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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

WT ,KLY SLTMMART Sptci al RtPort I

Tbe SoaietSpace Program Ten Years After Sputnick I |,

\ Sebqet 45" 6 October ]-967 No.03L0/678

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THESOVIET SPACE PROGRAIVI TENYEARS AFTER SPUTNIK I

October 4th marked the tenth anniversary.o.f the flight of Sputnik I, the world's first artificial earlh satellite. What have the Soviets tried to achieve during this period, what have they actually accomplished, how did they do it, and what are the prosDects in the years te come?

Some see the Sovlet space program as only a gcheme to capture spectacular headlinesir, some con- sider it an exclusively'military effortr.and sti11 others view the past ten years as an orderly unfold- ing of a long-range master plan with neither false steps nor blind alleys. The Soviets themselves fre- , , guently have characterized their program as purely,' scientific and not competitive with that of'the US. : None of these diagnoses is cornpletely right or wrong. The Soviet space program tras looked a good deal like that of the US and has featured a mixture of scientific, military, and commercial ventures. It has gained world-wide headlines wLth spectacular achievements; a creditabl-e number of Soviet f j-ights, on the other hand, quietly made solid coritributions to mants understanding of the cosmos. Cer'tain-a seg- ments of the program have indeed exhibited frigh degree of orderly planning.and intelligent execrl- tion; but there have been dead end.s, blundersr-.and even disasters -..- '.:." Earrv sputniks .'. :, .. . ;^;;rir: i;.: )...-r, Thea orbiting^vl-; + j ^^ of^€ Sputnikc*rr+- i r- Ir ::-:-:---l'--:,..:.--:tt!:+tig*'t5';"1i"1".'4$;lii'tt'-:::.;:-**:,-- ,' - on4October1957wasatre-i:.-.;1,;..-.,;;..,r.:'l--' ''-*---l:-'l*': i i r'': a mendous achievement f or its . ' '-'" "':\'41'''i day. Whether the timtng of the -''--r--'. - - ' l-aunch was determined by a de- '-'"'' .. sire to beat the US into ' space -- - -- or ref lected an independ.ent So- ' ' '- ' viet schedule is unclear. The l"'- : Soviet program already had been "'' in existence several years. TheUSSRlspermanentinterdepart-...*,i:'.'i;.. mental Commission for Inter- . "::.Y-- , ,t. . , planetary Travel was set up four

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or five years before the US ended in failure. Nine payfoads created its National Aeronautics failed to eject from earth orbit and Space Administration, and into interplanetary trajectories. in 1954 the USSR established the Most frustrating to the Soviets Tsiolkovsky Gold l,ledal, to be has been the fact that every probe awarded for accomplishments in put into an interplanetary trajec- interplanetary communications . tory suffered a comrnunisations failure prior to reaching its ob- j ective . Sputnik II, Iaunched in No- vember 1957 with the dog Laika aboard, represented the second The interplanetary story con- major Sovj.et achievement and tinues: a probe recently launched provided a clear indication of toward Venus is operating properly the USSR's strong interest in and is expected to reach the developing means of sustaining planet on 18 October. It is very Iife in space. The Soviets next likely that shots will be at- showed the world their tempted in January f969, when weight-lifting capability by the Venus window will again be launching Sputnik III, a capsule open, and in February L969, when weighing nearly 3,000 pounds. firings to Mars will be possible. The use of the very large. first generation 55-6 ICBM as a space booster made such launches pos- Lunar Probes sibfe. This booster is still the mainstay of the Soviet pro- gram and has been used to launch The Soviets unmanned lunar the majority of the more than 250 prograrn start,ed spectacularly Soviet satellites put into orbit but soon lapsed into a long dry thus far. spell. Their soLid initial ac- complishments subsequently were eclipsed by more spectacular US The Interplanetary Program successes.

outstanding among the dif- The USSR started launching ferences between the Soviet and probes toward the moon soon US programs has been the greater after its initial venture into emphasis the USSR has put on un- space. Luna 1 was successfully manned exploration of the moon ejected toward the moon on 2 Jan- and, especially, the planets. uary 1959. Although Luna I The Soviets have taken advantage missed the moon by a wide margin, of eight of the nine Mars or the operation represented a sig- Venus "faunch windows" open nificant step orward. Later the since the faII of 1960, when theY sa.meyear the Soviets hit the made their first attempt to moon, with Luna 2, and photo- launch an interplanetary probe. graphed its hidden side--a bril- Most of the attempted flights liant achievement--with Luna 3.

