Relations Between South Africa and France with Special Reference to Military Matters, 1960-1990
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RELATIONS BETWEEN SOUTH AFRICA AND FRANCE WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO MILITARY MATTERS, 1960-1990 by VICTOR MOUKAMBI Dissertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History at Stellenbosch University Supervisor: Professor A M Grundlingh Co-supervisor: Lieutenant Colonel (Professor) I J van der Waag December 2008 DECLARATION By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained therein is my own, original work, that I am the owner of the copyright thereof (unless to the extent explicitly otherwise stated) and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted it for obtaining any qualification. DATE: December 2008 Copyright © 2008 Stellenbosch University All rights reserved ii ABSTRACT This dissertation investigates the role played by France in the supply of military equipment and the transfer of technology to South Africa from 1960. This Franco-South African defence cooperation was opportune for South Africa, as she faced escalating international criticism over the apartheid issue and, from December 1963, the first military embargo, one joined by her erstwhile arms suppliers. The accession of the National Party (NP) to power in South Africa in 1948 brought a range of legislation that gave substance to the nationalist policy of apartheid. The suffering of the South African black population and the refusal of the South African government to revise its domestic policy, despite the growing international pressure, induced the newly-independent, Afro-Asian countries to press the United Nations (UN) to take tougher actions against Pretoria. At the same time opposing Black Nationalist movements, the African National Congress (ANC) the South West African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO) and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) adopted militant actions in response to increasingly repressive race legislation in South Africa and South West Africa/Namibia. Furthermore, when in 1961 South Africa left the British Commonwealth, she lost the long-term military commitment from London she had enjoyed for much of the twentieth century. South Africa would now have to satisfy her defence needs elsewhere. Pretoria knew that she needed a strong, well-equipped defence force in order to face the growing internal conflict as well as a possible military onslaught from outside the country. As a result, South Africa faced the first arms embargo in 1963 when her traditional arms suppliers, Britain and the USA elected to observe the voluntary terms of the embargo instituted by the UN. France, at the time under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle, identified an opportunity to strengthen her relations with South Africa and acquire the much-needed strategic materials for her nuclear programme; he decided to fill the space in the military market vacated by Britain and the USA. From 1964, France became Pretoria’s most important arms supplier, a relationship that lasted throughout the Gaullist administration. De Gaulle’s decision to supply South Africa with French military iii equipment and the transfer of technological know-how was based mainly on political, military and economic considerations. In short, De Gaulle wanted to free France from a military dependency on the United States, which had come to dominate NATO, and, by extension, Western Europe. Feeling hemmed in by les anglo-saxons, France, facing a shortage of North American uranium for her nuclear programme from 1957, sought new partners to shore up her own strategic vulnerability and ensure a role for her in world politics. Moreover, in the early 1960s, Apartheid had not yet become an electoral issue in France, as it was in Britain and the USA, and, in any case, France herself was drawing negative comment for her actions in the Algerian war of national independence. The logical outcome was a comfortable rapprochement, for the moment at least, between Paris and Pretoria. This military cooperation was broad-fronted and sustained until France implemented her first partial military embargo in 1975 and voted for the UN mandatory arms embargo in 1977. But, by this time, the weapons industry in South Africa, home-grown with French assistance, was well-established and placed South Africa in a position to launch military campaigns against the frontline states, commencing with Operation Savannah in late 1975. This study analyses the content and impact of the military cooperation between Paris and Pretoria and creates a better understanding of political and economic dimensions that were the key in the conduct of Franco-South African defence relations between 1960 and 1990. iv OPSOMMING Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die rol van Frankryk in