Corso di Laurea Magistrale in Relazioni Internazionali Comparate

Tesi di Laurea

The Zionist Legacy: Water and Agriculture Management in

Relatore Ch. Prof. Matteo Legrenzi

Correlatore Ch. Prof. Massimiliano Trentin

Laureanda Erika Ingami Matricola 831505

Anno Accademico 2011 / 2012

Acknowledgments

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Matteo Legrenzi, for his prompt advice and his constant encouragement during the course of the research and writing process of this thesis. A special consideration also goes to Professor Massimiliano Trentin for his support and suggestions. I want to express my profound gratitude to my parents and to the rest of my family for having always believed in me. Their help and support goes well beyond the extent of this thesis, enduring through the course of my whole student career. I must say that without them, I would never have managed to achieve this goal. Furthermore, I thank my closest friends and colleagues who, despite the distance, have always been present and supported me during these past two years. Finally my endless thanks also goes to Kerry and Gerald for encouraging and motivating me during the past six months. I dedicate this work to Christopher. Thanks for being with me through every challenge.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT IV

INTRODUCTION 1 ABOUT THE CHAPTERS 5 RESEARCH AND METHOD 9

CHAPTER I 10

THE PROCESS OF NATION BUILDING IN AND THE ZIONIST IDEOLOGY 10 1.1 LAND AND IDENTITY: A NEW BEGINNING 10 1.2 SOCIALIST ZIONISM AND THE RELATION BETWEEN MAN AND NATURE 22 1.2.1 THE EXAMPLE OF A.D.GORDON 30 1.3 THE CONSTRUCTION OF AGRICULTURAL SETTLEMENTS: “THE DESERT NEEDS TO BLOOM” 32

CHAPTER II 38

IMMIGRATION, LABOR AND AGRICULTURE 38 2.1 THE HISTADRUT 38 2.2 THE JEWISH ECONOMY UNDER THE MANDATE 42 2.3 JEWISH ECONOMY AND ARAB LABOR: A DIFFERENT PERSPECTIVE 49 2.4 THE ECONOMY OF ISRAEL AFTER 1948 59

CHAPTER III 75

WATER POLICY AND AGRICULTURAL POLICY IN ISRAEL 75 3.1 LANDSCAPE AND WATER RESOURCES: AN OVERVIEW 75 3.2 WATER, AGRICULTURE AND THE ZIONIST LEGACY 81 3.2.1 THE “ETHOS OF DEVELOPMENT” 87 3.3 AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE SETTLEMENTS 90 3.3.1 CATEGORIES OF COMMUNAL SETTLEMENTS IN ISRAEL 93 3.4 THE ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENT: WATER MANAGEMENT AND MISMANAGEMENT 95 3.5 THE ROLE OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES CONFRONTING HARSH CLIMATIC CONDITIONS AND WATER SCARCITY 101 3.5.1 DESALINATION 108

CONCLUSION 112

HYDROGRAPHIC APPENDIX 126

GLOSSARY 135

REFERENCES 142

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Abstract

L‘elaborato si prefigge lo scopo di analizzare il legame esistente fra i valori dettati dal sionismo socialista e i problemi derivanti dall’odierna gestione delle risorse idriche in Israele, focalizzandosi sul ruolo specifico attribuito all’agricoltura nell’ambito della fondazione dello Stato. Nel corso della tesi emergerà come il sionismo1, grazie ai suoi forti valori ideologici e religiosi, abbia offerto al popolo ebraico una via d’uscita dal processo di assimilazione europeo proprio attraverso il ritorno a “Eretz Israel” 2. Il sionismo socialista si prefiggeva lo scopo di realizzare nella Terra d’Israele una società basata sulla collettività e sull’uguaglianza fra i propri membri. Il movimento, intendendo gettare le basi per la creazione di una comunità capace di essere economicamente autosufficiente, decise di promuovere il concetto di “uomo nuovo” attraverso l’esempio del pioniere sionista3, una figura capace di far fiorire una terra arida e ostile grazie al lavoro manuale e alla diffusione di comunità agricole. Negli ultimi vent’anni dell’Ottocento giunsero in Israele migliaia di ebrei provenienti dall’Europa orientale (a causa dei pogrom in ). Inoltre il flusso d’immigrati verso la Palestina crebbe notevolmente nel periodo compreso fra le due Guerre al punto che, quando nel 1948 fu fondata la nazione, lo Stato già ospitava 800.000 abitanti, di cui 650.000 erano ebrei. L’unico capitale su cui lo Stato d’Israele4 poteva contare era dunque il “capitale umano”. I kibbutzim e i moshavim5 ebbero un ruolo fondamentale nella formazione della nuova società ebraica, al punto che vi lavorarono anche personaggi di spicco quali Golda Meir 6 e Ben Gurion. Inoltre, sebbene ostacolata dalla scarsità di risorse idriche, l’agricoltura s’impose come settore trainante negli anni ’50.

1 Il movimento sionista creò una sorta di “nazionalismo ebraico”. 2 Terra d’Israele. 3 L’obiettivo era creare una società basata sul lavoro manuale attraverso la diffusione degli insediamenti agricoli. 4 Comunità ebraica in Palestina prima della fondazione dello Stato d’Israele. 5 I kibbutzim e i moshavim sono comunità agricole. A differenza dei kibbutzim, nei moshavim si pone maggiore enfasi sul concetto di “lavoro cooperativo”. 6 Golda Meir fu insegnante e premier israeliano. Fu eletta primo ministro d’Israele nel 1969. Fu la prima donna a guidare il governo israeliano. iv

Inoltre, sarà spiegato come dagli anni Sessanta in poi, il Likud7 iniziò a farsi largo creando le premesse per la sconfitta elettorale del movimento politico laburista, che da quasi trent’anni si trovava al potere. Il Likud, sin dalla vittoria elettorale del 1977, ha accelerato un processo di privatizzazione economica e di alterazione dei valori laburisti, sebbene i pilastri del sionismo socialista fossero in discussione già da prima delle elezioni, a causa del rapido sviluppo economico e del cambiamento della società Israeliana. La tesi esporrà alcune fasi centrali della storia dello Stato8, dall’inizio del XX secolo sino a oggi. Lo scopo dell’elaborato sarà di dimostrare l’influenza che l’ideologia sionista continua ad avere sulla gestione delle risorse idriche e sul settore agricolo, nonostante la crisi del sionismo socialista 9 . Per raggiungere quest’obiettivo la discussione partirà da considerazioni di tipo ideologiche e storiche (quali il concetto di “purificazione” legato al lavoro nei campi) sino ad arrivare ad analisi di carattere economico e ambientale. È necessario aggiungere che, anche prima del 1948, l’espansione degli insediamenti territoriali legati all’attività agricola faceva parte di una valida strategia di “conquista territoriale”, ottenuta tramite la dispersione della comunità ebraica nelle aree più periferiche e rurali del Paese. In conclusione, saranno enunciate le conseguenze dell’influenza del pensiero sionista sull’allocazione delle risorse idriche, risultante in un sistema centralizzato che, nonostante la scarsità d’acqua che affligge la nazione, prevede generosi sussidi al settore agricolo. A tal proposito, si analizzeranno le presunte ragioni per cui questo settore, che costituisce solo il 2-3% del Prodotto Interno Lordo del Paese, impieghi il 60% della quantità d’acqua disponibile.

L’elaborato è suddiviso in tre capitoli:

• Il primo capitolo mira a fornire un quadro storico del pensiero sionista e del fenomeno del “pionerismo” nella Terra d’Israele, soffermandosi anche sulle

7 Il partito trae le sue origini dal movimento sionista riformista di Zeev Jabotinsky. Oggi il Likud è un partito nazionalista liberale. Inoltre, le elezioni israeliane del 2009 hanno visto un ritorno al potere del partito. 8 L’elaborato partirà dalla storia dell’, la comunità ebraica in Palestina. 9 Il sionismo socialista rappresenta la corrente di sinistra del movimento sionista che sosteneva la creazione di uno stato ebraico in Palestina attraverso il lavoro della classe operaia tramite la diffusione d’insediamenti agricoli quali i kibbutzim e i moshavim. v

cause della migrazione di massa che vide migliaia di ebrei stabilirsi in Palestina. I nuovi immigrati volevano creare un’immagine di “popolo ebraico” capace di rovesciare quelle limitazioni professionali cui erano stati a lungo sottoposti nel corso della diaspora. L’analisi dimostrerà che il movimento sionista riteneva che non vi fosse alcun futuro per la comunità ebraica in Europa, e che quindi fosse necessario stabilirsi in Palestina per creare una società basata sul lavoro manuale e sull’uguaglianza. Nel corso del capitolo saranno anche spiegate le differenze esistenti fra i membri della Prima, Seconda e Terza . A tal proposito, sarà illustrato come gli immigrati della Prima Aliyah, non avendo alcuna esperienza in campo agricolo, impiegarono la forza-lavoro locale, invece di coltivare la terra indipendentemente. Inoltre, particolare attenzione sarà dedicata alla natura della collaborazione fra la comunità ebraica e il mandato britannico, iniziata formalmente con la Dichiarazione Balfour10, documento che stabilì in maniera ufficiale il supporto britannico per la creazione di una “sede nazionale” o “national home”11 per il popolo ebraico in Palestina. Saranno inoltre esaminate le idee digli esponenti principali del movimento sionista quali A.D. Gordon. In conclusione, il capitolo anticiperà la natura del ruolo giocato dall’Histadrut, istituzione le cui competenze saranno descritte in maniera più dettagliata nel capitolo seguente.

• Il secondo capitolo fornisce un’analisi storica, economica e sociale della nazione partendo dal ruolo dell’Histadrut, elemento essenziale per comprendere il diretto controllo del governo sulle strutture sociali ed economiche del Paese. Inoltre, questa sezione si soffermerà sull’analisi dei cambiamenti introdotti dal rapido sviluppo economico e dalle elezioni del 1977, cui seguirà una descrizione dei problemi riguardanti la bilancia dei pagamenti e le pressioni inflazionarie che hanno afflitto il paese sino alla metà degli anni ‘80. Nello specifico il capitolo verterà sull’analisi dei seguenti elementi: -L’economia dell’Yishuv durante il mandato. -L’economia araba ai tempi del mandato.

10 La Dichiarazione Balfour risale al 2 novembre 1917. Il documento, una lettera scritta dall'allora Ministro degli esteri inglese (Arthur Balfour) diretta a Lord Rothschild, vedeva il governo britannico impegnarsi ufficialmente nel fornire il proprio supporto alla creazione di un “focolare” ebraico in Palestina. 11 Claudio Vercelli, Breve Storia dello Stato d’Israele, 1948-2008, Carocci Editore, Roma, 2008. vi

-L’Histadrut e lo Gdud Haavoda12. -L’economia d’Israele dal 1948 sino a oggi. -Il controllo dello Stato sulle risorse nazionali e naturali. -Progetti idrici caratterizzati da un particolare “ethos”.

• Il terzo capitolo si propone di analizzare le questioni ambientali legate alla gestione delle risorse idriche nel paese, con un focus specifico sulle attività di ricerca e sviluppo nel campo dell’agricoltura sostenibile. In questa sezione della tesi si discute anche dell’importanza attribuita al controllo dei corsi d’acqua, considerati un bene di rilevanza strategica sin dalla fondazione dello Stato. La discussione tratterà alcuni aspetti in particolare: -Descrizione delle risorse idriche di superficie e sotterranee. -Gestione delle risorse idriche nazionali. -Prospettive future legate allo sviluppo di un’agricoltura “sostenibile”. -Risorse idriche non convenzionali.

Inoltre da questo capitolo emergerà che, nei primi anni di vita dello Stato, la mancanza d’acqua era avvertita come diretta conseguenza dell’assenza di strumenti di ricerca e di tecnologie avanzate, mentre oggi il Paese è a conoscenza della reale disponibilità di questa risorsa. Come sarà più volte menzionato nel corso della discussione, all’inizio degli anni ‘80 le pressioni inflazionarie costrinsero molti kibbutzim a contrarre debiti, specialmente in seguito al programma di stabilizzazione finanziaria del 1985 (che ebbe un duro impatto sul settore agricolo) 13 . Il capitolo prenderà anche in esame le conseguenze dei generosi aiuti destinati alla lobby degli agricoltori, sebbene la crisi degli anni ‘80 contribuì a cambiare sostanzialmente i valori di molte comunità agricole, le quali si sono di recente dedicate più al turismo che alla produzione agricola con lo scopo d’incrementare i propri profitti14. La sezione, verso le conslusioni, sarà dedicata ad alcune riflessioni riguardanti il ruolo del

12Il Gdud Haavoda fu fondato dagli halutzim della Terza Aliyah (1919-1923). L’organizzazione voleva fondare una singola grande comune basandosi su una vera ideologia socialista. L’Histadrut vedeva questo progetto come una possibile minaccia. 13 Israele: Gerusalemme, Tel Aviv, Galilea, Golan, Cisgiordania il Negev e il Mar Morto, Touring Editore, 1998. 14 Ibidem. vii

MARD15nello sviluppo di un’agricoltura sostenibile. Inoltre, sarà chiarito che in Israele le superfici agricole occupano 1/3 del territorio nazionale e che tutta la terra coltivata, appartenente allo Stato o al Fondo Nazionale Ebraico, è solo “ceduta” per un periodo di circa novant’anni alle comunità agricole o a singoli agricoltori. Infine, si dimostrerà che, per raggiungere un’agricoltura sostenibile, lo Stato non necessita solo di attività di ricerca e di nuove tecnologie, ma anche di ricalcolare il sistema dei prezzi e delle allocazioni. A tal proposito, nel corso del capitolo si tratterà anche di risorse idriche convenzionali e non- convenzionali (quali la desalinizzazione).

In conclusione, l’elaborato si prefigge lo scopo di spiegare come l’agricoltura israeliana affondi le proprie radici in un passato segnato da sfide continue, quali l’immigrazione di massa, la “conquista della terra”, le guerre e le ripetute crisi. Per comprendere l’odierna gestione delle risorse idriche e delle politiche agricole è necessario capire il passato di questo Stato “fuori dall’ordinario” e interrogarsi sull’eredità del pensiero sionista.

15 Ministero Israeliano dell’Agricoltura e dello Sviluppo Rurale. viii

Introduction

The Zionist legacy plays an integral role and gives an insight into understanding water management in today’s Israel. The object of this dissertation is to highlight the ideological features that are the basis of the disproportionate water allocation to the Israeli agricultural sector operated by the State. This thesis will examine the role that agriculture played in the creation of a nation, beginning with an assessment of the aspirations of the halutzim16 in a time before the State had been founded. The dissertation will then move through some of the crucial events that shaped the nation's history and the life of the Yishuv. The analysis will take into account the sociopolitical realities, the fundamental institutions and the main historical events. A careful study of these elements shows that in Israel the ideas of the past have left their legacy on the present in a unique country where Jewish people form a religious group but also a nation. Starting with historical and ideological assessments, (the importance of manual labor and the bond between the pioneers and the land) the study will evaluate economical and environmental features in order to determine the potency of the Zionist legacy on water and agricultural management in Israel. In fact, it was through Zionism that the quest for the land was turned into a tool for the achievement of a sovereign State. The key to understanding Israel’s history is hidden in the endured dialectic between mythos and reality. In fact, myths are engraved in the land as much as the land belongs to the myths17. Garfinkle defines the Jewish people as the “most successful trans-territorial civilization in the human history”18, because even though vulnerably exposed to discrimination and limitations during the course of the Diaspora, they later found the strength, through Zionism, to take their myths and transform them into something

16 The Jewish “pioneers”. 17 See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000. 18 Ibidem. 1 distinctive: a “rebirth”. For the first time in history, an exiled people managed to gain its sovereign state after a long Diaspora19. Zionism is often defined as a family with many members (among them Religious Zionists, Political Zionists, Labor Zionists and so on)20. It will be argued that consensus among the Zionists was found in the necessity of establishing a Jewish State in Palestine for the self-emancipation of the Jewish community. But the Zionists disagreed on many aspects of the future Jewish society and in specific on its ultimate form21. Zion was never considered an ordinary place where land is just land: it was instead, the land for Jewish people and a place of unity where ideology served as the cementing factor.

This thesis will dedicate particular attention to the patterns of development of the period immediately following the Independence through the analysis of several strategies adopted in order to meet the country’s challenges. The essay will also provide ideological, economical and historical considerations of the nation-building process, mainly trying to address the following questions:

-Who were the halutzim? -What stood behind “the redemption of the land”? -Which elements contributed to the transformation of Israel from a historical mythos into an imposing modern State?

In order to understand the approach of this thesis it is important to acknowledge that from 1903 to about 1923 a new wave of Jewish immigrants from a diverse background arrived in Palestine. In fact, the term “halutzim” in Hebrew is translated as “avant-garde” – “the ones who go before the collectivity”22. It is also interesting to know that the word “halutz” was used for the first time in the Zionist context in 1919, during the Third Aliyah (as a retroactive use towards the pioneers of the Second Aliyah).

19 See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000. 20 See: Horowitz, Moshe Lissak, Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel, Suny Press, 1989. 21 Ibidem. 22 See: Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt, Explorations in Jewish Historical Experience: The Civilizational Dimension, Brill Academic Publishers, 2004. 2

The halutzim migrated to Palestine in order to change the course of the Diaspora, renouncing wages and material privileges, with the scope of working for the collectivity23. The halutzim believed that “being in the Land of Israel” was a primary necessity. It was their longing for this land that, apart from socioeconomic, ideological and political speculations, pushed them to set for the “conquest of land”. The halutzim were aware that they came to Palestine in order to become manual laborers; a remarkable task that even Ben Gurion defined as “possible only for two categories of people: the strong and young ones and the persons of great will”24. in particular looked at the pioneer venture as a form of an elite society committed to the achievement of a national goal. This ethos differed from the one of the right wing faction within Zionism. From the viewpoint of Labor Zionism, the collective settlement experience was a specific pillar of the ideology (essential to rebuild the Jewish people and their world). Garfinkle defines the Israeli political system as a mixture of hybrid and organic elements. Hybrid refers to those aspects developed by many former colonies (Israel for instance, inherited its parliamentary system from the British), which once independent import their system from the outside; meanwhile, organic elements derive from the country’s social and economic reality. “ have a long collective history as a people”. This history is echoed in the present political life of a country where politics is at the top of the iceberg and is the mirror of the Israeli society25. Many aspects of today’s Israel have roots in the pre-state period (before 1948); this heritage can be explained through the creation of institutions such as the Histadrut (General Federation of Labor) as it will be argued in Chapter I. In Israel there are many state-owned enterprises and an extensive public sector providing a full range of public services. As a result of the significant concentration of economic resources in the hand of the public sector: the State is the main owner of land and water resources. Immediately after the Independence, the human capital alone was seen as capable of overcoming the environmental challenges (such as water scarcity) as well as the economical challenges.

23 See: Boaz Neumann, Land and Desire in Early Zionism, Brandeis University Press, 2011. 24 Ibidem. 25See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000.

3

Another crucial question that will be addressed in the course of the dissertation is that the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine substantially changed the life of the Arab laborers in the land. The growth of the Jewish economy before the establishment of the State of Israel had already led to Arab protests on several occasions (1920, 1921, 1929 and 1936). The waves of Jewish immigration and the Jewish land purchase activity had strained the relations between Arabs and Jews in the pre-state period. The Arab community was faced with the loss of land and job opportunities, furthermore, the British mandate failed to promote cooperation between the two communities. It will emerge that the need for putting the nation before the individual (in the Labor movement) was embodied by the conception of the agricultural settlements and by the substantial shift “from class to nation”26 27. It is important to know that, Labor Zionism was still profoundly influential in 1948 although the social and economic circumstances of the years following the independence determined a slight change in its ideology. In this respect, it is crucial to mention that the first forty years after 1948, were characterized by intense Jewish immigration to the country and by the insurgence of several conflicts28. According to Horovitz and Lissak, the ethno-national criteria of the state lie at the basis of Israel, a country with its symbols and traditions. The law of return was the essence of the Zionist program of immigration and conquest of the land29. Meanwhile, the Six-Day War is considered to be the real turning point for the fate of Israel: the country’s territory had grown by a factor of three. Furthermore, Israel’s control over the Golan Heights meant increasing the nation’s water potential through the appropriation of a key region for the State’s water supply.

There are many similarities between water and oil: water like oil can be over- exploited (through over-pumping); furthermore, similar to oil, water is essential to human activities but it is not infinite. Both for oil and water, the increase in population and higher standards of living may lead to a higher demand. Due to water scarcity in Israel, like in the rest of the Middle East, these similarities are even more acute. The

26As wished Ben Gurion wished. 27 See: Dan Horowitz, Moshe Lissak, Trouble in Utopia: The Overburdened Polity of Israel, Suny Press, 1989. 28 Ibidem. 29 Ibidem. 4 persistency of the Zionist ideology in the Israeli water policy has often been the object of the analysis of many scholars who (like Clive Lipchin) have repeatedly criticized the Israeli agricultural lobby for opposing any attempt to reduce subsidized water allocations related to agriculture30.

About the Chapters

The dissertation is divided into three chapters: • Chapter I provides an insight into the historical background of the Jewish community in the Land before the establishment of the State of Israel and of the forces that determined the mass immigration from Europe at the end of the XIX century. As explained in the course of the chapter, by the end of the 1880s, the Jewish people in Europe would either assimilate to the European societies or choose the Zionist option; the assimilation process would have posed a threat to the endurance of the Jewish identity. The analysis will show that the Zionists believed that there was no viable future for the Jewish people on the Continent and that the establishment of a homeland was the right answer to the Jewish problem (as it was called in Europe at the time). This section is also focused on: -The differences existing between the values of the pioneers of the First Aliyah and those of the Second and Third Aliyah. -The nature of the British-Zionist relationship. -The significance of the role played by the General Jewish Labor Federation in Palestine.

Indeed the settlers of the first Aliyah tried to form a class of Jewish laborers, but they failed in this task. These immigrants still relied on hired Arab workers for the establishment of Jewish landed estates. Other differences are best exemplified in their approach towards the land; for instance, the Second

30 See: Giuseppe Azera, Barbara Marniga, Geopolitica dell’Acqua: gli Scenari Internazionali e il caso del Medio Oriente, ACEA, Guerini Studio, 2003. 5

Aliyah propagated the central role that farming played within its ideology. The effective attempt to form a Jewish working class can be credited to this third wave of immigration. This paper will point out how Ben Gurion was determined to avoid the emergence of a class of Jewish colons 31: the construction of agricultural settlements such as the “exemplary moshavot” of Metula and Qastina and the kibbutzim were viewed as a national goal (here the Jewish farmers had to prove their knowledge of agricultural techniques in order to be selected). Attention will be also given to the nature of the British-Zionist relationship, a bond initiated with the Balfour Declaration. The Chapter will also survey the nature of the role played by the General Jewish Labor Federation in Palestine (created in 1920): a Labor Union that served as an umbrella for workers, who were provided with a full range of services and a health insurance system. Furthermore, it will be explained that the Histadrut (tightly connected to the Mapai party) was a useful element for the building up of the nation and conquest of the land. The role of the Histadrut will be explicitly emphasized in the second chapter.

• Chapter II also focuses on the and provides a more economical and social analysis of the country up until nowadays. The communalism features of the Israeli social institution come from the Yishuv’s necessity to be self-sufficient: the Jewish community had to rely on its resources. In specific the dissertation will outline: -The Jewish economy under the mandate. -The contrasting perspectives - the Arab Laborers’ viewpoint as opposed to the Jewish Economy. -The frictions between the Histadrut and the Gdud Haavoda. -The economy of Israel after 1948. -The government’s centrality. -The State control over natural and national resources. -The “ethos” that marked the National Water Carrier project.

31 As colonial farmers or plantation owners. 6

The first frictions between the Histadrut and the Gdud Haavoda emerged between 1922 and 1923. The Gdud was seen as a threat for the Histadrut because the organization tried to establish an alternative society based on moral, social and labor value in order to achieve a “socialist utopia”. The section will also address the changes introduced by the British presence in the land (that spread hope among the Zionists who finally had the support they needed for the establishment of a National Home); and the issue concerning Arab labor. In this respect, it will be discussed how the British departments for agriculture, public health and education were mainly focused on supporting the Arabs, because the British government considered the Yishuv much more independent and self-sufficient than the Arab community. The Law of Return of 1950 transformed Israel into a “Homeland” opening the country to every Jewish immigrant. The Jewish Agency (since 1929) and the Israeli government provided housing, agricultural settlements and employment. It was in the 1950s that the government tried to achieve a successful agricultural program in order to accomplish “self-sufficiency”. The National Water Carrier will be outlined as the main water project in the country due to its enormous proportions: its length corresponds to 2/3 of the country’s length. Nearing the end of the chapter, we will examine the 1977 elections (considered to be a political turning point in the history of the country since Labor lost office), as well as the chronic balance of payment crisis and the several devaluations implemented towards the end of the 1970s up until the beginning of the 1980s.

• Chapter III is dedicated to the analysis of the Israeli water management and environmental issues, with a specific focus on Israel’s future R&D32 within the field of sustainable agriculture. Under discussion is the importance of water since the very establishment of the State, and that water has always been considered an essential asset for the state’s development and for agricultural expansion33. In particular the following aspects will be addressed:

32 Research and Development. 33 See: Gila Menahem, Water Policy in Israel: Policy Paradigms, Policy Networks and Public Policy, Pinhas Saphir Center for Development, , Discussion Paper No. 1-99, 1999. 7

-Israel´s water resources. -Water management and mismanagement. -Future perspectives for the expansion of a sustainable agricultural sector. -Non-conventional water resources.

Special attention will be paid to the 1980s and to the effects of the inflationary pressures leading to a highly indebted agricultural sector. The subject matter will deal with the financial recovery program, which was implemented in order to stabilize the Israeli economy, but had the side effect of weakening the financial stability of the Israeli agricultural settlements. As a consequence, there was a cut in government spending and subsidies that saw most of the Israeli farmers nearly bankrupted. On one hand, the analysis will show that there has been an effective change in the perception of water scarcity in the land. In fact, at the time of the State’s foundation water shortage was connected to the lack of research and technology; meanwhile today, there is a different awareness concerning the real quantity of water available; and for this reason, Israel´s water supply is now obtained both from conventional and non-conventional water resources. On the other hand, it will be outlined that (despite this awareness) land ownership, government-owned enterprises and a strong public sector are still the effects of the governmental centralization. The Israeli government is involved in most natural and national resources. Submitting to the strategy initiated with the construction of the National Water Carrier, the government has set up a highly centralized organ for water distribution and allocation. On conclusion, the chapter will highlight that the work of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Israel is focused on a specific challenge: the achievement of a “sustainable agriculture capable of limiting any environmental hazard”. It will also be argued that the country’s most urgent needs are: reconsidering water subsidies to agriculture, the static protection of water prices and establishing more rational water allocations.

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Research and Method

The thesis’s literary review, the data collection and analysis process were mainly carried out at Tel Aviv University (TAU) during an academic semester for research and study activity abroad. Access to the catalogue of the university libraries, TAU online resources and attendance to courses in Israeli Economy and Politics have substantially contributed to the outcome of this thesis. Books, reports, articles and web sources have been largely consulted, serving as crucial sources of information during the research process.

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Chapter I The Process of Nation Building in Palestine and the Zionist Ideology

1.1 Land and Identity: a New Beginning

The land of Israel was under Ottoman occupation until 1917. The Jewish migration towards Palestine began in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. When talking about Israel we enter a dimension where ideas and ancient myths lay the foundation of the modern State to a point that, still today, they influence the Jewish contemporary reality. It is, therefore, not erroneous to say that Israel is “no ordinary country”. Israel is a country of immigrants. The origins of the Jewish migratory phenomenon have economic, ideological and historical values. The Jewish people have always been firmly connected to the Land of Israel34. Their self-identity could be partly defined through their connection to the “Land”35. This bond can be understood through a deep analysis of the Jewish situation in Europe at the end of the 1800s. An active movement calling for the return of the Jewish people to Palestine appeared only in the second half of the nineteenth century. The emergence of Zionism as a political force represented a real turning point: Zionism appeared in response to the wave of anti-Semitism spreading in Europe and it soon became more than a national ideology. At that time Jewish people had been feeling that, for them, there was no viable place or role in Europe. This led them to believe that a genuine integration process would never happen. The result was a Jewish identity crisis. The advent of the Russian pogroms and the anti-Semitic policies of the Tsarist government provoked an exodus of Jewish people from 1882 until 1914 that migrated to North or South America. Only 1% of them decided to go to Palestine36. Between 1882 and 1947 543,000 Jews settled in Palestine37. Their presence enriched the one of the 24,000 Jews that were

34 See: Boaz Neumann, Land and Desire in Early Zionism, Brandeis University Press, 2011. 35 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 36 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 37 The pogroms in the included the Odessa pogroms, Warsaw pogrom (1881), Kishinev pogrom (1903), Kiev Pogrom (1905) and the Białystok pogrom (1906). 10 already living on the land and had mainly settled in the cities of Hebron, Jerusalem, Safed38 and . On the other hand, the Arab inhabitants in the region constituted a majority of 1,000,000 million of individuals who mainly relied on agriculture39.

Figure 1 Russian Pogroms 1881. From http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/pogrom.htm

Sholomo Avineri describes the Jewish migration to Palestine in terms of a “push” and “pull” mechanism: Jewish people felt the push to leave Europe and the pull that attracted them to the Land. The “French revolution” and the “emancipation process” through the impact generated by their revolutionary ideas had given Jewish people the chance to attend universities in Europe and to gain access to new positions within the job market. It was a remarkable change, considering that at the beginning of the nineteenth century Jews living in Europe were still placed on the margins of society. They were socially emarginated due to the centrality of the Christian religion in Europe (for instance, not

38 is located in the northern part of Israel. 39 See: Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, University of California Press, 1996. 11 being Christian, they were excluded from most professions within the public service). It was only at the beginning of the twentieth century that the life of the Jewish community began to change. Years of emancipation and Enlightenment had resulted in cities like Vienna, Warsaw and Berlin having a high density of Jewish inhabitants who were in higher professions (some of them were employed as doctors, lawyers, philosophers, etc.). The mechanism of “push and pull” can be better exemplified through the definition of what was the Jewish problem. The problem deals with how the Jews used to perceive their community and with how others used to perceive them. Taking the Enlightenment as a turning point it is possible to distinguish their self-perception before and after this historical event. Before this milestone, Jews used to see themselves as belonging to the “gens Christiana”40. At that time, Jews were automatically excluded from politics because Christian states envisaged a political body reflecting its Christian attitude. What was even more detrimental for the Jewish problem was that a non-Christian in a Christian state could not own any land. The Kehilla 41 (theocratic organizational structure in the ancient Israelite society) 42 found the root of the actual dilemma in the fracture caused by the Enlightenment. For instance, “Jewish children could now be sent to a secularized school (…) and schools were opened on Saturday”43 but the liberal approach had not solved the Jewish problem. Jewish people felt as if they were “succumbing” to an assimilation process: they were losing their Jewish identity. Trying to resist such a process was seen as an act of “individual heroism”. Every decision, such as sending one’s children to school on Saturday or letting them eat at a non-Kosher school cafeteria, became vital44. It is astonishing to acknowledge how Jews for more than one thousand years were mainly exiled and did not have the chance to share the same land (a time in which Jewish people were waiting for the Messiah)45.

