Chapter 3

An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict

Henri Tajfel John Turner University of Bristol, England

INTRODUCTION D. T. Campbell (1965) as the "realistic group conflict theory " (R. C. T.). Its point of departure for the expla The aim of this chapter is to present an outline of nation of intergroup behavior is in what Sherif (1966) a theory of intergroup conflict and some preliminary has called the functional relations between social data relating to the theory. First, however, this ap groups. Its central hypothesis—"real conflict of proach to intergroup behavior and intergroup conflict group interests causes intergroup conflict" (Camp must be set in context, in relation to other approaches bell, 1965, p. 287)—is deceptively simple, intuitively to the same problems. convincing, and has received strong empirical support Much of the work on the social psychology of (including Sherif & Sherif, 1953; Avigdor, 1953; intergroup relations has focused on patterns of indi Harvey, 1956; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & vidual prejudice and discrimination and on the motiva Sherif, 1961; Blake & Mouton, 1961a, 1962c; Bass & tional sequences of interpersonal interaction. Out Dunteman, 1963; D. W. Johnson, 1967; Diab, 1970). standing examples of these approaches can be found, R.C.T. was pioneered in social psychology by respectively, in the theory of authoritarian personality the Sherifs, who provided bothan etiology of inter (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, group hostility and a theory of competition as realistic 1950) and in the various versions and modifications of and instrumental in character, motivated by rewards the theory of frustration, aggression, and displace which, in principle, are extrinsic to the intergroup ment (such as Berkowitz, 1962, 1969, 1974). The situation (see Deutsch, 1949b; Julian, 1968). Op common denominator of most of this work has been posed group interests in obtaining scarce resources the stress on the intraindividual or interpersonal promote competition, and positively interdependent psychological processes leading to prejudiced at (superordinate) goals facilitate cooperation. Conflict titudes or discriminatory behavior. The complex ing interests develop through competition into overt interweaving of individual or interpersonal behavior social conflict. It appears, too, that intergroup com with the contextual social processes of intergroup petition enhances intragroup morale, cohesiveness, conflict and their psychological effects has not been and cooperation (see Vinacke, 1964; Fiedler, 1967; in the focus of the social psychologists' preoccu Kalin & Marlowe, 1968). Thus, the real conflicts of pations. (For a more detailed discussion, see Tajfel group interests not only create antagonistic intergroup 1972a, 1975.) relations but also heighten identification with, and The alternative to these approaches is rep positive attachment to, the in-group. resented in the work of Muzafer Sherif and his as This identification with the in-group, however, sociates (see Chapter 1), and has been referred to by has been given relatively little prominence in the

33 34 Chapter 3

extreme are provided by the behavior of soldiers from R.C.T. as a theoretical problem in its own right. The opposing armies during a battle, or by the behavior at a development of in-group identifications is seen in the negotiating table of members representing two parties R.C.T. almost as an epiphenomenon of intergroup conflict. As treated by the R.C.T., these identifica in an intense intergroup conflict. The main empirical questions concern the con tions are associated with certain patterns of intergroup ditions that determine the adoption of forms of social relations, but the theory does not focus either upon the behavior nearing one or the other extreme. The processes underlying the development and mainte first and obvious—answer concerns intergroup con nance of group identity nor upon the possibly au flict. It can be assumed, in accordance with our com tonomous effects upon the in-group and intergroup behavior of these "subjective" aspects of group mon experience, that the more intense is an intergroup membership. It is our contention that the relative ne conflict, the more likely it is that the individuals who glect of these processes in the R.C.T. is responsible are members of the opposing groups will behave to ward each other as a function of their respective group for some inconsistencies between the empirical data memberships, rather than in terms of their individual and the theory in its "classical" form. In this sense, characteristics or interindividual relationships. This the theoretical orientation to be outlined here is in tended not to replace the R.C.T., but to supplement was precisely why Sherif (1966, for example) was able it in some respects that seem to us essential for an to abolish so easily the interindividual friendships formed in the preliminary stages of some of his field adequate social psychology of intergroup conflict particularly as the understanding of the psycho studies when, subsequently, the individuals who had logical aspects of social change cannot be achieved become friends were assigned to opposing groups. An institutionalized or explicit conflict of "ob without an appropriate analysis of the social psychol jective" interests between groups, however, does not ogy of social conflict. provide a fully adequate basis, either theoretically or THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF INTERGROUP empirically, to account for many situations in which BEHAVIOR the social behavior of individuals belonging to distinct Our point of departure for the discussion to groups can be observed to approach the "group" follow will be an a priori distinction between two extreme of our continuum. The conflict in Sherif's extremes of social behavior, corresponding to what studies was "institutionalized," in that it was offi we shall call interpersonal versus intergroup be cially arranged by the holiday camp authorities; it was havior. At one extreme (which most probably cannot "explicit" in that it dominated the life of the groups; be found in its "pure" form in "real life") is the and it was ' 'objective" in the sense that, by the terms interaction between two or more individuals that is of the competition, one of the groups had to be the fully determined by their interpersonal relationships winner and the other group the loser. And yet, there is and individual characteristics, and not at all affected evidence from Sherif's own studies and from other by various social groups or categories to which they research (to which we shall return later) that the in- respectively belong. The other extreme consists of stitutionalization, explicitness, and "objectivity" of interactions between two or more individuals (or an intergroup conflict are not necessary conditions for groups of individuals) which arc fully determined by behavior in terms of the "group" extreme, although their respective memberships in various social groups they will often prove to be sufficient conditions. One or categories, and not at all affected by the interin- clear example is provided by our earlier experiments dividual personal relationships between the people (Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, involved. Here again, it is unlikely that "pure'' forms 1971), which we shall discuss briefly below, in which of this extreme can be found in "real" social situa it was found that intergroup discrimination existed in tions. Examples nearing the interpersonal extreme conditions of minimal in-group affiliation, anonymity would be the relations between wife and husband or of group membership, absence of conflicts of interest, between old friends. Examples near the intergroup and absence of previous hostility between the groups. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict 35

