DOCSLIB.ORG

(Modelled) Vermont Railway 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS V2.0

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
(Modelled) Vermont Railway 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS V2.0 Operations on the (modelled) Vermont Railway The Vermont Railway Operation Details 14 March 2018 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS v2.0 Page 2 of 16 Operations on the (modelled) Vermont Railway Vermont Rail System I am modelling the Vermont Rail System in the 2003-2010 timeframe. It is a modern, independent Class 3 Railroad, mainly within the state of Vermont – The Green Mountain State. The VRS is a grouping of 5 railways … 1. Vermont Railway (VTR), 2. Green Mountain Railroad (GMRC), 3. Clarendon and Pittsford Railroad (CLP), 4. Washington County Railroad (WACR), and 5. New York and Ogdensburg Railroad (NYOG). All railroads (except the NYOG which is in western New York State) are fully integrated and operate as one railroad. There are locomotives and cars lettered for the five railways. Route Map See map. Interchange points The VRS has several interchange points with other railroads. They are: 1. Burlington with the NECR, 2. Bellows Falls with the NECR, 3. Whitehall with the D&H, 4. Hoosick Junction with PAN AM, and 5. Newport with the Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway1 (MM&A). The interchange being modelled is the NECR interchange at Bellows Falls. 1Central Maine and Québec Railway (reporting mark CMQ) was formed in February 2014 after the Montreal, Maine and Atlantic Railway (reporting mark MMA) went into bankruptcy following a massive rail incident in Lac-Mégantic, Quebec in Feb 2013. 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS v2.0 Page 3 of 16 Operations on the (modelled) Vermont Railway Dispatchers and Operations The VRS dispatcher is located at Rutland, while the NECR’s dispatcher is at St Albans. On the layout one dispatcher will carry out both functions (and is located in the wine cellar!!!). As New England railroads, the VRS and NECR both use the NORAC operating procedures. These rules are established by the Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee (NORAC) and are similar to the General Code of Operation Rules (GCOR). From a model perspective, the rules used are a simplification of both sets of prototype rules. The Area Modelled Essentially, the area modelled is the Green Mountain Railroad, and in particular Bellows Falls. As Bellows Falls is the interchange with the NECR, the part of the line from Bellows falls to White River Junction is also modelled. Space has caused some compromises. Space only allowed for Bellows Falls Patch Track and not the Riverside yard. Therefore the Yard duties are undertaken in Bellows Falls. In the prototype, most of freight traffic from lineside industries is generated by the OMYA plant in Florence, near Rutland. To model that traffic, the OMYA plant has been moved to White River Junction. This also creates more operation on the layout as most of that traffic must be exchanged at Bellows Falls. As paper is a major industry in Vermont and the North East, a paper mill was placed on a mythical GMRS branch to Lake Rescue where a modelled paper mill is located. Lastly, Bellows Falls (and Walpole) has more industries than the prototype, again to generate more traffic. 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS v2.0 Page 4 of 16 Operations on the (modelled) Vermont Railway An overview schematic of the area being modelled is shown here. All traffic off the modelled area passes through one of the following interchange points: 1. Rutland - all points west and south- west (Rutland infers the interchanges at Whitehall and Hoosick Junction), 2. Brattleboro – New York area, New Haven and all points east (Boston, etc), 3. St Albans – Canada and all points north, and 4. Newport - Canada and all points north and east. Dark Territory Both railroads operate under the Dark Territory rules as they have very limited signalling on the railroads. On the modelled portion, the only railroad signals control the crossing at Bellows Falls. These signals are owned and operated by the NECR. Track Warrant Control (TWC) Both railroads operate under a Track Warrant Control process. Track Warrant Control (TWC) is a verbal authorisation system defined by both the Northeast Operating Rules Advisory Committee (NORAC) and General Code of Operation Rules (GCOR), used to authorise trains to occupy the main line (Main Tracks). TWC is usually used as a stand-alone dispatching and safety system for dark territory (no signals). Each crew must hold a valid Track Warrant before the train can commence its journey. The Track Warrant allows the train to occupy a section of the main line, between defined specific, named locations. 