40 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 41 Generally the term is translated into “community”. The Kehilla was a form of organization used in order to face the dispersion of the Jews. 42 http://www.wikipedia.com. 43 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 44 Ibidem. 45 The destruction of the Temple, the exile of the Jewish people, and other events were seen as opportunities for the fulfillment of Judaism's "mission" to all mankind. The events of Western world, in its liberalism, the subsequent emancipation, social and educational reforms, were seen under the 12

Zionist’s main concern was the existence and preservation of the Jewish people as a whole. Therefore, the aspirations of the Jewish people in Europe found an answer in the perspective of Zionism. An example of perfectly emancipated and secularized Jewish individual was Theodor Herzl. He was a Jewish speaking journalist living in who used to write for the Neue Freie Presse. The fathers of modern Zionism (Theodor Herzl, Max Nordau and Leo Pinsker) all embraced the idea that “Liberalism and nationalism would have been the beginning of a new self-awareness for the Jews in Europe”46. It is of interest to note that all of them lacked a traditional religious background. Their main idea was to form a normal social structure that had to be headed by peasants. Agriculture was the center of this revolution whose motto was “going to the land to build it and be built by it”. was the one who managed to incorporate socialism within the Jewish national thought. The author was raised in a Jewish Orthodox environment in the Rhineland, and subsequently joined a group of left Hegelians. Hess had become a socialist as a result of the industrial revolution and his works always earned Karl Marx´s approval. At times, Karl Marx himself used to call him “my communist rabbi”47. His 1862 book entitled “Rome and Jerusalem” called for the establishment of a Jewish Socialist Commonwealth in Palestine. The Jewish question appears in all of his early writings. Hess distanced himself from the religious Orthodox environment where he had been raised because, on one hand, he was convinced that the Jewish integration into the revolution of the socialist movement could be a solution to the Jewish problem; and, on the other hand, in his “Rome and Jerusalem”, he believed that not this form of integration but rather the establishment of a homeland in Palestine was the right answer to the Jewish issue. Hess saw Judaism as a nation and often stated that the Jewish problem is a “national problem”. He saw Jewish people as a nineteenth-century-liberation movement and wanted the establishment of a Jewish Socialist Commonwealth in Palestine with a Jewish proletariat48. Hess was well aware of the fact that not the Jewish bourgeoisies of

perspective of the messianic age of which the prophets had dreamed. See: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org. 46 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 47 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 48 See: Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, University of California Press, 1996. 13

Central and Western Europe, but rather the Jewish people from the Muslim and Eastern European world would have settled there. The scholar was also deeply convinced that public ownership of the land and of the means of production had to be considered the pillars of this Commonwealth based on cooperation and on the community. There is no doubt that Hess, thanks to his approach, anticipated a trend that later would become a milestone of the Labor Zionist ideology. His thought could be synthesized in this statement “realization of the emancipator principle of socialism (…) applied to the specific context of the Jewish existence”49. A new Jewish National consciousness arose at the end of the nineteenth century, the outcome of which was a search for a new type of Jewish identity. This was a process that interested “the first generation of emancipated Jews”. Zionism was all about this awareness. Even on the Orthodoxy side The Sephardic Rabbi Yehuda Havi Akalai and the Ashkenazi rabbi Zvi Hirsh Kalisher showed how there could be a shift towards a more pragmatic approach. The Orthodox world was split: on one side, those who continued on the path of redemption, and, on the other side, those who had a new secular approach. Alkalai and Kalisher reflect on the atmosphere deriving from the pressures imposed by the non-Jewish society. It is interesting to not that both rabbis wrote in rabbinical Hebrew50. Alkalai tried to transfer the redemptive vision onto a theoretical perspective: the redeemer would come only after a “preparatory” phase. He was really pragmatic and basically took into account the conditions of Palestine: a country with harsh climatic conditions. Without a preparatory phase, a mass migration to the Holy Land would have been unfeasible. Palestine had to be gradually built and prepared for this aim. So, buying land and reviving Hebrew as a language were necessary aspects of this phase. The Jewish bourgeoisie in Europe was essential: it had to provide financial aid in the form of donations to the poor settlers in Palestine. They had to be involved in the process of buying land. Meanwhile, the creation of a Perpetual Fund to purchase land in Palestine was only a product of the subsequent Zionist activity. Kalisher like Alkalai believed that the redeemer would not reveal himself soon51. He envisaged raising money through offers and the establishment of a fund

49 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 50 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 51 Ibidem. 14 aimed at purchasing land. Rich Jewish families, like the , had to provide financial support. His idea of settlement reflected the importance given to a public and cooperative dimension. And, last but not least, agriculture had to become private. He wanted the establishment of an Agricultural School in Palestine. The Alliance Israelite Universelle subsequently implemented his idea52 and established the Mikveh Israel Agricultural School near Jaffa in 1870. This school became essential to the development of agriculture in Palestine. Both rabbis did not deal with the identity issue. Within the Zionist perspective Peretz Smolenskin (1842-85), who lived in Odessa, is considered to be a remarkable personality. In the nineteenth century, most Jews in Eastern Europe lived in Lithuania, Russia, Poland, Ukraine and other countries. There was a huge gap between the Jews living in Eastern Europe and those in Western Europe. For instance, the Jews living under the Tsarist regime were excluded from public service. French revolution ideas had not managed to get through to Russia. However, Odessa (a very unusual city for Russia), was the exception. It was a place for Jewish poets, writers, doctors and maskilim (the enlightened ones). At a certain point in his life, Smolenskin decided to move to Vienna, a city where he came into contact with the 1881 disturbances of the anti-Semitic riots in Tsarist Russia. It must be considered that the Pogroms had provoked a massive Jewish migration from Russia (about 3 million people). In his works, the attention of the scholar was mainly focused on the issue of the Jewish identity. In this regard, he wrote a series of essays entitled “It´s time to plant”53 denouncing how the only reliance on religious observance cannot be used as the only method to define a Jewish identity. Smolenskin believed that: “The Jewish people differ from all the other peoples. Just as a territory protects other peoples, the spiritual heritage protects the Jews”54. He identified four good reasons to explain why Palestine was the only suitable country for a “Homeland”. Among them, he remarked that the country had the potential to develop beyond an agricultural economy and towards a commercial one. It should also be said that the experience of the pogroms marked the works of Moshe Leib as

52 See: Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, University of California Press, 1996. 53 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 54 Ibidem. 15 well. He was a Lithuanian maskil who moved to Odessa in 1869. Due to the events of 1881, he had realized that the city had not remained invulnerable to the anti-Semitic pressures. He imagined an Israeli state where the plurality of differences among Jewish people would be preserved within a single Jewish identity. Within such a Jewish state there should be no form of oppression. The first one to move from emancipation to the concept of “autoemancipation” was a Russian Jewish doctor named Pinsker. Among his works he wrote a pamphlet entitled “Autoemancipation”. It should be stressed how this publication became central to revolutionary ideas of a whole generation of Jews. Pinsker had studied medicine in Moscow but lived in Odessa. He criticized the concept of emancipation both in a pragmatic and in a theoretical way. Emancipation, according to him, involved Jews as passive subjects; meanwhile “autoemancipation” saw them as active participants. Thus, “autoemancipation” meant self-determination55. “A utopian or messianic solution” could not be a concrete answer to the Jewish problem. He wanted to provide Jews with a new pragmatic solution, moving beyond the concepts of assimilation and integration. He first pointed out how Jews differ from other peoples because they lacked the allegiance to a sovereignty, but he also highlighted how “they are seen by others as a nation (...) Jews lived for too long in a limbo”56. Furthermore, as a doctor, he tried to provide a clinical explanation for the phenomenon that he defined Judeophobia. In his studies, he gave priority to the issue of the Jewish people rather than to the land. The act of settling was for him more important than the destination. For another scholar, Ben Yehuda (1858-1922), the focus was rather on Hebrew (as an everyday language spoken not only by the enlightened-ones but also by every Jewish person). His own migration to Palestine was a “radical” decision. He was the only Hebrew Russian among the maskilim57 who managed to migrate to Palestine. He settled there before the 1881 pogroms. He believed that no national culture is created without the social background of national life. He took as an example the “linguistic renaissance and national political revival” of other countries. His main targets were the , the Jewish people and the Land. His ideas, in this respect, became

55 Ibidem. 56 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 57 Title of honor standing for "scholar" or "enlightened man". See: http://www.wikipedia.com. 16 fundamental for the creation of a national thought. Jewish people saw auto emancipation as the only possible solution to the Jewish problem. Nathan Birnbau58, a Viennese Jewish writer, coined the word Zionism. Only later, the Zionist movement of Herzl would have politicized this term. Theodor Herzl (1860-1904) was the convener of the held in Basel from 29th to 31st of August 1897. The congress was meant to set the basis for negotiating with the Powers about the recognition of the Jews as a people and for the implementation of a plan for a Jewish state by means of migration waves and land development. Two hundred people attained the congress that established the creation of a parliament, an executive, an electoral system, and a division between local and regional organizations. The Basel program set the main goals to be accomplished59. Through the Balfour declaration and the S. Remo conference the Jewish people were given confirmation of a “Jewish National Home”. Chaim Weizmann60 leader of the Zionist organization together with others managed to convince the British to support this project61. Only after Herzl’s death, we could see the instigation of the settlement program, through waves of immigrants coming to Palestine (1904-5). Theodor Herzl, the visionary of Zionism, founded the World Zionist Organization and became the father of political Zionism. His writings “The Jewish State” and “Alteneuland” deal with all the Jewish dilemmas that other scholars dealt with. But the real novelty of his works, which so deeply influenced the , was in their capacity to make an impact on public opinion. He distinguished himself for his realistic and anti-romantic approach, especially concerning the Jewish Question62. The scholar managed to transform what was a general debate on the fate of Jewish people within the Jewish world into a worldwide debate. Substantially the

58 In 1890, Birnbau coined the terms “Zionist” and “Zionism,” and, in 1892, “Political Zionism.” In 1893, he published a brochure entitled Die Nationale Wiedergeburt des Juedischen Volkes in seinem Lande als Mittel zur Loesung der Judenfrage (“The National Rebirth of the Jewish People in its Homeland as a Means of Solving the Jewish Question”), in which he expounded ideas similar to those that Herzl was to promote subsequently. See: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org. 59 See: Alex Bein, The Jewish Question. Biography of a World Problem, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Pr, 1990. 60 In 1918, Chaim Weizmann was made head of the Zionist Commission and was envoyed to Palestine by the British government in order to advise on the future development of the region. 61 See: Alex Bein, The Jewish Question. Biography of a World Problem, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Pr, 1990. 62 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 17

Jewish issue stopped being a marginal phenomenon. Herzl could only rely on his profession and personality; he had no financial resources and lacked that support he needed from the Jewish establishment. He understood the importance of public opinion and used it as an instrument. It was, in fact, thanks to this implementation, that the Zionist movement would manage to achieve results such as the Balfour Declaration or the UN Resolution of 1947. As a semi-assimilated person, with scarce knowledge of early Zionist writings, he managed to give a new perspective to the Jewish question. According to him, this sense of hatred towards the Jewish people may always have been present being deeply rooted in society. He knew that assimilation would have not stopped the anti-Semitic feeling towards the Jews. Only politics and a nationalist approach could provide Jews with a solution. Land was his first goal: he foresaw the establishment of a Jewish state proving to be more open and goal-oriented than his predecessors. In “Der Judenstaat” (The Jewish State) of 1986 Herzl argues that the essence of the Jewish problem was not individual but rather “national” and that “The Jewish question persists wherever Jews live in appreciable numbers. Wherever it does not exist, it is brought in together with Jewish immigrants”63. The introduction of his book is dedicated to the concept of sovereignty over a territory and, even at the beginning, defining an exact location seemed to be a secondary objective, he was already thinking of Argentina or Palestine as suitable states. Due to its more binding relations with the Zionist groups, Palestine became its only target. He envisaged the “Homeland” as a democratic country based on cooperation and capable of applying all the technology required in order to make the desert bloom. For too long, Jewish people had been subjected to restrictions by others. He therefore foresaw a healthy cultural and national Jewish renaissance in Palestine. Herzl understood that the formation of a Jewish state would have involved a radical change within the Jewish society. Jews had to be transformed from a “class into people” they would have been employed in industrial agricultural and scientific fields with no limitations. He realized the deep transformation of the social structure could not be achieved through a simple market economy64.

63 See: A.N.U.S “Theodor Herzl”, http//www.anus.com. 64 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 18

The state had to be central and a public ownership of land had to be imposed “No private property in land and natural resources”. The would become owner of the land possessed by the Zionist Organization. The Jewish State had to provide workers with public housing and social welfare institutions. “We shall march into the Promised Land carrying the badge of labor”65. Herzl´s socialism is of a humanitarian and reformist kind: it is a constructivist approach. He based the establishment of a Jewish state on socialistic and cooperative features because he knew that starting a State from scratch meant creating a mutualistic kind of society. To him we due the implementation of a program aimed at raising funds from the Jews living around the world by a company of stockholders (the World Zionist Organization). Another activist, Max Nordau, was a journalist and one of the most remarkable writers from the late nineteenth century. His family was very religious he distanced himself from the family environment and only later entered the Zionist movement influenced by his friend Herzl66. His speech opened the Congress in Basle. He was of the opinion that emancipation had been a real failure and that “the western Jew has bread, but man does not live on bread alone”67. Emancipation had proved to be an abstract idea and Jewish people found themselves trapped between leaving behind their old identity and having to visualize a new one not yet attainable. Moses Hess analyzed how the critique of modern society could be applied to the Jewish situation through social considerations. He was the only one of his own generation to develop this theory. But within modern Zionism and his main approach socialist Zionism became a leading trend and to the point that Labor Zionism was the leading approach until the 1977 elections.

Another scholar to be born in Russia was Nachman Syrkin. His involvement in the German Socialist Democratic movement and his participation in the Zionist congress made him a central figure within the debate over the Jewish problem. To the critique of Jewish integration he added a socioeconomic analysis. He also discussed the

65 Ibidem. 66 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Press, New Edition, 1999. 67 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 19 existing connection between the socialist movement and Jewish nationalism68. The Socialist movement saw Judaism merely as a religion and analyzed why Zionism had to be socialist. Developing an Israeli State in Palestine on the basis of laissez-faire approach would have been unfeasible. The Jewish settlement had to be planned on a large scale using a socialist model. A capitalist market economy would have not been compatible. Israel would have been a country capable of employing sophisticated agricultural techniques but the land had to be publicly owned. What Syrkin managed to foresee is what could be later found within the Labor Zionism scheme. Meanwhile, Borochov tried to find a legitimate explanation for socialist Zionism within Marxism. In his works he describes how a Jewish upper bourgeoisie naturally leans towards assimilation and does not feel the urgent need to find an answer to the Jewish question. He identifies just one class within the Jewish society that does not have the luxury to choose but feels compelled to look for a new economic dimension. According to the scholar, the groups of interest (the Jewish working class and the lower middle class) had to be part of an “active” process. These two categories had to migrate to Palestine in order to create a new revolutionary society and new infrastructures69. There, the Jewish peasantry and working class would find a future. This goal might have been achieved both in a spontaneous and in a conscious way. The spontaneous course sees the masses forced to leave Eastern Europe. The conscious effort is the will of the masses to transform the social pyramid of the new Jewish society. This is reflected in Borochov´s words “the emancipation of the Jewish people either will be brought by Jewish Labor or it will not be attained at all.”70The Jewish proletariat would have become the center of this national revolution. Israel would be a semi-agricultural country and not a highly industrialized one. Ben Gurion distinguished himself for his controversial approach. He was a socialist who tried to apply socialist ideas to the Jewish labor71. He was also an agnostic who enjoyed referring to the Bible and created the political connection between Labor and Zionism. He managed to create the Zionist dream of Jewish sovereignty; he was a charismatic person who was at the same time very complex. He believed that Zionism

68 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press, New Edition, 1999. 69 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981. 70 Ibidem. 71 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press, New Edition, 1999.

20 was a revolt and in particular a revolt against Jewish tradition, and that in order to attain this revolution he needed to look for a suitable social subject. The Labor movement in particular was, according to Ben Gurion, this element capable of creating the social infrastructure required for a viable existence in Palestine. Palestine had to be economically self-sufficient. Jewish people had to learn how to be economically independent essentially supported by their own labor force. Employing non –Jewish labor force and depending on donations coming from abroad would be creating a society doomed to fail. This is why, according to Ben Gurion, Jewish society in Palestine would have to be based on Jewish labor. The settlers of the first Aliyah tried to create a class of Jewish peasants. The result was a gradual introduction of Arab workers resulting in the creation of great Jewish landed estates, and what Ben Gurion wanted to avoid was the creation of a class of Jewish colons. He knew that creating a class of Jewish manual workers would have been a hard task, even more difficult than the migration process itself. He was also convinced of the urgent necessity of spreading Jewish people all over Palestine and in particular, to the Negev. Ben Gurion’s role as head of the Jewish Agency meant a double shift: “from Diaspora to Palestine and from the bourgeois Zionism to the Labor movement”. It is important to understand how the Labor movement consisted of people who had changed their existence and migrated to Palestine. They wanted to become workers or farmers and rejected their “bourgeois” European roots. Ben Gurion did not distinguish Socialism from Zionism: he saw the two concepts merging within Labor Zionism. He saw the Hebrew worker coming to Palestine as a pioneer that through the creation of his agricultural or industrial enterprise would satisfy the national interests.

21

1.2 Socialist Zionism and the Relation between Man and Nature

Since the destruction of the First Temple72 in the sixth century B.C. Jews have always been motivated by their desire to acquire land. The desire of the pioneers became concrete and referred to a specific land. The term “halutz” in Hebrew indicates a pioneer. The halutzim migrated to Palestine in order to change the course of the Diaspora, by doing so they were aiming at a concrete objective. The halutzim were considered pioneers because they were early Jewish immigrants to Palestine. In Russia, towards the end of the 1850s, a minority of Jews began to see Zion73 as the “idyllic land of the muses” rather than pure religion, and between 1882 and 1891, the first Aliyah saw 22,000 Jews settling in Palestine in order to start an enterprise that, at the time, proved to be difficult and hostile. They would later become role models for the creation of the first agricultural settlements (such as Rishon Le-Tzion or Yaakov in Samaria74). The First Aliyah (1882-03), the Second Aliyah (1904-14) and the Third Aliyah (1919-23) saw about 35,000 immigrants (per wave) establishing new settlements. The old Yishuv, the Pre-Zionist Jewish community in Palestine, had a diverse approach compared to the settlers of the Second Aliyah. Its members were rather isolated and still presented inner divisions within the Jewish community. Thus, the difference of attitude between the pioneers of the First Aliyah and the ones of the Second and Third Aliyah go well beyond their social relations. Other differences are best exemplified in their approach towards the land. Boaz Neumann highlights how the Jews who came during the First Aliyah had a specific attitude towards the land:

72 During the kingdom of Judah, Salomon’s Temple (the First Temple) was dedicated to Yahweh, the God of Israel. Rabbinic sources argue that the First Temple stood for 410 years and that it was destroyed in 422 BCE, 165 years later than secular estimates. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 73 Synonym of Jerusalem. 74 See: Anita Shapira, Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881-1948, Standford University Press, 1999. 22

“They did not use to work it with their own hands, land was a business and they had no interest in creating a new Jewish body or establishing Hebrew as a native language. The land of Israel, for them, was not mother Earth”75.

On the other hand, the Second Aliyah was very successful (also in terms of human capital), and made the Yishuv extremely optimistic towards the absorptive capacity of the land. At this point, the halutzim became the protagonists of a Jewish revolution; it was clear that they had migrated in order to implement a transformation. Meanwhile most of the historians agree that the Second Aliyah ended in 1914. There are some disputes concerning the exact moment of its beginning. The arrival of the first halutzim is often seen as a milestone, but most of the historians identify the Pogroms of 1903 as the main reason for the migratory wave. This process saw the Jewish population growing from 50,000 to 85,000 people, to the point that in 1914 the Jewish inhabitants in the land represented 12% of the whole population in Palestine. The Second Aliyah saw more than one category of Jewish people migrating to Palestine. One group was represented by middle-class people who settled in moshavot, a second group, constituted “pious and urban” people who had the same background of the Jews of the first Aliyah, and a third small group of immigrants who was made up of settlers coming from Yemen (one in 1907 and the other in 1912). The third group of settlers decided to become part of the old Yishuv and some of them worked as laborers for Jewish farmers. The Second Aliyah people shared values such as the importance dedicated to manual agricultural work and to the revival of the Hebrew culture. To the pioneers we due the establishment of settlements like the Moshav Po’Alim (was particularly advanced for its attempt at merging urban and agricultural labor).

The Second Aliyah distinguished itself for the central role that farming played within its ideology. Palestine was a country with a substantial problem: its land was not favourable for the establishment of an extractive or plantation colony. Initially, Jewish agriculture was all located in the hilly regions of the country, and was also expanding

75 Boaz Neumann, author of “Land and Desire in early Zionism” gives a provocative analysis of the Jewish desire towards the land at the very beginning of the twentieth century. See: Boaz Neumann, Land and Desire in Early Zionism, Brandeis University Press, 2011. 23 along the coastal areas, while arid zones were left aside. These conditions made private investment considerably difficult to achieve, but it must be said that Zionism could count on its real resource: the World Zionist Organization.76 The biggest portion of the Second Aliyah halutzim belonged either to the Marxist Poalei Zion77 or to the socio-nationalist Hapoel Hatzair78 parties. The members of the second party viewed the establishment of independent settlements as necessary for the creation of a socialist society in Palestine. Shmuel Eisenstadt79 notes that the experiments of the agricultural workers during the course of the second Aliyah, especially within the field of “their organizational solutions for practical problems” were strictly connected to their ideologies80.

Figure 2 Group of Poalei Zion members (1913). Source: http://www.jewishgen.org

76See: Dowty, Alan, The Jewish State: A Century Later. University of California Press, 1998. 77 Poalei Zion stands for "Workers of Zion". In the year 1905 the Poalei Zion Party was established in Palestine. 78 Hapoel Hatzair stands for "The Young Worker". This Labor Party was founded in 1905 by the Jewish pioneers of the Second Aliyah. Its main ideology indicated Jewish labor as a Zionist value. See: Zionism and Israel - Encyclopedic Dictionary at http://www.zionism-israel.com/dic/. 79 Shmuel Eisenstadt is an Israeli sociologist who studied and researched the dynamic aspects of the major civilizations and highly contributed to the fields of cultures, modernization and social and political change. 80 See: Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, University of California Press, 1996. 24

The First World War and its events led the Second Aliyah immigration towards Palestine to a halt. It was only in 1917, with the Balfour Declaration and the subsequent incorporation within the League of Nations project for a Mandate in Palestine that the Jewish people were given formal recognition of their right for a Jewish Homeland81. During the course of the First World War, the British made the Zionists a promise: they would have supported the establishment of a Jewish settlement in Palestine (after the end of the war). The Balfour Declaration did not mention explicitly the idea of a Jewish State; it rather referred to it implicitly. The prospect of the creation of a Jewish State of Israel would give the Jewish people the chance to move on. The Zionists, who saw the declaration as an incredible opportunity, were glad to send a Jewish Brigade to serve in the British army and collaborated with the establishment of a British mandate in Palestine (official only in 1924). The Balfour Declaration initiated a new époque. The process started by Theodor Herzl would result into the creation of the State of Israel. The British presence in Palestine managed to provide the Jewish settlers with a certain level of security: before the establishment of the mandate the Jewish farmers had been exposed to tough conditions, to the point that in 1919 the Jewish population had decreased to 35,000 inhabitants. Palestine gradually became a safe place to go for all the Jews coming from all over the world. It became a “shelter”. These courses of the events resulted in a third wave of migration to Palestine starting only at the end of the war. In particular, this third wave of immigrants felt the influence of the Marxism and the Socialist revolution. This phenomenon was characterized by larger settlements and kibbutzim and by a Jewish population in expansion. It is estimated that no less than 31 new Jewish settlements were established between 1920 and 1923. At this point, it is important to mention the example of Merhavia82, as the first settlement in the Jezreel Valley83 that was initially property of the Arab village of and was only later transferred into the hands of the Jewish National Fund. In 1922 this

81 See: Alex Bein, The Jewish Question. Biography of a World Problem, Fairleigh Dickinson Univ Pr, 1990. 82 It was established in 1911 as the first modern Jewish settlement located the Jezreel Valley. It was a co- operative farm. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 83 The Jezreel Valley is a large fertile plain and inland valley located south of the Lower area. 25 place was re-established as a Moshav84 due to social and economic issues, and was only in a second moment turned into “ Merhavia” (1929). At the very beginning the workers of these settlements were joined by an agronomist who taught them how to cultivate. Everything was based on a collective decision, in fact, their members had to decide together which type of crops were to be cultivated

The process of bonding with the land is a product of the Second and Third Aliyah. The Land of Israel was considered as something pure, eternal and maternal. The Return to the Land was seen as a rebirth. The rebirth was achieved through the total reliance on manual labor. The halutzim all cultivated the land as a pillar of the Zionist- pioneer experience. According to A.D. Gordon, the pioneer in this act of cultivating land was experiencing a form of assimilation to nature. The way in which the halutzim used to cultivate the land was of secondary importance. Some of them used their bare hands and others used specific tools. Water, in particular, was given a true symbolic meaning, being a scarce resource in a country affected by harsh climatic conditions. Most of the halutzim were born in countries that did not suffer from water scarcity. To deal with the desert environment of Palestine was a new challenge. The halutzim considered nature as an aesthetic and open experience and believed that “men have the power to humanize nature” through their collective action.

Figure 3 A group of halutzim in Tel Aviv (1923). Source: http://kehilalinks.jewishgen.org

84 Meerhavia became a Moshav ovdim (lit. workers' moshav). “A moshav ovdim is a workers cooperative settlement, the more numerous type that relies on cooperative purchasing of supplies and marketing of produce; the family or household is, however, the basic unit of production and consumption”. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 26

It is essential to understand how the Jewish settlers perceived the Arabs living on the land. There is evidence that the halutzim often felt that the Arabs constituted an obstacle. The Arab presence was more than once described as “blots on the environment”85 (even though they were still employed in the old moshavot and in some new farms). The Arab people were living together with the Jewish people sharing the same land being at the same time “absent”. According to the halutzim the Arabs had lived in “a land without organs”, they had not been able to build the Land and could not conquer it the way the pioneers did because they showed laziness and lacked the technological advantage. The Jews called them the “Arab labor” because the Arab way of farming was considered primitive. In the totality of the Jewish agricultural experience there was not enough room left for what was perceived as “the other”. Even Ben Gurion (who knew that most of the local population was Arab) pointed out how their majority was not capable of transforming the fate of the state. The focus was on the Jews: they were the ones who had introduced sophisticated agricultural methods and tools and had expanded new farming settlements. For the halutzim the Arab presence on the Land became only a further confirmation of this Jewish status86. The Jewish objective was not a destruction of the Arab society but rather an improvement of their living standards. Most of the halutzim believed that the Arabs on the land “the Arab fellaheen”87 descended from the ancient Jews who stayed in Palestine and converted to Islam. It is within this framework that we see the particularly remarkable works of Ytzhak Epstein88. He was a Russian-born teacher who had moved to Palestine and wrote "The Hidden Question" (an article in Hebrew that dealt with the Jewish attitude towards the Arabs in Palestine) that stressed how the way Jews were dealing with the Arabs was leading to frictions between the two factions. He was aware that meanwhile more than 500,000 thousand Arabs lived in the land, the Jews were a minority of only 80,000 people.

85 See: Boaz Neumann, Land and Desire in Early Zionism, Brandeis University Press, 2011. 86 See: Boaz Neumann, Land and Desire in Early Zionism, Brandeis University Press, 2011. 87 Fellaheen is a word used to describe a villager or a farmer of the Middle East in the Ottoman period and even later. 88 Epstein´s work was particularly focused on the public activity was in the educational arena rather than in politics. 27

The most important question raised by his article concerned the future of the Arab fellaheen. What would happen to them after all their land had been transferred into Jewish hands? Jewish people were buying their land legally, and even though the Arabs were not the legal owners anymore, they still had the right to live in their land. But a problem remained: Arabs had no source of income. Even though the Arabs were employed by the halutzim, they would not remain long under these terms Epstein wrote:

“Can we rely on such a method of land acquisition? Will it succeed and does it serve our goals? A hundred times no. A nation which declared: "but the land must not be sold beyond reclaim", and which gives preference to the rights of one who cultivates the land over one who buys it, must not and cannot confiscate land from those who work it and settled on it in good faith. We must not uproot people from land to which they and their forefathers dedicated their best efforts and toil. If there are farmers who water their fields with their sweat, these are the Arabs”89. (Yitzhak Epstein, THE HIDDEN QUESTION. 1907).

From 1978 until 1936 about ¾ of the land owned by the Jews was purchased from big Palestinian landowners90. In 1903 the process of land accumulation by the Jewish people in Palestine had stopped. The workers of the Second Aliyah, at first, wished to be assimilated within the settlement of the first Aliyah () and then went well beyond this assumption91. The term “conquest of labor” is a product of the Second and Third Aliyah. The First Aliyah intended labor only as tool to be used in order to acquire land. Initially, the moshavot was modeled on the imitation of the Arab fellah’s field- crop. It was common to see Jewish people cultivating grain. The result was that, gradually the Arabs who were former owners of the Palestinian land, were employed as laborers by strangers on their own territory. Epstein had understood the precarious conditions in which the Jewish community was at the moment and he believed that it was too risky “to provoke a sleeping lion”:

“Let us not make light of its rights, and especially let us not, Heaven forbid, take advantage of the evil exultation of their own brothers. Let us not tease a sleeping lion! Let us not depend

89 See “Yitzhak Epstein”, http://qumsiyeh.org/yitzhakepstein. 90 See: George E. Bisharat, Land, Law, and Legitimacy in Israel and the Occupied Territories, American University Law Review 43, no. 2 (467-561), 1994. 91 See: Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, University of California Press, 1996. 28

upon the ash that covers the embers: one spark escapes, and soon it will be a conflagration out of control”. (Yitzhak Epstein, THE HIDDEN QUESTION. 1907)92.