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AII of the earlY lunar shots were flown on a rela- tively simPle direct-ascent trajectorY, but subseguent orobes were rnade to circle the earth in a "Parking" or- bit before being blasted out toward the moon. This procedure--more comPlex but iermitting the use of heav- ier payloads--has become standard for aII lunar, irl- terplanetarY, and deeP- space launches. The Soviets also put a more Powerful third stage on their launch vehicl-e.

The lunar program' using the parking orbit technique, resumed in 1963 with the goal of orbiting the moon and of soft-landing a PaYIoad -on_the Lunlk ! 'surface. Lunas 4t 5, 6, 7, ar 3ldoof noon Talton ro]n and 8 all missed the moon or Lunar Orbit- crashed onto it, and six other the US SurveYors and Iaunches either failed to atlain ers. the parking orbit or to eject from it, before Luna 9 soft- landed in JanuarY 1966. The So- Manned gPace Flights viets were surprisinglY slow in correcting the deficiencies plaguing this program, a failing The beginning of the full-sYs- that has been noted in other tems test phase of the Soviet parts of the space effort, too. manned space program was signaled After the flight of Luna 9, how- by the launch of a I0,000-Pound ever, they successfullY Placed payload containing an instrumented three probes into lunar orbits-- dummy in May 1960. Six rnore tests Lunas 10, ll, and 12--and made a of spacecraft carrying dogs 1ed to a second landing with Luna 13. the electrifying flight of Yuri Since Luna 9, onlY one lunar Probe Gagarin in Vostok l- on 12 .APril has failed. The qualitY and num- 1961. Here, as elsewhele' the So- ber of pictures taken bY the So- viets used an "aII-uPt' test viet probes compares verY PoorlY philosophy in prepa,ring for their with those obtained soon after bY first manned orbital flight. At

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the earliest opportunity, they 25X1 tested a vehicl_e-payload combina- tion that was essentially the same as the one ultimately flown by Gagarin. This philosophy is characteristic of the Soviets and contrasts with the frequent US practice of preparing for a complex mission by a progression of tests of j.ncreasing complex- i f rr Voskhod 2, launched in March I965, carried two men and fea- Titov's one-day flight took 25X1 place four months after Gagarinls milestone single orbit. The next year saw the dual fli-qhts of Vos- toks 3 and 4, whose launches--a day apart--were tirned so that the two ships passed within three miles of eaeh other. Although not a true rendezvous--because the spaceships were in different or- bital planes--this operation in- dicated that the Soviets couLd cont::ol flight trajectory and launch times precisely enough to perform a rendezvous. The dual_ flight of Vostoks 5 and 6 took place in 1963. This opera- tj-on was basically a repeat of the Vostok 3 and 4 flights, with the added wrinkle that one of the spaceships contained a fe- male cosmonaut, Valentina Tereshkova.

