THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY SCHREYER HONORS COLLEGE

DEPARTMENT OF MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATION

THE INTEGRATION OF REFUGEES INTO THE WORKFORCES OF SWEDEN, GERMANY, AND POLAND FOLLOWING THE 2015 MIGRANT CRISIS

MARY KATHLEEN MORAN SPRING 2019

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a baccalaureate degree in Management with honors in Management

Reviewed and approved* by the following:

Maurie Kelly Professor of International Business Thesis Supervisor

Srikanth Paruchuri Professor of Management and Organization Honors Adviser

* Signatures are on file in the Schreyer Honors College. i

ABSTRACT

The 2015 European Migrant Crisis saw unprecedented numbers of Syrians, Iraqis, and

Afghans seeking asylum within the European Union. While the EU governance sought to institute quotas that would help to better distribute this population across member nations, national governments and populaces were largely left to develop their own responses to the crisis. These responses varied sharply in accordance not only with pre-existing governmental stances but also with shifts in public opinion. Sweden and Germany, representing left and centrist national perspectives, respectively, exceeded their quotas and initially led with open- door policies. Other nations, including Poland, one of the rightmost EU nations, were assigned enormous quotas but ultimately took on less than 1 refugee per thousand people. This left an overwhelmingly young, male, and Muslim population to be extremely unevenly distributed across an aging and largely Christian European Union, which in turn left many European national governments, workplaces, and populaces to grapple with the integration of migrants into their economies and labor forces.

The rise of far-right politics, the inconsistency of responses across the European Union, the aging of European populations, and the cultural divisions between migrant and native populations all played roles in determining the ability and willingness of nations to integrate these migrants. Sweden, Germany, and Poland provided three unique responses to the crisis and represent a portion of the breadth and variety of member nation reactions. This thesis will compare these reactions and the ways in which they have shifted in an effort to provide an image of the current challenges posed to both migrants and European societies.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES ...... iv

LIST OF TABLES ...... v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ...... vi

Introduction: The European Migrant Crisis ...... 1

Asylum Seekers and Refugees ...... 1 Origins of Asylum Seekers ...... 2 Arrival of Asylum Seekers and the Decline of the Crisis ...... 2

Demographics of Refugees ...... 3

Syrians ...... 4 Afghans ...... 5 Iraqis...... 6 Age, Sex, and Religion of Asylum Seekers ...... 7

The Response of the European Union ...... 8

Refugee Quotas ...... 8 Responses of the Constituent Nations ...... 9 Rise of Far-Right Politics ...... 10 Concerns About Muslim Migrants ...... 11

Spotlight on Sweden, Germany, and Poland ...... 12

Political Spectrum and Basis of Selection...... 12 Population Shift: Sweden ...... 14 Population Shift: Germany ...... 16 Population Shift: Poland ...... 18

Response of the Government: Sweden ...... 20

Overview ...... 20 Changing Rhetoric ...... 21 Changing Politics ...... 22

Response of the Government: Germany ...... 23

Overview ...... 23 Changing Rhetoric ...... 24 Changing Politics ...... 25 iii

Response of the Government: Poland ...... 25

Overview ...... 25 Changing Rhetoric ...... 26 Changing Politics ...... 27

EU Integration Directives ...... 27

The Impact of Decreasing “Pull” Factors ...... 27 The Impact of Early Integration ...... 28 The Impact of Education ...... 29

Integration Policy: Sweden ...... 29

Access to the Labor Market ...... 30 Education ...... 30 Introductory Programming ...... 31 Fast Track and Digital Tools ...... 33

Integration Policy: Germany ...... 33

Access to the Labor Market ...... 34 Education ...... 35 Legislation ...... 36 Introductory Programming ...... 37

Integration Policy: Poland...... 38

Access to the Labor Market ...... 39 Education ...... 39 Introductory Programming ...... 40 Integration Expectations...... 40

Integration in the News ...... 42

Integration in the News: Sweden ...... 42 Integration in the News: Germany ...... 44 Integration in the News: Poland ...... 47

Conclusion ...... 48

Appendix: Eurostat Asylum Statistics Figures ...... 50

BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 54

iv

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Non-EU asylum applications, 2008–2018 (Eurostat, "Asylum statistics") ...... 50

Figure 2: Protections granted by citizenship and country of asylum, 2016 (Eurostat, "Asylum decisions... 2016") ...... 51

Figure 3: Protections granted by citizenship, 2015 (Eurostat, "Asylum decisions... 2015") ... 52

Figure 4: Protections granted by citizenship, 2016 (Eurostat, "Asylum decisions... 2016") ... 52

Figure 5: Protections granted by citizenship, 2017 (Eurostat, "Asylum decisions... 2017") ... 53

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

A great deal of thanks goes to my supervisor, Maurie Kelly, who extended unparalleled trust in my work and who offered both expert research guidance and kind encouragement in equal measure. Her teaching inspired my interest in this issue and the foundation of this paper.

Thanks also to my academic advisor, Melissa Paloskey, and my human capital management professor, Dr. Lisa O’Hara, for serving as invaluable resources and infallible sources of kindness throughout my career as an honors student.

Above all, I owe an immense debt of gratitude to my parents, whose unwavering love and support provides the motivation and the backbone for everything I do. 1

Introduction:

The European Migrant Crisis

In 2015, migration into the European Union by non-EU nationals skyrocketed to 2.4 million individuals, a year-to-year increase of over 780,000 that represented the largest population transfer in

Europe since World War II (OECD, “Is this…” 1; Eurostat, “Migrant Integration” 12). Of these migrants,

1.3 million were applicants for asylum, a figure that represented approximately 10% of the total applications for asylum received by the EU within the previous 30 years (Pew Research Center, “Number of…”). This volume of applications repeated itself into 2016 despite a decrease of 400,000 non-EU migrants overall (Eurostat, Immigration by…). This so-called “European Migrant Crisis,” “European

Refugee Crisis,” or “Europe Situation” began to ebb in 2017 with the introduction of increased border controls, the effective closure of a major migratory route, and an agreement between the EU and Turkey to restrict the unauthorized inflow of asylum seekers (European Parliament, “The EU…”; UNHCR,

“Europe Situation”), but the EU was still left to grapple with a new, hugely sizable, and unevenly distributed populace.

Asylum Seekers and Refugees

Asylum seeking, as defined by the European Union, refers to the formal effort of seeking protection in another country due to a well-founded fear that one’s life is at risk in one’s home country

(European Parliament, “EU migrant…”). Migrants who enter a country seeking protection and who have formally applied for asylum are considered to be asylum seekers until their claims are processed.

Refugees, by contrast, are those people who have successfully applied for asylum and who have been granted formal refugee status under the Geneva Convention (which covers individual persecution rather 2 than, for example, civilians fleeing war) or who have received another form of protection such as subsidiary protection, which includes those individuals who do not otherwise qualify as refugees but who still risk serious harm if returned to their country of origin (Konle-Seidl 12). From 2015 through 2018, asylum seekers and refugees in the European Union were chiefly nationals of just a few sending countries.

Origins of Asylum Seekers

Though the European Migrant Crisis itself is widely considered to have begun in 2015 with the enormous insurgence of asylum seekers throughout the EU, the crisis actually represents the culmination of several long-standing issues stemming from various North African and Middle Eastern countries. A perfect storm of growing populations, civil war, continued conflict and extremism, and a lack of support from neighboring countries all combined to form a tipping point that Dr. Michael Arnheim of Cambridge

University refers to as the “wholesale disruption of the Islamic world,” which in turn led to the worst refugee crisis in a quarter of a century (Arnheim). More than half of the EU’s refugees at the peak of the crisis were natives of Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Pew Research Center, “Number of Refugees”).

Arrival of Asylum Seekers and the Decline of the Crisis

Nearly all asylum seekers from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan arrived in Europe via two main routes. The first was the Western Balkan Route, which involved an arrival in Greece and then an upward path through several nations to re-enter the Schengen area in Hungary (Faigle; Frontex). The second and more popular was the Eastern Mediterranean Route, which was tracked by land or sea but often involved a water crossing from Turkey into Greece, making it the most popular route for Syrians (Faigle; Frontex).

The popularity of this route meant that most refugees would eventually have to make a water crossing in 3 order to make landfall in Greece, whose shores were the most common arrival spot for Iraqis, Syrians, and Afghans (Faigle; Frontex; UNHCR, “Desperate Journeys” 2).

The logistical and financial implications of this journey were hugely varied and complex, and it was estimated by the Migrants’ Files journalism consortium in 2016 that smuggling people into Europe was a one-billion-dollar industry (Robins-Early). Refugees reported spending anywhere between 700 to

20,000 euros per person to make the trip, with most who traveled relatively safely spending around 2,000 euros each (Robins-Early). This included the cost of travel, compensating smugglers, securing documentation and various water vessels (many of them not much more than inner tubes), and paying fees at border crossings (Robins-Early; Murdock; El-Sherif). The cost in human lives was also substantial, with almost 3000 migrants perishing at sea in 2015 and 5000 more perishing in 2016, the deadliest year on record (UNHCR, “Desperate Journeys” 1).

Overwhelmed with the onslaught of migrants and increasingly concerned with the death tolls of those making the water crossing on the Mediterranean, the Balkan nations stopped waving migrants through their borders in March of 2016 (Chan). Shortly afterwards, an agreement to send migrants who failed to apply for asylum (or whose claims for asylum were rejected) back to Turkey officially came into effect (BBC, “Migrant Crisis: EU-Turkey…”). At the same time, the actions of other nations meant that the Western Balkan Route was effectively shut down: Hungary erected a razor-wire barrier on its border with Serbia and Croatia, and Austria erected a fence and deployed armed guards at the Slovenian border

(Mohdin, “These are the…”). This ultimately resulted in a sharp decrease in the number of new arrivals and a decline of crisis as it applied to migrants entering the EU.

Demographics of Refugees

Enormous disruptions within Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan and the spillage of these events into neighboring nations accounted for a large portion of the asylum seekers who sought to enter the European 4 Union for the first time in 2015 and 2016. Migration from these nations was also encouraged by factors within Europe, including Germany’s 2015 announcement that it would welcome all Syrian asylum seekers within its borders (even if they had already applied for asylum elsewhere in the EU) and the

Balkan states’ eased visa restrictions, which created a cheaper and less taxing asylum route (Hall &

Lichfield; Dockery, “The Balkan…”).

Official protection status was granted to 333,350 asylum seekers in 2015 and to 1,248,400 more over 2016 and 2017 (Eurostat, “Asylum decisions…2015,” “Asylum decisions…2016,” Asylum decisions…2017”). Accordingly, it is estimated that a figure of approximately 2.2 million people illegally present in the EU during 2015 was reduced to 600,000 in 2017 (European Parliament, “EU migrant…”).

The majority of official protections granted were to Syrians, who experienced a nearly 100% refugee recognition acceptance rate in 2015 and 2016, while Afghans and Iraqis averaged between 60% to 80% acceptance rates between 2015 and 2017 (Eurostat, ---). The vast majority of these protections were granted in Germany, followed closely by Sweden (Eurostat, ---).

