refutation of the arguments he offers, and document the evidence for an intrinsic racist motivation.

Chapter Four: The Biology of Racial Differences

With the details of the relevant arguments made clear, Chapter 4 seeks to document the flaws in the racialist’s claims concerning human taxonomy and heritability.

As the policy prescriptions advocated by the racists are based on their views of human biology, it is their biological arguments that must withstand scrutiny if their position is to be tenable. In this chapter, then, I shall examine the biological components of their respective views, and the assumptions necessary to support them. If the biological foundations of their arguments for racial differences can be successfully refuted, then the (alleged) social policy implications of those biological differences will need to be re- visited as well.

Herrnstein, Murray, and Levin need it to be the case that racial groups are both real in a biological sense and that the differences between these groups have persisted and will continue to persist in the face of attempts to attenuate or eliminate them. Their 13

argument requires us to accept a number of claims about the nature of biology,

heritability, and race, including the following: (1)Biologically distinct human races exist,

(2) There is a specific racial type or natural state for each race which suggests

differences between races in a number of important qualities such as intelligence, (3)

the phenotypic differences between these types are difficult, if not impossible, to alter.

These, then, are the issues that must be critically examined before the racialists

can carry their argument forward. We shall see that the biological theses defended by

the racialists are exactly those an adherent to the racial contract would be expected to

defend, and that they do indeed appeal to what is best understood as an example of

Appiah’s extrinsic racism. The reality is, however, that each of the relevant biological claims made by these authors falls short of accomplishing what they wish it to, and thus, as I shall show in Chapter Five, the social prescriptions they offer can be resisted or countered as well.

Chapter Five: What Follows?

In Chapter 5, I shall argue that, while nearly every empirical claim in the arguments developed by the racialists is hotly contested, a rejection of their position need not become embroiled in the controversy over the existence of races, or the accuracy and usefulness of IQ tests. Indeed, it is possible both to give up a great deal of ground and grant the racialists their assumptions about (a) the biological reality of race, (b) the existence of a general factor of intelligence, (c) the accuracy of IQ tests as indicators of that general intelligence, (d) the existence of a racial gap in mean IQ 14 scores, and (e) the current high heritability of IQ; and to deny that all of the above supports the sort of social policies they claim it does.

Using the explanatory tools developed in Mills’ work, it is possible to address the social policy arguments of the racialists on a number of fronts, each of which is independent of contentious biological claims. Whatever the biological differences between the races, and however much the races might tend toward different places and roles in society, these differences do not justify any sort of social policy designed to steer toward or force into the “appropriate” sphere of activity. Furthermore, the arguments made by Levin, et al. assume that the appropriate conception of justice pertaining to racial differences, is a broadly libertarian one. Such a position needs far more argument than they devote to it, and once examined as a manifestation of the racial contract, other options suggest themselves as preferable. In addition the racialists conflate two different issues in their social policy arguments, equivocating between the difficulty and permissibility of raising IQ scores (and modifying a variety of allegedly connected social behaviors), and the difficulty and permissibility of reducing the current gap between the races in IQ (and related social behaviors). This elision is understandable for an intrinsic racist defending the racial contract, but indefensible for those of us who wish to contest that contract, or even for those professing “only” extrinsic racism.

In the work that follows, I shall argue that the persistence of racial arguments based on biology is due not to biological reality, but to an adherence to what Charles

Mills calls the “Racial Contract”. The racial contract, rather than more traditional “social contract” models of social and political organization, makes explicit the ways in which 15 the equality of some requires the inequality of others. It requires fundamental differences between races in order to justify differential treatment of those races. The work of Michael Levin, Richard Herrnstein, and Charles Murray presents a clear example of this sort of thinking.

Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray craft an argument based on three broad claims.

One, that “race” is a biologically real and useful category, with significant clusters of intellecual and behavioral traits associated with racial membership. Two, those traits are highly heritable, and this high heritability makes the prospects for changing them bleak at best. Three, a variety of libertarian social policies are supported by the existence of races and the high hertiability of the differences between them. In the following pages, I will argue that “race”, at least as the authors in question use the term, does not reflect a biologically meaningful category. I will also argue that even if races as they understand them do exist, the alleged heritability of the traits in question does not indicate what they believe it does about the possibility of phenotypic change.

Furthermore, I will argue that even if they are correct about both the biology of race and the implications of the heritability of racial differences in intelligence and behavior, this still fails to support the social policies that they argue follow from the reality of race and heritability of racial differences.

I shall present a careful examination and analysis of these racialist arguments to document the manner in which these arguments are driven not by biology, but by an intrinsic racism necessary in signatories to the racial contract. In the absence of this type of intrinsic racism, the statistics deployed by the racialists fall far short of demonstrating the merit of their position. 16

CHAPTER TWO: RICHARD HERRNSTEIN AND CHARLES MURRAY’S

THE BELL CURVE

As affluence spread, people who escaped from poverty were not a

random sample of the population. When a group shrinks from over 50%

of the population to the less than 15% that has prevailed since the late

1960s, the people who are left behind are likely to be disproportionately

those who suffer not only bad luck but also a lack of energy, thrift,

farsightedness, determination--and brains.

Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve

Introduction

In 1994 Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray published The Bell Curve. This best-selling book brought new attention to some old arguments, as the authors sought to demonstrate that much of the difference in prosperity across American society is a result not of discrimination or exploitation, but of genetic factors. In their words:

“Success and failure in the American economy, and all that goes with it, are increasingly a matter of the genes that people inherit” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 91). Since the genes tell the causal story, and there is little we can do about them, we have no obligation to allocate resources in a (futile) attempt to correct nature’s work: “The story of attempts to raise intelligence is one of high hopes, flamboyant claims, and disappointing results. For the foreseeable future, the problems of low cognitive ability are not going to be solved by outside interventions to make children smarter” 17

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 389). Moreover, our best efforts to counteract these

genetic factors have done little more than make the problem worse. “Inequality of

endowments, including intelligence, is a reality. Trying to pretend that inequality does

not really exist has led to disaster. Trying to eradicate inequality with artificially

manufactured outcomes has led to disaster” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 551).

The proper course of action, these authors claim, is to rethink our views of social justice,

stop deluding ourselves about human equality, and return to a more traditional

conservatism that allows persons to accept their proper place in society.

Herrnstein and Murray’s work does exactly what Mills predicts adherents to the

racial contract will do. It postulates a taxonomy of human beings, with significant and

socially relevant genetic differences between taxa. It argues that these genetic

differences lead to differences in intelligence that constitute the root cause of social and

economic disparity. It urges us to accept, indeed even to work toward, a society in

which everyone fills the role or station appropriate to his or her genetic endowments.

As Mills would predict, it also argues that these differences are permanent in practice if

not in principle. This chapter is an attempt to explain and clarify the argument of The

Bell Curve, in preparation for the detailed criticisms of Chapters Four and Five.

As alluded to in Chapter One, The Bell Curve is only one among many recent

attempts to offer a biologically based explanation for the existence of social inequities in

our society. There is such a thing as “general intelligence”, and it is, the authors claim,

“substantially heritable” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 105).2 Given that there is a clear link between intelligence and socioeconomic status and that certain ‘races’ are

2 The technical issues surrounding the concept of heritability and its use in the arguments of The Bell Curve will occupy much of Chapter Four. In brief, heritability is the ratio of genetic variance to total variance of a trait within a population. 18

genetically predisposed to high or low intelligence, The Bell Curve suggests that little

can be done to alter the economic and social effects of these different genetic

endowments.

The authors stress that, while the conclusions inferred from the statistics may not

be what we would like them to be, an objective researcher needs to acknowledge them

as correct, no matter how much he or she might wish the results were different. There

should be, they argue, no real problem with admitting these differences in public debate,

and they should not affect our interactions with or evaluations of individuals at all.

Accepting the hard truth about human differences, race, and intelligence will allow us to better allocate public resources and to recognize that certain aspects of modern

American society are inevitable. In their words, “To try to come to grips with the nation’s problems without understanding the role of intelligence is to see through a glass darkly indeed, to grope with symptoms instead of causes, to stumble into supposed remedies that have no chance of working” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], pp. xxii-xxiii).

The political philosophy lying at the root of this position is simple. Herrnstein and

Murray argue that since it is biology, rather than society, causing the economic inequalities around us, we are not obligated to attempt to remedy them. Regardless of our cognitive endowments, we are all capable of finding a role in which to contribute, and recognition of our limitations will allow us to be content with our station in life.

It is time for America once again to try living with inequality, as life is lived:

understanding that each human being has strengths and weaknesses,

qualities we admire and qualities we do not admire, competencies and

incompetences, assets and debits; that the success of each human life is 19

not measured externally but internally; that of all the rewards we can

confer on each other, the most precious is a place as a valued fellow

citizen (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], pp. 551-552).

The Argument

The central claim of The Bell Curve revolves around what its authors describe as the “syllogism” Herrnstein first proposed in the early 1970’s. He argues that:

• If differences in mental abilities are inherited, and

• If success requires those abilities, and

• If earnings and prestige depend on success,

• Then social standing (which reflects earnings and prestige) will be

based to some extent on inherited differences among people

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 105).

While not a syllogism, and covering far too much argumentative ground too quickly, if

interpreted charitably and spelled out thoroughly, the underlying argument seems to be

the following:

1. Humans possess a particular kind of mental ability that can be described as

general-purpose intelligence, or “g”.

2. This “g” factor, or general intelligence, can be accurately measured by tests of an

individual’s intelligence quotient (IQ).

3. “g” (and thus IQ) is largely genetically-determined.

4. The degree to which a trait is genetically determined influences the ease with

which that trait may be modified by environmental factors 20

5. Success in our modern, technological society requires a high degree of

intelligence.

6. Since IQ is largely genetic, the differences in IQ between individuals are largely

genetic.

7. Differences in socio-economic status (SES) between individuals are a result of

differences in IQ.

8. Therefore, differences in SES are largely genetic.

9. The mean IQ of blacks is approximately 15 points (1 standard deviation) lower

than the mean IQ of whites.

10. This difference, too, is largely genetic.

11. The difference between the mean SES of blacks and that of whites is thus largely

genetic.

12. Therefore, the difference in mean SES between blacks and whites is thus

difficult, if not impossible, to alter.

13. Therefore, social programs designed to attenuate the difference in SES between

blacks and whites are wasteful, unjust, and counter-productive.

This, then, is the set of claims that Herrnstein and Murray need to support if their position is going to withstand scrutiny. At first glance the above may sound quite convincing. It is, in fact, the very sort of position one would expect to see from those defending (or in denial about) the racial contract. In subsequent chapters, however, we shall see that neither the biological nor the ethical foundations for The Bell Curve’s racially-informed social policy will hold up. Before we can proceed, however, a careful and charitable look at their argument is necessary. The argument proceeds in four 21

stages. First, the authors explain the concept of intelligence, what they refer to as “g”.

Second, they attempt to show that there is a significant genetic contribution to intelligence and this genetic component limits our ability to manipulate or modify differences in intelligence; this is important because of the crucial role intelligence plays in success. Third, this connection between success and genetics is a significant part of the explanation of current differences between the economic and social success of blacks and whites. Finally, they argue that the combination of the preceding factors leads to a number of social policy prescriptions they believe will make the best of the reality in which we find ourselves.

The “g” Factor

The first thing Herrnstein and Murray attempt to establish is that some quantifiable thing called “intelligence” does indeed exist, and that it is possible to measure (or at least to control for) this quality without various cultural biases. Rather than adopt what they refer to as the “revisionist” model of intelligence, in which intelligence is seen as a process rather than a structure, with the emphasis being placed on what is actually happening when an individual is using his or her intelligence

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 15), or the “radical” model of intelligence that views intelligence as too subjective, multi-faceted, ambiguous to be measured (Herrnstein and Murray [1994] 17), the authors make use of Charles Spearman’s concept of “g” or

general intelligence (Spearman [1904]). On this view, which they dub “classical”, the

core of what is known as “intelligence” is a fundamental and universal problem-solving

tool. “As of the 1990’s, the classicists are for practical purposes unanimous in 22

accepting that g sits at the center of the structure in a dominating position- not just as an

artifact of statistical manipulation but as an expression of a core human mental ability”

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.14 ).

Essentially, for Herrnstein and Murray, g is a measure of the ability to understand

complex information and relationships. Standardized tests such as the modern IQ test

can be administered in such a way that they are not “measurably biased against socioeconomic, ethnic, or racial subgroups” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.15). The accurate assessment of this quality g can be used to accurately predict various

outcomes of a socioeconomic nature.

The authors assure us that the following six conclusions are established “beyond

significant technical dispute” (despite what they claim is a mainstream media consensus

“180 degrees opposite from each of the six points” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994],

pp.22-23).

1) There is such a thing as a general factor of cognitive ability on which

human beings differ.

2) All standardized tests of academic aptitude or achievement measure

this general factor to some degree, but IQ tests expressly designed for

that purpose measure it most accurately.

3) IQ scores match, to a first degree, whatever it is that people mean

when they use the word intelligent or smart in ordinary language.

4) IQ scores are stable, although not perfectly so, over much of a

person’s life. 23

5) Properly administered IQ tests are not demonstrably biased against

particular social, economic, ethnic, or racial groups.

6) Cognitive ability is substantially heritable, apparently no less than 40

percent and no more than 80 percent (Herrnstein and Murray [1994],

pp. 22-23).

Obviously, the above list includes claims that, media confusion or no, require some argument. The authors acknowledge this, but plead space considerations for most of them. One issue they do take up directly, however, is the issue of test bias; namely, that it is possible to design tests/tests that can accurately measure “g”.

Measuring “g”

To advance their case, the authors must support the claim that this “g” factor, or general intelligence, can be accurately measured by tests of an individual’s intelligence quotient (IQ). In an attempt to show that various IQ examinations can be used to quantify “g” in a way that either eliminates or neutralizes any cultural or ethnic bias, the authors describe a number of measurement techniques. Making the distinction between external and internal evidence of bias, the authors claim that the overwhelming evidence is that major standardized tests do not over- or under-predict the performance of various groups.3 The equal predictive validity of the examination for all groups examined demonstrates that there is little external evidence of bias. Similarly, the authors claim that there is also little internal evidence of bias. While they admit that

3 Differences in the predictive ability of a test across groups are said to be “external” evidence of bias. Differences in test -taking success among groups is said to constitute “internal” evidence of bias, e.g. ‘cultural bias’ (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], pp. 280-282). 24

examinations such as the SAT may feature culturally-loaded items such as the

RUNNER: MARATHON/ OARSMAN: REGATTA analogies question (an infamous example of alleged test bias- the claim being that most children not of wealthy backgrounds have no idea what a “regatta” might be), they argue that the tests are nevertheless accurate in that the majority of test-takers rank the difficulty level of the questions in the same order; i.e. the questions white examinees find the most difficult are the same questions black examinees find to be the most difficult. (Murray and

Herrnstein do admit that among examinees of a different native language, some internal evidence of bias has been found.) Furthermore, the difference between the scores of blacks and the scores of whites is greatest on those items that appear to be culturally neutral, not on the questions involving regattas or Hamlet (Herrnstein and Murray

[1994], p.282).

Another argument offered against the usefulness of the tests claims that a sort of cultural bias may manifest itself in the form of a reduced “motivation to try” on the part of members of some groups. On this view, various cultures place different emphases on testing, for any number of reasons, and resulting in the members of these groups

having a different attitude toward the testing procedure itself. For example, the subject

might not be acclimated to test-taking in general, might not have any interest in being

tested, or may not be motivated enough to really put his or her best foot forward. In

response to this, Murray and Herrnstein offer the results of the “digit span test”. In this

test, the examinee must repeat a series of numbers in the order they are read to him or

her and repeat them back in inverse order. This test is useful not only because it would

appear to be free of any cultural bias, but also “because the backward recitation is twice 25

as g loaded as the forward recitation-that is, the backward form is a much better

measure of general intelligence” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 283). Since both

portions of the test are taken at the same time, it would appear that one could

reasonably infer a constant level of motivation across both parts of the exam (Herrnstein

and Murray [1994], p. 283. By establishing that the results of this type of ‘culture free’ exam corroborate the results of more traditional IQ exams, the authors hope to show that we can indeed measure cognitive capacity, or g, across cultures and ethnicities.

In summary, Herrnstein and Murray argue that humans possess a particular kind

of mental ability that can be described as general-purpose intelligence, or “g”. They further argue that this general factor of intelligence can be accurately measured and tested across racial and cultural boundaries, and that this general factor of intelligence lies at the heart of those traits we more familiarly describe as intelligence or IQ. As we shall see, it is this ability to measure (and thus to identify differences) in intelligence that the racial contractors will require to defend their multi-level conception of personhood.

