New Diversities an Online Journal Published by the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

New Diversities An online journal published by the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity

Volume 16, No. 2, 2014 Migration and development: Rethinking recruitment, remittances, diaspora support and return

Guest Editor: Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (Danish Institute of International Studies, DIIS)

Including the Debate on Migration-Development in the Post-2015 Millennium Development Goals: An Editorial Introduction 1 by Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS) Lower Migration Costs to Raise Migration’s Benefits 9 by Philip Martin (University of California at Davis) Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development: Implications for Discussions on Transnationalism 37 by Joan Lacomba (Universidad de Valencia) and Alexis Cloquell (Universidad Católica de Valencia) Exploring the Value of a Transnational, Reciprocal and Multi-Stakeholder Approach to the Migration-Development Nexus. Case Study: TRANSCODE Programme 21 by Lothar Smith (Radboud University, Nijmegen), Fabio Baggio (Scalabrini International Migration Institute, Rome) and Ton van Naerssen (Avanna Consultancy, Nijmegen) Understanding Diaspora Organisations in European Development Cooperation – Approaches, Challenges and Ways Ahead 55 by Nauja Kleist (Danish Institute for International Studies) Moving Back or Moving Forward? Return Migration, Development and Peace-Building 71 by Marieke van Houte (Maastricht University / UNU-MERIT, Maastricht) and Tine Davids (Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen) Who Cares? Transnational Families in Debates on Migration and Development 89 by Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Ida Marie Vammen (Danish Institute for International Studies) The Public Role of Social Scientists in Constituting the Migration-Development Nexus 109 by Thomas Faist (Bielefeld University)

Open forum From ‘Multiculturalism’ to ‘Interculturalism’ – A commentary on the Impact of De-racing and De-classing the Debate 125 by Harshad Keval (Canterbury Christ Church University) Editor: Marian Burchardt Guest Editor: Ninna Nyberg Sørensen Language Editor: Sarah Blanton Layout and Design: Birgitt Sippel

Past Issues in 2008-2014: “Social Mobility and Identity Formation”, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2014 “Diversity and Small Town Spaces: Twenty Years into Post-Apartheid South African Democracy ”, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2013 “Female Migration Outcomes II”, Vol. 15, No. 1, 2013 “Language and Superdiversities II”, Vol. 14, No. 2, 2012 “Skilled Migration and the Brain Drain”, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2012 “Language and Superdiversities”, Vol. 13, No. 2, 2011 “Female Migration Outcomes: Human Rights Perspectives”, Vol. 13, No. 1, 2011 “Depicting Diversities”, Vol. 12, No. 1, 2010 “Turks Abroad: Settlers, Citizens, Transnationals”, Vol. 11, No. 2, 2009 “The Human Rights of Migrants”, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2009 “The Conditions of Modern Return Migrants”, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008 “Citizenship Tests in a Post-National Era”, Vol. 10, No. 1, 2008

ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ISSN-Internet 2199-8116

Published by the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity Hermann-Föge-Weg 11 D-37073 Göttingen, Germany

Available online at www.newdiversities.mmg.mpg.de Including the Debate on Migration-Development in the Post-2015 Millennium Development Goals: An Editorial Introduction

by Ninna Nyberg Sørensen (Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS)

In September 2000, world leaders came together of post-colonial states such as Grenada, St. Vin- at the United Nations Headquarters in New York cent, Haiti and the Philippines began to engage to adopt the United Nations Millennium Decla- their migrant-populations living abroad in new ration, committing their nations to a new global de-territorialized processes of nation-state build- partnership to reduce extreme poverty and ing. They did this by constructing the image of setting a series of time-bound targets – with a migrants as loyal citizens, encouraging them to deadline of 2015 – that have become known maintain multiple ties to their homelands, and as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). expecting assistance in developing local agricul- The eight MDGs to be achieved by 2015 did ture and industries, either directly or through not include goals and targets related to migra- encouraging their relatives at home (Basch, tion basically, some might argue, because the Glick Schiller and Scanton Blanc 1994). Even hype around the migration-development nexus when initially deprived citizenship rights in their was not yet established in the international countries of origin – as was the case for many policy agenda-setting fora. Since 2003, when Central Americans fleeing political persecu- the Global Development Finance Annual Report tions during the 1980s – some migrants found took formal notice of remittances to developing that their home country governments began countries, increasing attention to the migration- to fight for their residency rights in the United development link ensued: First in migrant-receiv- States in order to secure the continuous flow of ing states such as France, Belgium, Switzerland, remittances. In the case of El Salvador, migrant the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden participation in cross-border community, family and Denmark, and later in the international and political networks led to formal recognition fora, such as the Global Forum on Migration of political rights as Salvadoran citizens (Mahler and Development (GFMD). Since then, studies, 1995; Popkin 2003). In other migrant-sending policy analyses, international forums and recom- countries, governments began to take an active mendations on migration have aimed to work for role in encouraging and formalizing cross-border policy development in practical ways, including action by granting dual citizenship rights and efforts to include migration concerns in the post- introducing policies to facilitate migrant partici- 2015 development agenda. pation in national development efforts (Smith Interestingly, national development processes 1998; Guarnizo 1998; Baker-Cristales 2008). existed in some developing countries well before Linking migration to development is not a new the international community took on the task to topic for the international community but has, “establish the link”. These processes attempted in the words of Hein de Haas, swung back and to strengthen the involvement of migrant popu- forth like a pendulum since the post-World War II lations living abroad. In 1994 Linda Basch, Nina period: from modernist development optimism Glick Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc noted to brain-drain pessimism, towards neo-opti- that, in the mid-1980s, the political leadership mistic brain-gain and remittance euphoria, ever

New Diversities Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Ninna Nyberg Sørensen

since the dawn of the new millennium (de Haas the World Bank, the regional development banks, 2012). Whether viewed positively or negatively, United Nations agencies such as the Develop- perceived migration pressures challenge social ment Programme (UNDP) and the Educational, cohesion and, combined with burdened humani- Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), tarian and development aid budgets, these ten- and the inter-governmental International Orga- sions may partly explain the post-2000 height- nization of Migration (IOM) (Faist 2008). The ened interest in attempts to formulate migration- financing model underpinning the original MDGs development policies (Vammen and Mossin Brøn- focused largely on domestic resource mobiliza- den 2012). To reiterate a few numerical facts: In tion and official development assistance (ODA), 2013, one out of every seven people in the world whereas the relative importance ofO DA vis-à-vis was a migrant, either internally or internationally, remittances has declined (Greenhill and Prizzon voluntarily or involuntarily. It is estimated that 2012), which further illustrates this global situ- 232 million people currently live outside their ation. country of birth, of which 60 percent are to be In this special issue, Philip Martin argues that found in more developed countries and 40 per- migration has contributed significantly to the cent in developing countries. Of these, some are achievement of the MDGs in areas such as pov- persons with legal status in the countries of set- erty reduction, increasing education and improv- tlement. Others are in irregular situations and try ing child and maternal health. With reference by various means to regularize their status. Refu- to the global policy interest in the field, Martin gees account for a relatively small proportion of also finds that international interest in migration global migrants; they are estimated at 15.7 mil- has been decisive in promoting global partner- lion, comprising about seven percent of all inter- ships for migration. Based on previous analysis of national migrants. Nearly nine out of every ten the “unsettled relationship” between migration refugees in the world are to be found in develop- and development (Papademetriou and Martin ing regions (OECD-UNDESA 2013). 1991), Philip Martin argues that three major Remittances have played an important role in migration-related processes of recruitment, establishing migrants as important development remittances and return can contribute to devel- agents. Viewed from a purely financial point of opment in migrant-sending areas. As significant view, remittances to developing countries indeed international cooperation already has been put constitute a considerable source of external into reducing the transfer costs of sending remit- resource flows. It is estimated that these remittances, the primary aim of the article is to argue tances exceeded $72 billion U.S. dollars in 2000, that governments can cooperate to reduce the reaching $336 billion in 2008 (declining slightly costs of migration by reducing the recruitment with the global financial crisis but getting back on costs paid by the migrants themselves. Mov- track with $404 billion in 2013). These figures are ing workers across borders may be a $10 billion expected to rise to $516 billion by 2016. Remit- global business, which means that substantial tances not only represent a large proportion of sums could be redirected towards development financial flows but also are substantially more if costs were reduced. A positive side effect of than global official development assistance, capi- better migrant worker protection may follow tal market flows and foreign direct investment in from cost-reduction efforts. many countries (World Bank 2014). From the mid-2000s onwards, international Remittances’ potential for development – and efforts to link migration to development through their resistance, or even their capacity to be remittances have increasingly realized the pri- counter-cyclical to economic recession – surely vate and family-based nature of individual remit- explains why they stand at the centre of the opti- tances. These efforts have thus begun to focus on mistic discussions at international institutions like collective remittances transferred by hometown

2 Editorial Introduction New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

associations or diaspora groups. Unlike family tion and economic and social integration plays a remittances, collective remittances tend to be major role. targeted towards community-development proj- Lothar Smith, Fabio Baggio and Ton Van Naers- ects in infrastructure or other communal areas, sen expand the analysis of transnational migra- such as health care and educational provisions. tion-development initiatives beyond bilateral Despite the fact that collective remittances rep- country of origin / country of reception arrange- resent a smaller share of the overall remittance ments. Their article is based on engagement flow, they are perceived to have a larger impact with the multi-stakeholder TRANSCODE pro- on local development, with potentially large mul- gramme, aimed at providing a platform for cross- tiplier effects on the local economy. fertilisation of experiences and ideas between Three case studies focusing on migrants’ col- migrant organisations of various national and lective participation in development are brought geographic origins as well as other actors such together in this special issue. The first article as NGOs in migrant-sending countries, local by Joan Lacomba and Alexis Cloquell discusses and national governments, policy makers, prac- the various claims made by national and inter- titioners, representatives of the business com- national institutions with regard to the role of munity, and academics. So far, the programme migrant associations in home-country develop- has built bridges between participants from the ment. Based on a comprehensive, comparative Philippines, the Netherlands, Ghana, Italy and study of the associations of eight migrant natio Burundi. It has also fostered lessons learned nalities in Spain – including Algerian, Moroccan, in terms of identification of best practices as Malian, Senegalese, Colombian, Ecuadorian, Bul- well as enhanced engagement and cooperation garian and Rumanian associations – the authors between transnational community organisations note the heterogeneity of migrant associations and other actors. The programme also has met, as well as the fact that not all migrant associa- however, a number of persistent obstacles, such tions take on a transnational behaviour. Whether as a weak representation of the private sector they do or not is narrowly related to the migrant and the creation of hierarchy as well as compe- groups’ incorporation in the country of recep- tition among actors for funding and along gen- tion, the level of ethnic solidarity within the erational lines. A main obstacle is located in the national group, the external assistance each policies and practices of funding development group has been able to mobilize from Spanish agencies that still seem to think along the lines NGOs and other alliances established with Span- of nation-states and partner-countries in consid- ish civil society and development agencies, the eration of the merits of projects and shortlisting. vitality of civil society in their country of ori- European development agencies have also gin, and the availability of material and human pursued migration-development initiatives resources within the associations. The study under the heading of diaspora-cooperation. concludes that migrant engagement cannot be These initiatives are often directed towards a substitute for state or private investments in areas that formal development actors find diffi- home-country development. To understand why cult to access due to conflict and other security some migrants engage in associational practices problems. Based on a larger study of diaspora of a transnational character, researchers and contributions to development and reconstruc- policy makers need to be clear on the units of tion in fragile situations, Nauja Kleist sets out analysis we select. In the country of origin con- to analyse the understandings of diaspora that text, attention should be paid to issues such as underlie development agencies’ engagement political situation, social conflictivity, economic with diaspora groups. The analysis outlines stability, and cultural identity. In the country of three dimensions of how diaspora groups are destination, migrants’ labour market incorpora- perceived and approached in European develop-

3 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Ninna Nyberg Sørensen

ment cooperation: First, as collective develop- mented migrants is considered both as a movement agents serving as bridgeheads or brokers ment back to normal that restores pre-conflict between the established development industry natural and social order and a movement for- and local actors; second, as security threats or ward to change in which returnees contribute to long-distance nationalists whose distance make development and peacebuilding. There are sev- them unaccountable or prone to affiliation with eral problems involved in this assumption: First, the wrong local actors (the fundamentalists, the that few assisted returns are, in fact, voluntary. terrorists); and, finally, as any other civil soci- Second, many assumptions pertaining to retur- ety actor in development cooperation that just nees – that they bring skills, capital, new ideas and needs to be mainstreamed. Concrete activities access to transnational networks – do not apply funded either by the European Commission or to migrants currently returned to countries such national European donor agencies are found to as Afghanistan. And third, only those returnees cluster around three types of support, namely with access to continued mobility (those having mainstreaming, particular diaspora schemes obtained citizenship elsewhere) have the neces- and network support. Capacity building and sary room to maneuver and engage in peace- matching fund schemes are the two common building efforts in post-conflict states suspicious ways of support. No matter the type and prac- to “foreign influence”. There is, in other words, ticalities related to support, the diaspora project a mismatch between the assumptions on which landscape is extremely volatile. Donor coun- migration-development policies are based and tries furthermore display a lack of policy cohe the fact that most resources are put into assist- rence between their migration and development ing involuntary returnees. policies by not linking projects concerned with Conceptual confusion and a mismatch development in countries of origin to integration between enactments in policy and migrant reali- efforts in countries of reception. When selecting ties inform several debates. The article by Ninna projects for funding, donors tend to merge qua Nyberg Sørensen and Ida Marie Vammen sets lity with value assessments and select only those out to discern the understandings of the family diaspora projects that are in line with their own in two (often intermingled) debates concerned priorities. Selection of partners is thus a very with the effects of migration on development: political process. Firstly, the largely state and policy driven dis- Following the recruitment-remittances-return course on the potential benefits of migration logic adopted by various international institu- on economic development and, secondly, the tions involved in the migration-development largely academic transnational family litera- field leads to the assumption that migrants will ture focusing on issues of care and the micro- contribute to development when they return politics of gender and generation. The authors to their country of origin. When returning to discern two standard accounts in policy dis- post-conflict countries, this contribution is seen courses around migrants and their families. The to have a peace-building effect. The contribu- first posits that remittances potentially benefit tion by Marieke van Houte and Tine Davids migrants and their families by lifting individu- addresses the question under which conditions als and families out of poverty, often leading to this might be the case. Their analysis focuses on increased female participation in employment experiences with “Assisted Voluntary Return and and, by implication, empowerment of women Reintegration” programmes that, at this point, and changed family relations. At the other end have taken up a substantial part of European of the spectrum, disconnections are emphasized: migration-development policies and budgets. Family separation leads to family disruption; Within this policy domain, the return migration has emotional, psychological and social costs; of refugees, failed asylum seekers and undocu- distorts care regimes; and causes a plethora of

4 Editorial Introduction New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

social problems ranging from school dropouts If the latter choice is made, an important task and teenage pregnancies, to societal decay and of migration-development academic research is the breakdown of social norms. These accounts to see through ideological statements made in rarely specify the family situations that circum- migration policy. New research should highlight scribe migrant families prior to, during and after interdependent functions in the construction of migration. The academic literature around trans- the policy field, beginning with pointing out that national motherhood, fatherhood, childhood much policy talk about migration-development and global care chains suggests a more compli- is, in reality, serving migration control functions. cated picture of gains and losses. The authors The full set of articles included in the issue argue that in understanding whether families fall expands the basis on which to make migration apart after migration or succeed in transnation- issues an integral part of the Sustainable Devel- alizing their existence, researchers might find a opment Goals (SDG) agenda succeeding the Mil- better explanation in global macro-politics than lennium Development Goals. The original MDGs in family micro-dynamics. briefly mentioned the respect for and protection The last article in the issue by Thomas Faist of migrants’ human rights but largely ignored takes the issue of the relationship between aca- broader migration-development issues, both demic knowledge and policy dynamics a step those concerned with making migration work for further by debating the public role of social development and those understanding migra- scientists in the migration-development nexus. tion as an integral part of global development Faist advances the proposition that policy and processes. Numerous policy inputs from stake- academia indeed have been coupled in migra- holders around initiatives such as the Global tion-development debates, not least through a Commission for Migration and the Global Forum high degree of commissioned research around on Migration and Development have sought to issues such as return-to-develop, brain drain, co- promote a more coherent, comprehensive and development, diaspora entrepreneurs, etcetera, global response to migration issues”.1 A UN High which are all related to particular macro-political Level Dialogue on International Development has changes. He then distinguishes between two debated the multidimensional aspects of inter- types of knowledge: instrumental knowledge ori- national development in order to identify appro- ented toward the means to achieve a goal, and priate ways to maximize its development ben- reflexive knowledge geared toward (normatively efits and minimize its negative impacts.2 Yearly desirable) ends. Should migration-development meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and research aim at producing expert knowledge to Development have sought to establish “a new political organizations? Should we take sides and global process designed to enhance the posi- advocate for social justice, equality, or migrants’ tive impact of migration on development (and human rights? Or should we rather pursue the vice versa) by adopting a more consistent policy role of the public intellectual who seeks to approach, identifying new instruments and best change the perspective of the debate by support- practices, exchanging know-how and experience ing the better argument? Since academic knowl- about innovative tactics and methods and, finally, edge may serve legitimizing, substantiating and establishing cooperative links between the vari- symbolic functions for policy and decision-ma ous actors involved”. After the first constitutive king, these are important questions. They imply meeting in Brussels, discussions have included that social scientists active in the migration- protection and empowering of migrants for development field should consider which role development (Manila 2008), integration of we wish to occupy in the post 2015 MDG migration-development debate: as advisors to politi- 1 See www.gcim.org 2 cians or as agenda setters in the public debate? See www.un.org/esa/population/migration/hld/ index.html

5 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Ninna Nyberg Sørensen

migration policies into development strategies Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deter- (Athens 2009), migration-development partner- ritorialized Nation-States. Langhorne: Gordon and Breach. ships (Mexico 2010), issues of coherence, capac- De Haas, H. 2012. “The Migration and Develop- ity and cooperation (Switzerland 2011), migra- ment Pendulum: A Critical View on Research tion and human development aspects (Mauritius and Policy”. International Migration 50 (3): 8-25. 2012), and establishing partnerships on inter- Faist, T. 2008. “Migrants as transnational develop- national migration (Sweden 2013). The results ment agents: an inquiry into the newest round of several years of intense debate have led to of the migration–development nexus”. Popula- achievements on the remittance front, first and tion, Space and Place14 (1):21-42. foremost lower transfer fees and easier access to Glick Schiller, N. 2012. “Unravelling the Migra- sending and receiving remittances.O n the policy tion and Development Web: Research and Policy alignment front, however, there has been less Implications”. International Migration 50 (3): 92- 9. convergence (Glick Schiller 2012). While there Greenhill, R. and A. Prizzon. 2012. “Who foots has been increasing policy attention to promot- the bill after 2015? What new trends in developing return of irregular migrants and failed asy- ment finance mean for the post-MDGs”. London, lum seekers, there have been fewer attempts to Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper actively include migration concerns in develop- 360. ment policy. Guarnizo, L. E. 1998. “The rise of transnational The current Outcome Document from the social formations: Mexican and Dominican state Open Working Group on Sustainable Develop- responses to transnational migration”. Political ment Goals confirms this picture by having only Power and Social Theory 12: 45-94. Mahler, S. J. 1995. American Dreaming: Immi- the following to say about migration: Goal 10: grant Life on the Margins. Princeton: Princeton reduce inequality within and among countries University Press. … by facilitate[ing] orderly, safe, regular and OECD-UNDESA 2013. “World Migration in Figures”. responsible migration and mobility of people, http://www.oecd.org/els/mig/World-Migra- including through implementation and well- tion-in-Figures.pdf (accessed October 16, 2014) managed migration policies.3 A key message Papademetriou, D. and P. Martin, eds. 1991. emerging across the issue is that any formulation The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migration and of migration-development goals and effective Economic Development. Connecticut: Green- implementing of policies in the area must con- wood Press. Popkin, E. 2003. “Transnational migration and de- sider the adverse effects of tighter migration con- velopment in postwar peripheral states: an ex- trol. If prevented from mobility, how would some amination of Guatemalan and Salvadoran state of the world’s most disadvantages people be linkages with their migrant populations in Los able to contribute to development where public Angeles”. Current Sociology 51(3-4): 347-374. policy and official aid programmes have failed? Smith, R. C. 1998. “Transnational Localities: Com- munity technology and the politics of membership within the context of Mexico and U.S. Mi- References gration”. In: M.P. Smith and L.E. Guarnizo, eds., Baker-Cristales, B. 2008. “Magical pursuits: le- Transnationalism from below. New Brunswick: gitimacy and representation in a transnational Transaction Publishers. political field”. American Anthropologist 110(3): Vammen I.M. and B. Mossin Brønden 2012. 349-359. “Donor-Country Responses to the Migration–De- Basch, L., N. Glick Schiller and C. Scanton velopment Buzz: From Ambiguous Concepts to Blanc. 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational Ambitious Policies?” International Migration 50(3): 26-4. World Bank 2014. “Migration and Development 3 See http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/fo- Brief 22”. April 11, 2014. Washington, D.C. cussdgs.html

6 Editorial Introduction New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Note on the Author

Ninna Nyberg Sørensen is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS). She has worked on migration-development issues for most of her career and published widely on transnational migration, conflict and gender, for exampleWork and Migration (London 2002), The Migration-Development Nexus (Geneva 2003), Living Across Worlds (Geneva 2007), and The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration (London 2013). Her recent work explores undocumented migration of Central Americans, the insecurities migrants encounter and the consequences of massive deportation on local communities and sending states.

Lower Migration Costs to Raise Migration’s Benefits

by Philip Martin (University of California at Davis)

Abstract Every year up to 10 million workers leave one country to work in another. Most are guest workers and enter the destination country legally, sometimes paying $1,000 or moreto recruiters, governments, and other agents who facilitate their employment abroad. Helping over five million workers a year to move across borders for jobs may be a $10 billion global business, and reducing migration costs could increase remittances and speed development in the workers’ countries of origin. This may also improve worker protections, since migrant workers who arrive abroad in debt may be vulnerable to exploitation. Governments have cooperated to reduce remittance costs. They could further reduce worker-paid migration costs by implementing a wide range of policies, from negotiating free-movement regimes to sending workers abroad only via government agencies. The highest worker-paid costs arise in complex systems that involve recruiters in both sending and receiving countries. Reducing recruitment costs is an important key to ensure that migrant workers are protected. This would also increase the rate at which development occurs in migrant-sending countries. Keywords: international labor migration, recruitment costs, recruiters

Introduction The eight Millennium Development Goals (www. • Recruitment deals with those who migrate. un.org/millenniumgoals) to be achieved by 2015 Are migrants persons who would have been do not mention migration. However, reforming unemployed or underemployed at home, or international labour migration could speed the key employees of business and government achievement of many of the MDGs, including whose departure leads to layoffs and reduced reducing extreme poverty and hunger, increas- services? ing education and improving child and maternal • Remittances to developing countries exceed health, and promoting global partnerships for $1 billion a day. Can the volume of remittances development. be increased if more migrants cross borders? Migration can facilitate faster development. How can the cost of transferring small sums Reforming the development framework on between countries be further reduced? Once migration and increasing flows of workers from remittances arrive, are they spent to improve poorer to richer countries could help more work- the education and health of children in migrant ers to achieve a better quality of life in their des- families, or do they fuel competition for fixed tination countries. The three major migration- assets, as when land or dowry prices rise? related processes that can contribute to develop- • Returns refer to migrants who come back to ment in migrant-sending areas are recruitment, their countries of origin. Do returning migrants remittances, and returns. bring back new technologies and ideas and

New Diversities Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Philip Martin

stay, do they circulate between home and and workers interact constantly in the workplace, abroad, or do they return to rest and retire? as supervisors assess employee performance The impact of these 3 R’s on the differences and workers consider their satisfaction with the between migrant-sending countries varies job. Employers may terminate unsatisfactory widely, which is one reason why the link between workers, and dis-satisfied workers may quit their migration and development is often described jobs. as uncertain or unsettled (Skeldon 2008, 1997; National borders can complicate the three-R Papademetriou and Martin 1991). Economically labour market processes. For example, if jobs motivated migration can set in motion virtuous are in one country and workers are in another, circles, as when young workers who would have language differences, variance in training and been unemployed at home find jobs abroad, send occupational standards, and varying definitions home remittances that reduce poverty and are of skills and occupations can make it harder to invested to accelerate economic and job growth, match workers and jobs efficiently. Employers and return with new skills and technologies that may have to rely on intermediary recruiters to lead to new industries and jobs. The result is a find workers, and governments in both sending convergence in economic conditions and oppor- and receiving countries may have to approve tunities between sending and receiving areas. employer job offers and check the health and There has been significant international coop- skills of workers selected by recruiters before eration to reduce remittance costs, and circular they cross borders to fill jobs. migration and diaspora development aim to The other two R-functions may also be com- ensure that migrants contribute to their coun- plicated by national borders. For example, it is tries of origin. There is a need, however, for more harder to determine appropriate remuneration cooperation to reduce recruitment costs. Reduc- when employers do not share the language and ing recruitment costs was a theme of the UN’s culture of their employees, leading to misunder- High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Develop- standings and disputes about employee respon- ment in October 2013 (http://migration.ucdavis. sibilities and performance, especially if low- edu/mn/more.php?id=3892_0_5_0), and is a skilled workers sign contracts that they do not focus of KNOMAD (www.knomad.org) efforts to fully understand. Productivity can be affected by measure recruitment costs. the expiration of work visas that require workers Understanding recruitment costs and the to return to their countries of origin. efforts to reduce them requires a brief discussion In labour markets, asymmetric information is of labour markets, which have three major func- exchanged (Akerlof 1970). Employers are most tions: recruitment, remuneration, and retention. knowledgeable about the jobs they offer, and Recruitment matches workers with jobs, remu- workers know more than employers about their neration, or the wage and benefit system, moti- abilities and competencies. Employers have vates workers to perform, and retention identi- developed a variety of strategies to screen and fies the best workers and develops methods to hire the best workers, including setting minimum promote and keep them employed. education and experience requirements, asking The primary goal of labour markets is to current workers to refer qualified friends and match workers to appropriate jobs, oversee that relatives, and advertising or using recruiters to the work is performed adequately, and provide find qualified workers. Meanwhile, workers may monetary wages and work-related benefits in signal their abilities to employers by earning cre- exchange for their workers’ time. Unlike many dentials and certificates and gaining experience other market transactions, this work is unusual that demonstrate they will be good employees. because it requires a continuous relationship Screening and signalling has been a core concern between employer and employee. Employers of labour economics (Riley 2001).

10 Lower Migration Costs to Raise Migration’s Benefits New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

When workers and employers do not share a The UN and Migration Costs common language or don’t have experience with Developing a framework that protects migrant the same education and training systems, they workers but does not lead to unwanted social often rely on intermediaries to facilitate worker- costs would give most migrants the economic job matches (Autor 2009). Recruiters who under- opportunities they seek. The UN’s High-Level stand the job requirements find and screen work- Dialogue on migration and development (www. ers to fill them. When low-skilled workers face a iom.int/cms/hld2013) in October 2013 noted high turnover in employment, recruiters may act the unfairness of worker-paid migration costs ris- as the port of entry into a business, as all new ing as worker skill levels fall, so that low-skilled hires enter the workplace via recruiters. Workers workers pay a higher share of their foreign earn- sometimes access these recruiters via temporary ings to recruiters and others than high-skilled help firms. If these workers prove to be satisfac- workers. Therefore, the UN has pledged new tory after a probationary period, they may make efforts to develop policies that can reduce migra- the transition to work as a regular employee of tion costs. the firm. The HLD’s concluding statement laid out five National borders add more layers between priorities, beginning with the need to integrate workers and jobs and often complicate the migration into the global development agenda, recruitment process. Employers may turn to making migration a catalyst for development recruiters in their own countries to find work- by protecting the rights of migrants and -lower ers in other countries. These local recruiters ing migration costs. The second HLD priority is may recruit foreign workers directly or transmit to improve lives and work for migrants by low- employer job offers to recruiters in countries ering remittance costs and improving the recog- with workers, where local recruiters can proceed nition and transfer of skills over borders. Third to seek out and screen workers. In other words, is to develop plans to help migrants in crisis, national borders offer opportunities for recruiter and fourth is to collect more data on migrants investment and specialization that can make the moving within the various migration corridors, process of filling vacant jobs more efficient or including their characteristics as well as migra- prompt rent-seeking that raises migration costs, tion and remittance costs. The fifth HLD priority as when recruiters act as gatekeepers and charge is to develop a strategy to achieve the first four local workers seeking higher wage-jobs abroad. priorities, and to have the strategy endorsed by There is a spectrum of recruiters, from those governments. who rely on word-of-mouth to find workers to International cooperation has reduced -remit those who advertise for and screen interested tance costs and called attention to the return and applicants. reintegration of migrant workers, while the citi- International borders should increase zens abroad, the diaspora, speed development at employer investment in recruitment to ensure home. After the 9/11 terrorist acts, governments good worker-job matches, but in practice, cooperated to make it easier to send small sums employers often invest little to recruit low-skilled over borders via regulated financial institutions, foreign workers. In addition, they sometimes and their revised policies plus technology have charge foreign workers to be hired in their com- reduced the cost of sending $300 from one coun- panies. If employers can charge workers to be try to another from 15 percent or $45 to 10 per- hired and pay them low wages, they may have cent or $30 over the past decade. an incentive to hire too many workers. This may The World Bank projected that remittances benefit their narrow, short-term economic inter- to developing countries would surpass $435 bil- est, but can lower productivity and ultimately lion in 2014, up eight percent from $404 billion make them less competitive over time.

11 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Philip Martin

in 2013.1 The average cost of remitting funds a poor worker-job match in these areas can be was 8.4 percent of the amount transferred, typi- costly to the employer (Sundheim 2013). How- cally $200 to $300, down slightly from 2013. The ever, there are often more workers than jobs in World Bank’s 5x5 program aims to reduce remit- low-skilled occupations such as domestic service tance costs by another five percentage points and construction labour, making some workers over five years. That is, to lower average remit- willing to pay high fees in order to move to the tance costs to less than five percent. Technologi- front of the queue of workers seeking foreign cal innovations, including remittance transfers jobs. Even if low-skilled workers know they are via cell phones, may help to achieve this goal. paying higher-than-government-set fees for for- Another potential migration-related spur to eign jobs, they may not complain if they get what development in migrant-sending countries is the they want: a foreign job that offers a higher wage. diaspora of citizens abroad. Migrants from devel- If worker-paid migration costs are low and the oping countries who live in high-income coun- process of matching workers with jobs is satis- tries have an estimated $500 billion in savings in factory, this can result in satisfied workers and the countries in which they are living. Since they employers and good outcomes for governments know the conditions in their countries of origin, in both migrant-sending and -receiving countries. the diaspora is often first to invest when oppor- Low migration costs allow migrant workers to tunities appear. Their savings as well as links to receive most of the wage wedge that motivates investors and firms in the high-income countries international migration.2 Low migration costs can economically help developing countries. can help governments to manage migration by reducing the need for them to deal with dis-sat- Recruiters and Migration Costs isfied, terminated, and runaway workers. Wage gaps between countries motivate labour High migration costs can have the opposite migration. Most workers will not give the entire effects. High costs can prompt migrant workers wage gap to recruiters, but they will pay more to seek jobs for which they lack necessary skills in than the typical one month’s foreign wages that a quest to earn higher wages, to take second jobs some governments specify as the maximum while abroad to repay migration debts but then amount private recruiters should charge to help become irregular by working in a job for which workers find foreign jobs. If workers have a two- they do not have a visa, or overstay their visas year contract, one month’s foreign earnings are to achieve their savings goals. Employers may 4.2 percent of foreign earnings; on a three-year be dis-satisfied with the performance of - work contract, one month’s earnings are 2.8 percent. ers who are worried about repaying recruitment Recruiters who match workers and jobs over debts as well as workers sent by recruiters that borders are paid for their services. Employ- were more interested in collecting recruitment ers generally pay some or all recruitment costs fees than in making optimal worker-job matches. for highly skilled workers, including manag- Given the benefits of good rather than poor ers, health care professionals, and engineers, worker-job matches, why do high migration costs because there are relatively few workers with and poor worker-job matches persist? There are these qualifications and the consequences of many reasons, including false incentives recruiters may employ to attract workers. Employers and 1 India received $70 billion in remittances in 2013, more than was earned from software service exports, 2 Wage differences can manifest themselves as effi- followed by China, $60 billion, Philippines, $25 billion, ciency wages, as when employers pay more than the Mexico, $22 billion, and Nigeria, $21 billion. Remit- market wage to workers who are hard to monitor in tances were 52 percent of GDP in Tajikistan in 2013, order to encourage them to work, since loss of their 31 percent in Kyrgyz Republic, and 25 percent in both job would result in the worker having to accept a low- Nepal and Moldova (www.worldbank.org/pros- er-wage job. pects/migrationandremittances).

12 Lower Migration Costs to Raise Migration’s Benefits New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

recruiters may not care about who is recruited both training and placement do not move work- if their major business is selling job offers that ers over national borders. result in the issuance of work visas, as under the kafala sponsorship systems of some mideastern Recruitment and Migration Costs countries. Recruiters may see low-skilled labour- There are three major steps in the international ers as homogeneous or interchangeable, giving labour migration process that affect migration them little incentive to invest to screen and find costs: learning about foreign jobs and receiving the best workers. Finally, migrants in countries a job offer, having sending- and receiving-gov- that offer few routes for upward mobility and ernments approve the job offer and check the who have few opportunities to migrate to higher migrant’s health status before departure, and wage countries may see recruiters as a way to travel to the foreign job and go to work. Each cross otherwise closed borders. of these processes, viz, job offer, government Easy access to migrant workers may have approvals, and travel, can lead to migration costs unwanted effects. If governments routinely that are passed on to workers. approve employer requests for the migrant workers, and their wages are low, the readily Foreign Job Offers available migrant labour may slow productivity Most countries have “employer-driven” labour growth in migrant-receiving countries. For exam- systems, meaning that workers are recruited to ple, employers may switch to labour-intensive fill jobs after governments agree with employers production processes and hire more workers, as that foreign workers are “needed.” Employers in countries with high shares of migrants in con- begin the process by requesting permission, usu- struction, manufacturing and other sectors.3 In ally from a Ministry of Labor, to recruit foreign some countries, labourers paid $200 a month workers to fill particular jobs. are kept on standby in case they are needed to Governments have a wide range of responses meet unanticipated peak labour demands, as at to employers that are reflected in their tempo- airports that handle freight.4 rary foreign worker programs. Some govern- Recruiters can be more than entities that ments bar the entry of low-skilled workers, as match workers and jobs. In some countries, pub- in Japan,5 while others establish quotas on the lic entities receive government funds to help dis- number of migrant-workers who can be hired by located, unemployed, and low-skilled workers industry, as in Korea, by industry and firm, as in to improve their skills and find jobs. Most work- Singapore, or by industry and region, as in Spain. force intermediaries that receive public funds for Other governments establish an overall quota on the number of work visas available, as with the U.S. H-1B program, but do not require 3 In Singapore, economic growth averaged five percent while productivity growth averaged one percent employers to try to recruit local workers before between 2000 and 2010, a decade in which the num- hiring migrants, while others have no quota, as ber of foreign workers almost doubled, from 612,000 in Germany and Australia-New Zealand for sea- to over 1.1 million. The Ministry of Trade and Indus- try’s Economic Survey for the 2nd quarter of 2013 sonal workers, but require employers to try to asked: “Are Low-Skilled Foreign Workers Substitutes recruit local workers while offering at least a for Machinery?” and concluded that the answer was minimum package of wages and benefits before yes, that is, the influx of foreign workers slowed pro- granting them permission to hire migrants. Some ductivity growth (www.mti.gov.sg/MTIInsights/Pag- es/Singapore’s-Missing-Capital---Are-Low-Skilled- governments use expert commissions to set Foreign-Workers-Substitutes-for-Machinery.aspx). 4 Hundreds of Bangladeshi workers paid $200 a month are housed in dorms near the Dubai airport 5 Japan allows employers to hire foreigners to fill and called to work as needed to deal with surges in air low-skilled jobs as trainees or as foreign students who freight. are allowed to work part time while they are studying.

