OAKLAND/BERKELEY HILLS FIRE Oakland/Berkeley, CA October 20, 1991
FIRE INVESTIGATIONS
NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION
1 Batterymarch Park, PO Box 9101, Quincy, MA 02269-9101 USA Telephone: 1-617-984-7263 E-mail: [email protected] All non-NFP A photographs have been removed from this document. -% d* d*(- (-,d $(*1% & (-,d
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l lYSAGHT, GAMMA-UAISON
A devastating conflagration Oakland suddenly lose a substantial tax drought had dried out overgrown grass, base in these poor economic times, but bushes, trees, and shrubs, making them occurred in the scenic hills they have since discovered that 30 per easily ignitable. The parched leaves of above the cities of Oakland and cent of the homeowners have decided closely spaced eucalyptus and Monterey Berkeley, California, on October not to rebuild in the Hills. pine trees touched in certain areas and overhung homes in others. Untreated 20, 1991. Burning embers The conflagration that day was so wood shingles were the predominant carried by high winGs from the intense that fire fighters were helpless in roof covering for homes in the area. their attempts to suppress it, and the Unprotected wood decks extended out perimeter of a small but grow affected residents suddenly found them frommany of the homes and over slop ing duff lire tunned overgrown selves encircled in flames, blinded by ing terrain that was covered with easily smoke, and helplessly looking for escape vegetation and led to the further ignitable combustible vegetation. That routes. One crew of fire fighters felt they day, unseasonably high temperatures, ignition of tree crowns and com would be overrun by the firestorm, but low relative humidity, and strong winds bustible construction materials made a defensive stand when they real pervaded the area, further setting the ized they could not escape. They manned stage for potential disaster. The only of adjacent homes, including their hose lines and gathered a cluster of atypical factors not found in other major many with wood-shingle roofs. trapped civilians into a home that soon wildland fires studied over the years became threatened, and fought for their were the prolonged drought and a The result was a major wildland/urban lives. Using large caliber hose lines to December freeze the year before that interface fire that killed 25 people protect themselves and to prevent igni killed much of the native and ornamental including a police officer and a fire fight tion of the home, they successfully sur vegetation, making them even more sus er, injured 150 others, destroyed nearly vived the fire. ceptible to fire and adding to the total 2,449 single-family dwellings and 437 fuel load'in the area. apartment and condominium units, While fire officials labeled the cause of burned over 1,600 acres, and did an esti the original fire "suspicious," the reasons With these factors at hand, once open mated $1.5 billion in damage. for the fire's rapid spread were neither flaming occurred, the fire was pushed Furtherm()re, not only did the city of suspicious nor surprising. A five-year beyond its original boundaries by fierce
3 up. In addition, the sudden and massive buildup of fire fighters, summoned to the fire.froni neighboring departments, soon overwhelmed radio and telephone traffic making it nearly impossible for the inci dent commanders to coordinate fire fighting activities.
These were the conditions confronting fire fighters on the scene. The massive firestorm conditions kept fire fighters on the defensive throughout the conflagra tion, giving them no chance to mount a sustained and effective attack until weather conditions improved. Their only hope until then was to slow the fire spread where and when they could.
The weather, which greatly affected the growth and helped sustain the fire, even tually changed and ultimately helped the S. RINGMAN, SIPA PRESS fire fighters bring the fire under control. By early the first evening, the winds died winds that averaged 20 miles per hour confronted and which they would face down to a five-mile-per-hour breeze, 6 and gusted up to 35-50 miles per hour. for over hours. Indicative of this nudging the flames back over areas The flames then fed on the unbroken described rapid growth development and already burned and giving fire fighters chain of dry vegetation and the com spread of the Oakland Hills fire is the the time they needed to begin to bring bustible construction materials of the fact that 790 homes were consumed in the fire under control. Fire fighters drew homes. The firewas virtually out of con the first hour of the fire! a perimeter around the fire early the next trol within only a few minutes of its start. morning, declared it contained by the It is not surprising that the fire quickly On-scene fire fighters tried to retreat to third day, and had it under control by the overwhelmed the initial fire fighters, the border of the fire but found that it fourth day. was moving faster than they could repo who fought valiantly. No fire depart sition their apparatus. Then with the ment, however, could have effectively The wildfire in the Oakland and additional affects of the topography of intervened at this point in such an intense Berkeley Hills was the worst in the land, the firebegan to move in sever fire. Further complicating its control California's history. It, like all fires, al directions involving more homes and were the narrow winding roads and the holds many lessons. While the 1990 vegetation and soon building into a mas fire's turbulent fury and blinding smoke Stephan Bridge Road fire in Michigan sive firestorm. When this critical level of conditions that restricted and even halted showed that wildland/urban interface a wildland fire is reached, not only is its the fire fighters' access to the fire area. fires canspread rapidly over flatterrain, intensity difficult to suppress, but also its Furthermore, the steep slopes within the the Oakland Hills fire reminds us that potential for spreading far beyond its hills, some at a 30-degree pitch, also similar spread phenomenon can occur current boundaries is inevitable. A facilitated fire spread and further ham even in urban areas not typically thought firestorm involves massive burning and pered fire fighting. Congestion on those of as being included in the needs an abundant amount of air in order roads, downed power lines, and flying wildland/urban interface. Oakland is a to sustain itself, and since the fire had no embers swirling along exit paths from large city, and while there are wooded natural bounds, there is plenty of air and several directions at once caused near areas within its boundaries, residents fuel for its continued rapid, uncontrolled panic conditions among residents trying may have thought they were immune to growth. Then, this phenomenon creates to flee the fire. Faced with this, some wildfires. Unfortunately, wildland/urban its own "wind" to supply air to the fire, residents abandoned their cars and start interface fires can affect city residents and when these winds combine with the ed running, worsening the congestion. too, so they, like the population in rural strong prevailing winds, a turbulence Unfortunately, 25 people, mostly those America, have to be aware of the dan results that causes the fire to be unman with little warning, were overrun by the gers and be prepared. ageable. As the combustibles burn, buoy rapid spread of the fire. ant forces carry burning embers upward In its aftermath, many have questioned Where defensive stands were made by where they eventually cool and deposit whether this fire typifies the fire of the the still flaming materials on unaffected the firefighters, high winds overpowered future. The answer is that it might. areas creating numerous additional fires. fire streams, gas lines ruptured, electrical power failed, and water reservoirs dried This was the chaos that fire fighters first