He was the first one to foresee a future conflict between the two factions. He believed that the Jewish conquest of the Land should have been done under certain conditions and particularly with consideration of the Arab rights. Epstein asserted that before acquiring land the Jewish people should have taken into account several aspects and showed consideration for the owner of the land in question. Furthermore, instead of exploiting the Arab labor, the Jewish settlers should have taught the Arabs scientific and modern agricultural technique. He argued that:

“Our agronomists will advise them, teaching them the sciences of agriculture, husbandry and cross-breeding, and show them the scientific ways to fight cattle and poultry epidemics and pests of the field, vineyard and garden. They will be able to cheaply purchase medicines against disease and, when in need, will have access to the Jewish doctor. Their children will be accepted in our schools, and when we can relieve the burden of the tithe, they will also be relieved. Although in the early days they will view us with suspicion, not believing the innovations and even less the innovators, but from day to day our integrity will become evident, and they will see the innocence of our aspirations and benefit of our reforms, which will undoubtedly succeed in the hands are such a diligent, wise and frugal people”. (Yitzhak Epstein, THE HIDDEN QUESTION. 1907)93.

The halutzim carried out a deep research activity on the Palestinian territory. With the help and the supervision of their agronomists the halutzim used labor as a tool to conquer and penetrate the land. The action of planting trees was seen as a way to establish a deep connection with mother earth and to plant their roots in the land of Israel. Their belief was that everything the halutzim worked with their own hands and especially the fruit of Jewish labor in Palestine meant purity. From this assumption, the simple “act of sending oranges to relatives overseas”94 acquired a metaphoric meaning. On the other hand, the non-Jewish labor was considered a sin.

92 See: http://qumsiyeh.org/yitzhakepstein. 93 Ibidem. 94 See: Boaz Neumann, Land and Desire in Early Zionism, Brandeis University Press, 2011. 29

1.2.1 The Example of A.D.Gordon

The pre-1914 period was marked by the ideology of A.D. Gordon. Gordon was one of the most unusual personalities within the pioneer movement whose personal experience in Palestine made him one of the most remarkable Zionist thinkers95. The Second Aliyah (1904-14) saw waves of young pioneers arriving in Palestine (about 30.000 people) and the Jewish population reaching 85.000 settlers. When Gordon made Aliyah with his wife and his daughter in 1904, he was no youngster. Apart from his age (forty-eight)96, he had not joined any Labor Zionist group. In fact, he had left behind him a successful career in Russia where he was responsible for an agricultural estate belonging to one of his relatives. In Palestine A.D. Gordon had to start from scratch: he decided to start his new life dedicating himself to manual labor, working first as an agricultural laborer in Petah Tikvah and then in the Galilee and Jordan Valley. His ideas became the basis for the Hapoel Hatzair97 ideology even though he had never pictured himself as a socialist in a “doctrinaire way”. This party belonging to the Labor Zionist movement would later attract “the pioneers from the Second Aliyah who were not part of the Marxist Socialism of Poalei Zion (party of Borochov, Ben Zvi and Ben Gurion)”98. His focus on the importance of manual labor and the new kibbutz phenomenon made him a central element of the movement. His principles would echo the future development of the Labor Zionist movement. Gordon rejected the idea of the urban society and culture. He identified it as the main cause of alienation: Gordon was in Palestine because he wanted to distance himself from a decadent European society. He believed that there was only one way for Jewish people to experience a renaissance, and that it was through manual labor. To him, a human being could only be truly human when in direct contact with nature. He envisaged that the physical migration to Palestine would have not been enough for this

95 See: Amos Perlmutter, A.D.Gordon: A Transcendental Zionist, Taylor&Francis Group, 1971. (pp. 81- 87). 96 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press, New Edition, 1999. 97A Zionist group active in Palestine from 1905 to 1930 that was founded by Yosef Ahronowitz, Yosef Sprinzak and Gordon. In accordance with Gordon´s thought the group had non-Marxist, Zionist, socialist approach. Hapoel Hatzair wanted the establishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine to be achieved through the conquest of labor and land acquisition. 98 See: Shlomo Avineri, The Making of Modern Zionism, Basic Books Inc. Harper Torchbooks, 1981.. 30

Renaissance: men had to “return to the self“. This “self” meant a radical change within the Jewish social structure (a social reform). A.D. Gordon became part of the Labor Zionist movement not because of a class war but rather in order to create a viable economy and a new social structure for the Yishuv that had to be based on manual work. One main aspect of Gordon´s beliefs was the true connection between natural life and physical labor. His philosophy was extremely practical. This “Religion of Labor”, as he defined it, keeps the individual connected to his homeland. He believed that: “Whatever man creates for the sake of life is culture: the tilling of the soil, all kinds of buildings, the paving of roads, and so on. Each piece of work is an act of culture”. Jews had to carry out labor themselves in order to feel all that workers experience so to embrace an image of homo faber because he felt that the link between nature and Jews had been absent for too long. A.D. Gordon best exemplifies the nature of socialist-Zionism in his capacity of fusing pragmatic synthesis of Judaism, Socialism, humanitarianism and naturalism. Gordon is the philosopher and the educator whose ideas managed to shape the pioneer movement for a long time after his death. This “live with nature” approach was based on a life style that would help men to find a renewed love for their families and friends. Industry and technology were, on the other hand, responsible for the human alienation. He called for a new image of the Jews with new values as a new prerogative. Gordon believed that a real nation is alive when it is itself: “the nation-man is the symbol of unity and universality in nature. Both men and nature are individual organs of nature” and “Nature is for a man what water is for a fish”99. According to his ideas individuals did not have to be egoist but rather individualist because of a fundamental distinction: the egoist people are narrow-minded, meanwhile the individualist are richer and sensitive. This new way of looking at Judaism was a call for a double revolution whose power gained even more emphasis considering that Gordon was no student of philosophy or scholar. He managed to establish the guidelines of his own thought driven by irrationalism.

99 See: Amos Perlmutter, A.D.Gordon: A Transcendental Zionist, Taylor&Francis Group, 1971. (pp. 81- 87). 31

His nationalistic approach was non-academic and anti-organizational100 but he gave the young Jews who had not received a traditional Torah education the chance to be part of a nation-building process. Gordon believed that the nation was a “big family”, it was “life” and it represented that linking part existing between man and humanity. He literally opposed himself to the “urban society” as a product of human alienation and capitalism. As far as Palestine was concerned Gordon was conscious that Jewish people had to be aware of Socialism rather than Liberalism. He believed that the comparison between Socialism and Nationalism was erroneous since the two aspects are opposed. Only labor had a spiritual and a national value: “Land (...) always remains in the hands of those who live on it and work it”101. Gordon´s Zionism was a Zionism that believed in the collectivism in agriculture and in the social ownership of means of production102. His contribution came at a time in which Jews had no experience in agriculture and much was still left to the mythical power of the land of Eretz Israel.

1.3 The Construction of Agricultural Settlements: “The Desert Needs to Bloom”.

When the Jewish settlers established themselves in Palestine they came into contact with two kinds of agricultural farms: the Arab village and the Templar colonies. The first one was particularly susceptible to the climate. Its crops were mainly unirrigated (wheat was the main crop). The second type was a mixed specialized farm prototype. Petah Tikvah, was a product of the First Aliyah It was considered to be the

100 Ibidem. 101 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel: Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press, New Edition, 1999. 102 See: Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, University of California Press, 1996. 32

“mother of all the moshavot”103. Unfortunately, at the time, the moshava lacked a single entity capable of providing them with an authority. When the Jewish pioneers settled in Palestine their main aim was “tilling the soil” with any kind of grain that could easily grow in this region and since the agricultural know-how was poor, they used both local and imported techniques. Mainly dreams and ideals inspired the pioneers of the moshavot who were given concrete support only between 1883 and 1884104. Part of the Rothschild’s assistance involved a monthly financial support program thanks to which the farmers started feeling less vulnerable. Most of the Jewish population began to cultivate vine grapes because the plantation system had to serve as a response to the settlers’ problem of the “low return of the field-crops”. This enterprise, that saw millions of sterling invested in the project, had put too much emphasis on the single crop agricultural system (a decision that made farmers mainly dependent on external aid).

Figure 4 Halutzim working in the orange groves in Petah Tikvah (1921). Source: http://www.jewishgen.org

103 See: Yossi Ben-Artzi, Changes in the agricultural sector of the moshavot 1882-1914, in “Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914: Studies in Economic and Social History” edited by Gad G. Gilbar Brill Academic Pub,1990. 104 See: Yossi Ben-Artzi, Changes in the agricultural sector of the moshavot 1882-1914, in “Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914: Studies in Economic and Social History” edited by Gad G. Gilbar Brill Academic Pub,1990. 33

Even though the agronomists had introduced new agricultural methods and despite the fact that for some years the enormous amount of money invested by the Rothschild family seemed to have been a valuable solution105, the dependence that cash crops had on the fluctuations of the capital market, made obvious that colonial agriculture was not a viable answer for Palestine. The years 1890-91 were pervaded by great optimism because Russian Zionists were finally allowed to form an organization with the aim of encouraging migration towards Palestine. The Odessa Committee, as it was named, undertook purchase of land and favored the creation of further moshavot. Between 1899 and 1900 Rothschild decided to transfer many functions to JCA (the Jewish Colonization Association). When Baron Rothschild transferred the management of the moshavot to the JCA his specific objective was to make farmers financially independent through a field crop system rather than a plantation one. The JCA approach proved to be successful. By 1895, due to the criticism towards an agriculture based only on vineyards, there was a return to field crops, as seen in the “exemplary moshavot” of Metula106 and Qastina107. Here, the farmers were selected on strict criteria and they had to show knowledge of agricultural techniques. Despite the great planning for the “exemplary moshavot” Metula and Qastina experienced a crisis only after four or five years of their activity. The crisis served as a case study to be analyzed in order to improve the conditions of the subsequent moshavot. In fact, in the moshava of Lower Galilee, many other branches were introduced: tobacco, sheep, almonds and even orchards. Already in 1914, the moshavot had changed substantially compared to the vineyard phase. The mixed specialized model became the standard for every farm. Within the country there were trends of specialization according to the region in question. For instance, Rishon Le-Tzion specialized in the sale of wine, meanwhile the moshava in Lower Galilee focused on a field-crop system. The agricultural model of the moshavot had something unique: compared to the Arab village it turned agriculture into a way of life and it served as the basis to establish

105 See: Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, University of California Press, 1996. 106 Metula lies between the locations of the Biblical towns of Dan, Abel Bet Maacah, and Ijon, at the border with . 107 The moshava, though supported by Baron de Rothschild, suffered from water, scarcity and distance from other Jewish centers, attacks by the close Arab villagers and difficult relations between its workers and the Rothchild's administration. 34 a national ideology. This resulted in a sharp increase in land process, where the Ottomans who were faced by these waves of Jewish immigration, quickly decided to emanate a decree against Jewish immigration and settlement108. Even though their establishment was the result of a gradual process and was subjected to different conditions all the moshavot had to give Jewish people the chance to live and survive thanks to farming109. It was through this long phase marked by trial and error that the moshavot had finally evolved into a mixed and specialized type of organization were farmers no longer relied on a single type of crop. The Second Aliyah people were wishing for better and new kinds of settlements. They had a new social aspect. After 1908 we witness the establishment of new forms of settlement. The moshava was a private agricultural settlement; meanwhile the moshav and the kibbutz were collective agricultural settlements. The kibbutz was created on the basis of the first earlier example of the kevutza110. It was inspired from the ideas of the kevutza but its dimensions were considerably extended. The basic idea of the kibbutz had to incorporate the idea of collectivism and cooperation but with a specific detail for the nuclear family. The kibbutz was based on agriculture and was meant to be self- sufficient; its members had to go through a selection process in order to join the community. It should also be highlighted that the moshav ovdim was a product of the third Aliyah. Its basic idea was national land, labor, and mutual aid among individual members. Another key element was that the members used to purchase services, crops and necessities collectively. On one hand, it is true that that the Kibbutz and the Moshav Ovdim shared their establishment on the national land; but, in the Moshav, each family used to lease the property from the National organization that owned the land and, compared to the kibbutz, the moshav was more based on the idea of community labor. The Ahdut Haavoda 111 was established in 1919, after the Convention of Agricultural workers that comprised the participation of all regional agricultural

108 See: Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor, and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914, University of California Press, 1996. 109 See: Yossi Ben-Artzi, Changes in the agricultural sector of the moshavot 1882-1914, in “Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914: Studies in Economic and Social History” edited by Gad G. Gilbar Brill Academic Pub,1990. 110 The term kvutza stands for "group" in Hebrew. It was then turned into kibbutz (community) when the membership increased. 111 The term identifies a series of political parties of the Mandated Palestine that were also later present in Israel. Its original version was led by David Ben-Gurion. (www.wikipedia.org). 35 workers’ organizations. Ahdut Haavoda party incorporated about 80% of the Jewish workers in Palestine. It called for the foundation of a Jewish society in the Land of Israel. When the Histadrut was created, the party transferred most of its tasks into the hands of the institution, though it remained extremely influent within the framework of politics and education. The agricultural workers in particular represented the solid basis of the recently established organization whose aim was to improve the absorptive capacity for the future immigration waves, providing a better mobilization of manpower and resources, learning from the mistakes of the First Aliyah112. The organization was therefore planned as a federation (United Labor) being more complex than a political party. A party is a concept that involves a fragmentation, meanwhile its founders envisaged to establish a single comprehensive organ capable of including every party. Unfortunately, due to the refusal of Hapoel Hatzair to join the federation, the Histadrut was found as a national organization. The national interest was the priority of the Histadrut. In this respect, it is important to consider the weight of Gordon´s ideas. According to the scholar “the collectivity always had the priority over the individual”. The protagonists of the Second Aliyah managed to find a compromise: the Socialist universal values would have been used in order to build nationalism and the Jewish settler had to respect the authority of the institutions (as well as the kibbutzim and the moshavim themselves). The General Jewish Labor federation in Palestine (or Histadrut), established in 1920, was a Labor Union that served as an umbrella for workers. It provided them with a trade union, with consumer and producer services and a health insurance system. Within this framework, the Histadrut was seen as a useful element to build the nation and conquer land. It aimed at the creation of craft unions, farms and factories. Mapai remained for a long time the leading party within the Histadrut.

112 See: Yossi Ben-Artzi, Changes in the agricultural sector of the moshavot 1882-1914, in “Ottoman Palestine, 1800-1914: Studies in Economic and Social History” edited by Gad G. Gilbar Brill Academic Pub,1990. 36

In 1920, members of the Hehaluz Youth Movement113, (an association of Jewish youth established with the objective of training members to settle in the Land of Israel), founded the Yosef Trumpeldor Labor Battalion whose ideology was derived from the Second Aliyah kevutza and the early romantic communism of the Soviet Union. Inspired by Yosef Trumpeldor, the Battalion represented the first large commune of Jewish workers in the country. Its main aim was the establishment of a broad commune of Palestinian Jewish workers, based on a cooperative system. In 1930, Ahdut Haavoda together with Hapoel Hatzair (a non-marxist Zionist group which was founded by A.D. Gordon and followed his beliefs, being pacifist and focused on the conquest of labor and land) fused to form the Mapai or “Workers Party of the Land of Israel”. This was meant to be a left-wing political party that would have become a leading force in Israeli politics and whose agenda would have included the creation of a welfare state, free access to subsidized goods and subsidies for health and social services.

113 “Association of Jewish youth whose aim was to train its members to settle in the Land of Israel, which became an umbrella organization of the pioneering Zionist youth movements”. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 37

Chapter II Immigration, Labor and Agriculture

2.1 The Histadrut

The Zionist leaders had decided to establish a unique institution responsible for organizing the lives of the Jewish workers in Palestine, and capable of maintaining a position above political divisions in order to improve the living standards for thousands of Jewish workers114. The Histadrut was established in December 1920 at the Haifa Technion115, the majority of its members were linked to the kibbutzim and moshavim. The Histardut paid special attention to agriculture and job opportunities on the land, it was in fact based on socialist ideals and envisaged the foundation of a Jewish workers’ State. Its founders firmly believed in expanding the settlement of Palestine116. In 1920, 4,400 members were incorporated in the institution. The Jewish Labor Federation would become the essential right wing of the Jewish Agency. The Histadrut represented a unique phenomenon. It was a fully independent body that was operating without any interference from the colonial government. Not only did the organization incorporate all the workers in Palestine but it also controlled the activities of the collective agricultural settlements. This organization´s aim was the accumulation of power and wealth, in which a unity of class was created, including wageworkers, settlers and self-employed persons117. The organization’s approach towards its members was complex. The Histadrut was a vital source of employment and a monitor. It provided a full range of services to its members who in turn, felt emotionally and materially connected to it, and were part of a sort of “enlarged family”118. By 1923, 55% of the Jewish workers in Palestine joined the Histadrut.

114 See: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948, University of California Press, 1996. 115 Israel Institute of Technology. 116 See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000. 117 See: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948, University of California Press, 1996. 118 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press, 1998. 38

The Histadrut´s workers had several benefits: employment, social and cultural services and health care (thanks to the Kupat Cholim119). A centralization of the Histadrut was necessary in order to ensure the community and national superiority over the single individual. The organization wanted to ensure public ownership for means of production, and tried to avoid any direct contact between the pioneers and the suppliers of capital, believing that the privatization of agricultural settlements had to be avoided for the sake of the expansionist project. Berl Katznelston, one of the intellectual founders of Labor Zionism and editor of the official Histadrut Journal “Davar” once said that “the farms were not the only product of those who worked on them but resulted from the effort of all the entire class or community”120, thus meaning that the Histadrut had the right to control the Jewish farms. As an outcome of the agricultural convention it was established that the Histadrut would come into possession of 41% of Nir 121 (Cooperative Settlement Company) shares. All the kibbutz and moshavim had to join the company individually. The intention of the Histadrut was not one of socializing means of production but rather one of strengthening its role as a “national enterprise”122. It must also be said that the Histadrut was based on class but motivated by a national interest. The company would be the mediator between the settlers and the Jewish Agency or the British government. Every contract or agreement would be signed between the company and the authorities. The settlers were not an active part in this process123.

As highlighted by Zeev Sternhell124 the centralizing tendencies of the Histadrut clearly emerge in the episode of the liquidation of the Gdud Haavoda. The Labor Battalion (or Gdud Haavoda) of Yosef Trumpeldor established on August 8, 1920 was

119 The Kupat Cholim, as part of the Histadrut, was established at the convention of the Federation of Workers of December 1911. 120 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press”, 1998.(p.194). 121 The Nir was a stock company directly controlled by the Histadrut. The company was meant to become the legal owner of all the collective agricultural settlements. 122 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press”, 1998. (p.197). 123 See: Dafnah Sharfman, Living without a Constitution: Civil Rights in Israel, M.E. Sharpe in Armonk, NY, 1993. 124 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press”, 1998. (p.192). 39 meant to be an independent organization focused on work, settlement and defense. The organization was based on the idea of a “general commune”125. The people who joined the unit were aiming at establishing larger agricultural settlements (like the kibbutz of Ein Harod) capable of including agriculture and industry combined into a single institution paving the way for a true socialist society. It was a new approach. Since chronologically the Gdud Haavoda was established before the Histadrut, its members often claimed that the Histadrut was a direct consequence of the Gdud. The first frictions between the Histadrut and the Gdud Haavoda appeared between 1922 and 1923. The issue was the connection between the kibbutz Ein Harod and the Gdud126. The Histadrut saw the Gdud as a dangerous competitor: if the Gdud had become successful, from an economic point of view, it would have threatened the existence of the Histadrut. It may also be said that the ongoing tensions between the two organizations were also due to their diverse nature and not only to a matter of interests. It was in order to prevent the Gdud from becoming more successful that the Histadrut asked the Gdud to repay its debts127. The Gdud agreed to settle its deficits, marking the beginning of its end without knowing128. The Histadrut was from the onset very cautious towards the Gdud. However, this careful initial strategy should not let us forget that its very aim was to finally control the organization. In 1922 Ben Gurion expressed his disappointment towards the lack of centrality of the Histadrut and its incapacity of seizing control of its bodies129. Ben Gurion had understood that the Gdud did not wish to be fused with Ahdut Haavoda and therefore decided to eliminate it. Furthermore, the political divisions within the Gdud Haavoda peaked in 1926 when the Gdud Executive Committee decided to split. The Gdud lacked a leader capable of guiding and forming a leadership such as Ben Gurion was for the Histadrut. The organization criticized the Ahdut Haavoda for its doubtful socialist identity and for its visible contradictions. In contrast to the Ahdut Haavoda the Gdud

125 See: Dafnah Sharfman, Living without a Constitution: Civil Rights in Israel, M.E. Sharpe in Armonk, NY, 1993. 126 See: Dafnah Sharfman, Living without a Constitution: Civil Rights in Israel, M.E. Sharpe in Armonk, NY, 1993. 127 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press”, 1998. (p.204). 128 The Gdud Haavoda had contracted substantial debts for paving roads in the country. This decision tuned the Labor Battalion into a “hostage” of the Histadrut. 129 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press”, 1998. (p.205).

40 had always remained faithful to its ideology of equality and common treasury. Its members valued labor: they worked around the clock in order to create roads and fields (thereby contracting debts). Shlomo Lavi130 (one of the founders of the Histadrut and of the Kibbutz Ein Harod who had first joined Ahdut Haavoda and later Mapai) had long wished that Ein Harod would be taken away from the Gdud. He wanted to hit at the heart of the Gdud and of its common treasury. The Histadrut believed that the financial resources of the kibbutz could not be part of the Gdud Haavoda’s resources131. The Gdud was therefore accused of misappropriation of funds. The circumstances of the Gdud changed the approach of the labor movement: it had become obvious that national goals were given priority over social values. The Gdud posed a threat that did not depend on the amount of its members or on its political or financial power. The Gdud had always believed loyalty towards the Zionist ideology to be a pillar of its strategy132. The Gdud was considered dangerous because it offered an alternative to the Histadrut by seeking to establish an alternative society based on moral, social and labor values. It embodied a “socialist utopia”.

At the 1923 Conference of the Histadrut the Hevrat HaOvdim or “Society of Workers” was founded. It was an institution of central importance for the economy of the Yishuv. The “society of workers” was the economic arm thanks to which the Histadrut could manage to operate a large number of enterprises including the central Bank Hapoalim. The Society of Workers was meant to engage in several sectors such as industry, settlement and the creation of job opportunities for the Jewish settlers133. Through its role of “only organized force” in the whole country, the Histadrut by the beginning of World War II had already turned into a synonym of Jewish Palestine itself. It was so powerful that it became the center of the Jewish economy. The political divisions of the Yishuv could only be solved in 1933 with the fusion of Haavoda and Hatzair into one single party.

130 Shlomo Lavi was born in Plonsk, nowadays Poland, in the Russian Empire. He made aliyah in 1905 and worked on the land as an agricultural laborer. 131 See: Dafnah Sharfman, Living without a Constitution: Civil Rights in Israel, M.E. Sharpe in Armonk, NY, 1993. (p. 10). 132 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel. Nationalism, Socialism, and the Making of the Jewish State, Princeton University Press”, 1998 (p.212). 133 See: http://www.thejewishvirtuallibrary.org 41

By 1933 Mapai “the Land of Israel’s Workers’ Party” controlled the Histadrut, the National Assembly and the political department of the Jewish Agency. It may also be said that the Histadrut is what turned the Yishuv into a self-sufficient and self-reliant society134.

2.2 The Jewish Economy under the Mandate

Palestine, a land known to be one of the most desolated and difficult to conquer within the whole Ottoman Empire135 saw the British forces capturing Jerusalem and establishing a mandate in 1922. The Balfour Declaration of 2nd November 1917 (in the form of a letter from the United Kingdom's Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour addressed to Baron Walter Rothschild) declared the importance of a Jewish National Home to be created but nevertheless respecting the local inhabitants and their civil and religious rights. The idea of an independent state was left implicit136. With these objectives the British tried to create the right balance between the two communities but they encountered serious difficulties when trying to solve the divergences between the Arabs and the Jews, who had fundamentally opposed interests137. The Declaration constituted a bound between Zionism and the British. The Balfour Declaration clearly stated the obligations of the British in Palestine:

“His Majesty's government view with favor the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country”138.

134 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. (p.159). 135 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. (p.118). 136 See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000. (p.43). 137 See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000. 138 See: http://www.mfa.gov.il. 42

It soon became clear to the British forces that the Zionist dream of a “Homeland” could only be realized at the expense of the Arab community. Nevertheless, it was during the course of the British mandate that the Jewish economy prospered. It was a time where Jews had the chance to purchase land, improve their agricultural skills and techniques and even launch their industrial sector139. The British Mandate was meant to safeguard and provide public order and to guarantee a correct government and personal rights to every individual living in the country irrespective of race and faith.140 As for Britain, the mandate represented a heavy burden; it was an “economic cripple”. Britain took responsibility for a seriously impoverished country that could count on few natural resources. Palestine was a land that by the end of World War I had already experienced malaria and starvation. The British presence in the land considerably improved the situation, spreading a feeling of hope among the Zionists (who had good reasons to be hopeful about the establishment of a National Home). The first two years were mainly concentrated on the establishment of a viable level of law and order. Special attention was given to the agricultural sector. For instance, the research activity was aimed at improving livestock, reducing the cattle plague, locusts and fruit parasites. In the first ten years of the mandate the British planted 1,000,000 trees141. Nevertheless, the British departments for agriculture, public health and education were mainly focused on supporting the Arabs142. The reason for this was that the British government considered the Yishuv much more independent and self- sufficient. According to the British, the Jews were quite capable of providing themselves with social services; meanwhile the Arab community needed external aid due to its poverty and illiteracy. The mandate had given the Zionists an incredible opportunity for a Homeland in Palestine, but at the same time, the British left most of the responsibility of this task on the shoulders of the Zionist Organization143.

139 See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000. 140 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 141 Ivi, p.133. 142 Ivi, p.142. 143 Ivi, p.138. 43

Weizmann had expressed the Jewish priorities: “expert knowledge, modern methods and money (…)”144. He was aware of the fact that the Jewish National Fund was not in a position to provide the new settlers with money for clothes, housing and job opportunities. Zionist fundraisers were convinced that agriculture had to be the leading sector for the Yishuv: without land how could the Jews be in a position to claim

Palestine from the Arab Palestinians or even from the British? Palestine was not prepared for the waves of immigrants coming after the end of World War I. The amount of accommodation available did not correspond to the influx of incoming settlers. In 1920 the government issued an ordinance to regulate immigration restricting the number of Jewish immigrants allowed per year to 16,500 individuals; the entry into Palestine had to be regulated by the High Commissioner145. In 1922 Churchill’s White Paper reinforced this approach. This document expressed concerns about the absorptive capacity of the land, an intrinsic factor to which immigration became directly connected146.

The Third Aliyah immigrants were in urgent need of finding employment. The role of the mandatory government envisaged an initial support to the new settlers; thus, most of them would be employed in the road-building sector. These newcomers were not aiming at working as hired laborers: they followed their socialist beliefs and wanted to establish collective villages based on farming147. The Third Aliyah background and their aspirations for a new life in the countryside can be exemplified in the lyrics of Abraham Shlonsky148 (an Eastern European immigrant):

“O lead me thou, Lord, And let me bear the measure of seed On the ploughed fields of spring… O, let me bear the measure of seed On my little parcel of land- Till my last day is weaned and stands before you

144 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. (p.140) 145 See: http://www.unispal.un.org 146 See: http://www.jewishagency.org/history. 147 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. (p.148) 148 Ivi, p.152. 44

Like a slender stalk That has bent its head full with grain: Cut me, scythe, for the time has come.” (A History of Israel, H.M. Sachar. p. 152)

Figure 5 Third Aliyah settlers (1920). Source: http://www.jewishgen.org

The Zionists enjoyed the advantages of the first ten years of the British mandate; however for the British the end of the 1920s proved to be a particularly difficult time. After 1927 immigration rates began to decline, and the depression of 1929 had repercussions in Palestine too149. In the same year, the Arab revolts against the Jewish immigration and settlements led to episodes of violence in Jerusalem and Hebron. Here 133 Jews were killed150. Furthermore, in 1929 Palestine experienced a year of economic depression, where immigration numbers declined. The Zionists feared that a decline in immigration would have led to an organizational and ideological catastrophe posing a serious obstacle to the establishment of a Jewish State. The circumstances created by the rise of Nazism in Europe led to the Fourth Aliyah, a wave of immigrants coming to Palestine that saw the local Jewish population increasing by another 190,000 individuals. The human capital of this wave in particular

149 See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000. 150 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 45 was considerable: these Jewish people coming from were well educated and wealthy. Their presence in Palestine discerningly contributed to enrich the Yishuv.

Pic. 6 Jewish immigration (1882-1945). Source: TAU

In April 1936, due to the increasing Jewish immigration rates and to the process of land acquisition by the Jews, the Arab frustration exploded: the Arabs initiated a revolt against the British and the Jewish presence in Palestine that lasted until 1939. From their view, the British were pressured by the events of World War II. Looking for a quick solution, the British decided to issue a White Paper. The MacDonald White Paper advocated a binational state in the Palestinian territory and called for the restriction of Jewish immigration151. Nevertheless, in the aftermath of World War II 61,000 Jews migrated to Palestine152. By 1946 the Jewish Agency called for the Americans to solve the issue concerning Jewish immigration, feeling the urge to protect its agricultural settlements from the claims of the Arabs. By October 1947 the Jewish military attacks had caused the death of 127 British soldiers. The British decided to pass the administration of the mandate into the hands of the United Nations. Their hopes for an Arab-Jewish

151See: http:// www.cfr.org (Council on Foreign Relations) 152See: Shoshana Neuman, Aliyah to Israel: Immigration under Conditions of Adversity, IZA,1999. 46 compromise under British supervision were eventually dashed. On November 29th, 1947 the UN General Assembly approved the Partition Plan for Palestine153 154.

During the mandate years, the existing gap between the Jewish and Arab economy widened (the Jewish product per capita was 2.7 times higher than the Arab one). This, in part, was due to the fact that the Arabs compared to the Jews were more dependent on rural agriculture and for the most part had remained concentrated in the rural areas of Palestine155.

Fig. 7 Employment (1936-1945). Source: TAU

During the British rule, Palestine became a country of two divided ethno- national economies. As already mentioned, the mandate was expected to collaborate with the Jewish Agency for the absorption process of the Jewish immigrants. Through the activity of the Histadrut, the World Zionist Organization (that from 1929 became the Jewish Agency) had established a semi-governmental public sector for the achievement of the Zionist goals156.