Syrians

Unrest in Syria began in 2011 when protests calling for the removal of the Assad government were met with violent suppression. The United States, Russia, Turkey, and Iran all heightened their engagements in the conflict as Syrian combatants escalated toward a vicious civil war that left unparalleled devastation across the country and its people (Augustyn et al, “Syrian Civil War”). As of

February 2016, the Syrian Center for Policy Research estimated that war-related violence alone had killed over 470,000 people and that crime, disease, and relentless bombings had left much of the country uninhabitable (Barnard). The Economist noted that nighttime light intensity in satellite images, used as a measure of human activity, fell 80% within four years due to the destruction of infrastructure and the mass exodus of nationals (The Economist). 5 Between 2011 and 2016, over 12 million Syrians were displaced, a figure estimated to represent over half of the country’s pre-war population (The Economist). According to the UNHCR, 5.6 million of these displaced citizens fled their country in search of safety (UNHCR, “Situation Syria…”). Turkey became host to 3.3 million of these refugees, and several hundred thousand also fled to Lebanon and

Jordan (UNHCR, ---). Although it was nearly impossible for Syrian refugees to gain secure legal status in these neighboring nations, Syrians grew to compose enormous proportions of their populations; as many as 1 in 5 people in Lebanon in 2015 was a Syrian refugee (Kingsley). The middle of 2015, however, saw

Lebanon and Turkey implementing severe entry restrictions that prevented many Syrians from crossing their borders (Kingsley). As such, as the Syrian conflict entered its brutal fourth year, seeking asylum just beyond these neighboring nations and within the European Union became an increasingly solitary option.

Afghans

At the start of 2015, Afghan nationals faced grim circumstances. The country’s political situation had gradually devolved beginning in the 1970s and continuing through the emergence of the Taliban as an

Islamic extremist group in 1994 (Witte). The Taliban controlled as much as 90% of the country by 2001, a year that would later mark heightened military involvement from the United States following the 9/11 attacks (Witte). In 2015, the war in Afghanistan (which had taken the lives of more than 30,000 civilians and 120,000 combatants) was approaching its 14th year, and many civilians had already sought refuge in neighboring Pakistan (Crawford).

When the US and NATO combat mission in Afghanistan ended in 2014, the Taliban’s ranks swelled as it became emboldened by decreased chances of bombing threats and the withdrawal of international involvement (Sharifi & Adamou). Throughout the following year, Taliban suicide bombings, massacres, and hostage situations terrorized the Afghan people (Vanden Brook). Militants began attacking major cities, and an Islamic state presence began to take root (McNally & Amiral). At the 6 same time, violence, arbitrary arrest, detention, and harassment of civilians within Pakistan drove Afghan refugees back to their home country on a scale of “humanitarian crisis” (IOM). Increased additional conflict between Afghanistan’s own security forces and its people also sharply worsened (International

Crisis Group). Though separated from the EU by a greater distance than their Syrian counterparts, returning Afghan refugees and civilians alike began looking toward Europe to seek asylum (International

Crisis Group).

Iraqis

From 2015 to 2017, Iraqis represented the third most common nationality to apply to seek asylum in Europe as their war-torn nation became increasingly uninhabitable. The Iraq War first began in 2003 when US forces sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein on the presumption that the Iraqi government possessed weapons of mass destruction (Augustyn et al, “Iraq War”). Tens of thousands of Iraqis were killed as the occupying forces sought to institute a democracy, and in 2006, the newly instituted prime minister enacted several policies that ignited feelings of alienation in the country’s Sunni minority

(Augustyn et al, ---; Boghani). The sectarian tensions that arose as a result paved the way for a 2014 ISIL offensive that forced the prime minister from office and spiraled the country rapidly into civil war

(Boghani, Baker). By the end of 2014, ISIL had seized an enormous portion of northwestern Iraq, launching guerrilla tactics to undermine the Iraqi government and claiming responsibility for various terrorist activities (Baker; Agence France-Presse). By 2015, 4.4 million Iraqis were displaced, and the country suffered immensely under increased rates of disease, illness, and infant mortality (UNHCR, “Iraq

Emergency”). Unable to secure safety in neighboring nations, 90 times more Iraqis migrated irregularly to

Europe in 2015 than in 2014 (REACH).

7 Age, Sex, and Religion of Asylum Seekers

The demography of asylum seekers during the peak of the crisis was strongly skewed on several metrics. As established, asylum seekers were disproportionately likely to be Syrians, Iraqis, or Afghans.

Additionally, in 2015, 83% of asylum seekers within the EU were under the age of 35 (Desilver). A statistics breakdown released by Pew Research Center described the typical makeup of asylum seekers as

40% young adult males, 20% male minors, 10% female minors, 10% young adult females, and 20% other groups (Pew Research Center, “Number of Refugees…”). Unaccompanied minors comprised only 7% of this population and were almost entirely teenage boys from 14 to 17 (Pew Research Center, ---). This distribution suggests that the plurality of asylum seekers at the peak of the crisis were young males travelling alone or in groups rather than entire families traveling together. As the crisis slowed in 2017, females grew to compose slightly larger portions of Iraqi and Syrian asylum seekers, while Afghan migrants continued to be mostly young males (EASO 8, 41).

Religious demographics were similarly homogenous. At the time of the crisis, Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq all represented populations that identified as Muslim by majorities of at least 90% (Pew Research

Center, “Europe’s Growing...”). Accordingly, 77% of Europe’s total refugees from 2010-2016 were

Muslims (Pew Research Center, ---). This was in contrast to the overall European population, which was only about 5% Muslim as of 2017, though this figure varies from nation to nation with the density of migration experienced (Pew Research Center, ---). France and Germany, for example, both generally have above average Muslim populations as a result of migration, while countries such as Poland remain well below average (Pew Research Center, ---). 8

The Response of the European Union

Refugee Quotas

The routes utilized by migrants to arrive in the European Union as well as uneven national policies toward migrants left an enormous volume of asylum seekers concentrated in just a few countries.

Therefore, in 2015, the EU voted to pass proposed relocation quotas to redistribute 160,000 migrants proportionately across constituent nations. As part of these quotas, refugees from border nations of Italy,

Greece, and Hungary would be relocated to each country in the EU in a way proportionate to its population size and economy, with France, Germany, Spain, and Poland being asked to take the largest shares (amounting to more than 60% of the relocating population) and with the UK, Ireland, and Denmark being given the option of whether to participate in the relocation scheme (BBC, “Migrant crisis: EU ministers…”). A financial penalty of .002% of GDP was instituted for member countries refusing to accept relocated migrants (BBC, ---). Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Romania turned against the scheme, and as of 2018, Poland and Hungary (while accepting some asylum applications on their own terms) had still refused to take a single asylum seeker under the scheme

(Euractiv, “EU rebels…”).

The end result was a somewhat unbalanced distribution of refugees across the EU. Poland, for example, had a 2017 population that was composed of less than one refugee per thousand people, while

Germany and Sweden had 17 and 32.5 refugees and asylum seekers per thousand people, respectively

(UNHCR, “Global Trends…”; Wagner). Other countries, such as Malta, had a low absolute number of refugees and asylum seekers but a massive share with respect to their population – in Malta’s case, 21.3 per thousand people (UNHCR, ---; Wagner). Turkey, the country to where many returned migrants were sent, toppled these totals with 46.3 migrants per thousand inhabitants (UNHCR, ---; Wagner). 9

Responses of the Constituent Nations

The initial responses of national governments to these quotas were widely varied, and there was a distinct lack of unanimity among the EU member nations, especially those whose assent was most crucial to the plan (O’Grady). On the supportive end of the spectrum were nations including Sweden, one of the plan’s most vocal supporters; the Netherlands, whose prime minister called the plan “reasonable” and accused other nations of overdramatizing the quota requests; Germany, which had already taken on hundreds of thousands of asylum applicants; and Italy and Greece, both of which were eager to lessen the number of migrants in their overcrowded detention centers (O’Grady). Among the plan’s strongest critics were Poland, which did not vote against the plan but whose leadership disagreed with the lack of state autonomy in quota determination and whose populace doubted the ability of Muslim migrants to adapt to their country; Slovakia, which voted against the plan and whose leadership insisted that the country would only accept Christian refugees, making its assigned quota too large; and Hungary, which also voted against the plan and whose leadership insisted that Muslims were a threat to Europe (O’Grady).

Despite these firm initial stances, public support did not necessarily align with leadership. Greeks and Italians said by an overwhelming majority that they did not approve of the way the EU had handled the “refugee issue” even though the quotas were designed to lessen the burden on their countries

(Connor). Germans, whose leadership had continued strong support of taking on asylum seekers, also disapproved of the EU’s handling of the situation by a majority of 66% (Connor). These disapproval rates exceeded disapproval rates collected in the same timeframe regarding the EU’s handling of the economy, a phenomenon that Pew Research Center suggests indicated true disapproval for the practice rather than simply for the EU itself (Connor). 10

Rise of Far-Right Politics

Across the European Union, many governments appeared to swing to the right as a result of concerns about the crisis. Proportions of far-right voting more than doubled in Austria, Finland, Hungary,

Portugal, and Sweden between 2002 and 2017 as citizens grew increasingly concerned about the impact of immigration on their employment markets, welfare systems, and domestic security (Davis & Deole 10;

Gramlich & Simmons). A number of studies on European politics conducted from 2015 to 2017 presented findings suggesting that the migrant crisis had “breathed life” (Davis & Deole 14) into far-right movements across the entirety of Europe (Davis & Deole; Gaston; Charalambous et al). One such briefing paper suggested the tendency of populist groups to define an enemy in order to elevate more clearly the electoral populace to whom they seek to appeal (Gaston). In the case of the migrant crisis, this defined

“enemy” may have proved to be the migrant population, which was a hugely popular talking point for several of the far-right parties (including the Swedish Democrats and Alternative for Deutschland in

Germany) making gains during elections as recently as 2018. A study published in 2017 found a “strong positive” relation between far-right voting in a country and the increase in the size of its immigrant population (Davis & Deole 12). Whether this voting was widespread was strongly impacted by the pre- existing culture of a country and whether it skewed toward individualism or collectivism; the more individualistic a European society was, the less likely it was to develop a nationalistic response to increasing migrant populations (Davis & Deole 14).

Regardless, a rise in anti-immigrant sentiment across right-leaning parties seemed to pervade

European political conversations, with right-leaning voters in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy,

Sweden, Spain, the UK, and France all reporting more commonly than left-leaning or centrist voters that immigrants were burdens to their economies because they took jobs, and additionally reporting by ranges of 52%-81% that immigrants increased the risk of terrorist attacks (Gramlich & Simmons).

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Concerns About Muslim Migrants

The overwhelming majority of refugees who entered Europe during the 2015-2016 crisis peak identified as Muslim and were natives of culturally Muslim nations (Pew Research Center, “Europe’s

Growing...”). As indicated by the responses of several right-wing governments to the possibility of taking on Muslim migrants, an area of major concern for the European continent in general has been these religious and cultural beliefs of asylum seekers.