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)l acres, 584 buildings, and caused $10 and "backfiring" to remove adjacent urban fires are likely to be structural, million in damages. fuels. This procedure works against the people put their emphasis on preparing need to protect individual homes. for those fires and forget the dangers Furthermore, in September 1970, a fire Committing major resources to protect they'll face in a fast-moving wildland in the East Bay Hills southeast of the ing individual homes can lessen the abil fire. University of California Berkeley cam ity to control the wildfire. pus destroyed 38 homes, damaged 7 oth To compensate for these special problem ers, and caused $3.5 million in damages. Another serious problem in wildland areas, some areas in California are legal Ironically, some of the homes destroyed fires is that wildland fire-fighting tactics ly designated ·as hazardous fire areas in that fire were rebuilt, then destroyed differ from structural fire-fighting tac where special fire protection measures again in the 1991 blaze. tics, and experts in one type of fire may are required. The law defines a haz not be trained or equipped to handle the ardous fire area as any land covered by December 1980 saw yet another fire, this other type. The first responding units in a grass, grain, brush, or forest, privately or one emerging from Wildcat Canyon wildland/urban interface fire are some publicly owned, that is so inaccessible located just north of the 1991 fire in times from agencies primarily concerned that a fire there would be abnormally Berkeley to destroy 6 homes and injure 3 with wildland fires. However, they can hard to suppress. In practice, however, people within 20 minutes. also come from agencies whose main areas where buildings can be accessed by experience and expertise is in battling paved roads aren't considered to present After the 1923 wildfire in Berkeley, the structural fires. abnormally difficult fire suppression City Council passed legislation requiring problems, and so they aren't considered fire-resistive wood coverings for roofs, It is not unusual for people in major hazardous under the law. All the resi then rescinded the legislation before it cities like Oakland and Berkeley to have dences in the Oakland Hills fire were could take effect. The Oakland area difficulty believing that a major wildfire accessible by paved roads, however nar destroyed in the 1991 fire had no local can happen in their area. Most city row and winding, so they were not desig fire protection regulations on fire-resis dwellers consider their surroundings to nated as hazardous fire areas. tive roofs. Ironically, this issue still has be more urban than rural. Since most not been fully resolved in this country. Cross-training of fire fighters can go a long way toward solving these tactical In 1982, Berkeley designated a section of problems. Just as important, however, is the city as the Hazardous Hill Fire Area. passage of sensible fire safety regula This designation included a rigorous. tions that prohibit dangerous building inspection program. In June 199 1, four practices and mandate regular inspec months before the fire, Berkeley passed tions to ensure adequate clearance for an ordinance requiring Class A roofs in a vegetation. Too often, public support for specific area. However, the area of the those requirements is lacking. Finally, city consumed by the fire was not part of residents have a responsibility for their that designated area. safety as well. At a minimum, they must make themselves aware of the wildfire Aside from their susceptibility to dry, hot potential in their areas and seek out air, abundant parched vegetation, high appropriate vegetation and design for winds, and combustible construction, all their landscaping. these wildland/urban interface areas shared one other risk factor: a different level of fire protection. One of the ironies of the migration out of cities and into rural areas is that among the things people "get away from" are city services like fire protection. People take it for granted in the city, tend to balk at its extra cost in rural areas, and don't even miss it until they need it, when suddenly they realize it may not be as quickly available as they had assumed it to be.
Fire protection agencies face special problems in wildland/urban interface set tings. Established procedures for control ling wildfires include sacrificing some acres by preparing a perimeter fire break
6 Severe wildland/urban interlace fires are seldom due to one or two physical factors. Generally, a combina· tion of factors work in tandem, spawning and nurturing the catastro· J. SMAUEY/PICTURE CUBE J. SMALLEY/PICTURE CUBE OAKLAND PUBLIC LIBRARY phe. Those factors in any given fire are rarely Besides having a high resin content like vegetation adjacent to combustible por the Monterey pine and chaparral, the tions of the homes was a significant igni unique. eucalyptus has long, dry, shaggy bark tion scenario in this fire. that can ignite easily. Further, its lower The elements at play in the Oakland and limbs often barely clear the ground and The chaparral is native to California and Berkeley Hills included the usual high provide a "ladder-fuel" arrangement that grows on more acrid sites. Its leaves and temperature, low-humidity, and high can spread fire (by convection currents) needles hold low levels of moisture, and wind conditions typical of all such fires; quickly up to the crowns, which ignite, it has a widely known and well-deserved a mix of easily ignitable duff-or forest greatly increase the intensity of the fire, reputation for ready flammability and floor material; shrubs and trees; inade and rapidly spread it beyond established fast rate of firespread. quate vegetation clearance; and fire department perimeters. The eucalyp wood-frame homes, some with wood tus trees were the most prevalent of the The burning of the chain of fuels in wild shingle roofs and overhanging wood tall vegetation in the fire area, and were land fires usually begins with the igni decks. Together they combined to pro estimated to have released over 70 per tion of grass, which is a light-weight, duce a firestorm of such great magnitude cent of the energy produced by the com easily ignited fuel. that it could not be stopped. bustion of the vegetation. Grassy areas respond more quickly to Vegetation Monterey pine, chaparral, grass, and precipitation changes than forested areas ornamental species such as junipers and do. In the fire area, a sharp fluctuation in The fields of native oak trees that once cedars were also common in the mix of precipitation occurred in the spring and occupied the Oakland/Berkeley Hills vegetation in the Hills. All but the grass summer of 1991. March had been a rainy began to be harvested as the population have high resin content and can ignite month, providing the moisture necessary in the area grew and prospered in the late readily. Each has the ability, once ignit for the grass to grow. But, the summer 1800s. In their place were planted mil ed, to produce fire intense enough to was hot and dry, making the once-lush lions of eucalyptus trees thought to be a ignite other combustibles and are capable grass, which covered wide stretches of fast growing, hard wood, perfect for use of producing airborne embers that are the land, a rich source of dry fuel. Dry as railroad ties and furniture. carried far from the burningsite. grass enables a fire to move quickly over Unfortunately, this was not the case and the land; but it is when the grass fire large stands of eucalyptus trees are com The Monterey pine, also characterized comes in contact with "heavier fuels" mon in the Hills. Farmers also planted by its low-growing limbs, is present that the chain continues. While grass the trees to take advantage of their stur throughout the Hills in thick stands. Not fires don't easily ignite tree canopies, diness as windbreaks. The wind they only can the Monterey pine "crown" eas they do ignite the ladder fuels, and the protected against spread their seeds ily, it will also sustain a crown fire, flames then quickly move up to the inter throughout the Hills, so that now the which again can out pace fire suppres mediate limbs, eventually engulfing the eucalyptus covers the area in thick, large sion crews. The juniper and cedar are tops of the trees. stands. Man began to encroach more and mostly present as ornamental vegetation more into the Hills and eventually began around many homes. A dry-climate Another item that played an important to build homes there and further brought species, the juniper also ignites easily role in the continuity of the fuel chain in with him an assortment of additional and bums intensely. Cedars are similar. this fire was the assortment of brush, vegetation. Placement of these and other ornamental which is also a heavier fuel and tends to