153 See: http://www.merip.org 154 Thanks to the plan the Jewish people were given national rights over a certain territory. The area destined to a Jewish state was in specific 56% of the whole Palestine. Jerusalem and Bethlehem had to become part of an international zone. See: http://www.merip.org. 155 See: Rory Miller, Britain, Palestine and Empire: The Mandate Years, Ashgate, 2010. 156 See: Jacob Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 47

The Jewish acquisition of land for instance, saw the land purchased immediately turned into a publicly owned “national asset”157. Among other Zionist objectives was also the promotion of education, health care and social welfare. Despite the push towards a rural and agricultural society, part of the Yishuv turned into an urban kind of society. The number of Jewish people who settled in all-Jewish towns substantially increased between 1922 (22%) and 1946 (52%)158. Even in the mixed towns (Jaffa, Haifa, Jerusalem, Tiberias and Safed) Arabs and Jews lived in separate neighborhoods. In 1947 nearly 80% of the Jewish community was concentrated in Haifa, Jerusalem and Tel Aviv; meanwhile just 20% lived in the periphery of the country159. In 1922 Palestine was still a small and scarcely populated country having 763,550 inhabitants, of whom 679,760 were non-Jews. Figures show how the economic activity, at the time, was mainly concentrated in the Arab sector: in 1922 the Arab economy constituted 81% of the National Domestic Product. Nevertheless, despite a dominant Arab economy, the Jewish economy in Palestine was more considerable: it allowed Jewish settlers to have a higher standard of living that “was twice as high as the one of the Arabs”160. When comparing the economy of the Yishuv (under the mandate) within the framework of an open system, it is easy to perceive how fast its economic growth was: with a growth rate of 4.8% (1922-48) the Jewish economy was one of the fastest ever registered in the world. Even though Palestine was a low-income country, the inter-trade between the two communities proved to be extremely decisive for the Arabs. The Arab sales to the Jews in 1935 represented 56% of their total export revenues; meanwhile for the Jews, sales to the Arabs made 7% of their National Product161.

157See: Jacob Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, Cambridge University Press, 1998. (p.5) 158 See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000. 159 See: Shoshana Neuman, Aliyah to Israel: Immigration under Conditions of Adversity, IZA,1999. (pp. 8-9). 160 See: Rory Miller, Britain, Palestine and Empire: The Mandate Years, Ashgate, 2010. 161 See: Adam M. Garfinkle, Politics and Society in Modern Israel, M E Sharpe Inc, 2000. 48

2.3 Jewish Economy and Arab Labor: a Different Perspective

The question of when the Arab Palestinians began to develop a national identity, regarding themselves as subjects belonging to a single community, has been largely debated. According to Rashid Khalidi, the rapid changes of the War World I years and the advent of the British mandate influenced the Arabs’ perception of themselves as a group. Furthermore, by 1914 the “pillars”162 of the Arab identity, Ottomanism and religion had been considerably altered. The Palestinian Arabs were becoming increasingly concerned with Zionism, thus the shift towards a national unity and a sense of belonging became necessary in order to compete with the Yishuv. On the other hand, in the 1830s the Jewish community also began to evolve. The end of the Egyptian rule and the return of the Ottoman domination in 1840 resulted in an increase in the amount of Jews living in Palestine to a point that the number of Jews in the following forty years more than doubled163. The First Aliyah and the beginning of the agricultural enterprise showed how Palestine was, for many Jews, an ideal destination from an ideological perspective; nevertheless it proved to be a real challenge from an economical point of view. In Palestine health conditions were poor: for instance, in Petah Tikvah the outbreak of malaria forced the Jewish settlers to suspend their venture until 1883164. At the end of the nineteenth century the Jewish settlements on the land were about twenty-one for a total of 4,500 Jewish people. Initially, their presence was not considered a threat by the Arab fellaheen, because their community was too small and concentrated on the coastal plains and in the valleys. It was only when the Jews started purchasing Arab land (mainly state-owned and notable-owned acres) that the first disputes arose. When the Jews bought a considerable amount of land near Tiberias (1899-1902) tensions began to mount. Through the process of land purchasing by the Jews, the fellaheen were soon employed as laborers165. The Jewish impact on the lives of the fellaheen was rather indirect: it happened through the adoption of modern and more advanced agricultural techniques such as the

162See: Rashid Khalidi, Palestinian Identity: The Construction of Modern National Consciousness, Columbia University Press, 1997. 163 See: Baruch Kimmerling, The Palestinian People: A History, Harvard University Press, 2003. 164 In 1883 the Jewish settlers moved back to Petah Tikvah. 165 See: Baruch Kimmerling, The Palestinian People: A History, Harvard University Press, 2003. 49

“change from human and ox into horse and donkey power, and finally to mechanical power by the end of the century”166. The Arab farmers benefited from this technical advantage only in part. The relations between the Arab community and the Yishuv were deeply shaped by the process of purchasing land. The Jewish ownership of the most fertile areas became an even more determinant factor. The demand for oranges (especially from England) pushed the citrus agriculture to its maximum production. This led to an urgent need of higher water supply: the traditional pumping system (involving the use of a mule) had to be substituted with a modern combustion engine.167 In the mountainous regions of Palestine, the Arab fellaheen could hardly recognize these changes. The use of modern techniques had a deep impact on the coastal plain that was transformed into an attractive region for the establishment of new settlements. Meanwhile, the techniques used by the fellaheen mainly relied on manual labor (rather than on the use of animals) and soon became antiquated. Furthermore, the fellaheen had little or no contact with the world market and working as cheap laborers was not a matter of choice.

The economy of the Yishuv was structured in a way that no viable room was left for the Arab fellaheen. Thus, a divided economy was the obvious consequence of this deep division.168 In 1908 the Palestine Land Development169 was created with the objective of promoting a category of skilled agricultural laborers for the newly established settlements. Kimmerling highlights that from 1908 until 1913 the Jewish National Fund bought more than “10,000 acres of farm land and stood to buy 35,000 more just as the war broke out in Europe”170. Within the Arab labor framework, the impact of the Second Aliyah proved to be decisive. Upon arrival the new settlers soon encountered issues that even the main scholars of the Labor movement had not foreseen. Most of them had imagined a situation in which the Jewish economy would have been rapidly absorbed and channeled in Palestine; meanwhile, the reality was that it was extremely hard to get private investment from abroad.

166 Ivi, p.24. 167 See: Baruch Kimmerling, The Palestinian People: A History, Harvard University Press, 2003. 168 See: Jacob Metzer, The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine, Cambridge University Press, 1998. 169 The PLCD program was created with the scope of purchasing land and training the Jewish settlers in the adoption of new agricultural techniques. 170 See: Baruch Kimmerling, The Palestinian People: A History, Harvard University Press, 2003. (p.26). 50

The biggest portion of the Second Aliyah settlers established their houses in towns rather than in small villages and even before finding an occupation they were already considering themselves as the “Jewish working class”. The Jewish settlers, as soon as they arrived found themselves confronted with a reality based on the supply of cheap Arab labor. At the time of the Second Aliyah, strong competition arose between Jewish and Arab laborers due to the fact that most of the workers in the moshavot were Arabs (working as wage laborers). The phase beginning after 1914 led to a series of tumultuous events for the Arab Palestinians. Due to earthquakes and the World Wars they had suffered economic and social damages. The First World War had an impact on the Jewish community too; nevertheless, the economic setback was compensated in part by the Zionist experience in international diplomacy, thanks to which they managed to obtain the British support for a Homeland in Palestine171. Before War World I Labor Zionism did not have the power to achieve the supremacy of Jewish labor. The movement lacked its own industries and enterprises. Therefore, the Zionists had to use part of their national capital in order to achieve financial development. After 1920, with the foundation of the Histadrut, the labor- Zionist movement finally managed to give birth to its own economy, turning the Histadrut into the biggest employer of the Yishuv172. In the midst of these events, the attention of the fellaheen was more focused on the British and on the mandate than on the effect of the Balfour Declaration. Agriculture was the pillar of the economic rebirth: much attention was dedicated to the expansion of citrus orchards and vegetables plantations in particular. The Yishuv was based on a mechanism that saw land purchased from the Arab owners in order to pass into the hands of the Jewish people. This land would never return again into the hands of non-Jewish owners: it was a “nationalistic ownership” system. An exemplar fact was the plantation of a forest in honor of Theodor Herzl by the Jewish National Fund (1908). For this occasion, the JNF had hired Arab workers, provoking the reaction of a number of Jews who considered this decision an insult to the memory of Herzl and

171 See: Baruch Kimmerling, The Palestinian People: A History, Harvard University Press, 2003. 172“In 1922, 8,394 of the 16,608 workers in the country were members of the Histadrut”. See: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org. 51 called for the JNF to lay them off. The Jewish National Fund eventually decided to dismiss the workers and hire Jewish laborers173.

Gradually, the years of mandatory Palestine witnessed the emergence of two separate economies or better a “dual society model” that has been often described by several scholars. The Arab economy and the economy of the Yishuv became competitors. The Histadrut was aware of the presence of Arab and Jewish workers within a single job market and considered this issue a matter that went well beyond an economic level (but also involved moral and political aspects); the presence of an Arab working class combined with economic growth would lead to an increase of Arab laborers. The Palestinian Arab community was still rural and due to the agrarian crisis started moving from the countryside to other areas in order to find better opportunities even becoming seasonal workers. The fellaheen could not compete with the power of the new cash crops such as citrus, fruits, and vegetable crops. The reason is that these products, in general, require higher investment and better fertilization (something that the Arabs could not afford). This explains why some of them had contracted debts and were forced to leave their households in order to work in foreign ventures (British or Jewish). The British mandate tried to preserve the Ottoman rules and the Arab customs in the villages when possible. It also aimed at reducing the anti-British sentiment; a difficult task considering that the Arabs held the British responsible for the Jewish immigration process and the Jewish land acquisition. The British attempted to safeguard the connection between the Arab peasants and their land as much as they could (also in order to avoid the creation of thousands of laborers without land); but, at the same time, they persuaded the peasants to move towards other regions through the promotion of public work. The contradictions are evident. The Arab-Jewish issue was ignored until the tensions between the two communities mounted in 1920 with episodes of Arab violence against the Jews in Jerusalem and in Jaffa (1921). During the Second World War many fellaheen temporarily prospered managing to repay their debts, but, at the same time, their approach towards the Jewish settlers

173 See: Ilan Pappe, The Israel/Palestine Question, Routledge, 1999. 52 radically changed. In those years the Zionist plan had become more ambitious: estimating an absorptive capacity of another 4 or 5 million of Jews174. The Labor Zionist movement did not only create a divided economy, but even tried to exclude the competition with the Arabs. This is what happened for instance in the mid-1920s: “the Histadrut pressed the Colonial Office and the government of Palestine to set a minimum wage for unskilled labor. This would have the effect of reducing the competition between Arab labor and Jewish labor, thereby preserving jobs for Jews”175. The Zionists often tried to balance and justify the deep changes that had influenced the lives of thousands of fellaheen (as a result of the massive Jewish immigration) with the positive results obtained through the adoption and diffusion of the new agricultural techniques. Also Herzl in “Altneuland” states that the Arabs through Zionism had the chance of acquiring technological improvement, which enabled them to be a part of the economic rebirth176. For Shafir the capitalist Jewish settlers in Palestine employed cheap local laborers in order to ensure themselves a standard of living similar to the one of the European people177. His analysis detects a further division of the Yishuv domination into six regimes, in specific from the 1880s until the 1910s178. In cities like Nablus, Hebron and Ramallah it was common to see people living and relying on agriculture: fellaheen either cultivated their plots or worked as hired workers. The time in which Arab families could live and survive thanks to their subsistence crops was over by the mid-1940s due to the success of cash-crops, the new “out of reach agriculture”. The inland towns used to be perfect examples of farming villages with their own peculiarities.

174 See: Baruch Kimmerling, The Palestinian People: A History, Harvard University Press, 2003. (p.34). 175 See: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948, University of California Press, 1996. (p.101) 176 See: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948, University of California Press, 1996. 177 See: Ilan Pappe, The Israel/Palestine Question, Routledge, 1999. (p.60). 178 According to Gershon Shafir, the aspect and composition of the labor force in most colonial systems was the result o fan accurate analysis carried out by the dominant classes. The majority of the planters of the First Aliyah for instance, hired a mixed labor force both Arab and Jewish. See: Gershon Shafir, Land, Labor and the Origins of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 1882-1914. 53

Pic. 8 Regional distribution of the population. Source: TAU

In 1928 there were several wage levels for unskilled laborers: a rural Arab laborer was paid less than an urban Arab laborer. A Jewish laborer, as a Histadrut member, received a higher income than an Arab laborer (almost the double)179.

As aforementioned, the Zionists feared the prospect of wage competition between the Arabs and the Jews due to the supply of cheap Arab labor. Aiming at preventing this scenario they foresaw Jewish and Arab unions to be established under a single organ (an agency), as parallel units, but soon the Zionists expressed their concerns for the amount of time and care invested in this project180. The Histadrut excluded the Arabs for almost forty years after its establishment. The main difficulty for the Arabs in the aftermath of the Second World War was finding an employment when the only jobs available were mainly for the Jewish enterprises and for the British agencies. On the Arab side, Rashid al-Haj181 founded in 1920 Haifa his workers’ organization182. Unfortunately, it was doomed to be unsuccessful.

179 See: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948, University of California Press, 1996. 180 Ibidem. 181 Rashid al-Haj Ibrahim, born in 1889, was a Palestinian Arab leader of the Independence Party of Palestine (al-Istiqlal). As one of the main Arab personalities in the city of Haifa, he became one of the central actors of the 1936 Arab revolt. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 182 See: Baruch Kimmerling, The Palestinian People: A History, Harvard University Press, 2003. (p.52). 54

In 1925 the Palestine Arab Workers Society was founded, as the main labor organization for the Arab workers183. From the same organization further units were established in Jaffa, and al-Majdal. The founders wanted to transform it into a counterpart of the Histadrut for the Arab people. The second half of the 1920s saw the Yishuv involved in the development of a distinct Jewish economy and struggling for predominance of the Jewish labor. The Histadrut was not interested in organizing Arab workers and even launched a campaign calling for Jewish citrus farmers to fire their Arab laborers in order to substitute them with Jewish workers184. The Histadrut strategy was meant to be an answer to the economic crisis and was considered a way to fight unemployment in the cities. The campaign had the effect that tensions were increased within the Yishuv but also strengthened the authority of Labor Zionism. The tensions soon escalated in the violent episodes of 1929. The events of 1929 led Ben Gurion to change his approach towards the Arab workers. He declared that the Arab nationalist feeling and that Zionism and the Arab national movement had to reach a compromise. This new approach, within the labor Zionist leadership, led to several attempts (during the 1930s) of organizing initiatives for Arab workers. Sometimes, these efforts were controversial. For instance, in January 1930 the Histadrut decided to direct a part of its activities towards Arab workers, but the issue of raising the necessary funds proved to be a substantial obstacle. Therefore a small sum was donated in order to reopen the Haifa Club185. The connection between the Histadrut and the club was kept secret. The Jewish leaders knew that no Arab worker would have participated in an organization supported by the Histadrut186. Nevertheless remarkable progress for the Arabs, within the field of a labor union, happened only during the course of the 1940s.

Uri Ram187 is very careful in defining Zionism as a colonial movement. This expression ignores the aim of redemption involved in the Zionist enterprise and in particular in the pillar of the labor Zionist ideology. Until 1948, the Jewish settlement

183 See: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948, University of California Press, 1996. (p.90). 184 Ivi, p.104. 185 The Haifa Club or Haifa Workers’s Club. 186See: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948, University of California Press, 1996. (p.180). 187 See: Ilan Pappe, The Israel/Palestine Question, Routledge, 1999. (p.50). 55 program was not led by a government nor by the military, but rather by the pioneers venture and by their ideologies. Also Kimmerling is cautious towards the expression “settler-colonial society” when referring to the Jewish enterprise, which in his opinion was rather a “migrant- settler” type of society. The author argues that Palestine was a territory desired by the Jewish settlers but at the same time occupied by another population. This led to a scarcity of resources that influenced and caused a series of events such as the increase in the price of land188. According to Kimmerling it was the low-frontier factor189 that promoted the establishment of Jewish institutions with the scope of acquiring land (such as the Jewish National Fund and the collective agricultural settlements). In 1944, there were 272 Jewish settlements on JNF lands. In 1948 after the Declaration of Independence and the war that followed, Israel had extended its borders far beyond the land it had acquired through purchase from the JNF to such an extent that, in 1962, a state-formed authority owned 75% of all the lands. It is what Kimmerling defines as the “Israelification of Land”190. According to him, the collectivist hegemony of the Israeli society was shaped by geopolitical conditions and in particular by the Arab-Israeli relations. Kimmerling considers the land acquisition process, based on the use of national funds and safeguarded by a collective proto-military force, as the pillar of the Israeli hegemony. Settler-colonial societies are, according to Shafir, shaped by the quest for new land, a reason that pushes the “land-allocation” regimes towards a constant search for further unskilled labor. Shafir continues his analysis through a further division of this regime into three types of colonies: mixed colonies, plantation colonies, and pure colonies. The scholar dedicates part of his study to the role of the kibbutz. Through this form of settlement the author unmasks the Labor myth concerning the kibbutz and highlights the connection existing between the kibbutz and the colonial enterprise. In his opinion, the kibbutz was a simple tool used to colonize agricultural laborers and in particular local workers. Through this strategy the kibbutz managed to achieve a good

188 See: Ilan Pappe, The Israel/Palestine Question, Routledge, 1999. (p.55). 189 For Kimmerling “low frontierity” means “hard to penetrate” frontiers due to a sedentary population tending to colletivism. In the case of Palestine the nation became the legal owner of the land and the owners turned into collective owners. (Israeli Nationalism: Social Conflicts and the Politics of Knowledge by Uri Ram). 190 See: Ilan Pappe, The Israel/Palestine Question, Routledge, 1999. (p.63). 56 standard of living and to provide its members with viable economic resources. The Labor movement could count on the funds provided by the WZO and thus created viable job opportunities for the members of the Yishuv, giving rise to agricultural settlements that “rather than exploiting Arab workers would exclude them”. Uri Aram explains how the ideology standing behind the “conquest of land”191 was based on a catch-22 situation: the settlers who did not consider employment on the Jewish farms a viable option could have become independent farmers. This option involved the purchase of land, which for single farmers was too costly. The result was that the farmer had to rely on the World Zionist Movement for financial aid. According to Gershon Shafir between 1882 and 1900 the Yishuv was turned into an ethnic plantation colony. In Palestine, Baron Edmund de Rothschild shaped the Jewish settlements on the advice of experts and agronomists. He promoted a mono- cultural colonial plantation type of agriculture that heavily relied on the Arab workers and on their cheap labor. The Yemenite labor force was taken to Israel in order to supply planters with low-cost labor. It became an exemplary model for other types of Mizrachi immigration and absorption process within the Yishuv192. When in 1900 the Baron decided to end his enterprise and stop investing capital in this venture, the plantations were rationalized and any Arab workers replaced the Jewish workers as low skilled labor. The process of land-accumulation was temporarily suspended. With the arrival of the Second Aliyah settlers a new phase began: the newcomers wanted to become part of the labor market and intentionally accepted lower standards of living (similar to those of the Arab workers). In 1908 this “equal” approach was abandoned in favor of the “Conquest of Labor” promoted by Hapoel Hatzair. At this specific point of the settlers’ experience in Palestine, the struggle for the conquest of labor was turned into a proletarization movement whose aim was the substitution of Arab workers with Jewish workers. The slogan of the party focused on the exclusion of the Palestinian workers from the future job market. Even though the Second Aliyah immigrants did not prove to be

191 Ivi, p.70. 192 The employment of Yemenite Jews was due to the arrival of Jewish Yemenite immigrants during the course of the First and of the Second Aliyah. Compared to the European Jews, this category of workers perceived lower wages. See: Gershon Shafir, Being Israeli, (p.75). 57 successful in achieving their aims, their approach was decisive because it influenced the course of the nation-building process. Jewish farmers had eventually turned into “nationalist exclusivists”. The “Conquest of Labor” or the “Kibbush Ha’Havoda” issue was shaped by the Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine and by their existence on shared territory193. This expression meant that the settlers’ will to move beyond the middle- class background and look for manual labor in Palestine. It was therefore necessary to achieve “the conquest of all the occupations in the country by Jewish labor”194. Another era began in 1909 through the work of the World Zionist Organization in Palestine. Since 1901 the JNF had begun the process of land “nationalization”. Most of the kibbutzim were built on nationalized land, purchased by the Jewish National Fund. In those settlements no Arab would be employed. The main difference existing between the settlers of the First Aliyah and the ones of the Second is that the first settlers built their society on the concept of Jewish supremacy; meanwhile, the latter built it also on the basis of the Arab exclusion from the Jewish job market (through the “Conquest of Labor”). It is also true that the leaders of the Labor movement always stressed the Jewish historical rights to the land but also believed that the Jews had to earn it through hard work and dedication. Another important factor that should not be ignored is the lack of knowledge and misinformation concerning Palestine and its population. Evidence of this, can be found for instance in the work of Theodor Herzl “The Jewish State”195 where the author expresses his astonishment in learning about the presence of indigenous inhabitants. At the very beginning of the Jewish enterprise, before the First Aliyah (1881-84) most Europeans and Zionists believed Palestine was a desolated country. The term desolation here does not stand for a lack of indigenous people but rather for an absence of a “civilized” population. 196No one was keen to deal with the issue of Palestine and its indigenous Palestinians who, at the time, were still “invisible”. Lockman quotes the famous statement of Marx Nordau expressing his surprise at the discovery of the existence of indigenous Palestinians. The events of 1936 that saw the Arab guerrilla

193 See: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948, University of California Press, 1996. 194 See: http://www.middleasteweb.org 195 See: Zachary Lockman, Comrades and Enemies. Arab and Jewish Workers in Palestine 1906-1948, University of California Press, 1996. 196Ibidem. 58 killing Jewish passengers and a Jewish right wing paramilitary group killing two Arabs, soon turned into an Arab nationwide strike that would last for six months until October of the same year. Meanwhile the Arab national revolt against the British and the Zionist rule would last until the summer of 1936.

2.4 The Economy of Israel after 1948

The legacy of the British mandate left Israel with an urgent need for creating jobs capable of absorbing the large number of immigrants arriving in Israel. In 1948, the economic future of the State of Israel was discouraging: at war with all its neighbors, the country had to defend itself from terrorist attacks along the borders. On one hand, the war of 1948 saw an exodus of Jews from the Arab countries resulting in the arrival of more than 300,000 Jews between 1948 and 1949. Some of these immigrants had reached the land in a clandestine way, and even though the war had caused serious financial damage to the state, they kept on arriving197. On the other hand, the aftermath of the war also saw the dispersion of hundreds of thousands of Palestinian Arabs. The average number of immigrants settling per year during the British mandate had been 18,000 Jews annually, however the average increased to a minimum of 18,000 newcomers a month, reaching a point that between 1948 and 1953 the Jewish population in Israel had doubled198. The Law of Return of 1950 had transformed Israel into a “Homeland” and had opened its doors to every Jew who wished to return to Israel. Israel as a young and small nation was not ready or equipped to welcome the many newcomers who needed to be provided with food, shelters and care. The extremely large flow of immigrants was provided with only minimum aid and, at the beginning, thousands of these immigrants were housed in encampments199. The Israeli government and the Jewish Agency were aware of the fact that the absorptive capacity

197 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 198 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. (p.35). 199 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 59 was not only a psychological issue but also an economic concern. Immediately after the war, the government took out loans with the objective of creating new jobs. It also decided to print money (a move that led to inflationary pressures)200. Despite the pressures, there was a lack of both coordination and comprehensive strategy. Therefore, the future of the Jewish settlers was deeply connected to their ability to use the resources at their disposal and to their family connections in Israel. Since the establishment of the state, it had become clear that most of the tasks of the Jewish Agency should have been transferred to the Israeli government and that the cost of the Jewish migration to Israel was to be partly financed by the Jewish people abroad201. Housing, agricultural settlements and immigrant absorption as a whole, had been entirely carried out by the Jewish Agency (since 1929) and the Israeli government. The dispersal of Jewish immigrants all over the country was also undertaken by the Jewish Agency and the prime minister’s office: the objective was to prevent Jews from settling down in one of the three main cities (Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa) and to encourage them to move to the periphery of Israel. In particular, there were two regions that were in urgent need of a Jewish population to replace the presence of the Arabs that used to live there: the Negev and the Galilee Hills. Israel needed to establish Jewish settlements along the empty regions in order to secure the armistice lines202. The government soon realized that Israel needed a centralized and controlled economy; therefore it established a policy of “austerity” that involved the rationing of food and services and checks on the production of “non-essential” products. Everything had to be in line with an “egalitarian” ideology (promoted by the Labor movement)203. Israel had a food shortage: the country needed to develop the agricultural sector. In the 1950s the government tried to implement a successful agricultural plan in order to achieve “self-sufficiency”. The nation had to be based on a “healthy” society capable of being self-sufficient through its agriculture204. This is the concept that lies at the basis of the four-year program for agricultural self-sufficiency designed by Eshkol (minister of agriculture and director of the land’s settlement department). Some facts of the plan were later criticized because they were not objective, and particularly the data

200 Ivi, p.35. 201 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 202 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 203 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. (Ch.1) 204 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 60 concerning the amount of farm settlements, workers and water required for agricultural purposes. It was through this means that by 1958, 35% of the Israeli GDP had been spent on agricultural activities and for irrigation alone. This use of water, mainly to create economic self-sufficiency through agriculture, was often defined as not rational and inefficient. As Howard M. Sachar suggests, it would have been more effective to focus efforts on the increase of the export of light industrial goods where Israel had a “competitive advantage”205. The strong focus on agricultural settlements and on their expansion was due to the need of containing the Arab infiltration and was particularly intense in the years that followed the independence. The agricultural plan was seen as a way to disperse population throughout the country. The leading role of the government was also linked to the remote chance of private investment in the desolated areas of Israel.

The land abandoned by the Arabs had soon been integrated and came under the influence of the government and of the JNF. The land recently obtained was managed in the same way that had characterized the creation of the hundreds of kibbutzim and moshavim in the region: only Jews could possess and cultivate the land through manual labor. Manual labor was again a pillar of the Zionist leadership. Every farmer had to pay a rent (that was not enforced until his land was tilled and ready to produce). The higher the amount of new settlers, the harsher it was for them to find new tracts of land easy enough to cultivate (due to the difficult climatic conditions). Most of the immigrants who turned to farming in the years following the Israeli independence were mainly Oriental Jews206 who had no pioneering values. This, in part, because the European Jews207 constituted a higher human capital and were more educated. The Oriental Jews were often unskilled. By 1959, 229 kibbutzim and 264 moshavim had been established in Israel. This trend reflected an increase in the amount of moshavim in particular. This form of settlement had quintupled by the beginning of 1960. For the Oriental Jews, the original meaning of the kibbutz as a pioneer institution had no relevance. The coastal plain was the first location that saw the rise of farm

205 See: Howard M.Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007.(p.406). 206 Mizrachi Jews or Mizrachim are Jews coming from the Middle East, Northern Africa and Causasus. 207 Or Ashkenazi Jews. 61 settlements, then the hills of the Jerusalem corridor and then the Northern and Southern areas of Israel. The Agency’s Land Settlement Department had established, according to its blueprint, that each moshav family should be issued with a cow together with 50 laying hens and 10/15 dunams208 of soil. The irrigation facilities were included209. Israel was establishing many agricultural communities without an extensive economic plan; therefore in order to obtain advantages of a functioning irrigation facility or a road a moshav could wait several years. The villagers were living in poor conditions: they were often isolated (due to the lack of roads connecting the moshavim to the highways) and some of the moshavim lacked electricity. Furthermore, in the years following the independence the moshav frequently hosted up to a hundred families for a total of 8 or 9 dunams of arable land. The villagers could count on the financial support from the Jewish Agency that, especially in the first years, provided the settlers with fertilizers, seeds and techniques. The farmers had initially been given cash crops such as tobacco crops in order to provide farmers with an economic benefit and to support their future production. Nevertheless, many factors threatened the successful outcome of the Jewish Agency strategy: mismanagement of the resources and the incapacity for producing surplus were extremely recurrent. It was not rare to see Oriental Jews selling their own equipment.

Despite the many achievements, Israel at its birth was underdeveloped and had a fragile economic infrastructure. The 1948 War led to a series of donations, for instance the Export-Import Bank lent Israel 100 million dollars. This money gave Israel temporary relief. In order to promote foreign investment in Israel, the Knesset passed a new law. The Law for Encouragement of Capital Investments that was enforced in 1950210, indeed led to some investments but not in the amount that the Knesset would have hoped. The reason was that foreign entrepreneurs had realized that investing in Israel

208 Unit of land area in use during the Ottoman Empire. In 1928, the metric dunam was fixed at 1,000,000 m2. 209 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007.(p.408). 210 The Law that came into force in 1950, with the scope of encouraging the foreign capital investment involved certain benefits, such as tax concessions and permission to transfer profits abroad. See: Yehuda Gradus et al., The Industrial , Routledge, London, 1993. 62 was not as remunerative as in other Western countries due to the higher degree of industrialization. Israel has always been a country susceptible to balance of payments crisis. The first acute episode was in 1949. In that year “the minister of finance had to ask public institutions and private importers to tap foreign sources of credit against long-term government guarantees”211. Thus, the Jewish Agency in Scandinavia, Belgium and Switzerland provided the country with a loan. Nevertheless, inflation in 1949 had reached concerning levels and therefore Ben Gurion had decided to call for austerity measures to be enforced in order to keep costs and wages under control. The program had a positive impact on the economy but significantly reduced the standards of living of the Israeli people who, as a result, could buy only a fixed amount of food and general goods. Under the Austerity Program212 life began to change and in the wintertime the rationing of clothes caused protests and exhaustion among the Jewish citizens. Agriculture produced only ¼ of the amount of food required by the population but it was still more than the industrial production. The amount of imports was exceeding the exports and the risk of famine was high, furthermore, in 1951 the Israeli pound was at risk of collapse213. In order to fight unemployment and provide new funds for investment the government took its first moves towards the liberalization of the economy.214The New Economic Policy of 1952 saw a devaluation of the Israeli pound.215 In order to limit immigration due to the fragility of the Israeli economy, a decision was made to limit the admission of immigrants into the country. The effect on the economy was one of gradual improvement. It must be noted that the Jewish population that had settled in the rural areas of Israel peaked to 325,000 people by 1959. Already by 1948 1,600,000 dunams of land had been cultivated by the Jews (reaching 3,900,000 dunams in 1958). In 1958 the agricultural sector was worth 675.7 million pounds.