Other social and behavioral continua are ployed during the depression of the 1930s) that the associated with the interpersonal-intergroup con impossibility of "getting out" on one's own, as an tinuum. One of them may be considered as having individual, becomes an everyday reality that deter a causal function in relation to the interpersonal— mines many forms of intergroup social behavior. But intergroup continuum. We shall characterize it again even this example is still relatively extreme. Many by its two extremes, to which we shall refer as "so social intergroup situations that contain, for whatever cial mobility" and "social change." These terms reasons, strong elements of stratification perceived as are not used here in their sociological sense. They such will move social behavior away from the pole of refer instead to the individuals' belief systems interpersonal patterns toward the pole, of intergroup about the nature and the structure of the relations patterns. This is as true of groups that are "superior" between social groups in their society. The belief in a social system as of those that are "inferior" in it. system of "social mobility" is based on the general The major characteristic of social behavior related to assumption that the society in which the individuals this belief system is that, in the relevant intergroup live is a flexible and permeable one, so that if they are situations, individuals will not interact as individuals, not satisfied, for whatever reason, with the conditions on the basis of their individual characteristics or inter imposed upon their lives by membership in social personal relationships, but as members of their groups groups or social categories to which they belong, it is standing in certain defined relationships to members possible for them (be it through talent, hard work, of other groups. good luck, or whatever other means) to move indi Obviously, one must expect a marked correla vidually into another group which suits them better. tion between the degree of objective stratification in a A good example of this system of beliefs, built into social system (however measured) and the social dif the explicit cultural and ideological traditions of a fusion and intensity of the belief system of "social society, is provided in the following passage from change." This, however, cannot be a one-to-one rela Hirschman(1970): tionship for a number of reasons, some of which will be discussed below, although we cannot in this chap The traditional American idea of success confirms the hold ter go into the details of the many social-psychological which exit has had on the national imagination. Success conditions that may determine the transition in certain —or, what amounts to the same thing, upward social social groups from an acceptance of stratification to mobility—has long been conceived in terms of evolutionary behavior characteristic of the intergroup pole of our individualism. The successful individual who starts out at a first continuum—that is, to the creation of social low rung of the social ladder, necessarily leaves his own movements aiming to change (or to preserve) the group as he rises; he "passes" into, or is "accepted" by, status quo (Tajfel, in press). It may be interesting, the next higher group. He takes his immediate family along, however, to point to the close relationship that exists but hardly anyone else [pp. 108-109]. between an explicit intergroup conflict of interests, on At the other extreme, the belief system of "so the one hand, and the "social change" system of cial change" implies that the nature and structure of beliefs on the other. One of the main features of this the relations between social groups in the society is belief system is the perception by the individuals con perceived as characterized by marked stratification, cerned that it is impossible or extremely difficult to making it impossible or very difficult for individuals, move individually from their own group to another as. individuals, to invest themselves of an unsatisfac group. This is precisely the situation in an intense tory, underprivileged, or stigmatized group member intergroup conflict of interests, in which it is ex ship. A caste system, based on race or any other tremely difficult for an individual to conceive of the criteria perceived as immutable, is an obvious exam possibility of "betraying" his or her own group by ple, but it need not be the main example. The moving to the opposing group. Although this does economic or social realities of a society may be such happen on occasion, sanctions for such a move are, on (as, for example, in the case of the millions of unem the whole, powerful, and the value systems (at least in 36 Chapter 3 our cultures) are in flagrant opposition to it. To use an out-group as undifferentiated items in a unified social example from social-psychological research, it seems category, rather than in terms of their individual hardly possible that one of the boys in Sherif 's holiday characteristics. The vast literature in social psychol camps would decide to change sides, even though ogy on the functioning of group stereotypes in situa some of his previously contracted friendships over tions of intense intergroup tensions is no more than an lapped group boundaries. example of this general statement. The intensity of explicit intergroup conflicts of Thus, this preliminary conceptualization rep interests is closely related in our cultures to the de resents an approach to the social psychology of inter gree of opprobrium attached to the notion of ' 'rene group relations that takes into account social realities gade" or "traitor." This is why the belief systems as well as their reflection in social behavior through corresponding to the "social change" extreme of our the mediation of socially shared systems of beliefs. continuum are associated with intense intergroup con This convergence occurs at both ends of the sequence flicts. These conflicts can be conceived, therefore, as just discussed: at the beginning, because it can be creating a subclass or a subcategory of the subjective assumed without much difficulty that the "social intergroup dichotomization characteristic of that ex change" belief system is likely to reflect either an treme of the belief continuum. They share the basic existing and marked social stratification or an intense feature of the "social change" system of beliefs, in intergroup conflict of interests, or both; at the end, the sense that the multigroup structure is perceived as because the consequences of the systems of beliefs characterized by the extreme difficulty or impossibil arising from the social situations just mentioned are ity of an individual's moving from one group to likely to appear in the form of unified group actions another. —that is, in the form of social movements aiming The continuum of systems of beliefs discussed either to create social change or to preserve the status so far has been seen to have a causal function in quo. We shall return later to an elaboration of the shifting social behavior toward members of out- kinds of hypotheses that can be put forward concern groups between the poles of "interpersonal" and "in ing the creation of change versus the preservation tergroup" behavior. To conclude this part of our pre of status quo. But before this is done, the realistic liminary discussion, we must characterize briefly two group conflict theory must be considered against this further and overlapping continua, which can be con general background. sidered as encompassing the major consequences of The implications of this conceptualization for social behavior that approaches one or the other end of intergroup relations in stratified societies and insti the interpersonal-intergroup continuum. They both tutions are both evident and direct. Whenever so have to do with the variability or uniformity within a cial stratification is based upon an unequal division group of behavior and attitudes concerning the rele of scarce resources—such as power, prestige, or vant out-groups. The first may be described as fol wealth—between social groups, the social situation lows: the nearer are members of a group to the ' 'social should be characterized by pervasive ethnocentrism change'' extreme of the belief-systems continuum and and out-group antagonism between the over- and un the intergroup extreme of the behavioral continuum, derprivileged groups (Oberschall, 1973, p. 33; see the more uniformity they will show in their behavior also Chapters 5 and 12). However, decades of re toward members of the relevant out-group; an ap search into ethnic-group relations suggest that eth proach toward the opposite extremes of both these nocentrism among stratified groups is, or at least it has continua will be correspondingly associated with been, very much a one-way street. Two recent books greater in-group variability of behavior toward mem (Milner, 1975; Giles & Powesland, 1976) summarize bers of the out-group. The second statement is closely a great deal of evidence that minority or subordinate related to the first: the nearer are members of a group group members—such as the American Blacks, the to the "social change" and the "intergroup" ex French Canadians, the New Zealand Maoris, or the tremes , the more they will tend to treat members of the South African Bantus—frequently tend to derogate An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict 37