13 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Philip Martin

and change quotas, while others fix temporary eral transmission mechanisms, including directly foreign worker quotas in law (Martin and Ruhs from the employer or a current employee to 2011). (potential) migrant workers in other countries, Most governments have a hire-local-workers- from one government employment exchange to first policy. Employers usually post job vacan- another, and/or from the employer to a recruiter cies for which they are requesting foreign work- in the country of origin or in the country with ers on local employment exchanges and try to workers. recruit local workers for at least several weeks Just as there may be tension between gov- before they receive permission to recruit foreign ernment desires to have employers hire local workers (Larsen and Vesan 2011). In many cases, workers and employer preferences to hire government approval or certification to employ migrant workers, there may be tension between foreign workers is a “reward” for the employ- employers, as well, who want to hire the “best er’s failure to recruit local workers. If employ- and brightest” in global labour markets, while ers prefer foreign to local workers, then trying sending-country governments want to retain to recruit local workers is a going-through-the- native talent and send jobless and inexperienced motions exercise that governments are not well workers abroad. These tensions were evident in suited to second-guess (Cappelli 2012). There Germany’s guest worker program with Turkey, are many reasons to prefer foreigners, including where many skilled Turkish construction workers the fact that they tend to be more “loyal” to their left for Germany and the Turkish government for employer because they generally lose the right a time in the early 1970s tried to prohibit skilled to be in the country if they lose their jobs. Turkish craftsmen from leaving (Martin 1991). Few governments have labour market infor- This Turkish regulation was not very effective at mation systems (LMIS) that provide timely and preventing out-migration because skilled Turkish detailed data on local labour supply and demand workers could leave as tourists and, once in Ger- (Stigler 1962). This means that, if employers fail many, find an employer to give them a job offer to recruit local workers within a week or two, that would lead to a work and residence permit they have passed the “economic needs test” issued in Germany. and receive permission to recruit foreign work- Migration costs paid by workers often rise with ers. Since most governments approve virtually the involvement of recruiters. Economic theory all employer requests for foreign workers, most suggests that migration costs should decline over employers are confident that they will be certi- time as employers rely on networks of current fied to hire foreign workers when they request employees to refer friends and relatives to fill permission to recruit and employ migrant work- jobs. Current employees know the requirements ers. of the job and the capabilities of their friends The fees that employers pay to be certified and relatives, and can be ideal “recruiters” who are generally paid by employers and not usually bring only qualified workers into the workplace recharged to workers, but the levies that some and often orient and train the newly hired work- countries impose on employers to discourage ers. Using networks of current employees to them from hiring migrant workers may be passed find new workers should lower migration costs on to migrants, especially in countries that do (Martin 2014). not have minimum wages. The wages paid to Network hiring has lowered worker-paid migrants can be lowered by several hundred dol- migration costs in many migration corridors, as lars a month due to employer-paid levy charges. from Eastern Europe to Spain or Mexico and Cen- Once approved to hire foreign workers, tral America to the United States. But worker- employer job offers are transmitted in various paid migration costs to move from South Asia to ways to workers who can fill them. There are sev- work as Gulf oil exporters remain very high for

14 Lower Migration Costs to Raise Migration’s Benefits New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

several reasons. First, Gulf employers and Gulf- The cost of job matching, of linking a potential based recruiters often charge recruiters in South worker in one country with a job in another, is Asian countries $1,000 or more for the kafeel or the first cost in the three-stage recruitment pro- sponsorship that most Gulf countries require of cedure. The migration costs in this first phase foreigners, an up-front cost that is usually passed that culminate in a contract for a worker to fill a on to workers. Second, South Asian governments particular foreign job can include both monetary often restrict or prohibit foreign employers from as well as opportunity costs, as workers spend recruiting their citizens directly, ensuring that time that they could be working to learn about most migrants must use local recruiters and thus foreign job offers and complete the paperwork pay their fees. Third, many Gulf employers who to go abroad. act as sponsors request more workers than they can employ, selling sponsorships as a way to sup- Securing Government Approvals plement their income. Recruiters may offer these Obtaining a foreign job contract is usually the “free visas” to South Asian workers as a way to first step to go abroad and work, followed by gov- work for any employer once abroad, but many ernment permission to leave one country and to migrants are vulnerable because, if detected enter another to work. Many low-skilled migrant while employed for an employer who is not a workers going abroad for the first time must sponsor, they are deemed illegal and subject to obtain passports, visas and work permits for the deportation.6 country in which they will work, and they must If recruiters are not involved, migrant workers also undergo health and other checks before may pay to be placed on recruitment lists from departure. Satisfying these procedures in order which employers select workers. Workers who to go abroad often involves visits to different want to be selected by Korean employers under agencies and facilities, and sometimes takes sev- the Employment Permit System must first pass eral days in a place far away from the migrant’s a Korean-language test. They may, therefore, home. Some countries, notably the Philippine incur costs to learn Korean. In many migrant- Overseas Employment Administration, have sending countries, information about foreign developed one-stop shops that enable migrant jobs is received in capital cities and transmitted workers to apply for required documents and via layers of agents and subagents to low-skilled clearances in one building in one day (Abella, workers in rural areas. These agents may be com- Martin and Midgley 2004). pensated by city-based recruiters after migrants Obtaining a first foreign work contract pro- pay them for contracts. Many agents accompany cures a passport into which a work and residence rural migrants to visit recruiters in urban centres, visa can be inserted. However, before the worker and some accompany migrants as they undergo can obtain the visa, he/she must usually undergo health and other pre-departure checks. a health check and submit a police clearance cer- tificate. In some countries, only specified health facilities can provide the health check, necessi- 6 Saudi Arabia had about nine million foreign resi- dents in 2013, but began a campaign to arrest and tating a trip to that facility. deport unauthorized foreigners in November 2013. Contracts provided to workers are often During the first five months of the campaign, 370,000 checked by a government agency before work- foreigners a month were deported, many of whom ers receive final approval to go abroad to ensure had so-called free visas. The Saudi government or- dered the 600 Saudi recruiting agencies to form 18 that they offer any specified wage required by mega associations to obtain visas for the foreign the sending country, such as $400 a month for workers requested by Saudi employers, making the domestic workers leaving the Philippines. In mega association rather than the sponsor-employer responsible. for the welfare of the migrant work- some countries, workers are asked about any er. See http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more. recruitment fees they paid, but the answers are php?id=3907_0_3_0

15 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Philip Martin

often not reliable, since recruiters often coach migrant-receiving countries require migrant their client-workers to say they paid no fees or workers with two- or three-year contracts to no more than government-set maximums. arrive with round-trip tickets, which often For migrants whose contracts have been increase travel costs. approved, some governments issue a photo Migrant workers usually pay a package price ID, as in Bangladesh and the Philippines. These to recruiters that include most migration costs, cards, which may be subsidized by local banks from passport and visa costs to travel and hoping that the migrant will use the card to recruiter fees. For this reason, it may be hard for make remittances, can serve as an ID to receive workers or researchers to understand how much consular services abroad, but are not usually rec- of the fee covers airfare and other elements of ognized by host-country governments as official the package. identification. Regulating Recruitment Traveling Abroad and Working The recruitment industry that moves workers Migrants with approved contracts normally go from one country to another is believed to be abroad soon after receiving contracts and work large and growing, but reliable data are scarce visas. Some migrant-sending countries require (Kuptsch 2006; ILO 2007). Several things are clear. migrants to undergo pre-departure orientation, First, most recruiters send few workers, often typically a half-day or day-long session that can less than 100 a year, abroad. Most recruiters be held at a government agency that approves operate in only one corridor, as with those who worker contracts. Other migrants undergo train- send Filipinos to Saudi Arabia or to Hong Kong, ing that can last from a few days to a few weeks. but not both. Many recruiters specialize in one For example, Sri Lanka has training facilities type of worker, domestic helpers or seamen or near its major international airport that provide accountants, but not all three types of workers. several weeks of training to domestic workers Second, many recruiters are linked closely to before departure. the governments that regulate their activities. In Most migrant-sending governments have final some countries, a significant share of recruiters checks for departing migrants at airports, where are members of Parliament or their relatives, and passports, visas, and contracts are checked a some may see recruitment fees as one means of final time to spot deficiencies that, if detected, extracting monies from low-skilled workers who can lead to the worker being denied the right to typically do not pay income taxes on their local board the plane. These pre-departure checks are or foreign earnings. Third, regulating recruiters generally established by sending governments to effectively has been difficult, in part because protect migrant workers, but are sometimes put most enforcement systems rely on workers to in place at the request of migrant-receiving gov- complain, and workers are unlikely to complain ernments who worry about the arrival of work- if they get what they want: a foreign job offering ers with false documents who must be repatri- high wages. ated. Recruiters often advise migrants that - air International conventions call for employers port checks the final obstacle to get what the to pay all of the recruitment costs of the migrant migrants want: a foreign job. workers they hire (ILO 2006, 2008). However, ILO The cost of air travel and the share of travel conventions 97 and 143 are not widely ratified, costs borne by workers vary widely. With remit- and not always enforced in countries that do ratify tances ranging from five to ten percent of GDP them (Ruhs 2013). The U.S. government has not in many countries, national carriers might be ratified OIL conventions 97 and 143, but has laws expected to offer cheap airfares to migrants that prohibit employers from charging migrants going abroad, but these are rare. Instead, some recruitment fees, so that employers must pay

16 Lower Migration Costs to Raise Migration’s Benefits New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

all costs, including passport and visa costs, for the job offer. Fourth, migrants may incur costs for low-skilled farm and nonfarm workers admitted passports, visas, and other documents, health under the H-2A and H-2B programs. Other gov- and security checks, and pre-departure training ernments that have not ratified OIL conventions and orientation. Migrants may pay internal trans- 97 and 143 specify maximum worker-paid fees, portation costs to get to recruiters and govern- as with the Canada-Mexico Seasonal Agricultural ment offices, and pay international transporta- Worker Program. However, unless there are com- tion costs as well. plaints, it is often hard to detect the payment of Once abroad, legal migrants with contracts (excessive) worker-paid fees. should receive the wages and benefits stipulated Both workers and recruiters report that recruit- in the contract. However, some migrants are ment costs are often higher than government-set confronted with a new contract once they arrive maximum fees. Governments normally embrace abroad that offers lower wages, fewer benefits, a three-step procedure to regulate recruiters and or different work, and they may feel compelled the fees that they charge, viz, require recruiters to accept different terms if they arrived abroad to identify themselves by registering, have them in debt. As the end of their contract approaches, establish financial security by posting bonds or migrants may not receive all of the wages due to making similar financial guarantees, and rely on them or certain benefits such as end-of-service a complaint-and-investigation system to detect benefits if they must leave when their contract violations of recruitment regulations. expires. Migrants typically return and reintegrate or prepare to go abroad again. Conclusions Learning more about worker-paid migration Migration costs for low-skilled workers who costs, and especially how they vary by migration cross national borders can be high, which- low corridor and worker level of skill, could increase ers remittances, makes migrant workers more the benefits of migration for the development of vulnerable abroad, and reduces the positive migrant-sending countries and enhance migrant impacts of migration on development. Reducing worker protections. International labour migra- recruitment costs could improve protections for tion is a journey of hope and fear: hope for higher migrant workers and allow labour migration to wages and more opportunities abroad, and speed development in migrant-sending areas. fear of the unknown and exploitation. Reduc- There are four major phases in the migration ing worker-paid migration costs and uncertainty process that can lead to worker-paid costs.7 First, for migrant workers can improve protections for employers in migrant-receiving countries can them and speed development, pushing recruit- pay governments for permission to hire migrant ment reform to a higher place on the interna- workers, a cost that can be passed on to migrant tional agenda. workers. Second, potential migrant workers may pay recruiters and sub-agents to learn about foreign jobs, especially low-skilled migrants in rural References areas where recruiters are in major cities. Third, Abella, M., P. Martin and E. Midgley. 2004. migrants often pay recruiters to obtain contracts “Best Practices to Manage Migration: The Phil- for foreign jobs, especially if the recruiter has ippines”. International Migration Review 38 No 4: 1544-59. http://www.jstor.org/sta- paid the foreign employer or foreign recruiter for ble/27645456 Akerlof, G. 1970. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: 7 Migrant workers may also incur opportunity costs Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mecha- as they travel to recruiters, government agencies, and nism”. Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, No 3: training centres, costs that governments may not con- 488-500. http://qje.oxfordjournals.org/consider if the assumption is that most migrants are job- tent/84/3/488.short less at home.

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Autor, D., ed. 2009. Studies of Labor Market eds., Handbook on the Economics of Interna- Intermediation. University of Chicago Press. tional Migration. Amsterdam: Elsevier. www. http://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/ elsevier.com/books/handbook-of-the-econom- chicago/S/bo6407656.html ics-of-international-migration-volume-1a/chis- Cappelli, P. 2012. Why Good People Can’t Get wick/978-0-444-53764-5 Jobs: The Skills Gap and What Companies Can Martin, P. L. 1991. The Unfinished Story: Turkish do About It. Philadelphia: Wharton Digital Press. Labor Migration to Western Europe, With Spe- http://wdp.wharton.upenn.edu/books/why- cial Reference to the Federal Republic of Germa- good-people-cant-get-jobs/ ny. Geneva: International Labor Office Giloth, R., ed. 2004. Workforce Intermediar- Martin, P., M. Abella and C. Kuptsch. 2006. ies for the 21st Century. Philadelphia: Tem- Managing Labor Migration in the Twenty-First ple University Press. http://muse.jhu.edu/ Century. New Haven: Yale University Press. books/9781439903865?auth=0 http://yalepress.yale.edu/yupbooks/book. International Labor Organization. 2006. asp?isbn=0300109040 Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration. Martin, P. and M. Ruhs. 2011. “Labor Shortages Non-binding principles and guidelines for a and US Immigration Reform: Promises and Perils rights-based approach to labour migration. Ge- of an Independent Commission”. International neva: ILO. www.ilo.org/public/english/protec- Migration Review 45. No 1: 179-192. www.wiley. tion/migrant/areas/multilateral.htm com/bw/journal.asp?ref=0197-9183

———. 2007. Guide to Private Employment Agen- Papademetriou, D. and P. Martin, eds. 1991. cies – Regulation, Monitoring and Enforcement. “The Unsettled Relationship: Labor Migration Geneva: ILO. www.ilo.org/sapfl/Information- and Economic Development” (Contributions in resources/ILOPublications/lang--en/docName- Labor Studies, No 33). Westport: Greenwood -WCMS_083275/index.htm Publishing Group

———. 2008. The Mekong Challenge: An Hon- Riley, J. 2001. “Silver Signals. Twenty-Five Years of est Broker. Improving cross-border recruitment Screening and Signaling”. Journal of Economic practices for the benefit of Government,- Work Literature 34, June: 432-478. www.aeaweb.org/ ers and Employers. Bangkok: ILO. International articles.php?doi=10.1257/jel.39.2.432 Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour. Ruhs, M. 2013. The Price of Rights: Regulating www.ilo.org/asia/whatwedo/publications/ International Labor Migration. Princeton Uni- WCMS_099808/lang--en/index.htm versity Press. http://press.princeton.edu/ti- Kuptsch, C., ed. 2006. Merchants of Labor. Ge- tles/10140.html neva: ILO. www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/ Skeldon, R. 1997. Migration and Development: A inst/publ/books.htm Global Perspective. Addison-Wesley.

Larsen, C. A. and P. Vesan. 2011. “Why Public ———, R. 2008. “International Migration as a Tool Employment Services always fail. Double-sided in Development Policy: A Passing Phase?” Popu- Asymmetric Information and the Placement of lation and Development Review 34. No 1, March: Low-skill workers in six European Countries”. 1-18. Public Administration 90. No 2, June: 466-79. Stigler, G. 1962. “Information in the Labor Mar- http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ ket. The Journal of Political Economy”, Vol. 70, No. j.1467-9299.2011.02000.x/abstract?deniedAcc 5, Part 2: Investment in Human Beings. October. essCustomisedMessage=&userIsAuthenticated 94-105. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1829106 =false Sundheim, K. 2013. “A Guide To Hiring Recruit- Martin, P. 2014. “Guest or Temporary Foreign ment Firms”, Forbes, September 19. www.forbes. Worker Programs”. In: B. Chiswick and P. Miller, com/sites/kensundheim/2013/09/19/331/

18 Lower Migration Costs to Raise Migration’s Benefits New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Note on the Author

Philip Martin is Professor of Agriculture and Resource Economics at UC Davis where he also chairs the University of California’s Comparative Immigration and Integration Program. Martin has earned a reputation as an effective analyst who can develop practical solutions to complex and controversial migration and labor issues. He has published numerous international journal articles on migration issues in the United States and Internationally. His most recent book is Importing Poverty? Immigration and the Changing Face of Rural America (2009).

Exploring the Value of a Transnational, Reciprocal and Multi-Stakeholder Approach to the Migration-Development Nexus. Case Study: TRANSCODE Programme

by Lothar Smith (Radboud University, Nijmegen), Fabio Baggio (Scalabrini International Migration Institute, Rome) and Ton van Naerssen (Avanna Consultancy, Nijmegen )

Abstract There is a prevailing bias, even amongst the actors directly involved, to consider activities falling under the migration-development banner as bipolar engagements, i.e. activities linking a country of origin of migrants to their country of present residence. Such conceptualisations assume the nation-state as the default frame of reference. Whilst progress has certainly been made towards a necessary sophistication of migration related issues in policy thinking and related academic research, the migration-development nexus remains something still often considered as essentially something to approach within a singular or bipolar nation-state framework. This can be seen in studies of potential policy interventions related to transnational flows such as human capital transfers, remittance flows and community development projects initiatives. Taking the case of the Transnational Synergy for Cooperation and Development (TRANSCODE) Programme, and focusing on empirical insights gained with this programme in relation to its conceptual underpinnings, we explore alternative modes of incorporating migration and development. This article thus seeks to provide insights in opportunities for alternative initiatives resulting outof cross-fertilization of experiences and ideas between migrant organisations and other actors engaged in migration and development efforts. Keywords: transnational development, multi-stakeholder initiatives, migration & development

Introduction In June 2010 a five-day workshop was held in our to learn from each other practices in the Tagaytay City, The Philippines under the banner field of international migration and to critically of the TRANSCODE programme. TRANSCODE discuss the migration-development nexus from stands for Transnational Synergy and Coopera- a multi-stakeholder perspective. The Scalabrini tion for Development1. During the workshop Migration Institute (SMC) in Manila, the Global 35 participants from The Philippines and The Society Foundation (Stichting Mondiale Samen- Netherlands met together to have a series of leving or SMS) in Utrecht and the Geography intensive debates, brainstorm sessions and field Department of the Radboud University (RU) in visits. These different activities had the endeav- Nijmegen took the initiative for this workshop. The first is a research centre studying interna- 1 Also see: www.transcodeprogramme.org, www. tional migration and policies in Asia, the second simiroma.org/transcodeRome.html and www.face- book.com/pages/transcode-Programme came forth out of a desire in the Netherlands

New Diversities Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Lothar Smith, Fabio Baggio and Ton van Naerssen

amongst refugee associations to establish a sup- dency, or perhaps bias, to consider activities fall- port organisation, and the third is an academic ing under the migration-development banner as institution that, among others, focuses onglo- bilateral engagements, i.e. as linkages between balization issues. The majority of the Philippine two countries: the country of origin of migrants participants represented migrant NGO’s, local and the country of current residence, rather than governments, national government agencies and a much more diverse set of actors, assorted also the private sector. The Dutch delegation also had by the particular qualities they bring rather than a varied composition albeit more in terms of their their nationality. Such a bilateral view basically origins, as they represented diaspora organisa- assumes the nation-state as the default mode of tions based in The Netherlands with roots in the identity and most relevant frame of reference. various continents of the Global South, including In other words such a view is based on certain countries such as Burundi, Ghana, Somalia, Tur- ‘methodological nationalism’ (Wimmer and Glick key and Indonesia. By mere virtue of being part Schiller 2002). of such an amalgamous body the participants at The Philippines delegates at the Tagaytay the Tagaytay ‘learning and linking’ event already event cannot be faulted for coming to the felt they had a real opportunity to communicate event with such a view however, when this view across the usual divides. What brought further still has a general following, also in academic innovation to this event, however, was its setup. research (particularly that which has an applied Rather than bringing diverse actors together for political nature). This perspective all too often an afternoon, or even a full day to hold a work- still conceives development cooperation -oppor shop, here a ‘live in’ setting was created. This tunities through migration as taking place within meant the (social) need to engage with each the framework of the framework of a bipolar other not only in a conference setting, but also nation-state to problematize, conceptualize and outside this, namely over dinner and during lei- study the migration-development nexus. This is sure time, this for a whole five days. According to for instance the case with studies looking at the the participants such a prolonged time of sharing impact of migration on human capital transfer of one space, which implied a mixing in of for- (brain drain/gain/regain), studies focusing on mal and informal moments, helped to create a remittance flows between two countries, and feeling of shared commitment, more than would studies exploring the meaning of community be the case in more structured setting of limited development projects through migrant support. duration. Indeed, some of the participants even (Smith and van Naerssen 2009; van Naerssen spoke of the emergence of some kind of TRANS- 2008) CODE ‘spirit’ during those days, and this became Of course we recognize that various pro- a term used affectionately and instrumentally at grammes have been initiated which have subsequent TRANSCODE gatherings. given attention to a wider set of actors than Beyond the merits of such a live-in happen- just migrants and their organisations in migra- ing and the kind of commitment this evoked, the tion and development initiatives. Yet, in most event also provided another interesting insight. cases the ultimate focus remained on meeting When the delegates from The Philippines itself a national agenda, usually of the country in the arrived at the venue and added their names to Global South. This is for instance the case with the registration list, they found out, much to their the diaspora-oriented projects organized under surprise, that the names of delegates from The the banner of the Migration for Development in Netherlands already on the list did not look typi- Africa (MIDA) programme of the International cally Dutch. Instead these names appeared have Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the Joint their origins in all sorts of other countries. Their Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI) of surprise is significant in reflecting a general ten- the European Commission and the Swiss Agency

22 The Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

for Development and Cooperation. From a Goldring 2004). This article thus seeks to set out more conceptual viewpoint empirical examples the societal and policy rationale for initiatives in can also be found in scholarly work focusing on the development arena that take a reciprocal, transnational spaces created by diasporas (Brah transnational and multi-stakeholder approach. 1996; Lampert 2012), and the potential for development these generate (Mohan 2002; Mazzu- The Mainframe of Migration and Development cato and Kabki 2009; van Naerssen, Spaan and In the last five years, the discussion on migra- Zoomers 2008) and on the nature of co-devel- tion and development has taken momentum, opment modalities (Riccio 2011). Conceptually not least due to the rising awareness of the these studies again pay tribute to more funda- sheer volume of remittances sent by migrants to mental underlying theoretical notions such as their countries of origin, as Sorensen has set out that of social remittances (Levitt 1998) and col- clearly in the Introduction of this special issue. lective remittances (Goldring 2004). Following the first publications by the World What the composition of the Dutch delegation Bank on the flow of hundreds of billions of Dol- to The Philippines really gave, as an eye-opener, lars from migrants to their home countries, an was that their diversity, as representatives of amount quickly surpassing official development all kinds of migrant associations had an inter- assistance provided to these same countries in est in learning from the experiences of Philip- the Global South, but also the volume of foreign pine migrant related institutions and civil society direct investments, discussion amongst govern- organisations to reconsider their own role and ments quickly zoomed in on the options available the shape of their migration and development to capitalize on these migrant remittances to programmes and projects. To illustrate this we make them of benefit to the whole nation. Such return with the specific example of the project “mythicisation” of remittances, e.g. entertaining proposal led by the Burundian Women for Peace the idea that remittances are the panacea for and Development (BWPD) later on in this article. all the development issues of migrant-sending In this article we provide an overview of the countries, is conceptually flawed (García Zamora activities and initiatives of the TRANSCODE pro- 2009; de Haas 2005). However this essentially gramme and an explanation of its conceptual functionalist and somewhat simplistic line of rea- underpinning in order to support a more general soning was taken by many countries in the Global discussion on good practises in the migration- South, when adopting or reinforcing national development field 2. In essence the TRANSCODE programmes encouraging the export of labour, programme queries the premises on which seeing this as a clear development strategy. conventional approaches to collective initia- A second misinterpretation relating to the tive development in the global South are often migration-development nexus concerns the conceived, as also reflected in the Millennium relegation of development responsibilities Development Goals signed in 2000 (see also the to migrants and diaspora groups (Márquez- Introduction by Sorensen). Also, and perhaps Covarrubias 2010). This emerged out of an more fundamentally, it explores opportunities understanding that individual remittances com- for alternative initiatives that result from cross- prise only one of various channels through which fertilization of experiences and ideas between migrants contribute to the development of their migrant organisations of various geographical home countries (van Naerssen, Spaan and Zoom- origins, as implemented in locations around ers 2008). Another channel is formed with so- the world. This builds on work already done in called “collective remittances”. These follow out this very direction (see for instance Faist 2000; of philanthropic donations to collective savings, or by supporting the collection of certain goods 2 All three authors are currently involved in the pro- (in kind). Once these were considered to be suf- gramme.

23 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Lothar Smith, Fabio Baggio and Ton van Naerssen

ficient in volume, they were sent to their com- the remittances that follow may help to reduce munities of origin. this ambivalence, but they should not be gov- A third issue concerns the fact that the focus erned by an instrumentalist understanding of on financial flows from migrants to their home the link between migration and development. In countries often ignores many kinds of knowledge many cases immigration and emigration policies transfers of overseas workers, immigrants and seem to respond more to economic – and uni- returnees to their countries, at both individual lateral – concerns rather than to ethical and/or and collective levels. These are seldom regis- humanistic principles. When benefits derived out tered as remittances3. This transfers insights in of migration are the result of abuse, exploitation new skills, technologies and professional exper- and discrimination of migrants elsewhere, then tise gained abroad to home countries. It is only they are surely most questionable. Moreover, with the general acceptance of the term “social the interests of receiving countries and sending remittances”, coined first by Peggy Levitt, that countries generally do not coincide, and this lack this kind of input by migrants has come to be bet- of correspondence has negative implications on ter recognized (Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). the effectiveness and consistency of migration These “social remittances” also include the trans- policies and regional dialogues. fer of new norms and values, particularly when The discussion on the migration-development women migrate (van Naerssen forthcoming). nexus should include the principle of co-respon- Finally, there are also examples of international sibility in the development of the whole human cooperation aid undertaken through diaspora community (Baggio forthcoming). Grounded on groups, as in the case of transnational devel- the universal destination of the earth’s goods, opment practices promoted by some receiving this principle calls on countries to go beyond the countries (Giménez Romero et al. 2006). concept of national sovereignty, acknowledging In terms of development, all these migrants’ everybody’s right to have access to resources contributions constitute a huge potential. Indeed, where they are. Moreover, the same principle policy makers would make a big mistake to ignore dispels the myth of the ‘generosity’ entailed in or underestimate their value. Nevertheless, also the international cooperation promoted by the according to various recent studies, the precise more industrialized countries, recalling the duty development impact of international migration of sharing to those who have more resources. in many sending countries provides e ambivalent Another ethical principle that should be consid- insights (Asis and Baggio 2008; Castles 2007; de ered in the discussion on the migration-devel- Haas 2008; Delgado Wise and Guarnizo 2007; opment nexus is the principle of subsidiarity. García Zamora 2009). The unleashing of the Grounded on the respect of the autonomy of development potential of migration is not auto- local communities and institutions, this principle matic or linear and all benefits generated may should be considered in the initiatives for inter- be overshadowed by the costs incurred. Indeed, national cooperation undertaken by receiving these gains and losses are to be considered not countries – in other words, promoting sustain- only in the economic sphere as they also extend able development should be respectful of local to the social, cultural and political realm. history and culture (“incultured” development). Policies and programs aiming at enhancing the The inclusion of the principle of democracy in benefits and reducing the costs of migration and the discussion on migration-development nexus is also crucial. According to this principle, the 3 For instance many small scale and informal entre- discussion leading to the elaboration of migra- preneurial activities exist which are created and/or tion policies and programs should include all the supported by migrants. For an in depth account of stakeholders through duly recognized represen- such an activity by (permanent) migrants, see Maas (2005). tatives.

24 The Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

No political exercise can neglect the central- (ISMU Foundation) in Italy and the University of ity of the human being understood in his/her Valencia in Spain. individual and collective dimensions. The clear The MAPID project had two overall objectives: identification of the main beneficiaries of migra- (1) to advance the understanding of the migration and development policies and programs tion-development nexus among migrant associa- reaffirms the inviolability of human rights beside tions and in Philippine institutions as a key factor visas and passports. The defence and promotion contributing to national and local development: of human dignity cannot be jeopardized by eco- and (2) to promote cooperation between migrant nomic or security concerns. associations and national and local institutions in Strategically speaking, the reflection on the the Philippines. Through the action 44 migrants’ migration-development nexus should always associations and 60 Philippine institutions consider the bottom-up approach, since a lot has (national agencies and local government units) already been done at the grassroots level and acquired knowledge of the development poten- migrants and migrant associations have been tial of migration, examples of good practices and learning from their own experience. Their inclu- models of cooperation. More migrants’ associa- sion in the debate may result highly beneficial. tions and Philippine institutions (but also other Then, when translating reflection into practice, stakeholders) were reached through MAPID spirit and trust should be always connected to research, training and dissemination activities achieve a sustainable and effective empow- undertaken between 2008 and 2010 such as free erment. The trust is to be built among all the distribution of reports and training materials in stakeholders of the migration and development the three countries, and the availability online exercise with no ground for competition and no of various materials. All in all 87 migrant lead- dependence from governments. ers participated in the MAPID training programs in Italy and Spain and acquired skills to serve as Tracing the Origins of TRANSCODE focal points/advocates/mediators between their Based on the conviction that migration has members and Philippine institutions. Further- development potentials beyond remittances, more 116 Filipino policy-makers, development in 2007, the Scalabrini Migration Center (SMC) and migration officers attended the training pro- decided to develop a project proposal for sub- grams in the Philippines and thereby acquired mission to the European Union. The proposal a better understanding of the migration-devel- was tendered as a response to the 2007 call of opment nexus, particularly the transnational the Aeneas Programme, which focused on finan- dimensions of development. Finally, MAPID also cial and technical assistance to third countries in had the effect of creating or fostering the - link the field of migration and asylum. In November ages between Filipino migrant associations in 2007, the project proposal was approved and in Italy and Spain and Philippines based institutions December 2007 SMC started implementing the (Baggio 2010). project titled “Migrants’ Associations and Philip- The final assessment of the activities- under pine Institutions for Development” (MAPID). The taken within the MAPID project led the imple- project aimed at building and strengthening the menters to highlight some lessons learnt. In partnership between government institutions in the first place, the success of the measures and the Philippines and migrant communities, par- actions for development in the countries of ori- ticularly through migrants’ associations, in Italy gin cannot be a priori defined, since it depends and Spain. Being a three-country project, SMC to a large extent on the ‘quality’ of a territory, decided to partner with the Commission on Fili- i.e. those characteristics that render it more or pinos Overseas in the Philippines, the Founda- less receptive to the contribution of migrants. tion for Initiatives and Studies on Multi-ethnicity This does not only mean material and infrastruc-

25 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Lothar Smith, Fabio Baggio and Ton van Naerssen

tural features but also other factors such as the guages, can give great impetus to commercial rootedness of democracy, the presence of an flow, investments and the creation of businesses, enlightened ruling class to lead incentives, and the transfer of new technologies, the circulation the vitality of civil society as a way of enabling of expertise and other forms of cross-cultural stratification for individual mobility. All these fertilisation. were of strategic importance for determining the Lastly, the success of the process of adapta- impact of initiatives promoted by migrants and tion to the host society, including the crowning helped to recognize and overcome certain unfa- achievement of naturalisation, is not enough to vourable contexts and institutional hurdles to ini- erode the attachment of migrants to their coun- tiatives taken. Thus it emerged that the involve- try of origin, but rather turns them into stra- ment of local authorities but also locally based tegic actors of its modernisation. Increasingly, civil society organisations in countries of origin is this is acknowledged by national governments of strategic importance for readying those local that are setting up special ministries or - depart contexts to become true receptacles and co- ments to deal with their compatriots, former investors for investment projects of migrants. citizens and second-generation emigrants. The Secondly, the impact of return migration can- transnational identities and the development not be interpreted merely through economic potential of migrants and their associations have measures, as this would underestimate the con- also attracted the attention of researchers (van tribution that migrants and former migrants can Naerssen 2008; Smith and van Naerssen 2009; make to the perspective of a development in the Agunias and Newland 2012) and international wider sense. Particularly attention to the cultural organisations (Sharma et al. 2011; IOM 2013). impact of migration and return migration is of importance. In this context it can be seen how Defining the Key Objectives and Principles of significant the MAPID project was, and notably TRANSCODE its training initiative aimed at empowerment as The TRANSCODE programme expressly built on a keystone to engaging local actors in actions of the foundations laid out with the MAPID pro- transnational development. gramme, seeking to extent its activities to other Thirdly, although traditionally the idea of countries and migrant populations. One of its migrants as agents of development of their coun- key objectives is to provide a platform to enable tries of origin above all focuses on those classi- the creative and structural engagement of vari- fied as temporary migrants with clear intentions ous actors, understanding these as stakeholders to return home, attention through MAPID efforts with certain common, but also with divergent has also shifted to other actors engaged with interests as related to their basic approach, scale migration. This provides for a more complete, and location of implementation, their resources albeit also more complex, picture of all kinds and their operational timelines. TRANSCODE of actors, including diaspora members, perma- thus sought to bring together NGOs in migrant- nent expatriates, citizens who are clearly well sending countries with migrant organisations in integrated in their host countries and younger destination countries for migrants, commercial populations abroad, i.e. second and third gen- actors, local and national governments, tradi- eration migrants. In fact, when considering the tional authorities (ethnic leaders, religious insti- diaspora, their knowledge of things such as mar- tutes) sharing potentially similar interests. ket opportunities, the most appropriate distribu- The overall objective of this programme is to tion channels (including first hand information engage different stakeholders in realizing the t about customs and laws of countries involved potential of migration and development and to with their trading activities), but also their abil- provide a forum for transnational (North-South ity to communicate fluently in two or more lan- and South-South) exchanges of innovative ideas

26 The Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

for local development initiatives. This general organisations, for instance at the first event in objective translates to a focus on enhancing the The Philippines. level of engagement and collaboration between Obviously migrant organisations are only one transnational community organisations O (TC s) of various actors involved in TRANSCODE activi- and other migration and development actors. ties. Yet we give them special attention in this The latter include actors situated both in the article, as, by and large, they remain the prin- Global North and South such as migrant-related cipal actor to initiate activities in the field of NGOs and home-based organisations. Thereby it migration and development. Furthermore they was also expected that a certain set of best prac- also take up a particularly complex position, as tices with development projects would emerge they are involved with developments in their to then replicate elsewhere. Following onto this country of origin, thereby becoming enmeshed field of practise dimension the TRANSCODE pro- through social networks with local actors, whilst gramme then envisioned identifying areas of they are simultaneously also serving local inter- cooperation and thereby also designs for trans- ests in countries of residence, e.g. dealing with national projects, the so-called TRANSCODE spin- societal perspectives on integration. They are off projects, in order to also search for funding. thus directly responding as much to so-called Finally, the TRANSCODE programme sought to immigration processes as to prospects for being disseminate the results and outcomes as learn- part of the migration-development nexus. To ing tools for capacity building and shaping of understand the connections between these two, policies to promote the development potentials and their different settings, we prefer to use the of migration. term: transnational community organisations While the first connection with The Nether- (TCOs). This concept then helps to understand lands was more or less accidental, based mainly new kinds of transnational spatial configurations on personal relations between the initiators of taking shape through families, churches, commu- the MAPID programme and one Dutch researcher, nities, etc. TCOs then also include organisations the choice for SMS (Global Society Foundation) that might otherwise be classified as Diaspora, as as a partner was deliberate. As a service and migrant or refugee led, when these have a firm support organisation for migrant organisations embedding in a country of origin. in The Netherlands, SMS had an extensive net- TRANSCODE is thus an effort to explore the work linking the TRANSCODE initiative to - pro role of TCOs to further the discussion and under- grammes of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs standing of the migration-development nexus and various development funding agencies. SMS and, at the level of implementation, to learn from also cooperated closely with ten migrant organ- each other and co-operate in the programmes isations that formed the Dutch Consortium of and projects. In this, specific features are pro- Migrant Organisations (DCMO) platform. DCMO, moting the involvement of multiple stakeholders among others, included an umbrella organisation and fostering cooperation across transnational of Moluccan forced migrants and their descen- contexts. The multiple stakeholder approach dants. They brought in forty years of experi- gives recognition to the need for engagement ence with small-scale development projects in between civil society, governments and private East Indonesia. Another member organisation sector, i.e. for them to work together. To that of DCMO is the Joint Muslim Aid Organisation end the academics involved in this initiative also (SMHO). This is of Turkish Dutch origin and is made sure not to take the limelight in the dis- primarily engaged in educational and relief pro- cussion on the direction TRANSCODE and its vari- grammes in African countries. For these migrant ous activities should take. As the participants of organisations TRANSCODE offered a substan- the first workshop elected a steering committee tive opportunity to exchange insights with other mainly comprising academics (the authors of this

27 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Lothar Smith, Fabio Baggio and Ton van Naerssen

contribution included), this committee was care- tion and development issues in the Philippines ful that it limited its role to the continuity of the and the Netherlands: TCOs, local and national overall programme, staying well outside deci- government agencies, private companies, the sion-making over individual activities and the academe, and development organisations. Both direction which projects were taking. As we will workshops explored the possibilities for collab- discuss in the reflections part of this article, the orative engagements to tap the development endeavour to take a reflexive rather than defining potentials of the participating organisations. or stipulating role was at times hard to maintain Project ideas on collaborative and transna- not only because of the personal engagement tional projects were prepared by the participants, of the committee members with some activi- which were then presented at the workshop in ties, but because some of the other actors, and Soesterberg. The participants unanimously rec- notably the TCOs, readily sought their support ommended that the initiative be continued. To in formulating their proposals to secure funding this end the organizers proposed an expanded for their projects. Nonetheless, beyond the slight TRANSCODE, by opening up the initiative to concerns with the nature of the steering com- participants from a new set of origin and des- mittee, given its original representation, overall tination countries: Ghana and Italy. Ghana was TRANSCODE has always seen as a real ‘bottom up’ chosen because: (1) it is an African country with endeavour and has been able to sustain a strong an emerging migration infrastructure; (2) it has interest the TCO, but also from grassroots organ- a sizable Diaspora in Europe; and (3) there are isations and local government representatives. existing links between academics based at the Radboud University and academic institutes in TRANSCODE Programme of Activities Ghana, The Centre of Migration Studies most In conjunction with the above objectives the particularly. The choice of Italy was also based on TRANSCODE programme of activities was then several considerations: (1) the existence of vari- divided into the following: ous TCOs in Italy, itself an emerging global south • Interface meetings through workshops, derived migrant destination; (2) the clear partici- conference, reflection sessions and field pation of (local) government(s) in migration and trips – face-to-face meetings to enhance development projects; and (3) the strong links maximum linking and learning and forging of between the Scalabrini Migration Center (SMC) partnerships; in The Philippines with the Italy-based institu- • TRANSCODE spin off projects: Transnational tion Scalabrini International Migration Institute multi-stakeholders projects enhancing (SIMI) facilitating research related activities. the positive contribution of migration in In 2011, soon after the first two workshops development, and, had been held, the Global Society Foundation, • Research: publications and documentation to as one of the initiators of the TRANSCODE pro- disseminate information for capacity building, gramme, had to close its doors because of finan- share learning processes to ensure the cial issues. This did not impact the initiative too sustainability of results. much since the Steering Committee (SC) continued. To ensure that its role would not be too International workshops coercive and/or influential an Advisory Board Returning to the chronology of events. In TRANS- was also set up. The members of this board came CODE 1 (2010), two workshops were held, one in from the full range of actors already involved Tagaytay City (Philippines) in June and the second with initiatives under the TRANSCODE flag. Later in Soesterberg (The Netherlands) in October. The on the Steering Committee changed its name in workshops brought together participants repre- TRANSCODE Programme Board (TPB) and, more senting different stakeholders involved in migra- significantly, also revised its composition to bet-

28 The Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

ter reflect the multi-stakeholder representation ment aid, poverty alleviation, communal owner- that is so strongly envisioned in TRANSCODE. ship) to this sector. Sustained effort at engaging Two TRANSCODE workshops were held in openly with various sectors should be seen as an 2012: the first took place in Elmina (January) with important objective for the principal actors of a the second workshop organized in Rome (April). certain project. With the assistance of RECOGIN, an umbrella Cross Transnational engagement: For TRANS- organisation of Ghanaian diaspora organisations CODE the inclusion of a transnational dimension based in Amsterdam, and the TRANSCODE secre- in the design of proposals needed to be more tariat, the Centre for Migration Studies (Ghana) thought through than the typical bilateral ties organized the first 2012 workshop. The selection of a certain TCO, linking a country of origin with of participants responded to the multi-stake- a country of receipt of migrants. Instead the holder criterion and practically all the key sec- expertise of similarly minded otherO TC s and tors were represented. All the attendees showed their partners should be sought where possible, clear knowledge and interest in the main top- also to take heed from the lessons learned there. ics related to the migration and development Additionally the attention to such linkages could nexus, with an enriching variety of approaches also help to fortify South-South relationships, for towards these. Particularly noteworthy was the instance through further engagement between presence of representatives of the Ghanaian and local governments involved. Philippine governments for the entire duration Bi-directionality: The project should have a of the workshop. The second workshop in Rome, positive impact on both the Northern and South- Italy, was organized by SIMI. The selection of ern partners involved. In essence this point calls participants again responded well to the multi- for a discerning perspective on power relation- stakeholder criterion. However, unfortunately, ships and the need to understand and essen- and this despite reiterated efforts, the organizers tially minimize unequal investments in projects were not able to secure representatives from the between partners, especially between the global private sector. At the same time representatives North and South, to avoid different levels of of the Ghanaian, Philippine and Italian (national involvement and associated sense of ownership and local) governments attended the introduc- (and thus sustained commitment) to projects ini- tory section providing clear messages of commit- tiated. ment. Expected development impact (beneficiaries): The sustainability of projects is a criterion quite TRANSCODE Spin off Projects common with all development cooperation ori- In TRANSCODE meetings held in Elmina (January ented projects, and under TRANSCODE it is seen 2012) and Rome (May 2012) the criteria for proj- as being important and legitimate too, notably in ects were set out and discussed with participants. relationship to the prior three more specific cri- For all TRANSCODE projects three specific and teria. This fourth criterion would then also help one overall criteria was discerned: to more easily satisfy potential donors. Thus it Multi-stakeholder approach: Projects were was recommended to the authors of project pro- expected to pay much attention to the role of posals that they would give special attention to different stakeholders in their design and imple- questions such as: What are the problems that mentation. For one the workshops revealed that need to be solved? What are the indicators for local governments could play a key role. Also the the expected development impact? To this end involvement of the private sector needed critical a logical framework was considered to be an appraisal, for instance in choosing certain ter- important integral component of all proposals. minology in proposals that would appeal more The transnational development projects are (e.g. return to investment) or less (e.g. develop- conceptually complete but, at this moment, still

29 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Lothar Smith, Fabio Baggio and Ton van Naerssen

Figure 1: Illustration of communication exchanges during the project proposal phase of the Burundian Women’s Post-Conflict Resilience Projec

under review with regard to funding. In two cases prime example of how transnational exchanges this might be explained by their scale and ambi- can lead to new inspiration and ideas. During the tion. Thus the project “Transnational Partnership first TRANSCODE workshop in Tagaytay, BWPD in Return Migration and Human Development” had the opportunity to visit DAWN offices and aims to encourage Ghanaian migrants in the witness its so-called healing and empowerment Netherlands to invest in food security in Ghana programme for traumatized female migrants and to establish small farmers cooperatives in returning from Japan. The BWPD programme will three districts. The major partners are RECOGIN include hands-on training in sewing and weaving from the Netherlands and ADRA, a relief organ- in its BWPD Peace and Reconciliation Centre in isation in Ghana. Kirundo. This provides women, many widows, The second project concerns the “Burundian who have survived the civil war and are returning Women’s Post-Conflict Resilience Project”. Its from refugee camps in neighbouring countries to principal objective is to build and enhance the the region of Kirundo with an activity that is both livelihood capacity of 120,000 Burundian women therapeutic and income generating. Thus these and men in the province of Kirundo, Burundi. traumatized women can regain their self-esteem, One if its activities is income-generating sewing gain social footing in the region and manage to and weaving programmes. To ensure that this is make a living. set up properly the Netherlands based Burun- The name of the “Pasali Farm Machinery Pool” dian Women for Peace and Development (BWPD) speaks for itself. The project is relatively small will cooperate with the Philippine based return scale with the total budget required anticipated migrants NGO Development Action Women Net- to remain below 100,000 Euro. PASALI is a Philip- work (DAWN), drawing on their methodology pine migrant organisation with branches in the and many years of implementation experience Netherlands and the Philippines (Mindanao). even if provided in a different. This project is a Unfortunately, partnership with another non-

30 The Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Philippine organisation, which had seemed quite ticularly in the more processional phases. The keen to fund this project as the endeavour fitted effect of this is twofold: First, whilst the role well with its own ideology, failed. Now alterna- of non-academic actors is, without any real tive funding is being sought. exception, perceived as enduring and engaged throughout project design and implementation, TRANSCODE as a Process that of the academics is less clear. Second, while Besides initiating and supporting the above- the academics certainly readily contributed their mentioned spin off project proposals, the TRANS- insights in discussions of the projects of others CODE programme also produced a platform to doing so in a form that might almost be consid- ensure more continual engagement and collabo- ered ‘action-research’ (and we also speak from ration between TCOs and other stakeholders in personal experience here). On the other hand the field of migration-development in various they also maintained a certain distance towards sending and home countries. To that end it may project initiatives started under the TRANSCODE be noted that all kinds of spontaneous bilateral flag, notably at the stage of project proposal exchanges have arisen between actors who have design. This points to a preference to keep cer- come to know each other through TRANSCODE tain objectivity, and thus also distance, to these initiatives, of which we have only learned of projects, with the argument that this was key for some, also contingent to the stage of develop- generating ownership. At the same time- how ment of ideas that they are in. Examples are a ever the question arises whether they are not spin-off from the 2010 workshops in which a also one actor amongst the various involved, and Philippines based local government contacted that an exceptional role would thus be a misfit. the migrant NGO Athika to start a migrant house To date no consensus has been reached on this. in the municipality; the initiative of Applied Uni- Moreover, none of the actors could be involved versity Rotterdam’s Department of Water Engi- in initiatives on a full time basis. In practice, this neering sending interns to the municipality of led to the situation that the knowledge institu- Infanta, The Philippines to support local water- tions are not so only facilitative or supportive to related developments there; and DCMO, which the project proposals but became also involved has started several initiatives based on core in project formulation and lobbying. This has cer- TRANSCODE principles. tainly also to do with capacities and capabilities Whilst the above list of activities might seem of project proponents. From the TRANSCODE to suggest remarkable progress, which in many workshop held in Rome (2012) it emerged that ways would be a justified conclusion, it is impor- there are clear coaching needs for the groups tant to also dwell on a number of critical points, involved with the projects. This relates to project notably also as lessons learnt from which other formulation, and how the proposal can comply programmes might also profit. To start, the with needs of funders. programme did not manage to equally involve Most participants do have experiences with all envisaged actors in its programme and vari- local kinds of projects and their implementation. ous projects. In particular the private sector That was also the reason why they were invited remained weakly represented, which may be to participate in the programme in the first place. attributable not so much to the nature of activi- Our premise thereby rests on the achievement ties pursued, but rather to the way they had a of sustained transnational levels of engagement, strong developmental character, as opposed to notably between migrants and counterparts in having a more outright entrepreneurial sense. their country of origin, but also in partnership Where the commercial sector was then some- with other related local partners both abroad what under involved, the knowledge institutions and in the countries of origin. This adheres well by contrast appear a little overrepresented, par- to the argument of Faist (2000: 191) argues

31 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Lothar Smith, Fabio Baggio and Ton van Naerssen

that when studying ‘transnational social spaces’ as in just about every family, there may always researchers must be careful not to conceive of be some conflict at certain times. This was also these spaces as ‘static notions of ties and posi- the case here, as an internal conflict between tions’ but rather as ‘dynamic social processes’. In Dutch participants was also taken into the dis- his view: cussion space of one of the workshops. This not only caused certain delay but also produced Cultural, political and economic processes in transnational social spaces involve the accumulation, some confusion with other participants about use and effects of various sorts of capital, their the reasons for bringing this up at that occa- volume and convertibility: economic capital, hu- sion, also because the underlying issues were man capital, such as educational credentials, skills not clear. The value of that moment of crisis was and know-how, and social capital, mainly resources that it showed up two things: First, it highlighted inherent in or transmitted through social and symbolic ties. the role of power and hierarchy, which a hori- zontal, bottom-up platform approach like that This kind of conceptualization of interventions of TRANSCODE did not automatically resolve. as a principle also held in TRANSCODE initiatives, Second, and related to the first point, funding does call for quite comprehensive, multi-sited opportunities for projects play out an element of (countries) approaches, sometimes through competition between actors, notably between various concomitant interventions, which not TCOs, for as long as this funding is not primarily all actors may feel sufficiently well equipped for. own resources, when there are clear limitations This relates to financial means and other forms in the funds available from external donors, such of investments, but also to their human capital, as supporting governments of countries of des- a required level of expertise, for instance in writ- tination. ing proposals in a manner relevant for funding TRANSCODE has a clear endeavour to achieve agencies or at least the way they perceive it. To transnational modes of collaboration -involv try and solve this apparent issue close friends ing various actors (stakeholders) in activities were approached, and many of these were the that are mainly based in the South. Usually the academics involved in TRANSCODE. Whilst their approach taken is one of collectives, of mutual conceptual knowledge does not stand to ques- and consensual approaches between various tion here, the point is that such insights may actors. What needs to be recognized in this is the not be the most required ingredient for these fact that some activities were also considered as proposals. As was also stated earlier, the mat- enabling for migrants, namely to allow them to ter of trust with the academics involved in the become involved in activities that would actually programme in steering further proposal develop- facilitate a financially sustainable return to their ments seems to prevail in the choice to call on countries of origin. them for assistance first. Needless to say this led Another matter that came out of the Rome to certain delays as these academics were then workshop, was the question of representation, required to play intermediary or catalytic roles notably from the angle of generations. At the vis-à-vis others to provide more relevant, direct Rome event a few second- generation migrants technical assistance. had been invited to join the occasion. Whilst Every organisation that took part in one of overall they enjoyed the occasion, and felt they the TRANSCODE workshops is considered to be had learned a lot, they also stated how as a gen- member of the ‘TRANSCODE family’. The term eration they felt somewhat underrepresented, family, like thinking ‘Transcodely’, or in the spirit and also a little subdued in the presence of senior of Transcode, is important, as it denotes a sense members of their migrant organisations. Further- of long-lasting commitment and a mutual com- more, and perhaps more significantly, they also mitment to meeting a shared set of needs. And, felt that the proposed projects were a bit “old-

32 The Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

fashioned” and traditional in approach, focusing in the field of education and health. Consider- on rural communities, on agriculture, and gen- ing the needs and requests from the communi- erally not bringing in new technologies, virtual ties of origin and more in general the immense spaces and such. This point is being addressed problems remaining in many migrant sending with a particular project that is initiated by the countries, TCOs feel the pressure to broaden second generation. their programmes and upscale their develop- Last but not least, funding of the workshops ment efforts. In this respect, TRANSCODE can and proposed projects is a continual challenge, be instrumental in bringing TCOs in contact with particularly since the European economic reces- each other and with other developmental actors sion is felt in both Italy and the Netherlands. In in order to achieve this endeavour without the latter, the government budget for develop- thereby overextending themselves. In that vein ment cooperation has seen major cuts, which the TRANSCODE programme has already proved has also heavily affected the development to be quite valuable. organisations involved with, and supportive of, A multi-stakeholder approach is complicated the TRANSCODE programme. To this we can add and time consuming, certainly in the defining that one of the principal challenges remaining at stages, however we anticipate that there will be this moment concerns the friction between the a positive return to investment in the course of conceptual approach of TRANSCODE, which is time, defined more precisely through the imple- essentially transnational, multi-scalar and multi- mentation of various TRANSCODE projects, but stakeholder, thereby embodying through activi- also by achievement of a sustained and active ties it generates not only bilateral North-South community of Transcodians, that embodies rep- (N-S) engagements but also the possibility of S-S, resentatives for various actors who are willing N-S-S, configurations, etc., versus the geo-polit- to exchange and share ideas and perspectives, ical context it is part of. Whilst the workshops because they understand the added value of this of TRANSCODE have clearly shown up the legiti- for all involved. Indeed, from personal interviews macy and value of such variations in approaches, held with various participants at workshops it development-funding organisations seem still emerged that participants were struck by the to primarily be organized along the lines of amount of information and debates they could nation-states, and then in N-S constitutions, or pick up through the TRANSCODE events. They in regional formations (for example sub-Sahara particularly noted the value of some similarities Africa, Southeast Asia) in their consideration of in the way transnational developments were the merits of projects proposed to them. achieved at local levels in various countries of the global south. Given the value of such exchanges Discussion: Lessons Learned it is also important to give more emphasis to the When considering what lessons we have learned importance of institutional changes taking place from the TRANSCODE initiative, we need to over time. immediately ask: lessons for, and by whom? As for the balance between the several actors For TRANSCODE this is an important and critical in a multi-stakeholder approach, a case to the observation, given the fact that we do not give point is provided with the process that has been precedence to one or the other actor in goals to taking place within TRANSCODE in the relation- achieve. At the same time, as also argued earlier, ship between its Programme Board and the the involvement of TCOs is crucial in the overall Advisory Board. Where the TPB was envisaged programme as they are the principal bearers of as guiding team for the setup of various com- migration and development programmes. Many ponents under TRANSCODE, with input in those of these organisations have already gained expe- components limited to an overall role, the mem- rience in small-scale development projects, e.g. bers of the Advisory Board took a more critical

33 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Lothar Smith, Fabio Baggio and Ton van Naerssen

perspective, asking why the Steering Committee ———. forthcoming. “Reflections on EU Border seemed to only comprise academics, asking how Policies. Human Mobility and Borders: Ethical this then reflected the overall multi-stakeholder Perspectives”. In: M. van der Velde and T. van approach of TRANSCODE. Beyond the question Naerssen, eds., Crossing Borders? A Threshold Approach to Mobility and Migration. Aldershot: of practicalities, which would favour a small core Ashgate. steering team with few direct own interests, this Brah, A. 1996. Cartographies of diaspora: contest- question is, of course, legitimate. ing identities. London: Routledge. In 2015 TRANSCODE will be formulating its Castles, S. 2007. “Comparing the Experience of second Five Year Plan. While maintaining the Five Major Emigration Countries”. (International essential principles of a multi-stakeholder, trans- Migration Institute Working Paper 7). Oxford: national approach, more attention will need to University of Oxford. be given to the mechanics of multilateral coop- Delgado Wise, R. and L. E. Guarnizo. 2007. eration. Furthermore we want to give specific “Migration and Development: Lessons from the Migration Policy Institute attention to original, out-of-box activities that Mexican Experience”. Online Journal. February 1, 2007 Feature. Web- are not already enmeshed in policy orientations. site: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/ Among such initiatives, a capacity building pro- migration-and-development-lessons-mexican- cess through educational E-learning programmes, experience (Accessed June 2014) but also the start of a TRANSCODE youth pro- de Haas, H. 2005. “International migration, re- gramme, are some of our priorities. mittances and development: Myths and facts”. Temporal dynamics in the field of migration Third World Quarterly 26(8): 1269-1284.

and development also relate, logically, to actual ———. 2008. “Migration and Development. A The- levels of mobility, a relation that from a policy oretical Perspective”. (International Migration perspective remains uneasy at best, especially Institute Working Paper 9). Oxford: University of Oxford. in the migrant receiving countries. In conceiv- Faist, T. 2000. “Transnationalization in internation- ing development prospects as enabled through al migration: Implications for the study of citi- investments that come forth out of migration, zenship and culture”. Ethnic and Racial Studies we consider human mobility as a core value. This 23(2): 189-222. needs to then also reflect the long-term engage- García Zamora, R. 2009. Desarrollo económico ment through various activities of TRANSCODE. y migración internacional: los desafíos de las políticas públicas en México. Zacatecas: Colec- ción Ángel Migrante. Giménez Romero, C. Et alia. 2006. El codesarrollo en España. Protagonistas, discursos y expe- References riencias. Madrid: Los libros dela Catarata. Agunias, D.R. and K. Newland, eds. 2012. De- Goldring, L. 2004. “Family and collective remit- veloping A Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in tances to Mexico: a multi-dimensional typology”. Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Development and Change 35 (4): 799-840. Practitioners in Home and Host Countries. Gene- International Organisation for Migra- va: International Organisation for Migration. tion (IOM). 2013. “Diasporas and Develop- Asis, M. M. B. and F. Baggio, ed. 2008. Moving ment: Bridging Societies and States” (Interna- Out, Back and Up: International Migration and tional Dialogue on Migration 22), Geneva: IOM. Development Prospects in the Philippines. Que- Lampert, B. 2012. “Diaspora and development? zon City: Scalabrini Migration Center. London-based Nigerian organisations and the Baggio F., ed. 2010. Brick by Brick: Building Co- transnational politics of socio-economic status operation between the Philippines and Overseas and gender”. Development Policy Review 30(2): Filipinos in Italy and Spain. Quezon City: Scalabri- 149-167. ni Migration Center.

34 The Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Levitt, P. 1998. “Social remittances: migration and Simultaneous Inclusion”. African Diaspora driven local-level forms of cultural diffusion”. 4(1): 97-113. International Migration Review 32 (4): 926- Sharma, K., A. Kashyap, M.F. Montes and P. 948. Ladd. 2011. Realizing the Development Poten- Levitt, P. and D. Lamba-Nieves. 2011. “Social tial of Diaspora. New York: United Nations Uni- remittances revisited”. Journal of Ethnic and Mi- versity Office. gration Studies 37(1):1-22. Smith, L. and T. van Naerssen 2009. “Migrants: Maas, M. 2005. “Transnational Entrepreneurship: Suitable Brokers of Development in Africa?” De- Exploring Determinants and Impacts of a Dutch- vISSues 11 (2): 19-21. based Filipino Immigrant Business”. Asian and van Naerssen, T. 2008. “We are Bridging Cultures Pacific Migration Journal 14 (1-2): 169-91. and Countries”. In: T. van Naerssen, E. Spaan and Márquez-Covarrubias, H. 2010. “Responsabi- A. Zoomers, eds., Global Migration and Develop- lizar a los migrantes del desarrollo: lecciones del ment, 172-92. London: Routledge. laboratorio social zacatecano”. Sociedad y Terri- van Naerssen, T. (forthcoming) “Exploring Gen- torio X (32): 99-141. der and Remittances”. In: T. van Naerssen, L. Mazzucato, V. and M. Kabki, 2009. “Small is Smith, T. Davids and M. Marchand, eds., Women, beautiful: the micro-politics of transnational Gender, Remittances and Development. Alder- relationships between Ghanaian hometown as- shot: Ashgate. sociations and communities back home”. Global van Naerssen, T., E. Spaan and A. Zoomers, Networks 9 (2): 227-51. eds., 2008. Global Migration and Development. Mohan, G. 2002. “Diaspora and development”. In: London: Routledge. J. Robinson, ed., Development and displacement, Wimmer, A. and N. Glick Schiller. 2002. 77-140. Oxford: Oxford University Press. “Methodological nationalism and beyond: na- Riccio, B. 2011. “Rehearsing Transnational Citizen- tion-state building, migration and the social sci- ship: Senegalese Associations, Co-development ences”. Global networks 2(4): 301-334.

35 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Lothar Smith, Fabio Baggio and Ton van Naerssen

Note on the Authors

Lothar Smith is assistant professor at the Department of Human Geography of the Radboud University Nijmegen, the Netherlands and researcher with the Nijmegen Centre for Borders Research. Recent publications: Among others he has co-editedGender, Remittances and Development in the Global South (forthcoming 2015, Ashgate; Aspirations to go: Understanding the bounded rationality of prospective migrants from Ghana (forthcoming 2015), in van der Velde & van Naerssen (eds.) Crossing Borders? A Threshold Approach to Mobility and Migration; Transnational business investments in Accra: A discontinuity of economic and social affiliations? (2011), in Faist et al. (eds.) The Development-Migration- Nexus: A Transnational Perspective on Changing Paradigms and Organizations). He also serves on the editorial board of the African Human Mobility Review (AHMR).

Fabio Baggio is a missionary of the Scalabrinian Congregation (Missionaries of San Charles Borromeo) since 1991. He holds a Ph.D. in History from the Pontifical Gregorian University (Rome). Fabio worked as researcher in the Center for Latin-American Migration Studies (CEMLA), in Buenos Aires, from 1998 to 2002. He was Director of the Scalabrini Migration Center (Quezon City, Philippines) and editor of the Asian and Pacific Migration Journal (APMJ) from 2002 to 2010. At present he is the director of the Scalabrini International Migration Institute (Rome, Italy), a master and Ph.D. program within the Pontifical Urbanian University (Rome). Fabio is also invited Professor at the Universidad de Valencia (Spain) and Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas (Mexico).

Ton van Naerssen is retired associate professor in development geography, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands and currently freelance researcher and consultant for migration and development issues with Avanna Consultancies. Recent publications: Among others, he has co-edited Asian migrants and European labour markets (London: Routledge 2005) and Global Migration and Development (2008, Routledge); Gender, Remittances and Development in the Global South (Ashgate, forthcoming 2015); and Crossing Borders? A Threshold Approach to Mobility and Migration (Ashgate, forthcoming 2015)

36 Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development: Implications for Discussions on Transnationalism1

by Joan Lacomba (Universidad de Valencia) and Alexis Cloquell (Universidad Católica de Valencia )

Abstract The extent to which migrants participate in development projects has gained increasing prominence in the field of migration studies. In keeping with the interest of national and international institutions which promote the involvement of migrants in the development of their home countries, social research has begun to question how this phenomenon has grown (on the migrant or transnational civil society level), the nature of the organisations that drive such actions (transnational organisations) and the implications on the latter (transnational development). Many studies have seen migrant organisations asnew actors in the transnational field; when not seen as emerging players, they are perceived as figures that can shape the transnational field. In order to assess the impact of migrant associations in debates of transnationalism, this article investigates the characteristics of migrant organizations located in Spain, as well as their practices aimed at development in the countries of origin. Keywords: migrants, associations, development, countries of origin, transnationalism

Introduction1 Since the late 1990s, coinciding with the States as unexplored territory with significant potential. and international organisations’ renewed This new political approach coincided with the emphasis on the positive role of migration in rise of the transnational perspective in academia, relation to development, migrants have been in which the idea that the new fields created by the subject of particular attention: First, their migration and discussed across boundary lines role as individuals sending remittances, and later, brought about a shift in thinking about social the role of their organisations and function as a relations. These ideas and discussions contribute collective. By recognizing the capacity for these to a deterritorialised framework. In conjunction individuals and organisations to solve social with discussions on transnationalism, the study problems in civil society – once the state and of migrant organisations has helped to expose market acknowledged their own weaknesses one of the factors that serves as a basis for the and limitations – migrant activity has been seen very transnational paradigm. The consolidation of transnationalism as a new approach to the 1 The article is based on the research project (I+D+I) study of migration – and this is perhaps one of its “Diasporas and co-development from Spain: The role main merits – has allowed one to see migrants of immigrant associations on the development of as agents. However, migrant agency continues their countries of origin”, funded by the Ministry of Science and Innovation (CSO2011-22686). to face many obstacles, including those imposed

New Diversities Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Joan Lacomba and Alexis Cloquell

by States in terms of international mobility and Discussions Concerning the Role of Migrant the difficulties faced by the migrants to achieve Organisations in a Transnational Context positive integration within new borders, as Roger The volume of studies on transnational migrant Waldinger has emphasised in various works organisations and their role in the home coun- (Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Waldinger try development has expanded considerably 2010). In this context, critically considering the in recent years. Facilitated by initiatives taken role of migrants as transnational agents of devel- by organisations such as the Global Forum opment is especially relevant, because, its organ- on Migration and Development, and by the isational weakness often contrasts with the role renewed interest shown by various national and attributed to them, both in host countries as in international organisations, studies on migrant the countries of origin. This is true especially by associations have acquired relative momentum. states that have reduced public contributions They have, in most cases, been primarily linked to international or national development, then to remittances and their impact on develop- transferring this responsibility to the migrants ment. In 2006, the International Organisation themselves. for Migration published a report on political Considering all these factors, this article aims, agendas of development called the Migration firstly, to shed light on the differences between Incorporation (Incorporación de la migración various national migrant groups, starting with en las agendas de políticas de desarrollo). This their organisational characteristics, available report warned that, even though cooperation resources and fields of activity, going beyond the with Diasporas had become a topic of general tendency to portray migrants as a homogeneous interest, there had not been any research on body in their behaviours. Secondly, the key ques- the subject in Europe at that time. This is, the tion we ask is to what extent migrant associa- report indicated, something indispensible when tions, who participate in development projects in promoting the participation of migrant commu- their home countries, can actually be considered nities2. Similarly, studies that focus on the form as transnational development organisations. taken by these organisations, and the logic that Employing a survey of 206 migrant associations lies behind their creation and maintenance over from eight countries (Algeria, Bulgaria, Colombia, time, continue to be scarce. In the same way, the Ecuador, Mali, Morocco, Romania and Senegal) most common pattern emerges in correspond- settled in Spain, we aim to illustrate the diverse ing case studies3, while studies of a comparative dynamics that different groups apply in the field of development and international solidarity. Our 2 However, we should mention previous studies, such as the OECD’s work entitled “The contribution main hypothesis is that not all national groups of migrants to the development of their country of are involved to the same extent or in the same origin” published by Libercier and Schneider in 1996. manner; we thus challenge the notion of gener- (In this investigation, a total of six migrant communi- alised transnationalism. From our point of view, ties were studied simultaneously: Cape Verdeans in the Netherlands, Haitians in Canada, Italians in Swit- transnational development led by migrant organ- zerland, Malians in France, Tunisians in Italy and Zair- isations not only responds to a minority of them ians in Belgium.) Similarly, we should refer to the work – as already noted by Waldinger (2010: 34) – but of Christophe Daum (Typologie des organisations de solidarité internationales issues de l’immigration, rather fits, to a greater extent, certain national 2000) and of Elodie Millet (La place des associations groups and organisations within them. These de migrants dans la solidarité internationale, 2005), groups have either been able to take advantage that detected the existence of more than a thousand of the opportunities created by the States of set- migrant associations in France, oriented towards international solidarity. tlement and origin, or have been able to utilise 3 The question of migrant participation in thede- community ties among those who migrated and velopment of their home communities has been those who remained back home. addressed by various authors with studies focused on several countries with a significant prevalence

38 Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

nature between different national backgrounds as “the set of processes by which immigrants are less frequent4. create and maintain multidimensional social The international literature reviewed in our relations which link societies of origin anddes- research has allowed us to identify a number of tination”. The three authors supplemented this criteria, which comprises part of the debate on definition by stating: “we label these processes migrant organisations and their participation in transnational, to emphasise that many immi- the development of their home countries. The grants today build social fields that cross geo- first of these concerns the transnational dimen- graphic, cultural and political borders” (Basch, sion of the migrants’ actions in the context of Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994: 7). In con- the discussion on the same transnational per- trast to methodological nationalism, the trans- spective. The second theme, closely related to national perspective made the growing bonds the previous one, revolves around the defini- connecting migrants and non-migrants visible, tion and conceptualisation of the organisations through transfers of money, goods, ideas, values, themselves. The third refers to the relationship and new behavioural patterns (including politi- between migrant organisations and other actors cal and organisational conduct). It thus became involved in the field of development (such as possible to speak of creating new transnational home and host countries and market and civil fields as a result of the convergence of all these society organisations concerned with develop- forces and their transformative potential. The ment). The fourth theme is related to the con- very participation of migrants in organised straints that migrant organisations face in terms development projects within their home coun- of resources and capabilities, in contrast to the tries was taken as an indicator of transnational high expectations associated with their role. behaviour. A good example of this is the study The anthropologists Basch, Glick Schiller and by Levitt (2001), which concerns organisations Szanton Blanc provoked a minor revolution in of Dominican migrants in the United States and the study of migration in 1994, with the publica- their impact on the society of origin. tion of the bookNations Unbound: Transnational In The Transnational Villagers, Levitt shows projects, postcolonial predicaments and deter- us how the action from outside the Dominican ritorialised Nation-state. Transnationalism has migrant organisations – properly classified as since been at the centre of numerous intense transnational organisations – provokes both theoretical and methodological debates. In its positive results and conflicts in the development initial formulation, transnationalism was defined of their home communities. These actions also affect the lives of those who did not emigrate, of international migration. For example, in El Salva- which is a trend that is pointed out in what Lev- dor (Landolt 2003), the Philippines (Asis 2010), Mali itt terms the transnational community develop- (Daum 1993; Gauvrit and Le Bahers 2004), Morocco ment. Subsequently, Levitt’s thesis that migrants (Daoud 1997; Lacroix 2005; Mernissi 1998), Maurita- nia (Yatera 1997), Mexico (Escala 2005; Lanly 2002; contribute in creating new transnational fields by Moctezuma 2005), Nigeria (Odaman 1990) and Sen- means of social remittances (the latter including egal (Quiminal 1991; Conde and Diagne 1986). political connections and migrant development 4 We placed a special emphasis on those works which display a comparative or general character, or projects), has been supported by several authors present compilations of studies realised within differ- (e.g. Goldring 2002), nuanced (e.g. Portes, ent countries, such as those by Portes, Escobar and Escobar and Walton 2006) or questioned (e.g. Walton (2006), Sørensen (2007), Merz, Chen and Geithner (2007) or Van Naersen, Spaan and Zoomers Waldinger 2013). (2008). The aforementioned papers highlight migra- Authors such as Goldring have delved deeper tion’s role in the development of societies of origin, into Levitt’s suppositions to reinforce the idea but they also accentuate the limitations and doubts that the actions of those referred to as “transmi- generated by the participation of migrants, both individual and collective, as transnational development grants”, through the various ways by which they agents.