211 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 212 The state of Israel was under a regime of austerity from 1949 to 1959. The rationing of goods was later expanded to furniture and footwear. The Israeli citizens used to receive monthly get food coupons corresponding to 6 Israeli pounds. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 213 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 214 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 215 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. (p.410). 63

It was in particular, due to the Reparation Agreement with the Federal Republic of Germany that the economy began to stabilize. The agreement was seen as a partial compensation for the Holocaust and was meant to give 800 million US dollars to the Israeli government and the Jewish institutions over a twelve-year period. The Reparation Agreement from Western Germany through the allocation of millions of dollars to the Israeli government was crucial for the economic recovery. Of the agreed sum the largest share was provided through German goods. The growth of the Gross National Product at an annual rate of 17% a year (1954-1955) was a consistent proof of the acceleration of the economic growth as an effect of the foreign aid and the sale of bonds216.

The public sector has always played a central role in the country, to the extent that from the first years of independence, government subsidies and loans to the public sector constituted almost entirely the national economy. It is adequate to say that, by 1960, 60% of the Jewish population in Israel was employed by the public sector and its institutions. The establishment of a dominant public sector resulted in part from the need to provide the waves of immigrant Jews with health services, education and a shelter217. The Israeli government played a central role in shaping the national economy, and governmental influence was one of the highest ever registered in the entire world. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic nature of the public sector (involving deficits, taxation and the importance given to the creation of a viable welfare system) has often been criticized for being inefficient218. The federations of kibbutz and moshavim were organized through the Histadrut and the Chevrat Ovdim. By 1954 the Histadrut was the nation’s largest employer and was providing 100,000 people with jobs. In fact, the Histadrut did not only serve as an employer but moreover as a surveillance of the Jewish laborers’ community. The years 1952-1953 marked a downturn in the immigration rate and saw less than 36,000 immigrants arriving in two years. Between 1952 and 1954 immigration represented only 17% of the population growth. The year 1953 was the only year in the history of Israel that saw “a negative net migration balance (immigration-

216 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 217 See: Yoram Ben Porath, The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crises, Harvard Univ Press, 1986. 218 See: Yoram Ben Porath, The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crises, Harvard Univ Press, 1986. (p.192). 64 emigration)”219. Immigration returned to its normal standards by 1954 (thanks to a more stabilized economy); in fact, between 1955 and 1957 immigration constituted 58%220 of the demographic growth. By 1958 about 120,000 Moroccan Jews arrived in Israel. They had no financial means upon arrival because they had previously sold their original belongings and some of them were not able to read and write. Similarly to the previous Oriental Jews they needed to be supported by the state and therefore represented a responsibility. The economy of the nation was experiencing an upturn thanks to the New Economic Policy of 1952. The balance of payments favorably improved, and the inflation rate was stable at 7% a year. Furthermore, the arrival of foreign capital was responsible for this upturn (both the minister of finance and the minister of trade and industry were involved in the task of resource acquisition from abroad with the scope of launching the agricultural, the industrial and the commercial sectors)221.

Pic. 9 Economic growth (1950-2005). Source: TAU

219 See: Shoshana Neuman, Aliyah to Israel: Immigration under Conditions of Adversity, IZA, 1999. (p. 12). 220 See: Shoshana Neuman, Aliyah to Israel: Immigration under Conditions of Adversity, IZA, 1999 (p. 12). 221 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 65

It is important to understand how most of the expenses of the state in the first ten years of its existence were financed by external aid, without these funds Israel would not have managed to grow and expand its per capita resources. After 1956 and the Sinai Campaign, Israel had managed to secure its borders and its army had become a real asset. The victory led to a sudden wave of immigration that saw (between 1956 and 1957) 125,000 people entering the country from North Africa and Egypt. In 1957 another 40,000 European immigrants settled in Israel. The government (although not expecting these figures) reacted promptly and organized temporary shelters with decent conditions. The newcomers had the chance to benefit from a five-month Hebrew language course (Ulpan)222. Israel was entering a phase of steady immigration rate and its population was rising to the point that the census was 2,384,000 inhabitants by the end of 1967. In addition to this trend was the added bonus that the population dispersion in the inland areas had improved and in 1968 54% of the people lived in smaller towns223. The 1960s were characterized by their “grip”224 on the soil in fact the greater majority of the rural settlements in Israel (1966) were inhabited by Jews, the agricultural settlements gave employment to 13% of the Jewish labor force and had cultivated 4.5 million dunams of land. The agricultural sector managed to answer to the food demand and even to produce a surplus in certain crops. For instance, the exports extended to cotton and exotic fruits, this production (agricultural exports) constituted 10% of the national income in 1964225. The moshavim and the kibbutzim were the core of this process by 1965: with its 229 kibbutzim Israel saw 78,000 people employed in the agricultural sector and another 120,000 employed in the 336 moshavim. The kibbutzim tried to contest their loss of power vis à vis the moshavim and substantially increased their productivity. Many elements constitute to the optimization of these efficient agricultural settlements: mechanization, marketing skills and a unique know-how. From the beginning of the Jewish enterprise in Palestine, it had been clear that irrigation would influence the future of the settlement. Palestine was a country affected

222 The Ulpan was introduced in 1948 after the establishment of the State of Israel. Learning Hebrew was considered essential for the development of a shared identity. 223 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. (p.517) 224 Ibidem. 225 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 66 by specific climatic conditions (rainfall only during winter). Even in the mandate years the Jewish Agency had studied the future perspective of irrigation in Palestine. In 1944 Walter Lowdermilk226 carried out his research on water and irrigation. Its study would prove to be essential for the water planning of Israel. The results of his analysis were quite optimistic: he stated that Israel could maintain a population of 5 million people through the utilization of the ground water resources and the Jordan River. His plan, later approved by other engineers, saw the Mekorot227 (the Israeli authority in charge for water planning) laying the basis for a future irrigation system. A budget of 175 million dollars was proposed for the whole plan, and the state could rely on the Reparation Agreement and on the loans coming from the United States. The human capital constituted by the many immigrated engineers represented a further asset. From 1948 to 1963, Israel evolved from utilizing an additional 610m3 of water annually, to a total of 850m3 a year228. The efficiency of this program was also determined by the implementation of the sewage treatment plants and the Yarkon-Negev and Kishon Valley projects. The sophisticated system of dams and pumping stations made millions of cubic meters of water flow from the Yarkon River into the desert for the benefit of the farmers located in the Negev. The Kishon Valley plan was to collect water coming from the Galilee hills in order to make it flow into the Valley of Jezreel. The Jordan River waters flow south and disappear into the . The three tributaries of the Jordan (the Chazbani, Litani and Banias) merge into the Jordan.229 Therefore, it is no coincidence that Israel decided to concentrate most of the program to the upper part of the river: the segment transporting water from Lake Galilee downstream. Eric Johnston230 had long tried to obtain a deal for the diversion of the upper part of the river with the Arab neighboring countries, but they ultimately decided to postpone the final agreement (in 1955).

226 An American soil conservationist. 227 Lowdermilk, in his plan, saw the use of the water of the Litani and the Jordan as necessary for the irrigation of the Negev. Mekorot agreed with this analysis. See: Munther J. Haddadin, Diplomacy on the Jordan: International Conflict and Negotiated Resolution, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001. (p.20). 228 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 229 The Hasbani, (originated from Mount Lebanon), the Banias (from the foot of Mount Hermon) and the Dan (from Mount Hermon) meet in northern Israel to form the Upper Jordan River. 230 Eisenhower had selected Eric Johnston (as a special ambassador) on 16 October 1953, for the role of mediator within the framework of the comprehensive strategy for the implementation of the Jordan River system. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 67

The Israelis, tired and frustrated, decided to act independently and elaborated their own project (based on the work of Cotton, Hayes and other engineers). It did not take long for the Israelis to commence work for the outline and the Syrians reiterated with their intention of building dams on the sources of the river. The Israeli Army responded with its artillery and bulldozers231. The idea of the plan was to create a balance between the areas of the country that suffered from water scarcity (such as the Negev) and the areas characterized by a water surplus. The water surplus had to be transferred through a long conduit in order to bring water to the dry regions along its way. The National Water Carrier, as the most important project in Israel, constituted an enormous water system whose length corresponded to 2/3 of the country’s length and whose plants were eventually completed in 1964 (an accomplishment that the Arab population saw as a consequence of the increasing Israeli power in the region).232 Through the National Water Carrier the country could count on an extra 25% more water supplies. The agricultural and irrigational improvements were evident. The villages and towns that managed to benefit from this surplus were many (Beersheba, Dimona, Ashkelon and so on). The impact of this enterprise in the desert was determinant: by 1967 the kibbutzim and moshavim that had managed to expand in the area were at least 57. The desert had begun to bloom233. The years after the Sinai campaign marked a significant improvement for the State of Israel. From a period of austerity the country was heading to a phase of economic development. The Gross National Product of the nation, in the year 1965, had more than doubled when compared to the year 1952. In 1953 agriculture was 35% of the total exports. The late 1950s saw a remarkable production of sophisticated industrial goods234.

Due to the necessity of employing more and more immigrants national costs rose sharply; the government had introduce an economic stabilization program. The plan envisaged devaluations and limited imports. Despite the new policy aimed at

231See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. (p.520). 232 See: Yiśraʼel Ṭal, National Security: The Israeli Experience, Preager Publishers, 2000. (p.132). 233 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 234 See: Yoram Ben Porath, The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crises, Harvard Univ Press, 1986. (Ch.5). 68 stabilizing the economy, in the mid-1960s Israel was still largely dependent on short- term borrowing. The event that changed the fate of the Israeli situation was its great victory in the Six-Day War of 1967. By the end of the war, Israel had tripled the surface of the area under its influence, passing from 8,000 to 26,000235 square miles of land, Jerusalem included. As an outcome of the war: the Sinai, the Golan Heights, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank became part of Israel. The effects were visible: at the end of the 1960s, Israel had reduced the amount of its imports and started producing nearly 85% of its own food demand. From this production, the surplus was exported236. By 1966 the share of agriculture had fallen by 10% of the national income. The reason was that in the 1960s industrialization began to be seen as the economic future of the country: after the Sinai Campaign237 the state saw expansion of the industrial sector as an answer to a growing demand, therefore it had absorbed a further 90,000 workers. Production in those years was mainly connected to raw materials (Dead Sea minerals, and local products).238. In 1966 the diamond sector proved to be the most lucrative production (for a total income of 164.7 million dollars). This industry, established in 1939 following the collapse of the citrus industry in World War II, was the product of the work of Belgian and local entrepreneurs who started a business in Netanya239. Nevertheless, Israel suffered from a heavy military burden that deeply influenced the inflation trend (it should be stressed that compared to 1952 the expenses in the defense sector had increased by sixteen times in 1966). In order to keep inflation within certain limits, Levi Eshkol240 (prime minister in 1965) called for a policy of reduced government spending and credit restriction, with the effect of improving the balance of payments issues between 1965 and 1967. Despite the temporary improvement, unemployment was still affecting the country and forced many Jews to leave the country to look for better opportunities abroad. The number of people emigrating from Israel in 1966 exceeded the number of immigrants.

235 See: http://www.jewishvirtualibrary.org 236 Ibidem. 237 The Sinai Campaign was aimed at ending episodes of terrorism in Israel and put an end to the Egyptian blockade. This Campaign saw IDF transformed into a force capable of carrying on large-scale missions. (From www.mfa.gov.il). 238 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 239 It is located 30 km north of Tel Aviv, and 56 km south of Haifa. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 240 Eshkol, as a Prime Minister, worked for establishing diplomatic relations with West Germany and with the Soviet Union. He was the first Israeli Prime Minister to be officially invited to visit the US. 69

Israel faced problems in the balance of payments since its establishment due to the amount of its imported goods and services: they always prevailed over the exports. During the 1960s and 1970s the emphasis placed on exports was dramatically intensified with the aim of generating growth and economic self-sufficiency. The rapid economic growth registered until 1972 (defined by many scholars as an “economic miracle”241) was mainly due to two factors: capital and labor. It is sufficient to say that in 1973 Israel had a population of 3.3 million inhabitants and had a civilian labor force of 1.1 million people242. The balance of payment problems was a consequence of defense spending and rapid growth. The Yom Kippur War of 1973 caused an abrupt stop in exports and increased the amount of defense imports, draining 75% of that year’s GNP. During the war 3,000 soldiers had died and many others had been wounded: the war was an “economic watershed” whose impact was also followed by the increase in oil prices243. This crisis escalated when by 1980 (in 1977, the president of Egypt, Anwar Sadat had started the peace talks with Israel and in 1979 signed a peace treaty that established the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai) the Sinai oil fields were given back to Egypt, causing considerable loss to Israel. After 1973 the economy of Israel was influenced by a series of events. In November 1974, the exchange rate was devalued by 43% and subsidies were cut. Energy prices were increased due to the austerity policy adopted by the government in order to face the rising debt repayments and the defense costs. As a result, the balance- of-payments deficit deepened244. For Israel, 1973 was a year of external shocks. The 1970s are considered to be a time of economic “stagflation”, but for a country with an open economy whose imports exceed exports, this phase constituted a real downturn.245 Consumer prices doubled in 1974 compared to 1973.

241 See: Yoram Ben Porath, The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crises, Harvard Univ Press, 1986. (p.1). 242 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. (ch.5) 243 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 244 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. (Ch.5). 245 See: Yoram Ben Porath, The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crises, Harvard Univ Press, 1986. (p.5). 70

It is sufficient to say that between 1973 and 1976 per capita consumption increased by 5%, meanwhile between 1976 and 1983 it increased by 30%246. The government decided that further devaluations were needed in order to maintain competitiveness.247 Between 1974 and 1976 the deflationary measures had some positive results, but they also had a negative impact on the job market248. In fact, already by the end of October 1977 the shekel was further devalued and, as part of the new scheme of strategy, travel taxes were abolished, foreign exchange controls were improved, and more incentives were introduced in order to liberalize the economy. This 1977 devaluation, compared to others, did not involve reductions in national expenditure. Between 1977 and 1979 the inflation rate increased to 71%249. The most evident legacy of the 1977 policy was an inflation that affected the economy until 1985.

The general elections of 1977 are considered to be a political milestone in the history of Israel: Labor lost office after twenty-nine years. The reason was that the Labor party had lost its unity and was regarded as corrupted. Menachem Begin, Likud’s leader, was in charge of forming a new government that would be based on a coalition of liberal politicians who wanted to achieve a system of free market policies. The result was the liberalization of the exchange rate system and further devaluations even though public expenditures were not cut. This resulted in a government budget deficit: “the most evident cause of inflation”250. It was between 1981 and 1984 that the government made “drastic” decisions in order to decrease imports and favor exports (such as devaluating the shekel and restricting imports)251. Nevertheless, inflation accelerated from 311% to 536% only in the year 1984. The year 1985 saw a new balance of payments crisis. This crisis, in particular, led to the Stabilization Program of 1985, an emergency plan designed with the scope of reducing inflation. The previous strategy based exclusively on wage and price freezes

246 Ivi, p.11. 247 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. (p.13). 248 There was a slight increase in unemployment. See: Yoram Ben Porath, The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crises, Harvard Univ Press, 1986. (p.17). 249 See: Yoram Ben Porath, The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crises, Harvard Univ Press, 1986. (p.17). 250 Ivi, p.320. 251 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 71 alone could not be a viable solution to the question. This was, in fact, a comprehensive plan that was meant to affect both the balance of payments and the inflationary pressures. The plan included: 18.8% devaluation, freeze on prices, cut of subsidized goods and more. Furthermore the government decided to dismiss 10,000 workers and to cut its expenses by 250 million dollars. The comprehensive nature of this plan was the key: a strategy that embraced all the aspects of the economic policy252. The measures adopted in 1985 managed to reduce inflation and stabilize the balance of payments253. The Stabilization Plan also secured a consistent reduction in the public sector deficit that in 1984 represented nearly 14%. The public debt, as an effect of the program, was successfully reduced in the following years. In the years 1986-1987 a rise in GDP was registered, even though the level of unemployment was increasing.254 The economic achievements of the Stabilization program were also accredited to the substantial U.S. grant that had provided Israel with $1.5 billion given over a two-year period. Until the mid-1980s Israel suffered from a lack of competitiveness due to government intervention and interference in the financial market. 255A new wave of immigration to Israel started in 1989, due to the fall of the Soviet Union. It saw the arrival of about 1,000,000 people. These Jewish newcomers were mostly highly educated, and represented about 13% of Israel's population (7,500,000 inhabitants). They successfully contributed to enrich the Israeli society through their skilled labor and transformed Israel into a high-tech country. In addition, the globalization process had an impact on the Israeli economy256. However, the immigration caused by the fall of the Soviet Union provoked an increase in private and public consumption257. The peace process of the 1990s guided Israel towards its neighbors and facilitated foreign investment into the country. Nevertheless the events of 2000, the intifada of September and the NASDAQ crisis had an influence on the Israeli economy until 2006.

252See: Yoram Ben Porath, The Israeli Economy: Maturing Through Crises, Harvard Univ Press, 1986. (p. 1). 253 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 254See: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org 255 See: Avi Ben Bassat, The Israeli Economy, 1985-1998: From Government Intervention to Market Economics, MIT Press, 2002. 256 See: http://www.state.gov. 257See: Avi Ben Bassat, The Israeli Economy, 1985-1998: From Government Intervention to Market Economics, MIT Press, 2002. (p.41). 72

Nowadays the food business in Israel constitutes one of the largest sectors in the country. Its industry can rely on the development and on the modern technologies reached in agriculture. Nevertheless, the presence of a limited water supply and the high costs of labor were responsible for its limited exports258. From 1950 to 1993, the number of Israelis living in agricultural settlements doubled, although its percentage of the total population was halved, from 12% to 6%.

Figure 10 The public debt after 1986. Source: TAU

Agriculture's contribution to Israel's GDP dropped from 11% to 3.5% and, even more dramatically, agriculture's share of exports dropped from 60% to less than 3% over the same period, despite an absolute increase in agricultural exports from $20 million in 1950 to $547 million in 1993. Today, agricultural exports are increasingly high-value off-season vegetables, fruits, melons and flowers for the European market, rather than citrus259.

258 See: Israel Genebank, Israel: Country Report to the Fao International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, Tel Aviv, 1995. See: http://www.fao.org. 259 See: Israel Genebank, Israel: Country Report to the Fao International Technical Conference on Plant Genetic Resources, Tel Aviv, 1995. See: http://www.fao.org. 73

Nowadays, Israel would need to reduce the fiscal intervention and government controls. Also the Israeli tax burden has an impact on the overall economy as do the defense expenditures260. The event that changed the fate of the Israeli economy, and gave the country the financial stability long hoped for, was the approval of U.S. guarantees of 2003: the U.S. Congress approved “$9 billion in loan guarantees over a three year period”261. These guarantees were then further extended (until 2015) in January 2012. As part of this plan most of this amount had to be spent in the United States in order to purchase American goods.

260 Most of the countries invest the biggest portion of their defense budget abroad; meanwhile Israel spends a large sum domestically. 261 See: http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org. 74

Chapter III Water Policy and Agricultural Policy in Israel

3.1 Landscape and Water Resources: an Overview

The water policies in Israel are in part the outcome of the long immigration process that has shaped the country ever since its establishment and that has transformed the state from a rural and traditional society into an urban-industrial nation in the 1980s262. At a demographic level the major event in the history of the Israeli population growth was marked by the arrival of 1,000,000 immigrants coming from the former Soviet Union263.

Figure 11 Population of Israel since 1949. Source: TAU

Today, Israel is regarded as a country of young people: 28% of its population is aged younger than 14, and only 10% of its citizens are older than 65 (in many other

262 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 263 See: http://www.thejewishvirtuallibrary.org 75 countries in the world the older generation is on average around 15%)264. Furthermore, studies estimate that the population of Israel is expected to double in the next thirty years. The birth rate in the country is considerably high: Israeli families tend to have between 2.8 and 2.9 children. Furthermore, most of the Israel’s inhabitants live in larger metropolis (92% are concentrated in the cities meanwhile just 8% of them live outside)265. When looking at its territory, Israel can be divided into four main regions: the Mediterranean Coastal Plain, the Central Hills, the Jordan Rift Valley and the Negev. The desert covers half of the country’s surface and has an extended triangular shape. The angles of its triangle are located alongside Beersheba, the Judean Mountains and Eilat266. The country’s climate is defined by two elements in particular: geographic position and topographic aspects. Most of northern Israel has a Mediterranean climate with dry, long summers and short, rainy winters. The country has diverse ecosystems and a rich and variegated flora and fauna. Rainfall is not evenly distributed and 70% of the average precipitation falls in the rainy season, from November till March. Annual rainfall is highest in the northern parts of Israel (80% of the water supply is in the north)267, meanwhile moving towards the southern and eastern areas of Israel, it decreases. The annual precipitation in northern Israel is on average between 600- 700mm. Meanwhile, in the Negev region, it reaches a maximum of 50mm 268 . Furthermore, between the two zones (the northern part and the Negev) there is an arid steppe269. Israel´s water supply is obtained both from conventional and non-conventional water resources270. Among the conventional reserves, the Sea of Galilee (or Lake Kinneret) is the only large surface water resource; it is 8km wide and 20 km long. Water from the River Jordan (and its tributaries) collects and flows into the lake. Episodes of over-pumping in the Sea of Galilee may cause irreversible reduction of its water

264See: Ruth Eglash, http://www.jpost.com/NationalNews/Article.aspx?id=219755. 265 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.42). 266 See: http://www.wikipedia.org 267 See: http://www.fao.org 268 See: Victor Lavy, Water-Consumption, Prices, Technology, and Government Policy: A comparative Study of Jordan Palestinian and Israeli Farmers in the Jordan Valley, The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1997. 269 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 270 See: http://www.mfa.gov.il. 76 capacity271 272, serious damage to the pumping installations and would also threaten its fauna. Therefore, the water that is collected in the reservoirs, Aquifers, and the Sea of Galilee has to be carefully extracted in order to create reserves for years of drought.

Figure 12 Mountain and Coastal Aquifers. Source: http://zalul.wordpress.com

The Lake Kinneret and the two Aquifers are the three main sources of fresh water that belong to the National Water System. The Coastal Aquifer runs eastwards along Israel´s Mediterranean coast; meanwhile the Mountain Aquifer extends from the Eastern part of the Coastal Aquifer into the Hills of Judea and Samaria. Teams of experts have defined the limits beyond which it is not recommendable to pump water from the National Water System. According to specific climatic conditions and annual rainfall, this limit (or safe yield) may change, 273 especially in consideration of the fact that due to the increase of municipal and industrial consumption (from the 1990s), the amount of water required for agricultural activities

271 See: Yoav Kislev, The Water Economy of Israel, Taub Center, 2011. 272 Infiltration of saline water into the reservoir affects the volume of the reservoir and its total capacity. 273 See: Victor Lavy, Water-Consumption, Prices, Technology, and Government Policy: A comparative Study of Jordan Palestinian and Israeli Farmers in the Jordan Valley, The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1997. (p.9). 77 can be provided only through an over-exploitation of the underground and surface water resources. The aquifers, (Coastal aquifer and Mountain Aquifer)274 are more exposed to salinity infiltrations compared to Lake Kinneret. It is true that the salt build-up is in general a natural phenomenon in most arid countries, but in Israel this condition has been altered by the fast irrigation process. This is evident when we view the case of the National Water Carrier whose system had the effect of transferring water with high salinity to the coastal area provoking the contamination of the Coastal Aquifer275. The quantity of water extracted by the NWS (and in particular, by the Coastal Aquifer) has an impact on the quality of the water in each reservoir resulting from chemical and biological pollution. In this respect, the State Comptroller has often pointed out the necessity of reducing the extractive activity from the Coastal Aquifer because every reservoir needs to benefit from the natural process of cleansing provided by the recharge rate. The water quality in the Mountain Aquifer, which is higher than in the Coastal Aquifer, provides the metropolis of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Beersheba with fresh supplies. 276Nevertheless, even in this reservoir the risk of water contamination is always prevalent: its formation (mainly formed by karstic limestone and dolomite structure) is more susceptible to salinity infiltration due to the fissures located in the underground rocks277. The yearly output from the lake (on average) constitutes 1/3 of the water supplied to the NWS through the NWC.278This amount may vary for seasonal reasons, and in the event of surplus, part of its water is stored in the Aquifers. The recharge of the Coastal Aquifer (as a reservoir of Lake Kinneret) has encountered a series of difficulties due to lack of proper drilling sites and locations. 279Meanwhile, the natural

274 The Coastal Aquifer goes from Haifa to the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Pensinsula. The Mountain Aquifer is largely found in the West Bank, in the central mountainous plateau. 275 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 276 See: Victor Lavy, Water-Consumption, Prices, Technology, and Government Policy: A comparative Study of Jordan Palestinian and Israeli Farmers in the Jordan Valley, The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1997. (p.16). 277 Ivi, p.21. 278 National Water Carrier. 279 See: Victor Lavy, Water-Consumption, Prices, Technology, and Government Policy: A comparative Study of Jordan Palestinian and Israeli Farmers in the Jordan Valley, The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1997. (p.33). 78 winter recharge of the lake (through the rain season of December/April) is of crucial importance. The rich diversity of climate and ecosystems results in a wide agricultural production, where crops may vary from one region to another within the country.280Most of the arable land in Israel is located on the Coastal Plain. The total of the agricultural land is 380,000 hectares and constitutes about 17% of the country’s land.281 282It is interesting to know that the country produces about 5 million tons of field crops every year283. Following the path initiated with the establishment of the NWC, the government decided to set up a centralized mechanism for the water distribution and allocation. Through a system of accessible resources (thanks to subsidies) farmers had the chance to cultivate even the crops that required extensive irrigation (such as cotton and citrus). Some of those crops even needed a certain quality of water, causing the bitter reaction of the municipal consumers284. The national quota of potable water assigned to agriculture may vary yearly according to specific climatic conditions; and, for each farm, water is provided taking into account the particular region285. The “quota” and subsidized price system tends to support farmers more than industrial and households consumers. Farmers are given the chance to benefit from more agreeable prices (paying approximately 70% of the original cost of the water used)286. The subsidies provided by the government for the agricultural sector have often turned into a burden for the national economy. Even though the total amount of renewable fresh water in the country is not steady, of this quantity about 95% is generally used to supply households as well as the agricultural and industrial sectors. Israel is a nation that due to its fast development has to sustain the costs of its urbanized and industrialized economy, responding to the water needs of several divisions. For instance, in the year 2004, the total water demand of 1,954 MCM saw

280 See: Joseph Ben David, Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel, UNESCO, Arid Zone Research, 1964. 281 Of this area only 78% is cultivated. 282 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.42). 283 See: http://www.un.org/esa/agenda21. 284 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 285See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.42). (p.43). 286 Ivi, p.94. 79

1,129 MCM destined to the agricultural sector, 712 MCM allocated to domestic uses and 113 MCM directed to industrial activities287 288.

Israel produces a wide range of fruits and vegetables (such as tomatoes, peppers and leafy vegetables). Grain, legume, and wheat, being field crops, are cultivated on 190,000 hectares of land, of which 130,000 hectares are designated for winter crops and the remaining 60,000 for summer crops. For instance, the Israeli farmers in the Jordan Valley mainly produce diversified crops: from flowers and vegetables to field crops. Some of them even specialized in the production of exotic horticultural crops with a higher added value; the state can rely on the latest technological advantages. Furthermore, viniculture in the valley constitutes 6% of the total viniculture activity in Israel. These farmers, thanks to the latest technologies, manage to use the quantity of water provided to their unit in the most efficient way. Cultivation is strictly dependent on the technological advantage and on the amount of available resources289 (due to the scarcity of fresh water also the quantity of marginally treated and recycled water is becoming an essential asset)290. Farmers in Israel also benefit from the latest researches thanks to which it is nowadays possible to monitor the dosage of water in the fields (using tension meters and other instrumentation in order avoid any wastage)291.

287 See: Sinaia Netanyahu, Water Development for Israel: Challenges and Opportunities (from Clive Lipchin, Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle East, 2006). 288 See: Yoav Kislev, The Water Economy of Israel, Taub Center, 2011. 289 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.51). 290 THE INTER-SESSIONAL PANEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT. See: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ecn162011crp1_en.pdf. 291 See: Victor Lavy, Water-Consumption, Prices, Technology, and Government Policy: A comparative Study of Jordan Palestinian and Israeli Farmers in the Jordan Valley, The Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1997. 80

3.2 Water, Agriculture and the Zionist Legacy

Some scholars, like Clive Lipchin argue that the Israeli agriculture nowadays is a result of the legacy of the Zionist ideology. Since the foundation of the State of Israel, water has been considered a priority, a vital source for the preservation of the bond between the Jewish people and the land, or more accurately: it has been the sine qua non for the future viability of the nation and for the creation of the living standards required292. “No natural resource was as important to Zionism as water”.293 Without sufficient water supply the return to the Homeland would have never been accomplished. Even before independence, the Zionist ideology had influenced people´s perception of the available water resources. Levi Eshkol (former Prime Minister) defined water as the “blood flowing through the arteries of the nation”. This natural resource was proclaimed within the Zionist ideology was turned into a synonym for wellness and development. Through the achievement of technological advantages and the analysis of geopolitical considerations the Israeli leadership strove for an unlimited development of the land of Israel294. It is interesting to know that “the word water is mentioned 580 times in the Old Testament (…) and that the Hebrew language has separate words for the first and the last rainfall, dew, different levels of floods, and half a dozen types of drought”295. Furthermore, the emphasis put on agriculture and on manual labor was essential in order to transform even the most arid areas of the country into a more flourishing habitat. The Jewish farmer was an image and water was his tool to conquer the land.296 The first Jewish settlers (First Aliyah) had no skills or knowledge of agricultural techniques: they had to rely on the financial aid of Baron Edmond de Rothschild. Therefore the very first crops were semi-extensive and were mainly centered on wine and almond production.