In late 2017, a sizeable amount of Europeans described themselves as having “unfavorable views of Muslims” in their countries, with 72% of Hungarians and 66% of Poles taking this position alongside

35% of Swedes and 29% of French and German citizens (Pew Research Center, ---). Interestingly, the origin of this belief didn’t seem to correlate with a country’s proportion of Muslim asylum seekers but rather seemed more specific to the population of each constituent state. A majority of Greeks, Hungarians,

Italians, and Poles all reported in 2017 that refugees from “countries such as Iraq and Syria” constituted

“major threats,” while residents of the UK, the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden elected this response by smaller proportions of 36% or fewer (Pew Research Center, ---). At the time of the survey, Germany and Sweden had taken on hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers from Muslim countries whereas

Poland and Italy had one or fewer asylum seekers per 10,000 residents (Pew Research Center, ---;

European Parliament, “EU migrant…”). Hungary, contrary to this trend, had a very large share of asylum seekers and felt strongly negative about them; meanwhile, the UK had hardly any and had a population split fairly evenly (Pew Research Center, ---; European Parliament, ---). Greece and the Netherlands both had comparable, medium-sized proportions of asylum seekers but gave opposite responses (Pew Research

Center, ---; European Parliament, ---).

Despite these concerns, Pew estimates that Muslims made up only about 5% of the European population in 2017 and would at most make up 14% of Europe’s population by 2050 assuming continued migration trends and high birth rates (Pew Research Center, ---). While this estimate predicts an 12 enormous leap in the number of Muslims in Europe, these populations would likely be extremely sparse in the countries where their presence is of the most contention. In 2050, Pew estimates Muslims will likely continue to compose less than 1% of the population in Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary,

Slovakia, Romania, Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania but grow to much larger proportions in France (12.7% of the 2050 population), Sweden (11.1%), and Bulgaria (12.5%), which already has a sizeable Muslim population (Pew Research Center, ---).

It is possible that the heightened response in 2017 toward what may be a relatively small population shift for most countries was caused by a pre-existing over-perception of Muslim communities.

In 2016, the average Polish person believed that 7% of the country’s population (approximately 2 million people) was Muslim, while the actual figure was less than .1% (Osiewicz). Similarly, residents of the UK and France in 2016 already tended to believe that Muslim communities were approximately three times larger than they actually were (Osiewicz).

Spotlight on Sweden, Germany, and Poland

The governmental and societal responses expressed across the EU’s constituent states concerning varying degrees of exposure to and involvement in this crisis showed enormous breadth as constituent states struggled to find their footing amid a rapidly changing EU landscape. As such, Sweden, Germany, and Poland, which are both politically and culturally distinct, found themselves at three very different crossroads and can provide a basis for displaying the range of national responses.

Political Spectrum and Basis of Selection

When considering political positioning prior to the onset of the crisis, Germany, Sweden, and

Poland serve as relative examples of left, center, and right perspectives with respect to the rest of the EU 13 states. One measure of this is the votes allotted to and the electoral seats won by various political parties in these countries during the years leading up to the crisis. A scale developed by the ParlGov database utilizes an aggregate measure from several established methods of evaluating a party’s position on the left/right political spectrum (Döring & Manow; Castles & Mair; Huber & Inglehart; Benoit & Laver;

Bakker et al). This scale is used annually to evaluate the political positions of the elected political parties of all EU countries based upon the same criteria and is expressed in data sets alongside election results described in vote percentages and seats won. This scale incorporates economic, cultural, libertarian/authoritarian, and EU anti/pro factors to produce a numerical picture of each country’s political landscape, with leftmost parties at 0 and rightmost parties at 10.

Due to relative perspectives of what constitutes left and right, the countries’ most noticeable differences in their pre-crisis years were manifested in the respective ranges of political parties from which their constituents could elect rather than the nominal left-right-center nomenclature of the parties elected and represented in office. Sweden and Germany, for example, have relatively similar weighted averages if their 2009-2014 voting history is used as a base (Dölger & Manow, European Election Data).

Sweden, however, chose from parties on a scale of 1.5 to 7.9 and favored left-moderate voting, while

Germany elected parties ranging on a scale of 1.2 to 9.8 with extreme voting favored, leading to an overall “moderate” average (Dölger & Manow, ---). Poland, on the other hand, elected on a scale of 2.8 to

9.7, with left-leaning parties never gaining more than 20.8% of the vote from 2009-2014 (Dölger &

Manow, ---). Notable overall are the extremes contained in Germany’s spread, which gave the country its overall moderate average; the left-to-moderate spread available to Swedish voters without an extreme right counterpart; and the right-to-moderate tendency present in Polish politics without an an extreme left counterpart (Dölger & Manow, ---). These tendencies present a solid suggestion that these nations may respectively represent examples of center, left, and right perspectives when examining national responses to the migrant crisis. 14

Population Shift: Sweden

Sweden underwent one of the largest national population changes as a result of the crisis. Its refugee population jumped from 140,000 in 2014 to 230,000 in 2016 (European Parliament, “EU migrant crisis: facts…”). 162,450 people applied for asylum within the country in 2015 alone, representing a double in applications from the previous year (European Parliament, ---). Those seeking asylum in

Sweden during the peak of the crisis were overwhelmingly Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans, with approximately 70% being male (Statistics Sweden, “Immigrations and emigrations…”). The increase in migrants from these countries was marked with respect to the overall makeup of the Swedish population; as of 2017, there were 132,000 Syrians living in Sweden compared to just 9,000 in 2012 (Statistics

Sweden, “Population of country…”). Additionally, 77% of refugees in Sweden as of 2018 were under the age of 34, a demographic composition that one EU-published analysis called “disproportionately young,” and that was majorly males from 25-34 with relatively few unaccompanied minors and children under fifteen (Konle-Seidl 16; Pew Research Center, “Number of…”). This was reflective of a broader phenomenon described by Pew as refugees bringing “youth to an aging Europe” (Connor) due to

“characteristics positively associated with a likelihood of employment”: i.e., the high probability that a refugee would be a working-age male looking to support himself or his family (Konle-Seidl 9).

It is likely that the cultural and educational backgrounds of these refugees were hugely different from those of Swedish natives. Not much has been officially documented about the educational attainment of those seeking asylum in Sweden, as it is not measured upon arrival; however, 2016 data from Sweden’s introduction program for refugees showed that 48% of the 70,000 participants had at most ten years of education, 22% had at most upper secondary education, and 30% had tertiary education

(Konle-Seidl 17; Olsson 31). The majority of Syrian and Iraqi refugees as a whole had at least upper secondary education (Konle-Seidl 9). Sweden has not gathered specific information on the percentage of refugees who may have arrived in the country with minimal knowledge of Swedish or English; however, 15 the Swedish government professed the importance of improving the availability of refugee resources in

Arabic and the “enormous need” for bilingual teachers of Swedish sparked by the 2015 crisis (Bunar 9).

Additionally, as noted above, the birthplaces of most asylum seekers and refugees now residing in

Sweden are Muslim countries; thus, the vast majority of Swedish refugees are culturally or religiously

Muslim, contrasting with the 70% of the Swedish population currently identifying as Christian (U.S.

Department of State).

A particular point of contention surrounding the increase in the Scandinavian refugee population has been the region’s otherwise aging population pyramid. Finland, for example, explicitly addresses the benefits of young workers in its immigration policies and frames its pro-refugee stances on the need to alleviate labor shortages and support an aging population (Gassen & Heleniak). Sweden, however, does not explicitly address this and rather frames its refugee and asylum policies out of humanitarian obligation (Gassen & Heleniak). Despite this, population decline is on the country’s horizon. Sweden’s working age population is expected to grow until 2080, but its dependency ratio is expected to increase even more quickly (Gassen & Heleniak). That is, its elderly population requiring the support of a working-age population will continue to grow at a faster rate than the country’s total fertility rate (Gassen

& Heleniak). While a “replacement migration” strategy of taking on millions upon millions of migrants to reduce a country’s dependency ratio has been deemed impossible and impractical for Sweden, the onset of migrants joining the workforce has been deemed capable of a short-term impact on dependency ratios provided that the migrants are integrated effectively (Gassen & Heleniak). This was observed in the 2015-

2016 halting of the percentage of Sweden’s population aged 65 and older, a figure that had previously been increasing by about .3 to .4% every year (Eurostat, “Population on…”). While some asserted the only sustainable solution to sustaining Sweden’s welfare system was encouraging active and healthy aging with longer terms of employment (Sanandaji, “How to…”), Sweden’s Public Employment Agency stated in late 2016 that it believed well-integrated, properly educated working-age immigrants were increasingly necessary to address the country’s labor shortages (Ahlander). In an interesting convergence 16 of these ideas, elderly Swedes were the only such European population to express positive attitudes toward immigration by a majority of greater than 60% (“Older Swedes…”).

Population Shift: Germany

As the chief destination for asylum seekers during the peak years of the crisis, Germany took on a large number of refugees relative to other EU states. As ⅓ of all European asylum applications since 1985 have been filed in Germany, the country already had a sizeable refugee population (Pew Research Center,

“Number of Refugees…”), but it skyrocketed from approximately 216,000 in 2014 to 669,000 in 2016

(The European Parliament, “EU migrant crisis: facts…”). The most typical asylum seeker in all of Europe during 2015 was a Syrian male seeking asylum in Germany, who sought asylum at more than double the proportion of the second-most typical asylum seeker, a Syrian in Hungary (Pew Research Center, ---).

Germany also provided protection to over 90% of the 18,000 unaccompanied minor asylum seekers who arrived in the EU in 2015 (Pew Research Center, ---). As with Sweden, Germany’s 2018 refugee population skewed both young and male, with an asylum-seeking population in 2016 that was 65% male and composed in plurality of people aged 18-34 (Eurostat, Asylum and…).

As in the case of Sweden, there is a lack of extensive research regarding the educational attainment of refugees who arrived Germany during the height of the crisis; however, there is evidence of a gap that would create barriers for cultural and economic integration. Germany has completed a survey of refugees who arrived between 2013 and the beginning of 2016 covering topics including school attendance and vocational education (Brücker et al, IAB-BAMF-SOEP; Konle Seidl 17, 41). Its chief finding was the disparity in educational attainment among the origin countries of refugees. 23% of Syrian refugees and 17% of Iraqi refugees living in Germany had earned a tertiary degree, while only 4% of

Afghan refugees had, with the majority having at most lower secondary education (Brücker et al, IAB-

BAMF-SOEP; Konle-Seidl 17). Germany also logged the vocational degree attainment of refugees, which 17 accounted for about 6% of the entire refugee population (Brücker et al, IAB-BAMF-SOEP 7). Overall, it was found that refugee women had higher levels of education but less professional experience than men and that there was a large disparity between the education level of refugees as a whole and the German population, wherein 86% of people had completed upper secondary education (Dumont et al 5; OECD,

“Education at a Glance”).