the in-group and display positive attitudes toward the when the processes of change become very rapid. dominant out-group. In other words, deprived groups Status differences between groups often do not remain are not always ethnocentric in the simple meaning of unilaterally associated with low levels of intergroup the term; they may, in fact, be positively oriented conflicts. For example, the generalization made toward the depriving out-group. Data of this kind are above—that certain forms of political, economic, and not consistent with a simple application of the R.C.T. social subordination of a social group tend to elimi Some writers (including Gregor & McPherson, nate or even reverse its ethnocentrism—is already 1966; Morland, 1969; Milner, 1975, p. 93) have ar dated. Research conducted in the last decade or so gued that the status relations between dominant and reveals a changing pattern in intergroup relations. subordinate groups determine the latters' identity American Blacks (see N. Friedman, 1969; Hraba & problems. (By social status we mean a ranking or Grant, 1970; Paige, 1970; Brigham, 1971; Harris hierarchy of perceived prestige.) Subordinate groups & Braun, 1971), French Canadians (Berry, Kalin, & often seem to internalize a wider social evaluation of Taylor, 1976), New Zealand Maoris (Vaughan, in themselves as "inferior" or "second class," and press), and the Welsh (Bourhis, Giles, & Tajfel, this consensual inferiority is reproduced as rela 1973; Giles & Powesland, 1976), for instance, now tive self-derogation on a number of indices that have seem to be rejecting their previously negative in- been used in the various studies. Consensual status group evaluations and developing a positive ethno itself—where subjective and accorded prestige are centric group identity. This construction of positive identical—is problematic for the R.C.T., which con in-group attitudes is often accompanied by a new ceptualizes prestige as a scarce resource, like wealth militancy over political and economic objectives (see or power. Status differences between groups, like Tomlinson, 1970). other inequalities, should tend to accentuate the inter- But these developments do not rescue the group conflicts of interests. Therefore, according to R.C.T. in its original form. The very suddenness with the R.C.T., the impact of low status upon a subordi which the scene has changed effectively rules out nate group should be to intensify its antagonism to objective deprivation and therefore new conflicting ward the high-status group (Thibaut, 1950). Yet, group interests as sufficient conditions for the "sub under some conditions at least, low social status seems ordinate" group ethnocentrism. On the contrary, to be correlated with an enhancement, rather than a there is often less "objective" deprivation than there lessening, of positive out-group attitudes. has been in the past. An active and new search for a It could be argued that only conflicts of interest positive group identity seems to be one of the critical perceived as such create hostility. This requires that factors responsible for the reawakening of these groups must compare their respective situations. And, groups' claims to scarce resources (Dizard, 1970). according to some views, it is only relatively similar In summary, the R.C.T. states that opposing groups that engage in mutual comparisons; therefore, claims to scarce resources, such as power, prestige, or many forms of status differences will reduce per wealth, generate ethnocentrism and antagonism be ceived similarity (see Festinger, 1954; Kidder & tween groups. Therefore, low status should tend to Stewart, 1975). It follows that status systems may intensify out-group hostility in groups that are politi reduce social conflict by restricting the range of mean cally, economically, or socially subordinate. The ingful comparisons available to any given group. This evidence suggests, however, that where social- hypothesis may be a useful tool to account for some of structural differences in the distribution of resources the determinants of social stability; but if it is taken to have been institutionalized, legitimized, and justified its logical conclusion, it can account for no more than through a consensually accepted status system (or at that. It fails to account for social change (in the sense least a status system that is sufficiently firm and perva of changes in the mutual relations, behavior, and sive to prevent the creation of cognitive alternatives to attitudes of large-scale human groups that have been it), the result has been less and not more ethnocentrism distinctly different in status in the past), particularly in the different status groups. The price of this has 38 Chapter 3 been the subordinate groups' self-esteem. On the evaluations and behavior. Not only are incompatible other hand, whenever a subordinate group begins, for group interests not always sufficient to generate con whatever reasons, to question or deny its presumed flict (as concluded in the last section), but there is a characteristics associated with its low status, this good deal of experimental evidence that these condi seems to facilitate the reawakening of a previously tions are not always necessary for the development of dormant conflict over objective resources. At the competition and discrimination between groups (for same time, it is likely that one of the counterreactions example, Ferguson & Kelley, 1964; Rabbie & Wil- from the dominant groups in such situations will be to kens, 1971; Doise & Sinclair, 1973; Doise & Wein work for the preservation of the previously existing berger, 1973). This does not mean, of course, that "subjective" and "objective" differentiations. in-group bias is not influenced by the goal relations A tentative hypothesis about intergroup conflict between the groups (see Harvey, 1956). in stratified societies can now be offered: An unequal All this evidence implies that in-group bias is a distribution of objective resources promotes antag remarkably omnipresent feature of intergroup rela onism between dominant and subordinate groups, tions . The phenomenon in its extreme form has been provided that the latter group rejects its previously investigated by Tajfel and his associates. There have accepted and consensually negative self-image, and been a number of studies (Tajfel etal., 1971; Billig & with it the status quo, and starts working toward the Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; Doise, Csepeli, development of a positive group identity. The domi Dann, Gouge, Larsen, & Ostell, 1972; Turner, 1975), nant group may react to these developments either by all showing that the mere perception of belonging doing everything possible to maintain and justify the to two distinct groups—that is, social categorization status quo or by attempting to find and create new per se—is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimina differentiations in its own favor, or both (see Chapter tion favoring the in-group. In other words, the mere 12). A more detailed specification of some of the awareness of the presence of an out-group is sufficient strategies and "solutions" that can be adopted in this to provoke intergroup competitive or discriminatory situation can be found in Tajfel (in press); we shall responses on the part of the in-group. return later to a discussion of some of them. For the In the initial experimental paradigm (Tajfel, present, it will be sufficient to state that, whether valid 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971), the subjects (both children or not, the hypothesis raises some important theoreti and adults have acted as subjects in the various cal problems that need to be considered. The first studies) are randomly classified as members of two question is: what social-psychological processes are nonoverlapping groups—ostensibly on the basis of involved in the development of positive group iden some trivial performance criterion. They then make tity? The second question concerns the conditions "decisions," awarding