292 See: Martin Sherman, The Politics of Water in the Middle East. An Israeli Perspective on the Hydro- Political aspects of the Conflict, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999. 293 See: Alon Tal, Pollution in a Promised Land: an Environmental History of Israel, University of California Press, 2002. 294 See: Francesca de Chatel, Water Sheikhs and Dam Builders, Transaction Publishers, 2007. 295 See: Alon Tal, Pollution in a Promised Land: an Environmental History of Israel, University of California Press, 2002. (p.199). 296 See: Francesca de Chatel, Water Sheikhs and Dam Builders, Transaction Publishers, 2007. 81

The farming and agricultural conditions changed considerably with the second wave of immigrants (Second Aliyah), who wanted to establish a labor class system based on manual work and rejected the idea of a colonial type of agricultural community297. According to the Zionist doctrine, the cooperative settlements were the key for the “socialization” of the new immigrants.298 In this respect, the promotion of immigration and of a rural and cooperative life-style was considered an effective way to secure the Israeli borders299. At the beginning of the British mandate, Palestine was supplied with wells and installations on a local level. Only later, thanks to the Palestine Water Company and to the Mekorot Water Company, these simple facilities were substituted by more sophisticated projects300. It was clear that the prospect of giving back to the Jews of the Diaspora the land they had long hoped for had to be achieved through an agricultural process. The Jewish harvest festivals became a clear expression of this ideological and religious meaning given to agriculture. But the idyllic and romantic approach of the Jewish pioneers was burdened by a harsh and unsuitable environment301, a huge obstacle that had to be defeated.

Most of the Jewish settlers who arrived and who decided to work on the land after 1948 were poor and had to rely on national funds302. For the agricultural sector, absorbing the wave of immigrants that moved to Israel after the establishment of the state was a real challenge. It should be said that in years 1948 and 1949 certain areas of the state were uninhabited (for instance the Negev). The government still counted on the agricultural sector as a powerful resource capable of creating viable settlements to repopulate those areas that lacked inhabitants. The role of agriculture in the years following the establishment of the State was: dispersing the Israeli population in the uninhabited areas, achieving an agricultural self-

297 See: Joseph Ben David, Agricultural Planning and Village Community in Israel, UNESCO, Arid Zone Research, 1964. (p.21). 298 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 299 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 300See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 301 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 302 See: Yoav Kislev, The Water Economy of Israel, Taub Center, 2011. 82 sufficiency in order to avoid imports (there was no money for imported goods), and providing jobs and subsistence for the Israeli settlers303. After independence the government decided to set the basis for an overall plan for the development of the Israeli water resources that was eventually confirmed in 1956. The establishment of a national Master Plan304 was determined by the necessity of providing the country with a higher water supply and by the need of creating an integrated water system throughout the nation, moving beyond the low-cost projects (mainly drilled wells that led to sea water infiltrations) that had been previously implemented305. With the agricultural sector in expansion, until about 1955, the cultivated land in Israel increased by 150%, due to massive immigration and the need to provide the newcomers with food and occupations. As a result of this growth, the agricultural self- reliance was reached by the beginning of the 1960s306. The tremendous agricultural growth of the 1950s was complicated by the necessity of pumping more water for irrigation. Therefore, dozens of wells were built along the coast, leading to episodes of over-pumping and eventually resulting in infiltrations of salinity and in water pollution307. The National Water Carrier, completed in 1964, employed a system of tunnels and pipes to conduct the water downstream towards the Negev desert. The investment in the National Water Carrier constituted 3-5% of the total gross capital of that time308. Thanks to this modern system the country could finally benefit from efficient water accessibility. The construction of water projects, such as the National Water Carrier, was more driven by ideological and political convictions rather than by environmental considerations. The value of water resources was always compared to the agricultural outcome and therefore the government often denied realistic data and unpredictable climatic conditions 309 in order to provide the agricultural sector with adequate

303 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing (p.80). 304 The first Master Plan for Irrigation in Israel was elaborated in 1950 and approved by the U.S. Board of Consultants in 1956. The plan aimed at the construction of the NWC whose construction works began in 1953 and ended in 1964. 305 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 306 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing (p.46). 307 See: Francesca de Chatel, Water Sheikhs and Dam Builders, Transaction Publishers, 2007. (p.113). 308 See: Gila Menahem, Water Policy in Israel: Policy Paradigms, Policy Networks and Public Policy, Pinhas Saphir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, Discussion Paper No. 1-99, 1999. 309 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 83 allocations. It is now evident how the water policy paradigm (between 1967 and the 1990s) was introduced because of the necessity for expanding agricultural settlements with scarce water resources. A main role was also played by the strong consensus among the representatives of the water policy network that influenced subsidized water prices for agricultural projects310.

Agriculture depended on the use of subsidized water until the end of the 1970s. According to certain studies, it has been claimed that since the 1970s, the profitability of several agricultural ventures in Israel experienced a downturn, due to rising costs for water and the decreasing prices of agricultural products311. At the beginning of the 1980s, the large amount of money invested and the inflationary pressures led to a highly indebted agricultural sector. In order to stabilize the Israeli economy in 1985, the financial recovery program had significant repercussions for the Israeli farmers: the necessity for cutting government spending and subsidies forced most of the agricultural activities in Israel to bankruptcy. The agricultural sector in Israel, gives employment to a significant portion of the population: from 1990 to 2008 the number of individuals employed in this sector went from 70,000 to 80,000; in addition to this, 70,000 workers were employed by the agro- food sector and 100,000 worked for the agricultural production in various phases of manufacture, for a total of about 250,000 (9% of the whole labor force)312. It should also be said that despite a downturn in exports between 1990 and 2007 the country had increased its agricultural production by 60%. In December 1990 a Report, drafted by the Israeli State Comptroller, denouncing the diminishing water reservoirs and the deterioration of potable water conditions, gained public interest. The report also stated that:

“The low selling price of water for agricultural use is, to a large degree the reason for the acute crisis in Israel´s water economy in the last decades. The low price only covers a small part of the cost of water production and supply,

310 See: Gila Menahem, Water Policy in Israel: Policy Paradigms, Policy Networks and Public Policy, Pinhas Saphir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, Discussion Paper No. 1-99, 1999. 311 MK David Magen, Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, 2002. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il. 312 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.54). 84

therefore creating an artificial demand (…) for low-profit crops (…) is lower than the cost of water production”313.

Francesca de Chatel is one of the scholars who argues that the decision made for allocating an extremely substantial portion of the water supply to the agricultural sector (only 3.5 of the country’s GDP) is a result of the legacy of the Zionist ideologies and the product of an irrational choice314: supporting farmers and distribution of water in the rural areas. She also suggests that the state´s support to the agricultural sector is the product of a political decision rather than a social necessity. The government controls the agricultural markets, and is the legal owner of the two fundamental assets: land and water. It is important to know that compared to other MENA countries the role of agriculture in Israel´s GNP is considerably lower. The net loss of the national economy due to this water pricing system is considerable. Furthermore, Israel is a country, whose position in the Middle East and whose economic development makes it less dependent on its own food industry. The nation would be capable of reducing its agricultural production and importing at a lower cost315. In fact, as argued in the Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector:

“The crisis, as we identify it, stems from the fact that despite the hydrological reality in our region, the enormous growth in the population of Western Eretz Israel in the last 50 years, and the rise in the standards of living of all the various populations living in the region, the decision makers in the sphere of the water sector, were not wise enough to bring about a balance between the supply and demand for water, and enabled the over- pumping to continue since the 1960s.”316

Also other authors believe that the Zionist principles led to mismanagement in the water allocation. According to Lipchin it would be more realistic to reduce the amount of water distributions destined for agricultural purposes to 40 or 50 %, and to

313 See: Gila Menahem, Water Policy in Israel: Policy Paradigms, Policy Networks and Public Policy, Pinhas Saphir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, Discussion Paper No. 1-99, 1999. 314 See: Francesca de Chatel, Water Sheikhs and Dam Builders, Transaction Publishers, 2007. 315 See: Ira Sharansky, Asher Friedberg, Toward a Typology of non-Decisions: Three Israeli Cases. From the International Journal Organization Theory and Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 1-2, 2002. 316 MK David Magen, Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, 2002. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il. 85 change crops when needed317. Some aspects, such as the decision to cultivate fruits like bananas or citrus (requiring extensive irrigation) rather than importing these goods, have often been debated. It is not surprising therefore, that agricultural production is experiencing a downturn compared to the industrial and technological sectors. Lipchin argues that any change in the status quo will require abandoning the ideological path in favor of decentralization and privatization. Despite the strong centralizing trend, a rural society as imagined by the Zionist project has not been achieved; and nowadays industry, new technologies and services play the biggest role in the Israeli economy. According to the Committee Report318, within the history of the Israeli water sector there are three main phases: • 1948-1964 (Completion of the National Water Carrier). This period was marked by massive immigration and rapid agricultural development. The main aim of this phase was bringing the water exploitation to the maximum capacity. • 1965- 1985. This phase saw the agricultural sector in rapid expansion. It was at this time that, due to this fast growth, the gap between the natural water resources and the growing demand began to be felt. • 1986-2000. During this third stage, the country experienced years of drought (mid-1980s) and saw the enforcement of the Stabilization Plan of 1985. At this point there was a central debate focused on the Israeli cultivators and on the agricultural lobby as well as the future of water for agricultural purposes. Despite growing awareness the real issues were not addressed. Even today, the Water Council’s members are mainly representing the interests of the farmers.

The aim to keep issues unsolved, outside of the political agenda due to a complex set of interests, reflects the concept of non-decision making introduced by Bacharach and Baratz. Ira Sharansky highlights how this approach characterizes the Israeli decision-making into three groups in the agricultural sector. The non-decision approach is used in order to reduce the benefits of the “powerless”, but it also reflects

317 See: Francesca de Chatel, Water Sheikhs and Dam Builders, Transaction Publishers, 2007. (p.119) 318 MK David Magen, Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, 2002. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il. 86 the political stagnation derived from the incapacity of dealing with deep-rooted issues319. This is why the country’s objectives within the agricultural policy, still today, resemble those of the first years of independence. The goals of the past are still important, though magnified by the need to expand the export markets and preserve the rural communities in the most isolated areas of Israel. Non-decision (within the framework of agriculture and water supply in Israel) is the product of the ideological legacy and the intricate interests of the agricultural lobbies; it is a strategy used to prevent a change in policy and a way to keep providing the Israeli cultivators with reduced water prices320.

3.2.1 The “Ethos of Development”

Two projects in particular are, according to Lipchin, an example of “ethos of development” the Hula swamps321 and the National Water Carrier. In the 1950s Israel claimed the area of the Hula for agricultural purposes. The main project for the swamps began in 1951 and was completed in four phases. The drainage of the Hula marshes caused the destruction of one of the main wetlands in the Middle Eastern region plus the extinction of a unique endemic fauna322. The drainage systems for the swamps had been built in attempt to put an end to malaria and improve agriculture in the region. By 1958 the project was completed323. The plan was initially considered an outstanding success for the national water supply due to the increased volume of water flowing into the Sea of Galilee. Eventually it became clear that the benefits were only limited: in fact, malaria was controlled successfully even before the implementation of the drainage, and the value of the soil was too poor to be used for farming.

319 See: Ira Sharansky, Asher Friedberg, Toward a Typology of non-Decisions: Three Israeli Cases. From the International Journal Organization Theory and Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 1-2, 2002. 320 See: Ira Sharansky, Asher Friedberg, Toward a Typology of non-Decisions: Three Israeli Cases. From the International Journal Organization Theory and Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 1-2, 2002. 321 Before the drainage the Lake Hula was 5.3 km long and 4.4 km wide. The drainage project was carried out by the JNF. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 322 See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 323 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 87

Figure 13 Lake Hula. Source: http://www.wikipedia.org

As a result, the total amount of money invested in the project did not justify the benefits. The drainage of the Lake Hula caused a change “in the movement of sediment in the upper part of the Jordan catchment”324. The most important objective: the establishment of a large-scale agriculture in the area was not accomplished325. The National Water Carrier completed in 1964, is another project that best exemplifies this “ethos of development”326. The NWC was founded for the purpose of expanding agriculture into the most arid areas of the country (the Negev desert) and involved a substantial increase in the water supply and a system of transportation to the south of Israel. The Carrier according to Alon Tal can be defined as an example of "hydrological socialism". The project was part of the intensive water exploitation policy promoted by the state327. After the drainage of the Hula swamps and the clashes between Israel and Syria (Israel responded to the Syrian diversion of water from the tributaries of the Lake Kinneret and bombed the Syrian bulldozers) the construction of the Carrier (the largest water project in Israel) was considered a national priority for the future of the State and for the policy of agricultural self-sufficiency.

324 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 325 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 326 Ibidem. 327 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2005. 88

Figure 14 National Water Carrier Map. Source: http://www.fanack.com

The system transports the waters of the River Jordan to the agricultural and industrial centers along the coast. Thanks to this project Israel could count on a more complex water supply system connecting underground and surface water reservoirs (Israel even managed to use the groundwater resources as a temporary storage facility for the surplus of the surface water supply)328. This achievement was a result of the extensive research work conducted by the state on the analysis of the aquifers’ features. Underground water resources were considered a vital resource for the country’s economy. Adversely, one of the effects of the carrier was that the whole country became dependent upon the water supply from the Sea of Galilee; thus, at the same time the fear of an overexploitation of the Israeli water resources prompted the government to establish a water policy aiming at the conservation and preservation of the national reservoirs.

328 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 89

Before the 1990s, 80% of the NWC water was distributed to agricultural enterprises; today, due to the process of urbanization, only 50% of its supply is used for this purpose. The project had and still has an impact on the environment as well as the Hula swamps: the River Jordan, due to episodes of over-pumping in the Lake Kinneret area has become a waste conduit; meanwhile the Dead Sea, (the lowest and saltiest lake in the world) due to the diversion of the Jordan River is rapidly depleting329.

3.3 Agricultural Cooperative Settlements

Looking back on the time of the first pioneers, we can understand that these newcomers had no financial means. Their complete subsistence depended on the state: the only institution capable of providing them with land and financial aid. This also explains why the individual farmers felt the need to regroup into cooperative structures and to use mutual guarantees within these enlarged communities. The kibbutzim were permanent settlements built on the land provided by the JNF330. Degania, located near the Sea of Galilee, was the first kibbutz ever established (1910). This agricultural community embodied the concept of communal life and agricultural labor. Its members were also provided with a full range of services. The cooperative farms have always relied on their political influence, thanks to which they have managed to face moments of financial hardship. The cooperatives often received the assistance of the government in part, through a series of long-term loans because farms that leased land through long-term agreements were given annual water use through quotas. By 1985 the inflationary pressures led the government to adopt severe fiscal measures in order to contain inflation that led also the kibbutzim and the moshavim to experience a financial crisis by 1986. Unfortunately with the spreading of the debt crisis the concept of mutual guarantees became worthless.

329 See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 330 Tal Simons, Paul Ingram, The Kibbutz for Organizational Behaviour, 2000. See: http://www.columbia.edu/~pi17/kibbutzrev.pdf. 90

In reality, due to the mutual guaranty system adopted in the collective settlements, most of the members of both the kibbutzim and moshavim were either extremely indebted or guarantors of debts.

Figure 15 Kibbutz Degania in 1910. Source: http://www.mideastweb.org

The issue, for the government, was to adopt a strategy capable of saving the cooperatives and some of the main banks in Israel; and, at the same time, avoid endangering the state budget in order to save the sector331. In 1988 the government convinced the commercial banks to reach an agreement with the farmers 332 in order to solve the kibbutzim debt crisis333. Since the 1980s the number of farms has decreased but at the same time there has been an increase in the size of the settlements that are also becoming more modern and specialized. The reason for these structural changes is mainly connected to the debt crisis and the Stabilization Program of 1985 that dramatically transformed the lives of the Israeli cultivators. After 70 years of kibbutz history, the crisis that pervaded this communal institution was stronger than any other financial downturn the kibbutzim had ever experienced in the past. Its impact was determinant for two main reasons: the crisis

331 See: Yoav Kislev, The Water Economy of Israel, Taub Center, 2011. 332 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. 333 Tal Simons, Paul Ingram, The Kibbutz for Organizational Behaviour, 2000. See: http://www.columbia.edu/~pi17/kibbutzrev.pdf. 91 lasted longer than expected, and the influence it had on the kibbutz members was profund334. The 1980s altered the concept of equality and collectivity in the communal life. Another decisive event, the 1977 elections, saw the Likud party coming to power. For the kibbutzim this involved the loss of support from the “sympathetic”335 Labor party (an aspect that turned the financial crisis also into a real political entanglement when the Likud established a conservative economic policy)336. The 1980s crisis also had the effect of revealing trends that had sporadically emerged ever since the 1950s (for instance, many kibbutzim hired external laborers altering the concept of communal ownership and reliance on kibbutz members). When looking back to the 1950s it is even more evident that the “pioneer” society, where agriculture used to provide a large portion of the population with a job, has disappeared. Manual work has been substituted by highly automated procedures, resulting in lower wages for people employed in this sector337. Evolution and crisis are two terms that nowadays appear inextricably connected to the kibbutz reality338. Many kibbutzim look more like capitalist rural communities where their members have abandoned the socialist ideologies and do not receive equal compensations for their work; today, more than 2/3 of the kibbutzim members receive different remuneration for their work in the community. This aspect reflects the gradual privatizing trend, often considered a consequence of the 1985 crisis339. Also many moshavim have abandoned their original convictions and have become less rural. Many of these agricultural villages had to change and expand in order to survive and become more competitive340. Both external observers and kibbutz members have analyzed the future possibilities of the kibbutzim after the happenings of the 1980s. In the years following the crisis these institutions have continued their agricultural and communal activities,

334 See: Michal Palgi, One Hundred Years of Kibbutz Life: A Century of Crises and Reinvention, Transaction Publishers, 2011. 335 Tal Simons, Paul Ingram, The Kibbutz for Organizational Behaviour, 2000. See: http://www.columbia.edu/~pi17/kibbutzrev.pdf. 336 See: Michal Palgi, One Hundred Years of Kibbutz Life: A Century of Crises and Reinvention, Transaction Publishers, 2011.. 337 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2005. 338 Tal Simons, Paul Ingram, The Kibbutz for Organizational Behaviour, 2000. See: http://www.columbia.edu/~pi17/kibbutzrev.pdf. 339 Ibidem. 340 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2005. 92 but in the late 1980s major developments influenced the welfare of their members: such as the introduction of hierarchical and market features 341 . These changes were implemented with the objective of increasing the economic potential of the communities. Looking towards the future, those kibbutzim that have developed a process of de-communalization risk not to be approved by the Registrar of Cooperative Societies342. This organ considers the system of differentiated salaries as contrary to the legal nature of the kibbutz343. Furthermore, today the extensive use of technologies in the agricultural sector forces the Israeli farmers to invest more in order to be competitive and technologically up to date.

3.3.1 Categories of Communal Settlements in Israel

In Israel there are several types of agricultural cooperatives. The kibbutzim and moshavim occupy almost ¾ of the total crop area in Israel. The kibbutz is based on the idea of a collective community (minimum 100 people) who work together for the productivity of the kibbutz. Kibbutz members share the means of production and the income of their business. The cooperative system in agricultural settlements was meant to provide its members with a number of services (financial support and many others).344 In 1948 54,200 people lived in kibbutzim, meanwhile nowadays more than 120,000 people live and work in these agricultural cooperatives. For instance, the year 2010 registered the presence of 270 kibbutzim in all Israel345. Differently from a kibbutz, a moshav is a cooperative rural village that consists of between 60 and 120 member families; the total amount of moshavim in Israel is 410. Each of these farms is a private business, but all of the associated families belong to a

341 See: Menahem Rosner, Future Trends of the Kibbutz- An Assessment of Recent Changes, The Institute for Study and Research of the Kibbutz, , pub. N°83, 2000. 342 A cooperative society, before being registered, needs the approval of the Registrar. The cooperative has to fulfill all the specific requirements. Only when registered, the cooperative society becomes an independent legal entity. 343 See: Menahem Rosner, Future Trends of the Kibbutz- An Assessment of Recent Changes, The Institute for Study and Research of the Kibbutz, University of Haifa, pub. N°83, 2000. 344 See: Yoav Kislev, The Water Economy of Israel, Taub Center, 2011. 345 Ibidem. 93 village and benefit from local services: from finance to marketing assistance346. The moshavim run certain resources collectively (such as land and water), yet other aspects, like their households, are considered private. Another form of agricultural settlement is the collective moshav (also known as Moshav shitufi), a compromise between a moshav and a kibbutz where the families own their private houses and share the work in the farm enterprise. The moshav shitufi has never been as common as a moshav or a kibbutz. In the year 2006 the number of these cooperative settlements in Israel was forty, not much if compared with the 400 moshavim and the estimated 300 kibbutzim. The secondary service cooperatives are a different kind of settlement providing their members with specific benefits. They were established in order to combine the purchasing power of several moshavim associations. They operate at a regional level in order to strengthen the members’ position on the market347. The collective farms and the agricultural labor force are not evenly distributed within the Israeli territory. More specifically, most of the production (80%) is in the northern and southern areas of Israel and is dependent on the diverse climatic conditions of each single region. For this reason, most of the fruit production is located in the north of Israel meanwhile field crops are found in the south348. Today, in Israel, the kibbutzim and moshavim are still seen by the state as mythic institutions that exemplify a specific role in the nation’s history. Members of these agricultural communities play important roles in the political life of the country and are assured seats in the Knesset and in the organs responsible for approving issues concerning water and agriculture, having the power to block all the undesirable proposals349.

346 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. 347 See: Yoav Kislev Zvi Lerman, Pinhas Zusman, Credit Cooperatives in Israeli Agriculture, Agriculture and Rural Development Department, The Wordl Bank. Working Papers, 1989. 348 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.53). 349 See: Ira Sharansky, Asher Friedberg, Toward a Typology of non-Decisions: Three Israeli Cases. From the International Journal Organization Theory and Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 1-2, 2002. 94

3.4 The role of the Government: Water Management and Mismanagement

The State of Israel is highly centralized and has an interventionist approach: the governmental centralization and its substantial involvement in most natural and national resources is evident (land ownership, government-owned enterprises and a strong public sector are part of this involvement)350. The Israeli government still has a dominant influence on the agricultural sector and often intervenes in issues of water policies351. As a result, Israel is the only developed country where the state owns 94% of the entire national land and just 6% is privately owned. The influential role of the state in the land allocation process is due to particular historical events explained in the first chapter of this dissertation. The “pioneer” enterprise and the promotion of a socialist ideology where the state is seen as a guarantor of an egalitarian system are the pillars of this ownership352. The result of this legacy today is, according to Clive Lipchin, seen in the “mismanagement and degradation” of the resources and of the environment. Furthermore, it should also be considered that water resources are often transboundary, leading to episodes of frictions between the riparian countries353. Nowadays, the agricultural policy is produced by the joint effort of MARD354 departments and of the Planning Authority. Other institutions are involved too: the Ministry of Finance, the Water Authority, the Ministry of Trade, Labor and Industry and the ILA355. The Israeli water budget focuses on short-term objectives: present issues (such as agricultural allocations) are often given priority over long-term prospects for

350 See: Gila Menahem, Water Policy in Israel: Policy Paradigms, Policy Networks and Public Policy, Pinhas Saphir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, Discussion Paper No. 1-99, 1999. 351 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 352 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. 353 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007.. 354 Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development. 355 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.85). 95 the future generations;356 moreover, distribution policies often ignore hydrological and climatic data. Improving the water policy also means recalculating the water allocations for certain agricultural settlements that have been transformed into “wealthy bedroom communities”357. In contrast with the Zionist ideology, they benefit from tourism (rather than agriculture). In fact, despite a higher income, these settlements continue to take advantage of reduced water prices. Another issue that should be addressed is also the transfer of ownership from generation to generation (due to a change in land use or family)358. The 1990-1997 period saw a growing debate concerning water management and policy in Israel. The yearly reports prepared by the Hydrological Service of the Water Commissioner were meant to draw the public’s attention to the unsolved issues.359It is also crucial to know that from 1975 until 1992, the prices of water for the agricultural sector were fixed by a sub-committee of the Knesset Finance Committee, in which the most influential members were part of the agricultural lobby360. In the summer of 2000, after two years of drought, other alarming reports concerning the water level in the Sea of Galilee and the Dead Sea were released. The state was asked to make a decision on the following options: importing water, desalinizing, increasing treatment of wastewater or reduce allotments for agriculture. Eventually, the government did not make a decision361. It is sufficient to say that from 1995 to 2008 the government spent between 42 and 168 million of USD in order to provide the agricultural sector with the necessary water resources362.

The gradual growing number of Ministries, Government and public institutions dealing with water matters in the country, reflects the complex nature of the water issue in Israel. It should also be said that to this plurality of institutions it does not correspond

356 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 357 Ivi, p.260. 358 See: http://www.un.org. Israel National Report. Agriculture. CSD-16/17. 359 See: Gila Menahem, Water Policy in Israel: Policy Paradigms, Policy Networks and Public Policy, Pinhas Saphir Center for Development, Tel Aviv University, Discussion Paper No. 1-99, 1999. 360 MK David Magen, Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, 2002. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il. 361 See: Ira Sharansky, Asher Friedberg, Toward a Typology of non-Decisions: Three Israeli Cases. From the International Journal Organization Theory and Behavior, Volume 5, Issue 1-2, 2002. 362 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.94). 96 a hierarchy; therefore, leading to persistent episodes of inner conflicts and to a lack of consistency363. The Land of Israel is run by the ILA and by the Israel Land Council. The Israeli cultivators have to pay a nominal price to the ILA364 through the endorsement of long- term agreements that can always be extended. Since in Israel, the state owns almost 94% of the arable land: the ILA (Israel Land Administration), as a government agency, is in charge of managing this land on the state’s behalf. Therefore, to own an estate in Israel means to lease the land rights from the ILA for many years365. Everyone who wishes to lease land from the ILA has to use the land for specific purposes: the land use right is strictly interconnected to the cultivation of the above-mentioned land. A farmer who does not cultivate his land for ten years might lose his rights. The ILA in specific has several functions:

“Guaranteeing that the national land is used in accordance with Israeli laws; actively protecting and supervising the state lands making the state land available for public use; planning, developing, and managing state land reserves; regulating and managing registration of state lands; authorizing contracts and agreements with other parties; providing services to the general public”366.

The Ministry for National Infrastructures, founded in 1996, took over all responsibility for the water sector, except for those issues for which Ministries other than Ministry of Agriculture were responsible. The Ministry has the capacity to influence the Israeli Water Policy. The Ministry of Agriculture was in charge for the water sector from 1948 until 1996. Today, the MARD is responsible for the distribution of the water quotas to agriculture, and while agriculture has the largest requirements for water (even though the amount of sweet water consumed by agriculture compared to the other sectors in the economy, is gradually decreasing), the approval of the Ministry (representing the

363 MK David Magen, Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, 2002. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il. 364 See: http://departments.agri.huji.ac.il/economics/teachers/kislev_yoav/kislev-cooperatives.pdf. 365 See: http://www.mmi.gov.il. 366 See: http://www.mmi.gov.il. 97 interests of the Israeli cultivators) is necessary in order to reform the water policies367. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD) is also in charge of pursuing a sustainable agriculture and is responsible for the development and expansion of rural areas and export markets (2008). The Ministry of Agriculture has often provided financial support to farmers in order to help agricultural communities during times of financial crisis; a move that frequently led to criticism from the general public relating to incidents of inadequate funding and resource mismanagement.

The main water regulations in Israel date back to the 1950s and 1960s. In 1959 (through the Israeli Water Law) private ownership of water resources was substituted by state ownership. The Ministry of Agriculture, being in charge of implementing the above mentioned law (as a result of the centrality of the agricultural lobby in Israel), invested substantial funds into the water allocations, distribution and pricing368 369. The Water Law (amended several times) is still nowadays the most complete legal framework concerning the Israeli national waters 370. The law nationalized the water resources of Israel affirming that:

“All sources of water371 in Israel are public property. A person's land rights do not confer rights to any water sources running through or under his land. Every person is entitled to use water, as long as that use does not cause the salination or depletion of the water resource”372. (From www.faolex.fao.org).

Today direct and indirect water management is carried out by the following institutions: • The Ministry for National Infrastructures, created in 1996 is in charge of the ministerial responsibility of the water issues that used to be part of the agenda of the Ministry of Agriculture until 1996. The Department

367 MK David Magen, Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, 2002. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il. 368 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 369 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 370 MK David Magen, Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, 2002. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il. 371 The law intended as "water resources": springs, streams, rivers, lakes and other sources of water, both surface and underground. 372 See: http://www.faolex.fao.org. 98

has the power to influence decisions concerning the Israeli water policy and issues regulations concerning the water sector. It is important to acknowledge that the Water Law does not state that the Ministry for National Infrastructures is in charge of water issues. It was in fact the Government that transferred this power into the hands of the new Ministry. • The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural development of Israel (since 1992) was initially called Ministry of Agriculture. The Ministry is in charge of issues concerning the country´s agricultural sector and since 1996 is no longer responsible for water issues. This organ is in charge of the allocation of water quotas to the agricultural sector; furthermore, it sets the related water prices and water usages. The approval of this organ is necessary in order to reform the water policies. The Knesset monitors the work of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural development. • The Ministry of Finance and its two divisions, the Budgets Department, which is in charge of approving budgets designated to various bodies for water issues, and the Accountant General's Department, monitores the Government expenditures for the water sector. Both play a central role in water policy. • The Ministry for the Environment was established in 1991. Since then, it has been responsible for avoiding pollution of water and preserving natural resources. • The Ministry of Health monitors the quality of fresh water, the effective distinction between sewage and potable water. The standards concerning the quality of drinking water are established through a reviewing committee (taking place every 5 to 10 years)373 that is in charge of monitoring the suitable standards taking into account foreign data and the country’s necessities. • The Ministry of Interior is responsible for water issues concerning the local authorities, the sewage network and water reservoirs.

373 See: Sinaia Netanyahu, Water Development for Israel: Challenges and Opportunities (from Clive Lipchin, Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle East, 2006). 99

• The Ministry of Science, Culture and Sports promotes research activity within the framework of water and the environment. • Other ministries, such as the Ministry of Industry and Trade, the Ministry of Housing and Construction, and the Ministry of Tourism, deal only with water issues when strictly connected to their agenda374. • The Water Commission, which is part of the Ministry for National Infrastructures, is in charge of the implementation of the water policy. The tasks of this institution and of the Water Commissioner are defined in the content of the Water Law (1959). • The Water Council is the privileged advisory organ of the Ministry of Agriculture. • “Tahal” is the Israel Water Planning Company established in 1952 and privatized in 1996. Tahal was initially a governmental corporation in charge of advising the government for the comprehensive planning of water issues; today, it is responsible for carrying out researches and for providing feedback on the projects of the Mekorot Ltd. • “Mekorot” is a state owned company created in 1937 by the Histadrut, the Jewish Agency and the JNF with the aim of implementing national water projects. The firm is in charge of the supply of 68% of the total water provided in the country. The company is directly connected to the Ministry of Agriculture.