Regarding cultural and linguistic disparities, this survey also measured language proficiency and found that 90% of refugees arriving in Germany did not have any knowledge of the German language upon their arrival, but 30% self-identified as being able to read or speak English well or very well

(Poutvaara & Wech 38; Brücker et al, IAB-BAMF-SOEP 8). Additionally, the countries from which

German refugees originated are Muslim by proportions of 90% or greater, both contrasting with

Germany’s otherwise 60% Christian population and also effectively growing Islam to the second largest religion in Germany (Pew Research Center, “Europe’s Growing Muslim Population”; The U.S.

Department of State).

The World Economic Forum has pointed out that pre-crisis population figures for Germany were considered very grim, with most predicting that the country would lose 10 million inhabitants by 2050 due to a low birth rate (just 1.5 births per woman) and falling immigration (Heise). In 2017, however, based upon enormous migration numbers and a 2015 fertility rate that rose for the first time in 30 years, the German government predicted that its population would remain above 80 million given current trends until at least 2060 (Heise). This is crucial for the country, whose retirement-age population will continue to grow until 2060 (Desjardins). As with Sweden, migration will be insufficient to solve Germany’s shrinking population, and many suspect the pension system to be “wiped out” within 30 years by the slew of people who need it and the lack of workers to support it (Greive & Hauteville). Also as with Sweden, the country is expected to need to rely on an increased utilization of women and seniors in the job market as well as improved integration of migrants to fill labor shortages in the short term (Greive & Hauteville).

This short term is not a small issue for Germany, which, in 2019, crossed the threshold to having more 18 citizens over 60 than it does under 30, an “extreme” phenomenon that suggests an enormous need for skilled labor in the short-term (Desjardins).

Population Shift: Poland

Poland received a relatively small proportion of applications for asylum with respect to both the size of its population and the volume of applications received by the EU as a whole. During 2015 and

2016, 18,605 people sought asylum in Poland out of the 2,156,825 seeking asylum throughout the EU as a whole (European Parliament, “EU migration: facts…”). This number was low in proportion to the Polish population of 38 million (Eurostat, “Population on 1 January…”) and the EU-designated quota for Poland

(based upon population and economic health, among other factors), which was set at 120,000 in

September 2015 (BBC, “Migrant Crisis: EU ministers…”). Although Poland’s asylum-seeking population did increase throughout the crisis (from roughly 8,000 in 2014 to 12,300 in 2016), the size of its official refugee population actually declined (from 15,700 to 11,700 in the same timeframe) (European

Parliament, ---). Additionally, unlike Germany and Sweden, Poland received more asylum applications in

2013 (15,240) than it did in any of the following years (European Parliament, ---). This is largely due to the unique pool of asylum seekers looking toward Poland. The country’s eastern location made it a first point of EU contact for fleeing Chechens as the republic deepened in conflict with Moscow and with

Islamic State-aligned terrorism (BBC, “Chechnya Profile”). Accordingly, the 2013 application spike was largely caused by Chechen nationals with Russian citizenship, and a subsequent trend of Ukrainian applications emerged following the Russian annexation of Crimea (Piłat & Potkańska 6). With the upheaval occurring in Eastern Europe (which is generally considered to be separate from the EU’s migrant crisis), the trends of most common nationalities arriving in Poland to seek asylum did not change significantly during the peak of the migrant crisis (Piłat & Potkańska 6). That is, the most common asylum seekers in Poland during this time were Russians, followed by Georgians, Ukrainians, Armenians, 19 and Syrians (Piłat & Potkańska 6). The composition of those granted refugee status, however, was notable with respect to the onset of the crisis. In 2015, protection was granted to 348 people, and 203 of them were citizens of Syria along with 24 citizens of Iraq, which dwarfed the 21 refugees accepted from Russia

(“On the performance…”). In 2016, the number of people granted refugee status shrank to 108; however,

40 of them were Syrians, more than double the 16 Ukrainians and 10 Russians (“On the performance…”).

The demographics of refugees accepted in Poland differed from their German and Swedish counterparts not only as a result of their different origins but also as a result of the type of refugee the

Polish government, whose Catholic leanings reflect the country’s 86% Catholic composition, preferred to accept (The U.S. Department of State). Of the Syrians accepted in 2015, for example, at least 150 of them were confirmed to be Christians who had arrived as part of family units travelling together and who were subsequently resettled in Christian communities (Ojewska). While Chechens are likely to be Muslim and while Poland had a history of accepting families of such people as refugees during the Second Chechen

War (1999-2009), Poland’s approved refugees from Iraq, Syria, and Afghanistan during 2015 and 2016 were most likely entirely Christian (Werber). This open preference for Christians (Werber) and families created a different “typical” crisis-period refugee than those of Germany or Sweden. Of the asylum seekers who arrived in Poland during 2015 and 2016, roughly 49% were female, creating a much more balanced gender ratio than those seen in Germany and Sweden (Eurostat, “Asylum decisions in the

EU…2015”, “Asylum decisions in the EU…2016”). Similarly, due to the increased number of families,

Poland also experienced a larger percentage of minor asylum seekers than did Germany or Sweden

(Eurostat, Asylum and…).

Poland, like Sweden and Germany, struggles with high emigration and low birth rates (Devictor).

Its current fertility rate is just 1.3, and its “next generation” birthrate is expected to be especially low due to an enormous drop in fertility during the 1990s (Devictor). The country’s aging workforce is expected to slow its GDP per capita growth from 4.7% to 3% by 2022 (Devictor). Due to the low number of refugees the country has accepted, Poland’s population is among the four least affected in the EU by the 20 migrant crisis, and the country maintains that it will address this by continuing to raise its standard of living in order to appeal to those seeking to migrate for work rather than safety (Rzegocki & Partyka;

Mohdin, “The EU countries…”; Stummer).

Response of the Government: Sweden

Overview

The Swedish government initially prided itself on leading with a generous response to the refugee crisis (Hansen). In 2014, departing prime minister Fredrik Reinfeldt told Swedes that they must “open their hearts” to people arriving from war-torn countries (Widfeldt). In 2015, referring to the country’s slowing population growth coinciding with the onset of asylum seekers, the Minister of Migration stated that “a country with a decreasing population is a stagnating country” and that therefore the integration of asylum seekers was to be viewed as nothing less than “an investment” (Hansen). 2015 Prime Minister

Stefan Löfven also called refugees an “asset” and believed that their successful integration was a top priority in order to prevent “a gigantic problem in a few years” (Hansen). This seemed to coincide with

Swedish public opinion, as it was revealed in September 2015 that Sweden was the only EU country with a majority positive opinion toward non-EU immigration (Paterson). The country was hailed as

“exceedingly generous,” and 31% of Swedes even felt the country should take in more asylum seekers

(Mohdin, “The most refugee-friendly...”). Asylum seekers were offered immediate accommodation in complexes with dorm-style housing or family rooms, and benefits were doled out in the form of food and a small allowance to cover clothing, medical treatment, and other basic needs (“Why do refugees...”;

Hodali & Prange; Trevelyan & Jones). Those whose asylum requests were granted received access to a two-year integration program including free Swedish lessons and financial support from the Swedish

Employment Agency while they were aided in finding work (“Why do refugees...”). 21

The volume of asylum seekers making use of these policies, however, proved unsustainable: in

November 2015, the country’s magnanimity screeched to a halt as headlines proclaimed the country had

“[slammed] shut its open-door policy” (Crouch) and “turned its back” on refugees (Witte & Faiola). The

Prime Minister’s defeated proclamation that the country “just couldn’t do any more” in the face of faltering public and EU support was accompanied by an unprecedented introduction in border controls and identity checks designed to crack down on the number of arrivals during 2016 (Crouch). Social benefits were redacted for migrants whose asylum requests had been denied, who had received an expulsion order, or who had ignored the deadline for voluntary return (Skodo). The permanent residency permits that were once liberally extended were now only extended upon conditions of economic self- sufficiency (Skodo). The move, although surprising to the European public at large, also appeared to be both shocking and disappointing to the Swedish government.

Changing Rhetoric

Sweden initially approached the swells of Iraqis, Syrians, and Afghans arriving in late 2014 through late 2015 in the same way it had approached decades of asylum seekers before them: with an

“open-door” policy (Crouch). The Swedish government proudly displays this facet of its history on an interactive online timeline that details how the country was able to accept and integrate refugees from

Iraq, Iran, and Yugoslavia during the eighties and nineties and into the Iraq War (“Sweden and

Migration”). In 2014, however, the timeline notes a shift that occurred when Sweden suddenly received the most asylum applications it had since 1992 (“Sweden and Migration”). According to the government, the ensuing influx of Syrians “made for a change” since, previously, the largest proportion of immigrants were almost always returning Swedes (“Sweden and Migration”). In the 2015-2017 section of the timeline, the government’s tone departs from proudly describing successful integration and instead outlines “the refugee challenge” of the Swedish government and public (“Sweden and Migration”). 22

Accordingly, the government attributes the 2017 decline in applications to changes in migration Swedish law that were necessary “to be able to provide for those already in the country” (“Sweden and

Migration”). These law changes included denial for those seeking to enter the country without a valid passport or other identification document, increased barriers to obtaining permanent residence permits, and restrictions on family reunification (“Sweden and Migration”). As justification for these measures, the government cites a “lack of practical resources” (including housing, schools, and healthcare) and a

“stretched system,” but it also somewhat soberly suggests that the measures would not have been necessary if other EU countries had agreed to accept their assigned quotas of refugees (“Sweden and

Migration”). In truth, however, the Swedish government was not only grappling with a push from the outside but also from the inside, as Swedish public opinion had rapidly begun to shift.

Changing Politics

The percentage of Swedes who affirmed that they personally would “definitely” help refugees plummeted by 24% between 2015 and 2016 (Mohdin, “The most refugee-friendly...”). By 2016, 60% of

Swedes said they believed the government should take in fewer asylum seekers (Pew Research Center,

“Europe’s Growing Muslim…”; Mohdin, ---). The Swedish public cited concern for an increasingly strained welfare system as well as several high-profile crimes committed by asylum seekers for the shift in opinion (Mohdin, ---). And, indeed, the Swedish government that had previously been able to outfit asylum seekers with private accommodations was left sleeping ten people to a tent and running out of accommodations altogether by the end of 2015 (“Sweden refugees sleep…”; Witte & Faiola).

An overall rise in the country’s crime, particularly sexual assaults and gang violence, was quickly linked to migration by Sweden’s far right parties (“Refugees, crime, environment…”; “Facts about migration…”), a trend that the Swedish government called “simplistic and occasionally inaccurate”

(“Facts about migration…”). After “years of irrelevance,” however, the anti-immigration Swedish 23

Democrat party doubled its parliamentary representation in 2014 and reached 20% public support by 2016

(Widfeldt). The 2018 election, which had an 87.18% voter turnout, saw the party gain 13 seats, more than any other party in the legislature and enough to maintain its place as the nation’s third-largest political party (Swedish Election Authority).