amounts of money to pairs of under which the status differences between social other subjects (excluding self) in specially designed groups are likely to enhance or to reduce intergroup booklets. The recipients are anonymous, except for conflict. In order to continue the discussion of these their individual code numbers and their group mem questions, we must now abandon speculation and con bership (for example, member number 51 of the X sider some relevant data. group and member number 33 of the Y group). The subjects, who know their own group membership, SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION AND award the amounts individually and anonymously. INTERGROUP DISCRIMINATION The response format of the booklets does not force the subjects to act in terms of group membership. The initial stimulus for the theorizing presented In this situation, there is neither a conflict of here was provided by certain experimental investiga interests nor previously existing hostility between the tions of intergroup behavior. The laboratory analog of "groups." No social interaction takes place between real-world ethnocentrism is in-group bias—that is, the the subjects, nor is there any rational link between tendency to favor the in-group over the out-group in economic self-interest and the strategy of in-group An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict 39 favoritism. Thus, these groups are purely cognitive, subjects' postsession reports (Billig, 1972; Turner, and can be referred to as minimal. 1975) shows that they do not share any common con The basic and highly reliable finding is that the ception of the "appropriate" or "obvious" way to trivial, ad hoc intergroup categorization leads to in- behave, that only a tiny minority have some idea group favoritism and discrimination against the out- of the hypothesis, and that this minority does not group. Fairness is also an influential strategy. There is always conform to it. also a good deal of evidence that, within the pattern of The more general theoretical problem has been responding in terms of in-group favoritism, maximum referred to elsewhere by one of us as follows: difference (M.D.) is more important to the subjects than maximum in-group profit (M.I.P.). Thus, they Simply and briefly stated, the argument (e.g., Gerard & seem to be competing with the out-group, rather than Hoyt, 1974) amounts to the following: the subjects acted in following a strategy of simple economic gain for terms of the intergroup categorization provided or imposed members of the in-group. Other data from several by the experimenters not necessarily because this has been successful in inducing any genuine awareness of member experiments also show that the subjects' decisions ship in separate and distinct groups, but probably because were significantly nearer to the maximum joint payoff they felt that this kind of behavior was expected of them by (M.J.P.) point when these decisions applied to the the experimenters, and therefore they conformed to this division of money between two anonymous members expectation. The first question to ask is why should the of the in-group than when they applied to two mem subjects be expecting the experimenters to expect of them bers of the out-group; that is, relatively less was given this kind of behavior? The Gerard and Hoyt answer to this is to the out-group, even when giving more would not that the experimental situation was rigged to cause this kind have affected the amounts for the in-group. Billig & of expectation in the subjects. This answer retains its plausi Tajfel (1973) have found the same results even when bility only if we assume that what was no more than a hint the assignment to groups was made explicitly random. from the experimenters about the notion of ' 'groups " being This eliminated the similarity on the performance relevant to the subjects' behavior had been sufficient to criterion within the in-group as an alternative explana determine, powerfully and consistently, a particular form of intergroup behavior. In turn, if we assume this—and the tion of the results (see Byrne, 1971). An explicitly assumption is by no means unreasonable—we must also random classification into groups proved in this study assume that this particular form of intergroup behavior is to be a more potent determinant of discrimination than one which is capable of being induced by the experimenters perceived interpersonal similarities and dissimilarities much more easily than other forms (such as cooperation not associated with categorization into groups. between the groups in extorting the maximum total amount The question that arises is whether in-group bias of money from the experimenters, or a fair division of the in these "minimal" situations is produced by some spoils between the groups, or simply random responding). form of the experimenter effect or of the demand And this last assumption must be backed up in its turn by characteristics of the experimental situation—in other another presupposition: namely, that for some reasons words, whether explicit references to group member (whatever they may be) competitive behavior between ship communicate to the subjects that they are ex groups, at least in our culture, is extraordinarily easy to trigger off—at which point we are back where we started pected to, or ought to, discriminate. The first point to from. The problem then must be restated in terms of the need be made about this interpretation of the results is that to specify why a certain kind of intergroup behavior can be explicit references to group membership are logically elicited so much more easily than other kinds; and this necessary for operationalizing in these minimal situa specification is certainly not made if we rest content with tions the major independent variable—that is, social the explanation that the behavior occurred because it was categorization per se. This requires not merely that the very easy for the experimenters to make it occur [Tajfel, subjects perceive themselves as similar to or different in press]. from others as individuals, but that they are mem bers of discrete and discontinuous categories—that Two points stand out: first, minimal intergroup is, "groups." Second, a detailed analysis of the discrimination is not based on incompatible group 40 Chapter 3

interests; second, the baseline conditions for inter Social groups, understood in this sense, provide their group competition seem indeed so minimal as to cause members with an identification of themselves in social the suspicion lhat we are dealing here with some factor terms. These identifications are to a very large extent or process inherent in the intergroup situation itself. relational and comparative: they define the individ Our theoretical orientation was developed initially in ual as similar to or different from, as "better" or response to these clues from our earlier experiments. "worse" than, members of other groups. (Fora more We shall not trace the history of its development, detailed discussion, see Tajfel, 1972b.) It is in a however, but shall describe its present form. strictly limited sense, arising from these considera tions, that we use the term social identity. It consists,

SOCIAL IDENTITY AND SOCIAL COMPARISON for the purposes of the present discussion, of those aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from Many orthodox definitions of "social groups" the social categories to which he perceives himself as are unduly restrictive when applied to the context of belonging. With this limited concept of social identity intergroup relations. For example, when members of in mind, our argument is based on the following gen two national or ethnic categories interact on the basis eral assumptions: of their reciprocal beliefs about their respective 1. Individuals strive to maintain or enhance categories and of the general relations between them, their self-esteem: they strive for a positive self-