Late in 1964 thE USSR put up Voskhod I, a capsule

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The two-year pause in the Soviet manned fliqht program fo1_ Iowing the orbiting of Voskhod 2 was ended by the ill-fated Soyuz-1 flight of Vladimir Koma_ rov. There has been no clear ex_ planation for t.he long hiatus. It appears that the Soviets had done about as much as they could with the Vostok capsule aira tf,at more complex missions would re_ guire a nehr spaceship. (A two- Scientific Satellites year delay also occurrecl between :ir" y_S ye-rculy and Gemini f tighrs. ) The Vostok afforded. the pilot The Soviet scientific poor visibilj.ty and was ill- satel__ lite program has suited for modification featured launches for ren_ of_ smal1 (500-pound) d.ezvous and docking , nonrecover_ experiments abLe payloads of th9 type performed using SS-4 MRBMs by the equipped Geminis. with upper stages. The Soviets have designated these launches as the Cosmos series. Fj-rings have been occurring 25X1 The only unexploited capa_ at a bility rate of abo of the Soviet craft w'as 25X1 its capacigV to support a long_ duration flight. It appears that the Soviets could have 6xceeded the Gemini record of 14 days in space had they chosen to do so. A variety of interestins Why they failed to try is not . ex_ clear. periments and significant coitriuu_ ti-ons to science have Ueen mii" by this program, even though it high Soyuz-l was indeed a 3p""^rro! gnjoy prioriiy ,itr,in new cne uovtet space spaceshi_p, although it weighec effort or compare favorably with US about as much as Voskhod aid was scientific 2SX1 put up by the achievements in space. 25X1 same booste

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teorological payloads for.weather 25X1 forecasting have been orb:-teo successfullY. These Programs so far have been much less exten- sive than US efforts. It aP- o""t" that the Soviets are find- inq it difficult to Put YP PaY- toias having an accePtablY long operating life.

The Proton Booster

Among the most interesting Soviet sPice flights in the Past few years have been those lnltL- ated with the orbiting of a iS,OOO-p"und Proton satellite in .l"iy f S'6S. The Proton was twice as heavY as any PaYIoad PreviouslY put into orbit bY the USSR and the availabilitY of a !1ore recentlY, MolniYa iiqnateO considerablY larger than munications satellites and Uo6=tut the 55-6. Three more P I eunches have been made 25X1 25X1

The inefficiencY of the Pro- ton Iaunch system was most Puz- z:-ing. BY aading a relativelY smali thiid stage, the soviets have doubled the weight Put """f4into orbit. It was exPected that this change would be made very ouicklv, but instead the Program iapsed- after the launch of Pro- ton-3 in JulY 1966. It seems that ihe of gnt iiii.iv Performance Holnlya I GornrnuntG!tl !alrllllr ,"N*g 6 oct 67 Page 6 SPECIAI REPERT

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the booster fe1l short of the expectations of the Soviets and that they found it neeessarv to modify the vehicle and possibl_., 25X1 its launch facitities.

Prolon at Farlt Alr tslrow

With continued testing, this Soyuz ship could be used new launch as a vehicle undoulteatv ferry for bringing up replace- will be perfected and made rel ments and. supplies. Iiable, giving the Soviets a num_ ber of interesting options. They send 9""19 a paytoad of 10,000 Outlook to 151000 pounds toward the moon or the nearby planets. This 25X1 weight is sufficient to allow a The USSR is now believed to manned circumlunar trip--that is, be constructi a flight around the moon without faci lit landing and a return to earth. The weight is also great enough to 25X1 permit the soft-l_anding of an un_ manned payload on the moon to col_ e J-acK ot rnterest the 25X1 lect a sample of the surface. A ets have shown in the use rocket in the spacecraft of would high-energy propellants in then return to the earth. upper stages of their booster systems suggests that the new Iaunch system wiLl In use conven- earth orbit , 50,000 to tional fueLs. If 601000 pounds this is the wouLd be ample for case, the first-stage booster a space station carryi-ng will 6j-x men have to generate a thrust in ex_ for four months or more. The cess of 10 million pounds if the

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could be used to Soviet paYloads are to Perform The booster sPacecraft weigh- missionl of tne tYPe Planned for place a manned a quarter of a. Saturn V. It seems clear that ing as much as into a low orbit Soviets will use this vehicle miilion pounds the A manned funar for manned flights, hecause no around the earth. unmanned missions to the nearbY olanets require so large a Looster. ft is unlikelY that manned flights to t*lars or Venus 25X1 will be tried in the next several 25X1 years, however, because the round-triP times are too rong'

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