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS v2.0 Page 5 of 16 Operations on the (modelled) Vermont Railway An Overview of the Model Railroad The Dispatcher’s Panel In dark territory, the only tracks that the dispatcher controls are the main lines, and the passing loops. It is the Dispatchers job, to know where all trains are on the system. The dispatcher tracks the trains by adding a token to the map for each train. In the diagram, trains BFRU001, BEBF001, 113S and 100N are shown. BFRU001 and BEBF001 are VRS trains, while 113S and 100N are NECR trains. 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS v2.0 Page 6 of 16 Operations on the (modelled) Vermont Railway Train Numbers on the VRS Format: XXYYnnn Where: XX Starting location of the train YY Destination of the train nnn Number of train (starts from 001 each day) Abbreviations of the modelled VRS Stations Abbreviation Destination BA Barre BE Bennington BF Bellows Falls CH Chester HJ Hoosick Junction MJ Montpelier Junction NP Newport RU Rutland SJ St. Johnsbury WH Whitehall WR White River Junction Example: BFCH002 – The second train of the day from Bellows Falls to Chester. Train Numbers on the NECR Format: nnnx Where: nnn 3 digit number. Even numbers are northbound, odd numbers are southbound X N or S – North or South Example: 100N – Train 100 is Northbound. 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS v2.0 Page 7 of 16 Operations on the (modelled) Vermont Railway Working on the Railroad Just like the prototype, in order to move equipment smoothly and safely across the railroad, there are many specialised jobs required during an operating session. They are: Trainmaster / Dispatcher The Trainmaster is the "boss" of the operating session. The Trainmaster makes the operating sessions possible by planning and coordinating the flow of trains within a session. The Dispatcher is the person responsible for making sure that trains move properly across the railroad without incident. The Dispatcher has a separate "office" away from the layout area. In the Dispatcher's Office there is a large diagram of the layout on which magnets can be used to track trains on the layout. The dispatcher cannot see you, when in doubt please recall the following old railroad adage: YOU may know where you are and what YOU are doing; GOD may know where you are and what YOU are doing; BUT, if the DISPATCHER doesn't know where YOU are and what YOU are doing, THEN I hope YOU and GOD are on very good terms! Yardmaster The Yardmaster controls all operations in the Bellows Falls / Walpole area. This includes the interchange tracks. The Yardmaster will be in contact with the Dispatcher to ensure all through trains pass through the area unhindered. Hostler The Hostler will report to the Yardmaster and will assist in building trains in the Bellows Falls precinct. Train Crew (Engineer and Conductor) The Train Crews may be one or two individuals. The train will make stops along its route, adding and/or removing cars from the train. The Conductor is the senior member of the crew and will communicate to the Dispatcher for permission to use the mainline. 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS v2.0 Page 8 of 16 Operations on the (modelled) Vermont Railway General Procedures 1. Report to Trainmaster/Dispatcher for your train assignment. 2. Check the train consist against the paperwork before departing. 3. Get authority from the Dispatcher to start the assigned journey. 4. Your Track Warrant must be completed and approved before departure. 5. Perform all pick-ups and set-outs along the journey. 6. If a car or engine malfunctions or is damaged, fill out a bad order form. 7. Contact the Dispatcher when the Track Warrant is complete. 8. Request a new Track Warrant for the next part of the trip. The Track Warrant The Track Warrant is read and validated to the train crew by radio. The process is … 1. The dispatcher reads the Track Warrant information and instructions to a crew member on the train. The crew member writes the information and instructions onto a Track Warrant Form. 2. The crew member then repeats the information to the dispatcher. 3. The dispatcher checks the repeated information and, if correct, says "OK" and gives the time and his initials. 4. The train crew member then enters the "OK" time and initials on the Track Warrant form and repeats that to the dispatcher. The Track Warrant is not in effect until the "OK" time is recorded on the track warrant. Some Definitions Named Point A named point is any point on the railroad that can be exactly identified. For example a Station, a switch, or a mileage post First Named Point This is the current location of the train and is the starting point. If the First Named Point is a Station with a Siding, the Track Warrant extends from, and includes, the last switch. The Track Warrant thus enables trains to leave the station. Last Named Point This is the ending point of the permission. 14 March 2018 Operations on the VRS v2.0 Page 9 of 16 Operations on the (modelled) Vermont Railway General Code of Operating Rules (GCOR) Track Warrant The General Code of Operating Rules (GCOR) is a set of operating rules for railroads in the United States.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Collision Between Two BNSF Railway Company Freight Trains Near Gunter, Texas May 19, 2004