39 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Joan Lacomba and Alexis Cloquell

connect with their home communities (remit- sation. In fact, in Portes’ work, an explicit defini- tances, political activism, social philanthropy), tion of transnational organisations of migrants facilitates the structuring of “transnational social that goes beyond considering them as collective fields”. Portes also largely accepts the existence organisations of immigrants that promote proj- of transnationalism – not only as an analytical ects in their home countries and communities, is perspective, but also as fact. He, however, con- not listed. However, in the subsequent analysis nects it with his thesis of compatibility through of the practices, both government initiatives and the assimilation of migrants into the host society. initiatives from civil society, such as foundations, According to Portes, the study of transnational non-governmental organisations, associations organisations of Colombian, Dominican and or clubs interchangeably, are included. In other Mexican immigrants in the United States allows studies, such as that of Roberts, Reanne, Lozano- one to see the existence of different patterns in Ascencio (1999), the term transnational migrant the forms of transnationalism that they adopted. communities is used, enabling the inclusion of These patterns are influenced by the respec- both organised activities that rely on coverage tive human capital and also by the increasingly at an institutional level as well as other more more active policies of both their home and host informal activities that can meet the challenge country’s governments (Portes, Escobar, Walton of accomplishing more or less concrete commit- 2006: 13). In contrast, other authors (Waldinger ments between those who left and those who and Fitzgerald 2004) are sceptical regarding stayed. Indeed, if we move to the other side of the scope of transnationalism and migrants’ the Atlantic, we find that in France, Daum (2000) ability to create transnational fields or influ- coined terms like “Organisations de Solidarité ence States in formulating new policies (Iskan- Internationale issues des Migrations” (OSIM) – der’s thesis regarding the cases of Mexico and translated as International Solidarity Organisa- Morocco). Waldinger (2013) posits that interna- tions emerging from Migration, and sometimes tional migration inevitably creates connections likened to Anglophone “Immigrant transnational and generates bonds between both sides of the organisations” – but in reality encompasses both border, but he believes it to be an exaggeration migrant associations and other organisations to speak of migrants’ actions as transnational. of solidarity that can incorporate a significant From Waldinger’s perspective, borders remain a number of immigrants, although they were not major constraint on migration and a clear limit necessarily created by the latter. This overview to the transnational nature of migration and the of conceptual dispersion is further complicated migrants themselves. This point is made with if we include other denominations that respond Fitzgerald’s (2004) proposal of limiting to the use to more local realities, such as the case of the of the term transnationalism. Home Town Associations (HTA) in the U.S. or los The second topic of debate concerns migrant clubes de oriundos in its Mexican version. organisations involved in projects in their home The discussion on the relations between the countries. Within this debate, the international different actors involved in the field of transna- literature shows various denominations and, on tional development is not an unresolved debate. occasion, refers to different distinct realities. For For some authors, this remains a problematic example, Portes, Escobar and Walton (2006) and issue; they see the emphasis on transnational Levitt (2001) use the term “transnational migrant migrant organisations as an attempt to relegate organisations” while Goldring (2002) speaks of the obligations of States. Faist (2005), in his “transmigrant organisations”, although they only article “Transnational space and development: share an indistinct notion of the term, which an exploration of the relationship between com- would include multiple bodies and initiatives munity, state and market”, agrees that the ideas with varying degrees of organisation and formali- relating to the role of communities in develop-

40 Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

ment and communities against other principles donations, collective investments and collective of social order, such as the market and the state, savings. Each type of activity has its respective merit our attention. However, he also asserts potentials, challenges and constraints (…) The that the great interest in the role of Diasporas potential of collective remittances should not and transnational migrant organisations, in many be overestimated as a panacea for employment ways, reflects conceptual changes in develop- generation and development. Migrants’ engagement. These same changes guide national and ment cannot be a substitute for state or private international institutions and NGOs in matters direct investment. Moreover, for governments of public policy (Faist 2005: 5). In this way, the trying to foster these collective activities, -inter relationship between migrant associations and action with migrant organisations can be difficult, NGOs is also questioned. Thus, the study con- and the transactions costs are high: the organ- ducted for the OECD by Libercier and Schneider isations are dispersed across recipient countries (1996) concluded that migrants’ contribution to and their activities are based on voluntary work, the development of their home communities is therefore reaching operational limits” (Schuttler not highly valued, which limits their participa- 2008: 27-29). So, compared to common positions tion to completing small local projects. They are, in major international organisations and devel- therefore, not recognised in their protagonist opment agencies, who often see migrant orga- role when it comes to designing and carrying out nizations as emerging players in international the cooperation projects in their communities development, one must call into question their of origin. The OECD highlights how the NGDOs actual ability to meet challenges of this magni- (Non-Governmental Development Organisa- tude, and the interests that operate behind such tions) themselves, as incontrovertible players for exaltation (Faist 2008). development cooperation, do not have an equal We are, in other words, far from reaching a relationship with migrant associations. Besides consensus on the proper transnational character a few exceptions, however, they only intervene of migrants’ associations and actions (on occa- in favour of these associations to provide them sion we highlight the confusion between the with intermediary service or to obtain financ- transnational nature of the organisations and the ing. However, the same study emphasises and transnational nature of their practices). We also has proven, how, compared to the international have not identified the role they could or should cooperation NGDOs, migrant associations have play in the development of their home societies. the advantage of knowledge of their home countries and a closer relationship with the local pop- Methodology of Study ulation; furthermore, the immigrants’ dual social The empirical evidence on which we base our belonging bestows upon them an important argument stems from a research project carried quality to act in a transnational environment. out in Spain over the last three years, entitledDia - Finally, the fourth area of discussion critically sporas and co-development from Spain: The role examines the potential of migrant organisations of immigrant associations in the development of in relation to the challenges of development. A their home countries. This project used second- study by Kirstin Schuttler (2008) delves further ary sources in the initial exploratory phase, fol- into this issue, in which she analyses the cases lowed by primary data collection, which utilized of Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines and Turkey. various quantitative techniques5. After showing what impact migrants’ collective remittances in these four countries have, she 5 The research also has a qualitative dimension that arrives to the conclusion that “migrant organisa- has developed into a second phase by interviewing fifty associations with programs in their home coun- tions contribute to income-generating activities tries and gathering information about their projects, in their countries of origin through collective but this information is not used in this text.

41 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Joan Lacomba and Alexis Cloquell

In order to develop a comprehensive map of On the other hand, the difficult access to the migrant associations established in Spain, and associations, due to their geographic -disper faced with the impossibility of preparing a record sion and the low response rate – which, from a that conforms fully to reality and does not over- methodological view point of view, are reflec- estimate the size of the migrant population, an tive of several studies that one way or the other inventory of associations was established. We have addressed migrant association movement did this by comparing the data with that of offi- over the last decade in Spain (Aparicio and Tor- cial records (The Ministry of Justice’s National nos 2010; Morell 2005; Martín 2004) or in - cer Register of Associations and the Regional Asso- tain Autonomous Communities (Cloquell 2012; ciations Records), as well as various directories in Albert, Moncusí and Lacomba 2011; Veredas order to complete and contrast some of the data 2003) – has forced us to come up with an alter- (Directory of immigrant entities in Spain, La Caixa native approach to the associations without an a Foundation and other directories specific to the priori calculation of the sample size. field of immigration and the third sector). Thus, The fieldwork was divided into several phases: when establishing the amount of migrant asso- First, we sent a letter of introduction and an invi- ciations (852 associations), all of those organ- tation to respond to a questionnaire on the Inter- isations which do not constitute an ethnic base net to all associations included in our study popu- (mixed associations with the presence of immi- lation who had access to this method of commu- grants, but where the majority are non-immi- nication (62.7% of the organisations). This letter, grant partners), which do not clearly correspond sent via email, presented the study and stressed to one of the national groups under study (there the importance of participation and the value of may be some immigrants from selected coun- the associations’ collaboration in order to high- tries, but also from other countries which are light their work. An access code was attached so outside the study) or those which group together they could complete the questionnaire via a web- several associations (federations and confedera- site set up for this purpose. This website also had tions) were dismissed. the ultimate goal of exhibiting the project and The primary data used in our analysis employs highlighting the actions of migrant associations8. a quantitative methodology, based on a statis- After realizing that many associations had prob- tical analysis of the results from a structured lems when answering the questionnaire through survey aimed at leaders and representatives of this system, we decided to send it electronically migrant associations6. The questionnaire con- via e-mail. Still, only 57 associations responded sisted of five thematic sections: 1) Details of through both procedures. It should also be noted the association; 2) The association’s activities in that 3.1% of the emails sent were returned due Spain; 3) The association’s activities in the coun- to incorrect email addresses. Secondly, consider- try of origin; 4) Activities in the country of origin ing the low response rate obtained, and with the with a direct relation to development; 5) Activi- aim of achieving a better representation of the ties in the country of origin defined specifically as associative map in Spain, we chose to administer co-development7. the survey by telephone. To do this, we called all of the associations that had not responded to the 6 The survey was carried out between November questionnaire through the above procedures and 2012 and February 2013. 7 In the questionnaire, we referenced the activities also appeared in the registers consulted for this in the country of origin, such as home-country devel- method of contact (78.7% of all organisations).9 opment, as well as the activities in the home countries as those defined specifically as co-development. This to identify how the term co-development is utilized in distinction allows us to work separately with: Firstly, said actions. home-country and global actions; Secondly, with ac- 8 http://www.diasporasycodesarrollo.org tions directed in a more determined way towards lo- 9 In 164 cases the available number does not match cal development with a transnational focus; Thirdly, that of the association or had stopped working.

42 Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Through phone interviews, we Table 1: Size and number of associations by country obtained responses of 153 other Country Number of Number of Percentage of associations. However, we faced associations interviewed interviewed certain drawbacks, such as the associations associations association’s legal representa- Algeria 36 7 19,4 tive or president’s unavailabil- Bulgaria 57 18 31,6 ity to respond to the survey, as Colombia 124 26 21,0 well as recent policy changes in Ecuador 223 55 24,7 the organizations, which subse- Mali 29 16 55,2 quently led to a lack of organizational knowledge as to how Marocco 95 34 35,8 to answer some of the required Romania 177 23 13,0 information. The most chal- Senegal 111 27 24,3 lenging aspect, though, was the TOTAL 852 206 24,2 migrant organizations’ distrust Source: Author, developed on the basis of research findings. and discouragement to participate in these kinds of studies, due to the satura- cal weights and their evolution (Figure 1), and in tion of research centred on migrant associations terms of their arrival dates, skill levels and social and general lack of return feedback on the infor- and economic insertion in context of their recep- mation they provided. All of these issues acted as tion in Spain and associative participation11. major barriers for our research. First, according to the results of the survey, it Despite the aforementioned difficulties, 206 is noteworthy that the organisations involved in out of 852 migrant associations were surveyed, different activities in the country of origin12 rep- although the differences in response rates were resent more than half of the 206 associations significant between the various national groups that are part of the study (115, or 56% of the and according to the total number of associa- total). This percentage drops to 49% (101 asso- tions per country (from 223 associations identi- ciations) when referring to activities specifically fied in the case of Ecuador to 29 in the case of related to development in the countries of ori- Mali)10. gin13 – those that focus on our interests –, and

11 The Results The rates of association, according to the number of associations identified by country and the number As noted above, one of our main objectives was of migrants in Spain in 2013, are as follows: Algeria to show to what extent migrant associations are 5.6 associations per 10,000 migrants; Bulgaria 3.4; involved in development activities in their home Colombia 5.6; Ecuador 8.5; Mali 12.2; Morocco 1.2; Romania 2; Senegal 17.4. The average rate for the communities, and the differences between their whole country would be 3.5 associations per 10,000 organisations and other national groups. From migrants. 12 the outset, the profiles of the eight national The activities included in the survey were: youth projects, unaccompanied minors projects, prevention study groups showed the diversity that exists of irregular migration, support for reintegration upon among them, both in relation to their numeri- return, psychosocial support for migrant families, promotion of their own culture (ethnicity, indigenism), 10 Sampling error in a finite population for an accu- religious activities, sports activities, arts activities, racy level of 95% and in which P and Q were equal to claiming political rights (voting), human rights de- 0.5. We can say that the sampling error obtained (6%) fence, research and media (newspapers, radio, televi- is within acceptable statistical standards. sion). 13 Activities that were considered in the questionnaire were: educational projects, health projects, infrastructure projects (water, electricity), rural development projects (agriculture, livestock), solidarity tourism, social welfare, humanitarian/emergency

43 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Joan Lacomba and Alexis Cloquell

Figure 1: Evolution of the population of the eight sample populations

Source: Author, on the basis of data from the municipal registration, National Institute of Statistics (INE).

further still to 29% (60 associations) when asked nia and, to a lesser extent, Ecuador and Bulgaria, about those activities defined among the latter, a significant drop occurs when moving from the such as co-development14. activities in their home countries to the activities Comparing the involvement in development related to development. activities in home countries with that of the associations’ provenance of origin, we observed significant differences. This can be seen in the Table 2: Participation in general activities and way that the associations of North Africa and activities related to development in the country of origin. Sub-Saharan Africa are involved to a greater extent (63.4% and 58.1% respectively) than Country Associations with Associations with the organisations in Latin America (46.9%) and activities in development Eastern Europe (29.3%). In this way, if we focus country of origin activities in country of origin on national origin, differences in the degree of participation is further emphasised among the Algeria 3 (43%) 3 (43%) groups studied, those with a higher percentage Bulgaria 8 (44%) 7 (39%) of implementation of development projects in Colombia 16 (62%) 15 (58%) the country of origin are the organisations origi- Ecuador 28 (51%) 23 (42%) nating from Mali, Morocco, Colombia and Sen- Mali 12 (75%) 12 (75%) egal, in that order (Table 2). In the case of Roma- Marocco 25 (74%) 23 (68%) Romania 9 (39%) 5 (22%) aid (natural disasters), environment, gender equality Senegal 14 (52%) 13 (48%) (female), fair trade, microcredit, co-operatives and investment remittances. TOTAL 115 (56%) 101 (49%) 14 In the last decade, co-development in Spain was understood as a form of cooperation for the devel- Source: Author, developed on the basis of research opment of countries of origin, carried out by the mi- findings. grants themselves, and was largely driven institutionally.

44 Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

In the same way, in order to further explore International financing (public funds). Taking this the dynamics of participation, we proceeded to into account, through the analysis of multiple draw an organisational profile of the associations correspondences, we can identify the elements involved in development projects in the coun- that characterise the associations involved in tries of origin, using the Chi-squared test. Thus, such activities from those that are not. in a first analysis, we compared the relationship Given the data shown in Figure 2, the organ- between participation in such activities, focus- isational profile of the associations involved in ing on structural and organisational variables development projects in the country of origin relative to the migrant associations that we have consists mainly of organisations that are inter- studied in the survey (Table 3). nationally established, have hired staff, and have acquired public funding, and are mostly made Table 3: Results of the Chi square test of the up of Colombian and Moroccan migrants (these variable “participation in develop- associations are also the same that have agreed, ment activities” and other structural to a greater extent, on public projects). With and organizational variables regard to the profile of the associations that are not involved in development activities within Organizational characteristics p-value the countries of origin – that are implemented Region ,010* at national or regional level – these organisa- Nationality ,009* tions have no public funds nor contracted staff. Autonomous region of residence ,102 Finally, they are mainly composed of immigrants Year of Founding ,108 from Ecuador, Bulgaria, Romania, Senegal and 15 Membership in umbrella association ,732 Algeria . However, associations of Mali are an exception, as they respond more to the latter Ownership of a community place ,070 group profile, which is characterised mainly by Geographic scope of implementation ,000* their degree of implementation at a local level Provision of personal contract ,000* and lack of resources. However, they show the Own funding ,262 highest degree of participation in development Funding from Spanish sources ,002* projects in their home country. Funding from international sources ,003* Analysing the type of development activities Funding from country of origin ,147 carried out in the home societies by the associa- Number of members ,771 tions of the eight countries, makes evident that the majority of the initiatives pertain to: the

*p < 0,05 field of education (remodelling and expansion of Source: Author, developed on the basis of research schools, provision of computer equipment, dona- findings. tion of educational materials), promoting gender equality (education and training of women), the construction of local infrastructure (develop- As we can see, the region of origin and the ment and electrification of streets, paving roads nationality of the organisations make up the and highways, water treatment, sanitation and combination of structural and organisational well building) the establishment of co-operatives variables related to participation in development 15 It can, therefore, be specified, and should not be projects in the country of origin. Some of these confused with the fact that a given group is repre- variables are, for example, the provision of a sented in one profile or another. As we have seen room for meetings and activities, the geographic in Table 2, each of the profiles obtained here consist scope of implementation, and the provision of mostly, but not entirely of all nationalities that are involved in varying degrees in development activities in contracted staff and the acquiring of Spanish and the countries of origin.

45 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Joan Lacomba and Alexis Cloquell

Figure 2: Results of the multiple correspondence analysis for the variable “participation in development activities in country of origin” and other structural and organizational variables, related by Chi square test

Source: Author, developed on the basis of research findings.

(agricultural, livestock and textiles) and the pro- its, to which, in Colombia’s case, we could add motion of social economy (see Table 4). fair trade. In between these two regional groups When referring to the type of activity and the would be the case of the Moroccan associations, group that is responsible, we observe several which fundamentally share projects in the areas distinct realities, but which maintain one certain of infrastructure, rural development, health and regional pattern. On the one hand, Malian and education with Mali and Senegal – while proj- Senegalese organisations (Sub-Saharan Africa) ects of an economic nature, like remittances and present a very similar behaviour, focusing their cooperatives – are more in line with those of projects on humanitarian or emergency aid, fac- Ecuador and Colombia. ing, for example, natural disasters and the con- In contrast, as seen in Figure 3, although the struction or renovation of infrastructure at a local Algerian, Bulgarian and Romanian groups appear level, like health projects and rural development. inactive in the Cartesian diagram in any area of Similarly, Ecuadorian and Colombian associations intervention; this does not mean to say, however, (Latin America) also share much of the variety of that they do not engage in projects within their development projects in their countries of ori- home countries. Rather, the initiatives that they gin. They have focused on gender, cooperatives, support, actually being few, are very heteroge- environment, solidarity tourism and microcred- neous in character.

46 Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Table 4: Type of development activities carried communities of origin” (Moctezuma 2008: 101). out in the home societies by the However, there may also be exceptions or, at associations of the eight countries least, early cases in which the involvement of the communities of origin takes place from the Type of activity % outset, thus surpassing the transition expected Educational projects 57,6 from social networks to subsidiary communities Gender 40,2 and from the latter to organisations of transna- Infrastructure 31,5 tional migrants (Moctezuma 2008: 99). The- lat Establishment of cooperatives 30,4 ter would be the Malian migrant associations, Rural development 28,3 which, despite the recent arrival of migrants and Health 23,9 corresponding recent creation of associations, Solidarity tourism 18,5 have managed to carry out a significant number Environmental projects 17,4 of projects in their country of origin. This forces us to take into account other variables that may Emergency assistance 16,3 be critical for some of the collectives, including Welfare 14,1 the influence of the ethnic root’s local solidarity Remittances 10,9 (many of the Malian associations’ names carry Microcredits 9,8 references of regions or towns from which their Fair trade 9,8 members originate), but also other factors, such as the external support received. In fact, Malian

*Multiple answers associations actively participated, in recent years, Source: Author, developed on the basis of research in a program aimed at strengthening co-develop- findings. ment driven by the Spanish NGO MPDL (Move- ment for Peace, Disarmament and Liberty). A of Discussion of Results a number of associations’ involvement in Mali The results from the survey show varying as well in the aforementioned program would not have as common elements and behaviours among been possible without a prior community agree- migrant associations. At the level of structural ment. One of the effects of their participation has characteristics of the associations (age, financial been the acceleration of the process of formulat- and human resources), they illustrate an impor- ing projects in the countries of origin, which has tant distinction between those who are active in not occurred in groups that have not had such their country of origin and those who do not. In extensive support16. Consequently, both the pre- this sense, the associations that represent more existence of strong ethnic ties and community established collectives, and thus have had more solidarity, as well as established alliances with time to structure themselves (Moroccan and civil society organisations in their host countries, Colombian institutions), would be more likely to may be able to accelerate the appearance of cer- engage in development activities in their home tain associations with increased transnational countries. This contradicts the idea that the projections. assimilation of migrants involves the disconnec- Similarly, we should not overlook the vitality tion from their societies of origin, an idea that of civil society in the sending countries. This is Portes, Escobar and Walton (2006) already has a critical component in the success of the activi- questioned, and that Moctezuma further under- lines by stating that “migrants, whilst they adapt 16 A similar case to that of Catalonia would be the and participate in new social circumstances, are Senegalese group, which for some years also relied also capable of maintaining ties and commit- upon a program of associative strengthening and co- development that was driven by the Catalan Fund for ments geared towards their organisation and Development Cooperation.

47 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Joan Lacomba and Alexis Cloquell

Figure 3: Results of the multiple correspondence analysis for the variables “national background” and “type of activity“

Source: Author, developed on the basis of research findings.

ties in the country of origin, because without country of origin on a regular basis. The adoption an associative network that acts as a -counter of cross border initiatives is made enormously dif- part in the country of origin, it is difficult for ficult without having certain conditions in place, the projects to be successful. These differences such as a minimal infrastructure (a place to meet in support among countries at this level are and plan projects), economic means (sources to notable: Morocco and Colombia demonstrate fund projects) and human resources (the possi- very dynamic emerging civil societies, with an bility of hiring contracted staff with some techni- extended associative network, while weakness is cal skills). However, in this area there may also greater in the cases of Algeria, Bulgaria, Romania be exceptions and alternative strategies such as and Senegal, or is supplemented by international those shown within the Malian or Senegalese development NGOs in the case of Mali. The syn- collectives (substituting, for example, the lack of ergy between these two variables – partnerships an official meeting place for association meetings within the destination’s civil society and support in members’ homes or by using collective dona- from a civil society active in the country of ori- tions to offset the lack of external financing) or gin – can ensure, to a large extent, the success or Ecuadorian collectives (organised sports leagues failure of philanthropic projects and the constitu- to finance projects in their country of origin). tion of associations and organisations capable of As for the type of projects implemented in influencing the country of origin. the country of origin, there are significant dif- Likewise, the material conditions underlying ferences between the groups in this study. Such the associations revealed important differences differences may be explained by considering the in regard to their shift toward projects in the needs in each of the countries of origin, such

48 Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

as the case of Mali and Senegal, who lack infra- Our study found that the Algerian collective has structure, as well as the identifications that these largely detached itself from their home countries’ migrant groups conduct from a distance. This is development. This detachment makes sense seen particularly in the priorities established by when considering Algeria’s recent experiences of public calls that fund the projects. The cases of political trauma, but that can also be explained Ecuador, Morocco and, to a lesser extent, Colom- by the lack of integration of Algerian migrants in bia, have notable differences in the activities of Spain. associations, which could be attributed to the effect of access to public calls in the extensive Conclusions search for funding, combined with the needs, As this study shows, not all migrant groups nec- identifications and the various requests received essarily adopt the same associative behaviour in from the communities of origin. relation to the development of their societies of On the other hand, the types of projects origin. undertaken definitely have a direct relation with In the Maghreb, Algerian associations actu- the degree of maturity of organisational struc- ally represent a very small number in the survey, tures (Moctezuma 2008). The same associations but what is significant is the contrast between may even have different levels of formalisation the associations of that country with those of or adopt different strategies and organisational Morocco in regards to their involvement in the interests (Escala 2005). In fact, especially in the development of their home countries. It should cases of Colombia and Morocco, most organ- be noted that almost three quarters of the asso- isational maturity has expanded the scale and ciations in Morocco carry out activities inthe scope of its activities in the countries of origin. country, and more than half have developmen- Ecuador presents both organisations with a tal actions themselves. The difference between high degree of formalisation, as well as informal the two countries cannot be explained without groups that have been able to implement small reference to the home countries’ internal stabil- projects in their communities of origin. Mali and ity and political conditions, the dynamism of its Senegal present some exceptions because, in civil society (much more evident in the case of many of their projects, the weakness of their Morocco) and the political cooperation and co- formal structures has been substituted by the development which their host States launched in vitality of their bonds and community networks. recent years (by France and Spain, towards the Bulgaria and Romania disagree with structuring a Moroccans but not the Algerians). broad associate network, which is considered as Ecuadorian associations, which are very preva- unrepresentative and, above all, thought to meet lent in Spain, only carried out development activ- the social and cultural needs of the group rather ities in their country of origin in 42% of respon- than to influence the development of the coun- dents’ cases. (The percentage drops to 18% when try of origin. Finally, Algeria is a complex case in you specifically ask for co-development activities; which a significant proportion of the surveyed however, there are highly significant examples associations claim to carry out development classified as co-development and initiated from projects in the country of origin17, although in Spain by Ecuadorian associations.) In contrast, reality none of these classify as co-development Colombian associations reached a percentage but rather as welfare or humanitarian projects.18 of 58% of development activities in the country of origin and 46% in co-development activi- 17 In any case we would be talking about a very small ties, which may be attributable to the impact of number of both organisations surveyed (seven) as its increased organisational culture. This higher well as associations with projects in the country of origin (three). percentage is also a result of the long conflict in 18 The assistance provided in situations of natural di- Colombia; there was an important and qualified sasters such as earthquakes registered in the country.

49 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Joan Lacomba and Alexis Cloquell

Diaspora that generated changes from abroad. origin while simultaneously achieving consolida- Co-development policies promoted from Spain tion and strength, although not all do it to the had Ecuador, and not so much Colombia, as one same degree or at the same time, and there may of its priority countries. be significant differences. To understand the Eastern Europe is where we find some of the differences between various groups, one must lowest percentages of associations with develop- refer to variables such as the age and size of their ment projects in their countries of origin (22% in organisations or sources of funding and avail- Romanian associations surveyed and 39% in Bul- able resources, but also other factors such as garian associations). Here the parallels are quite the nature of the migratory flow itself (economic, narrow, and the influence of associations on the labour, political) and the impact of policies aimed development of their home countries does not at promoting their participation, together with appear to be among their priorities. This could differentiated organisational logics, in which soli- add a high degree of mistrust in relation to pub- darity commitments and ethnic and cultural ties lic sector management, in both political and with their home communities play an important economic aspects, within the origin countries. role. Similarly, the conditions for integration into Furthermore, if we add to this the exclusion of the host country (economic-employment, social the two countries as beneficiaries of official -gov integration, immigration and cooperation poli- ernment cooperation programs for development, cies) and the characteristics of current affairs in it is easier to understand the distancing of both the country of origin (political situation, social from the sphere of transnational development. unrest, economic stability, cultural identity) have Finally, the countries in sub-Saharan Africa – a fundamental impact on the dynamics of par- and, above all, Mali – represent a relative excep- ticipation. tion in two ways: Firstly, they present a trend of In the literature on transnationalism, the highly active participation in the development involvement of migrant organisations in the of the origin country, and secondly, they show development of their home countries has usually similar behaviour in their projects. Both Mali and been taken as an indicator of their transnational Senegal are characterised by high percentages of behaviour. However, distinctions have not been associations with development activities in their clearly established between organisations that home countries (75% in the first case and 48% are considered transnational and those that are in the second), also closely coinciding with them not, as well as differences between transnational are actions defined as co-development. Its main development practices and development prac- feature is that the Diaspora closely links them to tices of a national character.O ur study of migrant the country of origin and generates very trans- associations in Spain and their participation in national behaviour, which is collectively organ- development in their countries of origin leads ised abroad and directs its activities towards the us to lower our expectations regarding their towns of migrants based on community and eth- transnational dimension. A significant number of nic bonds. On this basis, the orientation of official associations play a praiseworthy and important co-development policies and non-governmental role in development from a distance, although programs towards the two countries, both from this role varies widely between countries. A few Spain as well as from France in collaboration with of them go further in connecting home and host the States of origin, have had leverage on the communities, but that is not necessarily enough dynamics of migrant participation in local devel- to be considered transnational. Speaking of opment in recent years. transnational development organisations, it is Overall, the study of migrant associations assumed that we are at least supposed to have from eight countries shows that they tend to migrant associations with stable complex organ- redirect their activities towards their country of isational structures articulated between here

50 Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

and there, which would include both migrant and Daum, C. 2000. Typologie des organisations de sol- non-migrant participation. Speaking in regards to idarité internarnationale issues de l’immigration. transnational development practices, we would Paris: Institut Panos. need these to be programmed and implemented Escala, L. 2005. „Migración internacional y orga- nización de migrantes en regiones emergentes: with the joint participation of those who emi- el caso de Hidalgo“. Migración y Desarrollo 4: grated and those who remained, and that they 66-88. would respond to shared interests. In either Faist, T. 2005. „Espacio social transnacional y de- case, in order to consider migrant associations as sarrollo: una exploración de la relación entre co- transnational, we need to rely on precise indica- munidad, Estado y mercado“. Migración y Desar- tors. Furthermore, to classify these associations’ rollo 5: 2-34. actions as transnational, we also need to know Faist, T. 2008. “Migrants as Transnational Develop- which elements are actually international devel- ment Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round opment projects. This is the challenge that we of the Migration-Development Nexus”. Popula- tion, Space and Place will consider in future works. 14: 21-42. FITZGERALD, D. 2004. “Beyond ‘transnationalism’: Mexican hometown politics at an American labour union”. Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 27 (2): 228-247. References Fundación La Caixa. 2006. Directorio de enti- Albert, M., A. Moncusí and J. Lacomba. 2011. dades de personas inmigradas en España. Barce- „Asociaciones de inmigrantes africanos: partici- lona: La Caixa. pación e integración en el caso de la Comunidad Gauvrit, L., G. Le Bahers. 2004. Pratiques asso- Valenciana“. Revista Española del Tercer Sector ciatives des migrants pour le développement de 19: 87-119. leur pays d’origine: le cas des migrants maliens Aparicio, R. and A. Tornos. 2010. Las asociacio- de France originaires de la région de Kayes. Mali: nes de inmigrantes en España. Una visión de Service de Coopération et d’Action Culturelle. conjunto. Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo e Inmi- GOLDRING, L. 2002. “The Mexican State and Trans- gración. migrant Organizations: Negotiating the Bound- Asis, M., F. BAGGIO, J. M. PALABRICA and G. M. aries of Membership and Participation”. Latin ROMA 2010. Transnational bridges. Migration, American Research Review Vol. 37 (3): 55-99. development and solidarity in Philippines. Ma- Lacroix, T. 2005. Les organisations de solidarité in- nila: Commission on Filipinos Overseas. ternationale issues de l’immigration marocaine: BASCH, L., N. GLICK SCHILLER and C. SZANTON les motifs transnationaux de l’immigration ma- Blanc. 1994. Nations Unbound: Transnational rocaine. Agadir: Editions Sud. projects, postcolonial predicaments and dester- Landolt, P. 2003. „El Transnacionalismo Político ritorialized Nation States. New York: Gordon and y el derecho al voto en el exterior: El caso de El Breach. Salvador y sus migrantes en Estados Unidos“. In: Cloquell, A. 2012. „Las organizaciones transna- L. Calderón, ed., Votar en la Distancia: La Exten- cionales de inmigrantes en la Comunidad Valen- sión de derechos políticos a migrantes, experien- ciana y su papel en el codesarrollo“. Valencia: cias comparadas. México: Instituto de Investiga- Tesis doctoral. ciones Dr. José María Luis Mora. Condé, J., P. Diagne. 1986. Les migrations inter- Lanly, G. 2002. „Les associations de migrants in- nationales Sud-Nord. Une étude de cas: les mi- ternationaux dans trois communautés rurales grants maliens, mauritaniens et sénégalais de la mexicaines». Revue Autrepart 22: 109-128. vallée du fleuve Sénégal en France. Paris: OCDE. LEVITT, P. 2001. The transnational villagers. Berke- Daoud, Z. 1997. Marocains des deux rives. Paris: ley: University of California Press. Les Editions de l’Atelier. Libercier, M. H. and H. Schneider. 1996. Les Daum, C. (Dir.) 1993. Quand les immigrés du Sahel migrants. Partenaires pour le développement. construisent leur pays. Paris: L’Harmattan, Insti- Paris: OCDE. tut Panos.

51 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Joan Lacomba and Alexis Cloquell

Martín, A. 2004. „Las asociaciones de inmigrantes tes y desarrollo: un estudio comparativo“. Mi- en el debate sobre las nuevas formas de partici- gración y Desarrollo 6: 3-44. pación política y ciudadanía: reflexiones sobre Quiminal, C. 1991. Gens d’ici, gens d’ailleurs. Par- algunas experiencias“. Migraciones 15: 113-143. is: Christian Bourgeois. Mernissi, F. 1998. ONG rurales du Haut-Atlas. Les Roberts, B. R., F. Reanne and F. Lozano-As- Aït Débrouille. Casablanca: Editions Le Fennec. cencio. 1999. “Transnational migrant commu- Merz, B. J., L. C. CHEN and P. F. GEITHNER 2007. nities and Mexican migration to the US”. Ethnic Diasporas and development. Harvard: Harvard and Racial Studies, 22 (2): 238-266. University Press. Schuttler, K. 2008. “The contribution or mi- Millet, E. 2005. La place des associations de migrants organisations to income-generating activ- grants dans la solidarité internationale. Paris: ities in their countries of origin”. Working Paper Informe de investigación (50). Geneva: International Labour Office. Moctezuma, M. 2005. „Morfología y desarrollo SØrensen, N. N. 2007. Living across worlds: dias- de las asociaciones de migrantes mexicanos en pora, development and transnational engage- Estados Unidos. Un sujeto social y político extra- ment. Geneve: IOM. territorial“. Migración y Desarrollo 5: 59-85. Van Naersen, T., E. SPAAN and A. ZOOMERS 2008. Moctezuma, M. 2008. „El migrante colectivo Global migration and development. New York: transnacional. Senda que avanza y reflexión que Routledge. se estanca“. Sociológica 66: 93-119 Veredas, S. 2003. „Las asociaciones de inmigran- Morell, A. 2005. „El papel de las asociaciones de tes en España. Práctica clientelar y cooptación inmigrantes en la sociedad de acogida: cuestio- política“. Revista Internacional de Sociología 36: nes teóricas y evidencia empírica“. Migraciones 207-225. 17: 111-142. WALDINGER, R. 2010. „Rethinking transnational- Odaman, O. 1990. “Migration and Community ism“. Empiria. Revista de Metodología de Cien- Development at Origin: The Case of Migrants in cias Sociales 19: 21-38. Bendel North, Nigeria”. Migration World Maga- WALDINGER, R. 2013. “Beyond ‘transnationalism’: zine 18 (1): 14-17. Mexican hometown politics at an American la- Organización Internacional para las bour union”. Ethnic and Racial Studies Vol. 27 Migraciones. 2006. Incorporación de la mi- (2): 228-247. gración en las agendas de políticas de desar- WALDINGER, R. and D. FITZGERALD. 2004. “Trans- rollo. Diálogo internacional sobre la migración 8. nationalism in question”. American Journal of Geneve: OIM. Sociology Vol. 109 (5): 1177-1195. Portes, A., C. Escobar and A. Walton. 2006. Yatera, S. 1997. La Mauritanie. Immigration et „Organizaciones transnacionales de inmigran- développement dans la vallée du fleuve Sénégal. Paris: L’Harmattan.

