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SSI Changes 2014 (PDF) OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL CHANGES TO THE Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List SINCE JANUARY 1, 2014 This publication of Treasury's Office of Foreign [email protected]; BIK (RU) 044525060 [UKRAINE- OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE Assets Control ("OFAC") is a reference tool EO13662]. OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OAO; a.k.a. GPB, providing actual notice of actions by OFAC with BANK RAZVITIYA I OJSC), 16, Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow respect to persons that are identified pursuant to VNESHNEEKONOMICHESKOI 117420, Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya Executive Order 13662 and are listed on the DEYATELNOSTI (VNESHEKONOMBANK) St., Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSI List). GOSUDARSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA GAZPRUMM; Website www.gazprombank.ru; The latest changes may appear here prior to their (a.k.a. BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND Email Address [email protected]; publication in the Federal Register, and it is FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS Registration ID 1027700167110; Tax ID No. intended that users rely on changes indicated in (VNESHECONOMBANK) STATE 7744001497; Government Gazette Number this document. Such changes reflect official CORPORATION; a.k.a. VNESHECONOMBANK; 09807684 [UKRAINE-EO13662]. actions of OFAC, and will be reflected as soon as a.k.a. "VEB"), 9 Akademika Sakharova prospekt, GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT STOCK practicable in the Federal Register under the Moscow 107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC BFEA RU COMPANY (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS index heading "Foreign Assets Control." New MM; Website http://www.veb.ru; Email Address INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK Federal Register notices with regard to [email protected]; BIK (RU) 044525060 [UKRAINE- OAO; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OJSC; a.k.a. identifications made under Executive Order 13662 EO13662]. GAZPROMBANK OTKRYTOE may be published at any time. Users are advised GAZPROMBANK GAS INDUSTRY OJSC (a.k.a. AKTSIONERNOE OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, to check the Federal Register routinely for GAZPROMBANK OAO; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OAO; a.k.a. GPB, OJSC), 16, Building 1, additional names or other changes to the SSI List. OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT Nametkina St., Moscow 117420, Russia; 63, Entities and individuals on the list are occasionally STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK Novocheremushkinskaya St., Moscow 117418, licensed by OFAC to transact business with U.S. OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE Russia; SWIFT/BIC GAZPRUMM; Website persons in anticipation of removal from the list or OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OAO; a.k.a. GPB, www.gazprombank.ru; Email Address because of foreign policy considerations in unique OJSC), 16, Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow [email protected]; Registration ID circumstances. Licensing in anticipation of official 117420, Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya 1027700167110; Tax ID No. 7744001497; Federal Register publication of a notice of removal St., Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC Government Gazette Number 09807684 based on the unblocking of an entity's or GAZPRUMM; Website www.gazprombank.ru; [UKRAINE-EO13662]. individual's property is reflected in this publication Email Address [email protected]; GAZPROMBANK OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE and by removal from the SSI List. The following Registration ID 1027700167110; Tax ID No. OBSHCHESTVO (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS changes have occurred with respect to the Office 7744001497; Government Gazette Number INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK of Foreign Assets Control Listing of Sectoral 09807684 [UKRAINE-EO13662]. OAO; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OJSC; a.k.a. Sanctions Identifications since January 1, 2014: GAZPROMBANK OAO (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT STOCK GAS INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK COMPANY; a.k.a. GPB, OAO; a.k.a. GPB, • 07/16/14 OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT OJSC), 16, Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK 117420, Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya The following [UKRAINE-EO13662] entries have OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE St., Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC been added to OFAC's Sectoral Sanctions OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OAO; a.k.a. GPB, GAZPRUMM; Website www.gazprombank.ru; Identifications List: OJSC), 16, Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow Email Address [email protected]; 117420, Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya Registration ID 1027700167110; Tax ID No. BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN St., Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC 7744001497; Government Gazette Number ECONOMIC AFFAIRS (VNESHECONOMBANK) GAZPRUMM; Website www.gazprombank.ru; 09807684 [UKRAINE-EO13662]. STATE CORPORATION (a.k.a. BANK Email Address [email protected]; GPB, OAO (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS RAZVITIYA I VNESHNEEKONOMICHESKOI Registration ID 1027700167110; Tax ID No. INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK DEYATELNOSTI (VNESHEKONOMBANK) 7744001497; Government Gazette Number OAO; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OJSC; a.k.a. GOSUDARSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA; 09807684 [UKRAINE-EO13662]. GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT STOCK a.k.a. VNESHECONOMBANK; a.k.a. "VEB"), 9 GAZPROMBANK OJSC (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK COMPANY; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK Akademika Sakharova prospekt, Moscow GAS INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE 107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC BFEA RU MM; OAO; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OJSC), 16, Website http://www.veb.ru; Email Address STOCK COMPANY; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow 117420, OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL CHANGES TO THE SSI LIST IN 2014 Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya St., FINANSOVO-INVESTITSIONNAYA KOMPANIYA COMPANY), 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment, Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC NOVAFININVEST OAO (a.k.a. NOVATEK; a.k.a. Moscow 115035, Russia; Website GAZPRUMM; Website www.gazprombank.ru; OAO NOVATEK), 2, Udaltsova Street, Moscow www.rosneft.com; alt. Website www.rosneft.ru; Email Address [email protected]; 119415, Russia; 22 A, Pobedy Street, Tarko- Email Address [email protected]; Registration Registration ID 1027700167110; Tax ID No. Sale, Yamalo-Nenets Autonomous District ID 1027700043502 (Russia); Tax ID No. 7744001497; Government Gazette Number 629580, Russia; 22a Pobedy ul., Tarko-Sale, 7706107510 (Russia); Government Gazette 09807684 [UKRAINE-EO13662]. Purovski raion, Tyumenskaya Oblast 629850, Number 00044428 (Russia) [UKRAINE- GPB, OJSC (a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK GAS Russia; Email Address [email protected]; EO13662]. INDUSTRY OJSC; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK Registration ID 1026303117642 (Russia); OJSC ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO OAO; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK OJSC; a.k.a. Government Gazette Number 33556474 ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OIL GAZPROMBANK OPEN JOINT STOCK (Russia) [UKRAINE-EO13662]. COMPANY ROSNEFT; a.k.a. OPEN JOINT- COMPANY; a.k.a. GAZPROMBANK NOVATEK (a.k.a. FINANSOVO- STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; OTKRYTOE AKTSIONERNOE INVESTITSIONNAYA KOMPANIYA a.k.a. ROSNEFT; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL OBSHCHESTVO; a.k.a. GPB, OAO), 16, NOVAFININVEST OAO; a.k.a. OAO NOVATEK), COMPANY), 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment, Building 1, Nametkina St., Moscow 117420, 2, Udaltsova Street, Moscow 119415, Russia; 22 Moscow 115035, Russia; Website Russia; 63, Novocheremushkinskaya St., A, Pobedy Street, Tarko-Sale, Yamalo-Nenets www.rosneft.com; alt. Website www.rosneft.ru; Moscow 117418, Russia; SWIFT/BIC Autonomous District 629580, Russia; 22a Email Address [email protected]; Registration GAZPRUMM; Website www.gazprombank.ru; Pobedy ul., Tarko-Sale, Purovski raion, ID 1027700043502 (Russia); Tax ID No. Email Address [email protected]; Tyumenskaya Oblast 629850, Russia; Email 7706107510 (Russia); Government Gazette Registration ID 1027700167110; Tax ID No. Address [email protected]; Registration ID Number 00044428 (Russia) [UKRAINE- 7744001497; Government Gazette Number 1026303117642 (Russia); Government Gazette EO13662]. 09807684 [UKRAINE-EO13662]. Number 33556474 (Russia) [UKRAINE- OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL VNESHECONOMBANK (a.k.a. BANK FOR EO13662]. COMPANY (a.k.a. OAO ROSNEFT OIL DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC OAO NOVATEK (a.k.a. FINANSOVO- COMPANY; a.k.a. OIL COMPANY ROSNEFT; AFFAIRS (VNESHECONOMBANK) STATE INVESTITSIONNAYA KOMPANIYA a.k.a. OJSC ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. CORPORATION; a.k.a. BANK RAZVITIYA I NOVAFININVEST OAO; a.k.a. NOVATEK), 2, ROSNEFT; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY), VNESHNEEKONOMICHESKOI Udaltsova Street, Moscow 119415, Russia; 22 26/1 Sofiyskaya Embankment, Moscow 115035, DEYATELNOSTI (VNESHEKONOMBANK) A, Pobedy Street, Tarko-Sale, Yamalo-Nenets Russia; Website www.rosneft.com; alt. Website GOSUDARSTVENNAYA KORPORATSIYA; Autonomous District 629580, Russia; 22a www.rosneft.ru; Email Address a.k.a. "VEB"), 9 Akademika Sakharova prospekt, Pobedy ul., Tarko-Sale, Purovski raion, [email protected]; Registration ID Moscow 107996, Russia; SWIFT/BIC BFEA RU Tyumenskaya Oblast 629850, Russia; Email 1027700043502 (Russia); Tax ID No. MM; Website http://www.veb.ru; Email Address Address [email protected]; Registration ID 7706107510 (Russia); Government Gazette [email protected]; BIK (RU) 044525060 [UKRAINE- 1026303117642 (Russia); Government Gazette Number 00044428 (Russia) [UKRAINE- EO13662]. Number 33556474 (Russia) [UKRAINE- EO13662]. "VEB" (a.k.a. BANK FOR DEVELOPMENT AND EO13662]. ROSNEFT (a.k.a. OAO ROSNEFT OIL FOREIGN ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OAO ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY (a.k.a. OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OIL COMPANY ROSNEFT; (VNESHECONOMBANK) STATE COMPANY ROSNEFT; a.k.a. OJSC ROSNEFT a.k.a. OJSC ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. CORPORATION; a.k.a. BANK RAZVITIYA I OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OPEN JOINT-STOCK OPEN JOINT-STOCK COMPANY ROSNEFT VNESHNEEKONOMICHESKOI COMPANY ROSNEFT OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. OIL COMPANY; a.k.a. ROSNEFT OIL DEYATELNOSTI (VNESHEKONOMBANK) ROSNEFT; a.k.a.
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