7 smolder, burn longer, and spew off Clearances. One of the fundamentals of Resldential construction embers. In the Hills there was an abun residential fire protection in wildland dance of scrub brush known as French areas is the creation of safety zones, or Combustible construction materials of broom. This fuel also helped increase the fire breaks, around individual homes. the homes in the fire area also played an intensity of and furtherspread of the fire. Reducing the amount of fuelimmediate important role in the devastating effects ly around the home helps prevent fire of the fire. Specifically, the combustible Then there are the trees themselves, very spread to the structure or from the struc materials used for porches, siding, and heavy fuels which sustain burning for ture. In the Oakland Hills area, however, roofing finish were identified. long periods of time. When fire climbs many homeowners did not take that the fuel ladder to the tree crown, it easily basic precaution. The result was that Roof construction in the Oakland Hills ignites adjacent tree tops with heat radi embers ignited vegetation, which in turn area varied and included asphalt shin ated and convected to them. Those areas ignited homes, and massive embers from gles, ceramic tiles, and wood shingles. of the Hills that experienced a crown fire burning structures were driven by the Despite the variety, the vast majority of showed the area had an intense fire. winds to other areas where they, too, the homes had combustible roofs. Roofs Heavier fuels, characteristically, once ignited the fuelchain that led to destruc are not all created equal. Some offer ignited, can burn for days until con tion. more protection from fire than others. sumed or extinguished through a labor Class A roofs protect against fire brands intensive effort. Juniper and other vegetation were in weighing more than four pounds. Class some cases right up against and touching C roofs offer much less defense, with Further contributing to the available homes. Eucalyptus and Monterey pine standing brands weighing no more than fuels of this fire were the leaves and trees touched each other and spread over one third of an ounce, or about the size branches of the eucalyptus trees and the roofs of houses. Further, shrubs, of a kitchen match. Untreated wood shin ornamental vegetation in the fire area small trees, and other vegetation were gle roofs offer even less protection. New that had been killed by an unusual freeze allowed to grow under the overhanging treatments such as pressure treatment can the previous December. This made the wood decks of some homes, providing a improve the ignition resistance of wood trees easy to ignite, which added to the ready path for fire spread to the build roofing. Yet, even roofs whose wood already abundant and volatile natural ings. Steep slopes also accelerated the shingles have been dipped in fire retar fuel mixture in the area. fire spread. dant (another current method) can lose their protective treatmentdue to weather Regardless of the way in which this just The Hills residents who thought they ing. To maintain their protective coating, described mix of fuels becomes ignited, were far away from therising smoke col these shingles should be treated virtually it is not only the intensity of the resulting umn began to be bombarded by a shower every year, which is, of course, impracti fire that causes the rapid spread, but also of burning embers that ignited the vege cal. their ability to cause "spotting" that tation around their homes. Many tried to makes wildfires so dangerous. Spotting extinguish those fires with garden hoses The roof is the most vulnerable part of a is the carrying of burning leaves and to no avail. building in a fire. That vulner;ibility is embers by the wind or the convection dramatically increased if the roof is cov column from the fireto unaffected areas, Evidence of the benefit of adequate ered with untreated wood shingles. Over which then ignite combustible roofs, clearance was abundant in the aftermath time, rain, weathering, and the sun ornamental shrubs and bushes, and other of the fire. In some cases, homes facing cracked the shingles and curled them up vegetation. Strong winds and the in-rush one street survived the fire, while homes so they became effectiveember catchers. of air needed for the fire's combustion also facing the street on the opposite In more than one case, a home with a process are the driving forces behind block were destroyed. That is because wood shingle roof was severely damaged spotting. The long leaves of eucalyptus the combined backyard distance, when or burned to the ground, while homes on trees are especially susceptible to spot not filled with an overgrowth of vegeta either side of it with clay tile roofs were ting. Their shape and light weight give tion, slowed the fire enough for effective relatively undamaged. Many of the roofs them airfoil characteristics. They float fire suppression. Among the common were flat or sloped with overhanging along easily in a wind. Spotting was a factors that surviving homes shared was eaves. Overhanging eaves pose a danger major factor in the spread of this fire, a large, clear yard. because they are exposed on the under and a major reason initial fire crews side to burning vegetation. Further, flat Large thick stands of the trees can also could not contain the fire. These numer roofs were able to collect fallen leaves benefit through proper clearances. ous secondary fires caused by spotting and needles, and burning embers. Roofs Thinning of thestands to reduce the like can combine into a massive firestorm on the three-story, wood-frame lihood of heat radiating from a fire and and/or spread fire suppression forces so Parkwood Apartments were flat and igniting adjacent trees has proven to be thin, over a such wide area, that they are illustrated such an ignition scenario an effective method to slow the spread of ineffective. when many of the roofs began to burn a wildland fire. intensely.
8 Som,e roofs were built of clay tile and Fourth, homes on steep slopes were Rainfall in the Oakland and Berkeley terminated at the edge of exterior walls. extremely vulnerable. Due to preheating Hills area had been particularly low This type of roof covering performed of vegetation, the fire ran up steep slopes before the fire. For five years prior to much better in the perimeter areas like flames up an upturned match. Some 1991, the area had experienced drought because fire fighters could extinguish of the slopes in the fire area were at a 58 conditions. Coupled with the lack of pre embers before the roof could become percent, or 30-degree, pitch. That made it cipitation was especially low relative ignited. as difficult for fire fighters to traverse as humidity-the ratio of the amount of it was easy for the fire to travel. Further, moisture in a volume of air to the total
Virtually every major wildland/urban building on a slope often means there is that the air can hold at a given tempera interface fire in recent years has spread an open area under the house. This open ture and atmospheric pressure. faster than it otherwise might have or has area poses a major exposure to flame increased the amount of damage because fronts and radiant energy, and provides a Relative humidity and temperature are of wood shingle roofs. clear path for fire spread to the structure interrelated. As the temperature rises, itself. In this fire, there was another criti relative humidity drops. If the tempera There are five other noteworthy points cal factor in building on slopes. Once the ture rises by 20oF, the relative humidity about residential construction and this fire reached, ignited, and consumed the will drop by about 50 percent. Relative wildfire: home, structural collapse occurred, humidity controls the moisture content of allowing burning automobiles to roll fuels, and therefore their susceptibility to First, most of the townhouses in the fromgarages and down the slopes. These fire. Fuels with 20 percent moisture can Hiller Highlands sub divis ion were automobiles blocked the roads for sup catch fire; light fuels with 2 percent attached. Vegetation spread throughout pression crews and evacuating residents. moisture can bum like gasoline. Relative many of the open areas and touched humidity in the Oakland and Berkeley some of the buildings. The fire took Fifth, the contribution of wood framing Hills on the day of the fire was 16 per about an hour to move through the com to the overall spread of the fire was cent, while the temperature was 92oF, a munity and destroy every building in insignificant compared to the role of eas record high that surpassed previous highs sight. But, largely due to the spacing of ily ignitable vegetation, combustible by 6 degrees. The combination of the units, the burning was more charac roofing and siding, and burning brands. drought and low relative humidity dried teristic of an urban conflagration than a Failure of wood-framing members led to out the vegetation, eliminating whatever typical wildland/urban interface fire. structural collapse, but only after a long potential it might have had to resist or Once a unit or several units were ignited, and intense exposure that far exceeded slow down flames. Any open flaming the raging fire easily negated the one conditions humans could have survived. held the potential of causing a disaster. hour fire walls separating the units. Soon, blocks of the building burned, and The Weather Wind. Of all the weather elements affect that, too, affected the conflagration's ing wildland fires, wind is the most vari spread. Weather contributes as much to the life able and least predictable. The shape of of a wildfire as the fuels do. the terrain and local heating and cooling Second, the lower floor of the Parkwood Temperature, lack of precipitation, and affect wind behavior. In turn, wind Apartments included a concrete-rein humidity provide the conditions for a fire affects fires by carrying away moisture forced garage for cars. That concrete to start, and wind nourishes the blaze, laden air, hastening the drying of vegeta structure survived the fire well, and the spreading it through spotting or by caus tion, adding oxygen to a fire, carrying cars parked inside incurred little or no ing direct flame impingement on com burning embers that ignite other com damage, showing the benefit of fire bustibles. bustibles, and