“g” (and thus IQ) is a Function of Genetic Endowment

The authors appeal to the concept of heritability (the ratio of additive genetic variance within a population to the total variance within the population) to argue that cognitive ability is inherited. Herrnstein and Murray point out that we can estimate the heritability of any trait with a measurable variation, including IQ (Herrnstein and Murray

[1994], p.106). Pointing out that a heritability ratio is a trait of a population, the authors remind us that the variations in the environments to which a population is exposed may alter the heritability for a given trait in a given population. That being said, however, they 26

argue that our modern attempts at equality have made environments more uniform

across populations, and heritability tends to increase as environmental differences diminish (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 106). This leads us to what the authors describe as the ”central irony of egalitarianism: Uniformity in society makes the members of families more similar to each other and the members of different families more different” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 106). They make use of both direct methods for estimating heritability, such as studies on identical twins raised apart, and indirect methods, such as studying the differences between siblings raised in the same home (and thus, presumably, the same environment) (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.107).

Their analysis of these studies leads them to conclude that “the genetic component of IQ is unlikely to be smaller than 40 percent or higher than 80 percent”. In light of this range, the authors decide to work from what they describe as a conservative estimate of 60% heritability. This, “by extension, means that IQ is about 40% a matter of environment” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.105). This description is significant, for they are in effect arguing that the degree to which a trait is “heritable” is the degree to which that trait is genetically determined, and thus the ease with which that trait may be modified by environmental factors. As Herrnstein and Murray argue, even in a country in which every child experiences exactly the same environment, heritability still limits the amount of variation in intelligence we can expect, and heritability limits our ability to manipulate intelligence. Granted, a move from an extremely poor environment to an extremely rich one might have a significant effect, but “heritability so constrains the limits of environmental effects” that any change is limited in what it accomplishes 27

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.109). I shall return to this point, and the pitfalls of this

type of reasoning, in Chapter Four.

Intelligence and Success

According to Herrnstein and Murray, success in our modern, technological society requires a high degree of intelligence. Moreover, our economy generally rewards those successful, intelligent people more lucratively than it does those of lower intelligence. There is thus a correlation between success and intelligence, such that individuals with higher IQ scores tend to be more successful. The authors of The Bell

Curve ask us to consider this correlation from a new perspective: “We want to consider poverty as an effect, rather than as a cause” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], pp. 129-

130).

As the authors put it, “inherited cognitive ability is now extremely important”

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.109). In the course of walking us through some statistics, they ask us to consider two cases: Case One is a person whose IQ is 100, but is from an environment in which both parents fail to finish high school and are often unemployed. Case Two is a person raised by two parents that have at least finished high school, and make average incomes at skilled jobs. This person, though, has an IQ of 70, or roughly two standard deviations below average. The person described in case one has an eleven percent chance of falling into poverty; the person in case two, however, has a twenty-seven percent chance to fall below the poverty line (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.135). This, the authors claim, is the result of the premium our society places on intelligence and the necessity of at least average intelligence for 28

success. Given that intellectual ‘products’ make up such a large part of the total

economy, it is no wonder that those who can create such products are in high demand.

Moreover, it is not the case that intelligence is only of value in cutting edge technical

jobs. The modern world of the information revolution is sufficiently complicated that even in the case of secretarial jobs, an increase in intelligence of only one standard deviation is worth an extra 40% in the market place:

For a $20,000 a year job, which is correctly priced for an average worker,

the incremental value of hiring a new worker who is one standard

deviation above the mean-at the 84th percentile- is $8,000 per year. Hiring

a worker for a $20,000 a-year job who is one standard deviation below the

mean-at the 16th percentile- would cost the employer $8,000 in lost output

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 82).

Essentially, the information revolution is creating an economy in which a premium is placed on intelligence, rather than on a particular set of skills. As the economic processes and institutions which generate wealth become more complicated, the ability to understand and manipulate that complexity (i.e. intelligence) becomes more valuable (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 98). The authors offer this example:

“As robots replace factory workers, the factory workers’ jobs vanish, but new jobs pop up for people that can design, program, and repair robots. The new jobs are not necessarily going to be filled by the same people, for they require more intelligence than the old ones did” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 98). Intelligence comes into play in other areas as well. As things like the tax code and various forms of business regulation become ever more complex, and the dollar amounts to be gained from 29

successful navigation of those regulations grow ever larger, the value of the lawyer or accountant able to steer his client through grows ever higher (Herrnstein and Murray

[1994], p. 99). As intelligence becomes more valuable, intelligent people play a greater and greater role in the economy.

As a result, argue Herrnstein and Murray, socio-economic status (SES) is based largely on IQ. “If you have to choose, is it better to be born smart or rich? The answer is unequivocally ‘smart’” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.127). The authors argue that, even if we control for the socio-economic status of the parents, intelligence is tremendously important for one’s economic prospects. In their words: “Low intelligence means a comparatively high risk of poverty. If a white child of the next generation could

be given a choice between being disadvantaged in socioeconomic status or

disadvantaged in intelligence, there is no question about the right choice” (Herrnstein

and Murray [1994], p.135).

Since IQ is at least partly a function of genetic endowment, differences in IQ

between individuals are genetic. The authors admit that cognitive ability is a function of

both genes and environment, but they point out that as we grow ever more effective at

allowing persons to develop their intellectual ability by attenuating the environmental

differences between people’s lives, “the remaining differences in intelligence are increasingly determined by differences in genes” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 91)

Therefore, since SES is a function of intelligence, and intelligence is a function of genetic endowment, differences in SES between individuals are significantly genetic in origin. As the authors assert: “Putting it all together, success and failure in the

American economy, and all that goes with it, are increasingly a matter of the genes that 30

people inherit” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 91). This argument for the

impossibility or impracticality of changing life prospects is another key component of the racial contract view, and it too suffers from some serious flaws.

Race Differences in Economic and Social Success

As we have seen, Herrnstein and Murray argue that the mean IQ of blacks is approximately 15 points (1 standard deviation) lower than the mean IQ of whites in their view, this difference, too, is largely genetic. As noted above, on IQ tests, the white mean IQ is standardly scaled at 100, and the black mean is 85, with a standard deviation of 15 (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 276). This does not always show up so neatly, however. A variety of factors can lead to some variation in the scores and the standard deviation.4 A number of explanations have been offered for this difference,

claim Herrnstein and Murray (e.g. test bias, diminished motivation to try, etc.), but each

of them fails to measure up to the genetic explanation.

To support their claim of real differences in intelligence between the races, the

authors make use of Spearman’s Hypothesis, which says that “if the B/W difference on

test scores reflects a real underlying difference in the general mental ability, g, then the

size of the B/W difference will be related to the degree to which the test is saturated with

g” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994],p. 301). The idea is that if we examine a test with

many subtests like the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, we can group all of

those with the same score, regardless of SES, and compare how the specific scores on

the various subtests matched SES. When this is done with whites, SES seems to make

4 Of the 156 studies the authors examine, the mean SD is 1.08, or roughly 16 points (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 276). 31

little difference, with each of the white test taker’s exams reflecting similar distributions

of sub-scores. If the same analysis is performed on all those with some particular

score, black or white, we do not see the same parallel between the subtest scores of

whites and the subtest scores of blacks. The upshot of this is that whites and black

differ most on those most highly g correlated tests. This indicates that the difference in the pattern of black and white subtest scores is a result of some underlying difference other than SES (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.302).

As noted above, the authors are convinced that intelligence plays a key role in socio-economic success, and differences in socio-economic success can be explained in large part by differences in intelligence. Moreover, they argue that the role genetics plays in intelligence is large and getting larger. In light of this alleged connection between genes, intelligence, and success, they conclude that the difference between the mean SES of blacks and that of whites is largely genetic.

The authors admit that the mere fact that a trait is transmitted genetically within a population is not necessarily an indication that differences between populations are themselves genetic in origin; if the difference in IQ is due purely to differences in environment, however, there ought to be a mathematical relationship between environments and IQ scores. The authors ask us to assume for a moment that the following ‘middle ground” estimates are correct: by stipulating that the black- white difference is one standard deviation (15 IQ points), that one-fifth of a standard deviation

(3 points) separates whites from East Asians, and that IQ is 60 percent heritable, we can speculate as to the nature of the requisite environmental differences: 32

The observed ethnic differences in IQ could be explained solely by the

environment if the mean environment of whites is 1.58 standard deviations

better than the mean environment of blacks and .32 standard deviation

worse than the mean environment for East Asians, when environments

are measured along the continuum of their capacity to nurture intelligence.

Let’s state these conclusions in percentile terms: The average

environment of blacks would have to be at the 6th percentile of the

distribution of environments among whites, and the average environment

of East Asians would have to be at the 63rd percentile of environments

among whites, for the racial difference to be entirely environmental

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 299).

That the environmental differences are that extreme seems implausible to Herrnstein and Murray, who point out that other groups have also been subjected to impoverished environments of various sorts, and yet there does not seem to be an analogous effect.

Furthermore, the difference between blacks and whites is least pronounced at the low end of the socio-economic continuum, which would suggest that somehow the respective environments yield disproportionately greater benefits with increasing SES

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 299).

In light of, 1) the alleged connection between genes, intelligence, and success, 2) the apparent genetic basis for the difference in cognitive ability between the races, and

3) the constraining effects of the high heritability of intelligence, Herrnstein and Murray conclude that the difference in mean SES between blacks and whites is thus difficult, if not impossible, to alter: 33

An inexpensive, reliable method of raising IQ is not available. The wish

that it were is understandable, and to pursue the development of such

methods is worthwhile. But to think that the available repertoire of social

interventions can do the job if only the nation spends more money on

them is illusory. No one yet knows how raise low IQs substantially on a

national level (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.416).

The Bell Curve claims we are left, then, with an unfortunate problem. Many of our current social ills are due at least in part to differences in intelligence that we have no practical way of significantly attenuating. There is a significant difference between the mean intelligence of blacks and whites that both resists our best efforts at elimination and is responsible for a host of problems. That is not where the story ends, however, for in our vain attempts to fix the problem we have made matters worse. In light of what we have seen above, the authors conclude that social programs designed to attenuate the difference in SES between blacks and whites are wasteful, unjust, and counter- productive. Again, the racial contract predicts that adherents would argue for the futility or disutility of attempting to bring about greater equality, exactly what The Bell Curve does next.

Implications In 1798 Thomas Robert Malthus warned that populations could grow at a rate far exceeding our ability to increase food production, and thus if population were not controlled, famine would necessarily result (Malthus [1960]). Two hundred years later, the authors of The Bell Curve are worried about something similar, which they describe

as “dysgenic pressure.” Pointing to the demographic transition from pre-modern 34

societies with high birth and death rates, to early modernization with its still high birth

rates yet falling death rates, and finally to modern western societies in which both birth

and death rates are relatively low, they argue that the relationship between genetics, IQ,

and success could very well lead to an important demographic shift. The problem, as

Herrnstein and Murray see it, is that “declines in lifetime fertility occur disproportionately among educated women and women of higher social status” (Herrnstein and Murray

[1994], p. 344). When this is combined with the concept of genetic causation they are committed to, Herrnstein and Murray conclude that people with low intelligence are out- reproducing people with high intelligence, and since a child’s intelligence is correlated with his parent’s intelligence, more of the children being produced are on the ‘less intelligent’ side of the bell curve, and thus will themselves be less successful. In short, people capable of supporting themselves reproduce at very low rates, yet those people least capable of supporting themselves and their children continue to reproduce at the same high rates, triggering a vicious downward spiral, or “dysgenic pressure”

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], pp.333-334).

Under today’s prevailing conceptions of equality and moral responsibility, worry the authors, we may be experiencing a drop in the mean IQ of 1-2 points per generation. Of course even a small shift in the mean means a dramatic difference at the tails of a normal bell distribution, and this mere point or two translates into a major drop in the proportion of the most productive members of society, and a major increase in the proportion of those at the bottom demanding aid. The authors urge us to recognize that our efforts to help, no matter how well intentioned, do little more than 35 allow us to delay dealing with a problem that will be that much worse when we finally do face it.

Among other things, a recognition of the relationship between genes, race, and economic success should cause us to rethink our commitment to affirmative action.

Herrnstein and Murray urge us to consider the following claim: “If tomorrow all job discrimination regulations based on group proportions were rescinded, the United

States would have a job market that is ethically fairer, more conducive to racial harmony, and economically more productive, than the one we have now” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 505). We must recognize that many of today’s careers place a premium on intelligence, and so if employment was decided on the basis of which candidate was the most qualified, a smaller proportion of those intelligence-based jobs would go to blacks (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 507).

Such a policy would yield benefits for all, however. The increase in productivity for all sectors of the economy that would result from allowing employers to make hiring decisions based solely on merit is substantial, and the payoff in terms of fairness to all citizens would be substantial as well (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 508).

It is important to remember, note Herrnstein and Murray, that the social dysfunctions that they are concerned with occur mostly at the extreme tail of the bell curve distribution. The vast majority of Americans have more than enough intelligence to get on with their daily lives in a fashion that is acceptable to them. To better build a sense of community and allow everyone to find a valued place in society, however, a few policy changes are in order: First, government should be decentralized. As many social functions as possible should be assigned to as local a body as possible. Doing 36

this will increase the number of valued places in the community, and thus allow for more

of its members to find a niche appropriate to their talents, whatever they may be

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], pp. 536-540).

In addition, they argue, we need to make a major effort to simplify the rules and methods by which our society is run. Everything from the tax code to the process of credentialing workers for various jobs needs to be rethought and made easier for the ordinary person to participate in without needing expert assistance (Herrnstein and

Murray [1994], pp. 541-542).

We must also, they believe, simplify our society in order to make it easier for our citizens to live virtuous lives. Most people can determine right from wrong, but those at the low end of the cognitive ability distribution often have a hard time attempting to determine what is expected of them when both our legal codes and the punishment for transgressions seem so haphazard. “The meaning of criminal offenses used to be clear and objective, and so were the consequences. It is worth trying to make them so again”

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], pp. 543-544).

A further change concerns the institution of marriage. In their view, marriage is often a key to finding a valued place in society, yet in the aftermath of the sexual revolution and with the increasing tendency to recognize non-marital relationships as legally equivalent or nearly so has made it more difficult for those on the low end of the bell curve to see why they should get or stay married. As those privileges and rights once attached only to marriage spread to other arrangements, it is harder and harder to convince citizens that they should have children in wedlock, for example, and having 37

children out of wedlock is at least a contributing factor in many of the social problems we face today (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], pp. 544-546).

Conclusion

The Bell Curve informs us that people of high socioeconomic status tend to have

children who will grow up to be people of high socioeconomic status. This seems

uncontroversial enough, but Murray and Herrnstein’s explanation of this phenomenon is

problematic. The authors attempt to show us that intelligence is, at least in part, a

function of parental intelligence. This claim, too, seems relatively harmless. Since our

intelligence is, to some degree, a function of our genetic endowments, and it is our

intelligence that largely determines how successfully we deal with the various

increasingly complex social, economic, and regulatory institutions (e.g. the change from

factory worker to robot repairman), the institutions themselves cannot be held liable for

the success or failure of persons in our society. Since we obviously cannot be held

responsible for the genetic endowments of our fellows, we are under no obligation to

ameliorate the conditions under which they live. Furthermore, any attempt to do so is

likely to have quite the opposite effect, increasing the misery of all concerned.

Murray and Herrnstein claim that it is the lower intelligence of blacks that results

in their disproportionate representation among those of low SES, rather than the low

SES that causes lower IQ scores. The authors admit that this is controversial and

perhaps even unpleasant, but argue that it need not be so. If researchers would take

an “objective” look at the data, they would quickly see that “It is possible to face all the

facts on ethnic and race differences in intelligence and not run screaming from the 38

room” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 315). Racial disparity on IQ scores (and thus in

SES) should not bias our interactions with members of other races, and it should not

prevent us from working toward a society in which everyone can find a dignified and

productive niche. What this admission can do, however, is allow us to better allocate resources to programs in which they can do the most good, and to stop throwing good money after bad in those that are ineffective.

The proposals made and defended in The Bell Curve are clear manifestations of

Charles Mills’ model. From the description of racial groupings and racial differences to

the nostalgia for the good old days of neither affirmative action nor governmental aid to

the poor, the arguments reveal a political philosophy steeped in the intrinsic racism of the racial contract. Of course everything above, from the claim that races differ genetically, to the claim that social spending does more harm than good, as well as the claim that poor people will have less intelligent children who will themselves be poor, hinges on one key assumption: that intelligence is transmitted (and largely fixed) by genetics. If, however, this is not the case, then claims of immutable racial differences in cognitive ability and dire predictions about the consequences of allowing the poor to have children are little more than ideological propaganda.

In fact, contrary to Herrnstein and Murray’s assertions, the truth is that the racial distinctions they have identified as the source of may of our social problems cannot be maintained once some fundamental confusions are cleared up. Herrnstein’s ‘syllogism’ begins to unravel. As we shall see in Chapter Four, heritability is simply a description of the ratio of genetic variance to total variance, and tells us nothing about the genetic component of a particular phenotype or the responsiveness of a trait to environmental 39 manipulation. In Chapter Five we shall see that, not only does the argument of The Bell

Curve fail to support the sort of social policies Herrnstein and Murray advocate, but that it may in fact support more and greater efforts directed towards the promotion of social justice, and toward the repudiation of the racial contract. 40

CHAPTER THREE: MICHAEL LEVIN’S WHY RACE MATTERS

I am convinced that once we recognize the reality of race

differences, fully and openly, sound ideas will follow. But should we

continue to pursue the illusion that our troubles will be ended by more anti-

discrimination laws and more hand-wringing about racism, America will

become increasingly Balkanized, and perhaps cease to exist (Levin

[1997], p. 358).