52 Migrants, Associations and Home Country Development New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Note on the Authors

Joan Lacomba is a PhD in sociology and Professor at the Department for Social Work at the University of Valencia (Spain). Among his publications are Migraciones y desarrollo en Marruecos (La Catarata, 2004), various edited volumes of La inmigración en la sociedad española. Una radiografía multidisciplinar (Edicions Bellaterra, 2008) and De las migraciones como problema a las migraciones como oportunidad. Codesarrollo y movimientos migratorios (La Catarata, 2010). He currently directs a research programme on Diasporas and Co-development from Spain, with special emphasis on the role of migrants associations in country of origin development.

Alexis Cloquell is a PhD in Development Cooperation. He is professor of Sociology of the Catholic University of Valencia (Spain). He has recently published Migration and Development. The bond of co-development (Valencia 2013) and Unaccompanied migrant children in the protection systems for children of the Autonomous Communities (Valencia 2012). He has worked as consultant on migration in the Valencian Ministry of Solidarity and Citizenship. He recently won the national award II Cultural Research, Ministry of Education. His current work examines the migration-development nexus, from the optical immigrant associations.

Understanding Diaspora Organisations in European Development Cooperation – Approaches, Challenges and Ways Ahead*

by Nauja Kleist (Danish Institute for International Studies)

Abstract This article examines how Northwestern European development aid agencies support the development activities of diaspora organisations, especially in fragile situations. The article interrogates the perceived relationship between diaspora involvement and development, and how this perception is reflected in the ways in which development agencies collaborate with diaspora organisations through mainstream funding schemes, special diaspora initiatives and network support. Three tendencies are identified: a high emphasis on technical fixes; a tension between perceptions of diaspora organisations as special development agents and a mainstreaming ideal; and, finally, that diaspora organisations appear as particularly risky recipient groups to some development professionals because of their personal involvement in the country of origin. The article further argues that policy incoherence as well as underlying notions of development as planned, professionalized and based on a sedentary bias contribute to the marginal role diaspora organisations currently play in the professional development field. Keywords: development cooperation, development policies, diaspora, diaspora organisations, migration-development nexus, policy incoherence

Introduction Since the early 2000s diaspora organisations have are sometimes perceived to constitute linkages come to the attention of European development between Western societies and their homelands aid agencies as implementers of and partners in some development circles (BMZ 2014; Turner in development cooperation. In contrast to the and Kleist 2013). They have therefore emerged private and often family-based nature of remit- as actors in the migration-development nexus. tances – the main focus of the global migration- This article aims to contribute to the debate on development debate – collective remittances the development potential of collective diaspora from diaspora organisations generally focus on contributions by focusing on diaspora organisa- the local community level or are intended to tions1. It examines how European development benefit broader parts of the population through aid agencies engage with diaspora organisations support to social service provision, infrastructure, as potential agents of change. I use the term or civil society. Likewise diaspora organisations diaspora organisation to refer to organisations based on origin in a particular place or country

* I thank Ninna Nyberg Sørensen as well as two of personal or ancestral origin that do not coin- anonymous peer reviewers for valuable comments to an earlier version of the article. Likewise, I thank 1 employees at CISU and the DRC Diaspora Programme Parts of the article have been published in an ear- for much appreciated time and help. lier version in Kleist and Vammen (2012).

New Diversities Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Nauja Kleist

cide with the country of settlement and whose established by Northwestern European develop- leader and membership base primarily consists ment aid agencies, primarily in Denmark, Nor- of persons identifying with this origin. Dias- way, Sweden, UK, Germany and the Netherlands. pora organisations thus include a wide range of It is supplemented with interviews with repre- organisations, including hometown associations, sentatives from professional development NGOs branches of homeland political parties, cultural in Denmark, conducted in 2011 as part of a larger associations, migrant youth associations, and study (Kleist and Vammen 2012) and in 2014. many more (Sinatti and Horst 2014; Orozco and The article is further inspired by Bourdieu’s Rouse 2007). Their activities span social service notion of field (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). I provision, humanitarian assistance, advocacy approach the perceptions and practices of dias- work, political lobbyism, or civil society involve- pora organisations and how these are reflected ment in the (ancestral) country of origin as well in diaspora support models as part of a profes- as cultural events and integration-related activi- sionalized development field in which different ties in the country of settlement. Contributions actors interact. The field is guided by implicit and to development, relief and reconstruction are explicit ‘rules of the game’ – such as underlying thus just one aspect of what diaspora organisa- notions of development, bureaucratic set-ups tions do, and they often go hand in hand with that reproduce and circumscribe development activities focusing on the country of settlement interventions, and ideals of proper implementa- (Kleist 2007; Hammond 2013; Lacroix 2013). tion and professionalism. According to Bourdieu, In this article, I interrogate the perceived all actors in a field recognize the existence of the relationship between diaspora involvement and ‘rules of the game’ whether they take them for development and how this perception is reflected granted or contest them. Understanding devel- in the ways development agencies collaborate opment in this way implies that the ways devel- with diaspora organisations. I focus particularly opment aid agencies support and interact with on small and medium-sized diaspora organisa- diaspora organisations not only reflect explicit tions that contribute to and are involved in devel- intentions or value judgements (though these opment or relief processes in their (ancestral) certainly play a role) but also convey underlying country of origin, especially in relation to fragile notions of how diaspora organisations can be situations. Three questions structure the article: perceived within the professional development First, how do European development aid agen- field and how certain practices may not be rec- cies perceive the role of diaspora organisations ognized as ‘proper’ development, falling outside and their development potential? Second, how the field. However, there are different positions do they support and collaborate with diaspora within a field, and in this article I pay special organisations as part of their development coop- attention to these positions and the tensions eration activities? And third, what are the under- between them. lying assumptions and dilemmas in the ways that The article is divided into five parts: percep- diaspora organisations have been incorporated tions of diaspora organisations as agents of in migration and development activities? change; diaspora support models in current My approach to these questions is inspired European development cooperation; lessons by the anthropology of public policy (Wedel et learnt from these models; a case study; and al. 2005), exploring “underlying ideologies and policy-related implications. Three tendencies uses” (2005: 34) of public policies, in this case are identified: First, emphasis on technical fixes, of diaspora support. The empirical material for expressed in the widespread use of and atten- this exploration consists of policy documents, tion to capacity development when supporting such as evaluations, reports, and studies on dias- diaspora organisations. Second, there is a ten- pora organisation support initiatives funded and sion between perceptions of diaspora organisa-

56 Understanding Diaspora Organisations New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

tions as a special kind of development agent and actual communities. It can be argued that the the predominant mainstreaming ideal. Third, I analytical value of the term is eroded when used suggest that though diaspora organisations and in so many different ways (Faist 2010). However, other small development NGOs may face many the elasticity and vagueness of the term may also similar challenges vis-à-vis development aid be one of its strengths insofar as it lends itself agencies, diaspora organisations may appear to different modes of identification and mobili- as particularly risky and problematic recipient zation (Dufoix 2008; Tölölyan 1996; Kleist 2013) groups because of their (possible) personal and that can be attributed to different actors, actions, transnational involvement in the country of ori- and perspectives. Nevertheless, the academic gin. Such involvement might disturb ideals of discussion on the theoretical particularities or development engagement as neutral, profes- (lack of) usefulness of the diaspora concept is sionalized and based on sedentary notions of the generally not reflected in policy usages. Indeed, good life, widespread in current development as Sinatti and Horst argue, European develop- thinking (Bakewell 2008b). ment actors understand diaspora as referring to actual communities with particular traits (2014: Diaspora Positions 2) rather than as a category of mobilization or The term diaspora derives from Greek and means identification. Below, I outline two central posi- ‘the scattering of seeds’ or to ‘sow over’ (Cohen tions in how diaspora organisations are perceived 1997). Originally a term referring to the expulsion in European development cooperation: as trans- and scattering of Jews and other expulsed groups national agents of change and as long-distance such as Armenians and Greeks, the diaspora nationalists. category started to become more widely used The perception of diaspora as referring to col- in social science, anthropological and cultural lective and transnational agents of change which studies in the 1990s (e.g. Cohen 1997; Safran contribute to development in their ancestral 1991; Tölölyan 1991; van Hear 1998), broadly homelands started to proliferate in international understood as referring to transnational com- development aid circles in the beginning of the munities, dispersed from an original homeland. 2000s. Because of (actual or perceived) affilia- This notion of the diaspora category – in more tions with and involvement in both the country of or less well-delimited versions – has deeply reso- origin and residence (and possibly more places), nated in academic, policy and public discourse some diaspora groups are seen as bridgeheads (Brubaker 2005). Today the diaspora category is between the established development indus- employed by academics, development aid agen- try and local actors and contexts in developing cies, international organisations, political actors, countries. In these usages, the diaspora category and migrant groups and their descendants who is mostly employed exclusively with reference to make claims or frame expectations in the name highly skilled groups living in Western countries, of the diaspora (Kleist 2008a), often related to ignoring large migrant and refugee groups in moral obligation and political or humanitarian neighbouring countries (Bakewell 2008a) as well agency. The category has thus moved from being as low-skilled migrants and persons in irregular primarily research-oriented and has entered the situations. A key characteristic of this diaspora world of policy. position is the (expectation of) acquired skills The wide proliferation and elasticity of the through ‘exposure’ to Western countries as well diaspora category has made some researchers as involvement and knowledge of the local cul- suggest that the diaspora category is more use- tures and languages (see Orozco 2007). Living in fully approached as a category of identification the West but maintaining relations to the coun- (Axel 2004) or mobilization (Kleist 2008a, 2008b; try of origin, diaspora groups are perceived to Sökefeld 2006; Werbner 2002) than referring to hold potential resources for local and national

57 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Nauja Kleist

homeland development (Mohamoud 2005). This and Italian development cooperation policies position is found among international develop- (Nijenhuis and Brokehuis 2010) but these are not ment organisations, such as the International included in the scope of the article. Organisation for Migration2, the African Union3, Table 1 below identifies three diaspora sup- sending governments (Turner 2013; Kleist 2013), port models employed by European develop- and indeed diaspora organisations. ment agencies to support development contribu- At the other end of the spectrum is an under- tions by diaspora organisations: general co-fund- standing of diaspora groups as security threats ing schemes for development NGOs, special dias- or, as Benedict Anderson (1998) has formulated pora initiatives, and support to networks. The it, as long-distance nationalists. In this under- three models often co-exist and their activities standing, the migrant’s distance to the erstwhile may overlap. As the table shows, capacity build- homeland results in lack of accountability. In ing activities and matching fund schemes are the wake of 9/11 and the subsequent terrorist the two most common ways of supporting dias- attacks in London and Spain, the fear of migrant pora organisations. I examine these approaches long-distance nationalism has increased. In West- in more detail below, followed by discussion of ern countries, the fear of attacks and of so-called the lessons learnt and dilemmas associated with home-grown terrorism (Byman et al. 2001) has these approaches. I thereby wish to interrogate resulted in a securitization of migration where the underlying notions of diaspora organisations migrants and diaspora groups are perceived as and their development potential. potential terrorists through organising, financing, or conducting terrorism (Demmers 2002; Collier Mainstreaming 2000). While the securitization of migration – or One of the most common ways that Northwest- the migration-security nexus – is not the main ern European development aid agencies support focus of development cooperation activities, it diaspora organisations is through large fund- may still shape development aid agencies’ col- ing schemes targeting small and medium-sized laboration with diaspora groups through anxiety development NGOs. Such grant schemes are of supporting radicalized groups. The implication often administered by large NGOs or umbrella is that diaspora organisations, if they are not organisations, rather than development aid ruled out completely, may be at least considered agencies themselves. Financial support usu- problematic or risky recipient group or partners ally requires self-funding, sometimes with the for development aid agencies. opportunity of self-funding ‘in kind’, such as equipment or self-coverage of per diem. In some Diaspora Support Models cases diaspora organisations are mentioned as In the following section I examine how North- one of the primary target groups, like the British western European development aid agencies Common Ground Initiative which explicitly states support diaspora organisations. Several Euro- that it is open to “both small and diaspora organ- pean development aid strategies mention sup- isations to create real and sustainable change”4. port to migrant and diaspora development activi- However, it varies from initiative to initiative ties as part of their portfolio, including Germany whether special support is offered to diaspora (BMZ 2014), Norway (Erdal and Horst 2010), applicants. the UK (Thornton and Hext 2009; Vammen and In addition to matching funds, capacity- Brønden 2012; DFID 2014), and the Netherlands building activities for diaspora organisations (Dutch MFA 2008). Likewise so-called co-devel- (and other small development organisations) opment policies are part of French, Spanish to develop their capacity in relation to propos-

2 http://diaspora.iom.int/ 4 https://www.gov.uk/international-development- 3 http://pages.au.int/cido/pages/diaspora-division funding/common-ground-initiative-cgi

58 Understanding Diaspora Organisations New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Table 1: Development aid agencies’ support to diaspora organisations (DOs)

Principle Characteristics Examples Mainstreaming -- Access to matching fund schemes on -- Civil Society in Development (Danida), equal terms with other development 1996- NGOs -- Oxfam Novib Linkis (Dutch Ministry of -- Capacity building Foreign Affairs), 2004-2011 Special diaspo- -- Access to matching fund schemes -- The Diaspora Programme (Danida), ra initiatives for DOs only 2010-2015 -- Capacity building -- Pilot Project Pakistan (NORAD), 2008- 2010 Networks -- Establish DO networks and platforms -- EADPD5 (European Commission (EC) -- Facilitate collaboration between DOs with the Swiss Agency for Development -- Facilitate collaboration between DOs and Cooperation (SDC), Dutch MFA, and and other development NGOs Deutche Gesellschaft für Internationale -- Capacity building Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)), 2010-2013; (SDC), 2014-2016

als and project management is a common fea- making the involved diaspora organisations able ture. Specific objectives may include up-scaling to participate – and compete – in regular proof projects, strengthening the quality of propos- grammes and funding schemes. Furthermore, als, enhancing participation in policy decision- they usually target larger migrant or refugee making and public debates on development, groups originating from states that receive sub- and enabling common platforms of understand- stantial development or humanitarian aid. Like ing. Courses offered as part of capacity-building mainstream funding schemes, they are often cover a great range of fields, such as civil society, administered by a large professional NGO. Exam- organisational development, project cycle man- ples of special diaspora initiatives include the agement, leadership, proposal writing and fund- Norwegian Pilot Project Pakistan (PPP), a three- raising capacity, procurement, financial manage- year NORAD-funded project running between ment, etc.5 2008 and 2010 (Erdal and Horst 2010) and the Danish Diaspora Programme, funded by Danida Special Diaspora Initiatives and run by the Danish Refugee Council (DRC). In contrast to the mainstreaming approach, some I return to the DRC Diaspora Programme later in development aid agencies have established the article. initiatives exclusively targeting diaspora organisations, also consisting of matching funds and Networks and Umbrella Organisations capacity development. There is a tendency that Finally, the promotion and establishment of net- such funding schemes delimit their target group works between different diaspora organisations to organisations focusing on selected countries, and between diaspora organisations and other offering context-sensitive programmes and development NGOs constitute a significant trend. activities. They are often pilot projects, expected Networking activities aim at fostering coordina- to show quick results and with the objective of tion, cooperation and partnerships between organisations. Network support can be divided 5 European-wide African Diaspora Platform for De- into two overall approaches: the promotion of velopment, http://ae-platform.org/ networks as an added bonus and the establish-

59 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Nauja Kleist

ment of diaspora organisations networks and models. Nevertheless, four priority areas can be platforms. found in most external evaluations and migra- Network as an added bonus can be promoted tion policy research on the topic: capacity build- through capacity training or other activities with ing, adequate selection criteria, local anchorage, different kinds of participants, such as other and a participatory approach. development NGO representatives, policy -mak ers and development professionals. This kind of Capacity Building network promotion is broad in scope and may Capacity building is a central part of all three dias- range from mutual inspiration to the formation pora support models, as shown in Table 1. Capac- of formal collaboration between diaspora organ- ity building is employed as a means to improve isations and other development NGOs. Explicit the development effect of diaspora involvement network support takes place through the estab- in developing countries as well as to ameliorate lishment of or support to diaspora organisation the capacity of diaspora organisations more gen- platforms, networks, and umbrella organisations erally. Capacity building activities may range from by development aid agencies (or their imple- training courses to tailor-made support to pro- menting partners). In addition to more general posal writing, project management, monitoring, networking benefits, such initiatives may also and accounting etc. It is widely recommended in aim at providing an overview of diaspora organ- evaluations and studies as it may create “a level isations through membership registration and playing field” (de Haas 2006: 100), perceived as a mapping exercises. Indeed, the issue of whether good and valuable activity. diaspora organisations ‘represent their diaspo- However, capacity building also reflects power ras’ or which spokesperson or diaspora organ- relations between development aid agencies isation is the ‘most representative’ is sometimes and diaspora organisations. The ability to build brought up (Ars Progretti 2007; GTZ 2009). How- capacity is placed in the hands of donors (or ever studies and evaluations show that externally implementing partners) while diaspora organ- supported networks and umbrella organisations isations are the ones whose capacity needs to rarely have legitimacy within their target groups be developed. This understanding both reflects and are not sustainable without external support perceptions of diaspora organisations and of (Ars Progretti 2007; Horst et al. 2010; Thornton the nature of development (cf. Sinatti and Horst and Hext 2009). 2014). Many smaller diaspora organisations – like other small development NGOs – are run by Priority Areas in Diaspora Support volunteers with ensuing constraints on their time Northwestern European development aid agen- and resources. This means that diaspora organ- cies have been supporting diaspora organisa- isations’ approach to development projects may tions through general development NGO funding be different from development aid agencies and schemes from the middle of the 1990s and spe- other parts of the professional development cial diaspora initiatives from the middle of the industry who may find or fear that they lack 2000s. While some evaluations and studies high- capacity to engage effectively and professionally light the positive potential and opportunities in in development cooperation; for instance, in rela- collaboration with diaspora organisations (Erdal tion to demands on financial and project man- and Horst 2010; Horst et al. 2010; JMDI 2011), agement. According to Sinatti and Horst (2014), others point to mixed results (de Haas 2006), European development agencies work with a or conclude that it is still too early to say much rather narrow understanding of development as about their effect (Newland 2011). There is thus the change generated by “the planned activities no overall agreement of the development poten- of professional development actors” (Sinatti and tial of existing diaspora organisation support Horst 2014: 6). This has implications for smaller

60 Understanding Diaspora Organisations New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

diaspora organisations because it “inevitably Local Anchorage leads to the conclusion that diaspora organisa- Local anchorage is a third cross-cutting priority tions – in similar ways to many other small civil- area employed by development aid agencies society organisations – lack the technical skills to assess the quality of diaspora organisations’ to compete in the official development world” development potential. Local anchorage in rela- (ibid). The emphasis on capacity building can tion to development projects is generally under- be seen at least partly in this light, accentuating stood as close collaboration with partners based the hierarchical relationship between the profes- in the area of reception and that the develop- sional and the amateur in the development field ment project in question is based on local needs as well as a belief in technical fixes. and requests. It thus refers to a close connection between development partners and a locality. Adequate Selection Procedures Local anchorage constitutes a basic condition Good selection criteria constitute another key for obtaining funding in both mainstream and priority in matching funding models for diaspora special diaspora support schemes (JMDI 2011). organisations and other organisations alike. The In relation to diaspora organisations, there are question of whether special funding should be often expectations that ‘the local’ coincides with made available for diaspora organisations is at the community of origin of the diaspora organ- least partly linked to the question of the quality isations involved. However, just as the concept of of applications, and hence to selection criteria. diaspora is flexible in its geographical scale and On the one hand, selection may be viewed as a localisation of origin, ranging from continents technical issue – e.g. as a question of formulat- to quite specific localities (Kleist 2013), expecta- ing a convincing project proposal, showing abil- tions to ‘the local’ may be flexible too. Neverthe- ity to comply with procurement, accounting and less, it tends to be related to notions of origin reporting demands, etc. On the other hand, it and expectations of close social relations and relates to a value assessment, selecting diaspora networks. organisations whose objectives are in line with The emphasis on ‘the local’ as a connection donor priorities and, not least, avoiding funding between people and locality may also reflect the organisations that finance conflicts or- terror sedentary emphasis in much development think- ism. This is, of course, as it should be. However, ing. As Oliver Bakewell has argued, much contem- the political aspects of selection are sometimes porary development thinking is interventionist downplayed. Selection is not only a technical in nature and based on “an underlying assump- issue but also a political process, not least in relations that development is about enabling people tion to fragmented diaspora groups operating in to stay home” (Bakewell 2008b: 1342). In this fragile situations (Horst et al. 2010). As James understanding, migration constitutes a deviation Ferguson (1994) has famously argued, devel- to be corrected and controlled through different opment projects may turn into an anti-politics kinds of interventions; migration is perceived machine where development is understood as as a crisis symptom and development is seen technical solutions to technical problems; hence, as one of the ways to fix it. The notion of dias- development becomes a technical fix rather than poras as development agents based on belong- a deeply political process. The tendency towards ing to a particular homeland, desire, or even a depoliticisation can also be found in relation to sense of obligation to contribute to its develop- diaspora involvement (Turner and Kleist 2013; ment, simultaneously feeds into this discourse as Horst 2013). The political aspects of selection cri- well as it challenges it through the emphasis on teria may thus be downplayed or disguised. mobility and transnational belonging.

61 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Nauja Kleist

A Participatory and Consultative Approach say that the two approaches cannot co-exist, let Finally, long-term engagement and a participa- alone that development aid agencies (and their tory approach is mentioned in several policy implementing partners) do not engage in a par- documents (BMZ 2014; Danish MFA 2014; Dutch ticipatory approach. Rather, my point is that that MFA 2008) and consistently called for in the the overall model of planned and profession- major guidelines and studies (de Haas 2006; alised development frames what is seen as good Horst et al. 2010, JMDI 2011) as well as in sev- development engagement. eral evaluations (de Bruyn and Huyse 2008; Erdal and Horst 2010; Thornton and Hext 2009). This A Case Study: Between Mainstreaming and approach accentuates the importance of mutual Special Diaspora Initiatives learning processes in development aid agencies To examine the tendencies outlined above and diaspora organisations, establishing mutual in more detail, I now turn to a case study on interests, objectives, and monitoring procedures Danida support to diaspora organisations. The throughout the process. Likewise, policy con- case focuses on a respectively mainstreaming sultation is highlighted: rather than existing as and special diaspora initiative: Civil Society in merely implementing projects, diaspora organ- Development (CISU) and the DRC Diaspora Pro- isations are included in policy-making processes gramme6. with the opportunity of actually shaping policies. CISU7 is a union of more than 280 Danish civil A consequence is thus to dissuade a top-down society organisations (CSOs). About 15% of the approach where diaspora groups are perceived member organisations are diaspora organisa- as ‘tools’ to be mobilized or ‘tapped’, according tions, many with focus on Somalia but also on to a pre-conceived agenda – or as possible ‘polit- Congo, Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. ical messengers’ (Englom and Svensson 2009). CISU has received Danida funding since 1996 to Comparing NGO involvement in development support civil society involvement in developing cooperation with diaspora organisation engage- countries and administers the Danida-financed ment, Jennifer Brinkerhoff warns against the Civil Society Fund to support civil society proj- dangers of co-optation and instrumentalization. ects conducted by Danish CSOs in partnerships She concludes that “if donors and governments with local CSOs in developing countries. All Dan- seek to maximize diaspora development contri- ish CSOs – including diaspora organisations – can butions, rather than rushing to instrumentalize apply for funding. diasporas, they would do well simply to embrace CISU started receiving an increasing number diasporans as independent partners, not exten- of inquiries from diaspora organisations in the sions of their own agendas” (2011: 47; cf. de late 1990s (Frederiksen 2007), and from 2005 a Haas 2006). consultant was employed to strengthen diaspora The emphasis on a participatory approach in organisations and to extend their membership development thinking is not new but goes back in CISU. Activities included training courses and to Robert Chamber’s work in the 1980s. The seminars, the establishment of networks, and aforementioned emphasis on local anchorage proposal writing assistance. No special funding can also be seen as an aspect of this tendency. was made available. The inclusion of diaspora However, there is a potential tension between organisations thus evolved through member- the participatory approach and the emphasis on ship demands but was further strengthened by (especially standardized) capacity building and organisational initiatives – a development also technical criteria. While the former approach 6 emphasises flexibility and mutuality, the latter The case study is based on interviews with employees at CISU and the DRC Diaspora Programme in 2011 relies on professionalised, planned, and hier- and 2014 as well as on their websites and documents. archical notions of development. This is not to 7 www.cisu.dk

62 Understanding Diaspora Organisations New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

found in other funding schemes, e.g. the Dutch Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees) support Oxfam Novib Linkis project (de Bruyn and Huyse and monitor the projects in Somalia or Afghani- 2008). stan. The final decision of approving or reject- In 2010 CISU delimited its support to dias- ing funding applications rests with the DRC. The pora organisations. An external evaluation (NCG Diaspora Programme thus exemplifies the policy 2010) pointed to ambivalent results of the dias- tendencies outlined above, including a (rela- pora initiative: while CISU had been successful in tively) consultative approach and a transnational increasing the number of diaspora organisation programme design. members, it had not necessarily increased dias- A midterm evaluation of the programme from pora organisations’ ability to conduct develop- 2014 showed positive results: The evaluation ment aid projects according to CISU objectives. concluded that the majority of Diaspora Pro- The suggested reason was that most of CISU’s gramme funded projects have a visible impact diaspora member organisations focused on frag- for the beneficiary communities and states that ile and conflict areas, prioritizing reconstruction “[t]he Diaspora is perceived as an extremely and social service, rather than civil society devel- important actor for the development of coun- opment. The demands from diaspora organisa- tries of origin […] thanks to the common origins tions and CISU services thus did not match each that donors and beneficiaries share” (Saggiomo other (NCG 2010: v). Therefore, the evaluation and Ferro 2014: 4). It thus highlighted the posi- recommended developing a separate diaspora tion of diaspora organisations as transnational funding initiative outside CISU auspices. This development agents. recommendation was realized with the creation Though demonstrated in different ways, both of the Diaspora Programme as a pilot project in CISU and the DRC Diaspora Programme express 2010, administered by the DRC and funded by an understanding of diaspora organisations as a Danida grant. Diaspora organisations can still (potentially) special development agents. In the apply to CISU on similar terms with other Danish- words of a CISU employee, the aim of CISU’s based development NGOs, given their projects mainstreaming approach is to strike a balance so focus on civil society development. that diaspora organisations can “use their advan- The DRC Diaspora Programme offers matched tage without preferential treatment”10. This funding and capacity building to Somali and advantage refers to knowledge of culture and Afghan diaspora organisations – two groups language in the country of origin in line with the that are among the largest refugee populations perception of diaspora as development agents. in Denmark and whose home countries are sig- Their special position should not be particularly nificant recipients of Danish development aid. supported, though. This indicates that in spite of Eligible projects can focus on social service and ideas of a ‘special advantage’, CISU’s underlying civil society development alike and must adhere ideal is that diaspora organisations behave and to a range of criteria including local needs, sus- are evaluated like other Danish development tainability, measurability and capacity8. A board NGOs. Such ideals are also found among other with representatives from Somali and Afghan development aid agencies, such as in the case diaspora organisations as well as CISU and DRC of the before-mentioned NORAD-funded Pilot members “function as ambassadors between Project Pakistan. In spite of a very positive evalu- their respective diasporas and the DRC9”. Like- ation, this project was discontinued, as NORAD wise, field officers from DRC or DACAAR (Danish found it was too costly and ineffective (Molde 2011). This shows that though donors and imple-

8 https://drc.dk/relief-work/diaspora-programme/ menting agencies may want the ‘diaspora advan- looking-for-funding/ tage’, they may not want it enough to devote the 9 https://drc.dk/relief-work/diaspora-programme/ meet-the-team/ 10 Interview, May 2014.

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necessary resources or adjust their programs port programmes. I argue that though many of accordingly. these challenges are of a more general nature, From the point of view of diaspora organisa- diaspora organisations seem to appear as a par- tions, this is bad news as several studies show ticular problematic target and recipient group in that many diaspora organisations have compara- the eyes of some development aid agencies. tively low success rates when applying to general development NGO funding schemes (Erdal and Short-Term Commitment and Lack of Continuity Horst 2010; Trans and Vammen 2008; de Bruyn The volatile and short-term nature of many dias- and Huyse 2008), including CISU (Frederiksen pora support programs is identified as a signifi- 2007; NCG 2010). The mainstreaming strategy cant barrier for diaspora organisations’ access to may thus be less advantageous for diaspora support and for developing successful projects. organisations. Furthermore, while special dias- As Table 1 indicates, there is a high degree of pilot pora initiatives may offer flexibility in terms of projects, changed programs, and funding oppor- project criteria, the financial support is often tunities, constituting an extremely volatile pro- lower11 and short-term, programmes tend to be gram landscape. Studies and evaluations empha- time-limited and support is often delimited to size that successful collaboration with diaspora few diaspora groups. Or, in other words, there is organisations requires trust, confidence and a tension between mainstreaming and ‘special knowledge that can only be obtained over long advantage’ approaches where the former is the time (e.g. Ars Progretti 2007; Thornton and Hext most prioritized. In the Danish case, this is also 2009). This is especially so in relation to fragile reflected in the fact that the new Danish Civil Soci- situations where conflict may have created frag- ety Strategy only mentions diaspora once in rela- mentation and where development and recon- tion to remittances (Danida 2014: 12) and does struction projects are difficult to conduct due to not mention diaspora organisations at all. Dias- lack or weakness of local institutions, insecurity pora organisations still do not seem to be recog- etc. The fact that many diaspora organisations nized as proper actors by some development aid focus on fragile situations – and special diaspora agencies, at least not by those writing the policy funding schemes often have fragile states as target strategies. This also indicates that there are dif- countries – emphasises the importance of long- ferent opinions within the development field and term collaboration. While the problem of short- some initiatives may become invisible. term funding opportunities may apply to diaspora organisations and other small development Institutional Barriers and Challenges NGOs alike, special diaspora initiatives are char- The recommendations and priority areas pre- acterized by a very high degree of pilot projects. sented above apply to small development NGOs and diaspora organisations alike (cf. Brinkerhoff Donor Scepticism 2011; Sinatti and Horst 2014). Likewise, both The understanding of development interven- types of organisations may face similar insti- tions as ‘planned’ activities and the focus on tutional barriers and challenges vis-à-vis inter local anchorage shapes the engagement and action with development aid agencies. In the funding opportunities for development NGOs following sections, I go through some of the more generally, as indicated above. Nevertheless, institutional barriers that have been identified some parts of the development industry seem in the literature and evaluations of diaspora sup- to worry particularly about diaspora organisations, especially in relation to their involvement 11 The maximum grant size for CISU projects is 5 mil- in their countries of origin that takes place out- lion DKR (approx. 670.000 Euros) compared with side the professional development sphere and 400.000,- DKR in the DRC Diaspora Programme (approx. 54.000 Euros). its frequent grounding in local, family and per-

64 Understanding Diaspora Organisations New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

sonal relationships (Horst et al. 2010; Brinkerhoff 2002), and remains especially relevant in relation 2011; Sinatti and Horst 2014). Some develop- to the relationship between migration, development professionals may be anxious that migrants ment and security where political emphasis and and diaspora groups lack a ‘professional distance’ priority of the latter – e.g. the migration-security to development problems and thereby risk being nexus – overshadows and delimits migration- too emotionally or politically involved in devel- development efforts (Lavenex and Kunz 2008; opment projects in their homelands. In these Sørensen 2012; Isotalo 2009). Though the migra- cases, the diaspora position as special develop- tion-development nexus has been celebrated in ment agents may appear as an impediment to some policy circles, it tends to be subordinated adequate development engagement. to security-related aspects of migration, such as Worries about lack of professional distance migration control and migration management. may be further aggravated in relation to diaspora Furthermore, migration-development initiatives, groups who, due to conflict in the country of ori- including diaspora support activities, are rarely gin, are fragmented and divided. Development accompanied by substantial budgets (Sørensen aid agencies may fear that diaspora groups act as 2012), perhaps because of their relative low long-distance nationalists who fund or spur con- importance in overall political priorities. flict or political instability in their countries of ori- Another challenge in relation to policy incoher- gin. Donor support to such groups would cause ence is the relationship between diaspora organ- political scandals. As the amount of development isations’ possible engagement in both develop- aid is much contested in the current political cli- ment and integration activities. Many diaspora mate in Northwestern Europe, few development organisations have multiple and simultaneous aid agencies can afford such scandals. Diaspora activities in the country of (ancestral) origin organisations may therefore be perceived as a and settlement, and sometimes other locations particularly risky recipient group, discouraging too (Kleist 2007; Hammond 2013; Lacroix 2013; some development professionals from engag- Cordero-Guzman 2005; Layton-Henry 1990). ing with them. Furthermore, political fragmen- However, development and integration are usu- tation may result in a high number of internally ally treated as separate policy realms without competing diaspora organisations, possibly with relevance to each other. Studies show that the different political agendas, and proclaimed lead- relationship between processes of integration ers claiming to represent the diaspora. Such and transnational involvement is complex (Erdal situations may make collaboration with diaspora and Oeppen 2013; Erdal 2013) but engagement organisations time consuming and demanding, in both processes can be mutually reinforcing especially if donors’ development ideals are (Itzigsohn and Saucedo 2002; Portes 2003; Lev- based on notions of professional distance and itt and Schiller 2004). Indeed, the midterm and apolitical involvement (cf. Horst 2013). an earlier internal evaluation of the DRC Dias- pora Programme emphasised that participation Policy Incoherence in the programme can cause feelings of recogni- Finally, policy incoherence constitutes a serious tion in Danish society among some participants institutional impediment to diaspora organisa- (Saggiomo and Ferro 2014) as well as create tion engagement. Policy coherence refers to “a motivational benefit amongst peers and com- “the nexus between various policy sub-systems” munities in Denmark, Somalia and Afghanistan” (Carbone 2008: 324) and how these systems (Choudhury 2012: 5). The propensity of dual or effect or contradict each other. The need for pol- multiple engagements in country of residence icy coherence in relation to migration and devel- and origin is one of the areas where diaspora opment was pointed out more than a decade organisations may differ most from other devel- ago (Sørensen, van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen opment NGOs, but also constitutes an area with

65 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Nauja Kleist

opportunities for policy development across pol- tutes another area of possible collaboration and icy realms. policy development, though this may arguably be difficult in the light of current policy incoher- Concluding Discussion ence between these two fields. Conversely, dias- The examination of European development pora sceptics may argue that the relative lack of cooperation activities to support diaspora organ- attention to diaspora organisations reflects their isations paints a somewhat ambiguous picture. ambivalent or questionable role as development Diaspora groups are mentioned in a range of agents. Furthermore, they may argue that dias- policy documents on development, implying pora support initiatives are too expensive, risky that the diaspora rhetoric is still important in or time consuming. European development circles. However, though These different perceptions reflect underly- many European development agencies support ing notions of diaspora groups as special kinds matching funds schemes that diaspora organisa- of development agents: as either transnational tions can apply to, special support programmes agents of change, long-distance nationalists, or are characterized by relatively low budgets and a mix of both. However, they may also illumi- by being pilot or temporary projects. Diaspora nate a tension between a perception of diaspora support thus seems to have low political priority, groups as particular agents (whether good or especially after the financial crisis in 2009 when bad) and an ideal in which diaspora organisations a range of diaspora support initiatives fizzled out do not differ from other development NGOs, and were replaced by emphasis on mainstream- and thereby do not deserve or need preferen- ing and network approaches – though there tial treatment vis-a-vis to ‘native’ development are exceptions, such as the DRC Diaspora Pro- NGOs in the country of residence. Any ‘special gramme. This tendency may also be reinforced advantage’ is only rewarded if it is competitive by the subordination of development aspects of vis-à-vis other development NGOs and does not migration to the securitization of migration on require any additional support to be realized. (inter)national political agendas. Diaspora organ- This ideal is central in mainstreaming approaches isations thus seem to be perceived as relatively and is mentioned as an objective in some dias- unimportant development actors in the eyes and pora support schemes. institutional setups of development aid agencies; The mainstreaming tendency that emphasizes they are considered marginal players, though the particularity of diaspora involvement consti- tensions and disagreements persist within the tutes a risky outlook for diaspora organisations. I professional development field. have previously suggested that the diaspora cat- From the point of view of diaspora proponents, egory has political resonance for diaspora groups the current state of affairs indicates a huge and (Kleist 2008a). However, this resonance seems unexploited potential for further collaboration to be quite delimited within European develop- with and support of diaspora organisations. ment aid agencies when looking at actual modes Diaspora groups are seen as holding a distinc- of cooperation. This is because development tive and competitive development potential that aid agencies tend to perceive diaspora organisa- development aid agencies have not fully real- tions as ambivalent and potentially risky recipi- ized. This potential both relates to strengthening ent groups and partners, and also because most and ameliorating existing programmes and to available diaspora support is based on an under- develop new approaches and partnerships that lying ideal that diaspora organisations should take lessons learnt into consideration, not least become mainstream development agents over in relation to policy consultation and overcom- time. In this way, opportunities for extending ing policy incoherence. The relationship between and rethinking the nature of development and of development and integration activities consti- development actors are lost.