    National Transportation Safety Board Washington, D.C. 20594 PRSRT STD OFFICIAL BUSINESS Postage & Fees Paid Penalty for Private Use, $300 NTSB Permit No. G-200 Collision Between Two BNSF Railway Company Freight Trains Near Gunter, Texas May 19, 2004 Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-06/02 PB2006-916302 Notation 7793A National National Transportation Transportation Safety Board Safety Board Washington, D.C. Washington, D.C. THE CORRECTIONS BELOW ARE INCLUDED IN THIS VERSION OF THE PUBLISHED REPORT RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT NTSB/RAR-06/02 (PB2006-916302) COLLISION BETWEEN TWO BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY FREIGHT TRAINS NEAR GUNTER, TEXAS MAY 19, 2004 • Page 26, table 2 first row has been updated to include column head text (Fort Worth Conductor Extra Board*). The text did not print in the original version. (10 OCT 2006) Railroad Accident Report Collision Between Two BNSF Railway Company Freight Trains Near Gunter, Texas May 19, 2004 NTSB/RAR-06/02 PB2006-916302 National Transportation Safety Board Notation 7793A 490 L’Enfant Plaza, S.W. Adopted June 13, 2006 Washington, D.C. 20594 National Transportation Safety Board. 2006. Collision Between Two BNSF Railway Company Freight Trains Near Gunter, Texas, May 19, 2004. Railroad Accident Report NTSB/RAR-06/02. Washington, DC. Abstract: About 5:46 p.m., central daylight time, on May 19, 2004, two BNSF Railway Company freight trains collided head on near Gunter, Texas. The southbound train, BNSF 6789 South, was traveling about 37 mph, and the northbound train, BNSF 6351 North, was traveling about 40 mph when the collision occurred. The trains were being operated under track warrant control rules on non-signaled single track.
    [Show full text]
  • Train Control Working Group Final Report
    Train Control Working Group Final Report Presented to: The Advisory Council on Railway Safety September 2016 1 Table of Contents Train Control Working Group Final Report............................................................................................... 1 Executive summary .......................................................................................................................... 1 Railway safety technologies ........................................................................................................... 1 Review of Transportation Safety Board rail occurrence data ............................................................... 2 Implementation in the United States ............................................................................................... 2 Canadian ETC initiatives................................................................................................................. 3 Implementation challenges ............................................................................................................ 3 Implementation costs ................................................................................................................... 4 Conclusions ................................................................................................................................. 4 Recommendations........................................................................................................................ 4 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • NTSB Hearing Jeff Young Asst
    NTSB Hearing Jeff Young Asst. Vice President – Transportation Systems March 4, 2009 1 Topics to Address • Current Train Control Systems • Concerns with Existing Systems • How does PTC Address Concerns with Existing Systems • UP PTC Pilot Locations • PTC Challenges • PTC Implementation Plan • PTC Project Timeline 2 Dark Territory Track Warrant Control Track Warrant Authority Limits AMTK • Main Track Not Signaled • Movement Authority Conveyed By Track Warrant or Direct Traffic Control permit •2. [X] Proceed From (Station or Location) To (Station or Location) On Main Track Spokane Subdivision •8. [X] Hold Main Track At Last Named Point • Train separation provided by train dispatcher and train crew 3 Automatic Block System (ABS) Track Warrant Control Track Warrant Authority Limits AMTK • Main Track Signaled for Movement in Both Directions • Movement Authority Conveyed By Track Warrant or Direct Traffic Control permit •2. [X] Proceed From ( Station or Location) To ( Station or Location ) On Main Track Spokane Subdivision •8. [X] Hold Main Track At Last Named Point • Train separation provided by train dispatcher, train crew and signal system 4 Automatic Block Signal (ABS) Current Of Traffic Field Signal Indication • Two Main tracks with an assigned direction of movement • Movement authority is conveyed by signal system • The tracks are only signaled for movement in the assigned direction • Train separation provided by train crew and signal system 5 Centralized Traffic Control (CTC) Field Signal Indication • One or More Main Tracks Signaled
    [Show full text]
  • Oregon's Bridges Deficient Bridges Is an Indicator of the Aging Nature of Our State’S Bridge Inventory