die voorsiening van militêre toerusting en die oordrag van tegnologie na Suid-Afrika sedert 1960. Die Frans-Suid- Afrikaanse militêre samewerking het Suid-Afrika goed gepas aangesien die land vanaf Desember 1963 toenemend met die moontlikheid van militêre sanksies moes rekening hou. Die magsoorname van die Nasionale Party (NP) in 1948 is gevolg deur ‘n reeks wette om aan apartheid uitvoering te gee. Die lyding van die Suid-Afrikaanse swart bevolking en die weiering van die Suid-Afrikaanse regering om in weerwil van toenemende internasionale druk fundamenteel aan die binnelandse beleid te verander, het die nuwe onafhanklike Afro-Asiatiese lande groter druk op die Verenigde Volkere (VN) laat plaas om sterker stappe teen Pretoria te neem. Terselfertyd het swart nasionalistiese organisasies soos die African National Congress (ANC), South West African Peoples’ Organisation (SWAPO) en die Pan Africanist Organisation (PAC) hulle tot militêre optrede gewend om rasgebaseerde wetgewing te opponeer. Toe Suid-Afrika in 1961 die Britse Statebond verlaat het, het die langtermyn militêre ondersteuning wat die land vir die grootste gedeelte van die twintigste eeu van Londen ontvang het, in gedrang gekom. Suid- Afrika moes nou ook elders begin kyk. Pretoria het besef dat ‘n sterk en goed toegeruste verdedigingsmag nodig was om die moontlikheid van interne onrus en militêre aanvalle van buite Suid-Afrika die hoof te bied. Gevolglik het Suid-Afrika in 1963 die eerste wapenverbod van haar tradisionele wapenverskaffers, Brittanje en die VSA in die gesig gestaar toe dié lande die embargo wat deur die VN ingestel is, eerbiedig het. Onder die leierskap van Charles de Gaulle het Frankryk hier ‘n geleentheid gesien om die vakuum wat deur Brittanje en Amerika gelaat is te vul deur bande met Suid-Afrika te versterk en bowenal belangrike strategiese materiaal vir haar kernprogram te bekom. Vanaf 1964 het Frankryk Pretoria se belangrikste wapenverskaffers geword en die verhouding was vir die duur van die De Gaulle administrasie in swang. De Gaulle se besluit om Suid-Afrika met Franse militêre toerusting en die oordrag van tegnologiese kennis by te staan was hoofsaaklik gebaseer v op politieke, militêre en ekonomiese oorweginge. Kortliks wou De Gaulle Frankryk van militêre afhanklikheid van Amerika wat NAVO en by implikasie Wes-Europa domineer het, bevry. Ingeperk deur die Anglo-Saksiese wêreld, het Frankryk in die lig van Amerikaanse uraantekorte vanaf 1957 nuwe vennote gesoek om sy gewaande strategiese kwesbaarheid te besweer en ‘n rol in werêldpolitiek te beding. Hierbenewens het apartheid in die vroeë 1960’s nog nie as ‘n verkiesingskwessie in Frankryk gefigureer nie soos dit wel die geval in Brittanje en Amerika was nie. Frankryk het inderdaad self negatiewe kritiek ontlok as gevolg van sy optrede in die Algerynse nasionale vryheidstryd. Die logiese uitkoms op die bepaalde tydstip was gemaklike toenadering tussen Pretoria en Parys. Die militêre samewerking het oor ‘n breë front plaasgevind totdat Frankryk in 1975 ‘n gedeeltelike embargo ingestel het en in 1977 in die VN vir die verpligte embargo gestem het. Teen dié tyd was die plaaslike wapenindustrie reeds goed gevestig en het Suid-Afrika sy eie wapens vervaardig. Militêre veldtogte is dan ook geloods soos Operasie Savannah in laat 1975. Hierdie studie ontleed die impak van die militêre samewerking tussen Parys en Pretoria en poog om tot ‘n beter begrip te kom van die politieke en ekonomiese dimensies wat die sleutel was tot die wyse waarop Frans/Suid-Afrikaanse verhoudinge tussen 1960 en 1990 vorm aangeneem het. vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Firstly, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor and co-supervisor, Prof A M Grundlingh and Lt Col (Prof) I J van der Waag, who agreed to work with me despite their numerous responsibilities. Without their guidance, wisdom and encouragement this dissertation would not have seen the light. A special thank you must also go to Mrs Corinne Harmsen for her unconditional assistance, useful advice and encouragement over the years. Many thanks to Admirals Piet Potgieter and Peter Keene for positively helping me with interviews. Secondly, a great thank you to my entire family for their love, support and encouragement throughout my academic journey. A warm acknowledgement is also expressed to the Gabonese government for their financial support, which allowed me the opportunity to further my studies. I would like to thank all the people that helped me in finding relevant data in the South African and French archives as well as all of the others that crossed my path, at different points in my journey, and shared my emotions. Last but not least, my gratitude to God Almighty, who has always been by my side and provided to all my needs. To everyone, thank you. vii ABBREVIATIONS ACC: Allied Control Command ADO: African Defence Organisation AEB: