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Development of Enhanced Overlay Positive Train Control (EO-PTC) DTFR53-1 I-D-00008 6

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Development of Enhanced Overlay Positive Train Control (EO-PTC) DTFR53-1 I-D-00008 6 0 U.S. Department of Development of Enhanced Overlay Positive Transportation Train Control (EO-PTC) Federal Railroad Administration Office of Research, Development and Technology Washington, DC 20590 .... Overlay PTC MAS= 60 MPH - ' .... ' ...... -----30 MPH HO EO-PTC MAS= 60 MPH DOT/FRA/ORD-19/44 Final Report December 2019 NOTICE This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use thereof. Any opinions, findings and conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this ~aterial do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government, nor does mention oftrade names, commercial products, or organizations imply endorsement by the United States Government. The United States Government assumes no liability for the content or use of the material contained in this document. NOTICE The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers' names appear herein solely because they are considered essential to the objective of this report. REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved 0 MB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden b-lhis oollectioo of i'i.formation is estimated to a-.-erage 1 hour per response, inct.idi1 the 6me for l'e\ne'f~inst.ruction~ searching existing da~ sooroes, ga'Mrlng and ma:n1ann9 me aata neeciea, a"k(l co~1et1ng ana ~N9 tne oolleetlon Of 1nronna:ion. sen comments ~ arong is r,;,aen estimate or anyomer a~ec1 or 011s collection ot infonnaXll'l~f~ding s,;gi eSOO'IS b r lhis burden, to lNashington Headtarters Services, Orectorate lh.forrnati~ erations and Repor1~ 121 Jefferson uavis HIgmvay, til.lrte 1 4, Artng:01, A lliU2-4~4 to me umce o. Mcrlagement a-.o !Kl'get, l'aperworK Ke0'JCtlon 1-'tOJect (U/ tits), wash1ngt0n, uc ~. 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DA TE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED December 2019 Technical Report, July 2017-July 2019 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS Development of Enhanced Overlay Positive Train Control (EO-PTC) DTFR53-1 I-D-00008 6. AUTHOR(S) Task Order 0700 Joseph Brosseau, Christopher Grimes, Mehrnet Oztekin, Alan Polivka, Paulo Vieira 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFO RMING ORGANIZATION 1-<Cl-'UH. I NUMtlCI-< Transportation Technology Center, Inc. 55500 DOT Road Pueblo, CO 81001 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AUCN(.;Y l-tl:.PUH. I NUMtl CI-< U.S. Department ofTransp ortation Federal Railroad Administration Office of Railroad Policy and Development DOT/FRNORD-19/44 Office of Research, Development and Technology Washington, DC 20590 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES COR: Jared Withers 12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE This document is available to the public through the FRA eLibr;io:. 13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 WO<ds) Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI) researched a new method oftra in control proposed to increase operational efficiency where Positive Train Control (PTC) equipment is installed and ~ rational. Enhanced Overlay Positive Train Control (EO-PTC) allows for the removal of signal-based speed limits within blocks governed by Approach and Advance Approach signal aspects for PTC-equipped trains operating in PTC territory. In the EO-PTC concept,. trains may continue to operate at authorized speed as long as the train can be safely stopped prior to a signal indicating Stop. Within the project, TTCI developed a concept of operations for the EO-PTC concept, performed a safety analysis on the concept, and developed a general implementation and mitigation plan that can be adapted by individual railroads seeking to deploy the concept. 14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF PAGES Positive Train Control, PTC, enhanced ~ rations, Enhanced Overlay Positive Train Control, 69 EO-PTC, train control, rail signaling, traffic capacity improvement 16. PRICE CODE 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION 20. LI MITATION OF ABSTRACT 01'" 1-<tf-'Ul-<1 01'" I H l:S l-'Al3t 01'" A~:S I AA(; I Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified ii METRIC/ENGLISH CONVERSION FACTORS ENGLISH TO METRIC METRIC TO ENGLISH LENG™ (APPROXIMATE) LENGTH (APPROXIMATE) 1 inch (in) = 2.5 centimeters (cm) 1 mi.llime-ter {mm) = 0.04 inch (in) 1 foot (ft) = 30 centimeters (cm) 1 centimeter (cm) = 0A inch (in) 1 yard (yd) = 0.9 meter (m) 1 meter (m) = 3.3 feet (ft) 1 mile (mi) = 1.6 kilometers {km) 1 meter (m) = 1.1 yards (yd) 1 kilometer (km) = 0.6 mile (mi) AREA (APPROXIMATE) AREA (APPROXI TE) 1 square inch (sq in, in ) = 6.5 square centimeters {cm1) 1 square centime-ter (cm ) = 0.16 square inch (sq in, in ) 1 square foot (sq ft ) = 0.09 square mew (m ) 1 square meter (m ) = 1.2 square yards (sq yd, ycf) 1 s u:are yard (sq yd, yet) = 0.8 square meter Cm ) 1 square kilome-ter (km ) = 0A square mile {sq mi, mi') 1 square mile (sq mi m, ) = 2.6 square kilometers (km ) 10,000 square meters (m) = 1 hectare Cha)= 2.5 acres 1 acre= 0.4 he-ctare (he) = 4,000 squa.re meters (rn' ) MASS - WEIGHT (APPROXI TE) MASS -WEIGHT(APPROXIMATE) 1 ounce {oz) = 28 grams (gm) 1 gram (gm) = 0.036 ounce (oz) 1 poond {lb) = O.A5 kilogram (kg) 1 kilogram (kg) = 2.2 poonds (lb) 1 short ton = 2,000 pounds = 0.9 tonne Ct) 1 tonne (t) = 1,000 kilograms (kg) (lb) = 1.1 short tons VOLUME (APPROXIMATE) VOLUME (APPROXIMATE) 1 teaspoon (tsp) = 5 milJiliters (ml} 1 milliliter (ml) = 0.03 fluid ounce {fl oz) 1 tablespoon (tbsp) = 15 milliliters (ml) 1 liter {I) = 2.1 pints (pt) 1 fluid ounce (ft oz) = 30 milliliters (ml) 1 liter {I) = 1.06 quarts (qt) 1 cup (c) = 0.24 liter (I) 1 liter {I) = 0.26 ;allon (gal) 1 pin (pt) = 0A7 liter(I) 1 quart (qt) = 0.96 liter (I) 1 gal on (gal) = 3.8 liters (I) 1 cubic foot (cu ft, ft' ) = 0.03 cubic me-ter (m1 ) 1 oobic meter (mi = 36 cubic feet (cu ft, ff) 1 cubic yard (cu yd, yd1} = 0.76 cubic me-ter (m1 ) 1 cubic meter (mi = 1.3 cubic yards (cu yd, yd' ) TEMPERATURE (EXACT) TEMPERATURE (EXACT) l(x-32)(519)) "F = y "C [(9{5) y + 32) "C = X "F QUICK INCH - CENTIMETER LENGTH CONVERSION 0 1 2 3 4 5 Inches Centimeters 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 987 1110 1312 QUICK FAHRENHEIT - CELSIUS TEMPERATURE CONVERSIO °F -40° -22° -4° 14° 32° 50° 68° 86° 104° 122° 140° 158° 176° 194° 212° °C -40° -30° -20° -10° 0° 10° 20° 30° 40° 50° 60° 70° 80° 90° 100° For more exact and or other conversion factors, see NIST Miscellaneous Publication 286, Units of Weights and Measures. Price $2.50 SD Catalog No. C13 10286 Updated 6/17/98 iii Contents Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................... vii 1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 1.1 Background ................................................................................................................. 1 1.2 Objectives .................................................................................................................... 3 1.3 Overall Approach ........................................................................................................ 3 1.4 Scope ........................................................................................................................... 4 1.5 Organization of the Report .......................................................................................... 4 2. Concept of Operations ........................................................................................................... 6 3. Safety Analysis ...................................................................................................................... 8 4. Implementation and Cost Drivers .......................................................................................... 9 5. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 10 Appendix A. Concept of Operations ............................................................................................ 11 Appendix B. Safety Analysis Report ........................................................................................... 36 Appendix C. Implementation Plan and Cost Drivers ................................................................... 65 Abbreviations and Acronyms ....................................................................................................... 74 iv List of Figures Figure 1: High-level Architecture of ITC System .......................................................................... 1 Figure 2: Speed Limits under Overlay PTC (Current) and EO-PTC .............................................. 3 Figure 3: Wayside Signal Aspects in Overlay PTC and EO-PTC .................................................. 6 Figure 4: Example Onboard Display in Overlay PTC .................................................................... 6 Figure 5: Example Onboard Display in EO-PTC ........................................................................... 7 v Executive Summary From July 2017 to July 2019, Transportation Technology Center, Inc. (TTCI) developed a Concept of Operations (ConOps), a Safety Analysis Report, and an Implementation and Cost Drivers Analysis for an Enhanced Overlay Positive Train Control (EO-PTC) system. The fundamental concept of EO-PTC is that signal-based speed restrictions will be eliminated within blocks governed by Approach and Advance
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