this is clearly intergroup behavior in the everyday concept. sense of the term. The "groups" to which the inter- 2. Social groups or categories and the member actants belong need not depend upon the frequency ship of them are associated with positive or negative of intermember interaction, systems of role rela value connotations. Hence, social identity may be tionships, or interdependent goals. From the social- positive or negative according to the evaluations psychological perspective, the essential criteria for (which tend to be socially consensual, either within or group membership, as they apply to large-scale so across groups) of those groups that contribute to an cial categories, are that the individuals concerned de individual's social identity. fine themselves and are defined by others as members 3. The evaluation of one's own group is deter of a group. mined with reference to specific other groups through We can conceptualize a group, in this sense, as a social comparisons in terms of value-laden attributes collection of individuals who perceive themselves to and characteristics. Positively discrepant comparisons be members of the same social category, share some between in-group and out-group produce high pres emotional involvement in this common definition of tige; negatively discrepant comparisons between in- themselves, and achieve some degree of social con group and out-group result in low prestige. sensus about the evaluation of their group and of their From these assumptions, some related theoreti membership of it. Following from this, our definition cal principles can be derived: of intergroup behavior is basically identical to that of 1. Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain Sherif (1966, p. 62): any behavior displayed by one or positive social identity. more actors toward one or more others that is based on 2. Positive social identity is based to a large the actors' identification of themselves and the others extent on favorable comparisons that can be made as belonging to different social categories. between the in-group and some relevant out-groups: Social categorizations are conceived here as the in-group must be perceived as positively differen cognitive tools that segment, classify, and order the tiated or distinct from the relevant out-groups. social environment, and thus enable the individual to 3. When social identity is unsatisfactory, indi undertake many forms of social action. But they do viduals will strive either to leave their existing group not merely systematize the social world; they also and join some more positively distinct group and/or to provide a system of orientation for se//-reference: they make their existing group more positively distinct. create and define the individual's place in society. The basic hypothesis, then, is that pressures An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict 41

to evaluate one's own group positively through through social comparison, whereas the latter is based in-group/out-group comparisons lead social groups to on "realistic" self-interest and represents embryonic attempt to differentiate themselves from each other conflict. Incompatible group goals are necessary for (seeTajfel, 1974a, 1974b; Turner, 1975). There are at realistic competition, but mutual intergroup compari least three classes of variables that should influence sons are necessary, and often sufficient, for social intergroup differentiation in concrete social situa competition. The latter point is consistent with the tions. First, individuals must have internalized their data from "minimal" group experiments that mere group membership as an aspect of their self-concept: awareness of an out-group is sufficient to stimu they must be subjectively identified with the relevant late in-group favoritism, and the observations (Fer in-group. It is not enough that the others define them guson & Kelley, 1964; Rabbie & Wilkens, 1971; as a group, although consensual definitions by others Doise & Weinberger, 1973) that the possibility of can become, in the long run, one of the powerful social comparison generates "spontaneous" inter causal factors for a group's self-definition. Second, group competition. the social situation must be such as to allow for inter Social and realistic competition also differ in the group comparisons that enable the selection and predictions that can be made about the consequences evaluation of the relevant relational attributes. Not all for subsequent intergroup behavior of winning or los between-group differences have evaluative signifi ing. After realistic competition, the losing groups cance (Tajfel, 1959), and those that do vary from should be hostile to the out-group victors, both be group to group, Skin color, for instance, is apparently cause they have been deprived of a reward and a more salient attribute in the United States than in because their interaction has been exclusively conflic- Hong Kong (Morland, 1969); whereas language tual. However, when winning and losing establish seems to be an especially salient dimension of separate shared group evaluations concerning comparative identity in French Canada, Wales, and Belgium superiority and inferiority, then, so long as the terms (see Giles & Powesland, 1976; Fishman & Giles, in of the competition are perceived as legitimate and the press). Third, in-groups do not compare themselves competition itself as fair according to these legitimate with every cognitively available out-group: the out- terms, the losing group may acquiesce in the superior group must be perceived as a relevant comparison ity of the winning out-group. This acquiescence by a group. Similarity, proximity, and situational sa group considering itself as legitimately ' 'inferior" has lience are among the variables that determine out- been shown in a recent study by Cad dick (1974). group comparability, and pressures toward in-group Several other studies report findings that are in line distinctiveness should increase as a function of this with this interpretation: losing in-groups do not al comparability. It is important to state at this point ways derogate, but sometimes upgrade, their evalua that, in many social situations, comparability reaches tions of the winning out-groups (for example, Wilson a much wider range than a simply conceived "simi & Miller, 1961; Bass & Dunteman, 1963). larity" between the groups. Retrospectively, at least, the social-identity/ The aim of differentiation is to maintain or social-comparison theory is consistent with many of achieve superiority over an out-group on some dimen the studies mentioned in the preceding section of this sions. Any such act, therefore, is essentially competi chapter. In particular, in the paradigm of the "mini tive. This competition requires a situation of mutual mal group" experiments (such as Tajfel et al., 1971), comparison and differentiation on a shared value di the intergroup discrimination can be conceived as conditions, intergroup competition, mension . In these being due not to conflict over monetary gains, but to which may be unrelated to the ''objective" goal rela differentiations based on comparisons made in terms tions between the groups, can be predicted to occur. of monetary rewards. Money functioned as a dimen Turner (1975) has distinguished between social and sion of comparison (the only one available within the instrumental, or "realistic,'' competition. The former experimental design), and the data suggest that larger is motivated by self-evaluation and takes place absolute gains that did not establish a difference in 42 Chapter 3 favor of the in-group were sacrificed for smaller com The results showed that the Arts groups (H.I.) parative gains, when the two kinds of gains were made were more biased than the Science groups (L.I.); that to conflict. similar groups differentiated more than dissimilar There is further evidence (Turner, in press-a) groups in the Stable condition, but that they were no that the social-competitive pattern of intergroup more biased (and sometimes even less so) in the Un behavior holds even when it conflicts with obvious stable condition; and that, on some of the measures, self-interest. In this study, the distribution of either there was a significant main effect for out-group simi monetary rewards or "points" was made, within the larity: in-group bias increased against a similar out "minimal" intergroup paradigm, between self and an group. Although these data are relatively complex, anonymous "other," who was either in the in-group they do support some of our theoretical expectations or in the out-group. As long as minimal conditions and provide an illustration that variations in in-group existed for in-group identification, the subjects were bias can be systematically predicted from the prepared to give relatively less to themselves when the social-identity/social-comparison theory. award (either in points or in money) was to be divided We have argued that social