Response of the Government: Germany

Overview

Much like its Swedish counterpart, the Merkel-led German government wanted to be at the forefront of the European effort to welcome asylum seekers and refugees. The word Willkommenskultur, originally coined by politicians to attract skilled workers from other EU countries to Germany’s workforce, was re-appropriated to encourage public sentiments of benevolence toward asylum seekers

(Akrap). In 2015, Merkel described it as a “national duty” to take on as many refugees as possible, extending special consideration to those from Syria, who were allowed to claim asylum in Germany even if they had entered the EU elsewhere (Dockery, “Two years since…”). German volunteers (nearly 10% of the population) flocked to train stations to greet migrants with signs and candy, offered free translation and transportation services, and provided an abundance of donations (Jacobsen 1; Akrap). Merkel’s mantra of “Wir Schaffen Das!” (“We can do it!”) underlined the country’s open-door policy with benefits including free meals and housing in state-run collective accommodation centers for asylum seekers and regular social security benefits for refugees (Mayer; Skodo; Witte & Faiola). (Those granted asylum received a basic income of 400 euros per month in addition to funds for housing and heating (Skodo;

Witte & Faiola).) In July 2015, prior to the peak of the crisis, the German public affirmed by a staggering majority of 93% that the country should welcome those fleeing from war or civil conflict (Mayer). As the number of asylum seekers swelled in September, however, Germany began taking stands to suppress the 24 seemingly impossible flow of migrants arriving at the country’s borders (Dockery, ---). The country suspended trains from Austria containing migrants headed for small German towns now incapable of handling them, family reunification for those with lower degrees of protection status was suspended, and, most notably, the country led the charge for the EU’s deal with Turkey (Dockery, ---).

Changing Rhetoric

In a similar turn to Sweden, concerns about “criminal foreigners” quickly began to overtake public discourse due to increases in migrant crime rates (Scally). Although the share of migrants within

German crime rates was somewhat high in 2018 – representing 8.5% of non-immigration related crimes while making up only 2% of the German population – most researchers believe socioeconomic status and the young, male demographic makeup of asylum seekers, which makes them more likely to contribute to crime statistics “in any society,” should also be considered as major factors (BBC, “Reality check…”).

For example, young men make up 9% of the German population but commit 50% of its crimes; young men make up 27% of the German migrant population and are also more likely to be victims of crimes – by the end of 2015, the Federal Criminal Police Office reported that there had been 1,000 attacks on asylum centers (BBC, ---; Dockery, “Two years since...”). Nonetheless, public concerns appeared to be solidified following a high-profile series of sexual assaults by persons of “Arab descent” in Cologne in

December 2016 and two terrorist attacks by asylum seekers in July 2016 (Dockery, ---). In 2016, 61% of

Germans said that they believed the presence of migrants increased the likelihood of terrorism in their country, and 31% said they believed that the increase in diversity was making their country a worse place to live (Poushter). 25

Changing Politics

In 2017, representing an even more impressive gain than its Swedish counterpart, far-right group

Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) both entered the German parliament and became its third largest party

(Mudde). Formed in 2013 to oppose the bailout of indebted EU member states, the party grew to encompass an anti-immigration platform that served as its point of “significant appeal’ during the 2017 election, and it has stated that it “completely rejects” Merkel’s “open-door” policy (Chase). AfD’s platform for the 2017 election rested heavily on a desire to seal EU and national borders, to institute immediate deportations for those whose asylum claims were rejected, and to eliminate the right of asylum seekers to individual hearings (Chase). By late 2018, the party was polling second in the country at 18%, surpassing the “mainstream” Social Democratic Party by one point (Schütz).

Response of the Government: Poland

Overview

By 2015, Poland’s staunch refusal of the vast majority of refugees and asylum seekers who were being taken on by other EU nations had grown notorious. In September 2015, Poland joined the Czech

Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia in releasing a statement stating that any EU proposal leading to the introduction of mandatory quotas in the interest of solidarity was “unacceptable” (Bachman). Although its incumbent government eventually assented to this quota, its next-elected right-wing Law and Justice party adapted harsher stances (Bachman). In the wake of the 2015 Paris attacks, Poland’s new government officially announced that it would not accept any resettled refugees assigned to it as a part of these quotas, calling it a political impossibility (Keating). Still, the nation did take on asylum seekers and grant refugee status to a small number of deliberately selected people. 26

Asylum seekers within Poland were treated very comparably to those within Germany and

Sweden. Those living in government housing received small allowances for toiletries and pocket money as well as a small initial sum to purchase clothing and shoes, public transport for basic needs, Polish language classes, school supplies, and medical care (“Poland: Forms…”). Those who found their own housing outside government centers (approximately two-thirds) also received a small sum to cover living costs allotted according to family size (Skodo; Witte & Faiola). Similar to the more restrictive Swedish benefits that aimed recipients toward eventual independence, those whose claims were approved received

300 euro allowances each month for one year in addition to free health insurance and legal support with the aim of economic self-sufficiency (Skodo; Witte & Faiola).

Changing Rhetoric

As a nation that has historically been a sending country of migrants and that has recently taken on many Eastern European asylum seekers, Poles were not historically opposed to migration; in fact, between 2002-2012, Poland consistently expressed some of the most pro-immigration views in Europe

(Bachman). At the time, 63.4% of Poles affirmed that their government should be generous in judging refugee applications, compared to 60.3% of Swedes and only 38.8% of Germans (Bachman). They even expressed three times the level of tolerance for immigrants and people of all races and religions compared to their German neighbors, 15% of whom expressed that someone of a different race or religion would not be a preferable neighbor in 2014 (Bachman). When asked specifically about Muslims, however, Poland’s figures were significantly less positive, even in 2014 — 34.3% of Poles said no Muslims should be allowed to come to the overwhelmingly Catholic country (Bachman). Indeed, in 2017, the Polish Center for Public Opinion Research found that 75% of Poles opposed the reception of people from the Middle

East or Africa, citing cultural and religious differences, while only 32% would oppose refugees from the

Eastern Ukraine (Strzałkowski). 27

Changing Politics

The Polish government’s execution of the majority of its citizens’ beliefs was clearly displayed in its decision to accept Christians from Middle Eastern and North African countries while openly expressing that its decision not to accept Muslim migrants was largely based on the belief that cultural

Islam would be incompatible with and dangerous to Poland’s Catholic society (Cienski). Pope Francis urged the nation to consider a “willingness” to accept all people fleeing human rights violations during a

2016 visit, but the country staunchly kept upon its original course, referencing that it was welcoming

Ukrainian refugees and had donated large sums of money to refugee camps in Jordan, which the government believed was a better solution than rehoming refugees within Poland (“PM visits

Poland’s…”; “Pope Francis’ first…”; “Germany’s leading newspaper…”).

EU Integration Directives

The Impact of Decreasing “Pull” Factors

One of the key points of policy change as a result of the crisis was an attempt to decrease the flow of migrants by limiting “pull factors” that appealed to potential asylum seekers (Eurostat, “Migration and…”). Germany and Sweden’s main approach to this was a reduction in the length of residence permits granted to asylum seekers: Germany reduced its standard permit from 5 to 3 years and also required a level of German proficiency and economic self-sufficiency to attain permanent residence, and Sweden cut its permits back from permanent to 3 years and introduced a clause of contingency upon self-sufficiency for permanent residence (Konle-Seidl 15; “Sweden: Access…”; “Germany: Access…”). Poland, by contrast, remained constant in initially issuing 3-year renewable residence permits and then allowing refugees to attain permanent residence after five years provided that they have “stable and regular 28 resources” and “appropriate” insurance (“Poland: Access...”). While these countries saw huge decreases in asylum applications by 2017, the EU has reported that decreasing these pull factors had a double effect of worsening the situation of many refugees already living in the EU (Konle-Seidl 25).

In a mid-2018 report published by the European Union on the integration of refugees in Germany,

Austria, and Sweden, the EU asserted that the temporary nature of a 3- or 5-year renewable, contingent residence permit as opposed to a permanent one had a “discouraging effect” on the willingness of asylum seekers to invest themselves in language courses and other job training (Konle-Seidl 30). It was also suggested that these permits impacted the degree to which refugees integrated socially and the willingness of employers to invest in asylum seekers by hiring them (Konle-Seidl 31). Other research has supported that refugees who attain permanent residence status are less likely than any other migrants to plan to return to their home countries, and are therefore more likely to participate meaningfully in the labor force

(Konle-Seidl 30; Dustmann).

The Impact of Early Integration

The EU asserts that the elongated processing periods for asylum requests due to volume have created periods of delay that similarly discourage participation in the labor force (Konle-Seidl 10;

“Asylum Procedures”). To this end, the EU has advised nations create the expectation that migrants will be able to receive “legal certainty” for a “defined period” to maximize their participation in the job market (Konle-Seidl 30). It has also asserted, based upon several studies, that early introductions of integration measures, even for those asylum seekers whose claims are not yet processed, are crucial to long-term integration in society and the workforce (Konle-Seidl 34, 46; OECD, “Making Integration…”;

Hainmüller et al; Andersson Joona et al). It describes this as a “widely shared consensus” based on language skills and early assessment of workplace skills and qualifications all serving as predictive factors for labor market success (Konle-Seidl 37). Overall, it seems early contact and early intervention 29 resulting in the soonest possible contact with the job market are the best and most effective contributors to eventual long-term and stable employment for refugees (Konle-Seidl 42; Lemaitre 4).

The Impact of Education

Across the EU, migrants with low levels of education experience similar employment levels to their native-born counterparts; however, migrants with higher levels of education see much higher levels of unemployment compared to their native counterparts (Konle-Seidl 21). The EU suggests this may be a result of “skills mismatch” or the higher level of the host country’s language needed to pursue high- skilled careers (Dumont et al 25; Konle-Seidl 21). When refugees are concerned, the unemployment disparity is much larger, with unemployment at 15% for low-educated Swedes and 40% for low-educated refugees living in Sweden (Konle-Seidl 21). Despite generally having superior qualifications, refugee women with low levels of education also tend to struggle in the EU’s labor forces, with an employment rate of only 30%, trailing men by as much as 20% in some countries (Dumont et al 20).

Finally, despite high levels of spending and the compulsory nature of many educational integration programs developed by European countries, there is not yet conclusive information on their effectiveness (Kogan; Konle-Seidl 48-49; Martín et al).

Integration Policy: Sweden

According to the Swedish Government, Sweden allocated the equivalent of 1.6 billion euros to cover costs related to the settlement of asylum seekers for the year of 2018 (“Ministry of

Employment…”). In 2017, 57.8 million euros went specifically to spending on learning-based integration programs, which included new language initiatives and skills assessments/validation for asylum seekers

(“Ministry of Employment…”). Money allocated to the municipalities housing asylum seekers doubled to 30

272 million euros in 2017, and spending overall on integration has increased significantly since 2015, when total spending was only 713 million (“Ministry of Employment…”).