66 Understanding Diaspora Organisations New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

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———. 2013. “Flexible Politics of Belonging: Dias- Information Source:1-7. pora mobilization in Ghana”. African Studies 72 Portes, A. 2003. “Conclusion: Theoretical conver- (2):285. gencies and empirical evidence in the study of Kleist, N. and I. Vammen. 2012. Diaspora groups immigrant transnationalism”. International Mi- and development in fragile situations. DIIS Re- gration Review 37 (3):874-892.

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Safran, W. 1991. “Homelands in Modern Societ- ———. 1996. „Rethinking Diaspora(s): Stateless ies: Myths of Homeland and Return”. Diaspora Power in the Transnational Moment“. Diaspora: 1 (1):83-99. A Journal of Transnational Studies 5 (1):3-36. Saggiomo, V. and A. Ferro. 2014. Mid-Term Trans, L. and I. Vammen. 2008. African Diaspora Evaluation DIASPORA PROGRAM: Diaspora driv- Associations in Denmark: A Study of their Devel- en relief, rehabilitation and development. Co- opment Activities and Potentials. Copenhagen: penhagen: Danish Refugee Council. Danish Institute for International Studies. Sinatti, G. and C. Horst. 2014. “Migrants as Turner, S. 2013. “Staging the Rwandan Diaspora: agents of development: Diaspora engagement The politics of performance”. African Studies 72 discourse and practice in Europe”. Ethnici- (2):265-284. ties:1-19. doi: DOI: 10.1177/1468796814530120. Turner, S. and N. Kleist. 2013. “Agents of Sökefeld, M. 2006. “Mobilizing in transnational Change? Staging and Governing Diasporas and space: a social movement approach to the for- the African State”. African Studies 72 (2):192- mation of diaspora”. Global Networks 6 (3):265- 206. 284. Vammen, I. and B. M. Brønden. 2012. ”Donor- Sørensen, N. N. 2012. “Revisiting the Migration- Country Responses to the Migration-Develop- Development Nexus: From Social Networks and ment Buzz: From Ambiguous Concepts to Am- Remittances to Markets for Migration Control”. bitious Policies?” International Migration 50 International Migration 50 (3):61-76. (3):26-42. Sørensen, N. N., N. van Hear and P. Engberg- Van Hear, N. 1998. New diasporas. The mass exo- Pedersen. 2002. “The Migration-Development dus, dispersal and regroup of migrant communi- Nexus. Evidence and Policy Options State-of-the- ties. Seattle: University of Washington Press Art Overview”. International Migration 40 (5):1- Wedel, J. R., C. Shore, G. Feldmand and 47. S. Lathrop. 2005. “Towards and Anthropology Thornton, P. and S. Hext. 2009. Review of DFID’s of Public Policy”. Annals of the American Aca- Work to Build Support for Development through demicy of Political and Social Science (600):30-51 work with Businesses, Trade Unions, Faith Com- Werbner, P. 2002. “The place which is diaspora: munities, Black and Minority Communities, and Citizenship, religion and gender in the making Diaspora Groups. of chaordic transnationalism”. Journal of Ethnic Tölölyan, K. 1991. “The Nation State and Its Oth- and Migration Studies 28 (1):119-134. ers. In Lieu of a Preface”. Diaspora 1 (1):3-7.

Note on the Author

Nauja Kleist is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies. Her research interests include diaspora mobilization, migration-development policies, gender, belonging, and return migration. She has published widely on these issues in, inter alia, African Affairs, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, African Studies, and African Diaspora. Kleist is the coordinator of a research programme examining the social effects of migration management for West African migration and she is co-editing a book with the working title Hope and Uncertainty in Contemporary African Migration (Routledge) to be published ultimo 2015.

Moving Back or Moving Forward? Return Migration, Development and Peace-Building

by Marieke van Houte (Maastricht University / UNU-MERIT, Maastricht) and Tine Davids (Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen)

Abstract This article addresses under which circumstances migrants returning from European to (post-) conflict countries are willing and able to contribute to development and peace-building in their countries of origin. Based on comparative research in six countries world-wide and an in-depth study in Afghanistan, we explore (1) the heterogeneity of the post-return experience, (2) the complex meanings and motivations of return migration, and (3) the expectations of the characteristics of migrants, on which the link between return migration, development and peace-building is based. Based on these findings, we (4) explore return migrants’ potential to be agents of change. We find that while the expectations on which migration and development policies are based only count for a small minority of returnees, this is not the group that is targeted by policy. In order to formulate adequate policies that do address the needs and potential of returnees, we propose two modifications to current policy: First, de facto voluntary and involuntary return should be redefined into more relevant terms that cover the matter. Second, we propose to re-evaluate and disentangle the different goals that inform migration and development policies. Keywords: return migration, migration and development policies, return motivation, embeddedness

Introduction: The Rise of Return Migration as a development and peace-building (Skeldon 2008; Multi-Tool for Policy Raghuram 2009). ‘When migrants return to their country of ori- Efforts by host states to manage these three gin, they will contribute to development and overlapping goals have led to the formulation peace building’. This optimistic mantra in - cur of migration and development policies (see Fig- rent European national policies (ICMPD and ure 1). Within this policy domain, return migra- ECDPM 2013) is the result of a changing political tion evolved from being ‘the great unwritten discourse over the past 25 years with regard to chapter in the history of migration’ (King 2000: 7) migration. In this globalizing world, the interde- to a multi-tool to encompass all these goals at pendency of development, security and mobility once (see Skeldon 2008). Gradually, return migra- has become common ground. As a result, indus- tion came to be considered as both a movement trialized host states have started to see modern back to normal that restores pre-conflict natu- migration movements as instruments for policy, ral and social order as well as a movement for- which (1) need to be managed, controlled and ward to change in which returnees contribute regulated in order to (2) defend domestic secu- to development and peace-building (Koser and rity and welfare and (3) promote international Black 1999; Faist 2008).

New Diversities Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Marieke van Houte and Tine Davids

Although discussions on the link between peace building is based. Based on these findings, migration and development globally have we (4) explore return migrants’ potential to be focused on successful economic migrants, coun- agents of change. This exploration centres on the tries throughout the European Union1 have question of under which circumstances migrants expanded this link to also encompass the return returning from industrialized countries are will- of refugees, failed asylum seekers and undocu- ing and able to contribute to change with regard mented migrants (ICMPD and ECDPM 2013). In to development and peace-building in the (post-) these European countries, asylum and immigra- conflict country of origin. tion policies and so-called ‘Assisted Voluntary We explore these questions by focusing on the Return and Reintegration’ (AVRR) programmes life courses of return migrants, while building on have now taken up a substantial part, if not the two methodologically complementary research bulk of, migration and development policies phases. The first phase is a comparative study and budgets. These programmes are financed of 178 returnees from industrialized countries by, on average, three to nine per cent of Offi- to six countries across the world (Sierra Leone, cial Development Assistance (ODA) (ibid). Other Togo, Armenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Afghani- programmes that promote the link between stan and Vietnam) conducted in 2007-08. In return and development facilitate the tempo- each country, data was gathered through a struc- rary or circular return of high skilled migrants2 tured survey, semi-structured interviews with (ibid). returnees and key informants, and participatory Although allowed by the ODA reporting system observation. The study shows remarkable trends managed by the OECD, several scholars argue as well as context-specific differences. The sec- that ‘Assisted Voluntary Return’ programmes ond phase builds on the first with an in-depth are heavily motivated by an interest to man- case study from 2012 among 35 Afghan return age and control migration movements in a way migrants who returned to their countries of ori- that is financially and politically less costly than gin. They mainly returned from Western Europe, enforced removal. (Black and Gent 2006; Faist and particularly from the Netherlands, the 2008; Zimmermann 2012; ICMPD and ECDPM United Kingdom, Germany and Scandinavia. The 2013; Castles, De Haas and Miller 2014). Scholars autobiographical narrative was the core of the wonder why and how some of the world’s most data collected, which helped to obtain a holistic exploited people should contribute to develop- understanding of the role of migration in indi- ment where official aid programmes have failed viduals’ life courses. In addition, group discus- (Castles and Miller 2009: 58). sions and key informants helped to understand This article explores return migration within the complexities of return migration (Van Houte the migration-development-peace-building ne 2014). xus. We explore (1) the heterogeneity of the After providing a brief historical background post-return experience, (2) the complex mean- of the changes in political and social discourse ings and motivations of return migration, and during the past 25 years with regard to migra- based on that, (3) interrogate the expectations tion in general and return migration in particular, of the characteristics of migrants, on which the we present the main findings from these stud- link between return migration, development and ies. They highlight that return neither is a movement back to normal, nor is it easily a move- 1 Notably Belgium, France, the Netherlands and ment forward to change. We find that the only Spain. See ICMPD and ECDPM (2013) for a systematic returnees who could potentially contribute to analysis of 11 European countries’ Migration and De- velopment policies and how it often includes Assisted change are voluntary returnees, which questions Voluntary Return programs. the adequacy of migration and development 2 Notably Belgium, France, Germany and the Nether- policies. lands (ICMPD and ECDPM 2013).

72 Moving Back or Moving Forward? New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Figure 1. Return, development and peace-building goals, needs and policies

From Cold War Protection to Return Migrants from the beginning of the 1990s onwards. These as Agents of Change changes led to a gradually shifting discourse from Historically, three durable solutions to the ‘refu- integration to return as well as a shift from view- gee problem’ have been recognized: local inte- ing migrants as victims of rival regimes to agents gration in the host community, resettlement of change in their countries of origin. to so-called third countries (i.e. other than the The first consequence of the end of the Cold country of origin and the original destination War was an increasing reluctance to accommo- country), and repatriation to the country of ori- date asylum seekers. Protecting refugees from gin. The end of the Cold War set in motion a rival regimes had previously been a powerful number of changes in the industrialized states source of political propaganda and, at the same

73 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Marieke van Houte and Tine Davids

time, the non-departure regime of the Iron Cur- to restore the natural and social order became tain had kept refugee levels manageable. After portrayed as a basic human right. Since the the end of the Cold War, protecting refugees early 1990s, the United Nations High Commis- lost its geopolitical and ideological value for sioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other inter- Western states. In addition, fading national and national bodies have promoted and facilitated international boundaries, growing inequality return as the most desirable of all solutions for and increased civil conflicts in the post-Cold War refugees (Hammond 1999; Omata 2013). In period caused increased numbers of refugees practice, however, a strong interest in returning and asylum seekers to migrate (Castles, De Haas unwanted migrants to their countries of origin and Miller 2014). led host countries to reject asylum seekers and Along with these increasing immigration pressure them to return much sooner than that flows, the notion emerged that large volumes the migrants themselves found feasible through of migrants might threaten the social cohesion, financial inducements or with a threat of depor- welfare and security in destination countries. tation (Black and Gent 2006). This resulted in a growing public and political In the context of the growing significance of resistance in the industrialized states against civil conflicts, the limited success of classic devel- immigration in the 1990s. The events of 11 Sep- opment institutions and decreased budgets on tember 2001, which linked migration to issues aid and defence, the discourse of individualiza- of security, conflict and terrorism, led to- fur tion led to the search of alternative grassroots ther decreasing tolerance towards non-Western, actors for development and peace building (Zun- Muslim and/or immigrant groups (Skeldon 2008; zer 2004; Duffield 2006). Governments and inter- Raghuram 2009; Castles, De Haas and Miller national agencies became attracted to ascribing 2014: 226, 324). Finally, the interest in manag- migrants the moral responsibility for developing migration increased in the context of the eco- ment and peace-building in their places of ori- nomic recession in Europe over the last five years gin3 (Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen (ICMPD and ECDPM 2013). 2002; Faist 2008; Skeldon 2008; Raghuram 2009). The perceived need of host countries to contain migration changed policies that were Return Migration, Development and Peace designed to welcome Cold War refugees into Building regimes meant to exclude unwanted or unpro- Without theoretical and empirical foundations, ductive migrants (Duffield 2006; Castles, De Haas the discussion on the relationship between and Miller 2014: 226, 324). Obtaining refugee migration, development and peace-building risks status became more difficult (Koser and Black being reduced to a merely political and ideologi- 1999; Black and Gent 2006) and the act of leav- cal issue (Raghuram 2009) that produces inade- ing one’s home and seeking asylum was progres- quate policies (Bakewell 2008). Scholars highlight sively criminalized (Duffield 2006). New legis- the limited and contradictory evidence found in lation aimed at the eventual return of asylum research as well as the complex and heteroge- seekers, such as temporary protection regimes neous linkages between return, development instead of permanent refugee status (Castles, and peace-building (Cassarino 2004; De Haas De Haas and Miller 2014: 226). 2010). The paradoxical expectations of return A second trend after the collapse of the- for migration as both a movement back to normal mer superpower hegemony was a discourse change towards individualization, which also 3 Policies aimed at stimulating the link between appeared in the field of migration, development migration and development usually contain elements and conflict. In migration policy, individualization promoting remittances, skilled migration, circular migration, the engagement of diasporas and return meant that returning back ‘home’ after conflict migration (Skeldon 2008, ICMPD and ECDPM 2013).

74 Moving Back or Moving Forward? New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

and a movement forward to change need to be war to peace for different reasons. First, large- explored (Koser and Black 1999; Faist 2008). In scaled repatriation movements can stretch addition, an important question is which catego- the resources in the society of return. Second, ries of returnees are expected to contribute to returnees may be associated with former eth- what kind of change. nic and political (élite) structures. Third, distrust and resentment regarding questions of loyalty Return as Restoring Order: is Return Going between returnees and those who stayed in the Home? country can form a new line of conflict (Zunzer The argument that return means a restoring of 2004; Chan and Tran 2011). natural and social order in the country of origin In addition to socio-political and economic implies that when the initial reasons for migra- challenges of return, a third line of research high- tion have disappeared, return equals going lights the tension between return, identity, home ‘home’ to the pre-conflict and pre-migration life. and belonging. First, ‘home’ has changed as the Return after conflict is seen as a means to undo post-war economic, social, cultural and politi- the negative consequences of conflict, embod- cal situation in the society of origin is often very ied in refugee flows. The expectation of return as different from what people have left (Ghanem going ‘home’ has made reintegration a key issue 2003). Second, the notion of the homeland as on the international humanitarian agenda, which a ‘purified space of belonging’ (Ahmed 1999) envisions the disappearance of ‘any observable no longer fits in the experience of migrants who distinctions which set returnees apart from their construct multiple and hybrid forms of belonging. compatriots’ (UNHCR 1997: 9). In addition, protracted refugee situations lead to Despite the political and humanitarian logic, second-generation migrants who were born out- the academic debate is now beyond the point side of the country of ‘origin’, which further com- of seeing return as the end of the refugee cycle plicates notions of ‘home’ (Hammond 1999; Faist where everything goes back to normal. First, 2008; Monsutti 2008; Raghuram 2009). Return return is not necessarily the best option or migrants need to both negotiate belonging to the most logical move in the lives of migrants the community of return as well as the distinc- (Monsutti 2008; Omata 2013). Migrants’ deci- tiveness of their identity (Chan and Tran 2011). sion to move is often part of dynamic life strate- The wealth of literature on the dynamic and gies that aim to seek a better future in holistic multi-local notion of home and belonging sug- terms, including security, but also political, eco- gests ambiguity and variety as to what ‘home’ nomic, social and cultural aspects. The financial, means; this concept needs to be taken into physical and emotional investments in migra- account in order to produce empirically and tion imply that migrants have a lot to loseby theoretically valid insights on return migration going back, even if the conflict is settled and the (Hammond 1999; Black and Gent 2006). country is considered safe. In addition, opportunities or gains achieved in exile can be a factor Return as Change: Contributing to Human that may delay (or deter) migrants’ decisions to Capital and Peace or to Inequality and Conflict? return (Zimmermann 2012). In contrast to the ‘restoring of order’ argument A second line of research highlights that rein- that implies the disappearance of differences tegration is not evident, as the post-conflict between returnees and the local population, the moment is a new phase in a dynamic and ongo- ‘return as change’ argument highlights the poten- ing process rather than a return to the pre-con- tial of such differences (King 1978; Bakewell 2008). flict situation (Hammond 1999; Cassarino 2004; First, as migration to industrialized countries is a Faist 2008). Return may increase tensions in the privilege of a relatively wealthy minority, these society of origin and hinder the transition from migrants are considered as the higher educated,

75 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Marieke van Houte and Tine Davids

wealthy, entrepreneurial and strongly networked 2008; Faist 2008; Raghuram 2009). Implicitly, élite. Second, they are expected to have acquired the notion of change is tied to socio-economic skills, capital and ideas while abroad. Third, they modernization in which migrants insert innova- are believed to adopt an in-between position tion, a sense of progress, justice, democracy and between the host country and the country of ori- human rights into the society of return (King gin, which enables them to mediate between cul- 1978; Raghuram 2009). In addition, change is tures and negotiate change (King 1978; Sørensen, expected to take place within existing (political) Van Hear and Engberg-Pedersen 2002). frameworks. Power shifts, political unrest, reli- Despite these specific expectations on the gious-based opposition and illegal activities are characteristics of returned migrants as agents of not the kind of change policy makers are hoping change, a number of gaps remain insufficiently for. Especially since the events of 11 September explored (Raghuram 2009). First, the increasing 2001, and recent news of young Muslims travel- significance and benefits of mobility and access ing from Europe to Syria and Iraq to join Jihad- to transnational circuits makes inequalities ist movements, there is a heightened awareness with regard to the right or capacity to migrate that migrants may also contribute to the ‘wrong’ an important dimension of social stratification kind of change (Raghuram 2009; Castles, De Haas (Carling 2002; Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg- and Miller 2014: 79). The idea that migrants’ Pedersen 2002; Faist 2008; King 2012). Such actions can and should be directed raises ethical increased socio-economic differences caused by and practical questions (Raghuram 2009). migration can induce conflict rather than contribute to stability (Zunzer 2004). The study of What Kind of Returnees? Meanings and migrants’ contribution to development should Motivations of Mobility therefore recognize the hierarchization of peo- The tension in return as a movement back to ples’ right to migrate (Castles, De Haas and Miller normal versus a movement forward to change 2014: 75-76). touches upon more fundamental questions about A second knowledge gap is that there is lim- the meaning of mobility in the lives of migrants. ited and contradictory evidence on the extent to The perception of return as going back to normal which migrants are willing and able to change conceptualizes mobility as a disruption of life, existing (social, cultural, economic or institu- with migrants as the victims of this disruption, tional) structures in the country of origin. If they while return is considered to restore a ‘normal’, have gained new ideas for development and sedentary life (Bakewell 2008). In contrast, the peace-building, how can they negotiate these perception of return as change comes forward changes within the society of return (Faist 2008)? from the expectation that migrants increasingly Will their in-between position make them rela- benefit from their ‘hyperglobal’ (Carling 2002) tively independent from the constraints of struc- and ‘hypermobile’ (King 2012) lives. tures (Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg-Peder- Although this understanding of migrants as sen 2002)? Can they overcome the institutional either victims or agents informs dichotomies constraints to which they themselves are subject, between voluntary and forced migration, the real- or is change only possible within an enabling ity is more complex and heterogeneous. Scholars institutional and economic framework (Castles, highlight that the motivations and meanings of De Haas and Miller 2014: 78)? migration and return are the outcome of a mix of Third, migration-development-peace-build- migrants’ choices and constraints to stay or move ing policies do not only assume the ability of (King 1978; Cassarino 2004; Bakewell 2008; Mon- migrants to contribute to change, but they also sutti 2008; Zimmermann 2012). Migration can have specific, yet under-defined expectations on be considered as a livelihood strategy through the type and direction of such change (Bakewell which people can adapt to constantly changing

76 Moving Back or Moving Forward? New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

circumstances (Monsutti 2008). Even wartime migrants with regard to building a sustainable migration, although associated with disruption livelihood, establishing social networks and hav- and loss, is argued to be less disempowering ing a sense of identity and belonging in the coun- than involuntary immobility (Carling 2002). try of return. Our data suggests that returnees With regard to return, it is argued that the were often worse off in terms of access to inde- motivation for return defines an important part pendent housing and income compared to their of the post-return experience (Cassarino 2004). pre-migration situation. Cerase (1974) argued that migrants who return The process of post-return embeddedness out of failure will be reabsorbed into society is determined by a wide range of factors. The as if they had never migrated, while successful study showed context-specific factors as well as migrants who return with the ambition to start remarkably strong general trends across the six a new life, could potentially be a source of inno- highly heterogeneous countries of return. First, vation. Although recent studies show a more the obstacles and opportunities faced by return- nuanced image, going beyond dichotomies of ees are directly related to previous experiences success and failure and taking into account a in the migration cycle. The living circumstances wider variety of migrant profiles, they recogin the host country and the motivation for return nize similar processes (Cassarino 2004; De Bree, to the country of origin are of critical importance Davids and De Haas 2010; Cassarino 2014). Sev- for post-return embeddedness. Years spent in eral authors argue that legal status is an impor- restricted circumstances that constrain freedom tant factor that shapes the meanings and moti- of movement and limit possibilities for employ- vations of migrants’ return. (Carling 2004; Black ment and education, thus making migrants and Gent 2006). dependent on social welfare, are factors that damage migrants’ self-esteem, survival skills and Moving Back or Moving Forward? social networks. Their damaging effects cannot In the following sections we provide an answer be compensated by the limited return assistance to the questions raised above based on the main that is provided. Apart from business assistance, findings from the 2007-2008 comparative study the return assistance therefore has limited and the 2012 Afghan case study. or even negative effects on all dimensions of embeddedness. Determinants of Post-Return Embeddedness These findings show that it is unjustified and We first investigated whether the use of Official even misleading to suggest that ‘Assisted Volun- Development Assistance for ‘Assisted Voluntary tary Return’ programmes may promote develop- Return’ programmes of rejected asylum seekers ment. While the intention is expressed, and bud- and undocumented migrants is justified (i.e. con- get assigned, to make this type of return migra- tributing to development) (see Van Houte and tion contribute to development, this intention is Davids 2008; Ruben, Van Houte and Davids 2009). undermined by restrictive migration policies. In Based on the 2007/2008 comparative study, we contrast, we found that returnees faced depri- analysed the factors that influence post-return vation rather than benefits from their migration embeddedness, which is defined as an indi- experience. As achieving sustainable return for vidual’s identification with and participation in the individual returnee is thus already a chal- one or multiple spaces of belonging (Van Houte lenge, returnees cannot be expected to contrib- and Davids 2008; Ruben, Van Houte and Davids ute to development. Rather, the opposite is true; 2009), including return assistance, migration returnees are often a burden on their relatives’ cycle experiences and individual characteris- household budgets and put higher pressure on tics. The results highlight the overall difficulties already limited employment, health care and for rejected asylum seekers and undocumented education facilities in the country of return.

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Meanings and Motivations of Return and meaningful way. While pleading to take into Here we focus on the 2012 Afghan case study. account the complexities of return, a distinction First, the findings that return motivation, more that captures the large empirical differences in than return assistance, is of crucial importance the post-return experience, which is therefore for post-return embeddedness, which called for more relevant for policy and research on migra- a more thorough analysis of the meanings and tion, should be based on post-return mobility. motivations of return. In policy terms, return is Practically, this categorization is based on legal called voluntary as long as it does not take place status in the host country: return of migrants with physical force. We proposed to deconstruct with a legal alternative to stay permanently in return as a complex decision-making process to the European country of residence is the basis for find an alternative for this unsatisfactory- ter calling return voluntary, while return of migrants minology. A better understanding of the mean- without such legal alternative is defined as invol- ings and motivations of return can help to- bet untary (see Van Houte, Siegel and Davids, forth- ter address the needs and potential of returnees coming). through improved policies. We took a closer look at the mechanisms that Interrogating the Expectations of the decide how much agency people have over their Characteristics of Return Migrants migration decision by taking into account struc- This categorization was used to interrogate the ture, desires, capacities and agency of migrants expectations of the characteristics of return concerning their decision to return. We found migrants, which inform the debate on the linkages that there is no clear-cut boundary, but rather between migration, development and peace- a gradual scale from voluntary to involuntary building. First, other than the assumptions that return (see also Monsutti 2008), and that almost underlie migration and development policies, all migrants could claim some degree of agency we showed that not all migrants are élites, not over their return. all returnees benefit from their migration expe- The analysis, furthermore, shows that mobil- rience and not all strongly participated in and ity entails an essential capacity and desire in the identify with multiple places of belonging. Rather, lives of return migrants, leading to strong empiri- the opportunities migrants have to accumulate cal differences in the post-return experiences skills, knowledge and savings in the host country, of those who are transnationally mobile after which they may invest after return, are unequally return and those who are not. Returnees who distributed among different types of migrants. were unable to match desires of mobility with The majority of voluntary returnees in this their capacities, because of their lack of legal sta- study were members of the Afghan élite. They tus in the former host country and stricter migra- were able to leave their country at an early tion policies, experienced involuntary immobility stage of the conflict and, because of their high (Carling 2002). On the contrary, returnees who profile, they were often granted refugee status had permanent legal status in the host country and, eventually, citizenship of the country of resi- returned while knowing that they would be able dence. These refugees were able to participate to re-emigrate if needed. This continued trans- in the new society of residence and had access national mobility gave these returnees a sense of to education and opportunities to learn the lan- security and comfort, and allowed them to take guage and employment. Voluntary returnees advantage of geographical differences (Carling returned to Afghanistan when they, given their 2002). individual circumstances, felt this was the best We therefore challenge the current policy- option (Cassarino 2004). They returned while oriented categories based on the use of force by maintaining strong and multi-local ties and con- defining the same categories in a more adequate tinued transnational mobility.

78 Moving Back or Moving Forward? New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Involuntary returnees, on the other hand, between which they are transnationally mobile. were of more modest descent and left later or This means that they have increased room to stayed in transit countries for several years to manoeuvre, and can form hybrid identities, save money for the rest of the trip; they there- which allows them to apply creative responses fore took up to nine years to reach Europe. Hav- to new situations in their personal lives (see also ing arrived in European countries at a later stage, Bakewell 2008). they claimed but never received refugee- or per- Despite the fact that all returnees can display manent asylum status. Their legal status did not agency over their personal choices, they do not allow them to fully participate in the host society. always want to, are not always able to, or do Contrary to voluntary return, involuntary return not feel the need to mediate between cultures felt like a step back rather than an improvement. and negotiate structural change in Afghan soci- If involuntary returnees succeed economically, ety. The expectation that returned migrants can this was despite rather than thanks to their time mediate between cultures and negotiate change abroad. The uneasy feeling of being ‘stuck’ in in existing structures (Sørensen, Van Hear and Afghanistan because of their involuntary immo- Engberg-Pedersen 2002) is therefore overstated bility, and their relative failure compared to suc- and should be carefully formulated in policies on cessful returnees (Carling 2004), made them feel migration and development. impoverished, disempowered and frustrated. Our findings show that previously existing Return Migrants’ Potential to be Agents of socio-economic differences are reinforced by the Change migration experience, which results in strongly Last, we explore the expectation that return differentiated patterns of post-return multi-local migrants can be agents of change in develop- embeddedness and transnational mobility. This ment and peace-building (see Van Houte, forth- finding restricts expectations of return migration coming). We built on the previous findings to and development. answer the main question. We took an emic per- Second, we focused on the expectations spective to explore the ways returnees identify within the migration, development and peace- with the conflict and what kind of ‘change’ they building debate on returnees’ potential to medi- could potentially bring in the migration-develop- ate between cultures and negotiate change as a ment-peace-building nexus. result of their multi-local ties and hybrid identi- The only returnees who could potentially live ties (Van Houte and Davids, forthcoming/b). We up to any of the expectations raised in the migra- explored how Afghan migrants returning from tion, development and peace-building debate European countries negotiated belonging to one are voluntary returnees. They return while main- or multiple spaces of belonging through their taining ties with the European country of resi- expressions and practices of marriage, sexuality dence. Their participation in and identification and gender norms. with multiple places of belonging (in the country While the migration experiences strongly of origin, the European country of residence and, determined returnees’ capacities, returnees often, the international expatriate community) also displayed a variety of desires. The findings and transnational mobility gave them the confi- show that all returnees can be seen as agents in dence that they could protect themselves from an attempt to match their desires and capacities, generalized violence and at the same time keep although agency takes place through a variety of their dependants safe in the Western country of strategies. Involuntary returnees often choose residence. While ethnic or other pre-migration to comply with the limits of the structures they security issues were remarkably absent in their are confronted with. Voluntary returnees, on the narratives of security, their strong affiliation other hand, are embedded in multiple structures with the West and their sometimes high profiles

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as successful returnees created a risk for them, get of violence compared to voluntary returnees. both with regard to common criminality and Having lived but never really participated in the kidnapping, and targeted anti-Western violence. former host country, they did not pick up many Younger voluntary returnees found a sense of skills or ideas and rather leaned to the conserva- belonging in the Afghan society by taking that tive and traditional side as a strategy to negotiate risk and are pioneers who take advantage of the belonging to the Afghan society (see Van Houte opportunities of a market with limited compe- and Davids, forthcoming/b). Having lived in con- tition because of the physical and financial risk stant insecurity for much of their lives, the expec- involved. tation of increased insecurity after 2014 affected Many voluntary returnees were driven by their mental health. Being unable to maintain ambition and chose to return to Afghanistan ties with the host country in addition to their lack despite the expected post-2014 turbulence. of embeddedness in the Afghan space, further- They returned with optimism, energy and pro- more, made them angry and disappointed which active attitudes, which was a new input into the compelled them to retreat from, rather than conflict-ridden Afghan society. They adopted a bring change in society. discourse of modernization in which they saw Two main conclusions can be drawn from their knowledge, skills and attitudes from Europe these results. First, more than economic impacts, as an asset they could offer to Afghanistan. How- the human dimension of returnees’ involve- ever, although they tried to negotiate in-between ment in the country of origin is the most impor- practices of Western modernity in an Afghan tant potential contribution to change. Voluntary context, any ‘foreign’ ideas were regarded sus- returnees’ creativity, resilience and innovative- piciously. Implementing them required patience ness, along with their entrepreneurial mentality and social skills, which made few of these efforts and their intellectual skills, are important input to change existing structures successful. Vol- by these returnees. Nevertheless, these aspects untary returnees constantly re-evaluated their are relational and have proven to be extremely decision to stay or move, and they were likely to difficult to negotiate change in a society that is re-emigrate in the face of the post-2014 changes. suspicious of returnees and ‘foreign’ involve- However, this very mobility also enabled them to ment. In contrast, the human dimension of take the risk to be ‘different’ from dominant soci- returnees who are impoverished and frustrated ety, and to advocate controversial opinions that by their migration experience, and the role of go against the current discourse, through creativ- the Afghan government and their European host ity, innovation and improvisation, as Hammond country, can also have a negative impact. This (1999) defined social change. negatively feeds the already present anti-West- In contrast, involuntary returnees, who ern sentiments in their return environment. returned without having any legal alternative to Second, while the international community stay, were in no way a potential to Afghan peace- sees repatriation as the ultimate proof of peace building and development. Most of them were of that represents the restoring of normalcy, it is modest background and returned further impov- rather continued transnational mobility that erished and frustrated rather than enriched could be the basis for Afghan migrants’ contri- by their migration experience (see Van Houte, bution to change in Afghanistan (Black and Gent Siegel and Davids 2014). Being weakly embed- 2006; Monsutti 2008). There is no such thing as ded in Afghanistan and involuntarily immobile, a return to ‘normalcy’ in the context of Afghani- involuntary returnees felt exposed to generalized stan, as the conflict and migration movements violence, as they did not have enough means to over the last 35 years have shaped the reality of protect themselves and their dependants. How- today (Monsutti 2008). In the explosive environ- ever, their lower profile made them less of a tar- ment of today’s Afghanistan, continued transna-