pushing flames in the resistive construction. direction of virgin fuels. Wind, in short, Like the vegetative fuels themselves, the strongly influences the direction of Third, the fire provided further evidence different weather characteristics work spread of a wildfire. Nearly 90 percent of that double-pane windows appear to together to form a system that is either the large southern California wildfires resist breakage and reduce the transmis hospitable or inhospitable to wildfire. documented in the last three quarters of a sion of radiant energy in a fire, especial century have taken place between ly in the perimeter areas of the burn. Moisture. The moisture content of fuels September and December - the season Such windows in dwellings in the is a critical variable. Naturally, the drier of the Santa Ana winds. Those winds Oakland Hills for the most part helped the fuel, the more susceptible it is to fire. come less frequently to northern protect the interiors of the homes. Even The moisture in fuels comes from rain California, but they do occur there. in areas of maximum fire intensity, they fall and relative humidity. Average annu showed their protective potential. In one al rainfall along some parts of the Dry easterly winds that average 8 to 25 case, even when the outer panes of a northern California coast can be as low miles per hour, and dry northeasterly window cracked due to intense heat, the as 20 to 30 inches, although other areas winds that average 15 to 30 miles per interior panes remained intact. in the state can experience as much as hour are prevalent in northern California 150 inches. from July through September. That peri-
9 od is one of critical fire danger. So The Red Flag program deals with the minute, and then the next minute it was called "Diablo" winds occur in the area extreme end of the fire rating system behind them. The winds preheated in May and October. These winds occur when the CDF foresees extreme condi everything in their path. These condi when an inversion layer builds up in the tions they put up red flags and broadcast tions created a totally unmanageable sit Bay area and forces air moving west warnings so fire officials can take extra uation rife with terror for residents from the SanJoaquin Valley to speed up precautions. As the CDF anticipated, the caught up in it and struggling to finda as it moves down the west, or lee, side of Diablo wind phenomenon occurred way out of the area. the hills. When it can go no furtherlater October 20. Early that day, the winds ally, it moves up and over the ridges and shifted to the northeast and the relative Another phenomenon that led to rapid then down. As it flows downward, it humidity dropped. Wind velocity spread of the fire was development of a increases in temperature. increased to the high teens and low twen thermal inversion layer. The smoke and ties. By the time the fire rekindled, the heat from a fire will rise only until their There was virtually no wind on Saturday, wind in the Oakland Hills was blowing temperature equals that of the surround October 19, the day before the conflagra at 17 miles per hour, with gusts to 25 ing air. Then, the smoke and heat flatten tion, just a five-mile-per-hour breeze miles per hour. Some reports of condi out and spread horizontally. The thermal from the northeast. Nevertheless, the tions later in the day said winds were inversion layer during the Oakland Hills California Department of Forestry and gusting to 38-58 miles per hour. fire was at 3,500 feet. The layer trapped Fire Protection (CDF) issued a Red Flag heat from the fire and spread it out, warning that day and the following day. The Diablo winds are "foehn" winds that adding to the preheating of vegetation The reason was that a strong high-pres force the convection currents down and structures in the area. sure area in Oregon and the Great Basin against the natural flow that normally on Saturday was threatening to send blows up the hills. The result in this fire By approximately 7 p.m. on Sunday, the strong northerly winds to the Hills area was wild turbulence that sent embers in winds slowed to about five miles per and lower the relative humidity. several directions. The phenomenon was hour. They also shifted and began to Actually, precursors of those winds had a swirling effect much like a tornado, blow over the areas already burned. The moved into the area a week before and picking up embers from one place and combination of decreased velocity and replaced the moisture-laden air that nor depositing them in another. From the change in direction to an area of virtually mally would have swept in from the perspective of the fire fighters on the no live fuel helped fire fighters bring the Pacific. scene, the fire was in front of them one fire under control.
HIGH WINDS
10 K1VU-TV/OAKLAND
Origin and spread. The area around the perimeter. Only one section growing fire. By 11:15 a.m., the fire of fire-line construction was undertaken. blew out of the canyon and within min where the lire started was a Fire fighting forces soaked the rest of the utes it was out of control. ''box canyon" with steep slopes perimeter with water from hose lines and At first, the fire ran uphill from its point and contours that had formed helicopter drops. of origin to Grizzly Peak Boulevard. over the years lrom wind and Within and outside the bum there was Then, the winds changed and blew the water drainage. Once ignited, dense coverage of Monterey pines, and fire in several directions at the same duff under those pines was about a foot time. A classic foehn wind also pushed fuels within a canyon are pre deep. Further, theheat from the fire pro the fire downhill toward Buckingham heated, can more easily ignite, duced greater-than-normal needle cast Place as fast as it was going uphill. In from the pine trees, which added fresh minutes, the winds shifted again and the and are more apt to further kindling to accumulated duff about the fire spread eastward toward the ignite adjacentcombustibles. fire area. It is known by wildland fire Parkwood Apartments near theCaldecott fighters that fire bums freely in the top Tunnel. Another wind shift sent the Strong upslope winds are also common layer of duff in such fire scenarios, but flames southwest toward the townhomes in canyons. Winds are drawn in from the smolders deep within the duff because of in the Hiller Highlands. Pine trees in the bottom (especially on warm days) which the lack of oxygen. Water extinguishes area crowned and other vegetation burst further preheat and dry fuels. The the surface flames but combines with ash into flames. Soon homes were threatened "walls" of the canyon then contain the and charcoal to form a crust; the smol and fire fighters scrambled to contain the heat from a fire. As a result, fires in dering continues under the crust, some fire. Then, spotting spread the fire across canyons are an efficientmechanism for times for days. Highway 24 and pointed it toward Lake intense burning. Temescal. Meanwhile, another flame When the fire fighters thought they had front rushed northwest toward the The fire in this canyon might have erupt extinguished the fire early Saturday Claremont Hotel and into the city of ed a day earlier than it did had the day evening, they left the scene. Early Berkeley. not been unusually calm for that time of Sunday morning, they returned to "mop year. On Saturday, October 19, a fire of up." The spotting soon turned the fire into suspicious origin started near 7151 numerous large fires. The winds caused a Buckingham Drive; an area near the top Overnight, however, the heat buried in downward acceleration as the fire of the Hills near Grizzly Peak Boulevard. the duffat the firesite intensified. So too descended along the ridge between But the almost pleasant, five-mile-per did the local winds. By 10:45 a.m. Marlborough Terrace and Hiller hour breeze was too gentle to push the Sunday, while fire fighters were on the Highlands consuming everything in its flames very far from their point of ori scene mopping up, sparks burst out of path. The fire burned with such intensity gin. Sixteen engine companies, four the duff. They were quickly picked up by that it consumed 790 structures within patrol wagons, and a helitac unit from convective currents and carried by strong the first hour, and spread about 1.67 area fire departments aggressively winds out of the northeast portion of the meters per second. attacked the 5-acre fire and brought it fire area to nearby vegetation. The winds under control in about three hours. Fire (17 miles per hour, gusting to 25 miles The fire also swept around the mouth of fighters relied heavily on wet lines per hour) acted like bellows on the now the Caldecott Tunnel into the area south
11 11:30 1:00