    REPORT CARD FOR OREGON’S 2019 INFRASTRUCTURE Oregon Section of the American Society of Civil Engineers INFRASTRUCTUREREPORTCARD.ORG/OREGON INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS GRID WATERWAYS HIGHWAYS BRIDGES AVIATION DAMS DRINKING WATER WASTEWATER TRANSIT RAIL PORTS STREETS NETWORK AQUEDUCTS AIRPORTS ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS HIGHWAYS BRIDGES AVIATION DAMS DRINKING WATER WASTEWATER TRANSIT RAIL PORTS STREETS AQUADUCTS AIRPORTS ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS HIGHWAYS BRIDGES AVIATION DAMS DRINKING WATER WASTEWATER TRANSIT RAIL PORTS STREETS AQUADUCTS AIRPORTS ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS HIGHWAYS BRIDGES AVIATION DAMS DRINKING WATER WASTEWATER TRANSIT RAIL PORTS STREETS AQUEDUCTS AIRPORTS ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS HIGHWAYS BRIDGES AVIATION DAMS DRINKING WATER WASTEWATER TRANSIT RAIL PORTS STREETS AQUEDUCTS AIRPORTS ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS HIGHWAYS BRIDGES AVIATION DAMS DRINKING WATER WASTEWATER TRANSIT RAIL PORTS STREETS AQUEDUCTS AIRPORTS ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS HIGHWAYS BRIDGES AVIATION DAMS DRINKING WATER WASTEWATER TRANSIT RAIL PORTS STREETS AQUADUCTS AIRPORTS ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS HIGHWAYS BRIDGES AVIATION DAMS DRINKING WATER WASTEWATER TRANSIT RAIL PORTS STREETS AQUADUCTS AIRPORTS ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY RESILIENT INFRASTRUCTURE ROADS HIGHWAYS BRIDGES AVIATION DAMS DRINKING WATER WASTEWATER TRANSIT RAIL PORTS STREETS AQUADUCTS AIRPORTS ENERGY SUSTAINABILITY RESILIENT
    [Show full text]
  • CM Vol III Ch3 2018.Pdf
    Federal Railroad Administration Track and Rail and Infrastructure Integrity Compliance Manual Volume III Railroad Workplace Safety Chapter 3 Roadway Worker Protection March 2018 Track and Rail and Infrastructure Integrity Compliance Manual Volume III, Chapter 3 – March 2018 Table of Contents Contents CHAPTER 3 Roadway Worker Protection ................................................................................. 4 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 4 Summary ............................................................................................................................ 4 Principles ............................................................................................................................ 4 Railroad On-track Safety Programs ..................................................................................... 4 Documentation of On-Track Safety Programs ...................................................................... 5 § 214.301 Purpose and scope. ......................................................................................... 6 § 214.303 Railroad on-track safety programs, generally. ................................................... 6 § 214.307 On-track safety programs. ....................................................................... 7 § 214.309 On-track safety manual. ................................................................................... 8 § 214.311 Responsibility of employers.
    [Show full text]
  • Comments of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
    October 14, 2016 (Via online at www.regulations.gov) Docket Operations Facility U. S. Department of Transportation 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE, W12–140 Washington, DC 20590 Re: FRA-2016-0075 Comments of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET) Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division (BMWED) Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS) Sheet Metal, Air, Rail and Transportation (SMART) The Labor Organizations identified above are the recognized collective bargaining representatives of a significant majority of railroad industry workers engaged in train operations, and track & signal maintenance, inspection, and repair. The Labor Organizations and their collective membership are vested in rail safety, including the preservation and maintenance of railroad signal systems. These comments are in response to the CSX Transportation (CSX) petition to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) seeking approval for the discontinuance of the signal system, control point (CP) Rule-511, and traffic control (TC) Rule-510 on the Plymouth Subdivision, Chicago Division, Plymouth, MI. - Docket Number FRA-2016-0075. CSX proposes to discontinue CP-511 and TC-510 Rules currently in effect on portions of track between CP Beck Road, Milepost (MP) CH27.0, and CP Seymour, MP CH148.17, and operate under track warrant control D 505 Rules. Signals will be removed and all power-operated switches will be converted to hand operation. The CP-511 Rule will remain in effect 1 at CP Ann Pere, MP CH52.8. CP-511 and TC-510 Rules will remain in effect between CP EE Throwbridge, MP CH83.12, and CP Ensel, MP CH89.95, which is intended to ensure that there is no operational impact to the Jackson & Lansing Railroad.