Access to the Labor Market

Sweden’s laws surrounding the integration of asylum seekers into the workforce are among the most liberal in the European Union (“Sweden: Access…”). Asylum seekers are able to work from their first day in the country provided that they have valid ID, that Sweden is handling their asylum application, and that they have valid reasons for seeking asylum (“Sweden: Access…”). In 2017, Sweden elected to suspend its usual work permit requirement provided that an asylum seeker met these qualifications (Konle-Seidl 29). Additionally, currently, if a person has been employed four months within the period of seeking asylum, that person is eligible to apply as a labor migrant (which does not affect the person’s asylum application or criteria but does afford another means to remain in the country)

(“Sweden: Access...”). This policy was introduced largely to accommodate highly qualified asylum seekers who had been rejected as refugees but who had also demonstrated their ability to contribute to the

Swedish labor market through highly needed skills (“Sweden: Access...”). Up to and including 2017, 50% of official refugees in Sweden had entered the labor market within five years of arrival, a figure that rose to 60% at ten years (Konle-Seidl 20). The 2017 overall employment rate for non-EU migrants, however, was 66.2% versus the native rate of 85.5% (Eurostat, “Migrant Integration…”).

Education

Migrants who are over 18 upon arrival to Sweden have no right to secondary education, but those under the age of 18 are “to a great extent” fully integrated in regular Swedish schools (“Sweden:

Access...”). Children also have a right to lessons in their native language provided there are more than 31 five children with the same native language in the area (“Sweden: Access...”). Children aged 16 and older have access to a preparatory course to improve their Swedish language skills and other core subjects before being permitted access to vocational education. (“Sweden: Access...”).

Since the onset of the crisis, the EU has stated that Sweden has “strengthened [its] integration efforts” for irregular adult migrants (Konle-Seidl 8). Funding for integration, particularly language courses, has increased significantly (to 1.35% of GDP) since 2015 (8). Participation in integration measures such as these language courses has been made mandatory, and the Swedish adult migrant population who was officially granted protection status comprised 2.2% of the country’s labor force at the end of 2017, a figure of approximately 112,000 people to be integrated (19). A notable figure for Sweden, whose refugee population has 30% rate of tertiary education, is that migrants with lower levels of education have significantly lower levels of unemployment than their more highly educated counterparts

(21). Still, the 2015 unemployment rate for low-educated non-European migrants in Sweden was 40% compared to the non-migrant rate of 15% (21). This is likely due to the fact that, as of 2016, only 5% of

Swedish jobs required low-skilled labor (not requiring a secondary education), a mismatch with the 48% of refugees in Sweden who had not yet completed lower secondary education (18). Sweden does have a history of impressive rates of employment for migrant women when compared to the rest of the European

Union, who do better in the country after 11 years than do women in any other EU nation (Konle-Seidl

21; European Union/OECD 113).

Introductory Programming

Sweden’s introductory programming (for those who have been granted a residence permit and settled in a municipality) in the Swedish language and work skills has recently shifted to emphasize the responsibility of migrants to integrate into the Swedish society and labor market (Konle-Seidl 34). (To this end, a “fast track,” discussed in the following section, has been introduced for the skill assessment 32 and quicker integration of highly-skilled refugees in shortage occupations (“Fast track…”).) In a study looking at employment rates for those who had completed Sweden’s introduction program, however, results were not especially promising. Only 31% of migrants were in regular employment or education following the two years of introductory programming, and 19% of migrants were only engaged in subsidized employment (OECD, Working Together). Low-educated migrants were the least likely of all to find employment following this introductory programming — 22% of men and 8% of women with low levels of educational attainment had found employment, and the majority of this employment was also subsidized (OECD, ---). Recently, figures have shown modest improvements, but it remains to be seen whether this program offers any substantial benefit to refugees (OECD, ---). It is likely, however, that these figures will remain somewhat clouded throughout the next several years due to the Swedish government’s replacement of permanent residence permits for refugees with three-year residence permits in late 2016, which could either increase the incentive for employment due to their contingent, renewable nature or decrease the incentive for employment due to their transience (Konle-Seidl 30; “Proposal to temporarily…”). For example, Public Employment Service workers in Sweden report that the issuance of temporary residence permits over permanent ones had an obvious “discouraging” effect on language learning and other training both for refugees and for employers who may view these employees as an unsound investment (Konle-Seidl 30). Research conducted in 2000 confirmed that refugees who perceive their stays as temporary underperform their economic potential and elect different career paths

(Dustmann). Additionally, as this program requires the official attainment of a residence permit, many of the refugees who entered Sweden during the peak of the crisis have not yet or have only recently completed the programming due to delays in beginning it, which the EU believes to have additionally hurt their employment prospects as well as motivation for labor market activities (Konle-Seidl 30). Prior to these programs, however, many local governments began to offer free Swedish language courses as well as social events for those awaiting decisions on their asylum claims (“Ministry of Employment…”). 33

Fast Track and Digital Tools

Since 2016, Sweden has employed a unique approach within its integration programming called the “Fast Track Initiative” designed to integrate highly skilled migrants with residence permits into shortage occupations (Konle-Seidl 38). The program, which covers 31 professions ranging from butchery to medicine, incorporates the help of the government, trade unions, and a comprehensive program that covers coaching, assessment, skills validation, and language learning in order to place high-potential individuals in apprenticeships and internships (OECD, International Migration 81; Konle-Seidl 38).

According to the EU, the initiative has been well received by trade unions and employers, and within the first year of its implementation, between 33% and 52% of participants across all professions (excluding healthcare, which requires lengthier training) had found employment (Westphal & Gustafsson; Konle-

Seidl 38). In 2017, approximately 3,500 participants were pursuing fast-track options (Konle-Seidl 38).

In an effort to further engage new arrivals, Sweden released an online tool known as Jobskills in

2017. Jobskills is designed to identify users’ skills in their own first languages and allow them to create career profiles cataloguing their educational and workplace experience. Additionally, the site provides guidance for CVs and interview preparation (“About Jobskills”). Ultimately, it aims to serve as a

LinkedIn-esque service that will allow employers to search for qualified candidates. Sweden also incentivizes the employment of refugees - if a company commits to employing 100 new arrivals in three years, it is entitled to wage subsidies (“The Government presents…”).

Integration Policy: Germany

The German government has allocated a great deal of funds toward integration measures for its refugees. Federal funding for integration courses in increased from 244 million euros in 2015 to 610 million euros in 2017 (Konle-Seidl 36). Job centers that assist with the labor market integration of 34 refugees received 900 million euros of supplementary funding to assist with the enormous increases in volume, and vocational language learning spending totaled 410 million euros in 2017 (36). An additional

19 million was spent on the country’s “Integration Through Qualification” network, which coaches migrants in the cultural, linguistic, and practical aspects of German business (36).

Access to the Labor Market

According to the Asylum Information Database, access to the labor market is somewhat more restricted for migrants to Germany, who must sit a waiting period of at least three months after arriving in the country and registering as asylum seekers (“Germany: Access...”). Asylum seekers, however, are barred from employment for as long as they are under an obligation to stay in their initial government reception centers, which is also generally a three-month period with a maximum of six months

(“Germany: Access…”). (States have a right to extend this period to 24 months for asylum seekers originating countries deemed to be “safe,” such as Serbia or Senegal (Konle-Seidl 31).) As asylum seekers have no right to determine their place of residence in Germany, this creates a substantial delay, which can further delay motivation to participate in the labor market, as previously mentioned

(“Germany: Access…”). Asylum seekers are also specifically denied work on a self-employed basis throughout their asylum procedure, as this requires a regular residence title in Germany (Konle-Seidl 58).

After the three-month waiting period, asylum seekers may apply for an employment permit by providing a detailed job description as well as demonstrating that they have a job offer contingent upon their receipt of the permit (“Germany: Access…”). Additionally, until 2016, the Database notes that a measure was in place that required a “priority review” of German citizens and foreigners with secure residence permits who are eligible for the same position must also be conducted before it can be extended to an asylum seeker (“Germany: Access…”; Konle-Seidl 58). This measure, which applied during the first fifteen 35 months after the three-month employment bar, has been suspended in most areas of Germany, and does not apply after the fifteen-month period (Konle-Seidl 29, 32, 58).

Roughly 1% of the German labor force is now composed of refugees who must be integrated.

(“Germany: Access...”). As of 2015, Germany’s track record was that 50% of refugees had found a job within five years of arrival (Brücker et al, IAB-BAMF-SOEP; Konle-Seidl 20). Germany does, however, align with the overall EU trend of a higher rate of unemployment for refugee women than for refugee men

(Eurostat, “Migrant integration statistics…”). For recent arrivals, Germany’s refugee survey found that

31% of those who arrived in 2013 had a regular job by 2016 compared with 22% of the 2014 arrivals and

14% of the 2015 and early 2016 arrivals, all of which are improvements upon past rates (Brücker et al

IAB-BAMF-SOEP; Konle-Seidl 22). While Germany does not release refugee-specific data, employment rates of Syrians, Iraqis, and Afghans are still low but increased by over 50% from 2016 to 2017 (Eurostat,

“Employment rates”). (Overall, in 2017, non-EU migrants were employed at a rate of 64.5% compared to the native rate of 81.6% (Eurostat, ---).) A notable contrast between Germany and Sweden in this regard is the amount of refugees who have found lower-skilled employment in the hospitality, restaurant, and logistics industries (Konle-Seidl 22). 11% of Germany’s job growth between 2012 and 2016 was accounted for by low-skilled jobs (Konle-Seidl 22). A 2017 EU report described German employers as having a “high willingness” to train and hire refugees, either for reasons of corporate social responsibility or for “immediate business cases” in the face of “current and future skills bottlenecks” (Konle-Seidl 27).

Education

Access to education for asylum seekers above the age of eighteen in Germany has been described as “severely limited,” but Germany does extend compulsory education to all children under the age of sixteen and as old as eighteen provided they began education at a younger age (“Germany: Access…”).

Asylum seekers on the whole do have access to vocational training (contingent upon an employment 36 permit but not requiring “priority review”); however, the often six-month intervals of residence permits for asylum seekers often makes attaining this training very difficult as employers are unwilling to take a risk on an applicant whose claim may be rejected (“Germany: Access…”). Additionally, these permits are contingent upon the holder’s agreement to live in an assigned place for three years, another factor that may limit employment and educational opportunities (“Germany: Access…”). In the case of Germany, concerns have been raised by the EU about the demotivating potential of these shortened permit with respect to the push for refugees to acquire vocational training that may prove useless should the person return to his or her home country (Konle-Seidl 30). To this end, Germany introduced the “3+2 Rule” in

2016, which allows tolerated migrants below the age of 25 to begin vocational training and retain their tolerated status for the duration of this training plus at least two years if they obtain jobs in their vocational field afterwards (Konle-Seidl 30).