of Highway 24. Parts of the Upper mind that the Oakland Hills wildfire was However, before reaching the firestorm Rockridge area ignited due to winds and not particularly intense and hot as wild level, a fire passes through another spotting. By noon, the fire had burned fires go. Wildfires of this type, with the phase. The fuels combine with wind and about 40 percent of the area ultimately to mix of fuels primed to bum and the high temperature to build a fire into a confla be affected. Included at this time were winds to nourish and spread the flames, gration, typical of the kind that occasion the Parkwood Apartments and the Hiller can easily reach 2,000 degrees F and ally devastates cities. Examples include Highland townhomes. But as the fire spread fasterthan a person can run. the Chelsea, Massachusetts, conflagra spread south and west, it slowed some tion in the late 1970s and the Great what because the land there was flatter The Oakland Hills fire, as many other Chicago Fire of the last century. and there was more open space. By 5 wildland/urban interface fires, developed Conflagrations need the right weather p.m., cooler temperatures and decreasing firestorm conditions. Within lS minutes and climatic conditions to continue wind velocity halted the fire's advance, of ignition of the first structure, the fire building in intensity. When the intensity but the intensity of the fire, much of it developed into at least one and possibly reaches conflagration and then firestorm coming fromthousands of burning struc two firestorms. proportions, the fire can develop a fire tures, would require many more hours of front that will actually move away from burning before it would subside. Firestorms develop when the heat, gases, the direction of the wind. and motion of a fire build up to the point The Oakland Hills fire achieved all three Intensity where they begin to create their own weather and wind, independent of the of these conditions. The hot, dry, high The fire that raged in the Hills was terri external conditions. Firestorms pull air speed winds, and dry, overgrown, close fying. It reached temperatures as high as into the base of the fire, the fire begins to ly spaced vegetation triggered a 2,000 degrees F, hot enough to boil feed itself, and towering convection conflagration that built up to firestorm asphalt. Temperatures reached cremato columns result in long-distance spotting intensity and eventually developed sev rium-level. Still, it's important to keep in and tornado-like vortices. eral fire fronts. The combination of spot-
12 3:00 5:00
ting and wind-driven fl ames spread the the street at 7200 and the house at 7235. spread of the fire. Additional units fire in several directions at once. But as They fought valiantly, holding positions responding to the area found adj acent the fire swept west, it slowed when it until the last possible minute. The wind areas burning too, and began to engage reached flatter terrain and less open was so strong that it bent 500-GPM hose those fires. However, they also found space. Still, the topography in other streams (at 100 psi) 90 degrees. Seventy that the fires were overrunning their areas, such as Broadway Terrace, kept five-GPM streams were completely inef positions. That was the early picture the fireburning fiercely. By 5 p.m., cool fective. Air attacks were also ineffective, being relayed to the incident command er temperatures and a dramatic decrease at least during the first three hours of the structure from all responding units. Such in wind halted the fire's progress. In fire due to strong winds, the continuous unprecedented and rapid fire spread effect, nature gave the fire back to the fuel chain, and heavy smoke that made it impossible to establish a coordi fire fighters so they could bring it under obscured visibility. Residents, off-duty nated attack. control. In the 10 hours the fire roared teachers, and other civilians helped fire through the Oakland and Berkeley Hills fighters, and the Oakland and Berkeley Coordination of the attack by the inci it ignited one building every 11 seconds. departments used wildland tactics like dent command was also hampered by the bulldozing firebreaks where that seemed inability to directly communicate with Response advantageous. Those tactics only helped mutual aid fire departments arriving along the east and west flanks of the fire. from around the state. There was plenty Public-protection-agency response to the of fire for all arriving units, however, so fire was massive and swift. But the fire Fire fighters' first reaction to the fire was they began to stake out areas for a defen was, too. Fire behavior was so extreme to retreat to perimeter areas, attack the sive stand. The efforts of mutual aid that fire fighters could not save the resi fire, and summon help. While additional companies were complicated however by dence at 7151 Buckingham Boulevard, alarms were being sent, however, the ini the lack of compatibility of their hose connections with Oakland's hydrant sys near the point of its origin. They were, tial crews could not establish effective however, able to save the house across perimeter areas because of the rapid tem.
13 One fire fighter died while shielding a The steep hills interfered with radio CONSENSUS woman from a live power line that fell transmissions, especially those from on both of them. A police officer was hand-held radios. Finally, communica killed while trying to lead residents of tions between Oakland and Berkeley the Hiller Highlands neighborhood to were hampered because the direct-dial safety when they were overrun by the tactical line (TAC) that links East Bay fire. fire departments was down.
Communications Despite the many hindrances, fire fight ers did their best to control this blaze. In The Incident Command System (ICS) the end, however, the fire followed its developed by the Southern California own course. There really was little fire Fire Service and the U.S. Forest Service fighters could do until the winds subsid in the 1970s allows for unification and ed. coordination of multiple jurisdictions responding to a fire. Water
Virtually no water-supply system might have been adequate for a wildfire of this magnitude. Eleven pressure zones were in the district, nine of which were affect ed by the fire. There were one or more reservoirs per zone, each with between 400,000 and one million gallons of water. Pumping stations linked the reser voirs, and draw-downs from the reser voirs activated them. However, there was E. LEDESMA, SIPA PRESS no auxiliary power supply. The coordination of the activities of this many responders was extremely difficult The entire system had been designed for normal operations. Emergency reserves Command and coordination of fire units due to the intensity and rapid spread of were in place to minimize temporary dis improved as time went on, but they were this fire. Coordination was worsened ruptions, and fire fighting reserves were never ideal. As weather conditions because the communications system was among them. The fire fighting reserves improved, it became possible to establish quickly overwhelmed by the volume of were designed for "normal" fires. This perimeter areas. Fire crews were still telephone and radio traffic generated by was no normal fire. subjected to the full intensity of the fire, responding elements and the public, who but they were now able to effectively were pleading for information. suppress ignition of homes. Crews could During the first 12 hours of the fire, break the chain of combustibles that had communications after fire spread, were earlier led to the total destruction of the biggest problem that public agencies homes. Hose streams became effective in faced. The result was uncoordinated extinguishing burning vegetation, wood action, losing requests for resources, and siding, and spot fires on roofs. Still, they an inability of field commanders to get were helpless in extinguishing the rapid an accurate picture of overall suppres propagation caused by the ignition of sion efforts and resources committed or homes with wood shingles. available. Field commanders resorted to OAKLAND TRIBUNE There is little doubt regarding the effec self-assigning their units where they The rapid spread of fire caused numer tive role fire fighters played in the reduc thought they were needed. ous power failures. As houses incinerat tion of loss of life and property in this The Oakland Dispatch Center had no ed, their water service lines ruptured. fire. The fire scenario they first encoun telephone lines reserved for outgoing The result was a drain on reservoirs, tered stacked the cards against them, yet calls. As available incoming lines were since the water kept flowing. For exam in spite of this they fought the fire flooded with calls, dispatchers could not ple, ruptured water lines at the burning assuming they would not survive. Their make outgoing calls. Radio frequencies, Parkwood Apartments complex drained valiant efforts began to pay off as the including the mutual aid frequencies, reservoirs in that zone. That led to aban winds subsided and the fire spread were saturated. Some field elements tried donment of suppression efforts in other slowed down. reaching dispatch on cellular telephones. areas of the zone because hydrants ran
14 dry. In one area, water tenders and other fire engines transported water to fire companies on the scene.