374 MK David Magen, Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, 2002. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il. 100

3.5 The Role of New Technologies Confronting Harsh Climatic Conditions and Water Scarcity

When Israel was established a wave of optimism pervaded the country. At the end of the British Mandate water was the “new frontier”375. The state-leaders were of the opinion that innovation combined with national projects would provide water for the growing population and for the agricultural sector. Their initial approach was often defined as “myopia”376: at that time, the water engineers knew that most of the total fresh water supply was coming from three sources (the Sea of Galilee and the Aquifers), but they ignored the exact quantity available in each reservoir377. Israel is a country that suffers from persistent droughts. The nation is constantly challenged by a lack of a potable water supply in part due to the fast demographic and economic growth. In order to fight water scarcity the state has adopted water policies that have had an impact on the Israeli environment. This “trial and error” mechanism led to nowadays’ current methodology: a mixture of water transport, rain collection, waste effluents treatment and desalination of seawater378. Israel is a country characterized by western living standards: the prospect of preserving these levels is challenging, especially when faced with the lack of large reserves of land, water or minerals. Though, it is true that Israel can count on its human capital379 (in the past, the state had to face many social and economic challenges acquiring a significant know how) and on scientific and technological advantages380. How can the agricultural sector expand and be sustainable without harming land and water resources? This is considered to be a real challenge especially when sustainability, a concept that does not deal with natural resources alone but also with the human dimension, is hard to calculate.

375 See: Alon Tal, Pollution in a Promised Land: an Environmental History of Israel, University of California Press, 2002. (p.200). 376 Ivi, p.201. 377 Ibidem. 378 See: Alon Tal, Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy, 2006, at http://web.natur.cuni.cz/fyziol5/kfrserver/gztu/pdf/TAL_Israel_water_management.pdf. 379 See: Martin Sherman, The Politics of Water in the Middle East. An Israeli Perspective on the Hydro- Political aspects of the Conflict, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999. (p.3). 380 See: Tamar Achiron-Frumkin and Ron Frumkin, Water Allocation for Nature and the End of Conflict Era. From Shuval, Hillel, Water Resources in the Middle East, 2007. 101

Even though rural life and the agricultural sector have played a main role in the nation’s history since the foundation of the State, the 21st century needs a new strategy. It might be said that for Israel the real goal is to develop a sustainable agriculture in full respect of the environment. Therefore, the call for food security (involving local cultivation and production) seems unrealistic when considering the extensive amount of water required (including also desalinated and transported water supplies).381 Israel covers most of its food demand through its national production (the country produces almost 5 million tons of field crops, 1.15 billion of liters of milk, 1.6 billion of eggs). The lack of water resources and the dry climate considerably interfere with the expansion of the agricultural sector. The work of the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development in Israel is now aimed at achieving a “sustainable agriculture limiting the insurgence of any environmental hazard”. The strategy for the prevention of pollution and of other environmental risks is one of the most cost-effective aspects of the management of water resources382. Since the foundation of the state the irrigated and cultivated area of the country has increased from 15 % in 1950 to 55% in the late 1980s. Of the water for agriculture 40% comes from facilities that are generally owned by regional and local cooperatives or by the Mekorot383. The company (that initially was a Yishuv water cooperative in charge of administering wells and water pipes)384 has activities that extend to the whole Israeli territory. This incredibly technologically advanced water company manages all the Israeli water resources and provides each sector with the allocations set by a water commissioner385386. It is very difficult for the government to set the right water policies387.

381 See: Hillel Shuval, Virtual water in the Water Resource Management of the Arid Middle East, from Fathi Zereini, Heinz Hötzl, Climatic Changes and Water Resources in the Middle East and North Africa, Springer, 2008. 382 See: Sinaia Netanyahu, Water Development for Israel: Challenges and Opportunities (from Clive Lipchin, Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle East, 2006). 383 See: Yoav Kislev, The Water Economy of Israel, Taub Center, 2011. 384 See: Alon Tal, Pollution in a Promised Land: an Environmental History of Israel, University of California Press, 2002. 385 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 386 The company i salso considered to be a world leader in desalination, water reclamation and water project engineering (see: http://www.mekorot.org). The company runs 3000 water installations (see: http://www.wikipedia.org). 387 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.153). 102

Water pricing in Israel is calculated on the basis of volume use and is updated in accordance with the Consumer Price Index. There have been changes since the 1980s in the method applied: nowadays the price of water may vary depending on the purpose of water consumption. For instance, water for agricultural activities is cheaper than the water provided to the industrial sector, and water distributed to households is even more expensive. Tariffs change also from one region of the country to another and general consumers tend to pay higher prices for higher quantities of water consumed. In this respect, prices are set by the Ministry of National Infrastructure and by the Ministry of Finance in order to be subsequently passed by the Knesset Finance Committee. The two decades of the 1950s and 1960s saw the irrigated areas in the country in expansion thanks to the implementation of the national project (the National Water Carrier) and the enforcement of the Water Law. The construction of the NWC marked the beginning of a shift in the agricultural process: the farmers began to use the pressurized irrigation methods (through the sprinklers). It must also be said that the water transported by the NWC from the wet northern Galilee to the arid southlands has had the positive effect of increasing the cultivated land surface (even in the country’s most arid regions), but also the negative consequence of increasing the level of salinity in the land. In fact, the water of Lake Tiberias has an average chloride density of 390 mg per liter388. The environmental issues in Israel began to be felt during the 1960s, when it became evident that water management might have an impact on the environment; whereby, during the previous decade the state was mainly focused on economic growth and technological progress 389 in order to support the astonishing agricultural development (over 500% of growth in yields)390. Pollution is one of the side effects of the agricultural activity on a large scale: the use of pesticides and salinity infiltration can easily damage water resources 391. For instance, as a result of urbanization, industrialization and of the abovementioned inflexible water demand, more than half of

388 See: Alon Tal, Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy, 2006, at http://web.natur.cuni.cz/fyziol5/kfrserver/gztu/pdf/TAL_Israel_water_management.pdf. 389 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 390 See: Alon Tal, Pollution in a Promised Land: an Environmental History of Israel, University of California Press, 2002. (p.202) 391 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. 103 the population prefers drinking bottled water rather than tap water (due to the unpleasant taste of chlorination392). It might be said that large-scale agriculture has side effects, which are not only economical but also environmental393. Rudolf Orthofer394 argues that agriculture is a “very inefficient way of using water”395 in order to generate economic development. In fact, the urban and industrial sectors produce a high amount of wastewater that can be turned into water for the agricultural sector. Also according to Peter Beaumont the present lack of water resources in Israel can be eased through a better allocation of the water resources; in fact, the scholar argues that the water used for agricultural purposes should be invested into the more remunerative urban and industrial sectors396.

As aforementioned, from late 1970s the new pressurized irrigation systems considerably improved water efficiency in the country (it was around this time that saline water began to be used in agriculture as well as treated wastewater). Drip irrigation became a viable solution for keeping the level of salinity that normally tends to concentrate in the soil under control397. This technique also helped farmers to cultivate arduous and shallow terrains. The drippers are found between 7 and 30 cm under the ground and reduce the risk of water runoff and evaporation398. Drip irrigation was improved through the use of a non-clogging plastic emitter designed by Simcha Blass399. The negative aspect of the drip system is related to the high costs. An efficient use of water resources including the promotion of wastewater reuse, combined with the Subsurface Drip Irrigation method, embody the focal part of the Ministry´s strategy400. Drip irrigation is considered to be one of the most important innovations ever achieved in the field of agriculture because it paved the way for

392 See: Alon Tal, Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy, 2006, at http://web.natur.cuni.cz/fyziol5/kfrserver/gztu/pdf/TAL_Israel_water_management.pdf. 393 See: Clive Lipchin, Water Agriculture and Zionism: exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 394 See: Rudolf Orthofer, Ra’ed Daoud, Jad Isaac, Hillel Shuval " Options For A More Sustainable Water ManagementIn the Lower Jordan Valley" Water ForLife Conference, Anatalya, Turkey, 2004. 395 Ibidem. 396See: Peter Beaumont, The Myth of water Wars and the Future of Irrigated Agriculture in the Middle East, from Water Resources Development, Volume 10, N°1, 1994. 397 Crops normally tend to absorb water and reject the salts. 398 See: Alon Tal, Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy, 2006, at http://web.natur.cuni.cz/fyziol5/kfrserver/gztu/pdf/TAL_Israel_water_management.pdf. 399 See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 400 See: http://www.un.org. Israel National Report. Agriculture. CSD-16/17. 104 agricultural revolutionary solutions in the driest regions of the planet. The unusual feature of this system is the capacity to irrigate exact quantities and with the right amount of fertilizers (the whole process is computerized)401. The effect is that the quality of water used in the agricultural sector has changed: in fact, today, agriculture employs a mixture of potable and recycled water according to crops, terrain and source of irrigation 402 . Technology has also helped in the development of more efficient water distribution: the capacity to transform a semi-arid or hyper-arid region into an example of a flourishing and cultivated land has been the product of the research activity focused on salt and crops resistant to frequent droughts.403 Water delivery efficiency increased from 64% (in the 1960s) to 90% thanks to drip irrigation.

Figure 16 Drip irrigation in Israel. Source: http://www.wikipedia.org

By the 1980s, the country had already become fully aware of the environmental consequences of extensive irrigation404. Therefore the state decided to increase the use

401 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2005. 402 See: Sinaia Netanyahu, Water Development for Israel: Challenges and Opportunities (from Clive Lipchin, Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle East, 2006). 403 See: http://www.un.org. Israel National Report. Agriculture. CSD-16/17. 404 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 105 of treated waste effluents in agriculture405. Today, also the new regulations reflect this increased use of treated wastewater for irrigation. The government established that the Israeli territory had to be divided into several regions through a “development priority” evaluation system. This division takes into account several factors: supply of agricultural products necessary for the nation, water resources and environment, population dispersal. Each of these regions (in total four) qualifies for various benefits. The Negev desert and Galilee region is entitled to benefit from the highest contribution and is therefore region A. The area around Nazareth and between North Negev, Jerusalem and Mediterranean Sea, is entitled to a secondary priority aid and is the region B. The other two areas receive support only for specific conditions: the ecological region B (Tel Aviv, Haifa and the most populated districts) can count on support for agri-environmental issues; the Mediterranean Sea region B is only entitled to receive aid for fishing activities406. The Israeli water sector has been a frequent case study for many researchers. On one hand these studies highlight the gaps present in water management, and on the other hand show the positive aspects: the prospects offered by future technologies combined with the Israeli know-how407. Israel has invested in a series of enterprises involving the integrated management of the Lake Tiberias, underground aquifers, water collection through a system of rain-fed reservoirs and desalination facilities for seawater and stagnant groundwater408. The use of water harvesting, in particular, and the construction of water reservoirs promoted by the JNF had the effect of increasing the water supplies in the country. Since the 1980s a network of more than 170 reservoirs had been built with a higher concentration in the arid regions of Israel. This project collects more than 120 million of cubic meters per year (roughly 7% of the total water supply) providing irrigation to 300million of square meters of cultivated land409.

405 THE INTER-SESSIONAL PANEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT, at http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ecn162011crp1_en.pdf. 406 See: OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Israel 2010. OECD Publishing. (p.84). 407 See: Sinaia Netanyahu, Water Development for Israel: Challenges and Opportunities (from Clive Lipchin, Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle East, 2006). 408 See: Alon Tal, Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy, 2006, at http://web.natur.cuni.cz/fyziol5/kfrserver/gztu/pdf/TAL_Israel_water_management.pdf. 409 See: Alon Tal, Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy, 2006, at http://web.natur.cuni.cz/fyziol5/kfrserver/gztu/pdf/TAL_Israel_water_management.pdf. 106

This project could provide a viable substitute to the large demand of fresh water for the agricultural sector, but not without the risk of salinity infiltration and soil degradation. It should also be said that agricultural communities that operate the reservoirs have often tried to seize control over these storage facilities implementing a direct connection between the reservoirs and the irrigation systems (altering the quality of this treated water)410. Furthermore, the process of building water reservoirs requires huge investments: it is sufficient to say that the price of a standard reservoir with a 0.5-2 million m3 water capacity may cost between one million and five million dollars411.

Recent data show that more than 90% of the municipal sewage in Israel is treated; of this percentage 73% is reused (1/5 of the total water supply in Israel). This water after being treated is channeled towards water reservoirs; subsequently the water is filtered and stored in order to be transferred to irrigation systems. Until the end of the 1970s the largest amount of water used in the agricultural sector was fresh water; nowadays just 50% of this water is potable meanwhile 30% comes from treated effluents and 20% is saline water and rainwater412. For the agricultural sector there are no officially recognized water standards; nevertheless the use of recycled wastewater has been approved by the government and is considered as a conventional source of irrigation413. The initial concerns regarding the possible consequences of using this water for irrigation led to specific researches carried out by the Ministry of Health and to an official authorization. Despite the benefits derived from the use of treated wastewater, it should be said that the latter cannot be employed for any kind of crop, due to the presence of infectious agents in the water. Therefore, vegetables and fruits are excluded from this kind of irrigation.

410 Ibidem. 411 Ibidem. 412 THE INTER-SESSIONAL PANEL OF THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY FOR DEVELOPMENT. See: http://unctad.org/en/Docs/ecn162011crp1_en.pdf. 413 See: Sinaia Netanyahu, Water Development for Israel: Challenges and Opportunities (from Clive Lipchin, Integrated Water Resources Management and Security in the Middle East, 2006). 107

3.5.1 Desalination

The degradation of the Israeli water sources due to over-pumping 414 and qualitative reasons (salinity and contamination) has led many experts to believe that desalination, as an extra source of artificial water supply, is the concrete answer to the water scarcity issue. The latter would not provide a solution for the contamination of the Aquifers or of the Kinneret415. In spite of these considerations the advantages of desalination and the use of waste effluents in agriculture alone may not be enough to guarantee the preservation of Israel´s ecosystems and habitats416. Desalination has had the side effect of spreading an over reliance on new technologies, moving the focus from the institutional and political issue of water allocations to the future potential of desalination417. Among several approaches for water management, desalination is the latest alternative. In 1999, the Israeli government decided to launch a Sea Water Reverse Osmosis desalination program with the aim to fight the chronic droughts that have affected the country years since the mid-1990418. Compared to the past when, due to the high costs involved, the use of the desalination facilities were confined to certain regions (such as Eilat at the Red Sea, an area that could not count on any other resource), nowadays the use desalinated water is more widespread and has reached high-quality standards. For instance, in 2002 the government announced the establishment of five new desalination plants in the next years; and, in 2005 the VID419 desalination consortium inaugurated the first plant in the town of Ashkelon. At the time it was built, Ashkelon was the largest420 reverse-

414 Seawater enters the reservoir as a result of the vacuum created from over-pumping. 415 See: Tamar Achiron-Frumkin and Ron Frumkin, Water Allocation for Nature and the End of Conflict Era. From Shuval, Hillel, Water Resources in the Middle East, 2007. 416 See: Tamar Achiron-Frumkin and Ron Frumkin, Water Allocation for Nature and the End of Conflict Era. From Shuval, Hillel, Water Resources in the Middle East, 2007. 417 See: Alon Tal, Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy, 2006, at http://web.natur.cuni.cz/fyziol5/kfrserver/gztu/pdf/TAL_Israel_water_management.pdf. 418 See: Abraham Tenne, Sea Water Desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with difficulties, and economic aspects of long-term risks, 2010, at http://www.water.gov.il. 419 Private company. 420 See: Abraham Tenne, Sea Water Desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with difficulties, and economic aspects of long-term risks, 2010, at http://www.water.gov.il. 108 osmosis421 desalination facility worldwide and one of the “most economical operating expenses”422 at an international level423. The desalination process entails that the seawater is filtrated through several stages. Desalination is not only applied to seawater but also to brackish424 water. Brackish water is extremely common in the terrain of certain areas of the country and it is cheaper to desalinate than seawater. In Israel some smaller desalination plants treat brackish water from groundwater wells425. Sometimes brackish water does not need to be treated and can be directly used to irrigate certain crops (such as tomatoes or almonds)426. Also the desalination process has its challenges, some of them have been solved (the initial opposition from the agricultural lobby) and others remain (budgetary constrains) 427. Furthermore, there have been environmental issues concerning the desalination procedure and they mainly concern the impact that the desalination plants may have on the landscape (on the coast) and the impact of the brackish water discharged into the sea428. The issue of the distance existing between the water user and the source (like in the case of the National Water Carrier) due to the complex system of water transport and distribution gives the consumer the feeling that this resource is easily accessible and has endless potential.

421 The reverse osmosis process is based on membrane-technology filtration capable of removing large molecules and ions from solutions. The reverse osmosis in based on pressure. 422 See: Abraham Tenne, Sea Water Desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with difficulties, and economic aspects of long-term risks, 2010, at http://www.water.gov.il. 423 See: Alon Tal, Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy, 2006, at http://web.natur.cuni.cz/fyziol5/kfrserver/gztu/pdf/TAL_Israel_water_management.pdf. 424 Brackish water compared to seawater has a lower concentration of salts. It is often a mixture of seawater with fresh water. It is often found in fossil aquifers. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 425 See: Abraham Tenne, Sea Water Desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with difficulties, and economic aspects of long-term risks, 2010, at http://www.water.gov.il. 426 MK David Magen, Report of the Parliamentary Committee of Enquiry on the Israeli Water Sector, 2002. See: http://www.knesset.gov.il. 427 See: Abraham Tenne, Sea Water Desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with difficulties, and economic aspects of long-term risks, 2010, at http://www.water.gov.il. 428 See: Alon Tal, Seeking Sustainability: Israel’s Evolving Water Management Strategy, 2006, at http://web.natur.cuni.cz/fyziol5/kfrserver/gztu/pdf/TAL_Israel_water_management.pdf. 109

Figure 17 Ashkelon: desalination plant. Source: http://www.water-technology.net

Every nation has essential priorities: the prime concern for those countries affected by drought and water scarcity should be an efficient use of the “remaining” water429.

Figure 18 Ashkelon: desalination process. Source: http://www.water-technology.net

429 See: Rudolf Orthofer, Ra’ed Daoud, Jad Isaac, Hillel Shuval " Options For A More Sustainable Water ManagementIn the Lower Jordan Valley" Water ForLife Conference, Anatalya, Turkey, 2004. 110

It is important to understand that agriculture and the future hydrological standards are interconnected in the region. Together with the technological advantages (including desalination and waste effluents) and prevention of pollution, it is necessary to work on the economic policies. Israel needs to reexamine its water subsidies to agriculture, the static conservation of water prices and establish equitable water allocations430.

430 See: Howard M. Wachtel, Water Conflicts and International Water Markets, from Shuval, Hillel, Water Resources in the Middle East, 2007. 111

Conclusion

In order to understand the agriculture and water management of today’s Israel, it is necessary to look at the past. As highlighted in “Being Israeli” (by Shafir and Peled)431 the ties existing between the pre-state days and the present-day Israel reveal the significance of the Histadrut and the emergence of a divided economy432. The authors have focused on the concept of citizenship and how the economy was built around the pioneer agricultural experience, the settlements and the military service433. During the course of the past hundred years Israeli agriculture has been shaped by many significant events: for instance, the waves of Jewish immigrants, the Zionist “Conquest of Land”, the nation-building process, the constant economic growth (until the 1970s), and the financial downturn of the mid-1980s434. The most defining features of Zionism within the field of the agricultural sector in Israel were infused through the doctrines of Socialist Zionism or Labor Zionism. Since the Second and Third wave of Jewish immigrants who settled in Israel, this ideological movement rich in powerful symbols and myths became the pillar of the nation even before its creation435. Nathan Birnbau 436 coined the word “Zionism” as a meaningful term that embodied the wishes of the Jewish people who aimed to live together in a Jewish community and build a single homeland (Eretz Israel 437). His work was focused on the struggle against Jewish assimilation to the hosting countries: he saw this process as an impoverishment and a failure; and advocated that Zionism had a culture-building

431 Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled consider Israel as an ethnic democracy. This term in particular, indicates a combination of ethnocratic and a liberal democratic features. See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 432 During the British mandate in Palestine. 433 See: Jan Selby, Post-Zionist Perspectives on Contemporary Israel, New Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005. 434 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2007. 435 See: Ayse Omur Atmaca, Roots of Labor Zionism: Israel as the New Land of Socialist Ideas?, Volume 4, No 1, July 2012. 436 Nathan Birnbau was a pioneering Zionist who coined the word Zionism and later Yiddishism. See: Dovid Katz Words on Fire: the Unfinished Story of Yiddish, Basic Books, 2007. 437 Eretz Israel or Land of Israel. 112 power438. This ideology could not be described as unmutable439: it is instead an ideological movement that has had a wide range of trends (socialism, nationalism, liberalism, and even religious elements). Therefore, we talk about Zionism in all its forms: Political Zionism, Labor Zionism, Religious Zionism and Revisionist Zionism440… In the first chapter of this dissertation it is explained how the halutzim believed that only Jewish labor in Palestine could lead to a Jewish homeland (with the establishment of rural kibbutzim/moshavim and an urban Jewish proletariat). It is important to understand that although the founders of the Labor Zionist movement (such as Borochov441) felt the influence of the Marxist school442, their Zionist ideals had less to do with the Marxist struggle, but more with a concept of egalitarianism and public ownership443. Their ideology was infused444 with Jewish nationalist sentiment445:

“The groups of an oppressed people generally bound up with its tradition are the middle-class and the petty bourgeoisie, particularly the "clericals" and the landlords. Those participating in the national education and the national literature, -- teachers, writers, -- also color their traditionalism with a national hue. The chief protagonists of national freedom are, however, always the progressive elements among the people and among the intelligentsia. (…)The process of liberation is essentially not nationalistic, but national. (…) Its goal is the actual liberation of the nation, to restore to normal its conditions and relations of production”446.

In the first chapter the thesis introduced the ideas of A.D Gordon, another member of the Zionist movement, who argued that the Jewish people had lived too long like alienated people in other societies. Again, physical labor and the contact with the

438 See: Josha A. Fishman, Yiddish: the Turning to Life, John Benjamins Pub Co, 1991. 439 See: Ayse Omur Atmaca, Roots of Labor Zionism: Israel as the New Land of Socialist Ideas?, Volume 4, No 1, July 2012. 440 Ibidem. 441 Dov (1881 –1917), one of the founders of the Labor Zionism. 442 See: Stephen P. Halbrook, Land Haegelianism, Arab Nationalism and Labor Zionism, Journal of Libertarian Studies, Spring 1982, Vol.6 N°2. (pp.193-194). 443 See: Ayse Omur Atmaca, Roots of Labor Zionism: Israel as the New Land of Socialist Ideas?, Volume 4, No 1, July 2012. 444 See: Baruch Kimmerling, The Palestinian People: A History, Harvard University Press, 2003. 445 See: Jan Selby, Post-Zionist Perspectives on Contemporary Israel, New Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005. 446 See: Ber Borochov, “THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE” at http://www.zionism-israel.com. 113 land are presented as the key to the Jewish dilemma. It is a spiritual experience and a bonding factor447:

“We Jews have developed an attitude of looking down on physical labor…. But labor is the only force, which binds man to the soil… it is the basic energy for the creation of national culture. This is what we do not have, but we are not aware of missing it… In my dream I come to the land. (…) And the only link that ties my soul to her the only reminder that I am her son and 448 she is my mother is that my soul is as desolate as hers" . (From “Our Tasks Ahead” by A.D. Gordon).

Under the pressure of this “romantic and agrarian” vision449 the country, though a small young nation, was capable of achieving an explosive agricultural development, even cultivating its arid landscape 450. The Jewish pioneers decided to create new dimensions of collective agricultural settlements, according to their specific needs. They were determined to transform their “utopia” into reality. The moshava is symbolic of this “conquest of land”, a concept that can be better exemplified through the scheme of the “reversed social pyramid”: labor and farmers should replace the middle-class people in order to form the basis of a new Jewish society in the land451. David Ben-Gurion believed, like Gordon, that Jewish labor and agriculture were the basis for the creation of an independent and powerful Jewish economy. He considered the kibbutz movement as a means for the achievement of permanent Jewish labor. Therefore, during the 1920s, Ben-Gurion set the framework for the establishment of a Jewish workers’ state in the land. The Kibbush HaAvoda452 (The Conquest of Jewish Labor) approach was felt as a priority for the achievement of a self-sufficient economy of the future state453. The “conquest of labor” was not immediately pursued

447 See: Ayse Omur Atmaca, Roots of Labor Zionism: Israel as the New Land of Socialist Ideas?, Volume 4, No 1, July 2012. 448 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2007. (p.3). 449 (As Alon Tal defines it). 450 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2007. (p.229). 451 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2007. 452 Slogan coined during the Second and Third Aliyah. 453 See: Ayse Omur Atmaca, Roots of Labor Zionism: Israel as the New Land of Socialist Ideas?, Volume 4, No 1, July 2012. 114 due to the need to hire cheap Arab workers. In fact, the members of the First Aliyah had little or no experience in farming, being forced to hire Arab workers (this also happened before and during the Second Aliyah, when new immigrants performed jobs on the farms of the members of the First Aliyah). This led to protests from many Jewish immigrants who did not hesitate to assert their common Jewish heritage and shared nationalist principles454. As a result, Jewish people began to be hired more often than Arabs (mainly in the1930s), which consequently led to a general strike of Arab workers in 1936455. The term “Avoda Ivrit”456 or “Jewish labor,” was meant to substitute the identity of the “Jews of the Diaspora”. It should also be taken into account that the Zionist farmers had advantages that the Arab fellaheen did not have. The Jewish farmers decided to learn from the western countries new agricultural techniques. The symbolic support that the British government gave to the fellaheen (during the mandate) was not enough to equip them with new methods that could allow them to reach self-sufficiency457. In the first and in the second chapters it was reviewed that as early as the 1920s, there was evidence that labor Zionism had soon become the glue of the Jewish society. The concept of self-emancipation, pushed the pioneers of Labor Zionism to create and unify the political institutions that made up the focal structure of Israel458. The labor movement, dominated politics and the organizational system of the Jewish community in the region during the pre-state period. It became the main feature of the founding ideology of the State of Israel and turned out to be an interwoven element of its political culture. This explains why even today we can observe the impact of these traditions on the contemporary Israeli water and agriculture management459.

It should be highlighted that not all of the visions of the labor ideology were achieved: Israel could not be defined the as the rural society it used to be at the

454 Ibidem. 455 Ibidem. 456 Labor Zionism began to push for a strict segregation and division of the Jewish and Arab communities that had to be echoed by the division of the Arab and Jewish economies. See: http:// www.wikipedia.org on “Socialist Zionism”. 457 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2007. 458 See: Ayse Omur Atmaca, Roots of Labor Zionism: Israel as the New Land of Socialist Ideas?, Volume 4, No 1, July 2012. 459 See: Ayse Omur Atmaca, Roots of Labor Zionism: Israel as the New Land of Socialist Ideas?, Volume 4, No 1, July 2012. 115 beginning of the 1950s. Despite the many efforts focused on the establishment of a socialist/rural Jewish society, 90% of the Israeli population lives in urban centers (a more materialistic and individual approach has emerged and spread throughout the country460).

Figure 19 GDP Israel from 1952 to 2007. Source: www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il

As discussed in chapter II, when Israel was founded, the agricultural growth and expansion were seen as a natural consequence. In 1953 the agricultural sector constituted 53% of the exports, meanwhile by 1965 this percentage fell and agricultural contribution was just ¼ of the export revenues461. After the State’s foundation the Jewish economy was the economy of Israel. Only 150,000 Arabs remained in the country after the independence (leading to a further downturn in the non-competititive fellah economy)462. During the years of steady agricultural growth the State was determined to focus on: food security, water development and technology. It is a fact that, on one hand the Israeli agricultural development prevented soil erosion from spreading and “making the desert bloom” but on the other hand, it caused a series of environmental problems (water contamination and mismanagement)463. As far as the State was concerned, the worker unions were essential for the development of the Israeli economy. As seen in chapter I, the ‘Histadrut’ was the largest

460 See: Chlive Lipchin, Water, Agriculture and Zionism: Exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 461 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 462 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2007. 463 See: Alon Tal, To Make a Desert Bloom: Seeking Sustainability for the Israeli Agricultural Adventure, The Blaustein Institute for Desert Studies, Ben Gurion University, 2007. 116 employer in the country with a strong connection to the Labor party464. The Yishuv saw the rise of the most important centralized-pre state institutions. Earlier the Jewish community had identified itself with the collective agricultural settlements, the Histadrut and the Haganah465 466. This identification was transformed by the 1977 elections that saw Menachem Begin’s Likud-led coalition coming to power467. As a result, the control of the main institutions no longer depended on a single party468. After the 1977 elections, the country was pervaded by a new form of Zionism, focusing “on religious and ethnic sentiments and on exclusivist territorial claims”469. Nevertheless, in contrast with this religious and traditional approach, there were also other trends such as the process of modernization, the advent of new technologies, different social patterns, and penetration of Westernization470. According to Jan Selby, the Ashkenazi-led Labor coalition, with its values permeated with socialism, nationalism and pioneerism, dominated the political life of the country from before the foundation of the State471 until the above-mentioned elections472. The determination of Labor Zionist politicians characterized almost the first thirty years of statehood and was due to the consensus built around the Labor entourage473. As seen in the second chapter of this dissertation, in the 1950s a shortage in foreign currency forced the state to pursue a policy of Austerity the so-called Tzena,474 in order to avoid an increase in prices475. By the mid-1950s, Israel had extended its irrigation plan to the Negev desert through a system of pipes and was planning the

464 See: The Israeli Economy: Fundamentals, Characteristics and Historic Overview, Ministry of Finance, State of Israel, Summer 2011. 465 The was a Jewish paramilitary organization founded during the British Mandate of Palestine. This organization would later form the basis of the Israeli Dedence Force (or IDF). 466 See: Jan Selby, Post-Zionist Perspectives on Contemporary Israel, New Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005. 467 Ibidem. 468 See: Alan Dowty, The Jewish State: A Century Later, University of California Press, 1998. 469 Ibidem. 470 Ibidem. 471 See: Jan Selby, Post-Zionist Perspectives on Contemporary Israel, New Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005. 472 Ibidem. 473 See: Alan Dowty, The Jewish State: A Century Later, University of California Press, 1998. 474 The word Tzena in hebrew means austerity. The Austerity period saw the enforcement of food rationing and similar procedures. 475 See: The Israeli Economy: Fundamentals, Characteristics and Historic Overview, Ministry of Finance, State of Israel, Summer 2011. 117 establishment of the Water Carrier476. It should be said that although the phase of economic depression ended in 1967, from this time on inflation began to increase. As often explained in the thesis Israel is a unique case. Massive immigration and its defense budget forced the government expenditures to be more substantial than in most western countries477. Therefore it is understandable that the country’s budget deficit expanded due to the 1967 war, forcing the government to take loans and print money (leading to episodes of hyperinflation)478.