Introduction

The above quotation from Michael Levin’s book, Why Race Matters, neatly encapsulates his views about both the reality of racial differences, and the social policy implications of those differences. Levin contends, among other things, that there is a biologically-based gap between the IQ scores of whites and blacks, that this gap lays at the root of many of our current social problems, and that attempts to eliminate the gap are effectively doomed to failure. He deploys a number of controversial empirical arguments in support of his claims that there are biologically distinct races, and that these races differ on a number of socially important traits. Once he has established this case to his satisfaction, he proceeds to outline the social policy measures that he contends follow from this recognition of racial differences.

Why Race Matters represents an excellent case study of the racial contract outlined by Mills. Levin stakes out a position as a racialist, and defends an argument for the biological reality of race. He goes on to argue that membership in a particular race 41 provides others with reliable information about a variety of intellectual and moral traits.

He further argues that the significant racial differences in intelligence and morality justify differential moral and even legal treatment on the basis of race. Throughout, he argues as an extrinsic racist, contending that he is only dealing in averages, and that it is the differences in the relevant qualities that concern him, not with membership in a particular race simpliciter. However, as we shall see in Chapters Four and Five, his assessment of the science and his evaluation of the options suggest there is an intrinsic racism driving his position.

Levin argues for the following theses: (1) Distinct human races do exist; (2)

These races do in fact differ in mean intelligence; (3) This difference in mean intelligence is the result of genetic factors and not the result of any discriminatory practices on the part of the white majority; (4) This difference in mean intelligence has implications for social issues such as education, affirmative action, and crime (Levin

[1997], pp1-11).

In light of these facts, Levin argues, there is no moral argument for compelling the white majority to fund or otherwise attempt to remedy the disparities in economic and social status between blacks and whites, nor is there a moral argument to compel the white majority to give up rational, race-based risk analysis in personal or political decision making, such as racial profiling. Levin’s argument may appear compelling, but

Chapters Four and Five will explore a number of problems with both his biological and his social policy arguments, respectively. The remainder of this chapter will be devoted to exploring each of Levin’s four theses (outlined above) in turn.

42

Distinct Human Races Do Exist

According to Levin’s first thesis, we can draw on both biological and statistical concepts and demonstrate that race is a biological reality with important social implications. Despite the protestations of some theorists concerning the clarity of of the concept of race, if we ask a random sample of people on the street, claims Levin, we will get a great deal of agreement about who belongs in which racial categories (Levin

[1997], p. 19). This widespread agreement indicates that there must be some objective basis for these classifications. The most plausible basis for these racial classifications, he argues, is geographic ancestry: According to Levin, a Negroid is defined as anyone whose ancestors from 40 to 4400 generations ago were born in sub-Saharan Africa.

Because of the racial mixing that has occurred in America, “American Negroid” can be defined as “anyone 75% or more of whose ancestors from 40 to 4400 generations ago were born in sub-Saharan Africa” (Levin [1997], p. 20). Moreover, it is Levin’s view that since we describe ourselves by our continent of origin, it follows that most people have this geographical conception in mind.

Using ancestry as the sorting mechanism in this way has, according to Levin, predictive power. In his words, “The look of members of a given race bears the same relation to the race’s inherent properties that prominence in the evening sky bears to such inherent properties of Venus as its mass” (Levin [1997], p. 20). Physical appearance and non-visible traits are each effects of some particular set of evolutionary pressures and thus the presence of some particular set of visible traits is a reliable indicator of those non-visible traits that result from the same set of pressures. The word “race” isn’t even necessary- we can talk about differences between the 43

descendants of various continents. We could instead discuss the differences between descendants of African and Eurasians, and lose nothing by this but the word “race” itself

(Levin [1997], p. 22). While Stephen Jay Gould, et al, contend that the genetic diversity among Africans makes such claims about ancestral differences meaningless, Levin points out that there is more genetic diversity among dogs than among giraffes, and yet we still feel comfortable speaking of giraffes as taller than dogs.5 While racial classifications often make use of physical appearance, the physical correlates of race do not define what is meant by the term “race”, they merely fix its reference. Because both physical and mental characteristics are adaptive responses to evolutionary pressures, appearance and inherent properties such as intelligence are common effects of the same set of causes, and differences in one can indicate differences in the other

(Levin [1997], pp. 21-22).

Obviously, Levin allows, genes do not tell the whole story, and there are environmental effects on any given genotype as well. When the discussion turns to the subject of racial differences in intelligence, this point gets a great deal of attention. It is true, he argues, that environment always mediates the action of genes, but this should not be taken to mean that any phenotype is possible from any genotype, for genes constrain the effects of environmental manipulation (Levin [1997], pp. 22-23).

The Races Do in Fact Differ in Mean Intelligence

According to Levin, on a wide variety of standardized intelligence tests the white mean IQ exceeds the black mean IQ by roughly one standard deviation (SD). Scaling the white mean at 100 puts the black mean at 85. This “IQ gap” has remained since

5 Chapter Four looks at this issue more fully. See also (Gould[1996], p. 391) and (Lewontin [1995]). 44

first noticed during World War I, and the National Academy of Science has concluded

that the one SD difference is roughly constant across the country, across tests, and across age (6th, 9th, 12th grades). There are legal prohibitions on gathering the kind of

data Levin contends we might wish to have, but there has been some decrease in the

average score difference on the SAT and ACT. We cannot however, make too much of

this, “as the possibility cannot be dismissed that test designers have eliminated some questions which differentiate the races, making the convergence partly artifactual”

(Levin [1997], p. 37).

In order to distinguish between a number of opposing views while further exploring the relationship between IQ and race, Levin coins the terms “empirical egalitarianism” to refer to the view that the races are in fact equal in mean phenotypic intelligence, “normative egalitarianism” to refer to the view that all persons ought to be treated equally, and “environmentalism” to the view that any differences in mean racial intelligence are a result of purely environmental factors (Levin [1997], p. 37). He then goes on to detail what he sees as the flaws in each position.

Egalitarians, according to Levin, accept the existence of a race gap in IQ, but dispute its significance, for at least one of the following five reasons: (1) There is no such thing as intelligence, (2) Intelligence tests do not measure intelligence, (3)

Intelligence tests do not measure the intelligence of blacks, even if they do measure it for whites, (4) Individual differences in intelligence are caused entirely by environment,

(5) Individual differences may be partly genetic, but race differences are entirely caused by environmental factors (Levin [1997], p. 37).No matter what the source of the difference may be, in Levin’s view there is in fact a difference, and it is this difference 45

that needs to be explained. Intelligence is a phenotypic trait, and regardless of its

cause, a difference between phenotypes is a difference. Should the “black and white

intelligence polygene turn out to be identical, and there is a mean difference in

intelligence due entirely to environmental factors, all that would follow is that blacks would be on average as intelligent as whites had it not been for some environmental factors, perhaps including racism. It would not follow that blacks are as intelligent”

(Levin [1997], p. 38). In other words, no matter what the cause, the fact remains that there is a persistent difference of roughly one standard deviation between the mean IQ for whites and the mean IQ for blacks. This is the difference that concerns us, Levin argues, as this difference has important implications for social policy.

Levin also asserts that, while some may contest the accuracy or value of IQ tests, IQ does correlate with a wide variety of social measures, including occupational attainment, job training success, socio-economic status (SES), time on welfare, academic achievement, and criminal behavior. In addition (citing Lawrence Kohlberg

[1981]), he contends that moral reasoning seems to be affected by IQ. High intelligence is necessary for moral maturity, and “IQ tests correlate with moral maturity” (Levin

[1997], p. 55). For example, persons with lower IQ’s tend not to score as well on tests designed to measure altruism and honesty.

While Levin’s egalitarian critics may attempt to explain away these correlations as functions of the greater white socialization allegedly reflected in high IQ scores, he contends that there are nonsocial external factors that correlate with IQ which make this explanation hard to support. For example, there is at least a weak correlation between

IQ and brain size, as well as a negative one with glucose metabolism. We have the 46

technology to further refine our research in this area, but the opposition is such that it is

impossible to carry out. It is unlikely that head size is a function of socialization, as

“adult head size is predicted by head size at birth” (Levin [1997], pp. 56-57). Even if it is the case that head size is determined by environment, this is still a phenotypic

difference in need of explanation, and as a matter of fact “brain development appears to

be largely under genetic control (Levin [1997], p. 58).” Thus, if head size is largely

under genetic control, and brain size is at least in part a function of head size, Levin

argues that we are justified in concluding from the correlation between IQ and brain size that IQ is at least partly under genetic control.

Levin acknowledges that there are those who refuse to accept that correlations

are anything other than correlations, and argue that they can be explained in other

ways. He argues that “such a view seems absurd; for an explanation to be correct, its

premises must be true and the entities it posits real” (Levin [1997], p. 60). Intelligence

does not mean “whatever intelligence tests measure,” it means learning ability. At

worst, IQ tests have fixed the reference for intelligence. IQ is more than just a predictor

of success or failure, it reflects some underlying property (Levin [1997], pp. 60-61). As

Levin points out, even Gould will admit that an exceptionally low score on the Binet

intelligence test indicates retardedness. Once it is admitted that a low score means

something about the subject’s learning ability, there is no reason to think the middle

range of the IQ scale is less informative (Levin [1997], p. 62). If the very low end of the

scale is meaningful, we can also draw conclusions about differences between blacks

and whites in the underlying property based on the aforementioned difference of one

standard deviation between white and black mean IQ scores. 47

The Difference in Mean Intelligence Between the Races is the Result of Genetic Factors and not the Result of Any Discriminatory Practices

Once he has established his case for the existence and importance of the IQ gap, Levin proceeds to argue that “As the cause of race differences proves to be morally pivotal, it is important to estimate the extent to which genes are involved” (Levin

[1997], p. 83). Despite the fact that environment always mediates the effects of genes,

Levin contends that it is still possible to speak of traits as being “due to genes” (a claim I shall return to in Chapter Four). While some authors claim that genes and environment are so closely linked that they are inseparable, Levin argues that the contribution of genetic factors can be isolated just as the role of a chemical in a reaction can. We can think of the contribution in terms of a genotype’s “norm of reaction”. A genotype can be defined as its norm of reaction, and environment defined as the totality of factors that impinge on the gene (Levin [1997], p. 82). A norm of reaction is a graph of a genotype’s response to environmental factors, with environment on the horizontal axis and phenotype on the vertical axis. A given genotype can produce different phenotypes in different environments. Therefore, to completely describe the genotype’s effect on the phenotype, we describe the entire range of phenotypes that gene could produce under all viable environmental conditions.

When two individuals have the same phenotypic value for a trait in all environments, they are said to have the same genotype for that trait. If there are environments in which two individuals would display different phenotypes, then those individuals are said to have different genotypes, with DNA being the appropriate determiner of difference between the phenotypes. In other words, Levin claims that if 48

the two individuals manifest different phenotypes in the same environment, the

difference must be attributed to genotypic differences between the two individuals.6

When two individuals are raised in identical environments, their different phenotypes are said to be genetic in origin. A genetic difference, however, need not express itself phenotypically in all environments. In other words, individuals with different genotypes may be phenotypically identical. Genetically different individuals may respond differently to any given environment, yet there may be different environments that will yield the same phenotype (e.g. Genotype1 in Environment 1 yields Phenotype 1,

Genotype 2 in Environment 2 also yields Phenotype 1) (Levin [1997], pp. 84-86).

Levin argues that some traits seem to be especially “in the genes”. In other words, they are displayed in all environments, such as carnivory in lions. Another way of putting this is to say that the trait expresses itself in a constant fashion across environments. A natural trait is one that organisms display in environments similar to their evolutionary ones. One individual can be said to be innately more “x” than another when it is more “x” in all environments, or at least in all practically possible environments. Alternatively, an individual is said to be naturally more “x” if it is more “x” in environments that are similar to its evolutionary one (Levin [1997], p. 86).

In response to critics that suggest changes in black behavior have occurred too quickly to be the result of genetic influences, Levin argues that the relevant feature of such examples is that blacks and whites have responded differently to environmental changes. This indicates that “while a change in environment may explain the change in the phenotype of each, the phenotypic difference between them remains genetic in origin” (Levin [1997], p. 87). As black environments have become more like white

6 The validity of this attribution will be examined in Chapter Four 49

environments, contends Levin, black phenotypes have grown more and more different

from white ones, and this indicates a genetic component to the differences, because

black phenotypes are not becoming as similar to white phenotypes as black

environments are to white environments. Were there similar genotypes at work, we

would expect that there would be an increasing similiarity of phenotype as the

environments of blacks become more and more similar to those of whites, but quite

opposite seems to be occurring. As environments become more uniform, the differences between mean racial behavioral phenotypes seem to be increasing.7 He adds that the issue of whether or not there might be environments in which blacks and whites manifest similar behavioral phenotypes is irrelevant- as the phenotypes diverge while the environments converge, there must be a genetic difference (Levin [1997], p.

86).

It is the relationship between this genetic difference and the racial differences in intelligence and behavior that Levin must now address. He contends that commonplace notions of intelligence treat it as something that describes innate potentials. In other words, calling intelligence innate means that individuals raised in identical environments would develop different intelligences. In the context of racial differences this means that, even in identical environments, black children would not develop the same mean

IQ as white children. “Hereditarianism” is the label Levin coins for this view that blacks would develop lower mean intelligence than identically raised whites in any practically possible environment. The environmentalist, on the other hand, contends that

7 While the claim of an ever greater similarity between black and white environments strains credulity, even if true, it fails to address the more fundamental problem that we still do not have a clear understanding of which environmental variables are relevant. 50

identically raised blacks and whites would develop the same mean intelligence (Levin

[1997], p. 89).

Obviously, writes Levin, genes have an undeniable influence on motivation and

intelligence. A chicken cannot learn calculus no matter how rich its environment, and so the human’s ability to learn calculus must be dependent on those genes it has and the chicken lacks. Once one grants that interspecific differences are due to genetic differences, there is no point at which groups are so closely related that they cannot have genetically based differences. Different breeds of dog differ in intelligence, and thus it seems as though there is no reason that human groups cannot (Levin [1997], p.

90).

“It is important theoretically and, it turns out, morally, to say how much of the

difference between two phenotypes is ‘due to genes’” (Levin [1997], p. 91). Even though

both genes and environment are powerless without each other, Levin contends that we

can analyze the genetic component. We can discuss these matters in terms of “a

phenotype’s heritability, which Levin understands to be the geneticist’s explication of

‘degree of innateness’” (Levin [1997], p. 91).8 According to Levin, the heritability of intelligence is a measure of the extent to which variations in intelligence are explained by genetic differences. Furthermore, we can make quantitative claims about innateness. “Intelligence is ‘mostly innate’ if differences in intelligence between individuals are due primarily to differences in their genes, not their upbringings - if, that is, h2 for intelligence is large” (Levin [1997], p. 92).

8 Levin offers no references for this understanding of “heritability”. Broad heritability, the sort Levin is making use of, is the ratio of genetic variance to total variance in a population. A variety of reasons for concluding it does not indicate “degree of innateness” will be offered in Chapter Four. 51

Levin’s position, hereditarianism, is the view that race differences would remain

in IQ even if blacks and whites were raised in an identical range of environments. The

environmentalist view, by contrast, attributes all differences in intelligence to

environmental factors that are non-genetic. On Levin’s reading of them, authors such

as Richard Lewontin contend that giving any weight at all to genes is extreme (Levin

[1997], p. 92).9 Furthermore, “The ratio of genotypic to phenotypic variance in a limited ensemble of environments is perfectly well-defined” (Levin [1997], p. 94). Thus, we can use a “heritability estimate over widely varied environments to make informed guesses about phenotypic variation in unexamined ones” (Levin [1997], p. 94). According to

Levin, intelligence “has appeared in the same form” in every environment colonized by humans, so we can expect that it will continue to appear in new ones, and “it is reasonable to expect genetic variation to continue to be roughly as important as it has been” (Levin [1997], p. 94).10

The IQ gap between the races surfaces around age three, and remains relatively constant. Referring to an “ethological rule of thumb” Levin claims that this early onset is important because the earlier a trait appears; the more likely it is to be genetically controlled (Levin [1997], p. 103).11 In light of its early appearance, the environmentalist must identify some environmental factor that differentially impacts children before their

third year of life. The identification of some factor with such powerful and early effects

9 Lewontin’s analysis of the concept of heritability will be discussed at length in Chapter Four. In brief, his position is that heritability is an indication of how much genetic variation exists, not a measure of how much influence genes have on phenotype (Lewontin [1985],[1995],[2000]). 10 Again, this attempt to predict which phenotypes will appear in untested environments is based on both his interpretation of heritability as a measure of genetic influence on phenotype, and on a further assumption that the norm of reaction of a genotype is necessarily linear. Both of these issues will be addressed in coming chapters. Furthermore, Diamond [1999] offers a different interpretation of the role and character of intelligence in different human populations and environments, and suggesting good reasons to doubt Levin’s claim that intelligence takes “the same form” in every environment. 11 No indication is given of the identity of those ethologists responsible for this “rule of thumb”. 52

on children is difficult, and it would seem that candidates such as the low expectations of teachers could have little impact on pre school-age children. Even if the

environmentalist is successful, the earlier these differences impact children, “the less

likely they are to be the fault of whites” (Levin [1997], p. 104).