Eight pumping stations and 10 residen tial reservoirs were lost in the first half hour of the fire due to power disruptions to pumping stations. By 5 p.m. on Sunday, the first day of the fire, 10 key reservoirs were dry. It is estimated that more than 20 million gallons of water were used to extinguish this fire.
Oakland's fire hydrants have one or more standard three-inch-thread outlets. Other California cities and towns have hydrants with two-and-a-half-inch-thread outlets. Except for those departments in cities immediately adj acent to Oakland, to whom Oakland had previously sup R. WARWICK, OAKLAND TRIBUNE plied the appropriate adapters, respond ing fire departments could not connect to the hydrants. Those fewdepartments that did have the required adapters usually left them behind when they were overrun by the fire, and therefore did not have them when they got to their next posi tion.
Even if the water supply system had been greater, there had been an emergen cy power supply, and the hydrants all had the two-and-a-half-inch threads, offi cials question whether it would have made much difference in a fire as violent and wide$pread as this one.
Narrow roads
Another major hindrance to fire fighting was the system of narrow, winding roads M. MACOR, OAKLAND TRIBUNE in the fire area, many of which ended in cul-de-sacs. Fire apparatus could not Road. Eight others died on narrow streets requested one engine company each pass each other or the cars filled with in the same area. from Alameda, Alameda Naval Station, fleeing residents. Traffic jams devel Emeryville, Lawrence Berkeley Lab, and It oped, especially near the large apartment Mutual aid San Leandro. then asked Contra Costa complex. Many apartment residents and San Francisco for 10 engine compa abandoned their cars in frustration so Mutual aid for the Oakland Fire nies each. Berkeley requested one engine they could run to safety. The abandoned Department is secured through the company each from Albany, Emeryville, cars, in turn, served as roadblocks to fire Alameda County Fire Mutual Aid Plan. and Lawrence Berkeley Lab, and two fighters and other residents. Downed Inter-regional resources are mobilized strike teams from Alameda County. power lines further impeded evacuation through the State Fire and Rescue Between 11 :40 a.m. on October 20 and 5 down the narrow roads. Some apparatus Coordinator of the Office of Emergency p.m. on October 23, fire officials placed and private vehicles were trapped for Services. 17 separate requests formutual aid. hours on these roads. Within an hour after the fire erupted, In total, the Oakland and Berkeley fire 88 Eleven of the fire victims died as flames Oakland requested mutual aid in the departments were assisted by engine caught up with them while they were form of air attack from the California strike teams, 6 air tankers, 16 helitac 8 trapped in a traffic jam on Charing Cross Department of Forestry. The city also units, communications units, 2 man-
15 agement teams, 2 mechanics, and more left on their own without waiting for and police officials hampered evacuation than 700 search and rescue personnel. assistance. coordination. Additionally, 767 law-enforcement offi cers supplemented the efforts of the two On the other hand, the firefighters had to The majority of the fatalities occurred to cities' police departments, and the force some residents to evacuate. Other individuals who had little warning of the California Office of Emergency residents returned to the area to check on pending disaster. As a result, their posi Services, Federal Emergency friends, relatives, valuables, and the sta tions were overrunby the rapidly spread Management Agency, the Red Cross, tus of their homes, and . fire fighters had ing fire. One fire fighter and a police and the Salvation Army pitched in to to re-evacuate them. Some civilians, pos officer sacrificed their lives trying to help. ing as volunteers, entered the fire area save residents. The police officer gath and looted homes. ered several individuals into his squad Utilities car hoping that they would survive the Evacuations were conducted on a per fury of the fire. Unfortunately, their sonal, one-on-one basis. Oakland chose When the power lines were knocked escape route was blocked and the fire not to use the Emergency Broadcast down by the fire, electricity was not moved past them. System, feeling it was inefficient. The available to the pumping stations set up lack of a common radio frequency at the to refill reservoirs. Also, as the fire rav operational level between Oakland fire aged homes it also destroyed gas lines. The ruptured lines sent plumes of flame upward from the meters. While the burn ing gas may or may not have contributed RISKS to fire spread, officials were not able to tum off the lines for several hours after the fire began.
Evacuation
Evacuation of the fire areas was a major problem. hnagine the situation: Swirling winds blowing embers from all direc tions at once, making no area really safe; thick clouds of smoke taking away visi bility; congestion as residents fleeing in cars and on foot clogged narrow roads that fire apparatus was trying to traverse. It was a nightmarish scene. Evacuation was impeded by narrow, steep roads, high winds, and heavy smoke. In fact, the smoke made it difficult to locate the fire. Fleeing residents did not know which way to go, and fire fighters had a hard time directing them because they could not see beyond their immediate areas. The rapid fire spread made it hard to distribute evacuation personnel effec tively.
During the early stages of the fire, offi cials opted for fire control rather than evacuation. However, residents turned to fire fighters for evacuation assistance. Police using loud speakers moved through the area. Little time was avail able for anyone to instruct residents on how to evacuate, what to take with them, or how to secure their homes before they left. Eventually, after sensing the grow ing magnitude of the fire,many residents
18 KlVU-lV/OAKlAND
Fire is part of the natural ecolo years, include mismanaging vegetation Life and Property from Wildfire. The gy of forests and wldlands. It's by ignoring "ladder fuels," not cleaning standard was developed through NFPA's out brush and allowing vegetation to broadly participatory consensus stan predictable, and even cleansing. grow up to and over dwellings, building dards-making process, and presents fun For thousands of years, wild homes with wood shingle roofs and damental planning and design criteria for untreated combustible siding, construct fire agencies, planners, architects, devel fires have periodically raged ing combustible decks on pilings buried opers, and government on development throughwooded areas like the in steep slopes, and depending on narrow in wildland/urban interface areas. Oakland and Berkeley Hills, roads that can hardly accommodate two way car traffic for access and egress, Fires like the one in the Oakland and clearing out combustible vegeta making it virtually impossible for large Berkeley Hills will continue to burn tion and making room for new vehicles like fire apparatus to pass. wildland areas periodically, but future wildland fires need not be as devastating. growth. In fact, centuries ago, People need to be aware of the natural Residents in interface areas can take Native Americans populating the fire risks in wildland areas. Fire officials steps to make themselves and their Oakland Hills, which then did and others can offer guidance in con homes safer. struction, landscaping, and other factors have oak trees, practiced burn that reduce those natural risks. Many For the person who intends to build in ing in the area to Improve hunt suggestions like these are included in the interface areas, the first step is to choose Recommendations section of this report, the house site wisely. Flat sites are better ing. and in reports the Wildland/Urban than hills because fires move uphill Interface Initiative has produced on pre rapidly. Also, narrow, steep, or winding Throughout time, fire has been an impor vious fires, such as the Black Tiger Fire roads slow and sometimes block fire tant factor in nature's rejuvenation and of July 1989 near Boulder, Colorado; the apparatus and make evacuation difficult. man's efforts to modify the natural envi Stephan Bridge Road Fire of May 1990 ronment. Today, large numbers of people in Crawford County, Michigan; and Next is the house itself. The roof is the and the homes they have built in these "Firestorm 91," a study of a series of most vulnerable part of the house in a lush, beautiful areas have added a .com fires that occurred during October 1991 fire. Noncombustible roof coverings are ponent that makes wildfires far more near Spokane, Washington. Further, a must. So, too, are noncombustible sid grave than they were 300 years ago. The there are publications similar to the ing, decking, and trim. The chimney human presence is not likely to diminish. California Department of Forestry, "Fire should extend above the roof line and be For a large number of people, moving Safe-Inside-And Out," that provide topped with a spark arrester. Eaves out of the city and into areas like the detailed information on lowering the risk should be boxed and vents should be Oakland and Berkeley Hills provides a fromwildfires. screened. No part of the house should desirable counterbalance to the crush of rest on poles or pilings. city life. Sometimes these people make Based on data gathered from those and unsafe choices when they make such a other fires, and on the experience and The yard can and should act as a fire move. advice of fire officials, foresters, other break. Decorative masonry walls free of public officials, builders, architects, and vegetation are an effective barrier. A 30- Some of these unsafe choices, as fire and average citizens, NFPA has published foot safety zone around the house, free forestry officials have pointed out for NFPA 299, Standard fo r Protection of of flammable vegetation, is preferred.