Figure 20 CPI. Source: www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il

The state delegated a substantial portion of its economic capacity to defense. It is therefore necessary to take into account these defense expenditures in order to understand the course of the Israeli economy479. In the aftermath of the Six-Day War, Labor Zionism did not survive the new nature of the Israeli economy480: socialist convinctions had been substituted by a more neo-liberal approach481. This is why nowadays; the is considered a social democratic party that has no particular weight on a political level482.

476 See: Abraham Tenne, Sea Water Desalination in Israel: Planning, Coping with Difficulties, and Economic Aspects of long-term Risks, WDA, 2010. At http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/Planning-and- Development/Desalination/Documents/Desalination-in-Israel.pdf. 477 See: The Israeli Economy: Fundamentals, Characteristics and Historic Overview, Ministry of Finance, State of Israel, Summer 2011. 478 See: The Israeli Economy: Fundamentals, Characteristics and Historic Overview, Ministry of Finance, State of Israel, Summer 2011. 479 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 480 See: Ayse Omur Atmaca, Roots of Labor Zionism: Israel as the New Land of Socialist Ideas?, Volume 4, No 1, July 2012. 481 Ibidem. 482 Ibidem. 118

The country’s growth was impressively rapid until 1973, the year of the Yom Kippur War. The average growth rate per year (until 1973) was 8.9%483. Before the 1970s, Israel was considered to be one of the world’s most outstanding economies (also attributed to reparation agreement with Western Germany and the funds provided by the Jewish people living outside of Israel)484. The crisis of the1980s was so serious that it led to the enforcement of the Economic Stabilization Plan of 1985. Significantly, by the mid-1980s inflation was running at a 300-400% annual rate (for instance, in 1984 the inflation rate marked 445%). The new program involved budget cuts and forbade money printing by the government485in order to have the dual effect of solving the balance of payments problem and decreasing inflation. On one hand, the strategy adopted by the government proved to be quite successful in stabilizing the Israeli economy; but on the other hand, the Economic Stabilization Plan caused a reduction of public services. Many kibbutzim and moshavim were overburdened with debts486. In 1989 the kibbutz debt to the government had reached 7.2 billion NIS (there were in total 270 kibbutzim). In that year the negotiations between the government and the collective settlements began and an agreement was reached. Shimon Peres had declared that he would participate in a Likud-led coalition just to be nominated Minister of Finance in order to support the kibbutzim. The1989 agreement saw the government declaring 1.65 billion NIS debt as null and void and gave the kibbutzim new grants and favorable terms of repayment for the remaining amount. The kibbutzim also agreed to cut a number of expenses, reducing their standards of living. Furthermore, this crisis led to a change: the original prototype of these settlements and the values that they supported were transformed. From the end of the 1980s and during the 1990s the Histadrut experienced major reforms that transformed it into a standard workers’ union 487 . This phase was particularly important for the economic development of the country: the fall of the Soviet Union saw the arrival of many skilled Jewish immigrants, an event that turned

483 See: The Israeli Economy: Fundamentals, Characteristics and Historic Overview, Ministry of Finance, State of Israel, Summer 2011. 484 See: Alan Dowty, The Jewish State: A Century Later, University of California Press, 1998. 485 See: The Israeli Economy: Fundamentals, Characteristics and Historic Overview, Ministry of Finance, State of Israel, Summer 2011. 486 See: Alan Dowty, The Jewish State: A Century Later, University of California Press, 1998. 487 See: The Israeli Economy: Fundamentals, Characteristics and Historic Overview, Ministry of Finance, State of Israel, Summer 2011. 119

Israel into a high-tech tiger economy. In the 1990s the quest for peace became an essential objective488.

Figure 21 Government expenditures. Source: www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il

As often mentioned in the course of the dissertation Israel is a country affected by a lack of natural resources; these restrictions led the state to depend constantly on its human capital489. The industrial sector in Israel has expanded and nowadays it produces a wide range of items (from agricultural products to clothing and high-tech goods) opening the country to foreign trade (as part of the government’s liberal economic policy). The defense industry has become the fastest-growing industrial sector. The military production began in 1948; today, it is the main source of exports. Production of military equipment includes metal products, machinery, and electrical/electronic equipment490. The increase in defense expenditure over time has been financed by cutting other expenditures, increasing taxation, foreign aid and deficit financing491. The Israeli budget deficit rose to 6% in 2003, and decreased again to 0.57% by 2007. This reflects a typical trend in Israel: a country exposed to several inflationary phases and with a history of chronic balance of payments problems492. The balance of

488 See: Jan Selby, Post-Zionist Perspectives on Contemporary Israel, New Political Economy, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2005. 489 See: The Israeli Economy: Fundamentals, Characteristics and Historic Overview, Ministry of Finance, State of Israel, Summer 2011. 490 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 491 Ibidem. 492 See: The Israeli Economy: Fundamentals, Characteristics and Historic Overview, Ministry of Finance, State of Israel, Summer 2011. 120 payments issue was what prompted the government to change the economic policy. The state feared that it may become unable to secure loans abroad493.

Figure 22 Defense expenses. Source: www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il

As seen in Chapter III the effects of repeated droughts in Israel has led to the implementation of water strategies whose ultimate results were depending the shift of responsibilities from one governmental body to another494. According to Steven Plaut the government is responsible for misallocating water resources with dangerous consequences; the Israeli State Comptroller Report of 1990 also shared this view point condemning the Israeli water management as “irresponsible”; and indeed ten years later, the report issued in 2000, bitterly criticized the government’s inability in the prevention of water pollution due to the presence of contaminants that affected the agricultural production495. In this respect, Chlive Lipchin argues that the removal of expensive agricultural products from production (such as citrus) and “the liberalization of import and tariff policies” would lead to substantial economic benefits especially when monitored by regional and local authorities. Furthermore, the author believes that the “nationalized

493 See: Paul Rivlin, The Israeli Economy from the Foundation of the State through the 21st Century, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 494 See: Chlive Lipchin, Water, Agriculture and Zionism: Exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 495 See: Steven Plaut, Water Policy in Israel, Policy Studies N°47, IASPS, 2000. From http://: http://israeleconomy.org/policystudies/ps47eng.pdf. 121 water management bodies” follow an “agriculture-centered Zionist ideology”496. It should be added that today’s agriculture share in the Israeli GDP has suffered severely from the threatened water supply; however, past development of new technologies have yielded immense advancement. According to the 1959 Water Law the Water Commission is in charge of distributing water quotas. This organ decides the quantity of water required for a certain allotment. Mekorot Ltd is in charge of carrying out the water pumping and supply. Mekorot Ltd is heavily subsidized by the government that often rescues the company when indebted, as a result of the low water prices applied (they do not correspond to the cost of the operations carried out by the firm). One important issue concerning the Israeli water is overconsumption, which results when water is underpriced. The method by which water prices are set has not changed substantially since Israel’s independence497. As often mentioned, agriculture is the sector that gains more benefits and as a result, farmers are not paying enough and water subsidization has become one of the priciest burdens on Israel’s budget. Water prices should be set through a market mechanism498 but Israel’s water management is influenced by a “politicized” system that does not take into account economic considerations499. Lipchin maintains that in Israel the less affluent people are the ones who tend to be more concerned about the available water supply500. In this respect, the case of the Dead Sea raises the issue of the exploitation of water resources by the present generations at the expense of the natural heritage in the future. As a consequence of the reduced freshwater input from the River Jordan the Dead Sea water capacity is declining. It is estimated that the present water input into the Dead Sea is no more than 100-200 million cubic meters per year (the water of the Upper Jordan and Lower Jordan River tributaries now flows towards urban centers and agricultural settlements)501. It should be added that more than 200 million cubic meters

496 See: Chlive Lipchin, Water, Agriculture and Zionism: Exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 497 See: Steven Plaut, Water Policy in Israel, Policy Studies N°47, IASPS, 2000. From http://: http://israeleconomy.org/policystudies/ps47eng.pdf. 498 See: Steven Plaut, Water Policy in Israel, Policy Studies N°47, IASPS, 2000. From http://: http://israeleconomy.org/policystudies/ps47eng.pdf. 499 Ibidem. 500 See: Lipchin, et. al. Public Perceptions and Attitudes Towards the Declining Water Level of the Dead Sea Basin: A Multi-Cultural Analysis, at http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/whatsnew/documents/Lipchin. 501 Ibidem. 122 of water per year are pumped into evaporation ponds. The researchers are still debating about the eventuality of a further decline in the water level in the future502.

The current water scarcity further highlights the necessity to rely on new technologies and water conservation503. In this regard, the technological advantage of the Israeli agriculture has been achieved through research and development activities largely sponsored by the public sector. It is important to know that the government, through the MARD, spends 64.1% of the total budget dedicated to this aim on research activities. Only in 2000, the state invested 69.4 million US dollars in this sector. This also explains why, compared to the Jordanian and the Palestinian farmers, the Israeli cultivators use water in a more efficient way504: once water reaches the farm, the farmers constantly monitor its level in the field employing evaporation data and other mechanisms. Some of the future objectives within the framework of R&D activities are: increasing water efficiency and recycling, limiting the use of chemicals and pollutants, improving the quality of agricultural products505. The State´s environmental agenda also involves the solutions for the following issues: • Shrinking of the Dead Sea. • Public health concerns over water quality. • The role of water resources within the Peace Process framework.

Nevertheless, technology is only one of the elements required for the creation of a sustainable agriculture. In fact, understanding the social and cultural dimensions of water use and management is necessary for the development of sustainable practices506.

As already mentioned in chapter III, Israel is exposed to the risk of contamination of the aquifers and to the lowering of the water level in the Sea of Galilee.

502 Ibidem. 503 See: Victor Lavy, Water-Consumption, Prices, Technology and Government Policy: A Comparative Study of Jordanian, Palestinian and Israeli Farmers in the Jordan Valley, Maurice Falk Institute for Economic Research in Israel, 1997. 504 Ibidem. 505 See: Dr. Arieh Sheskin and Dr. Arie Regev, Israeli Agriculture Facts and Figures, The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Second edition, December 2001. From http:// http://www.agron.co.il/media/Israeli_Agriculture_Facts_and_Figures.pdf. 506See: Lipchin, et. al. Public Perceptions and Attitudes Towards the Declining Water Level of the Dead Sea Basin: A Multi-Cultural Analysis, at http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/whatsnew/documents/Lipchin. 123

Therefore, the country had no alternative but to increase the use of recycled water and develop alternative strategies in order to meet future water demands. The Israeli government began its large scale SWRO (Sea Water Reverse Osmosis) desalination program in 1999, in order to provide the country with a larger water supply especially in times of drought. The targeted quantity of water to be desalinated changes yearly, according to climatic conditions507. Desalinated water is now considered essential for Israel’s sustainable fresh water supply. According to the estimates of Water Authority’s Master Plan for Water Sector Development, desalinated water supplies are expected to be 41% of all national potable water by 2050508. It is true that desalinated water has achieved remarkable quality standards, with the added benefit of not depending on climatic conditions; but, in the future, desalination plants might be substantially energy consuming (making this process reliant on Israel’s future energy prices). In fact, the establishment of desalination plants (such as Ashkelon) involves substantial investments of capital509. Desalination may also be influenced by the water quality of the Mediterranean Sea510. It is important to consider that an excess of desalination programs might encourage an increase in water consumption rather than promoting a better conservation of this precious resource: these processing plants are changing the way consumers perceive water scarcity. It would be wiser to evaluate the numerous consequences of every technological asset over the long-term perspective511; desalination should not be the only option. According to Alon Tal, assessments regarding the way intensive agriculture (promoted by the Zionist enterprise) has changed the Israeli landscape are left to one’s philosophical and ethical point of view512. But learning from Israel’s history it is possible to understand that economic growth has a price. Even though Israel has

507 See: Abraham Tenne, Sea Water Desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with Difficulties, and Economic Aspects of long-term Risks, WDA (Water Desalination Administration), 2010. At http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/Planning-and-Development/Desalination/Documents/Desalination-in- Israel.pdf. 508 Ibidem. 509 See: Abraham Tenne, Sea Water Desalination in Israel: Planning, coping with Difficulties, and Economic Aspects of long-term Risks, WDA (Water Desalination Administration), 2010. At http://www.water.gov.il/Hebrew/Planning-and-Development/Desalination/Documents/Desalination-in- Israel.pdf. 510 Ibidem. 511 Ibidem. 512 See: Alon Tal, Pollution in a Promised Land An Environmental History of Israel, University of California Press, 2002. 124 substantially changed its economic policy, water management still reflects the socialist legacy that infused the country since its establishment 513. It is, therefore, imperative to question “the Zionist heritage”514 responsible for water allocation calculated on the basis of its usage515.

513 See: Steven Plaut, Water Policy in Israel, Policy Studies N°47, IASPS, 2000. From http://: http://israeleconomy.org/policystudies/ps47eng.pdf. 514 See: Chlive Lipchin, Water, Agriculture and Zionism: Exploring the Interface between Policy and Ideology, Arava Institute for Environmental Studies, Israel, 2007. 515 See: Steven Plaut, Water Policy in Israel, Policy Studies N°47, IASPS, 2000. From http://: http://israeleconomy.org/policystudies/ps47eng.pdf. 125

Hydrographic Appendix

Banias River The Banias springs rise at the foot of the Southern slopes of Mount Hermon in Syria. From here, the water flows through a “canyon”516 channel, and forms the Banias waterfall. Its average annual discharge (121 MCM) is highly variable517due to climatic conditions.

Figure 23 Banias. Source: http://www.wikipedia.org

Coastal Aquifer The Coastal Aquifer plays a central role in the NWS of Israel, it extends eastwards along the Mediterranean coast of Israel between Haifa and Gaza518. The Aquifer is composed of Pleistocene sandstone, silt and calcareous sandstones. It serves both as a water resource and as a long-term water reservoir. Its water is used for domestic, industrial and agricultural settlements, and it is pumped through a system of

516 See: http://www.jewishagency.org 517 See: Peter Beaumont, Drylands: Environmental Management and Development, Routledge, 1989. 518 See: Martin Sherman, The Politics of Water in the Middle East. An Israeli Perspective on the Hydro- Political aspects of the Conflict, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999. 126 wells (around 3000 in total). Its catchment is naturally recharged (through precipitation) and artificially (through the NWC)519.

Figure 24 Coastal Aquifer. Source: http://www.sciencedirect.com

The aquifer did not suffer extensive exploitation until the 1940s when pumping activities began to increase. It provides the country with about 280 MCM per year.

Dan River The Dan is the main tributary of the Jordan River. Its waters originate from Mount Hermon in Israel and its annual flow is 250 MCM.

Figure 25 Dan. Source: http://www.wikipedia.org

519 See: Jacob Bear, A. Cheng, S. Sorek, D. Ouazar, I. Herrera, Seawater Intrusion in Coastal Aquifers Concepts, Methods and Practices, Springer, 1989. 127

Dead Sea The Dead Sea is the lowest continental depression on the planet (-410m). It is a closed sea where evaporation constitutes the only outlet520. The waters of the Dead Sea have a high salinity concentration (1.234g/l) and, for this reason, it is also called the “Salt Sea”. The water from the lake differs substantially from seawater: chemical composition of the Dead Sea waters is also rich in calcium, potassium, bromine, and magnesium. However it is poor in sodium, sulfate and carbonate521. The lake borders on Jordan to the east and Israel and the West Bank to the west, and it has a 40,000km2 drainage basin. The Jordan River is its main source of water; but there are also small springs located under and nearby this Salt Sea. Precipitation is scarce: about 100 mm/y in the northern part of the Dead Sea and barely 50 mm in the south522. The level of the Dead Sea is influenced by several elements: evaporation, rain and runoff (also subsurface springs)523.

Figure 26 (2010) Dead Sea Water Balance. Source: TAU

520 See: http://www.caee.utexas.edu/prof/maidment/giswr2010/TermProj/Comair.pdf, (University of Texas, Austin GIS in Water Resources, 2010). 521 See: I. Gertman, A. Hecht, The Dead Sea hydrography from 1992 to 2000, Journal of Marine Systems 35, 2002. (pp. 169-181). At: http://isramar.ocean.org.il/isramar2009/DeadSea/Gertman&Hecht_2002.pdf. 522 See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 523 See: I. Gertman, A. Hecht, The Dead Sea hydrography from 1992 to 2000, Journal of Marine Systems 35, 2002. (pp. 169-181). At: http://isramar.ocean.org.il/isramar2009/DeadSea/Gertman&Hecht_2002.pdf. 128

The Dead Sea water level is drastically affected by human activities (causing a reduction of runoff). Since the end of the 1970s the surface level has decreased by about 60 cm/year, resulting in an increase in the upper layer of salinity of the lake. Today the level declines by 1m/year, and evaporation substantially exceeds the input. The consequences of the water reduction threaten the equilibrium of the landscape surrounding the Dead Sea and often result in: • Presence of prolonged mud flats surrounding the Dead Sea. • Vulnerability of abrupt slopes adjacent to the Dead Sea coasts. • Increase in episodes of collapsed sinkholes524.

Hasbani River Another name for the Hasbani is the Snir stream. This river is one of the tributaries of the Jordan River525. It has an average annual flow of 135 MCM526. The river stems from the Wazzani and the Haqzbieh, which are two springs located in Lebanon (most of the catchment area is in Lebanon). The river flows for about 40 kilometers through Lebanon before it joins the waters of the Banias and Dan directly on the border in the north of Israel.

Figure 27 Hasbani. Source: http://www.exact-me.org

524 See: Reuma Arav, Sagi Filin, Yoav Avni, Monitoring changes along receding lake environments, Israel, 2012. At: http://www.fig.net/pub/fig2012/papers/ts05f/TS05F_filin_arav_et_al_6047.pdf. 525 See: http://www.wikipedia.org 526 See: Jon Martin Trondalen, Water and Peace for the People: Possible Solutions to Water Disputes in the Middle East, UNESCO Publishing, 2008. 129

Jordan River The River Jordan is 350 km long. Its watershed drains an area of 18,300 km2 and its catchment is divided among the following countries: Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Jordan. The river flows through a number of zones: from the north (the Mediterranean/subtropical area of Lebanon and the Galilee region) to the south (the Negev Desert and the Rift Valley). The river flows southwards to the Sea of Galilee.

Figure 28 River Jordan. Source: http://www.mapsof.net

Today, The Jordan River is a water source threatened by the depletion of its aquifers and presenting a low water quality.

Lake Tiberias/Kinneret or Sea of Galilee. The largest freshwater lake in Israel, the Lake Tiberias, is located in northeast Israel near the Golan Heights. The lake lies in the upper basin of the River Jordan. Also called Lake Kinneret or Sea of Galilee, it has the following characteristics: • Circumference: 53km. • Length: 21 km. • Width: 13 km527.

527 See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 130

• Surface area: 167km2

As a reservoir the lake holds about 3 billion cubic meters of water. The lake also serves as the main reservoir of the National Water Carrier (often known as the Kinneret- Negev Conduit).

Figure 29 Sea of Galilee Map. Source: TAU

The lake capacity is refilled by underground springs and by its main source, the Jordan River. The lake is the only major surface water source in the country528 and its waters have a mild temperature. Extensive agricultural activities are carried out in the catchment area, thanks to the favorable climate. The main agricultural products are: cotton, vegetables and fruits. The lakeshores host the production of bananas, dates and cotton. Lake Kinneret is also the main reservoir of Israel's NWCS and it provides at least one third of the country's yearly water supply529. Since the yearly water capacity of the lake is unpredictable, the aquifers have become storage facilities for years of drought530.

528 See: Martin Sherman, The Politics of Water in the Middle East. An Israeli Perspective on the Hydro- Political aspects of the Conflict, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999. 529 See: http://www.ilec.or.jp. 530 See: Martin Sherman, The Politics of Water in the Middle East. An Israeli Perspective on the Hydro- Political aspects of the Conflict, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999. 131

Mountain Aquifer The Aquifer extends from the eastern fringes of the Coastal Aquifer under the hills of Judea and Samaria. It is subdivided into three parts: the northern part (discharging into the Jezriel Valley), the eastern part (extending beneath the eastern slopes of the hills of Judea and Samaria towards the Jordan Valley) and the western portion that is considered to be the most relevant part due to the high quality standards of its waters531. The Mountain Aquifer supplies drinking water to many regions (for instance, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem and Beersheba).

Figure 30 Mountain Aquifer. Source: http://kanat.jsc.vsc.edu

National Water Carrier The National Water Carrier is the most important water project in the country. It was planned with the intention of transporting water from the Kinneret to the urban and agricultural centers along the coast and towards the desert in the south of Israel.

531 See: Martin Sherman, The Politics of Water in the Middle East. An Israeli Perspective on the Hydro- Political aspects of the Conflict, Macmillan Press LTD, 1999. 132

The National Water Carrier was inaugurated in 1964, when the plant began to transfer water from the lake to the south. It enhanced the national water supply with an extra 320 MCM532 per year, revolutionizing the chances of agricultural development even in the arid regions. At that time 80% the water transported was supplied for agriculture and only 20% was for domestic use533. By the beginning of the 1990s, the Carrier was providing half of the fresh water supply in Israel. Every hour the NWC transports 72,000m3 of water.

Figure 31 National Water Carrier Map. Source: TAU

When the NWC was completed, Israel managed to coordinate the use of surface and groundwater resources on a national scale. Through the NWC the short-term seasonal water storage was accomplished through the establishment of small reservoirs allowing water surplus storage in the wet months and water withdrawal during phases of droughts.

532 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to our Time, Knopf, 2007. 533 See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 133

Yarmuk River The Yarmuk River is the main tributary of the Jordan River. Its waters flow into the Jordan between the Lake Kinneret and the Dead Sea. The total catchment area of the river is 6,790 km2534. The Yarmouk River flows along the border between Syria and Jordan.

Figure 32 Yarmuk River. Source: TAU

534See: Y.Abu-Rukah, H.A. Ghrefat, Assessment of the anthropogenic influx of metallic pollutants in Yarmouk River, Jordan, Research Article, Environmental Geology 40 (6) March 2001, Springer-Verlag. At: http://faculty.ksu.edu.sa/74534/Publications/assessment%20of%20anthropogenic.pdf. 134

Glossary

Ahdut Haavoda A party created in 1919 in Palestine at the time of the British Mandate that saw Ben Gurion as its leader. In 1930 the party merged with Hapoel Hatzair and formed “Mapai”535.

Aliyah The word Aliyah (pl. Aliyot) in reality means “immigration to Israel by a Jew” but the term also has the symbolic significance of “ascension”536.

Alteneuland The book is a “utopian” novel written by Theodor Herzl in 1902. The work reflects the author’s populist-socialist conception of a Jewish state in Palestine.

Ashkelon A city located on the Mediterranean coast of Israel, 50km south of Tel Aviv and 13km north of the Gaza Strip.

Ashkenazi Jews, Ashkenazic Jews or Ashkenazim The word “Ashkenazi” originally referred to the medieval Jewish communities of the Rhineland Valley (including nowadays Germany and part of northern France). Today, the term includes groups of Jewish people coming from European communities537.

Balfour Declaration In the form of a letter sent from the British to Lord Rothschild on November 2 1917 outlining the British support for the establishment of a “Jewish National Home” in Palestine. At the 1897 Congress, the Zionist had coined the expression “National

535 See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 536 See: Stephane, Diasporas, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. 537 See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 135

Home”538, unknown in the international usage in order to avoid the expression “State”.

Bank Hapoalim (“Laborers Bank”). The Histadrut and the World Zionism Organization originally founded the bank (1921) and until 1983 it belonged to the Histadrut. In 1996 the bank was sold to a group of investors, and today it is controlled by Arison Holdings.

Beersheba This city is often called the “Capital of Negev” because it is the largest town in the Negev desert with its 194,300 inhabitants.

Davar Davar was a daily newspaper published in Hebrew during the course of the British Mandate in Palestine and also Israel from 1925 until 1996.

Dimona This is a city located in the Negev desert, 36 km south from Beersheba and 35 km far from the Dead Sea in the south of Israel. The city has about 34,000 inhabitants.

Ein Harod (Kibbutz) This kibbutz was built in 1921 from the people of the Second and Third Aliyah and was the first largest kibbutz in the country. Ein Harod is located in the Jezreel Valley, and today the kibbutz totals more than 500 members.

Fellah The word fellah means peasant. The fellaheen are farmers/agricultural laborers in the MENA countries.

Gdud Haavodah A socialist Zionist work group based on the principle of a general commune, advocating equality and democratic self-management 539 . The organization,

538 See: Howard M. Sachar, A History of Israel from the Rise of Zionism to Our Time, Knopf, 2010. 136 established in 1920, did not only build several kibbutzim, but also paved roads and worked the land.

Haganah The word “Haganah” means defense in Hebrew540. This name was also given to the Jewish paramilitary organization established in 1920 during the British Mandate. It was subsequently turned into the .

Halutz (pl.Halutzim). The halutzim were the Jewish pioneers who originally came to Palestine to cultivate the land and establish agricultural settlements.

Hapoel Hatzair Hapoel Hatzair was a Zionist organization, which was founded in Palestine in 1905. Its founders, including A.D. Gordon, were inspired by non-Marxist-Zionist-socialist beliefs.

Hevrat HaOvdim The economic unit of the Histadrut was established in 1923, with the scope of enhancing the Histadrut's possessions and assets under a single organ541.

Histadrut The Histadrut or Genaral Federation of Labor in Israel was established in 1920 with the capacity of providing workers with a range of amenities. It was a trade union organization542 that at the time of its establishment represented 35% of the Jewish adult population in the country.

Kevutza The Kevutza (small kibbutz) is a communal settlement based on the common ownership of means of production

539 See: Dafnah Sharfman, Living without a Constitution: Civil Rights in Israel, M.E. Sharpe, 1993. 540 See: http://www.zionism-israel.com. 541 See: http://holtd.co.il. 542 See: Sara E. Karesh, Mitchell M. Hurvitz, Encyclopedia of Judaism, Checkmark Books, 2007. 137

Kibbutz Type of communal settlement created before Israel’s independence and based on socialist beliefs. The kibbutzim were meant to protect the land and to provide its members with a range of economic and social services.

Knesset The Knesset or “Assembly” is the parliament of Israel. There are 120 members. Constituted in 1949, it was initially established in Tel Aviv but it was later moved to Jerusalem (1950). Its members are elected by a proportional system and it is important to know that no single party has ever achieved a majority of seats.

Kosher Set of rules establishing how food should be cooked and prepared for Jewish people.

Kupat Cholim The “Sick Fund” was created by the Histadrut with the scope of taking care of the medical needs of the Jewish population.

Law of Return (1950) The law that was passed, granting every Jew the right to immigrate to Israel543.

Mapai Mapai lit. Workers' Party of the Land of Israel was the left-wing party that remained dominant in the country until, in 1968, it became part of the Labor party544.

Maskil (pl.Maskilim) Lit. The “enlighted ones” were the members of the Jewish enlightenment movement of the 18th and 19th centuries. They were interested in the relationship between Judaism and Western Enlightenment and encouraged secular education.

543 See: Stephane Dufoix, Diasporas, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. 544See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 138

Merhavia Kibbutz The Kibbutz that was established in 1929 and is located in the north of Israel near the city of Afula.

Mizrahi Jews The Mizrahim are Jews descending from the Jewish communities of the MENA countries and of the Caucasus545.

Moshav The moshav is a type of agricultural cooperative settlement whose origins date back to the Second Aliyah settlers and to the pioneer farms. Though similar to the kibbutzim, the moshavim are in contrast farms that are individually owned.

Negev The Negev is a desert/semi desert region located in the south of Israel whose area covers more than half of the country (13,000 km²). Its shape is one of a scalene triangle.

NIR Nir was a Cooperative Company for the Settlement of Hebrew Workers Ltd', dating back to 1924, created with the task of transforming it into the legal owner of the Jewish collective settlements in Palestine546.

Petah Tikvah Petah-Tiqva was established in 1878 by a community of Jewish pioneers who created a society with the aim of working the land. In 1888, Baron Edmund de Rothschild gave financial support to the settlement and bought additional land, and sent experts to train farmers in rural areas547.

Poalei Zion This was a movement of Marxist Zionist Jewish workers established in several towns

545 See: http://www.wikipedia.org. 546 See: Zeev Sternhell, The Founding Myths of Israel, Princeton University Press, 1998. 547 See: http://www.zionism-israel.com. 139 within the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20th century.

Pogroms By the XX century the word pogrom indicated any form of violence against the Jews. This word was mainly connected to the Russian Empire and Eastern Europe548.

Sephardi The word Sephardi normally identifies the descendants of Spanish and Portuguese Jews who in the remote past used to live in the Iberian Peninsula before being expelled in 1492 by the Alhambra Decree549.

Six-day war The Six-Day War (or June War, 1967 Arab-Israeli War, and Third Arab-Israeli War) began on 5th of June 1967 and ended five days later. It saw Israel fighting against its neighboring countries (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria). The war changed the fate of Israel: in six days, the country had seized control over the Gaza Strip, the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights.

Tahal The “Israel Water Planning Authority” or Tahal was founded in 1952 with the aim of developing Israel’s water resources.

Ulpan The word “Ulpan” comes from the root “Alef” that means to teach. It is an institution created with the scope of teaching Hebrew to adults. It was first established in 1949 by the government due to the need to the massive amount of immigrants coming to Israel. The standard ulpan lasts 6 months and also teaches immigrants about the culture of Israel550.

548 See: John Doyle Klier, Russians, Jews, and the Pogroms of 1881-1882, Cambridge University Press, 2011. 549 See: Paloma Diaz-Mas, Sephardim: The Jews from Spain, University Of Chicago Press, 1993. 550 See: G. Abramso, Encyclopedia of Modern Jewish Culture, Routledge, 2005. 140

WZO The establishment of the World Zionist Organization in 1897, at the first Zionist congress in Basel, was a main event in the history of Zionism. It reflected the emergence of the movement and the urge for a further development551.

Yishuv The word Yishuv refers to the body of Jewish residents in Palestine, before the creation of the State of Israel.

Yom Kippur War The war, often called the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, was fought from October 6 to 25, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria.

Zionism Form of nationalist Jewish movement relating to the will of establishing a Jewish nation state in the Land of Israel. The movement ideas were based on the concepts of human improvement and national liberation.

551 See: James L. Gelvin, The Israel-Palestine Conflict: One Hundred Years of War, Cambridge University Press, 2005. 141

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