    [Show full text]
  • Migration from Conventional Signaling to Next-Generation Train Control
    122 TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH RECORD 1314 Migration from Conventional Signaling to Next-Generation Train Control JEFF TWOMBLY Migration from present-day signaling system to next-generation tern, regardless of its resemblance (or lack thereof) to the Lrnin control, such a Advanced Train Control Systems (AT S) , AAR/RAC specifications. It is worth noting that, so far as is will need to be an evolutionary process. interoperability and com­ known, no existing, functioning system fully implements the patibility with existing signal systems will be essential if ATCS, AAR/RAC specifications. integrated with management information systems (MIS), are to provide suitable return on investment. Some of the benefits of For clarity's sake, in this paper "ATCS'"refers only lo the:: ATCS can be realized now, some later, and probably the "train system defined by the AAR/RAC specifications. The term control" feature will be the last implemented. certainly where "next-generation train control" refers to other types of ad­ signaling is now in service. Some of the benefits sought are already vanced train control systems. (Others define these systems ~eing realized through developments applied co existing, tradi­ using lowercase "ates.") We will further define "next­ tional teclmology. generation train control" to refer only to systems that provide actual control of train movement, as opposed to management The introduction of computer-based equipment and high-speed information systems (MIS). communication links brought to the railroad industry prom­ Management information is one of the two principal func­ ises of timely transfer of information, which could benefit tions of advanced train control systems: issuing work orders, operations.
    [Show full text]
  • Development of Enhanced Overlay Positive Train Control (EO-PTC) DTFR53-1 I-D-00008 6
    0 U.S. Department of Development of Enhanced Overlay Positive Transportation Train Control (EO-PTC) Federal Railroad Administration Office of Research, Development and Technology Washington, DC 20590 .... Overlay PTC MAS= 60 MPH - ' .... ' ...... -----30 MPH HO EO-PTC MAS= 60 MPH DOT/FRA/ORD-19/44 Final Report December 2019 NOTICE This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof. Any opinions, findings and conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this ~aterial do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government, nor does mention oftrade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the United States Government. The United States Government assumes no liability for the content or use of the material contained in this document. NOTICE The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers' names appear herein solely because they are considered essential to the objective of this report. REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 0 MB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden b-lhis oollectioo of i'i.formation is estimated to a-.-erage 1 hour per response, inct.idi1 the 6me for l'e\ne'f~inst.ruction~ searching existing da~ sooroes, ga'Mrlng and ma:n1ann9 me aata neeciea, a"k(l co~1et1ng ana ~N9 tne oolleetlon Of 1nronna:ion. sen comments ~ arong is r,;,aen estimate or anyomer a~ec1 or 011s collection ot infonnaXll'l~f~ding s,;gi eSOO'IS b r lhis burden, to lNashington Headtarters Services, Orectorate lh.forrnati~ erations and Repor1~ 121 Jefferson uavis HIgmvay, til.lrte 1 4, Artng:01, A lliU2-4~4 to me umce o.