Studies of cross-racial adoption are, Levin argues, the closest we can come to an

experiment for testing the hereditarian hypothesis. There have been two studies of

black children raised by whites. One of them, a study on children born to German

mothers and American troops, indicates that the IQ of children fathered by blacks and

children fathered by whites was about the same. There are flaws in this study, but it

does seem to support environmentalism. Another, more careful study shows that, while

children do seem to benefit from being raised in the culture of the schools and IQ tests,

the mean IQ of the black children was above the national black mean but still below the

national white mean. Levin claims that this study of Minnesota families must be taken

with a grain of salt, however, as “the mean IQ of Minnesotan blacks is considerably

above the national mean” (Levin [1997], pp. 106-107).

Furthermore, the IQs of the adoptive families were quite high, indicating that the

home environments were abnormally rich. We can conclude, Levin writes, that rearing

in rich environments can bring black children to within -.2 SD of whites at age seven,

which then falls to within -.8 SD at age 17, which fits the known increase of h2 with age.

A plausible and conservative hypothesis seems to be that that 70% of the deviation from the between-race mean is due to genetic factors (Levin [1997], p.109). At the end of the day, it is not even clear that intelligence can be taught, and if it can, that it can be taught at the same rate to all groups (Levin [1997], p. 114). 53

Levin contends that looking to Africa can help clear up some of the problems research on racial differences faces. White perceptions are irrelevant in Africa, writes

Levin, because blacks have been dominant there for millennia. Early explorers found blacks to lack intellectual curiosity and to be present-oriented. They may have had good memories, but they lacked foresight. It is unlikely that oppression in the U.S. produced the same traits that were found among African Blacks by early explorers

(Levin [1997], pp. 116-117).

The fact, writes Levin, is that the IQs of African blacks are 2 SDs lower than

American whites. Even if we attribute this to colonialism, we still need to explain why it is that Europeans were so much more advanced than Africans, and able to conquer and colonize them.12 This itself may reflect a genetic difference. We also see little of the

hallmarks of civilization, such as the wheel, writing, and mathematics among African

cultures. Africans have not made scientific breakthroughs or cultural advances. Even

in places where colonial powers instituted modernity, it has disappeared in their

absence. As Levin sees it, in order to maintain that blacks are as genotypically

intelligent as whites, one must claim that African achievements did in fact equal those of

Eurasians (Levin [1997], p. 121).

The mean IQ score of Africans is important, argues Levin, because it serves as a

response to those arguments that assert that the races separated too recently to have

undergone significant genetic divergence. This argument is correct in the sense that

12 While beyond the scope of this project, Jared Diamond has argued convincingly that the differences in technological achievement between continental populations are a function of the availability of plant and animal species suitable for domestication. Furthermore, latitude, not intelligence is responsible for the patterns of technological and cultural transmission. Those areas with climates hospitable to the earliest domesticated plants could easily make use of them, but attempts to transplant the staples of fertile crescent agriculture to a jungle climate, for example, were doomed to fail. A head start in agriculture also meant a head start in civil organization, population size, and weapons technology (Diamond[1999]). 54

there is no gene that is present in all members of one group, yet absent in the other.

The real question, however, is whether there has been sufficient time for different gene

frequencies to produce phenotypic differences. Levin answers this in the affirmative:

The 110,000 years since separation is more than adequate for this type of divergence

(Levin [1997], p. 125).

Levin also deals with the argument that, since the mean IQ throughout the West

has been rising for the last sixty years, environmental factors, rather than a changing

genetic makeup, seem to be the more likely cause. Another formulation of the

argument suggests that, since current blacks are as intelligent as whites of two

generations ago, and there has presumably been little genetic change in the white

population, there seems little reason to assume that such a gap is genetic when it is

between black and white, yet not genetic when it is between whites at time T and whites

at time T + 2. Levin argues that the fact remains, however, that the white IQ is always

higher, and thus it seem likely that, even if IQ is not determined by genes, the gap

between white and black IQ scores is (Levin [1997], pp. 128-129).

This Difference in Mean Intelligence Has Normative Implications.

In light of the empirical evidence Levin believes he has marshaled, he proceeds to develop a normative argument. The racial differences he has described can be combined with a species of libertarianism to justify a set of social policy prescriptions, including the reallocation of educational resources, the elimination of affirmative action programs, and the utilization of racial-profiling for crime prediction and avoidance.

Levin recognizes that a God’s eye view of morality is not available to us, so he addresses his moral arguments to his perceived audience and the “Caucasoid values” 55

they hold as Europeans or European-Americans. In Levin’s own words: “When I call a

position ‘justified’, or speak of ‘ordinary standards’, I will mean ‘in accordance with standards the reader of this book will probably hold.’ It is pertinent to ask what

Caucasoid values imply about racial differences not because that point of view is God’s, but because it is yours” (Levin [1997], p. 207).

His reader’s basic morality, Levin argues, is that of the “golden rule”. We do not, if we look closely, find ourselves concerned with the promotion of happiness as basic value. Rather, we think in terms of duties and rights. A right, in everyday usage, is a

“freedom that should be allowed”; a duty is the corollary of that right. The golden rule requires that “basic rights must belong to everyone” (Levin [1997], p. 208). This principle of universality of rights is also attributable, in various forms, to Kant, Hobbes, and Rawls. There is little problem when rights are limited to negative rights, or rights of non-interference, as it is possible for all to share in them without conflict (Levin [1997], pp. 208-209).13

As Mills predicts, we see Levin relying heavily on Kant and the contract theorists and arguing for the equality of all contractors. However, he will draw very different conclusions about the social value and standing of blacks as compared with whites. It is just this sort of tension that the racial contract is “designed” to handle, an issue to which we shall return in Chapter Five.

Positive rights, however, are more difficult to handle. According to Levin,

“everyday morality agrees in rejecting unilateral rights to association. Nobody has a right to force himself on others” (Levin [1997], p. 209). Positive rights also run afoul of

13 Clearly there is room for disagreement that Christ’s golden rule really refers to a bundle of negative property rights or Kant’s Categorical Imperative. 56

the golden rule when they are rights to goods. A positive right to basic goods imposes

duties on others to provide them, but this duty prevents the provider from asserting the

same right (e.g. quitting work and demanding public maintenance). “Ordinary morality”

writes Levin “again agrees that the world owes no one a living” (Levin [1997], p. 209).

For Levin, the appropriate label for those who accept the golden rule is Kantian.

As Levin understands it, Kantianism is “the tendency to inhibit oneself from doing what

he would not want others to do, especially to him” (Levin [1997], p. 211).14 A number of other traits also seem to be linked to Kantianism, including intelligence and altruism.

There appears to be a correlation between altruism and IQ, as well as between

Lawrence Kohlberg’s “moral maturity” and IQ. Moreover, on Levin’s interpretation of

Kohlberg’s concept of moral maturity, what Kohlberg’s “moral maturity” refers to is the highest level of moral abstraction; in other words, Kantianism. In short, “The higher the mean IQ of a group, consequently, the more Kantian its morality is likely to be (Levin

[1997], p. 212). 15

Citing different racial responses to the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality

Inventory (MMPI), which he describes as “a widely used personality test”, and believes tracks a number of behaviors consistent with the Kantian standard of behavior. Levin contends that blacks are less Kantian than whites. There are, Levin writes, certain

MMPI items that “reliably distinguish the races” (Levin [1997], p. 76). Blacks, according to Levin, more frequently agree with statements such as “It wouldn’t make me nervous if any members of my family got into trouble with the law”, “Most people are honest chiefly

14 Again, perhaps we might want to disagree with Levin’s analysis that Kant is concerned with what everyone wants. 15 Kohlberg’s view has been criticized for failing to account for different moral sensibilities between men and women as well. Levin dismisses this by claiming that “Caucasoid women nevertheless value kantianism highly” (Levin [1997], p. 212). 57

through fear of being caught”, and “It is not hard for me to ask help from my friends even though I cannot return the favor” (Levin [1997], p. 76).

Moreover, “since Kantianism is the principal Caucasoid measure of personal

worth, it follows that, by ordinary Casucasoid standards, the average white is a better

person than the average black” (Levin [1997], p. 213). Since IQ correlates with moral

maturity, altruism, and Kantianism, the IQ difference between the races implies a racial

difference in moral reasoning. There is also, argues Levin, a large racial difference in

willingness to commit crimes, with blacks being more likely than whites to do things to

others they would not want done to themselves (Levin [1997], p. 213).

The Injustice of Affirmative Action

While many authors have argued that the existence of racial differences has no normative significance, Levin contends that it does, in fact, have serious implications for social justice. In the matter of affirmative action programs, for example, Levin has strong views about where a recognition of racial differences would lead:

It is obvious, to begin with, that policies based on error must end. One

such policy is affirmative action, conceived as compensating blacks for the

harm done them by whites. No damages are owed when no damage has

been done, and the difficulty blacks have in competing in a white world are

not the legacy of past wrongs...but a result of biology for which whites are

not to blame (Levin [1997], p. 359).

Obviously, there are and will continue to be those that argue that, even if race differences are real, they can have no bearing on policy. Often, the argument about the 58

irrelevance of race differences to policy matters is based on claims about the interaction of genes and environment. As shown earlier, the same gene can express itself differently in different environments, and different genes can express themselves similarly in some environments and differently in others (Levin [1997], p. 229). In other

words, the mere fact that there are currently racial differences does not mean that there

always must be. Levin grants this claim, but argues that the mere possibility that there

could be environments which would reduce the racial IQ gap does not mean that such environments actually exist. The norm of reaction for IQ might be very narrow. Another possibility is that the norms of reaction for IQ might be very wide but co-varying, and thus that the racial difference would be fixed in all environments (Levin [1997], p. 230).

Problems of evidence aside, however, Levin argues that normative questions about what we could do are not the issue. What is relevant for determining what should be done is a backward looking perspective akin to Nozick’s [1975] “historical theory of justice”, but claimed by Levin as a simple truism of common-sense (Levin [1997], p.

231). On this view, what we may do now is dependent on how the situation in question came about. In Levin’s own words, “That a year’s training for A can close a genetic difference in running speed between himself and B does not bear on whether B beat A fairly in today’s race” (Levin [1997], p. 231). By ignoring this historical principle of distributive justice, claims Levin, the interaction argument misses the point and makes itself virtually irrelevant.

Even if there were environments in which racial differences would disappear,

Levin argues, the consideration relevant to our moral obligations, if any, is what actually happened in the historical environments. If the differences are the result of genetic 59

factors rather than white discrimination, the difference is not an injury caused by whites,

and thus whites are under no obligation to remedy the condition. “Given that race

differences express genetic variation in the environments that have actually existed,

how these same genetic factors would respond to other environments is irrelevant to

questions of fault” (Levin [1997], p. 231). The normative significance of racial

differences, then, is not what they prove, but what they disprove. Genetic explanations

refute charges of racism or discrimination as causal factors in the current situation, and

thus refute policies (such as affirmative action) that are justified as attempts to redress

some wrong (Levin [1997], p. 232).

There might be other considerations that would justify looking at the situation from some perspective other than the historical one, allows Levin, but the dominant theme of race discussions centers around white responsibility for current disparities, so

the historical view is the proper way to address these allegations of harm and

responsibility (Levin [1997], p. 232).

Since most affirmative action policies, for example, are based on some idea of

compensatory justice, Levin offers an account of what compensatory justice amounts to.

On Levin’s view, the purpose of compensatory justice is to restore the victim to the state

they would have been in had the injury in question never taken place. This idea of restoration cashes out in terms of the following three principles. The first and narrowest, pure compensation, claims simply that the injured party deserves to have what he lost restored by the wrongdoer. A broader principle is required for third party wrongs, that of illicit advantage, this principle states that those worse off because of a wrong deserve to have their former status restored, at the expense of the wrong’s beneficiaries. The third 60

principle, net illicit advantage, covers cases in which there is an injury due to a wrong, but no wrongdoer from whom to seek redress. This principle states, “If the gap in advantage between A and B is increased by a wrong, and the casual nexus is appropriate, A must surrender to B his net illicit gain relative to B” (Levin [1997], p. 237).

As Levin sees it, in the affirmative action debate, black under-representation in the professions is viewed as an effect of wrongs committed by whites in the form of slavery, discrimination, and contempt. Despite current civil rights laws, modern blacks

lack the advantages they would have had had their parents and grandparents received

equal treatment. Levin cites an argument from Bernard Boxill as evidence of the compensatory rationale for affirmative action claims: “Black people have been and are being harmed by racist attitudes and practices. Those wrongs deserve compensation.

Therefore, black people deserve compensation. Preferential treatment for black people is an appropriate form of compensation for black people. Therefore black people deserve preferential treatment” (Boxill, cited in Levin [1997], p. 238).

Other, superficially distinct, arguments for affirmative action reduce to arguments

based on compensatory justice (Levin [1997], pp. 239-46). If there is no wrongdoing on

the part of whites- if racial differences are indeed due to genetic factors beyond the control of whites, then it would seem that the compensation arguments, and with them, most of the arguments for affirmative action, must fail. The same basic argument that works against affirmative action can also be applied against publicly funded job training, or publicly funded childhood enrichment programs. Even if such programs stood a chance of succeeding, the white majority is under no obligation to fund them (Levin

[1997], pp. 369-60). 61

Crime and Racial Profiling

Levin also applies his analysis of racial differences in behavior to social problems such as crime. In his own words:

Important as is the issue of justice, many people find the relation of race to

crime of equal concern. This topic raises basic questions of risk-

avoidance, rights to self-defense, the use of race in judging individuals,

the function of government, and, ultimately, free-will (Levin [1997], p. 291).

Offering an extensive array of crime statistics, Levin makes a number of claims concerning black proclivity to crime and, more specifically, the preference of black criminals for white victims:

Thus, Whites attacked blacks at about ¼ the rate predicted by random

victim choice, while blacks attack whites at about 2/3 the predicted rate.

Taking the ratio of these fractions -.66/.25- as a measure of intensity of

preference by race, blacks may be said to prefer white victims more than

2.6 times as intensely as whites prefer black victims. Informative as this

ratio is, it seriously understates the racial asymmetry because of the

absolutely greater crime rate of blacks…the average black is about 25

times more likely to have victimized a white than the average white is to

have victimized a black (Levin [1997], pp.293-94).

Statistics and arguments based thereon lead Levin to conclude that it is only rational for any member of any racial group to behave differently toward a young black male than to some other individual under the same circumstances. The prevalence of criminal behavior among black youths and the intensity of their preference for non-black 62

victims mean that an individual is justified in believing a black to be a danger, and a

white individual is justified in believing that he is in more danger than he would be if he were black. Combining the statistical methodology that rejects a hypothesis when its probability is less than .05 with the claim that the probability of .3 that any given black male is an offender, we cannot rule out the possibility that a random black male is a threat to us (Levin [1997], pp. 295-96).

The end result of all of this is that the shopkeeper that keeps a closer eye on black than on white customers, the cab driver that is more cautious about picking up

black males, and the single woman that gets out of the elevator rather than ride with

one or some black males are all behaving rationally; furthermore, they are not behaving

in an injurious fashion (Levin [1997], pp. 299-300).

Levin goes further, and argues that not only is it rational and permissible for the

individual to take race into account when making decisions, the state enjoys the same

privileges. The concept of profiling, by its very nature, requires us to link certain

information bearing traits with others in order to decide whom to search or audit. Race,

according to Levin, is an information bearing property. “Knowledge of race redistributes

probabilities about past and potential crimes. So, absent countervailing considerations,

the state seems entitled, indeed obligated, to use it in screening”(Levin [1997], p. 301).

The purpose of the state is, first and foremost, to provide security, and in light of the

relationship between race and crime, the state’s purpose “permits and probably

demands that it attend to race” (Levin [1997], p. 303).

Conclusion

63

Michael Levin uses Why Race Matters to argue that: (1) Distinct human races do exist; (2) These races do in fact differ in mean intelligence; (3) This difference in mean intelligence is the result of genetic factors and not the result of any discriminatory practices on the part of the white majority; (4) This difference in mean intelligence has implications for social issues such as education, affirmative action, and crime.

In simple terms, Levin’s assessment of the situation is as follows: Blacks, being genetically predisposed to IQ scores one standard deviation below the white mean, are thus predisposed to the sorts of socially maladaptive behaviors which correlate with those IQ scores. Because IQ is highly heritable, efforts to diminish the gap between black and white scores represent an ill-considered investment. Since recognition of genetic differences absolves whites of any obligation to diminish the gap, there is little reason to continue with spending programs dedicated to the futile attempt to raise black

IQ scores.