Legislation

The German Integration Act of 2016 provided refugees and preferential asylum seekers (as well as tolerated persons) the right to participate in the Integration Course consisting of German language training and civic orientation (Gesley). Participation in these courses is mandatory, and failure to participate will result in the lowering of monthly benefits (Gesley). This mandatory measure has allowed

Germany to introduce an “A2” level of German proficiency requirement for obtaining a permanent residence permit in addition to evidence of self-sufficiency. Refugees are additionally able to apply for permanent residency early if they have achieved a “C1” level of proficiency (Gesley). Spending on these courses, public employment agencies, and job centers with a specific view toward improving integration has increased to .5% of Germany’s GDP since the onset of the crisis (Konle-Seidl 8).

Germany has also paid unique attention to the benefits of transferring foreign credentials; migrants with foreign degrees recognized as equivalent have a 23% higher employment rate and 28% 37 higher wages (Brücker et al, Arbeitmarktintegrations; Konle-Seidl 37). Germany also passed a

Recognition Act in 2012 giving migrants the right to have their foreign qualifications recognized across regulated and non-regulated professions (“Germany: the new…”). This recognition has allowed migrants success in finding full-time jobs that suit their qualifications – 9/10 migrants with foreign qualifications in

Germany were successfully employed after a recognition of their qualifications as of 2017, increasing gross income by an average of 1000 euros per month (German Federal Ministry of Education and

Research 9; Konle-Seidl 37).

Introductory Programming

With a view toward efficiency, Germany undertook the somewhat unique measure of sorting asylum seekers upon registration in early 2016. Asylum seekers’ placement within these groups determines how quickly they are able to access language courses and labor market support (Konle-Seidl

31). Asylum seekers who are likely to be allowed to stay based upon their situation and country of origin

(including Syria and Iraq) are treated as a preferential group, asylum seekers from “safe countries of origin” do not receive pre-decision access to language and labor support, and those with “complex cases”

(approximately two-thirds of cases) are given “subordinated access” to this support (31).

In contrast with Sweden, which pursues the integration of its already skilled migrant laborers,

Germany places more intensive efforts into equipping refugees with the tools to enter “middle-skilled” jobs that require formal vocational qualifications (Konle-Seidl 38). 80% of refugees who come to

Germany must be upskilled to enter the German labor market at this level; however, attracting refugees to upskilling programs is difficult due to the low wages received during the apprenticeship period in comparison with work in unskilled labor (38). Similar to Sweden’s fast-track program, the German government also works on an individual basis to combine the resources of the government with the needs and training of employers through short-term programs (39). One of these is the Perspectives for 38

Refugees (PerF) course, which teaches the language and culture of the German workplace and offers counselling on the recognition of qualifications and degree (38). Another is KompAS, which focuses on

“early activation” and provides competence assessment and language acquisition skills (38). Both include company visits, the formulation of CVs, work practice, and job application strategies, all of which are underlined with an emphasis on vocational language training, which Germany sees as its most effective integration measure (38). PerF also includes particular options for female (PerF-W) and young (PerjuF) refugees, with PerjuF preparing participants for apprenticeships in collaboration with trade unions and companies (38). As of 2017, these programs had 13,500 participants compared with the overall 81,000 participants in the mainstream programs; however, the vocational language training offered through these programs showed a 30% increase in employment (40).

In an effort to maximize the reach of information dispensed about these programs, the German government has released an app called Ankommen for new arrivals, which provides information about life in Germany, the asylum procedure, and the job search as well as the potential for skills recognition

(Toor).

Integration Policy: Poland

The most recent figures available for spending on integration in Poland are from 2009, during which time approximately 4 million euros were spent on Individual Integration Programs and language courses (Duszczyk & Góra 23). An EU report conducted in 2017 asserted that Poland had no official integration strategy or policy beyond the institution of Individual Integration Programs (Piłat & Potkańska

8). 39

Access to the Labor Market

According to the Asylum Information Database, access to the employment market for asylum seekers in Poland is somewhat more restrictive depending upon the length of time it takes for one’s claim to be processed (“Poland: Access…”). Asylum seekers have the right to seek employment within Poland six months from the date of their application submission or upon the receipt of their positive decision, which will provide a temporary ID document serving as a work permit in Poland (“Poland: Access…”).

Generally, asylum seekers need to wait out the six-month employment bar, a fact that has been criticized as increasing dependence on social welfare due to a prolonged period outside of the labor market

(“Poland: Access…”).

Education

All children under the age of eighteen are given the right to compulsory education in Poland

(“Poland: Access…”). Asylum-seeking children attend the same public schools as native Polish children; however, they are also obliged to attend their classes in Polish even if they do not speak it (“Poland:

Access…”). Reception centers provide Polish language classes specifically for children for this reason, and their school supplies are also covered by government assistance (“Poland… Access…”).

Additionally, non-Polish speaking children are entitled to one year of a teacher’s aide who speaks their native language and additional free classes in the Polish language (or other “compensatory classes” needed for grade-level performance) that must be organized by the schools they attend (“Poland:

Access…”). 40

Introductory Programming

Adult asylum seekers in Poland do not receive access to vocational training under law except what is organized through reception centers and through projects of the Office for Foreigners. Refugees receive the support of a voluntary one-year Individual Integration Program (IPI), which includes Polish language courses, legal and psychological counseling, connection with labor market assistance, health care, and social work assistance (Duszczyk & Góra 20, 23). Through these IPIs, a person or family’s final place of residence is also determined with consideration of “preferences or proposals” from the migrants, with the ultimate priority being integration that allows participation in the local labor market (Duszczyk

& Góra 21).

Integration Expectations

Unlike other EU countries, Poland has not seen a demographic-altering increase in its workforce or refugee population (approximately 12,000 people as of 2017) due to the onset of the crisis and has therefore not made many practical adjustments to the ways in which it handles its asylum-seeking population (European Parliament, “Migrant Crisis…”). A 2015 study noted that, in contrast with countries such as Sweden, which recognizes the cultural gap between its society and the societies from which its migrant populations originate and thus need to shape policies for those “difficult to integrate,”

Poland made no indication of this concern in its migration policies (Stefánska 9). Without making a specific reference to any particular nationality or religion, Poland’s “key strategic document” in 2015 describes groups of migrants who “integrate easily” and should therefore be the focus of migration policy

(Stefánska 9). The fact that Poland’s IPIs are voluntary reflect the fact that it has a base expectation of its migrants to be somewhat smoothly integrated into its society (Stefánska 9). As a result, it has been 41 criticized for its short length relative to other longer but mandatory programs throughout the EU

(Sienkiewicz 7).

A 2016 EU report on the integration of migrants in Poland stated that the Polish Employment

Service did not have any specific programs dedicated to the integration of refugees or asylum seekers but rather addressed its migrant population as a whole through its voluntary programming (Sienkiewicz 3).

Differing somewhat from Sweden and Germany, Poland emphasizes that those granted refugee status have “unrestricted access to employment” and are subject to the same benefits and regulations as all native Polish citizens (Sienkiewicz 4). Despite access to all of these benefits, several reports have suggested that a lack of specialized programming (particularly addressing the Polish language) and recognition of qualifications has created barriers to gainful employment for refugees; however, official statistics and/or a detailed report has yet to be released (Sienkiewicz 5). As of 2017, Poland was among the four best countries in the EU in terms of the equivalence of its native and non-EU migrant employment rates, both of which were approximately 73% while the EU average for non-EU migrants is just 63% (Eurostat, “What is…”). Additionally, between 2014 and the end of 2017, Poland’s employment rates for female non-EU migrants and female native citizens increased substantially, rising from 56.8% and 59.4% in 2014 to 68.9% and 63.6% in 2017 (Eurostat, “Employment rates…”). While refugee- specific statistics are not available, this does suggest that, in Poland, a woman born outside of the EU is

+5.3% more likely to be employed than a native-born woman, which topples the deficits for non-EU migrant women in Germany (-21.4%) and Sweden (-23.5%) (Eurostat, “Employment rates…”).

Therefore, given that the country’s workforce was minimally impacted by the crisis, it may be that specialized integration programming for migrants will remain a very low priority for the government and will instead continue to be handled by NGOs. 42

Integration in the News

Given the recent nature of this issue, there is a lack of statistics that can point firmly to what work outcomes might be for the refugees taking up long-term residence in these countries. Analyzing recent reporting, however, can provide insight into the day-to-day challenges, successes, and failures of integration between refugees and these countries’ native workforces.

Integration in the News: Sweden

By late 2016, it was increasingly obvious that the face of Swedish politics had changed significantly as a result of the public’s response to the crisis. The Swedish Democrats, a far-right populist party once “reviled” in polite society, had gained the support of one in seven Swedish voters (Lifvendahl).

This drastic twist in the country’s popular opinion can likely be attributed to the Sweden’s over- estimation of its capabilities for immediate integration. The country’s largest swells of migrants prior to the crisis were scarcely half of its 2015 numbers, and Sweden had had substantial stretches of time between prior events to re-situate itself (Lifvendahl; “Sweden and Migration”). Even so, refugees and asylum seekers were not necessarily integrating successfully into Swedish society; gang “warfare” had been raging on the fringes of Swedish society as a result of migratory swells since at least the 1990s, and in 2017, lethal crimes were the worst they had even been in Sweden since reporting began in 2002

(Lifvendahl; Roden). Areas of Sweden’s major cities are now decried by the public as “no-go” zones for the police, with one professor of organized crime at Stockholm University even describing them using the term “Wild West” (Lifvendahl; Billner & Jefferson). This same gang warfare is linked with the violence that the Swedish Democrats have used as a partial basis for their anti-migration stances. In 2018, just before the Swedish Democrats made their biggest electoral gains to date, the number of neighborhoods classified by the police as “marred by crime, social unrest, and insecurity” was on the rise (Barry). Stories 43 of rape, arson, stabbings, and gun and explosives violence linked to gangs were reported in unprecedented numbers (“In figures: 2017…”; Neuding). In 2018, Politico described the crimes as a “phenomenon among men with immigrant backgrounds in [Sweden’s] parallel societies” and noted that the fact that such violence no longer made front-page headlines was indicative of its magnitude (Neuding). In early

2019, the Swedish Democrats polled at 41% in a neighborhood in the city of Malmo, which experiences some of the highest violent crime rates in the country and is composed in half by foreign-born residents

(Billner & Jefferson; Sanandaji, “So Long…”). One resident was quoted as saying that her neighbors believed that “all criminality stems from immigration” (Billner & Jefferson).