17 Special attention should be paid to the ladder fuels. Low-lying branches must be cut off and hauled away and grass must be low in that area. Hardwood trees are a good addition because they are less flammable than conifers. All trees need to be at least 20 feet from each other and any structure. Limbs should be pruned to a height of 15 to 20 feet from the ground, never over the roof, and not within 15 feet of or directly above a chimney. Shrubs are best planted at least 15 feet from the house.
Maintenance is important. Structures should be kept free of vines and roofs should be clean, i.e., no leaves, pine nee dles, moss, or twigs. Keep leaves and needles more than 30 feet from the house. Residents should mow grass closely when it has stopped growing, and collect the clippings.
Not every dwelling in the Oakland and Berkeley Hills was burned to the ground. Several survived with minimal damage. Here is what they had in common:
1. Class A or Class B roof coverings. Many were clay or concrete tile, or cov ered with mineral-surfaced asphalt shin gles. Some had a mineral aggregate overlay, and a few had metallic tile roofs. These roof coverings were espe cially important at perimeter areas where fire fighters could extinguish small roof firesbefore they ignited the dwelling.
2. Stucco exterior walls. They are non combustible. Again, the delay in the ignition of the home brought about more effective extinguishment.
3. Small double-pane windows. Just as they keep out the cold air, they resist breakage when subjected to fire and reduce the transmission of radiant ener- ' gy.
4. Few overhangs or projecting elements like roofs exposed to burning vegetation.
5. Adequate clearances, or fire breaks. Where there were cleared, clean separa tions between houses and vegetation, or between houses themselves, fire did little damage.
J. SMAUEY/PICTURE CUBE •
18 KlVU-lV/OAKLAND
The wildfire in the Oakland and case in many similar settings throughout are in a unique position to ensure public the United States. safety before a disaster rather than after Berkeley Hills in October 1991 it has occurred. That can mean enacting was theworst in California's No one can predict exactly when or unpopular regulations at times. where the next fire will be, but nature history. It killed people, 25 gives us clues. Prolonged drought condi Tragic losses of homes in the wildlands injured150 others, and tions, high temperatures with low rela are usually preventable. However, com tive humidity, and extreme winds destroyed more than 3,000 bined efforts of the community organiza blowing hot, dry air are among the warn tions, fire services, federal, state and structures. Yet, for all that ing signs of potential disaster. Fire offi local governments, and individual home horror and tragedy, it was a cials everywhere recognize these signs owners are necessary to minimize losses. and base their declarations of "fire sea relatively small lire by wildfire son" on them as well as local fire history. The Oakland/Berkeley Hills fire has standards. The area it burned The public must learn to recognize those resulted in a greater local and statewide awareness of the problems associated was two-and-a-half-miles signs as well. with the wildland/urban interface. square. Had the winds not sub Just as every wildland/urban interface Nevertheless, a continuing and expanded sided Sunday evening, this fire fire is the result of a combination of fac effort must be undertaken to inform the tors rather than a single event, prevention nation of the potential hazards involved could have been much worse. of those fires and protection against them in interface areas, to inform them of how requires the cooperation of everyone in they can assess the hazards in their area The Oakland/Berkeley Hills was a pic the community. Urban/interface resi and to assist them in eliminating the haz turesque setting for thousands of resi dents must learn to adopt firesafe habits ards. Clearly, this effort cannot be dents who called the area home. But in and firesafe lifestyles. accomplished by just the individual fact, the area was ripe for a major disas efforts of one of the listed groups. ter and on October 20, 1991, it finally Those who choose to move to interface happened. The long history of fires in the areas have an obligation to use good The fire service area should have been warnings that we judgment in construction of their homes, must be vigilant regarding the identified in choosing their landscaping design and Wildfires require different tactics than factors constant in most of these prior materials, and in maintaining their structural fires do, and experience fight fires. But we were not. Slowly over time homes and the vegetation around them in ing one kind of fire is not readily trans the Hills were allowed to integrate the a firesafe condition. Once a wildfire ferrable to another. Yet, the very nature factors that led to a build-up of a sub starts, the survival of individual of an interface fire requires knowledge stantial fuel load about the homes. But dwellings will depend, in part, on the of both types of fire fighting. then, when the predictable yearly preparations that were made for such a "Diablo" winds that quickly dry out the catastrophe. The fire service should ensure that all normally plush vegetation don't produce personnel receive r�gular cross-training Legislators at the local and state level disaster, perhaps we begin to believe that in fighting both wildfires and structural have an obligation too. Theirs is to make disaster cannot occur. We might, in fact, fires. That cross-training should be a sure that well-known and proven fire even forget that we are in a required component of the regularly protection methods and practices are in wildland/urban interface area. But this scheduled training activities in each was not the case for the Hills nor is it the place in their communities. Legislators
19 LOOK FOR TROUBLE SPOTS
department that may be called on to fighting strategies, reporting protocols, Communities should establish communi respond to a wildland/urban interface command and functions of the Incident cations systems that allow allocation of fire. Management System, staging areas, radio frequencies by function, opera deployment of personnel, supporting tional division, and support service. The Urban departments, in particular, should activities, and demobilization. system should be compatible with other recognize the need for such tactics as local departments' systems and with working inside the perimeter with hand Drafting detailed mutual aid plans is county and state systems. And, the sys tools to break up charred crust, chum up only a first step. The next crucial step is tems should be able to transmit to all vegetation, and mix water with vegeta regular practice in carrying out those areas, regardless of topographical fea tion to ensure fires are totally extin plans. tures such as hills. The public apathy guished. This procedure is commonly about fire in general, and wildland/urban referred to as "mop-up." The fire service should schedule regular interface fires in particular, is under and frequent mutual aid exercises so that standable. People have other things on No single fire department will likely be when the next fire occurs that requires their minds, like raising families and able to handle a wildland/urban interface mutual aid personnel they will be pre making a living. The fire service has to fire on its own. Local departments will pared to work together. Good communi break through that apathy to educate need the assistance of sister departments cations facilities, systems, and people, including public officials, about and agencies in their areas, and perhaps procedures are essential for the coordina the potential dangers they face and how even outside their areas. Close coordina tion of fire fighting resources. to prepare fo r them. The fire service tion of the efforts of other responding Communities should plan those systems should fundand plan regular public edu departments is essential for effective fire for a worst-case scenario-because all cation campaigns, including the distribu fighting, life safety operations, and the too often in a wildland/urban interface tion of pamphlets, visits to homeowners, safety of the fire fighters themselves. fire theworst case happens. The Oakland and even public meetings, to make and Berkeley Hills fire overwhelmed the homeowners aware of wildfire risks and Further, the fire service in interface com established communications system and the steps citizens can take to minimize munities should develop a specific mutu resulted in a lack of coordination of all those risks. In particular, they should al aid plan for coordinating resources to responding forces. explain practical fuel-management steps attack wildfires. Plans should cover fire that residents should take and make reg-