    [Show full text]
  • Federal Railroad Administration Office of Railroad Safety Accident and Analysis Branch
    Federal Railroad Administration Office of Railroad Safety Accident and Analysis Branch Accident Investigation Report HQ-2014-5 BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) Pillager, MN May 11, 2014 Note that 49 U.S.C. §20903 provides that no part of an accident or incident report, including this one, made by the Secretary of Transportation/Federal Railroad Administration under 49 U.S.C. §20902 may be used in a civil action for damages resulting from a matter mentioned in the report. U.S. Department of Transportation FRA File #HQ-2014-5 Federal Railroad Administration FRA FACTUAL RAILROAD ACCIDENT REPORT TRAIN SUMMARY 1. Name of Railroad Operating Train #1 1a. Alphabetic Code 1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. BNSF Railway Company BNSF TC-514-104 GENERAL INFORMATION 1. Name of Railroad or Other Entity Responsible for Track Maintenance 1a. Alphabetic Code 1b. Railroad Accident/Incident No. BNSF Railway Company BNSF TC-514-104 2. U.S. DOT Grade Crossing Identification Number 3. Date of Accident/Incident 4. Time of Accident/Incident 5/11/2014 11:05 PM 5. Type of Accident/Incident Derailment 6. Cars Carrying 7. HAZMAT Cars 8. Cars Releasing 9. People 10. Subdivision HAZMAT 0 Damaged/Derailed 0 HAZMAT 0 Evacuated 0 Brainerd 11. Nearest City/Town 12. Milepost (to nearest tenth) 13. State Abbr. 14. County Pillager 133.1 MN CASS 15. Temperature (F) 16. Visibility 17. Weather 18. Type of Track 52ࡈ F Dark Rain Main 19. Track Name/Number 20. FRA Track Class 21. Annual Track Density 22. Time Table Direction (gross tons in millions) Single Main Track Freight Trains-60, Passenger Trains-80 East 35 U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding How Train Dispatchers U
    © Understanding How Train Dispatchers U. S. Department Manage and Control Trains of Transportation Federal Railroad Administration Results of a Cognitive Task Analysis Office of Researc U.S. Department of Transportation and Development Research and Special Programs Administration Washington, DC 20590 John A. Voipe National Transportation Systems Center Cambridge, MA 02142-1093 Human Factors in Railroad Operations DOT/FRA/ORD-01/02 Final Report This document Is available to the May 2001 public through the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA22161 This document is also available on the FRA web site at www.fra.dot.gov NOTICE This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof. NOTICE The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers' names appear herein solely because they are considered essential to the objective of this report. Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burdon lor this collection ofinformation Is estimated tooverage 1hour per response, including the tlmo for roviowing instructions, searchmg existing data sourcos, gathering and maintaining the data needed and completing and reviewing the eolloction ofinformation. Send commonts regarding this burden estcmato or any aspocis ol this colleciion of informalcon , including suggestions lor reducing this burdon toWashington Headquanors Service, Oirectorale for information Oporotions and Reports. 1215 Jolforson Oavis Highway. Suito 1204. Arlington. VA. 222202-4302. and totheOlfico of Management ond Budget. Paperwork Reduction Project IO7O4-018B). Washington, DC 20503. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Fiber Optic Availability and Opportunity Analysis for North American Railroads DTFR53-11-D-00008L 6
    U.S. Department of Transportation Fiber Optic Availability and Opportunity Analysis Federal Railroad for North American Railroads Administration Office of Research, Development and Technology Washington, DC 20590 DOT/FRA/ORD-18/23 Final Report July 2018 NOTICE This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof. Any opinions, findings and conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this material do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government, nor does mention of trade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the United States Government. The United States Government assumes no liability for the content or use of the material contained in this document. NOTICE The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers’ names appear herein solely because they are considered essential to the objective of this report. REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.
    [Show full text]
  • Oregon Electric Or Union Pacific?
    Oregon’s Amtrak Cascades Future Alignment: Oregon Electric or Union Pacific? Draft Commentary Introduction In June 2009 the Rail Division of the Oregon Department of Transportation (ODOT) and Parsons Brinckerhoff issued a draft “ODOT Intercity Passenger Rail Study.” The Study purports to evaluate “the feasibility of moving Portland-to-Eugene intercity service from the current Union Pacific Railroad (UPRR) mainline to a somewhat parallel rail route known as the Oregon Electric (OE) alignment.” AORTA (Association of Oregon Rail and Transit Advocates) is a 501(c)(3) nonprofit organization seeking to educate decision-makers and the public about the need for and advantages of safe, efficient, environmentally responsible transportation since 1976. AORTA promotes increased reliance upon rail for both passengers and freight, and improved public transportation. Its board and membership include persons with extensive knowledge and professional expertise in transportation planning and operations. AORTA has been involved for many years in the state’s rail planning efforts and is familiar with both the UPRR and the OE branch line of the Portland & Western Railroad. AORTA contends the conclusions and cost estimates of ODOT’s June 2009 Draft Rail Study are not credible. This is, in part, because some of the assumptions were incorrect. AORTA believes the UPRR alignment, a corridor the state has invested in and engaged in extensive planning, is the reasonable corridor and that the cost of moving to the OE far exceeds the estimates published in the Study. Furthermore, the impact of moving to the OE would result in profound social, community and environmental damage that are not easily mitigated.
    [Show full text]