Despite the sharp turns in public opinion and press coverage, there are still some reasons to suggest that Sweden made the right choice in remaining as open as possible to refugees. The Council for

European Studies at Columbia University published a series on the crisis in late 2017 and dedicated an entire research article to how refugee spending in Sweden “challenged austerity, put the local fiscal houses in order, and proved beneficial to all” (Hansen). It argued that Sweden’s economy, which was growing considerably faster than the rest of the European Union, was excelling not in spite of but because of “large-scale refugee reception” resulting in “expansive fiscal policy [that] stimulated aggregate demand and thus helped economic growth” (Hansen). That is, the Swedish government’s decision to spend aggressively on housing, integration programming, and other needs for refugees provided a huge economic boost to local businesses (Hansen). Another late 2018 article from Bloomberg decried that the benefits migrants were offering to Sweden’s economy and aging population were “lost amid the political rhetoric” (Lindeberg). It referenced a statistic that foreign-born workers accounted for all of the job growth in Sweden’s industrial sector, 90% of the job growth in the welfare sector, and 79% of the total job growth in Sweden for 2017 (Almérus et al 2; Lindeberg). The Swedish Public Employment Service stated in 2018 that this statistic was evidence that foreign-born workers were “necessary” for the Swedish labor supply in certain areas (Almérus et al 2). Still, as noted above, many of these individuals are engaged in heavily subsidized employment, and a 2017 EU report found that the implications of a “labor 44 market of two extremes” (i.e., highly-educated Swedes in white collar jobs and foreign-born workers in low-skill, public sector employment) was “more and more worrying” (Dessimirova et al 11) both societally and in terms of what may be an increasingly unsustainable welfare state (Sanandaji, “So long...”). There are, of course, success stories of highly-qualified refugees who have found work with companies like Spotify, Deloitte, and major banks after making the most of the programming from the government and Swedish universities that allow them “crash courses” in management and work culture; however, one such program at the Swedish School of Economics graduated only 29 people in two years

(Lindeberg; Lane).

Finally, across the Swedish society and labor market, “cultural distance” persists as an issue for many refugees (Englund 12). It is suggested that this perception of a heightened state of “difference” from native populations, rather than sheer ethnic discrimination, is a huge barrier for refugees in being perceived as valuable human capital (12). This may be because employers in the Swedish economy increasingly value “social competence,” (or “competence in communication”) and employers are unable to perceive this competence even in the most well-qualified refugees due to the often-segregated living situations and social networks of refugees as well as their sub-native linguistic fluency (12). This cultural rift seems to be particularly important in Sweden, which struggles with reconciling its radically equal society even with the religious beliefs of some of its native citizens. In mid 2018, a Swedish Muslim woman won a high-profile discrimination lawsuit after she was denied an interpreter position for refusing to shake hands with a male in a job interview on religious grounds (“Swedish Muslim woman…”).

Integration in the News: Germany

As in the case of Sweden’s shift away from its open-door policy, Germany’s public support for

Wilkommenskultur ultimately faltered under the enormous influx of refugees. Like the Swedish

Democrats, the German far-right party Alternative for Deutschland (AfD) capitalized on hikes in migrant 45 crime rates and violent crime rates in 2015-16 to garner support for an anti-immigration agenda (BBC,

“Reality Check…”; Alkousaa). High-profile crimes, including an egregious string of sexual assaults in

Cologne perpetrated by gangs of “Arab or North African” men that was described the police as a

“completely new dimension of crime” (“String of New…”) and also the fatal stabbing of a man by two migrants in the town of Chemnitz, seemed to fuel anti-refugee sentiment despite the fact that legal refugees who were most likely to be granted asylum (such as Syrians) were statistically least likely to be those involved in violent crime (Shubert & Schmidt; Alkousaa). By late 2018, support for Merkel’s conservative-center bloc plummeted to a record low (29%) at the same time that AfD polled at a record high (17%, up 4.5% from 2017) (“Support for Merkel’s…”). Unlike Sweden, however, whose anti- refugee sentiment seemed more fueled by concerns for crime rates and the welfare system, Germany’s far-right expansion may have been motivated by social media.

Facebook, which has been described by researchers as “surfacing negative, primal emotions” and

“distorting users’ senses of right and wrong” (Fisher & Taub; Müller 2-3), was pinpointed by the German police as propagating rumors about migrants that spur extremism in German natives (Stolton). This may be related to the aforementioned figures suggesting that Germans prior to the crisis were more likely to be opposed to living in close proximity to people of other races or nationalities (Bachman). One paper studying racially-motivated attacks on refugees over two years found both that the AfD (which refrained from moderating interactions on its page) had more followers on Facebook than any other German political party and also that Facebook usage could effectively be correlated with increased probability of hate speech and violent incidents (Stolton; Müller 1). The New York Times described the German police as taking this link as seriously as they would take “a pandemic or a new street drug,” presenting personally at the homes of people who post or repost exaggerated stories (for example, the arrest of an

Afghan national suspected of groping a 17-year-old being spun into the gang rape of an 11-year-old) and providing evidence to debunk the claims in an effort to encourage users to delete or correct the posts (in the case of the Afghan national, all but one person whom the police visited did so) (Fisher & Taub). 46

As evidenced by the police’s involvement in the Facebook rumors spread by German nationals, the German government is more disposed than the Swedish government to address integration concerns through engaging with its native populace as much as its incoming one. In light of this, in August of

2018, Merkel’s party floated the possibility of restoring a mandatory year of service (previously abolished in 2011) for both native and foreign-born youth as well as adult asylum seekers and refugees (Le Blond).

The proposal would have seen young Germans working alongside young asylum seekers and refugees in military, fire, service, disaster relief, and volunteer care worker positions to improve societal integration and “increase the acceptance of refugees among the population” (Le Blond). The party believed such a program would “strengthen social cohesion” in Germany and “integrate refugees into the country and society” as well as improve shrinking numbers in the country’s military (Le Blond). Ultimately, however, the plan would have required a change to Germany’s constitution (which forbids any form of forced labor) and was therefore unsuccessful (Le Blond).

Despite the continued turmoil surrounding the integration of refugees, Germany’s aging population continues to require skilled laborers, who are predicted to be in shortage by 2030, and labor bottlenecks were believed to have cost the country 1% in GDP during 2018 (Hockenos). In this regard, the refugee population has the potential to be immensely appealing to the German economy: though many are unskilled, the country’s young, mostly-male refugee populace is interested in many of the apprenticeship vacancies that young Germans are not (Hockenos). They offer such potential to certain areas of the German economy that the German Institute for Economic Research believes that, if the country’s huge investments in educational programming and pushes for 3+2 integration programs succeed, they will have paid for themselves in just seven to ten years (Hockenos). Despite these promising figures, program drop-out rates (often fueled by language or bureaucratic issues) are not low, and many refugees are finding more successful integration through grassroots initiatives (Hockenos). For example, the group Welcome by Friends, which is supported with both public and private funding, counsels immigrant youths and offers advanced language instruction lasting several years (Hockenos). 47

Colleges including Heidelberg University have set up courses specifically for refugees whose education had been halted or whose records had been erased, and such programs have found solid job placement rates (O’Brien). Given the skills required for much of the labor that Germany needs and the length of apprenticeship programs, it may be a few years before solid data emerges on the success of governmental or charitable programs; however, in 2017, four times more refugees graduated from vocational training than did in 2015 (Hockenos). As in the case of Sweden, the successful attainment of employment following this training is especially important. Currently, migrants are likely to be undertaking gig work through apps like Deliveroo or Uber, which some fear may hurt their job and integration prospects in the long term due to the type, quality, and quantity of social interactions required as well as the minimal language skills used (Lindsay). Germany, therefore, needs to be mindful of the efficacy of its vocational training in order to avoid an economy of extremes.

Integration in the News: Poland

As the country whose government is least proactive about both immigration and integration,

Poland’s overall internal crime rates, labor market participation, and politics have not shifted as drastically nor been reported as hotly as those in Germany or Sweden. This may be partially because the country’s far-right Law and Justice Party is, in fact, pro-immigration toward migrants whose home countries espouse similar cultural and religious values, as evidenced in the country’s historic openness toward Eastern European migrants and its 2016 issuance of 586,000 residence permits (more than any other EU nation except the UK) to citizens of non-EU countries, many of whom were Israelis

(Mazurczak). The crime spikes in Germany and Sweden as well as the terrorist attacks in France and

Belgium did, however, have a strong impact on the increased adversity of the Polish public toward

Muslim migrants, with only 22% of Polish people favoring the admission of “Middle Eastern” refugees in mid-2018 (Mazurczak). These sentiments were on display in the January 2019 murder of Pawel 48

Adamowicz, the relatively progressive mayor of Gdańsk (described by the EU as “one of the most progressive cities” in Poland) who invited and welcomed refugees to the city and also participated in several feminist and pro-LGBT movements (Piłat & Potkańska, 26; “Poland has been divided…”). Many blamed his assassination, which was committed by an otherwise mentally ill man with a criminal history, on the tendency of the Polish media to treat sympathy “as a scarce resource” and encourage competitive attitudes in native Poles who struggled with their own feelings of ostracization (“Poland has been divided…”).

Nonetheless, the labor market integration of refugees was described by the European Union as

“not a top priority” for Polish authorities (Piłat & Potkańska 19), furthered by the argument that refugees have access to the same benefits as do any native citizen within Poland without much of the additional support they receive elsewhere in the EU. This may be comparatively limiting to Polish refugees, who have self-identified as possessing an average level of lower secondary education and the skills necessary for employment in the childcare, elderly care, construction, transport, and agricultural industries, while very few reported they would be able to work in an office or administrative job (Piłat & Potkańska 20).

While the federal government appears to remain mostly indifferent, cities such as Gdańsk and Warsaw have risen to the task of integrating these migrants by assembling committees to work with migrants and generate information about resources and opportunities that have the potential to help meet migrant needs to great degrees of success (Piłat & Potkańska 26-28).

Conclusion

The actions of the governments and populaces of Sweden, Germany, and Poland from 2015 through the present provide a snapshot of the breadth of responses expressed thus far by EU member nations toward the European Migrant Crisis. While conclusive information about the long-term effects of governmental initiatives or lack thereof is not yet available, it seems that each nation’s response was most 49 closely driven by its pre-existing values and beliefs rather than any obligations it felt as a member of the

European Union. Likewise, it was when these values and beliefs (for example, nonviolence in Sweden, self-sufficiency in Germany, or self-determination in Poland) were perceived to be under attack by the effects of the Migrant Crisis that backtracking and disapproval manifested most strongly. This feeling of attack ultimately seemed to fuel the eventual surge in the popularity of nationalistic voting and far-right political parties.

Amid this political and cultural upheaval, countries are now still faced with questions of integration made increasingly pressing by realities of shrinking workforces and a need for moderately or highly skilled labor. Migrants, governments, and populaces must confront differences in education, language, and culture that pose obstacles to timely integration, and it remains to be seen whether present integration programming will have its desired long-term effect. Nonetheless, if these migrants remain in the EU and are integrated successfully and beyond the lowest levels of the economy, there is reason to believe they will be a transformative force politically, economically, and culturally.

50

Appendix: Eurostat Asylum Statistics Figures

Figure 1: Non-EU asylum applications, 2008–2018 (Eurostat, "Asylum statistics") 51

Figure 2: Protections granted by citizenship and country of asylum, 2016 (Eurostat, "Asylum decisions... 2016")

52

Figure 3: Protections granted by citizenship, 2015 (Eurostat, "Asylum decisions... 2015")

Figure 4: Protections granted by citizenship, 2016 (Eurostat, "Asylum decisions... 2016") 53

Figure 5: Protections granted by citizenship, 2017 (Eurostat, "Asylum decisions... 2017") 54

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