He builds his case from an impressive-sounding combination of biological, statistical, and ethical claims, and a cursory read may leave the reader convinced of the truth of his claims and the cogency of his argument. A more careful analysis of his biological and ethical arguments, however, will make the problems with his case explicit.

Mills’ model suggests that Levin is developing exactly the sort of argument one would expect from a defender of the racial contract. A society founded on a contract theoretically based on ensuring liberty and equal treatment requires a justification for treating some members differently, and this is exactly what Levin seeks to provide. His defense of the biological reality of race and his association of race with a set of morally relevant traits is evocative of Appiah’s extrinsic racism. As further analysis of Levin’s 64 position will show, however, there is good reason to dispute both his biological and his policy arguments. Chapter Four will document a variety of flaws in his biological argument, and Chapter Five will demonstrate that not only are his social policy arguments unfounded, but that they are driven by an intrinsic racism, rather than a serious attempt to redress social problems.

65

CHAPTER FOUR: THE BIOLOGY OF RACIAL DIFFERENCES

Introduction

In previous chapters, I have closely examined the views of Herrnstein, Murray, and Levin. As a result of that examination, I have shown that the policy prescriptions

these authors advocate are based on their views of human biology. These policy

prescriptions thus require that the biological arguments on which they are based

withstand scrutiny. In this chapter, then, I shall examine the biological components of

their respective views, and the assumptions necessary to support them. If the biological

foundations of their arguments for racial differences can be successfully refuted, then

the social policy implications of those biological differences will need to be re-visited as

well.

The racial contract is based on the belief that members of different races have

different status in the society, and that difference in status is justified by a belief in

morally relevant differences between races. If it is to be defended, it requires real

races, real racial differences, and the practical if not actual permanence of those

differences. Herrnstein, Murray, and Levin thus need it to be the case that racial groups

are both real in a biological sense and that the differences between these groups persist

in the face of attempts to attenuate or eliminate them. Their argument requires us to

accept a number of claims about the nature of biology, heritability, and race, including the following: (1) Biologically distinct human races exist, (2) There is a specific racial type or natural state for each race which suggests differences between races in a number of important qualities such as intelligence, and (3) the phenotypic differences between these types are difficult, if not impossible, to alter. 66

These, then, are the issues that must be critically examined before we adopt

Herrnstein, Murray, and Levin’s policies. Each of the biological claims made by these authors falls short of accomplishing what they wish it to, and thus, as we shall see in

Chapter Five, the social prescriptions they offer, and the racial contract they defend can be resisted as well.

Biologically Distinct Human Races Exist

The starting point for our authors is the claim that there are in fact biologically distinct races. There are three possible candidates for a biologically meaningful taxonomy of subspecies, or in the case of humans, races. The oldest model of such classification is a typological one, in which each race has some natural state or type that reflects the true essence of that group. Another alternative is a geographical model, in which races are classified according to geographic range and morphological similarity.

Finally, races could be distinct groups of ancestors and their descendents, in the language of cladistics, races could be monophyletic groups. I shall argue that each of these accounts of race fails. Furthermore, the models of race used by our authors are not consistent with any of these. They often appeal to cladistic or geographic arguments to make their case, but the model of race they are using is actually a type of essentialism.

Essentialism

A clear account of the typological or essentialist model of subspecies, and its human analogue, race has been offered by Robin Andreasen in her article “A New Perspective on the Race Debate” (Andreasen [1998]). According to Andreasen, the typological account is based on an essentialism dating to Aristotle. On this view, a subspecies is 67

defined by an essential property. Possession of this essential property is both a

necessary and a sufficient condition for membership in the subspecies. The typological

definition of subspecies holds that subspecies can be “classified on the basis of a

uniform association of characteristics, transmitted together due to the existence of an

essential property” (Andreasen [1998], p. 202).

As Andreasen points out, the typological account may seem impractical, given

the rarity of such necessary and sufficient conditions among subspecies. This lack of

candidate traits doesn’t eliminate the typologist model however, as its advocates can

still appeal to a natural state model. On the natural state model, the absence of a relevant trait in a particular specimen can be described as a deviation from the natural state of the organism because of some interfering force. The typologist can thus accept a great deal of variation as long as there are natural tendencies that can be identified.

Statistical concepts such as the arithmetic mean and the standard deviation can then be used to identify the ‘natural’ state of the subspecies in question (Sober [1980]).

Unfortunately for the typologist, modern biology no longer relies on this model of deviation from a natural state to understand variation. The modern biologist utilizes

Mayr’s population based approach to taxonomy, in which categories are classified based on “phenotypic differences existing between populations as a whole” (Andreasen

[1998], p. 203). For the modern, population thinking, biologist, variation is not a deviation from the real essence, but a real feature of the population to be studied and explained. In light of all this, argues Andreasen, the typological model has no place in modern biology and will not work as an account of subspecies or races (Andreasen

[1998]). 68

The essentialist model fails to offer an adequate definition of race, and so we

must look elsewhere is we are to support arguments for the biological reality of race. A

more recent candidate is based on geographic similarity

The Geographic Model

The traditional alternative to typological models of subspecies is based on geographic similarity. According to Andreasen, geographical subspecies are

“Morphologically distinct geographic representations of a species” (Andreasen [1998], p.203). On this account, subspecies can be distinguished on the basis of statistically significant differences between their respective means for relevant characteristics.

There is, of course, a problem with determining what is to count as a characteristic, and which characteristics are relevant for classification. If the classification is not to be arbitrary, a large enough number of characteristics must be involved in the definition to prevent the addition of new characteristics from redefining the classification (Andreasen

[1998]).

On this view, subspecies are conventional groupings based on human interests, with those that allow for “biologically interesting generalizations” to be the most meaningful (Andreasen [1998], p 204). A problem with this method stems from the fact that variation is usually not discrete. Species exhibit clinal, or geographic, variation. A further problem results from the often discordant nature of the variation. In other words, a species may exhibit one pattern of geographical variation for a trait across its range, and yet vary in a different trait according to a completely different pattern. Under these circumstances, we are left with no principled method of classification (Andreasen 69

[1998], pp. 203-205). Geographic variation is certainly an attribute of many species, including homo sapiens. The problem for the racialists, however, is that variation within a species does not appear in neat, unambiguous categories

Even if we grant that the subspecies level of classification may prove useful in some contexts, there is a separate argument against using it in the case of human races. On this view, even if subspecies do exist, distinct human races do not. Data collected and organized into ‘races’ on the basis of major skin-color groupings, reveals that there is more genetic variation within the major races than there is between more specific local populations. In addition, the variation within populations is greater than that between ‘races’. In light of this, it is argued, “Populations are clustered so closely together that any portioning into races would be merely subjective” (Andreasen [1998], p.206).

If neither the typological nor the geographic accounts can be supported, is there another alternative? Andreasen herself defends a cladistic concept of race. It is to this

concept, and Andreasen’s argument, that we must now turn.

Cladism

Cladism, Andreasen argues, can provide us with a useful method of classifying subspecies. On this view, we can think of subspecies as groups of “ancestor- descendent sequences of breeding populations that share a common origin”

(Andreasen [1998], p. 206). Using this cladistic approach, Andreasen claims, we can define human races without running afoul of the arguments against typological and geographical accounts. As she points out, “defenders of the typological approach 70

embrace essentialism and defenders of the geographical approach adopt a

conventionalist stance, yet discussions about the biological reality of subspecies have

taken place without seriously considering the cladistic approach” (Andreasen [1998], p.

209). Even if her approach succeeds, however, Andreasen can only show that races were once biologically distinct, not that they currently are. Furthermore, she admits that the classificatory scheme that results from her argument has no necessary connection to the folk conceptions of race most of us rely on in discussions of race and racial issues.

What is cladism? Cladism is a method of classification that seeks to identify genealogical relationships and thus monophyletic groups. Let us consider this idea that each race is a separate monophyletic group, and thus that each member of a race is more closely related to other members than any of them are to any nonmember. We are familiar with the tremendous variety of life on our planet. Organisms on earth differ not only in matters of size and color, but also in such characteristics as number of eyes and legs. The question naturally follows: How did such variety come about? It is generally accepted that the tremendous diversity of life on our planet did not spring into being ex nihilo, but is the result of a process of descent with modification from common ancestors. This view holds that the organisms around us descended from ancestors that were in some cases quite different from the current species. The differences we observe are a result of a trial and error process of mutation and selection, in which those mutations that survive are passed on to descendants. Assuming this is true, there should be some ‘family tree’ that would indicate when and where these 71

modifications occur, and thus how any particular organism is related to any other. This

tree is called a phylogeny.

In their efforts to reconstruct a phylogeny from incomplete data, cladists are forced to make certain assumptions. One of the assumptions involved is a version of the principle of parsimony. The cladistic parsimonist holds that the phylogenetic hypothesis that most nearly reflects the actual history of life is the one requiring the smallest number of evolutionary changes, and the smallest number of homoplasies

(matching traits resulting form separate originations). Cladism seeks to reconstruct phylogeny by identifying monophyletic groups, or clades. A monophyletic group

consists of a species and all of its descendants, but nothing else. Figure 1 shows a

hypothetical phylogeny. Species A generates species B and C, and species B

generates species D and E. Species B, D, and E thus make up a monophyletic group

(the ancestor B plus all of its daughter species). To include A would make it a

paraphyletic, because the resultant group would exclude other descendants of A.

Cladism sees its task as that of identifying monophyletic groups and attempting to 72

reconstruct phylogenetic relationships by determining which organisms belong to which monophylies (Sober [1988]).

Crucial to this endeavor is the notion that some kinds of similarity carry more evidential weight than others. These evidentially special similarities are those that are derived from (relatively) more recent common ancestors. The rationale for granting more weight to these special similarities is based on a common cause principle. If we were to encounter a group of three term papers, and discover that two are identical and the third is quite different, we could infer at least two things. We know, at a minimum,

that there was more than one possible way to write the term paper. We can also infer

that the similarity between the first two is due to some form of plagiarism, because this

is a far more likely scenario than one in which the two are generated independently.

The application of the common cause principle to evolution works in the same way.

Given a group of three organisms in which two share a trait that the third lacks, and that

trait has not been there ‘all along’ (phylogenetically speaking), we infer that the two

possessors of the common trait are more closely related to each other than either is to

the third (Sober [1988]).

The two types of similarity involved in phylogenetics are known as

symplesiomorphy and synapomorphy. If we refer back to our earlier example, those

characters which D and E share with A are said to be ancestral similarities, or

symplesiomorphies. According to cladistic parsimony, a symplesiomorphy indicates

nothing about the degree of relatedness between two organisms, for it is simply an

evolutionary holdover from the earliest ancestor A. In contrast, a synapomorphy or

derived similarity can help us to infer phylogenetic relationships. If for a given character 73

there are two states “0” and “1”, with “0” being the ancestral state, and we find that B,D,

and E possesses that character in its derived or evolved state “1”, while C still retains

“0”, we could infer that D and E share a common ancestor B, and thus that D and E are more closely related to B than they are to C. This is only possible because we are looking at a specific character that has evolved into a different state in one lineage.

Were we to look at a symplesiomorphy, where all the organisms in question retain the ancestral state “0”, we would be unable to determine which organisms in the group were descended from which. When dealing with some character that has changed, however, we are able to infer that all the organisms which possess that character state inherited it from the initial posessor of that trait, and thus to infer that that original and all the other possessors are a monophyletic group, or clade (Sober [1988]).

Trying to apply this method to taxa below the level of species is difficult at best.

The lack of reproductive isolation between them suggests we cannot make use of cladism to understand human races.

First, in order to make use of the principle of common cause, the cladist must be able to assume that it is indeed more likely that the presence of the derived trait does indeed reflect a single origin and with multiple descendants than that its presence in the multiple organisms is due to separate originations. If the descendants with the trait are not reproductively distinct from those without it, it would seem that the trait can be passed back and forth, with individuals and their descendants able to exhibit either the

“0” trait or the “1” trait, and thus that the presence of one trait or the other can tell us nothing about the relationships between the organisms in question. 74

Second, cladistic analysis requires that we be able to identify both the original form of the trait and its derived form. We must be able to establish an ancestral ‘out- group’ with the ancestral form of the trait in order to conclude that those groups which do manifest the derived form have been significantly modified to qualify as a separate group. Even the race theorists with whom we are concerned with in this dissertation, however, will admit that at least some members of all the groups can manifest the

‘advanced’ or derived trait, thus, there is no outgroup available. Any trait which can appear in one group can appear in any of the others, and so any attempt to show that one group has a derived trait which others lack (necessary for identifying a monophyletic group), and thus that it is evolutionarily distinct, is perilous. Without the certainty of reproductive isolation, any attempt to determine which trait is the derived form requires us to choose ahead of time salient racial features so we can use them to determine “propinquity of descent” and thus racial relationships.

Despite the above, at least one theorist has attempted to show how these difficulties can be overcome and cladistic principles can be used to identify and describe human races. Robin Andreasen has argued that the emphasis on reproductive isolation is “overstated”, and that cladistic analysis can tolerate a low level of interbreeding

(Andreasen [1998], pp. 209-210).

How does one overcome the problems involved in determining which is the ancestral and which is the derived form of a trait? Andreasen argues that we can measure genetic distance (Andreasen [1998], p. 210). Genetic distance, as she describes it, is “a measure of the difference in gene frequencies between two breeding 75 populations…Roughly, the smaller the genetic distance between two populations, the closer their ancestral relation” (Andreasen [1998], p.210).

Recognizing that this method is only a rough guide, Andreasen points out reliance on genetic distance can yield an inaccurate phylogeny for a variety of reasons.

The forces of natural selection on separate populations in similar environments can cause convergence. Both convergence and interbreeding can cause us to overestimate the propinquity of descent of two populations. Conversely, if we have small populations evolving more rapidly than larger populations, the larger genetic distance may result in underestimating their phylogenetic closeness (Andreasen [1998], p. 211).

These problems can largely be overcome, she argues, by using DNA that is not subject to selection, such as mitochondrial or ‘junk’ DNA. We can attempt to use enough different genes to average out those factors that could undermine the accuracy of our phylogenetic inferences. We can also overcome much of the difficulty posed by interbreeding if we study those populations that remain in their ancestral homes and are thus less affected by the major human migrations of recent centuries (Andreasen

[1998]).

While the clever phylogenetic methodology offered by Andreasen may indeed offer a way to make some sense of subspecies, it still leaves much to be desired as a basis for supporting the categories used by the racialists. Even if we grant her claims that the evidentiary problems can be dealt with, we are still left with a taxonomy that bears little similarity to those folk conceptions of race that serve as the basis for racial social policies. 76

Andreasen’s best cladistic reconstruction of the human phylogeny, for example,

“results in racial categories that cross-classify” the standard racial groupings of

Africans, Caucasians, and Asians (Andreasen [1998], p. 212). On her reconstruction,

we end up with a large number of monophyletic groups, such as Pacific Islander,

Amerindian, European, Non-European Caucasoid, African, etc, (Andreasen [1998], p.

212). As she points out, what a cladistic analysis yields is a “nested hierarchy” of

groups, and there is no particular reason to identify any particular level in that hierarchy

as the “race” level (Andreasen [1998]).

The essentialist and geographic models fail, and the cladistic account, while

perhaps workable for some purposes, falls short of providing a definitive case for the

biological reality of race. At most, Andreasen has shown that races did exist at one time. Even so, it seems that modern patterns of migration and interbreeding between populations may make it the case that distinct human races no longer exist.

Furthermore, while Andreasen’s broader argument about the identifiability of human migratory patterns may be useful, there is no assurance that a classificatory scheme based on such data will track ordinary conceptions of race (Zack [2002]). It is to this problem that we now turn.

Race According to the Racialists

Having surveyed the three candidate models of race, we can reexamine the work of our racialists, Herrnstein, Murray, and Levin, with an eye toward the accuracy of their racial classifications. Each of the racialists appeals to plausible sounding quasi-cladistic or geographic models in the initial stages of their arguments. In reality, however, the 77

model that each defends (and needs to defend in order to support his social prescriptions) is that of the discredited essentialist’s ‘natural state’.

As we have seen above, all of the models for biologically distinct human races are problematic. The racialist authors, however, have a further problem in that the racial classifications they rely on have little to do with any of the biological accounts.

Herrnstein and Murray, for example, “classify people according to the way they classify themselves” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 271). While their stated position is thus

one of self-identification as the relevant criterion for race, they make use of data

developed by governmental and other agencies and based on the criteria those bodies

use.

Michael Levin develops a more theoretically sophisticated model of race in his

argument, but he, too, makes use of different models for different purposes. Levin’s

justification for his classificatory scheme is based on a folk conception of race, and the

claim that there is a great deal of agreement between laypeople in sorting us into racial

categories, but of course there is no necessary connection between this folk

classification and the “biological” account Levin is defending. Levin suggests that, since

the parties which make use of the term ‘race’ assume it is a reasonably clear concept,

and since a poll of average passers-by on the street would yield agreement in racial sorting, the concept of race rests on some objective basis. In an attempt to quantify this basis scientifically, Levin explains that a “Negroid may be defined as anyone whose ancestors 40 to 4400 generations removed were born in Sub-Saharan Africa…An

American Negroid can be defined as anyone 75% or more of whose ancestors 40 to

4400 generations removed were born in sub-Saharan Africa” (Levin [1997], p 20). 78

Of course Levin is careful to point out that physical characteristics are not identical with race, but that they are “observable correlates of geographical origin” and bear the same relation to the “race’s inherent properties that prominence in the evening sky bears to such inherent properties of Venus as its mass” (Levin [1997], p.20).