20 ELIMINATE FIRE HAZARDS
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21 ular visits to interface communities to of NFPA 299 provides important guid Oakland/Berkeley Hills admitted to a check for overgrown, closely spaced ance in this area, but it is fully effective lack of knowledge about the wildfire vegetation that may brush up against only when adopted by local lawmakers. risks where they lived. dwellings and other fuel-management problems. Public officials should fund In the absence of clear and meaningful Potential homeowners should determine those efforts to the fullest. Finally, the regulations for the common good, the the wildfire hazard potential of the fire service should intensify its training practices of uninformed developers may immediate area before buying or moving efforts on conducting fire prevention create potential hazards. Fire protection into any home. This information can be inspections, tailoring those efforts to the features, or their costs, may not be appre obtained from the local fire department. hazards prevalent in wildland/urban ciated by uninformed buyers. However, NFPA 299 provides guidelines for rating interface areas. decisions made at the early stages of a the wildfire potential of an area. development will affect a home's fire Legislators safety for many years in the future. Homeowners should contact federal, state, and local fire and forestry agencies All developments should have more than for educational programs and materials Although the public determines accept one ingress-egress route and employ to address the fire hazard in general. able levels of risk from fire in wildland looped road networks. Roads should be Information should also be shared with areas, lawmakers react to the perceived wide enough for simultaneous access for children. Information and publications needs of constituents and enact the regu emergency vehicles and the evacuation covering numerous wildland home fire lations controlling that level of risk. of residents. In consideration of the long safety details are available free from Therefore, it is generally up to home wheelbase of tankers and other emergen many sources, but until individual apathy owners and fire protection agencies to cy vehicles, roads should be constructed is overcome the homeowner may not be articulate and justify acceptable and with an adequate curve radius. Homes motivated to take proper precautions. unacceptable levels of risk. When losses along dead-end roads and long drive Here, the fire services can function as occur, they usually focus attention on the ways provide extra privacy for residents fire protection resource centers for the risks, but preventive actions are prefer but also provide the potential for fire public. able. Legislation for such actions may apparatus to become trapped by spread be necessary for homes that are to be ing fire. These roads and driveways It is the responsibility of the individual located in high hazard areas. should allow access by large emergency property owner to provide a defensible space around structures to help protect Lawmakers should take the initiative to vehicles. them. Extra measures to provide addi examine existing laws, regulations, and Developers should reconsider their fre tional space are required for structures standards from other jurisdictions that quent use of combustible exterior build built on steep slopes or above canyons, are available for local use in mitigating ing materials, or at least offer options for and near combustible materials, and fire hazards associated with wildland more fire safe materials for potential exposures. fires. buyers who may not yet understand the When homeowners become aware of the Lawmakers are encouraged to adopt differences. wildfire risk of their own areas, they NFPA 299 as one part of the protection Developers should also consider the should join forces with other interested provided for new construction in the long-range imp�ications of siting unpro individuals and groups to urge lawmak wildlands. tected homes on slopes or where water ers to respond with legislative assistance Authorities should provide strong build supplies for fire fighting are low or to require appropriate fire safety mea ing regulations restricting untreated nonexistent. sures by all of those who live in the wood shingle roofs and other practices affected areas. Developers can provide a valuable ser known to decrease the fire safety of a vice to new buyers, who may initially be These are but a few of the recommenda structure in the wildlands. In the past, distracted by other moving details, by tions that have been proposed following untreated wood shingle roofs have creating appropriate fuel breaks or green the fire. There are many others and con repeatedly been shown to be. a major belt areas. cerned parties are encouraged to access contributing factor in the loss of struc the others. But regardless of the specific tures to wildfires, yet today some resi recommendation, they have one common dential subdivisions actually encourage, General public thread-prevention of devastating wild and some cases even require, wood shin The people who choose to live in the land fires is not one group's responsibili gle roofs for aesthetic reasons. scenic wildlands have the responsibility ty. Itis all our responsibility. of taking necessary precautions when Planners facing predictable hazards. Informed homeowners would be better prepared This event.has also focused on the need for surviving a wildfire, but some to have construction standards for homes homeowners in the area of the in the wildlands. The published version
22 One year alter th,e lire there have been several changes in the Oakland and Berkeley Hills. Thirty percent ol those who lived there during the lire have chosen not to move back and rebuild. KTVU-TV/OAKLAND Nevertheless, 51 homes have Other acttvities include the folloWing: been rebuilt, many of them larg • The California Public Utilities Commission is considering a $36 million project to er than before. The area now bury utility lines underground. has a Firestorm Memorial • East Bay Municipal Utility District has used computer analysis to investigate the Garden at the intersection of potential of several enhancements to the water supply. Among possibilities: more Tunnel Road and Hiller Drive, tanks in the Hills, bigger pumping plants, more connections between different parts of the system, and installation of a permanent backup system. Steps already taken and a community newspaper, include installation of a permanent emergency generator at Claremont Center, which The Phoenix Journal, has risen powers pumps that fill the first two reservoirs in the hillside system. Also, there are out of the ashes to keep commu now portable power generators on both sides of the Hills and a policy of keeping reservoirs full during high-fire-hazard weather. Despite these actions, officials main nity residents informed ol activ tain that it would be impossible to supply all the water needed during a firestorm ities in the area. such as took place October 20, 1991.
• Oakland is negotiating with the Federal Emergency Management Agency fora $1 million grant to widen Charing Cross and Drury Roads.
• Oakland officials are considering using $300,000 from a bond issue to put adapters on all 6,500 hydrants in the city.
• There is a new program to control vegetation in the Hills.
• The Oakland City Council has passed an ordinance requiring Class A roofs in the entire fire-hazard area above Highway 13. Berkeley has a similar ordinance.
• Berkeley has approved a $55 million bond issue to improve the water system to include a salt water backup supply.
• A hazardous assessment district was created in Berkeley to fund the fuel-manage ment district, which is comprised of 8,300 properties.
• Fifty-three lawsuits have been filedin Alameda County as a result of the fire.
23 For additional information, contact your local fire department or forestry agency, or contact the following organizations.
National Association of State Foresters 444 N. Capitol Street, NW Washington, DC 20001 202-624-5415
National Are Protection Association 1 Batterymarch Park P.O. Box 9101 Quincy, MA 02269-9109 617-770-3000
United States Department of Ute Interior Interior Building 18th and C Street, NW Washington, DC 202-653-8800
United States Department of Agricunure Forest Service, Are and Aviation Management P. 0. Box 96090 Washington, DC 20090-6090 703-235-3220
United States Fire Administration 16825 South Seton A venue Emmitsburg, MD 21727 301-447-6771
Boise lnteragency Fire Center Publications Management System 3905 Vista Avenue Boise, ID 83705 208-389-2512