and realistic compe between self and an anonymous member of the in- tition are conceptually distinct, although most often group, as compared with dividing with an anonymous they are empirically associated in "real life." In an member of the out-group. These results seem particu experiment by Turner and Brown (1976), an attempt larly important, since the category of "self," which was made to isolate the effects on intergroup behavior is by no means "minimal" or ad hoc, was set here of the postulated autonomous processes attributed to a against a truly minimal in-group category, identical search for positive social identity. Children were used to those used in the earlier experiments. Despite as subjects, and the manipulations involved decisions this stark asymmetry, the minimal group affiliation by the subjects about the distribution of payments for affected the responses. participation in the experiment, to be shared equally The theoretical predictions were taken outside by the in-group, between the in-group and out-groups of the minimal categorization paradigm in a further that were made relevant or irrelevant to compari study by Turner (in press-b). He used face-to-face sons with the in-group's performance. Monetary self- groups working on a discussion task. In each session, interest (of a magnitude previously ascertained to be two three-person groups discussed an identical issue, of genuine significance to the subjects) would have supposedly to gain an assessment of their verbal intel produced no difference in the distribution decisions ligence* and then briefly compared their respective involving the two kinds of out-group; it would also performance. The subjects were 144 male under have led to decisions tending toward maximum in- graduates. The criterion for intergroup differentiation group profit (M.I.P.) rather than toward maximum was the magnitude of in-group bias shown in the difference (M.D.). ratings of the groups' work. Half the triads, composed M.D. was the most influential strategy in the of Arts students, believed that verbal intelligence was choices. Furthermore, when the subjects could choose important for them (High Importance, or H.I.); half, in-group favoritism (M.D. +M.I.P.) and/or a fairness composed of Science students, did not (Low Impor strategy, they were both more discriminatory and less tance, orL.I.). Half the sessions involved two Arts or fair toward the relevant than the irrelevant comparison two Science groups (Similar Outgroup), and half in group. Other measures of in-group favoritism pro volved one Arts and one Science group (Dissimilar duced an interaction between reward level and type of Outgroup). Finally, in the Stable Difference condi out-group: more discrimination against the relevant tion, subjects were instructed that Arts students were than the irrelevant group with high rewards, and less definitely superior and Science students definitely in with low rewards. Whatever may be other explana ferior in verbal intelligence; in the Unstable Differ tions for this interaction, we can at least conclude that ence condition, there was no explicit statement that when reward levels are more meaningful, in-group one category was better than the other. These vari favoritism is enhanced against a more comparable ables were manipulated in a 2x2x2 factorial design. out-group, independently of the group members' eco- An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict 43 nomic interests. Indeed, insofar as the subjects used indirectly by the whole literature on racial identifica the M.D. strategy, they sacrificed "objective" per tion and preference. The most important feature of sonal and group gain for the sake of positive in-group individual mobility is that the low status of one's own distinctiveness. group is not thereby changed: it is an individualist On the whole, these studies provide some approach designed, at least in the short run, to achieve confirmation for the basic social-identity/social- a personal, not a group, solution. Thus, individual comparison hypotheses. We shall now attempt to mobility implies a disidentification with the erstwhile apply this analysis to some of the problems raised in in-group. the earlier sections of this chapter. 2. Social Creativity. The group members may seek positive distinctiveness for the in-group by rede STATUS HIERARCHIES AND SOCIAL CHANGE fining or altering the elements of the comparative The reconceptualization of social status at situation. This need not involve any change in the tempted earlier in this chapter needs now to be made group's actual social position or access to objective more explicit. Status is not considered here as a scarce resources in relation to the out-group. It is a group resource or commodity, such as power or wealth; it is rather than an individualistic strategy that may the outcome of intergroup comparison. It reflects a focus upon: group's relative position on some evaluative dimen (a) Comparing the in-group to the out-group on sions of comparison. Low subjective status does not some new dimension. Lemaine (1966) found, for ex promote intergroup competition directly; its effects on ample, that children's groups which could not com intergroup behavior are mediated by social identity pare themselves favorably with others in terms of processes. The lower is a group's subjective status constructing a hut—because they had been assigned position in relation to relevant comparison groups, the poorer building materials than the out-group—tended less is the contribution it can make to positive social to seek out other dimensions of comparison involving identity. The variety of reactions to negative or threat new constructions in the hut's surroundings. The ened social identity to be discussed below are an problems that obviously arise here are those of elaboration of the principles outlined earlier in this legitimizing the value assigned to the new social chapter. products—first in the in-group and then in the other groups involved. To the extent that this legitimization 1. Individual Mobility. The more an individual may threaten the out-group's superior distinctiveness, approaches the structure of beliefs (most often socially an increase in intergroup tension can be predicted. shared) described in the Introduction to this chapter as (b) Changing the values assigned to the attri that of "social mobility," the more it is likely that he butes of the group, so that comparisons which were will try to leave, or dissociate himself from, his erst previously negative are now perceived as positive. while group. This usually implies attempts, on an The classic example is "Black is beautiful." The individual basis, to achieve upward social mobility, to salient dimension—skin color—remains the same, pass from a lower- to a higher-status group. In a but the prevailing value system concerning it is four-group hierarchy, G. F. Ross (1975) found a di rejected and reversed. The same process may underlie rect linear relationship between low status and the Peabody's (1968) finding that even when various desire to pass upwards into another group. Many ear groups agree about their respective characteristics, the lier studies report the existence of strong forces for trait is evaluated more positively by the group that upward social movement in status hierarchies. Ten possesses it. dencies to dissociate oneself psychologically from (c) Changing the out-group (or selecting the fellow members of low-prestige categories are known out-group) with which the in-group is compared—in to many of us from everyday experience; they have particular, ceasing or avoiding to use the high-status been noted more systematically by Jahoda (1961) and out-group as a comparative frame of reference. Klineberg and Zavalloni (1969), among others, and Where comparisons are not made with the high-status 44 Chapter 3 out-group, the relevant inferiority should decrease in unsatisfactory social identity, to promote the wide salience, and self-esteem should recover. Hyman's spread adoption of individual mobility strategies, or at (1942) classic paper on the psychology of status sug least initial attempts to make use of these strategies. gested that discontent among low-status-group mem Insofar as individual mobility implies disidentifica- bers is lessened to the degree that intraclass rather than tion, it will tend to loosen the cohesiveness of the intergroup comparisons are made. More recently, subordinate group. This weakening