This combination of references to a race’s inherent properties and the claim that

75% ancestry is sufficient suggests a peculiar type of essentialism in which the essence of one race is can dominate the other in a hybrid. Zack has referred to this idea as hypodescent. A hypodescent model is one in which a person’s race is defined by the parent with the socially less desirable race. It is thus a social, rather than biological, classification (Zack [2002]).

The account of race offered by the racialists only makes sense as an essentialist model. It is only by postulating some identifiable essence that the racialists can get from self-identification (Herrnstein and Murray) or man-in-the-street taxonomy (Levin) as a basis for racial groups to a claim that the races differ in important, non-observable qualities. On Levin’s view, for example, while racial classifications often make use of physical appearance, the physical correlates of race do not define what is meant by the term “race”, they merely fix its reference. Because both physical and mental characteristics are adaptive responses to evolutionary pressures, appearance and inherent properties such as intelligence are common effects of the same cause, and differences in one can indicate differences in the other (Levin [1997], pp. 20-21).

The problems we have seen with applying biological concepts of race to modern human groups and the disparity between the biology and the indicators the racialists use to collect their data, along with the claims they make about the difficulty of 79

modifying certain traits, shows that what they are really working with is a natural state model.

A natural state model “presupposes that there is some phenotype which is the natural one which is independent of a choice of environment”, and that that each human has a particular tendency that will manifest itself if the environment doesn’t interfere

(Sober [1980], p. 179). On this view, “variability in nature…is a deviation from type”

(Sober [1980], p 171). It is this idea that certain differences are natural that drives the social policy arguments of the racialists.

As we saw in Chapter Three, Levin goes to great lengths to describe the behavior of genotypes in ‘natural’ environments. He allows that environment always mediates the action of genes, but this should not be taken to mean that any phenotype is possible from any genotype, for genes constrain the effects of environmental manipulation (Levin [1997], pp. 22-23). He also argues that some traits seem to be especially “in the genes”. In other words, certain traits express themselves in a constant fashion across environments. Levin describes certain traits in terms of their naturalness. As noted earlier, a natural trait is one that organisms display more in environments more similar to their evolutionary ones (Levin [1997], p. 86).

Each of the authors suggests that we can compare the groups by discussing differences in racial means, and argues that these mean differences are unlikely to change, in effect reifying the mean as the natural state for that race.

A phenotypic trait such as intelligence seems to be a prime candidate for indicating ‘essential’ differences. Levin contends that commonplace notions of intelligence treat it as something that describes innate potentials. In other words, calling 80

intelligence innate means that individuals raised in identical environments would

develop different intelligences. In the context of racial differences this means that, even

in identical environments, black children would not develop the same mean IQ as white

children. “Hereditarianism” is the label Levin coins for this view that blacks would develop lower mean intelligence than identically raised whites in any practically possible environment (Levin [1997], p. 89).

Herrnstein and Murray make a similar point in the context of describing the ‘g loading’ of the subtests on the Weschler Intelligence Scale for Children, analyzing the patterns of scores on the subtests, they argues that whites and blacks differ most on those most highly g correlated tests. This indicates that the difference in the pattern of black and white subtest scores is a result of some underlying difference other than SES

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p.302).

Each of the authors argues that the racial gap in characteristics such as IQ will

remain constant (or at least nearly so), implying that there is some essential difference

between the races independent of environment.

As we have seen earlier in this chapter, the natural state model is flawed, and is

inapplicable to human racial differences. Even if the racialists are correct about the

current existence of racial gaps, there is no reason to believe that the phenotypes being

manifested are actually the “healthy” or natural ones. Furthermore, modern biology

rejects natural state or typological models in favor of population models, accepting that differences reflect normal variations, rather than deviations. The ascription of differences to underlying racial essences is not accidental, however. On the contrary, the social policy arguments of the racialists require this essentialist model if they are to 81 support their claims of impracticality, immorality, and futility with regard to attempts to alleviate racial differences. In an ironic twist, however, they camouflage their essentialism by disguising it as the population biology concept of heritability.

Heritability, Race, and Essentialism

Statistics figure prominently in the natural state models of our authors. As we have seen, they rely heavily on the biological concept of heritability (h2). Heritability is the proportion of the variance of a particular trait in a particular environment that is

2 2 2 2 genetic variance. In symbolic terms, h = σ G/ σ T. The denominator, σ T, is equal to the genetic variance plus the environmental variance plus the variance due to the

2 2 2 2 interaction of genes and environment. Again in symbolic terms, σ T = σ G + σ E + σ

(GxE). Our authors make use of heritability ratios to suggest that the racial differences they are concerned with are difficult, if not impossible, to alter. Heritability is not the modern incarnation of essence, it is simply the proportion of the variance of a particular trait in a particular environment that is genetic variance. 16

16 The arithmetic mean (often referred to simply as the mean) is calculated by adding all of the recorded values, and then dividing this sum by the number of recorded values. Another key component in the analysis of heritability is the statistical concept of variance. Variance is the square of the average distance from the mean. In other words, to calculate the variance of a population we subtract the population mean from each of our measured values, square the results to remove any negative values, sum these squares, and them divide this sum by the number of values. This process yields the population variance, denoted σ2. Often, however, we cannot measure the entire population. In this case, we can calculate the variance within our sample by subtracting the sample mean from each of the values in our sample, squaring and then summing these values, and then dividing this sum by the number of values in our sample minus one. This quantity, known as the sample variance, is denoted s2. Of course, since this result is calculated by the squaring of differences from the mean, it too must be expressed in terms of squared units. It is often more convenient to make further calculations without these squared units, and thus the standard deviation is often used instead. The standard deviation (denoted σ for the population or s for a sample) is simply the positive square root of the variance, and thus is expressed in the same units as the original measurements. As an illustration of these concepts, consider the following example. Alf, Betty, Charlie, Doris, Ernie, and Francis are members of a club. If we measure their weights, we get the following results: Alf 275 pounds 82

For our purposes, however, it is important to note that a trait does not have a heritability per se. A trait has a heritability only in a particular population and a particular environment. The denominator in the equation, total variance, is a function of both genetic and environmental variance, as well as some interaction effects between the two, and thus the equation has environmental considerations ‘built–in’. If we change the environment, the heritability of the trait may change as well (Lewontin [1995], p.71)

Thus, while a great deal of the argument developed by our authors relies on claims about the heritability of certain traits, the concept may not do the work they believe it does.

Betty 100 pounds Charlie 175 pounds Doris 125 pounds Ernie 150 pounds Francis 175 pounds

Adding the measured weights and dividing the sum by 6 (the number of measured values), yields a mean weight of 167 pounds. Subtracting the mean from each value yields the following differences from the mean: A B C D Name Wt (lbs) Wt – Mean (Wt - Mean)2 Alf 275 108 11664 Betty 100 -67 4489 Charlie 175 8 64 Doris 125 -42 1764 Ernie 150 -17 289 Francis 175 8 64

Adding the values in column D and dividing by 5 yields s2, the sample variance. In this case s2 = 3667 lbs2. If we take the square root of this number, we have s, the standard deviation of the sample. In this case s = 61 lbs. Obviously, the mean of a sample by itself doesn’t tell us a great deal about the sample, but if we combine it with some measure of the variation around the mean, such as variance or standard deviation, we can better interpret the distribution of values in the sample itself. Measures of dispersion and variability such as the variance or the standard deviation may tell us something about how the individual values cluster around the mean, but they do not and cannot tell us anything about an individual’s actual measured value. In other words, from the calculated mean of 167 pounds, and the calculated variance of 3667 pounds2, we cannot know or predict Alf’s weight. In the case of Alf and his friends, if we could somehow determine the genetic variance within the members of the club, we could divide that number by the total variance within the club (in this case 3667 pounds2) and this number would be the heritability of weight for this sample in this environment. For example, if we postulate that the genetic variance within Alf’s club is 2000 pounds2, we can divide 2000 (the genetic variance) by 3667 (the total variance), yielding a heritability of 0.545 for weight in this environment.

83

If we are going to estimate the heritability of a trait in a population, we have two choices of method. Direct methods involve studying the differences in a trait between blood relatives that have been separated. We can estimate the genetic overlap between members of a family, and we can assume that correlations are not due to shared environments because they do not, in fact, share environments. Ideally, these comparisons are based on monozygotic twins raised apart. Since these twins are of exactly the same genotype by definition, any differences between them must be due to their different rearing environments. We shall address the issue of pre-birth or uterine environments and their possible impact later in this section.

As an alternative, we can use indirect methods for estimating heritability. Indirect methods compare the IQ correlations between people with varying levels of shared genes in similar environments and attempt to draw conclusions based on differences in

IQ among individuals in similar environments.

Since heritability is calculated by dividing genetic variance by total variance, the accuracy of the genetic variance calculation is of crucial importance for the calculation of heritability. For simple traits that are directly coded for by a particular gene, identifying the amount of genetic variance may not be problematic. With quantitative traits in a complex organism, however, the attempt to determine how much of the total variance is due to genetic variance is far more difficult. Each of the above authors makes use of some form of twin or sibling comparisons in an effort to determine genetic variance. All of these attempts assume that separating twins at birth effectively isolates the respective contributions of genes and environment. If genetically similar individuals raised in different environments are similar in phenotype, it must be due to their 84

genotypic similarities rather than their environmental differences. Each of the authors is

aware of the fact that even when separated at birth, twins have experienced nearly

identical uterine environments, but each of them seems to feel that this presents no

great problems for their estimation of genetic variance and thus of heritability.

However, it appears as though the evidence obtained even from monozygotic

twins separated at birth may overestimate genetic variance and thus heritability

(Daniels, Devlin et al. [1997], p. 54). Even if we ignore the common arguments that suggest the environments of twins separated by adoption are not really as different as one might think, there still is a difficulty in trying to use the similarity of separated twins as evidence of genetic variance. Essentially, the problem is that the shared uterine environment may be more important than expected, and thus that conclusions based on the assumption of separate environments may be more tenuous than they first seem.

The environmental component involved in a phenotype may be separated into two parts: The maternal environment and the external environment. In the case of twin studies, we can include any shared external environment with the maternal environment as the preseparation environment. Herrnstein, Murray, and Levin ignore or at least treat the effects of the preseparation environment as insignificant. Problematically, there are indications that it may not be. In humans, the maternal environment includes such things as the nutrition of the mother and drug or alcohol use or non-use. Consider birth weight, for example: At least 20% of the variance in human birth weight is explained by the maternal effect. In terms of IQ, it appears as though the pre-separation environment can explain about 20% of the variance in twins (Daniels, Devlin et al. [1997], p. 54).

Obviously, studies which treat the pre-separation environment as insignificant for their 85

determination of genetic variance can overestimate the proportion of the variance that is

due to genetic factors and, thus, overestimate heritability.

In short, the authors must have an estimate of the genetic variance within a

population if they are to calculate heritability. The method they rely on to estimate genetic variance assumes, among other things, that monozygotic twins separated at birth really do develop in different environments, and thus that their similarity or difference really does tell us something about genetic variation. In light of the influence the preseparation environment may have on development, however, the use of these twin studies to infer genetic variance may yield a significantly exaggerated result, and thus an inflated estimate of heritability.

A genotype’s response to environmental factors can be a complex, unpredictable, and nonlinear matter. Consider the case of obesity in laboratory mice. If a mouse is homozygous for the recessive gene db and is allowed to eat whatever it wishes, it manifests all the symptoms of diabetes. Simply being homozygous for db does not entail that the mouse expresses the diabetes phenotype. If the mouse is not allowed to overeat, it does not develop diabetes, and manifests the phenotype of a normal mouse, despite the fact that it is homozygous for db (Wahlsten [1997], p.74)

A further example of this type of phenomenon concerns the laboratory mouse strains C57BL/6J and A/J. Given a normal diet, neither strain develops diabetes, but if they are fed a high fat diet, diabetes is induced in the C57BL/6J strain, yet not in the A/J strain. Here we can see that the organism’s response to changes in the environment depends on its genotype (Wahlsten [1997], p.74). 86

There are analogous cases among humans. Phenylketonuria (PKU), for example, has as a necessary condition a defect in a gene that codes for an enzyme that breaks down phenylalanine. In the absence of this enzyme, phenylalanine builds up in the body and causes brain damage. If the ingestion of phenylalanine is controlled, however, brain damage can be averted, even in individuals that have the genotype

(Wahlsten [1997]). Rather than a genotypic deficiency in intelligence, it would seem that this case is better seen as a case in which a uniform environment would damage the individual’s phenotypic prospects, and thus that an environment customized for this genotype is the most appropriate solution.

Despite all of this, we have seen that the racialists are confident that they can speak of the heritability of a particular phenotypic trait, a view that only makes sense if one adopts a natural state model and uses heritability values as indicators of naturalness. Herrnstein and Murray, as we have seen, contend that 0.6 is a safe and reasonable estimation of the heritability of intelligence. They also seem to contend that this is the heritability of intelligence, and that environmental changes can have little to no effect. For example, The Bell Curve claims that the ‘conservative’ estimate of 60% heritability for intelligence means that “IQ is about 40% a matter of environment”

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 105). Expanding on this, its authors ask us to imagine a world in which the environments of all children are identical, and ask how much intellectual variation would remain. “If the heritability of IQ is 0.6, the standard

deviation of IQ in our magical world would of identical environments would be 11.6

instead of 15- smaller, but still leaving a great deal of variation in intellectual talent that could not be reduced further by mere equalization” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 87

105). Levin, too, seems to accept that ‘a heritability’ can be determined for a trait, and

that those traits with high heritabilities are natural. As we saw earlier, he identifies his position as ‘hereditarian’, which he defines as one who subscribes to the view that blacks would develop lower mean intelligence than whites even if raised in identical environments of any practically possible kind (Levin [1997], p. 89).

Here, obviously, Levin is claiming that the heritability of intelligence is such that any current differences that exist between groups would also exist in any other

‘practically possible environment’. This conclusion is based on his claim that, while heritability does indeed have an environmental component, the ratio of genotypic to phenotypic variance under a range of environments is definable (and defined). In effect,

he is using his conception of heritability to support his essentialism, and argue that we

need not even test all environments, as certain traits will behave in predictable ways

regardless of environmental effects. In his own words:

Without infallibly predicting the behavior of a genotype elsewhere, a

heritability estimate over widely varied environments permits informed

guesses about phenotypic variation in unexamined ones. When a trait-

such as intelligence-has appeared in the same form in virtually every

ecological niche so far colonized by humans, it may reasonably be

expected to emerge in like form in new niches, and it is reasonable to

expect genetic variation to continue to be roughly as important as it has

been (Levin [1997], p.94).

The racialists’ analysis of the relationship of genotype and environment is

misleading, to say the least. It would be difficult indeed to quantify the capacity of an 88 environment to nurture intelligence, much less predict how an untested environment might affect a particular genotype. The racialists get around this by working from a natural state model that allows them to dismiss unexpected (or inconvenient) results as unnatural, and to move from a discussion of the range of phenotypes occurring in

‘natural’ environments to claims about the possibility and or desirability of environments that might yield different phenotypes. Of course, it is difficult even to determine if any of the environments we have experience with are optimal- they may very well each be deficient in some way. As Sober writes in a slightly different context “A perfectly healthy phenotype may be historically non-existent; the optimum actually attained might be some diseased state” (Sober [1980], p. 182). In light of this, even a consistent ‘gap’ between racial means for some trait gives us no reason to suppose that this gap indicates an essential difference between races.

Furthermore, as Lewontin points out, removing one source of variance will not necessarily reduce the total variance. The change in variance that results from fixing the environment is in fact dependent on which environment we choose to fix. Consider the case in which we have two genotypes, one of which is relatively plastic (its expression is very sensitive to environmental effects) and another that is not so plastic.

If we arrange the possible environments on a horizontal continuum from left to right, and plot the various phenotypic expressions on a vertical axis, we may find that the plastic genotype plots very high in the environments on the left of the continuum, and lower as we move to the right. If the other genotype expresses basically the same phenotype across all environments, and intersects the first genotype’s plot somewhere in the middle, we may find that, for environments in the center of the scale, there is very little 89

total variance. If we fix the environment sufficiently far to the right of the mean,

however, we can actually increase the total variance. Since genotypic variance remains constant, and heritability is the ratio of genotypic to total variance, we have actually decreased the heritability by fixing the environment at a particular point (Lewontin

[1985], p. 116-7).