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tional mobility has become a strategy of migrants return migration as an indicator for voluntary or to become more independent from national involuntary return. structural constraints and ensure their own Next, we interrogated the expectations of the safety. Transnational mobility is, therefore, their characteristics of return migrants, that returnees strongest asset to overcome their constraints are (1) positively selected, (2) benefit from their and carefully negotiate change; rather than a migration experience, and (3) form hybrid identi- weakness, their mobility is therefore their stron- ties to negotiate change upon return. We found gest asset that may facilitate their most valuable that these expectations are too easily formulated contribution. Policies aimed at stimulating the and strongly differ between voluntary and invol- migration-development-peace-building nexus untary return, in which transnational mobility is should therefore release the focus on putting the strongest differentiating factor. The findings migrants ‘back in their place’ (Bakewell 2008). therefore highlight the limitations of the applicability of return and development policies. Conclusions Last, we projected these insights on returnees’ Return is neither a movement back to normal nor identifications with conflict. We highlighted that is it easily a movement forward to change. When policy makers’ idea that migrants’ actions can migrants return to their country of origin, they and should be directed raises ethical and practi- do not automatically contribute to development cal questions. With regard to the main question and peace-building. The relationship between of this article on the circumstances under which migration and development is too complex for return migrants are willing and able to contrib- easy generalizations. Rather, the policy and prac- ute to development and peace-building, we high- tice of migration would benefit from highlighting lighted the importance of the human dynamics the complexities of migration. By unfolding the and transnational mobility. meanings and motivations of return migration, Overall, this article showed that return migra- and comparing the experiences of voluntary and tion is a complex process to which contempo- involuntary returnees, this article identified con- rary policy is responding inadequately. Next, tradictions in return migration policies. we discuss the policy implications of these First, we highlighted that return is more com- conclusions. plex than going ‘home’ and introduced the concept of multidimensional embeddedness as a Policy Implications: Humans as Policy holistic approach to the post-return experience Instruments? of migrants beyond ‘reintegration’. We analysed Return migrants have come to be seen as a the determinants of post-return embeddedness, threefold multi-tool in which their actions and showing a number of remarkable trends across movements can be controlled to meet their host six heterogeneous countries under study. The governments’ overlapping goals. Policies and strongest findings showed the limited or even budgets on return migration and development negative impact of return assistance, and the sig- are considered as instruments to: nificance of the migration cycle experience and 1. Manage, control and regulate the movements in particular the return motivation. of migrants who are economically and We therefore first focused on the meanings politically superfluous by returning them to and motivations of return. We deconstructed the country of origin and relieve the burden of return as a complex decision-making process the host state; that goes beyond dichotomies of voluntary and 2. Defend domestic security and welfare by involuntary mobility. We furthermore high- relieving the burden of immigrants on host lighted the importance of post-return mobility, states while preventing destabilizing effects which we proposed to centralize in the study of of return migration, which may initiate

81 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Marieke van Houte and Tine Davids

Figure 2. Development potential and development budget for returnees

new migration movements or be otherwise development in any way. This simple but ironic harmful for the host society; finding is visualized in Figure 2. 3. Shift the responsibility of development and peace-building to migrants and give a positive Why is this a problem? connotation to their return, while controlling The way migrants are seen as instruments for and preventing the ‘wrong’ kind of change, fulfilling the goals of the host state dehumanizes such as revolution, religious-based opposition them, because it fails to see them as purposive or political unrest, which may be a threat to actors whose actions are part of dynamic life the second goal. strategies, ambitions, values and visions (Omata In order to combine these goals into one policy, 2013). Governments representing liberal democ- host governments choose to ignore and blur the racies should pay more attention to the individ- understanding of the heterogeneity of these ual lives of people without assuming that they returnees, who include failed asylum seekers as can control migration (Skeldon 2008; Castles, De well as high-skilled economic migrants. European Haas and Miller 2014: 318). Rather than being countries assign substantial parts, if not the bulk used as an instrument for development, migra- of their Migration and Development policies that tion should be taken into account as an encom- are paid out of Official Development Assistance passing aspect of development and conflict. If budgets, to asylum and immigration policies and migration is to contribute to development and ‘Assisted Voluntary Return’ programmes (ICMPD security, migration should be facilitated rather and ECDPM 2013). than contained. Both policy makers and civil society organiza- Ineffective Return and Development Policies tions have, however, been pragmatic about the While the expectations on which migration and mismatch between policy and reality. First, the development policies are based only count for a current policy on return migration and develop- small minority of returnees, this is not the group ment is intentionally misguided. Several reports that is targeted by policy. Though the bulk of have questioned the development potential of budgets of policies promoting return, develop- return assistance programmes (Van Houte and ment and peace-building go to de facto involun- De Koning 2008; Frouws and Grimmius 2012). tary returnees, they are unable to contribute to However, policy makers have not been respon-

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sive to arguments about the limited evidence on ment among returnees who find that the story return and development and the need for careful is not as bright as was presented to them. Their wording and definitions regarding the nature of discontent may have a destabilizing effect after mobility. They are aware that using a vocabulary their return, which then undermines the goals of of ‘voluntary return’ and ‘return migration and migration and development policies. development’ makes it easier to explain a politically sensitive topic to the public, and that fram- Undoing the Mismatch ing the policy in this way enables them to use It is therefore both for moral and pragmatic budgets assigned for development assistance for reasons that NGOs and policy makers should the return of unwanted migrants. For host coun- acknowledge the real impact of return pro- try governments, this is a multiple win situation. grammes on individual migrants and develop- Second, non-governmental organizations ment in the country of origin, and to re-evaluate whose primary goal is the wellbeing of migrants their roles in this process. To undo the mismatch have now been incorporated into the migration between policy and reality, and in order to for- and development discourse. NGOs who became mulate adequate policies that address the needs involved in return assistance, as a way to ‘do and potential of returnees, we propose two something for those who have to return’, now modifications to current policy. First, to avoid have to comply with the terms of the govern- further conceptual confusion, de facto volun- ments’ return policies in order to receive funding, tary and involuntary return should be redefined which basically means that they have to produce into more relevant terms that cover the matter. a target number of returnees. While NGOs ori- Second, it is time to re-evaluate and disentangle ented towards migrants have an image of inde- the different goals that inform (return) migration pendence in society and among migrants, they and development policies. This is displayed in are in fact implementing government policy for Figure 3 and described below. removing unwanted migrants. The pressure to Although these goals do have overlaps, they market their product, in what has been called imply different needs in relation to return migra- the ‘migration industry’ (Gammeltoft-Hansen tion. The first goal to regulate, prevent and and Sørensen 2012), leads to claims that they reduce migration implies the need to remove contribute to sustainable return or even to unwanted migrants effectively. Since deporta- development. Such claims may, in turn, be used tion is both financially and politically costly and by governments to further legitimize their return ineffective, an effective way is to provide a return policies. incentive by means of financial or in-kind com- Expressing these expectations in policy papers, pensation. Second, the goal to ensure domestic statistics and other communications is, however, security and welfare implies the need to pre- not harmless, as it affects our thinking and debat- vent any destabilizing effects of return through a ing about, and communication with, migrants. ‘safety net’. Both these goals and their needs can Civil servants in charge of convincing migrants to be met through policies of return assistance for return tend to become frustrated with migrants unwanted migrants. The third goal to promote who are not willing to leave. In their optimistic development and peace-building in the country frame, migrants who do not cooperate with ‘vol- of origin implies the need for an investment in untary return’ are unwilling to take responsibil- human capacity of migrants and continued trans- ity for their own lives (Kalir 2013) and for the national mobility. Policies promoting the devel- development of their ‘home’ country. These opment and peace-building potential of migrants expectations, raised by both policy makers and should ensure both needs. NGOs, strain communication with migrants Considering the discussion above, it becomes before return and foster anger and disappoint- clear that these goals are not complementary

83 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Marieke van Houte and Tine Davids

Figure 3. Disentangling return, development and peace-building goals, needs, policies

but rather serve different needs, call for different in the lives of the individual migrants, if they policies and target different types of migrants. would be allowed to increase their capacities While the first two goals aim at putting unwanted through rights to employment, education and migrants back in their place, the third goal high- freedom of movement in the host country. lights the need for continued transnational The different goals and needs therefore imply mobility, which does not even require migrants the use of different budgets: if return is to regu- to return. In addition, while the first two goals late migration and ensure domestic security and only meet the needs of the destination countries, welfare, this is a matter of home affairs and secu- the third goal would mainly favour development rity budgets. Only if return occurs under the con- and peace-building in the countries of origin and dition of continued transnational mobility and

84 Moving Back or Moving Forward? New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

strengthened human capacity, it may meet the Cerase, F. P. 1974. “Expectations and Reality: A goals to promote development and peace-build- Case Study of Return Migration from the United States to Southern Italy.” International Migra- ing, which justifies funding fromO fficial Develop- tion Review 8 (2):245-262. ment Assistance budgets. Chan, Y. W. and T. L. T. Tran. 2011. “Recycling Migration will always be part of people’s sur- Migration and Changing Nationalisms: The Viet- vival strategies in times of conflict and crisis. namese Return Diaspora and Reconstruction of Instead of trying to manage and contain these Vietnamese Nationhood.” Journal of Ethnic and migration flows, a way forward in the migration Migration Studies 37 (7):1101-1117. and development debate should be how we can De Bree, J., T. Davids and H. De Haas. 2010. facilitate the resilience and determination of “Post-return Experiences and Transnational Be- people to find a better life. Further policy-ori- longing of Return Migrants: a Dutch-Moroccan ented research is needed to look into how trans- Case Study.” Global Networks 10 (4):489-509. De Haas, H. 2010. “Migration and Development: national mobility can be fitted better into current A Theoretical Perspective.” International Migra- migration and development policies. tion Review 44 (1):227-264. Duffield, M. 2006. “Racism, Migration and De- velopment: the Foundations of Planetary Order.” Progress in Development Studies 6 (1):68-79. References Faist, T. 2008. “Migrants as Transnational Develop- Ahmed, S. 1999. “Home and Away.” International ment Agents: An Inquiry Into the Newest Round Journal of Cultural Studies 2 (3):329-347. of the Migration-Development Nexus.” Popula- Bakewell, O. 2008. “‘Keeping Them in Their tion, Space and Place 14 (1):21-42. Place’: The Ambivalent Relationship Between FROUWS, B. and T. GRIMMIUS. 2012. “Migratie en Development and Migration in Africa.” Third Ontwikkeling. Beleidsevaluatie van het Neder- World Quarterly 29 (7):1341-1358. landse Migratie- en Ontwikkelingsbeleid sinds Black, R. and S. Gent. 2006. “Sustainable Return 2008: Eindrapport.” Research voor Beleid / in Post-conflict Contexts.” International Migra- Maastricht University. tion 44 (3):15-38. Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. and N. N. Sørensen. Carling, J. 2002. “Migration in the Age of Invol- 2012. “Introduction.” In T. Gammeltoft-Hansen untary Immobility: Theoretical Reflections and and N. N. Sørensen, eds., The Migration Industry Cape Verdean Experiences.” Journal of Ethnic and the Commercialization of International Mi- and Migration Studies 28 (1):5-42. gration. Abingdon / New York: Routledge. ———. 2004. “Emigration, Return and Development GHANEM, T. 2003. “When Forced Migrants Re- in Cape Verde: The Impact of Closing Borders.” turn ‘Home’: The Psychological Difficulties Re- Population, Space and Place 10 (2):113-132. turnees Encounter in the Reintegration Pro- Cassarino, J.-P. 2004. “Theorising Return Migra- cess.” RSC Working Paper. Oxford: University of tion: The Conceptual Approach to Return Mi- Oxford. grants Revisited.” International Journal on Multi- Hammond, L. 1999. “Examining the Discourse of cultural Societies (IJMS) 6 (2):253-279. Repatriation: Towards a More Proactive Theory ———. ed. 2014. Reintegration and Development. of Return Migration.” In R. Black and K. Koser, Florence: European University Institute / Robert eds., The End of the Refugee Cycle? Refugee Re- Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies patriation and Reconstruction. New York / Ox- Castles, S., H. De Haas and M. J. Miller. 2014. ford: Berghahn. The Age of Migration: International Population ICMPD, and ECDPM. 2013. Migration and Develop- Movements in the Modern World. Fifth ed. Bas- ment Policies and Practices. A mapping study of ingstoke / New York: Palgrave Macmillan. eleven European countries and the European Castles, S. and M. J. Miller. 2009. The Age of Commission. Vienna / Maastricht: International Migration: International Population Movements Centre for Migration Policy Development / Eu- in the Modern World. Fourth ed. Basingstoke / ropean Centre for Development Policy Manage- New York: Palgrave Macmillan. ment.

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Kalir, B. 2013. Paper read at Migration, Stockholm Sørensen, N. N., N. Van Hear and P. Engberg- and Beyond: The Follow Up of the 2009 Stock- Pedersen. 2002. “The Migration-Development holm Programme on Migration Governance; Nexus: Evidence and Policy Options.” Interna- The Need for Further Steps, December 9, at The tional Migration 40 (5):49-73. Hague. UNHCR. 1997. The State of The World’s Refugees King, R. 1978. “Return Migration: A Neglected As- 1997: A Humanitarian Agenda. Geneva: UNHCR. pect of Population Geography.” Area 10 (3):175- Van Houte, M. 2014. Moving Back or Moving 182. Forward? Return Migration After Conflict, Maas- ———. 2000. “Generalizations From the History of tricht Graduate School of Governance, Maas- Return Migration.” In Return migration: Journey tricht University, Maastricht. of Hope or Despair, edited by B. Ghosh, 7-55. Ge- ———. Forthcoming. “Returnees for Change? Af- neva: IOM / UNHCR. ghan Return Migrants’ Identification with Con- ———. 2012. “Geography and Migration Studies: flict and their Potential to be Agents of Change.” Retrospect and Prospect.” Population, Space and Conflict, Security & Development 14 (5):1-27. Place 18 (2):134-153. Van Houte, M. and T. Davids. 2008. “Develop- Koser, K. and R. Black. 1999. “The End of the Ref- ment and Return Migration: from Policy Pana- ugee Cycle?” In The End of the Refugee Cylce? cea to Migrant Perspective Sustainability.” Third Refugee Repatriation and Reconstruction, edited World Quarterly 29 (7):1411-1429. by Richard Black and Khalid Koser, 2-17. New ———. Forthcoming/b. “Love (n)or Marriage: How York / Oxford: Berghahn Books. do Afghan Return Migrants from Europe Negoti- Monsutti, A. 2008. “Afghan Migratory Strate- ate Belonging to One or Multiple Spaces of Em- gies and the Three Solutions to the Refugee beddedness?”. Problem.” Refugee Survey Quarterly 27 (1): VAN HOUTE, M. and M. DE KONING. 2008. Towards 58-73. a Better Embeddedness? Monitoring Assistance Omata, N. 2013. “The Complexity of Refugees’ Re- to Involuntary Returning Migrants from West- turn Decision-Making in a Protracted Exile: Be- ern countries. Nijmegen / Amsterdam: CIDIN / yond the Home-Coming Model and Durable So- AMIDSt. lutions.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies Van Houte, M., M. Siegel and T. Davids. 2014. 39 (8):1281-1297. “Return to Afghanistan: Migration as Reinforce- Raghuram, P. 2009. “Which Migration, What De- ment of Socio-economic Stratification.” Popula- velopment? Unsettling the Edifice of Migration tion, Space and Place. doi: 10.1002/psp.1876. and Development.” Population, Space and Place ———. Forthcoming. “Deconstructing the Mean- 15 (2):103-117. ings of and Motivations for Return: An Afghan Ruben, R., M. Van Houte and T. Davids. 2009. Case Study.” “What Determines the Embeddedness of Forced- Zimmermann, S. 2012. “Understanding Repatri- Return Migrants? Rethinking the Role of Pre- and ation: Refugee Perspectives on the Importance Post-Return Assistance.” International Migration of Safety, Reintegration, and Hope.” Population, Review 43 (4):908-937. Space and Place 18 (1):45-57. Skeldon, R. 2008. “International Migration Zunzer, W. 2004. Diaspora Communities and Civil as a Tool in Development Policy: A Passing Conflict Transformation. In Berghof Occasional Phase?” Population and Development Review Paper. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Con- 34 (1):1-18. structive Conflict Management.

86 Moving Back or Moving Forward? New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Note on the Authors

Marieke van Houte completed her PhD thesis entitled Moving Back or Moving Forward? Return migration after conflict, in November 2014. She currently works for the OECD on a research project on migration and development. Her most recent publications are in Population, Space and Place (With Melissa Siegel and Tine Davids, 2014): Return to Afghanistan: Migration as Reinforcement of Socio-economic Stratification, and Conflict Security and Development (2014): Returnees for Change? Afghan Return Migrants’ Identification with Conflict and their Potential to be Agents of Change (vol. 14, issue 5). In her current and future work, she aims to continue doing migration research and expand her expertise on qualitative and participatory research methods.

Tine Davids is lecturer at the department of Cultural Anthropology and Development Studies at the Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands. She is involved in teaching and research on gender, politics, globalization and (return) migration. Among others, she is co-editor of ‘Rethinking Gender Mainstreaming’ (Special Issue for Journal of International Development, 2014), also: ‘Embodied Engagements: Feminist ethnography at the crossing of knowledge production and representation.’ (Special Issue for Women Studies International Forum 2014) and co-editor of the volume Women, Gender, Remittances and Development in the Global South, forthcoming by Ashgate in 2015.

Who Cares? Transnational Families in Debates on Migration and Development*

by Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Ida Marie Vammen (Danish Institute for International Studies)

Abstract International migration sets in motion a range of significant transnational processes that connect countries and people. How migration interacts with development and how policies can promote and enhance such interactions have, since the turn of the millennium, gained attention on the international agenda. The recognition that transnational practices connect migrants and their families across sending and receiving societies forms part of this debate. The ways in which policy debate employs and understands transnational family ties nevertheless remains underexplored. This article sets out to discern the understandings of the family in two (often intermingled) debates concerned with transnational interactions: The largely state and policy-driven discourse on the potential benefits of migration on economic development, and the largely academic transnational family literature focusing on issues of care and the micro-politics of gender and generation. Emphasizing the relation between diverse migration-development dynamics and specific family positions, we ask whether an analytical point of departure in respective transnational motherhood, fatherhood or childhood is linked to emphasizing certain outcomes. We conclude by sketching important strands of inclusions or exclusions of family matters in policy discourse and suggest ways to better integrate a transnational family perspective in global migration-development policy. Keywords: migration, development, transnational family relations, gender, global care chains

Introduction International migration sets in motion a range of field, reference is routinely made to ‘migrants significant transnational processes that poten- and their families’: Migration potentially ben- tially contribute to development. Over the past efits migrants and their families; remittances lift decade, transnational interactions conducive to individuals and families out of poverty; migra- development have received considerable attention leads to increased female participation in tion in global policy papers, international forums, employment and, by implication, empowerment and dialogues (Sørensen, Van Hear and Engberg- of women and changed (gender) relations. At Pedersen 2002; Sriskandarajah 2005; de Haas the other end of the spectrum, disconnections 2005, DRC 2009, UNDP 2009). Within this policy are emphasized: Family separation potentially leads to family disruption; has emotional,- psy

* The authors would like to thank Sarah van Wal- chological and social costs for children, spouses sum, Peggy Levitt, Nina Glick Schiller and Laura Oso and the elderly; disrupts family care regimes; for insightful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft. The present version benefitted from two blind- and causes a plethora of social problems ranging ed peer reviews. from school dropouts and teenage pregnancies,

New Diversities Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Ida Marie Vammen

to societal decay and the breakdown of social produced by the Coalition Against Trafficking in norms. Policy discourses rarely specify the family Women2) or organized migration for marriage situations that circumscribe migrating subjects (Kawaguchi and Lee 2012). However, as several prior to, during and after migration. Rather, fam- decades of gender studies have shown, whether ily relations are taken for granted or attributed women and men migrate or not, gender identi- particular normative qualities, predominantly ties are characterized by fluidity, multiple social conceived of on the basis of nuclear families or positioning, movement and transformation single unit households (Mazzucato and Schans (Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Anthias 2000; Pessar 2011). and Mahler 2003). Throughout the migration It is our contention that migrants remain process, ideas about appropriate gender roles understood as individual actors in the migration- become the lens through which desirable social development debate. They may be approached change (the object of development policy) are as individuals of particular sexes, colors and expressed. The pressure exerted on migrating classes, but seldom as relational subjects subjects often departs from idealized notions of embedded in larger social structures. Yet migra- family relations where everyone – and women tion research has demonstrated how migration in particular – acts according to societal expecta- decisions, choice of destination, adaptation and tions (Parreñas 2005; Abrego 2009). In almost all incorporation, and transnational relations are societies, gendered notions of appropriate travel, linked with family ties and bonds, although not occupation and living conditions circumscribe necessarily in harmonious or tension-free ways. female migration to a larger extent than that of The decision to send one or more migrants may men. be taken within the family and the financial Basic research and policy studies have dispa- costs involved found by pooling family resources. rate traditions of categorizing social reality and The motivation behind migration decisions may gendered transitions; the diverse and complex involve the need to be able to provide for fam- case-based research in academia and the policy ily members, and family members – in both makers’ inclination towards operational solu- source and destination countries – may remain tions creates a complicated dialogue between key sources of economic and emotional support the two disciplines. This article sets out to discern throughout the migration process. However, in the conception of the family in two (often inter- other instances, family-based conflicts and fam- mingled) debates concerned with transnational ily-induced violence motivate movement, a clear interactions: The largely state and policy-driven warning against taking the primacy of family rela- discourse on the potential benefits of migrations – or the moral sensibilities informing poli- tion on economic development and the largely cies around families – for granted. academic transnational family debate focusing Early debates regarding the migration-devel- on issues of care and the micro-politics of gen- opment policy largely overlooked the impact der and generation. A few recent articles have of gender. A perceived increase in independent reviewed the transnational family literature from female migration – often termed the ‘feminiza- different angles, examining research on immi- tion of migration’ – led to policy studies con- grant families (Glick 2010), the effects of trans- cerned with the specific forms female migration national family life on children (Mazzucato and may take, such as migration for domestic work Schans 2011) and other central themes related to (e.g. produced by the ILO Global Action Pro- transnational parenthood (Carling, Menjivar and gramme on Domestic Workers and their Fami- Schmalzbauer 2012). We supplement these con- lies1), the trafficking of women for sex work (e.g. tributions by focusing explicitly on what the lit-

1 See http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/labour-migration/projects/WCMS_222567/lang--en/index.htm 2 See http://www.catwinternational.org/

90 Who Cares? Transnational Families … New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

erature engaged with transnational motherhood, Migration 2013 Report nevertheless makes - ref fatherhood, childhood and global care chains erence to a smaller sample of recent migrant can tell us about migration-development dyna family studies and concludes that these studies mics. In addition, we bring in considerations of come up with various findings: in some contexts the consequences of macro-politics on the trans- emotional costs of family separation is found, in national family, a topic often given insufficient particular among children left in the care of other attention in research concerning family-related family members. In other cases, the benefits of migration. We conclude by sketching out impor- remittances may bring higher levels of well-being tant strands of inclusions or exclusions of family among migrant families (IOM 2013). mattes in policy discourse and suggest ways to Engaging in this dialogue, transnational stud- better integrate a transnational family perspec- ies suggest that migrant parents may “leave chil- tive in global migration-development policy. dren and other dependents behind” in a physical sense, but often migration is grounded in one’s Migration, Development, and Family Matters sense of responsibility to the family. Most seek The Global Forum on Migration and Develop- to retain their family relational status, e.g. by ment (GFMD) and the two High Level Dialogues carrying out fatherhood or motherhood in new (HLDs) have maintained migrant family matters ways, challenging conventional notions of fam- high on the international policy agenda since ily life as defined by geographical proximity. The 2006. Supporting positive migration outcomes, costs and benefits of family separation are not a special Working Group on Human Rights, Gen- fixed; rather, they vary according to the micro der and Migration was established under the and macro-level contexts in which they occur Global Migration group (GMD) in late 2012, pay- (Zentgraf and Chinchilla 2012). The transnational ing particular attention to the promotion and family research field has grown extensively dur- protection of the human rights of all migrants ing the last 5-10 years, and a number of topical and their families. The GFMD 2013-14 Concept questions have been raised, particularly relating Paper states that “Migrants often bring higher to care and parental roles. Most studies are con- income and more opportunities to their families cerned with migration from the Global South to and communities” but also communicates that the Global North, reflecting the general tendency the downside of migration may include “depen- in migration research to focus on the period after dencies and social tensions within families and migration and processes of adaptation and inte- societies” (GFMD 2013). In a similar vein, the gration to the host society (Nawyn 2010). Far less 2013 HLD on International Migration and Devel- attention is given to South-South migrations.5 opment makes ample reference to migrants and Migration from Latin America and Asia and sub- their families “who rely on migration to improve sequent transnational family development are their livelihoods” but “too often face high costs the predominant regions of investigation. Lesser and risks”, including “family separation”.3 The attention is given to African migrations. Transna- 2013 Human Development report also points to tional family studies involving European migrants the “profound human costs of forcibly prolonged are beginning to emerge, as are comparative family separation” (UNDP 2013), a concern studies. Apart from a few exceptions, family shared by ILO who states that “little attention is dynamics of sub-Saharan migrants have been paid to the social costs of family separation and impacts on families left behind”.4 The IOM World 5 The focus on migration from developing to developed countries are misleading in comparison with 3 See www.un.org/esa/population/mmetings/ current international migration flows in which only 37 HDL2013/documents/Roundtable 1-paper.pdf percent of global flows move from developing to de- 4 See http://www.ilo.org/migrant/publications/ veloped countries, 60 percent moves either between specialized-publications/WCMS_222913/lang--en/ developing or between developed countries (UNDP index.htm 2009: 21).

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only scarcely researched and have often been identities and loyalties. Like other families, trans- related to other topics,6 but authors are begin- national families are not biological units per se, ning to take an interest in how South-South and but social constructions or ’imagined commu- interregional migration affects the involved fami- nities’ that must mediate inequality amongst lies. These research interests include compara- their members, including differences in access to tive studies focusing on the effects of internal, mobility, resources, various types of capital and regional and international migration (i.e. Illanes lifestyles (Bryceson and Vuorela 2002: 3-7). 2010; Carrasco 2010; De Regt 2010). In transnational family research, continuity in In the following section we highlight two the- social family networks across borders is generally matic trends: Firstly, we analyse family reproduc- seen as conducive to human development and tion and issues of transnational motherhood, often underlies the formation of transnational transnational fatherhood, and transnational (or institutions that can further economic develop- local) childhood. Secondly, we focus on repro- ment in the countries of origin (Oso and Ribas- duction to production through the concept of Mateos 2013). At the other end of the conti global care chains. Our categorization in family nuum we find case studies emphasizing the high or chain relationship is not indicative of mutable emotional tolls on individual family members, exclusive debates, but rather suggests a cata- potentially leading to family breakdown and ulti- logue of themes that seems to form part of cur- mately to the breakdown of the social fabric of rent trends in research on transnational families. entire local communities. Such findings will generally point to negative migration-development Transnational Family Relations outcomes (UNICEF 2007). The contradictions The academic transnational family literature between often idealized notions of family ide- addresses the multifaceted and asymmetric char- ology and concrete lived experiences of differ- acter of relationships between family members ing but workable family configurations beg the and how these relationships transform by being question of whether breakdowns in the family subjected to spatial separation. Perhaps the most occur naturally or as a consequence of migration. significant effort to develop a theory regarding Often, female migration is a consequence of male transnational families was made in 2002, in Bry- abandonment of family responsibilities, leaving ceson and Vuorela’s edited volume ‘The Trans- women in charge of both emotional and finan- national Family: New European Frontiers and cial family needs (see e.g. Sørensen and Guarnizo Global Networks’. Building on the work of Basch, 2007). Another question relates to the conditions Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc (1994), Bryceson and constraints within which migrant families and Vuorela defined transnational family life as maneuver; in particular, how the state and state social reproduction across borders. They further migration and family policies play out in the life understood transnational families as families of migrant families (Boehm 2008). In the follow- that live separated from each other for some or ing paragraphs we take a closer look on what the most of the time, yet still remain together and transnational family literature has to say about create a feeling of collective welfare and unity, a particular family positions and whether an ana- process they term ‘familyhood across national lytical point of departure in respectively transna- borders’. Transnational families, they argued, tional motherhood, fatherhood or childhood is have to cope with multiple national residences, linked to emphasizing particular outcomes.

Transnational motherhood 6 For example, Nigerian migrants often figure in the literature on human trafficking, sex work and interna- Almost to two decades ago Hondagneu-Sotelo tional crime but are absent in studies of transnational and Avila (1997) drew attention to how female families (motherhood and multi-local households) Latina domestic workers in the United States (Kastner 2010: 18).

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creatively rearranged and reconstructed them- preoccupations may also overlook how mod- selves as mothers to accommodate spatial and ern forms of low-cost communication enable temporal separation from their children. They migrant mothers to fulfil important maternal termed these emerging cross-border care rela- responsibilities (Tungohan 2013). While a sense tions “transnational motherhood”, a term largely of enhanced co-presence is produced under cer- adopted in later literature. Drawing on social tain conditions as texting, chatting and skyping constructivist and feminist notions of family become part of the social fabric of transnational and gender roles, subsequent studies of trans- motherhood (Madianou and Miller 2011, 2013) national motherhood highlighted how family this may not prevent migrant mothers from feel- reconfigurations, on the one hand, are deeply ing insufficient, guilty and distressed (Horton rooted in and mediated by social stratification 2009; Parreñas 2010). Enhanced communication factors (Lutz 2008), and, on the other hand, how can increase discontent, grunges, insults, argu- migrant women tackle the practical and emo- ments, and avoidance as much as it contributes tional challenges of mothering from a distance in to binding families together (De Bruijn,Brinkman a context of socially defined moralities (Åkesson, and Nyamnjoh 2013). Carling and Drotbohm 2012). The ways in which female migrants leave Transnational motherhood analyses the traditional gender roles behind and become pressures of culturally-specific gender norms. economically independent and empowered by Firstly, women’s migration for wage work – and migrating to more ‘egalitarian’ societies also ability to send home remittances – challenges remains an open question (Barajas and Ramirez local gender ideologies of male breadwinners 2007). Rather than reconfiguring gender roles, a and female caretakers (Hondagneu-Sotelo and range of studies point to the inertia and conser- Avila 1997; Parreñas 2010, 2005; Dreby 2006; vative nature of gender systems. Rachel Parreñas’ Gamburd 2008; Abrego 2009; Bernhard, Landolt (2010) work on Philippine transnational mother- and Goldring 2005). Secondly, social imaginaries ing indicates that fathers rarely take over child- of emotionally close mother-child relationships rearing responsibilities when mothers migrate. are challenged by women’s migration (Dreby Instead, other female kin step in, risking becom- 2006; Horton 2009; Parreñas 2010; Illanes 2010; ing overburdened with such responsibilities. As Boehm 2011), potentially fostering myths of parental expectations to female migrants may mothers abandoning or putting their children at not decrease, migrant mothers attempt to make risk and subsequent family breakdown (Suárez- up for emotional distress and social stigma by Orozco, Todorova and Louie 2002; Boehm 2008). remitting as much of their income as possible, Preoccupations expressed in public discourse in often irrespective to their economic situation receiving societies may not always reflect histori- (Lim 2009; Peter 2010). Moral expectations of cally established child-rearing practices involv- motherly responsibilities and self-sacrifice may ing extended family members, as Olwig’s (2012) limit migrant women’s socio-economic integra- research on Caribbean and Åkesson, Carling and tion in the receiving country and, in some cases, Drotbohm’s(2012) research on Cape Verdean lead to a life in chronic poverty (Abrego 2009). child fostering practices demonstrate.7 Such When single mothers leave their first children in the countries of origin and later have new fami- 7 Examples of more fluid child fostering practices lies and children in the migration destination, and by implication broader definitions of what transnational motherhood entails have also been report- their dual breadwinning role may further limit ed for Latin American (Leinaweaver 2009; Sørensen the realization of social and economic indepen- and Guarnizo 2007; Madianou and Miller 2012); Af- dence (Kastner 2010). rica (Al-Sharmani 2006; Drotbohm 2010; Filho 2009; Mazzucato and Schans 2011; Poeze and Mazzucato Studies of transnational motherhood have 2014); and Asia (Huang, Yeoh and Lam 2008). mainly looked at family and gender relations

93 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Ida Marie Vammen

after migration and only rarely compared tion to diverse effects related to whether fathers migrant and non-migrant families in the send- leave mothers and children behind, or stay put ing context (Mazzucato and Schans 2011). We when women migrate. Finally, it connects father- therefore are unsure as to whether families were hood to remittance practices and family welfare on the breach of falling apart due to national (Schmalzbauer 2005; Dreby 2006). structural barriers and inequality prior to migra- We detect two separate sets of effects on tion. We also lack knowledge regarding local family wellbeing related to respectively paternal transformations in gender relations and family or maternal absence. Studies concerned with norms. Finally, we lack analysis concerning the the household division of labour upon paternal changing and dynamic nature of motherhood migration explain fathers’ reluctance to rear- over the life course. Life stage clearly influences range household labour and provide emotional both family constructions, migration patterns childcare as embedded in dominant notions of and the respective mothering functions (Singh fatherhood and paternal inclination to infuse and Cabraal 2013; Bonizzoni and Boccagni 2014; respect and not care (Parreñas 2008, 2010; Ryan Wall and Bolzman 2014); hence, an analytical et al. 2008; Tungohan 2013). Pribilsky’s study of framework of circulation might be one way for- Ecuadorian migration to New York shows a pos- ward to capture the dynamic and structurally sible alternative outcome in which migration diverse forms of family formations, care relations becomes a window into domestic work for male and relational motherhood (Baldassar and Merla migrants, who after having had to cook and clean 2014). become more appreciative of women’s work in the country of origin. In addition they experience Transnational Fatherhood more freedom to transcend traditional gender To counter-balance the predominant focus on roles from their new position in the U.S., includ- transnational motherhood, a small but - grow ing the establishment of more affective care rela- ing body of literature addresses the migration tions with their children (Pribilsky 2012). Studies of fathers from a gendered perspective. This concerned with stay-at-home fathers also find literature partly comes from a critique of equat- that they are willing to not only care for their ing attention to gender with attention to women children but also for their migrant spouse’s well- (Pribilsky 2004; Waters 2009), and for incor- being (Fresnoza-Flot 2014; Waters 2009). Some rectly positioning men as the deviant ‘other’ men strive to become different fathers than their who either abandon the family upon migration own (Kilkey, Plomien and Perrons2014). or who cannot or will not take over reproductive Transnational fatherhood analysis contributes labour when mothers migrate (Datta et al. 2009; a nuanced understanding of ‘parental abandon- Abrego 2009; Alipio 2013; Mazzucato and Schans ment’. Paternal abandonment may be due to 2011). This literature underscores how masculine disadvantaged socio-economic and legal posi- identities change during different stages of the tions, such as unemployment or lack of proper migration process.8 Additionally, it pays atten- documentation (Pribilsky 2007; Abrego 2009; Coe 2011). A middle position is found among 8 other transnational literature links male migra- migrant fathers whose long and/or irregular tion to stages in the life course: In parts of the world working hours provide a challenge to maintain where access to local work opportunities are scarce or no longer can provide a proper livelihood, migration regular contact with their children. Thus work- may present the only way to become a “man” (Ah- ing conditions, rather than essentialist masculine mad 2008; Pribilsky 2012; Christiansen, Vigh and Utas identities, may explain abandonment. Finally, 2006; Vigh 2009). In such contexts, male migration should be understood as a prerequisite to realize the abandonment may be temporary as contact masculine potential of entering into a familial union may be reestablished when the social and eco- and begin to father children; in short, become an nomic situation improves.Y et other studies focus adult.