of subjective at Rosenberg and Simmons (1972) found that self- tachment to the in-group among its members will tend: esteem was higher among Blacks who made self- (a) to blur the perception of distinct group interests comparisons with other Blacks rather than Whites. corresponding to the distinct group identity; and (b) to Other work also suggests (see I. Katz, 1964; Lefcourt create obstacles to mobilizing group members for col & Ladwig, 1965) that, in certain circumstances, Black lective action over their common interests. Thus, the performance was adversely affected by the low self- low morale that follows from negative social identity esteem induced by the presence of the members of the can set in motion disintegrative processes that, in the dominant out-group. It follows that self-esteem can be long run, may hinder a change in the group status. enhanced by comparing with other lower-status Second, assuming that the barriers (objective, groups rather than with those of higher status. This is moral, and ideological prohibitions) to leaving one's consistent with the fact that competition between sub group are strong, unsatisfactory social identity may ordinate groups is sometimes more intense than be stimulate social creativity that tends to reduce the tween subordinate and dominant groups—hence, for salience of the subordinate/dominant group conflict of example, lower-class or "poor white" racism. interest. Strategy 2(c) mentioned above is likely to be crucial here since, in general, access to resources such 3. Social Competition. The group members as housing, jobs, income, or education is sufficiently may seek positive distinctiveness through direct com central to the fate of any group that the relevant com petition with the out-group. They may try to reverse parisons are not easily changed or devalued. Few the relative positions of the.in-group and the out-group underprivileged groups would accept poverty as a on salient dimensions. To the degree that this may virtue, but it may appear more tolerable to the de involve comparisons related to the social structure, it gree that comparisons are made with even poorer implies changes in the groups' objective social loca groups rather than with those that are better off (see tions. We can hypothesize, therefore, following the Runciman, 1966). R.C.T., that this strategy will generate conflict and As noted above, some writers (Festinger, 1954; antagonism between subordinate and dominant Kidder & Stewart, 1975) imply that strategy 2(c) is a groups insofar as it focuses on the distribution of dominant response to status differences between scarce resources. Data relevant to this strategy have groups. The assumption is that intergroup comparabil been referred to earlier in this chapter. ity decreases as a direct function of perceived dissimi Let us assume as an ideal case some stratifica larity. If this were the whole story, then, somewhat tion of social groups in which the social hierarchy is paradoxically, the creation of a consensual status sys reasonably correlated with an unequal division of ob tem would protect social identity from invidious com jective resources and a corresponding status system parisons. The causal sequence would be as follows: (based on the outcomes of comparisons in terms of similar groups compare with each other; the outcome those resources). Under what conditions will this not determines their relative prestige; the perceived status lead to intergroup conflict—or, more precisely, to the difference reduces their similarity and hence com development of competitive ethnocentrism on the part parability; intergroup comparisons cease to be made; of the subordinate group? subjective superiority and inferiority decrease in sa First, to the extent that the objective and the lience; correspondingly, the groups' respective self- subjective prohibitions to "passing" are weak (see esteems return to their original point. There may be our earlier discussion of the "social mobility" struc occasions when this social-psychological recipe for ture of beliefs), low status may tend, in conditions of the maintenance of the status quo can be observed in An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict 45

something like its pure form. However, we shall argue tions are perceived as immutable, a part of the fixed presently that there are many status differences that do order of things, then social identity is secure. It be not reduce comparability. comes insecure when the existing state of affairs be For the moment, we can note that both indi gins to be questioned. An important corollary to this vidual mobility and some forms of social creativity argument is that the dominant or high-status groups, can work to reduce intergroup conflict over scarce too, can experience insecure social identity. Any resources—though with different implications. The threat to the distinctively superior position of a group former is destructive of subordinate-group solidarity implies a potential loss of positive comparisons and and provides no antidote to negative social identity at possible negative comparisons, which must be group level. The latter may restore or create a positive guarded against. Such a threat may derive from the self-image but, it can be surmised, at the price either activity of the low-status group or from a conflict of a collective repression of objective deprivation or, within the high-status group's own value system perhaps, of spurious rivalry with some other deprived (for example, the sociopolitical morality) and the group. It is interesting in this context that the French actual foundations of its superiority. Like low-status Canadians, having recently gained a more assertive groups, the high-status groups will react to insecure identity, are now apparently more disparaging of other social identity by searching for enhanced group minority groups than are the English Canadians (see distinctiveness. Berry etal., 1976). In brief, then, it is true that clear-cut status By reversing the conditions under which social differences may lead to a quiescent social system in stratification does not produce intergroup conflict, we which neither the "inferior" nor the "superior" can hypothesize that negative social identity promotes groups will show much ethnocentrism. But this ' 'ideal subordinate-group competitiveness toward the dom type" situation must be considered in relation to the inant group to the degree that: (a) subjective iden perceived stability and legitimacy of the system. Per tification with the subordinate group is maintained; ceived illegitimacy and/or instability provide new di and (b) the dominant group continues or begins to be mensions of comparability that are directly relevant to perceived as a relevant comparison group. As a great the attitudes and behavior of the social groups in deal of work has been done in social psychology on volved, whatever their position in the system. This is the determinants of cohesiveness and loyalty within the social-psychological counterpart to what is widely groups, we shall concentrate on the second condition. known today as "the revolution of rising expecta Let us consider a comparison between two football tions." Providing that individual mobility is unavail teams that have come first and second in their league, able or undesirable, consensual inferiority will be respectively. There is no argument about which has rejected most rapidly when the situation is perceived the higher status, but alternative comparative out as both unstable and illegitimate. This is probably comes were and, in the future, still will be possible. the set of conditions underlying the development When the new season begins, the teams will be as of ethnocentrism among Black Americans, French comparable and competitive as they had been before. Canadians, and New Zealand Maoris, for instance. In this instance, the status difference does not re Vaughan (in press) reports that the perceived feasi duce the meaningfulness of comparisons because it bility of social change (probably including, in this can be changed. instance, the perceived illegitimacy of the present This example illustrates Tajfel's (1974a) distinc situation) is an important predictor of the developing tion between secure and insecure intergroup compari Maori ethnocentrism; N. Friedman (1969) argues sons. The crucial factor in this distinction is whether that what we may term the "cognitive alterna cognitive alternatives to the actual outcome are tive" of Black nationalism in the developing coun available—whether other outcomes are conceivable. tries was influential in enhancing Black American Status differences between social groups in social social identity. systems showing various degrees of stratification can On the other hand, when the dominant group or be distinguished in the same way. Where status rela- sections of it perceive their superiority as legitimate, • -. ■■ .: ■ ■■ ■