The point is made very clearly by Lewontin in his analysis of the growth of

Achillea at three different elevations. Cuttings were taken from seven different Achillea plants, and each of the particular plants was represented in one of the environments by its genetically identical cuttings. The results showed that any one of the plant genotypes might do well relative to the others at one of the elevations, but do poorly relative to the others at another elevation. Moreover, it was not a simple linear relationship in which some genotypes did progressively better as elevation increased or decreased. Some of them did very well at middle elevations, but poorly at high or low elevations, and others did well at both the high and the low elevations, but poorly in the middle (Lewontin [1985], pp. 22-23). In this case, the amount of genotypic variance was constant across all environments, but the total variance, and thus the heritability, varied widely. In Lewontin’s own words:

It is simply not true that, if a trait has a heritability of, say, 90%, it is

useless to change the environment because somehow ‘genes determine

the trait’…All that the heritability of a trait tells us is how much genetic

variation exists for that trait at a particular time in a particular population

(Lewontin [1985], p.72). 90

Clearly, the concept of heritability will not work as a modern surrogate for

essence. The heritability assumptions and claims made by Herrnstein, Murray, and

Levin cannot be supported in light of what we know about the meaning of heritability,

the response of genotypes to environments, and the impossibility of drawing

conclusions about differences between groups from the heritability of differences within

groups, and they fall far short of showing that the differences between races are permanent or even resistant to modification. Furthermore, Levin’s claims about the

‘practical’ possibility of various environments are normative, not descriptive, and will have to be supported with normative arguments. We shall revisit these arguments in

Chapter Five.

Through an analysis of variance on the measured IQ among various ‘races’, the

racialists argue that “heritability so constrains the limits of environmental effects” that

little can be done to alter the phenotypes of the groups in question (Herrnstein and

Murray [1994], p. 108). As we have seen, a heritability value is always relative to a

particular population in a particular environment. This point gets overlooked, however.

As illustrated above, the racialists often calculate a heritability, and then effectively

declare that that value is the once and future heritability of the trait in question. As

heritability is a function of environment, it is hard to see how claims such as “heritability

constrains environmental effects” can make any sense at all. In reality, what the

racialists are doing is trying to use the concept of heritability to identify essential

differences between races in an attempt to argue that racial differences are resistant if

not immune to our best efforts to attenuate them.

91

Conclusion

Herrnstein, Murray, and Levin advocate social policy views on the basis of what they argue are biological differences between human races.

Unfortunately for the racialists’ there are only three candidates for a biological conception of race. The essentialist and geographic models of race fail, and the cladistic account, while perhaps workable for some purposes, falls short of providing a definitive case for the biological reality of race. Furthermore, even if a case can be made for the existence of biological races, those races have no necessary connection to the folk conception of race at work in social policy debates.

Nevertheless, it is the long-discredited typological model that is lurking in the background of the racialists’ claims. Indeed, the social policy arguments of the racialists require this essentialist model if they are to support their claims of the impracticality, immorality, and futility of attempts to alleviate racial differences. In an ironic twist, however, they camouflage their essentialism by disguising it as the population biology concept of heritability.

The biological arguments they offer as support for their position do not withstand scrutiny. A careful analysis reveals that they have systematically misconstrued key biological concepts, and that once those misconceptions are cleared up, the biological support for their social views vanishes. They cannot support their claim for the biological accuracy of their racial classifications, the natural state model that drives their claims of differences, nor their use of heritability to support claims of about the futility of environmental modification. The biological underpinnings on which they rely for their

defense of the racial contract do not withstand scrutiny. 92

The putative social policy implications of these biological differences need to be re-visited as well, and in the next chapter, we shall see that they fail both as consequences of biology and by their own lights as normative arguments.

93

CHAPTER FIVE: WHAT FOLLOWS?

Introduction

Mills’ “racial contract” serves as a powerful explanatory tool when applied to the work of Levin, Murray, and Herrnstein. We have seen how their biological claims are based on a particular interpretation of data, and why there is good reason to believe that this interpretation does not tell the whole story. The arguments they deploy are those one would expect to find supporting a defense of the racial contract based on an extrinsic racism. This allows them to claim that they are only reporting the facts, and that those facts have normative ramifications, whether we wish them to or not. A more critical analysis of the data, however, suggested that they are actually working from an intrinsic racism that taints their analysis, and should cause us to reject their conclusions.

A careful examination of the social policy arguments they propose, combined with the preceding analysis of the underlying biology, will show both how these arguments attempt to buttress the racial contract, and how, in fact, they fail. Furthermore, it will be argued that these authors, in contrast to their claims of being driven only by science, are in fact engaged in a particular type of racist thinking. A sincere concern with the social problems they describe would suggest attempts to address the causes of the problems.

What we get from Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray suggests a different agenda, one in which they seek to document that which is necessary for continued support of the racial contract.

As noted earlier, K. Anthony Appiah makes a distinction between what he calls racialism, intrinsic racism, and extrinsic racism. Racialism, on this characterization, 94

contends that distinct human races exist, and each has characteristic tendencies. This

need not be a moral problem, according to Appiah, as the races do not necessarily

differ in morally relevant ways (Appiah [1990]).

What concerns Appiah, and should concern readers of Levin, et al, are the two types of racism he describes. Extrinsic racism is the type of racism that seems to be what Levin, Murray, and Herrnstein are expecting their readers to accept. This is the position that argues not for the inherent moral inferiority of one race with respect to another, but that significant differences between races in morally relevant qualities justify differential treatment of these races. The issue, says the extrinsic racist, is not membership in one race or another per se, but the fact that members of the group in

question display (or fail to display) certain traits and tendencies in which we are

justifiably interested. As we have seen, the accounts of racial differences developed by

Levin, et al make frequent reference to statistical arguments, and suggest that it is the

statistical basis for assuming blacks are less intelligent, for example, that drives their

policy arguments, not claims of inferiority or incapacity based simply on taxonomy. This

is the sort of argument one would expect from an extrinsic racist, as it suggests that,

were these differences not in evidence, the justification for differential treatment would

disappear.

Racism of the intrinsic variety, by contrast, is a position that contends mere

membership in a particular race to be a morally relevant quality. Such a position is

immune to counter-evidence or counter-examples, for it is not driven by a perceived

statistical correlation, but by a belief in the inherent superiority or inferiority of the race in

question. Such a position, made explicit, is obviously much harder to defend on 95

reasonable grounds. If the goal is to sustain the racial contract, it would seem to be a

far less palatable defense.

As described in Chapter One, Appiah seeks to show that intrinsic racism is an

ideology that determines, at least in part, what we are prepared to count as evidence.

The analysis of the biological arguments of Levin, Murray, and Herrnstein in Chapter

Four suggests that, while their arguments are cloaked in what seems an extrinsically

racist position based on statistical tendencies, intrinsic racism and its resistance to

counter-arguments lies at the heart of their argument.

In this chapter I shall argue that Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray fail to make

compelling arguments for their social policy prescriptions. In effect, their arguments are

an attempt to defend the racial contract in its modern form, on the basis of what amounts to the species of racism described by Appiah as “intrinsic”. We need do no more than reject racism of the intrinsic sort to reject the arguments Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray defend.

The Racial Contract

Much of modern western political theory draws on the social contract tradition of the 17th and 18th centuries. Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray fit this mold as well, making use of traditional liberalism, rights, and Kantian morality. This model, in essence, is one in which persons are said to contract with one another for limitations on their respective liberties in exchange for security. Mills recognizes the influence the contractarian theorists have had on modern western political structures, but suggests that a modified 96

racial contract model better accounts for the structure of our current moral and political system (Mills [1997]).

The racial contract, contends Mills, is not constituted by an agreement among persons to limit their liberty but rather an agreement between full persons to limit the liberties of some other set of less than full persons. The social contract, on this view, is not about preserving liberty, but about maximizing the liberty of its “signatories” at the expense of the sub-person group. Greater liberty for full persons is purchased at the expense of diminished liberty of the out group. As noted earlier, on Mills’ view, “The

terms of the racial contract mean that non-white subpersonhood is enshrined

simultaneously with white personhood” (Mills [1997], p. 55).

As a political philosophy putatively based on equality, the social contract requires a justification of why members of one group are not entitled to full membership in the system of rights and liberties created by the contract. Historically and philosophically, the explanation has been that the members of the groups in question lack the qualities necessary to fully participate in or contribute to the society created by the contract. As noted earlier, Mills argues that:

The racial contract establishes a fundamental partition in the social

ontology of the planet, which could be represented as the divide between

persons and subpersons, Untermenschen. ‘Personhood’ has received a

great deal of philosophical attention in recent years because of the revival

in Kantian and natural rights moral/political theories and the relative

decline of utilitarianism (Mills [1997], p. 55). 97

Mills goes as far back as Aristotle’s “natural slave” to document the long history of moral and political thought that makes use of a distinction between fully human and sub-human (Mills [1997], p. 53). The natural slave’s deficient reason prevented him from being able to fully participate in political society, and allowed those who were fully able to make use of him to enhance their liberty. The defenders of modern political and

moral systems based on a racial contract continue to ascribe intellectual deficits to

those in marginalized groups, and use that alleged deficiency to excuse or justify

differential treatment. The argument advanced by Levin, et al becomes one in which

blacks are, in virtue of their genetic predispositions, less than full contractors, and thus

less than full persons. The modern contractors, however, make use of “scientific”

arguments to support their claims of deficient intellect, and thus of sub-personhood.

We may be tempted to argue that any racism in our political system is a function

of imperfect application, or an unfortunate historical anomaly. On Mills’ view, racism is

essential to the system. It is white embarrassment over the privileges afforded them by

the contract that spawns the claims of racism’s contingent nature. I argue that the work

of Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray, et al, is best seen as an attempt to demonstrate the

‘true’ inferiority of non-whites, and to justify the terms of the racial contract in such a way

as to preempt that embarrassment. In fact, the arguments advanced by these theorists

are exactly the sort one would expect from signatories to the racial contract. They need

to establish the inherent sub-personhood of those groups they oppose treating as

equals.

Historically the paradigm indicator of subpersonhood has been deficient

rationality, the inability to exercise in full the characteristic classically 98

thought of as distinguishing us from animals. For the social contract, a

rough equality in men’s cognitive powers or at least a necessary ground

floor capability of detecting the immanent moral structuring of the universe

(natural law), or what is rationally required for social cooperation, is crucial

to the argument. For the racial contract, correspondingly, a basic

inequality is asserted in the capacity of different human groups to know

the world and to detect natural law. Subpersons are deemed cognitively

inferior, lacking in the essential rationality that would make them fully

human (Mills [1997], p. 59).

Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray are dedicated to demonstrating exactly this, and they attempt to apply modern concepts such as phylogeny, heritability, and IQ to argue that blacks are genetically predisposed to criminal behavior, short-sightedness, and low educational achievement. This set of traits, they argue, has important consequences for our understanding of equality, justice, and liberty with respect to race.

As Mills argues, according to the traditional (what he calls the idealized) conception of Kantianism, personhood is an either/or quality, and a being either has the necessary properties for full personhood or he does not. By contrast, the “Herrenvolk”

Kantianism of the racial contract makes room for some beings to have less personhood than others.

In Herrenvolk Kantianism, the transition of degrees of rationality is fuzzier,

thereby making possible the intermediate category of sub-persons, those

humans whose rationality is great enough to lift them into the [moral]

universe to begin with but not sufficient to elevate them to the status of full 99

personhood. Subpersons are not capable of becoming moral agents in

the full sense, directing and legislating for themselves, but require the

paternalistic supervision of the person population (Mills [1998], p. 153).

As we saw in Chapter Three, Levin’s contention is that Kantian morality (as he understands it) is the cornerstone of a healthy, well-functioning society. His belief that blacks are less “Kantian” than whites is based in large part on his understanding of their allegedly different genetic predispositions. As we have seen, he makes a wide array of claims suggesting that the genetic endowment of blacks is such that they are less intelligent, more prone to crime, possess less freedom of will, and are in general less good persons than whites. This difference, he argues, justifies different moral and even legal treatment for blacks than what would be appropriate for whites.

Chapter Two documented that Herrnstein and Murray, too, discuss these issues in terms of what they describe as a “Middle Class Values Index”. The middle class values index is their attempt to quantify what they consider those characteristics possessed by those who “form the spine of the typical American community” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 264). According to this metric, high IQ correlates with high scores on the MCVI, with those in the top quintile of IQ scoring 74%, and those in the bottom quintile scoring 16%.

The racial contract requires an argument for racial differences in morally relevant characteristics. Levin, Murray, and Herrnstein work very hard to provide just such an argument. As shown, they seek to ground these differences in genetics and argue that the genetic basis makes it difficult if not impossible to eradicate or alleviate these differences. The end result, they suggest is that some races simply lack the necessary 100

qualities for full personhood and thus full membership in the society. It is this difference

that allows the traditional social contract view to claim equality and freedom for some

while simultaneously denying it to others. As quoted earlier:

In the Lockean state of Nature…Those who show by their actions that

they lack or have “renounced the reason of natural law and are like “wild

Savage Beasts, with whom Men can have no Society nor Security” may

licitly be destroyed. But if in the racial polity nonwhites may be regarded

as inherently bestial and savage (quite independently of what they happen

to be doing at any particular moment) then by extension they can be

conceptualized as carrying the state of nature around with them,

incarnating wildness and wilderness in their person. In effect, they can be

regarded even in civil society as being potentially the at the center of a

mobile free-fire zone in which citizen to citizen/white-on-white moral and

juridical constraints do not obtain (Mills [1997], p. 87).

As we have seen, Mills makes the further contention that the racial contract

becomes “an agreement to misinterpret the world” (Mills [1997], p. 18).

White misunderstanding, misrepresentation, evasion, and self-deception

on matters related to race are among the most pervasive mental

phenomena of the past few hundred years, a cognitive and moral

economy psychically required for conquest, colonization, and enslavement

(Mills [1997],p.19).

The applications of this claim, too, are apparent in the work of Levin and his fellow travelers. Their claims are not based on overt racism, but on what they contend is 101

objective science. Chapter Four has already documented a variety of flaws in their

scientific arguments. This chapter will document the case for understanding their

positions both in terms of the racial contract and in terms of Appiah’s taxonomy of

racisms.

The “Race Gap” in IQ

As we explored in Chapters Two and Three, Levin, Herrnstein and Murray make much of a purported “race gap” in IQ scores, and argue that this gap has important normative ramifications. Mills’ work explains why such a move is necessary for proponents of the racial contract. The liberty of whites, on his view, is set against a backdrop of the non-liberty of nonwhites. For this to be palatable in a “non-racist” society, there must be a justification. The race gap serves just such a purpose for the theorists in question, providing them with a superficially extrinsic racist argument based on the “facts”, but supporting a position of differential liberty for whites and blacks. As

Levin argues, “Attention to any of a person’s predictively valid traits (whether specific or generic, voluntary or involuntary) treats him as an individual; and individual’s race is a valid, useful predictor of his intelligence, temperament and social behavior; therefore, the principle of individualism permits attention to race” (Levin [1997], p. 341).

Consider, for example, Michael Levin’s view of the implications of racial differences for the state’s police power:

Customs agents may subject people carrying violins to special scrutiny if

the suitability of violins for hiding contraband increases the chance that

anyone possessing one is a smuggler…Indeed, Officials charged with

preventing and detecting crime are obligated to use relevant information in 102

screening. Customs agents would be remiss in letting violin cases

through airports unchecked in the circumstances described. But race

bears information. Knowledge of race redistributes probabilities of past

and potential crimes. So, absent countervailing considerations, the state

seems entitled, indeed obligated, to use it in screening (Levin [1997], p.

301).

Here we see Levin embracing the argument that blacks are more likely to

commit crimes than whites (in his view as a result of their genetic endowments).

This greater likelihood of criminal behavior allows and even requires greater

police surveillance of blacks, and attendant limitations on their liberty.

To further make his point, Levin extends an example of two groups that

have car accidents at different rates and subsequent differences in their car

insurance rates to racial differences and contends “If the state is allowed to deter

Blue [one type of driver] heedlessness by imposing higher insurance premiums

with expedited payments, expedited appeals procedures and more severe

punishment might be warranted for convicted black offenders” (Levin [1997], p.

302).. Later, he claims that “Given the relation between race and crime, the

state’s primary protective function permits and probably demands that it attend to

race (Levin [1997], p. 303).

Relationship Between the “IQ Gap” and the Possibility of Raising Mean IQ Scores

To demonstrate the defense of the racial contract driving the argument, it may be helpful to look again at the assessment of IQ and social problems developed by Levin, 103

Herrnstein and Murray. Theses authors conflate two different issues in their social

policy arguments, equivocating between the difficulty and permissibility of raising IQ

scores (and modifying a variety of allegedly connected social behaviors), and the difficulty and permissibility of reducing the current gap between the races in IQ (and related social behaviors). It would seem that, were they working from the position they

contend, i.e. one of recognizing an unfortunate reality, and wishing it could be remedied,

they would be more careful to distinguish between these two theses.

Much of what drives their conclusions of futility is their understanding of the

concept of heritability. As we have seen in Chapter Four, however, it is not clear that

the heritability of a trait, no matter how high, has anything to do with how easy or difficult

it will be to modify the trait through environmental means. In addition, it is not clear that

both blacks and whites will respond equally to environmental modification, and thus it is

not clear that there will always be the much discussed “race gap” in IQ scores. Finally,

they seem to lose sight of the fact that, while they are arguing about the impossibility of

shrinking the race gap, many of their social policy arguments are based on the claim

that blacks currently have a mean IQ roughly one standard deviation below the white

mean, not on the existence of the gap in mean IQ itself. In comparison after

comparison, they argue that the white population (average IQ 100) behaves properly

and manifests a tolerable level of socialization (it is sufficiently Kantian), while the black

population remains dysfunctional. If the behaviors in question are indeed functions of

intelligence, as the arguments about the necessity of high IQ for Kantian behavior

indicate, then this is a good reason for a concerted effort to raise as much of the

population as possible to the magic 100 IQ threshold. By the lights of their own views, 104

such a policy would have an enormous payoff in social utility. In short, they must deal

with the fact that, while their argument is based on the permanence of a one standard deviation difference between black and white IQ scores, they show neither that such a

gap is permanent, nor that the mere existence of a difference in racial IQ means is

sufficient to justify their social policies.

Using Levin’s argument as a case study will demonstrate this point more clearly.

I shall grant Levin his assumption that there is such a thing as intelligence, and, despite

the many claims to the contrary, that IQ tests do measure it. As we have seen, he

contends that there is a gap of roughly one standard deviation between the mean IQ of whites and the mean IQ of blacks, that across a variety of IQ tests the white mean IQ exceeds the black by roughly one SD, and that scaling the white mean at 100 puts the black mean at 85.

The problem, however, is that even if Levin is correct about the high heritability of intelligence, this does not support the hereditarian position as he defines it. His hereditarian position requires that black and white norms of reaction for IQ co-vary, and thus that any attempt to improve the environment will yield an IQ gap, as Lewontin

points out above, however, we have no way of knowing this short of testing each

environment.

The hereditarian is conflating means and ends. Even if it is the case that, for any

given environment, black children do not develop the same IQ as white children, this

does not mean that it is impossible to raise the mean IQ of black children to current

mean white levels. As we saw earlier, Levin will admit that IQ scores have been rising

for all groups (Levin [1997], pp.128-129). If the goal is diminution of the “race gap” 105

perhaps that goal can best be realized by intensive environmental enrichment for those

students that need it most. There is little reason to view the uniformity of environments

as an intrinsic good and an end in and of itself, rather it is only one possible means to

the end of higher IQ scores for black children. If it will not achieve that goal, then

another must be found.

Early in the normative section of the book, Levin argues that, while many authors

claim that a genetic basis for racial differences would not have any normative

significance, such a difference does indeed matter morally (Levin [1997], p. 229). Levin

contends that claims about the irrelevance of genetic factors to normative concerns is

based on the environmentalist’s claim that the same gene can express itself differently

in different environments, and that different genotypes could express themselves in the

same way in some environment. He grants the truth of these claims in principle, and

adds “the high heritability of IQ relative to known environments does not rule out

undiscovered environments in which black and white genotypes express themselves as

equal phenotypic IQ (Levin [1997], pp. 229-30). Going on to point out that the possibility

of such an environment is no indication that it exists or that it is realizable, Levin

contends that the deeper flaw is in the moral reasoning of those espousing the virtues of

various environmental enrichment schemes. Such schemes, writes Levin, ignore the

crucial feature of the historical origin of such differences. It is his claim that these differences are not the fault of whites that allows him to evade the compensation justification for this kind of social spending. Despite the fact that there may indeed be environments in which the racial IQ gap would vanish, the fact remains that the gap currently exists. If its existence is due to genetic factors, rather than to mistreatment of 106

blacks by whites, then the gap is not a harm imposed by whites on blacks, and whites

are under no obligation to provide the enriched environments that might eliminate the IQ

gap (Levin [1997], p. 231).

Assuming that the gap could be reduced even if there is no single, common

environment that will do so leaves us with the possibility that enriched environments for

the disadvantaged will yield a diminished (or absent) racial IQ gap. This option,

enriching only the environments of those who need it most, poses moral problems for

Levin (Levin [1997], p. 275).

Levin claims that even if it is the case that there is some environment that will

make some people better off, common sense shows that the mere possibility is not

sufficient to require its creation. He goes on to survey and dismiss a wide variety of

moral arguments which might suggest that there is an obligation to create such an

environment. It is his argument against a utilitarian justification for diminishing the gap

that concerns us here. Levin contends that utilitarian arguments attempt to make use of

a “threshold effect”; in other words, they assume that the mean environment of blacks is

so poor that the marginal utility of these dollars is higher than others, so this is where

they should be spent. Levin denies that this is the case, once again citing the roughly

equivalent heritability of IQ among blacks and among whites, and arguing that this

indicates “black children are apparently not exposed to deprivation severe enough to

affect mental development” (Levin [1997], 282).17

Since there is no threshold effect of this kind among black children, we are left with the conclusion that any sort of environmental manipulation would result in an increase of white and Asian IQ scores as well. In light of this problem, any attempt to

17 As noted earlier, such a position strains credulity and suggests an obliviousness to the facts. 107 diminish the race gap would require restricting environmental enrichment to black children only. In other words, to eliminate or reduce the gap in IQ scores, we would probably have to place white and Asian children into impoverished environments, and black children into enriched ones. As Levin points out, “the utilitarian case for raising everyone’s IQ must be distinguished from a utilitarian case for raising the IQ of blacks only, or raising the IQ’s of blacks while lowering everyone else’s (Levin [1997], pp 282-

283).

Levin seems to be conflating two ends here. While the elimination of the gap would certainly be a positive thing, it is not the only means to solving our society’s social problems. It is unlikely that anyone would complain about some IQ scores becoming too high relative to the rest of the population, rather they are troubled by our refusal to bring more low IQ scores up to socially viable levels.

In effect, since Levin cannot rule out the possibility of IQ gains among black children, he moves to arguing that American society at large (the white majority) should not be compelled to pay for attempts to achieve such gains. Since the current low IQs are due not to white conduct but to genetic differences, he argues, whites have no duty to attempt to remedy them. What Levin’s causal responsibility argument fails to adequately handle, however, is the solid utilitarian argument having nothing to do with distributive justice that would support funding for IQ raising measures. I shall return to his contention (offered in defense of racial profiling on the part of the state) that “Given the relation between race and crime, the state’s primary protective function permits and probably demands that it attend to race” (Levin [1997], p. 303). I agree that the state should attend to race, although in ways very different from those he advocates. 108

Despite his denial of a threshold effect among black children in terms of dollars

per IQ point, Levin’s own arguments suggest that there is an IQ threshold of a different

type, namely a level at which socially problematic behaviors decline precipitously. It is

this threshold we ought seek to cross, and this threshold that one would expect to be

pursued by a theorist sincerely concerned with the relevant social phenomena as

problems, rather than as vindication of a position.

Non-Compensation Based Arguments for Social Policy

As Levin has pointed out, IQ correlates with a wide variety of measures, including occupational attainment, job training success, SES, welfare persistence, academic achievement, and crime (Levin [1997], pp. 54-56). Moral reasoning, too, seems to be affected: high intelligence is necessary for moral maturity, and “IQ tests correlate with

moral maturity”. Another correlate of low IQ is increased criminal behavior. Citing

Herrnstein and Murray, Levin claims that the average IQ of prisoners is below 92, and

that the “average IQ of rapists and murderers is lower than that of ‘white collar’

criminals- embezzlers and forgers- in the prison population” (Levin [1997], p. 55).

Furthermore, aggression levels correlate with low IQ, as does the likelihood of being

interviewed in a correctional facility (Levin [1997], p. 55).

I shall grant that the above statistics, do suggest that there is an important link

between low IQ and socially undesirable behavior. What these data do not support,

however, is the further claim that mean IQ scores are genetically fixed in a population,

and thus that blacks are now and forever genetically predisposed to the sorts of socially

problematic behaviors that he describes. 109

If Levin and his fellow hereditarians are correct, and there is a correlation

between IQ and socially desirable or undesirable behavior, then much of Levin’s own

argument looks to be misdirected. As we have seen, Levin is attempting to convince us

that the problems of black Americans are due not to white actions or omissions, but to a

genetically induced “race gap” in IQ scores which prevents blacks from achieving the

same kind of success as white Americans, and makes them more prone to the sort of

behaviors which society views as problematic. He allows that it might be possible to raise IQ scores, but rejects attempts to do so for two basic reasons: First, morality demands that such efforts be made available to all, and thus white Americans would enjoy improvements in IQ as well, and the gap would persist. Also, such attempts cost money, and since the genetic basis of these behavioral differences was not caused by white Americans, white Americans have no obligation to provide that money.

The first reason is a red herring: By the terms of their own arguments, it is not the mere existence of an IQ gap that creates the problems, but the fact that far too many members of one population lack the IQ to exhibit socially desirable behavior. The

(alleged) fact that a consistent gap between white and black mean IQ scores will persist in any range of environments does not speak to the claim that IQ scores cannot or should not be raised.

The second reason fails as well. Even if it is not the case that the white majority is guilty of any wrongdoing with regard to blacks, one need not accept Levin’s unargued claim that the historical conception of distributive justice is the only relevant factor. An equally plausible rationale for social spending is the utilitarian one that it provides for the betterment or protection of society and its members. Spending on national defense, 110

environmental protection, and food and drug safety clearly falls into this category, and it

is unclear why the sort of social programs Levin opposes cannot as well. In light of

what Levin himself has argued about the relationship between low IQ and socially

undesirable behaviors, an intensive effort to increase IQ and thus to alleviate some of

our more pressing social problems is justifiable for the same reason we accept

spending on public safety, namely that it increases the overall well-being of our society.

Throughout the empirical portion of the argument, the claim is not that social problems are caused by having an IQ some number of points below the white mean, it is that they are caused by having an IQ that is too low for proper social functioning.

Time and again the comparison is to standards of Kantian behavior allegedly practiced by the white majority. If this behavior is, in fact, a function of IQ, then it seems as though having an IQ of 100 (the white mean) generally is a sufficient condition for behaving in a socially responsible, Kantian, manner. In other words, if the goal is a greater level of socially desirable behavior, the proper method to realize that goal is to ensure that as much of the population as possible finds itself in an environment conducive to developing an IQ of at least 100. The problem is not the disparity in IQ scores, but how low the low scores currently are. Herrnstein and Murray seem to acknowledge this when they point out that “controlling for IQ reduces the discrepancy between minority and white children living in poverty by more than 80 percent”

(Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 335), and that “Controlling for IQ cuts the black-white disparity in low birth-weight babies by half” (Herrnstein and Murray [1994], p. 334).

In terms of motivation, one need not look to past wrongs as the only justification for social spending. Given the costs and inconveniences Levin claims are imposed on 111 society by the behavior of low IQ individuals, utilitarian considerations argue for allocating resources to target the root of the problem. In light of the gains in prosperity, self-sufficiency, and law-abidingness that come with increases in IQ, the utilitarian position is not, as Levin claims, a simple case of IQ points per dollar spent, but a case of a tremendous social payoff for a relatively small increase in IQ.

In simple terms, Levin’s assessment of the situation is as follows: Blacks, being genetically predisposed to IQ scores one standard deviation below the white mean, are thus predisposed to the sorts of socially maladaptive behaviors which correlate with those IQ scores. Because IQ is highly heritable, efforts to diminish the gap between black and white scores consist in throwing good money after bad. Since recognition of genetic differences absolves whites of any obligation to diminish the gap, there is little reason to continue with spending programs dedicated to the futile attempt to raise black

IQ scores. Furthermore, such differences provide an intellectual underpinning for the racial contract, and thus an incentive to document, but not to solve, the problems in question.

Even if we ignore the controversial claims about the existence of distinct races, the claims about the existence and testability of a general factor of intelligence, and the high heritability of that factor in racial groups, his argument faces at least three serious difficulties. Heritability does not mean what Levin takes it to mean, and it is not the case that a heritability value, no matter how high, indicates anything about the ease of modifying IQ scores through environmental means. Furthermore, it is not clear that, whatever the heritability measure, whites and black IQ scores will respond similarly to environmental modification and maintain the 1 SD “race gap” in IQ scores. Even if the 112 two problems above are solved, Levin still must deal with the fact that, while much of his moral argument is based on the permanence of the gap between white and black scores, many of the problems he cites seem to be correlated with merely having a low

IQ, not with the existence of a gap between population mean IQ scores.

Running throughout Levin’s normative claims is a simple comparison. The white population, with its mean IQ of 100, manifests a tolerable level of social cohesion and economic self-sufficiency, while the black population falls short of these norms. Levin focuses on the existence of a consistent gulf between white and black IQ scores. Any attempt to raise the black scores will also raise the white scores, and the gap will persist. If he is correct about the relationship between IQ and social behavior, however, the problem is not that there is and perhaps will remain some difference between the mean IQ scores of the groups in question, but that not enough members of society have been elevated to the magic 100 IQ threshold.

One might expect a sincere proponent of the liberal principles Levin defends to pursue just such an argument. In the face of his own claims of social dysfunction and difficulty, and his own arguments that appropriate social behavior seems to require an

IQ near 100, he ought to seek to bring as many individuals as possible to this level of minimal tolerable social behavior. His response, however, is to argue that such efforts must be available to all, and thus that they would be likely to raise white IQs higher as well. The lack of evidence for the undesirability of this claim suggests that something else is at work here.

Herrnstein and Murray, too, are susceptible to this argument. Their own “Middle

Class Values Index” attempts to track what they believe is socially valuable behavior, 113

and it is strongly correlated with IQ. However, their response is not to propose or

defend efforts to raise IQ to socially viable minimums, but to propose a society that

provides “a place for everyone”. Signatories to the racial contract would expect nothing

else.

Conclusion

Mills’ racial contract model contends that from their inception in the work of Locke and Kant to the present day, social contract theories ostensibly based on the equality of all are in fact based on the equality of some at the expense of the inequality of others.

A modern adaptation of Aristotle’s “natural slave” concept, in which entire populations are said to be deficient in reason, is used to argue that members of those populations are thus incapable of full participation in society. Since they lack the capacities to join society as full moral persons, it is argued, they are justifiably treated as subpersons, with appropriately limited liberty and opportunity. Modern racial contractors may be rather squeamish about defending openly racist ideas, says Mills, and so may require a more palatable justification. This desire for a principled defense of the racial contract is the reason for both the prevalence and the enduring popularity of racial taxonomies and racial “science”.

It is the search for this more palatable justification of the racial contract that is driving the arguments of Herrnstein, Murray, and Levin. Rather than espouse the sort of intrinsic racism that simply declares one race to be superior to another by virtue of racial membership simpliciter, these authors argue from a position consistent with what

Appiah calls “extrinsic racism”. That is, they contend that they are not racists per se, 114

but that they value a particular constellation of behavioral traits, and as a matter of fact,

those traits tend to be distributed along racial lines.

As we have seen, the racialist arguments crafted by Herrnstein, Murray, and

Levin require the truth of three broad claims. They require the real existence of race as

a biologically meaningful classificatory scheme that can make predictions about

behavioral and moral phenotypes. Chapter Four demonstrated that this is not the case,

and that if races exist at all, they do not exist according to the taxonomy used by these

racialists. However, even if races are real in the sense the racialists claim, this is not

sufficient. Their argument also requires the concept of “heritability” to reflect something

like “degree of immutability” and “degree of innateness”. Chapter Four also

documented serious difficulties with interpreting heritability in this way. These racialist

theorists also require that current differences in IQ and behavioral traits between “races”

support a particular set of social policy prescriptions, specifically, those central to the

racial contract. Chapter Five suggested a variety of reasons why this is not the case,

and suggested one avenue for ameliorating the differences in question. The argument

developed by these racialists is untenable at every stage of its development

These authors describe themselves not as racists, but as scientifically minded

theorists recognizing (unpleasant) truths about the reality of race and race differences in

morality and behavior. According to Appiah’s taxonomy of racism, then, they would seem to be extrinsic racists arguing for solutions that make the best of the situation.

However, if they are in fact extrinsic racists they should be susceptible to arguments that show they are mistaken about relationship of the relevant traits to racial membership. What we find in the work of Herrnstein, Murray, and Levin, however, 115

suggests that they have crafted a position immune to such arguments, and are thus

better described as racists of the intrinsic sort. Again, Mills predicts that modern

signatories to the racial contract will suffer from a sort of epistemic blindness, and be

unable to grasp that their arguments are not based in fact, but are rationalizations of the status quo and their own racial privilege.

Mills contends that the strength of his model is that it “voluntarizes race in the same way that the social contract voluntarizes the creation of society and the state”

(Mills [1997], p. 126). The racial contract can thus separate “whiteness” as a description of a phenotype from “Whiteness” as a description of persons privileged by the racial contract. On Mills’ model, “Whiteness is not really a color at all, but a set of power relations” (Mills [1997], p.127). The work of Levin, Herrnstein, and Murray represents a modern attempt to legitimize Whiteness by grounding it in an intrinsically racist biology.

Their biological arguments fail, as do their social policy arguments. If we are to repudiate the racial contract, we must see them for what they are and their argument for what it is.

116

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