46 Chapter 3

they will probably react in an intensely discriminatory and empirically distinct from out-group hostility. On fashion to any attempt by the subordinate group to the other hand, social-identity processes may provide change the intergroup situation. Such perhaps was the a source of intergroup conflict (in addition to the cases i post-bellum situation in the Southern United States: outlined above) to the degree that the groups develop the Whites, threatened by those who had been their conflicting interests with respect to the maintenance of slaves, rapidly abandoned their paternalistic ste the comparative situation as a whole. It seems plausi reotypes of the Blacks as "childlike" in favor of ble to hypothesize that, when a group's action for openly hostile and derogatory ones (see Van der positive distinctiveness is frustrated, impeded, or in Berghe, 1967). The reactions of illegitimately su any way actively prevented by an out-group, this will perior-groups are more complex (Turner & Brown, promote overt conflict and hostility between the 1976). It seems that conflicts of values are reduced by groups. This prediction, like many others, still re greater discrimination when superiority is assured, but mains to be tested. by less discrimination when it is unstable. This calls to "OBJECTIVE1 AND SUBJECTIVE- mind some Prisoner Dilemma studies in which White CONFLICTS discrimination against Black opponents increased the more cooperative was the opponent, but decreased the None of the arguments outlined in this chapter more competitive he was (Baxter, 1973; Cederblom must be understood as implying, that the social- & Diers, 1970). Baxter suggested in the title of his psychological or "subjective" type of conflict is article ("Prejudiced Liberals?") that a conflict of being considered here as having priority or a more values may underlie his data. important causal function in social reality than the Many of the points and hypotheses we have "objective" determinants of social conflict of which advanced in this chapter are not, in themselves, new the basic analysis must be sought in the social, eco (see, for instance, M. Sherif, 1966; Runciman, 1966; nomic, political, and historical structures of a soci Milner, 1975; Billig, 1976). What is new, we think, ety. The major aim of the present discussion has been is the integration of the three processes of social to determine what are the points of insertion of categorization, self-evaluation through social iden social-psychological variables into the causal spiral; tity, and intergroup social comparison, into a coher and its argument has been that, just as the effects of ent and testable framework for contributing to the these variables are powerfully determined by the pre explanation of various forms of intergroup behavior, vious social, economic, and political processes, so social conflict, and social change. This framework they may also acquire, in turn, an autonomous func contains possibilities of further development, and, tion that enables them to deflect in one direction or to this extent, we hope that it may stimulate theo another the subsequent functioning of these processes. retically directed research in areas that have not been It is nearly impossible in most natural social considered here. situations to distinguish between discriminatory in But some cautionary points should be made. tergroup behavior based on real or perceived con The equation of social competition and intergroup flict of "objective" interests between the groups conflict made above rests on the assumptions concern and discrimination based on attempts to establish ing an "ideal type" of social stratification in which a positively-valued distinctiveness for one's own the salient dimensions of intergroup differentiation are group. However, as we have argued, the two can be those involving scarce resources. In this respect, we distinguished theoretically, since the goals of actions have simply borrowed the central tenet of the R.C.T. aimed at the achievement of positively-valued in- There is no reason, in fact, to assume that intergroup group distinctiveness often retain no value outside of differentiation is inherently conflictual. Some of the the context of intergroup comparisons. An example experimental work that is proceeding at present at the would be a group that does not necessarily wish to University of Bristol points to the conclusion that increase the level of its own salaries but acts to prevent evaluative derogation of an out-group is conceptually other groups from getting nearer to this level so that An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict 47 differentials are not eroded. But the difficulty with this types and all other aspects of the "irrelevant" example—as with many other similar examples—is in-group/out-group differentiations so well described, that, in this case, the preservation of salary differen for example, in Sherif's studies. The first category of tials is probably associated with all kinds of "objec actions is both commonsensically and theoretically tive '' advantages that cannot be defined in terms of accounted for by assuming nothing more than the money alone. In turn, some of these advantages will group's desire to win the competition—although this again make sense only in the comparative framework poses all the theoretical "comparison" problems dis of intergroup competition. Despite this confusing cussed in this chapter; the second category of actions network of mutual feedbacks and interactions, the can be directly and parsimoniously accounted for in distinctions made here are important because they terms of the social-comparison-social-identity- help us to understand some aspects of intergroup be positive-ingroup-distinctiveness sequence described havior which have often been neglected in the past. here. A further distinction must be made between The "implicit" conflicts are those that can be "explicit" and "implicit" conflicts—a distinction shown to exist despite the absence of explicit in- that has to do with objectivity in a different way. A stitutionalization or even an informal normative ac conflict can be "objective" despite the fact that the ceptance of their existence by the groups involved. goals the groups are aiming for have no value outside The proof of their existence is to be found in the large of the context of intergroup comparison. This is so number of studies (and also everyday occurrences in when the conflict is institutionalized and legitimized "real life") in which differentiations of all kinds are by rules and norms, whatever their origin, that are made between groups by their members although, on accepted by the groups involved. This was the case in the face of it, there are no "reasons" for these dif Sherif's studies in their phase of competition between ferentiations to occur. Clear examples of this have the groups; and it also is the case in any football match been provided in several studies mentioned in this and in countless other social activities. The behavior chapter in which the introduction by the subjects of toward out-groups in this kind of conflict can be clas various intergroup differentiations directly decreased sified, in turn, into two categories, one of which can the "objective" rewards that could otherwise have be referred to as instrumental and the other as been gained by the in-group, or even directly by the noninstrumental. The instrumental category consists individual. Findings of this kind, which can be of all those actions whose explicit aim can be directly generalized widely to many natural social situations, related to causing the group to win the competition. provide a clear example of the need to introduce into The noninstrumental category, which could be re the complex spiral of social causation the social- ferred to as "gratuitous" discrimination against the psychological variables of the "relational" and out-group, includes the creation of negative stereo "comparative" kind discussed in this chapter.