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attention to complications stemming from alco- In the latter case, remittances benefit child wel- hol, drug abuse and the establishment of new fare by strengthening household finances, reduc- affective relationships in the migration destina- ing child labour, and contributing to cover the tion, resulting in complicated relations with the costs of education, healthcare and other welfare family-members in their country of origin (Dreby related expenses (Carling and Tønnessen 2013). 2006; Worby and Organista 2007). While such behavior may result in ‘social death’ in the coun- Transnational Childhood tries of origin (Peter 2010), it seem that men Parents’ transnational migration practices- af are less likely than women to be socially sanc- fect children. Whether staying with a parent or tioned for defaulting on family responsibilities another care-giver in the country of origin, be- (Dreby 2006; Abrego 2009; Carling, Menjivar and coming reunited with family members in the Schmalzbauer2012). migration destination or migrating on their own Gender powerfully determines labor market to support their families, children take an active opportunities and is therefore believed to shape part in creating and maintaining transnational remittance behavior. Although male migrants family configurations (Uehling 2008). The trans- generally have access to better paid jobs than national family literature frequently focuses on women, it is often assumed that women not only children but often through the lens of their par- send home a higher proportion of their income ents (Mazzucato and Schans 2011). This might but also remit more frequently and continuously explain the tendency to see children as acted (Sørensen 2005). In her study of Salvadoran upon rather than being actors in their own life. transnational families, Abrego (2009) finds that However, recent literature has started to adapt transnational fathers generally send less money a more child-centered approach (Dreby and Ad- home than migrant mothers. As male migrants kins 2012), giving voice to children’s own notions are less burdened by normative expectations of of family, gender and mobility, as well as empha- self-sacrifice, they tend to spend more of their sizing children’s agency. earnings on personal needs with the result that Age seems to be a significant variable when many ‘father-away’ transnational families barely considering how children are affected by migra- manage to survive. Such findings are not univer- tion (Carling, Menjivar and Schmalzbauer 2012). sally applicable, as other case studies provide Age also structures how migrant children are evidence that remittances from male migrants treated politically, e.g. as eligible for child-cen- support families quite well, especially when tered development programmes in the countries managed properly. To the extent that whole of origin (Carling and Tønnessen 2013), as depen- families become dependent of migrant fathers’ dants eligible for family reunification (Bernhard, remittances, family reunification may become Landolt and Goldring 2009), or as unaccompa- more difficult or prolong the transnational family nied minors (Uehling 2008). arrangement (Pribilsky 2004). When children stay behind, migrating par- The relationship between fathers’ where- ents sometimes disclose the difficulties involved abouts and family welfare cannot be limited to a in migration. This can lead to misunderstand- question of migration, as parental absence might ings and unrealistic expectations (Schmalzbauer be due to divorce or death, as well. Recent find- 2008). Perceptions of parenting and childhood ings from Malawi indicate that concern about are shaped by societal norms, which partly the welfare of left behind migrant children might explain the conflicting findings of problems be exaggerated. Paternal orphans and children related to feelings of ‘abandonment’ (Parreñas of divorcees are significantly disadvantaged 2005; Bernhard, Landolt and Goldring 2009) or compared to otherwise similar children who live family relations based on acceptance of sepa- with their father or whose father has migrated. ration (Poeze and Mazzucato 2014). The quality

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of care-giving arrangements is important, as dif- (Carling, Menjivar, and Schmalzbauer 2012). In ficult relationships with new care-givers create some immigration contexts, states even facilitate tensions between the child, the caregiver, and such returns in the form of re-education camps the migrant parent(s) (Parreñas 2010, 2008; for diasporic youth (Turner 2014). Schmalzbauer 2006; Dreby 2007; Haagsman and Children are not just moved but also move Mazzucato 2014). independently for a variety of reasons, including Due to their parents’ migration, children bene escaping from fragile situations, human rights fit economically and get access to better health abuses, gang violence, or because of the break- and education, which has diverse developmen- down of care arrangements. Others seek educa- tal effects. Several studies find that better eco- tion, access to better paid jobs and economic nomic family situations does not necessarily opportunities (Terrio 2008; Hess and Shandy translate to higher human development for chil- 2008; DRC 2009). Perhaps more than any other dren (Schmalzbauer 2006; Dreby 2007; Parreñas family category, the independent migration of 2008, 2010), as emotional strain may impact children or ‘unaccompanied minors’ reveals the negatively on health and school performance complex relationship between political impulses (Kandel and Massey 2002). The extent to which to protect children (e.g. from becoming victims of transnational family arrangements under certain smuggling/trafficking networks) and protect the circumstances might strengthen children’s sense receiving societies from rising immigration pres- of membership to their family is an understudied sure. Uehling (2008) describes this paradox by topic (Dreby and Adkins 2012). juxtaposing ‘Childhood at risk’ with ‘Children as Children who migrate to be reunified with risk’. Recent studies of deportation and its effects their families adjust to their new family setting on migrant communities underscore that ‘child- over time. This adjustment, however, can be a hood at risk’ involve children’s fear that one or challenging one (Phoenix and Seu 2013). Disap- more adult family members might get deported. pointment with their new living arrangement The threat of a family member’s detention and and a desire to return to their former situation- deportation demonstrates that, compared to the can occur, indicating that reunification with one stresses of their initial migration, the risk of fam- family member might signify a loss of close rela- ily disruption may be higher after the family is tionships with others (Bonizzoni and Leonini settled in the destination country (Boehm 2008; 2013). Familial divisions of labour in country of Dreby 2012). origin contexts are rearranged when one or both parents migrate, but this is also the case when Transnational Care children reunite with their parents in the migra- In 2000 Arlie Hochschild coined the term ‘global tion destination. Children with working parents care chain’ to describe how migrant domestic may be put in charge of caring for younger sib- workers are employed by professional working lings, which again might intensify the family’s women in the global North, which in turn leaves transnational identity (Lee and Pacini-Ketchabaw a care deficit, or care drain, behind with regard- 2011; Øien 2010). Second and third generation ing their own families (Hochschild 2000). The youth remain a part of transnational social fields discussion of global care chains within the migra- that influence their practices, values and ideas tion-development debate include Rachel Salazar (Fouron and Glick Schiller 2002; Levitt 2009; Parreñas’ work on ‘the international transfer Reynolds 2006; Mand 2010). A child’s involve- of caregiving’ and ‘the international division of ment in transnational social fields also influences reproductive labour’ (Parreñas 2000, 2001), as mobility, as parents may choose to send them well as various related studies compiled in the back to their country of origin in order to avoid edited volume ‘Global Women’ (Ehrenreich and the ‘bad influence’ of the destination country Hochschild 2003).

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Inspired by global value chain analysis, care that affect male migrants’ access to the labour chain analysis asserts that economic globaliza- market, leaving work in the care industry one tion is inextricably linked to the globalization of of few open options for e.g. undocumented social reproduction. The conceptual framework migrants (Sarti 2010). The function of children attempts to illustrate/explain the processes in in care chains is only just emerging in the lit- which several phenomena – e.g. neoliberal glo- erature (Lee and Pacini-Ketchabaw 2011; Olwig balization and the feminization of migration 2012), while studies on transnational care for the – interact with gender relations, transnational elderly have attracted attention for quite some families and cross-border care arrangements time (Baldassar and Baldock 2000; Baldassar, (Lutz and Palenga-Möllenbeck 2012). The care Wilding and Baldock 2006; Izuhara and Shibata chain calls attention to the commodification of 2002). New amalgams of care between children care work among women, how the economic and the elderly may emerge, as suggested by value of care work diminishes as it gets passed an interesting multigenerational case study of along, and how economic and social inequal- care in Peruvian transnational families, where ity is maintained on a global scale. The care migrants fill ‘care slots’ by leaving the children chain metaphor undoubtedly uncovers a vari- to live with their grandparents in arrangements ety of gendered economic push-pull dynamics where the two generations take care of each (Nawyn 2010) and illustrates the interdepen- other (Leinaweaver 2010). dence between people in different positions Global care chain analysis has expanded in across different places quite well (Escrivá 2004). a number of important ways. It has applied a Yet, this approach has been criticized for reifying ‘transnational political economy of care’ perspec- that only women do care work, for insufficiently tive (Williams 2011). It has also revealed the taking local inequalities into account, for -ignor role of the global migration industry in the pro- ing institutionalized/professionalized care work duction of particular chains (e.g. global domes- chains involving trained migrants as doctors and tic care chains, global nursing care chains), the nurses (Parreñas 2012; Raghuram 2012), and for huge profits made by international corporations remaining embedded in gendered and asym- in facilitating certain chains, and how global metrical morality regimes that “risks underesti- care chains are produced and facilitated by the mating migrants’ endeavors to provide care even intersection of government policy in the areas under adverse conditions” (Boccagni 2014: 231; of migration, welfare and health with actors Zentgraf and Chinchilla 2012). involved in recruitment, brokerage, training and The changing nature of global care economies travel (Yeates 2009). has expanded the thematic orientation to include Apart from attracting attention across aca- men’s reproductive labour, care for the elderly demic fields, the global care chain concept has left behind, and children’s work as caregivers found a place in policy discussions. This particu- and as such acknowledged not only relations but lar response to global care chain conceptualiza- also generations. In relation to the question of tions are found in part in the unwearied rights- men, various scholars have attempted to ‘add based advocacy efforts of feminist scholars and the other sex’ to the care chain discussion by women’s organizations, which have broadened looking at the entrance of male migrant work- the policy debating tables over the past ten ers in care work, particularly how male domes- years. In 2005, Nicola Yeates introduced the con- tic workers practise and reconstruct masculin- cept and its usefulness to the Global Commis- ity by underlining their traditional roles as the sion on International Migration (Yeates 2005). family head and breadwinner (Bartolomei 2010; In 2008 UN-INSTRAW suggested that the forma- Näre 2010; Sarti and Scrinzi 2010). Other stud- tion of global care chains embodies the broader ies have paid attention to the structural factors process of globalization of care and provides a

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valuable position from which to examine the Szanton Blanc 1994) and the early work by Roger interrelationship between migration and devel- Rouse (1995) indeed underlined that transna- opment, culminating in the 2010 publication tional families have to be understood within a of ‘Global Care Chains: Towards a Rights-based world of nation states. Global Care Regime’ (Orozco 2011). The fourth Migration scholars have generally explained meeting of the Global Forum for Migration and migration-policy making in terms of a ratio- Development, held in Mexico in 2010, made nal balancing of economic interests, electoral explicit reference to transnational families and pushes and judicial constraints. More recent highlighted that “Global Care Chains are a 21st studies have focused attention to the construc- century development issue with major implication of collective identities and value systems by tions for gender and family” (but yet not a prior- discussing migration policy in relation to issues ity for development policy).9 A final example of such as social cohesion, national identity, the policy interest in the global care chain concept limits to multiculturalism and the alleged fail- is the European Commission funded ILO Global ure of integration (Bonjour and de Hart 2013). Action Programme on Migrant Domestic Workers Within transnational family research, scholars and their Families (2013-16), with the objective have pointed to how complex factors deriv- of “developing and strengthening national labour ing from family and migration policies contrib- laws, migration policies, and recruitment regula- ute to the systemic production of transnational tions and practices that are oriented towards cross-border family arrangements. It is, in other achieving decent work for migrant domestic words, politics, and not the exotic foreign family workers across global care chains”.10 forms and child-rearing practices, that explains the current global extension of transnational The Impact of Macropolitics on the Family families. Transnational family research has high- Early transnational studies are often criticized lighted that international migration law doesn’t for romanticizing transnational family life. These necessarily serve the interests of all individuals studies have emphasized the continuity of social equally (migrant mothers, fathers, single moth- networks and institutions across borders while ers, dependent children and the elderly). While largely overlooking the macro-political struc- formal equality between native men and women tures limiting the mobility of individual family may be reached in national family law, substan- members within such networks (Bernhard, Land- tive inequalities may persist in emigration and olt and Goldring 2009; Goulbourne et al. 2010). immigration law (Van Walsum 2009). Regard- Studies on transnational families have likewise ing emigration, some sending countries may been criticized for privileging de-territorialized restrict or ban the emigration of women based notions of family-care arrangements at the on either age or sector of employment (e.g. for expense of analyzing the state policies and inter- domestic work or entertainment in certain coun- national regulations within which transnational tries, but not for nurses, doctors and engineers, families are situated (Baldassar 2008; Kilkey and (see Oishi 2005), often in attempts to protect Merla 2014). While we found examples of such nationals from known exploitation. In regard ‘celebratory’, often under-theorized, research in to immigration, transnational family arrange- our review, it should be stressed that the semi- ments may be built into the very structure of nal work in transnational migration studies such immigration policy, e.g. by installing temporary as ‘Nations Unbound’ (Basch, Glick Schiller and worker programs for particular and gender-specific sectors that are tied to long-term restric-

9 See gfmd_mexico10_rt_2-2-annex_en%20(1).pdf tions on acquiring permanent residence, family 10 See http://www.ilo.org/migrant/capacity-build- reunification or social benefits in the receiving ing-and-technical-assistance-on-labour-migration/ country (Bernhard, Landolt and Goldring 2009), projects/WCMS_222567/lang--en/index.htm

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a constraint strongly underscored by care chain and Barrios 2011; Golash-Boza and Hondagneu- analysis. Sotelo 2013). In these studies, deportation is Feminist and actor-oriented research has examined as a global mechanism of state con- equally underscored the contradictory nature of trol, deportability (the protracted possibility of gender-specific migration. A case study of Mexi- being deported) as the real effect of internalized can women employed in the highly masculinized migration policies and practices. In this process, temporary migration programmes in Canada deportees arise as members of a new global dias- by Preibisch and Grez (2013) found that even if pora consisting of “people who had to leave one acquisition of Canadian citizenship was out of the home only to be forcibly removed, often years reach for these women, they expanded notions later, from another” (Kanstroom 2012: ix). Some of citizenship in other ways, e.g. by being able to attention is paid to how these mass deporta- acquire land, property and capital in Mexico that tions affect migrants in the sending countries, for in turn produced greater respect and social status example by Hagan, Rodriguez and Castro (2011). from families and neighbours. Yet, while migra- These include both the termination of the ability tion allowed these women to expand certain to send remittances upon deportation and the dimensions of their citizenship, they remained additional pressures on local labor markets with subject to “punitive labour-immigration regimes high unemployment rates, adding yet another in the global North, to repressive gender systems level of development problems to poor migrant embedded in both arenas of their transnational sending countries. lives, and to the structural realities of the con- Our analysis underscores the importance of temporary global political economy” (Preibisch understanding transnational families and cross- and Grez 2013: 799). border family arrangements as always situated Another line of studies has focused on the within broader macro- and geopolitical contexts. ways states divide families by defining and regu- It highlights how current destination country lating family and kinship in numerous ways. State deportation policies tend to undermine long- policy and migrant families may interpret and standing family reunification principles and pose understand family in multiple and contradictory dire social, economic and psychological costs ways, leading to ongoing tensions over criteria for transnational families in both countries of for who actually constitutes a family member. destination and origin (Hagan, Eschbach and It is exactly through definitions of who qualifies Rodriguez 2008). The threat of deportation is as a legitimate migrant that state power is par- particularly poignant for families of mixed status ticularly strong in disrupting family life (Boehm (Brabeck, Lykes and Hershberg 2011), who, in 2008). New post-Fordist migration management the incidence of deportation of individual family systems exclude an increasing number of peo- members, become subjected to the ‘disruption ple from the global circuits of legal mobility by of family ties’ that not only is an undesirable out- disconnecting increasing numbers of individual come of their initial migration, but ironically also transnational family members from the promises the subject of much public concern. of globalization (De Genova 2002). Even when transnational families have ‘succeeded’ in divid- Conclusion and Ways Forward ing their productive and reproductive labour Our findings point to a tendency to think in binary across borders (Schmalzbauer 2005, 2010), their oppositions – women versus men, adults versus strategies become increasingly vulnerable. children, staying put versus migrating, staying The recent increase in deportation has led connected versus breaking family ties – when migration scholars to focus on deportation, discussing transnational families. We also detect deportability and deportees (see e.g. De Genova a tendency to locate social concerns in a moral and Peutz 2010; Juby and Kaplan 2011; Brotherton economy of emotions rather than in a political

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economy of human mobility. These tendencies national scholarship (Delgado Wise and Márquez are more pronounced in policy debates but also Covarrubias 2007; Sørensen 2012). traceable in academic contributions. We find that focusing solely on transnational We find that policy debate generally has motherhood, fatherhood or childhood obscures reacted inclusively to academic insistence on other central caregivers in transnational fam- acknowledging diversity. This is perhaps not a ily arrangements and neglects the central role surprise, as scholars often are contracted to of the state in the lives of transnational fami- produce policy inputs by international organisa- lies. As stated by Boehm, transnational family tions. Attention to specific potentials, problems positions are “indeed riddled with difficult deci- and risks facing migrant mothers and children sions, ambivalent emotions, and multiple nego- (and only to a limited extent migrant fathers) tiations in the face of limited options” (Boehm increasingly appears in these papers, as does 2008: 788). Future studies of transnational family reference to the importance of more encom- positions would benefit from turning attention passing perspectives that consider the wellbeing towards the conditions and constraints within of the entire transnational family. However, an which migrants and migrant families maneuver. acknowledgement of diversity in migrant experi- Paying attention to the ways in which - mother ences does not necessarily include attention to hood, fatherhood and childhood are shaped by the structures that produce this diversity. state power would lead to more nuanced and Awareness of the importance of migration pol- less normative assessments of transnational icy was at the forefront of transnational migra- family arrangements. tion theory (in particular the influential work of In our view, attempts to connect individual Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994; migrants and migrant positions to larger global Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Levitt and Glick structures can be found in the literature on global Schiller 2004). In contrast to the rather simplis- care chains. The application of global care chain tic belief that migrants are agents of change, this analysis to the migration-development policy literature insists that ‘positive gains’ and ‘nega- field has uncovered the tendency to find market- tive costs’ of migration always must be weighed oriented solutions to the vacancies in care func- against state policies, leading to an understand- tions in the global North by relaxing immigra- ing of transnational families within – and not tion policy towards people with certain skills in beyond – a world of nation states (Goulbourne times of need (e.g. health workers in the 1960s et al. 2010). State policies either facilitate or con- and 70s, domestic workers in the 1980s and 90s) strain how ‘fluid’ or ‘continuous’ family contact while using moralizing arguments in favour of and other exchanges can be maintained. Gains return or extending only time limited labour con- and costs are almost always closely connected to tracts (families will suffer less emotional stress legal status, making the legal status of each indi- if the separation is short term). While we note vidual transnational family member a key axis a high policy responsiveness to the global care of differentiation (Piper 2005) and thus oneof chain concept, we nevertheless ask whether this entanglement with migration and development responsiveness is due to a rather linear image policy. We therefore insist that the critique of invoked by the chain metaphor, constructing reproducing a rather seamless image of transna- easily defined victims (care drained families and tional family arrangement – e.g. by focusing on care deprived children in the global South) to the developmental impact of family remittances whose rescue social workers, religious institu- without emphasizing the conflicts these remit- tions and NGOs (based in or paid by the North) tances give rise to and the state neglect they can turn (Raghuram 2012)11, or to whom restric- make up for – rather should be directed at migration-development political practice than at trans- 11 For a parallel discussion of the schism between political efforts to rescue victims of trafficking and a

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tive migration policies in the form of time-limited benefits of migration (Carling 2013). To move the contracts can be constructed as beneficiary? migration-development policy agenda forward, To find a balance between the extreme ends of we nevertheless insist that policy makers need to the global care chain and regulate in a more just recognize the role played by policy making in the manner the burden of the costs, risks and invest- global North and South in generating and main- ments currently falling on migrants and develop- taining transnational family arrangements (Bern- ing countries, some kind of global governance is hard, Landolt and Goldring 2009; Mazzucato and clearly needed (Yeates 2012). The rights/treat- Schans 2011). To support such efforts, transna- ment of migrant care workers is a strong human tional family research needs to bring the state rights issue that often sits uneasily between into any analysis concerned with difference-pro- migration and development polies. It also high- ducing family relations. lights the asymmetrical power balance in the debate between northern and southern partners. Extending labour rights to migrant domestic workers runs somewhat counter to current References return and temporary migration scheme efforts Abrego, L. 2009. “Economic Well-Being in Salva- in the migration policy field. Pushing for access doran Transnational Families: How Gender- Af to civil and social rights in both sending and fects Remittance Practices“. Journal of Marriage and Family 71 (4):1070-1085. receiving countries seems a more radical way Agustín, L. M. 2007. Sex at the Margins: Migra- forward. As recently argued by Lutz and Palenga- tion, Labour Markets and the Rescue Industry. Möllenbeck (2012), neither the academic nor London and New York: Zed Books. the policy oriented care chain discussion has Ahmad, A. N. 2008. “The Romantic Appeal of Illegal hardly taken into account the citizenship situa- Migration: Gender Masculinity“. In: M. Schrover, tion of care workers, in particular the fact that J. Van der Leun, L. Lucassen and C. Quispe, eds., care workers often fail to obtain citizenship rights Illegal Migration and Gender in a Global and in the countries of reception. At the same time, Historical Perspective. Amsterdam University they are harshly reminded of their social citizen- Press. ship obligations – which maintain an emphasis ÅKESSON, L., J. CARLING and H. DROTBOHM. 2012. “Mobility, Moralities and Motherhood: Navigat- on migration-development on the remittance ing the Contingencies of Cape Verdean Lives”. sending potential – in their countries of origin. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38 We agree with many of the policy recommen- (2):237-260. dations made by our colleagues. Surely there is Alipio, C. 2013. “Young Men in the Philippines: a need for policy development to support safe Mapping the Costs and Debts of Work, Marriage, mobility for children, women and other per- and Family Life“. ANNALS of the American Acad- ceived vulnerable migrant groups, and surely emy of Political and Social Science646:214-232. such policy development needs to recognize that AL-SHARMANI, M. 2006. “Living Transnationally: both access to and experience with migration is Somali Diasporic Women in Cairo”. International Migration 44 (1):55-77. highly gendered.12 We also agree that the welfare Anthias, F. 2000. “Metaphors of Home: Gender- of children and parents alike can be improved by ing New Migrations to Southern Europe“. In: avoiding stigmatization, preventing false prom- F. Anthias and G. Lazaridis, eds., Gender and ises, and providing support and stability for fam- Migration in Southern Europe: Women on the ily members left behind to further maximize the Move. Oxford: Berg. Baldassar, L. 2008. “Debating Culture Across Dis- rights-based approach to sex work, see (Agustín 2007; tance: Transnational Families and the Obligation Plambech 2014). 12 See http://www.migrationdrc.org/publications/ to Care“. In: R. Grillo, ed.,The Family in Question: misc/Making_Migration_Work_for_Development. Immigrant and Ethnic Minorities in Multi-Cul- pdf

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Note on the Authors

Ninna Nyberg Sørensen is a senior researcher at the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS). She has worked on migration-development issues for most of her career and published widely on transnational migration, conflict and gender, for example Work and Migration (London 2002), The Migration-Development Nexus (Geneva 2003), Living Across Worlds (Geneva 2007), and The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration (London 2013). Her recent work explores undocumented migration of Central Americans, the insecurities migrants encounter and the consequences of massive deportation on local communities and sending states.

Ida Maria Vammen is a PhD fellow at the Danish Institute of International Studies (DIIS). She has worked on migration, development and the role of migrants’ transnational religious engagement. Her current project explores West African migrants in Argentina as part of an emerging new trans-Atlantic migration trend. She recently contributed to the special issue of International Migration on Rethinking the Migration-Development Nexus and Policies (Vol 50, No 3, 2012).

108 The Public Role of Social Scientists in Constituting the Migration-Development Nexus1

by Thomas Faist (Bielefeld University)

Abstract Academic and public debates on the migration-development nexus often raise the question whether and in what ways social scientific research may form a basis for rational political decisions. The main thesis of this article is that such a question is ultimately misleading. Social scientific research may offer crucial information for describing, understanding and explaining the migration-development nexus. The most important role of social science is not to give policy advice but to offer concepts and patterns of interpretations – based on empirical research – which can guide political debates in the public sphere. This means that sociological analysis should go beyond focusing on research-policy links, and bring the social scientists’ role in the public sphere in a much more forceful way. Keywords: international migration, development, public sphere, knowledge, public role of social scientists

Introduction1 Considering remittances as instruments for eco- the idea that migration plays a central role for nomic development, and the idea that interna- economic and human development. They have tional migrants have the capacity to drive forward established a link between migration and devel- economic growth, have not been central tenets opment via remittances, and have convinced of the Millennium Development Goals (2000- governments and international organizations to 2015). Nonetheless, during the past decade and implement improved measurement techniques a half, attention to the potential of migrants’ in order to record remittance flows (Bakker 2014). remittances for development has increased tre- While this claim could be disputed, the ques- mendously (Sørensen et al. 2002), and it is quite tion is which role social scientists, among other plausible that migration for development will actors in the public sphere, have played in linking play a prominent role in successor schemes and basic and applied research. The latter has often programmes to the Millennium Development been conducted in the context of policy changes, Goals (cf. UNDP 2009). Experts and researchers which have touted migrants’ remittances as a have held a key function in the renaissance of development tool. More specifically, there is an often-mentioned gap between research in the social sciences, on 1 A slightly different version of this article was published in Thomas Faist, Margit Fauser, Peter Kivisto the one hand, and social action and praxis on the (eds.), The Migration-Development Nexus: A Transna- other. This alleged disjuncture is particularly per- tional Perspective. Houndmills, UK: Palgrave Macmil- tinent in the migration-development nexus. At lan, 2011, pp. 185-203.

New Diversities Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Thomas Faist

first glance, this may seem astonishing because (Boswell 2009)? While this may be a fruitful migration studies and development research— question to begin with, it is ultimately mislead- both fields being interdisciplinary in nature —are ing. John Maynard Keynes already pointed out in characterized by a high degree of commissioned the 1930s that finding the link between the intel- research. This kind of research is often politi- lectual and the political world may be difficult to cally motivated. For example, one of the main achieve, pointing to the crucial role of economic motivations to sponsor economic development ideas: “Practical men, who believe themselves to via remittances is to reduce international migra- be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, tion from the global South to the global North. are usually the slave of some defunct econo- To illustrate, over recent years politicians across mist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in Europe have often claimed that higher levels of the air, are distilling the frenzy from some aca- economic development (measured by per cap- demic scribbler of a few years back. Not, indeed, ita income and/or increased human develop- immediately, but after a certain interval” (Keynes ment symbolized by lower infant mortality and 1970: 361). higher rates of literacy) would eventually lead to This proposition indicates that there is indeed a decrease in international migration (European a strong coupling of the two worlds of policy- Commission 2002). Academic analysts of migra- politics and academia, albeit not through direct tion, however, insist that—while this expectation application of knowledge, but rather through may be borne out in the long run, considering ways of thinking and representation in the public demographic transitions and economic transfor- sphere. It is in this way that social scientists are mations—increased economic development cor- brokers bridging ‘structural holes’ (Burt 1992), relates highly with increased international migra- which are not simply due to the absence of social tion, expressed in concepts such as the ‘migra- ties but from different systemic dynamics as well. tion hump’ (Martin and Taylor 1996). Moreover, The function of academic knowledge in the pub- while the policy world may be concerned with lic sphere goes beyond the ‘enlightenment’ role adhering to more efficient means of migration (Weiss 1979) because it designates a ‘place’ for control, ranging from border controls to develop- public debates to occur. Thus, social science ment cooperation, academic researchers often knowledge, on the one hand, and the system of insist on those endogenous dynamics of inter- public policy, on the other hand, are not only two national migration, which escape blunt efforts at very different worlds; they are linked in the realm control, such as irregular migration. where ideas are exchanged and arguments occur Thus, even in these fields of migration and in publicly accessible forums that range from development, which seem to be strongly mass media to small circles of debate. The worlds immersed in public policy issues and pub- of academic research and public policy are based lic debates, both practitioners and academic on different assumptions. These assumptions, in researchers heatedly debate the difficulties of turn, provide for different views about the func- mutual exchange. At its core, this gap hypoth- tion of knowledge. While academic research is esis raises the following question, which has more geared toward the function of knowledge been debated as long as social science research to understand migration and development pro- has existed: Would social science knowledge be cesses in a critical perspective, public policy tends more useful if it could be more easily applied to prioritize the instrumental use of knowledge. instrumentally? In other words, would we desire The social sciences do not so much produce social a state of affairs in which political action could technologies, but offer worldviews and lenses be systematically based on knowledge about cal- which help to categorize observable social facts culable causal relations, as the term ‘evidence- and make it possible to arrive at interpretations. based policy’ instead of ‘dogma’ would suggest The world of public policy-making, by contrast is

110 Constituting the Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

structured by its own dynamics in which political and development. In this area we are basically interests aim to shape social life. Policy-makers concerned with the (mutual) conditioning and use social science knowledge when it serves the conjunctures of academic research and policy internal dynamics of policy-making, although paradigms. The second issue area deals with in fact, quite often, it may not serve this func- knowledge production in the social sciences and tion, as when electoral pressures trump expert the public role of social scientists. Finally, the knowledge. Politicians are often driven by politi- third issue area addresses social science knowl- cal exigencies and in such circumstances end up edge and its uses in public policy and in the pub- ignoring evidence where it fails to support elec- lic sphere. But before plunging into these issue torally appealing courses of action—especially in areas, however, it is necessary to question the areas susceptible to populist styles of action such standard account of why the worlds of academic as migration. At any rate, the social sciences, not research and public policy supposedly talk past only including sociology but also political science, each other. anthropology, and economics, have delivered such lenses galore, in the form of concepts deal- The standard account: the gap hypothesis and ing with human and economic development. its deficiencies The very fact that the social sciences usually do A deficit or gap argument is at the core of stan- not have direct impact on decision-making but dard debate, which states that given the large are able to influence at best the lenses through stock of academic knowledge in various fields which ‘social problems’ are viewed, make it all of societal life, the de facto usage of this kind the more important to look not only at the inter- of knowledge in politics, state, and non-state action of social scientists and policy-makers in policy-makers is widely insufficient. In the field governments, international organizations, non- of migration and development, we claim to governmental organizations, social movement have knowledge about how financial remit- organizations, and the like, but also at their role tances ameliorate or increase social inequalities in the public sphere. If it is true that social scien- in regions of origin and destination of migrants. tists can usefully provide lenses through which This knowledge, as the argument goes on, is only to view and identify issues, topics, and problems insufficiently applied to policies by the respec- and not so much be prescriptive, the direct link- tive national governments or international orga- age to policy and thus decision-making should nizations. In this perspective, much more could not be overrated. Yet the discursive impact then be done to facilitate the transfer of money by assumes an ever more crucial role. And it is in the reducing transaction costs in offering channels public sphere that such lenses are debated. And alternative to Western Union and MoneyGram, it is, above all, in the public sphere that political or even to ‘illegal’ viz. informal routes, such as decisions in democracies, no matter how partic- the Hawala system. Hence, no publication on ularist the interests behind them are, can usually the subject of remittances fails to mention the be seen to make and to have been legitimated by Mexican government’s ‘3 for 1’ program in which reference to both universal norms and plausible each ‘migradollar’ is complemented by an extra conceptual beliefs. The ubiquitous references in dollar from the federal and regional government. policy debates to meta-norms such as human The fact that only a fraction of remittances is rights, or the almost undisputed gospel of eco- channelled into this program is rarely mentioned nomic growth, are examples that come to mind. (Castles and Delgado Wise 2008). This proposition can be explicated in three Usually, three reasons are advanced to account issue areas. The first concerns public policy and for the allegedly deplorable gap between the research agendas, social order, and the organiza- plentiful store of research knowledge and its tion of research in the specific field of migration application in decision-making. The first pos-

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its that social scientists simply do not yet know demically trained persons, and policy-makers are enough about certain causal relationships or certainly capable of being influenced. mechanisms of behaviour. In the case of financial This standard account needs to be questioned remittances, this refers, for example, to the ques- in a fundamental way because of its rationalist tion how—if at all—remittances sent to family prejudice. This mode of thinking is based on a members in regions of origin aggregate from the purely instrumental model according to which family level to local communities or even to the the social sciences are to be used in applying national economy. So far, social scientists know generalized findings to particular, concrete situ- very little about these processes of aggregation. ations. In abstract terms, this perspective says: The second reason offered relates to the transfer if A then B, or B as a function of A. The policy- of results from the social sciences to praxis. Each maker then seeks to change B or produce B, and of the two worlds uses its own language and par- so forth. This formula seems to be rather short- ticular jargon. One could argue that social scien- sighted, not least because all knowledge needs tists write in barely intelligible ways and should to be translated, for example, to consider ceteris strive for greater clarity. This insight suggests paribus conditions. When talking about the that a simple one-to-one transfer is not pos- effects of a policy, one cannot simply say, when sible. Instead, the processes and tasks involved A then B, etc. but one needs to know about con- could be better described as the mutual transla- sequences of specific and complex sets of factors. tion of different codes characteristic of the social Yet such knowledge is not simply stored in the sciences and public policy, respectively. Thus, it warehouse of the social sciences. There is also is not surprising that policy-makers establish no recipe-like knowledge in the form of easy expert commissions—such as the Global Com- rules to follow (Luhmann 1992). For example, it is mission on International Migration (GCIM) con- plausible to argue that financial remittances may vened in 2005 by the then Secretary General of result in the economic improvement of regions the United Nations (UN), Kofi Annan—not only of origin. Yet the number of ceteris paribus con- to legitimate decisions or delay them, but also ditions affecting this formula are legion, andit to translate actual research results. We can would take a great deal of specific knowledge observe a similar pattern of knowledge trans- other than academic knowledge—such as tacit, lation in the run-up to the latest International ‘everyday,’ and local knowledge—to appreciate Migration Report (UN 2013). A third explanation the conditions under which financial remittances of the gap suggests that those who apply social make a particular impact (on various ideal typical science knowledge are thought to lack the capac- ways of modelling the boundaries between sci- ity to interpret research results correctly, or that ence and policy, see Hoppe 2005). their readiness to learn is, moreover, also limited. Even more important is that all social science If so, a change in the style of thinking among this knowledge is value-bound, even derived under group would be warranted. This third argument the ideal of value-free objectivity. Concepts is highly questionable because we find that many have direct and strong relations to values, such policy-makers in fact have a social science back- as development, evolution, exploitation, social ground. While one may quibble with the fact progress, social integration, and social inequal- that among social scientists in the field of devel- ity. With these notions in mind, social scientists opment, those with an economics background produce something of a worldview of selected predominate; one may also plausibly argue that parts of reality, which also implies an urge to economics as a field has been buoyant and impe- act in a certain way. For example, the notions rial, and perhaps less reflexive about the transfer of economic development and human develop- problem. It is still true that the staffs of national ment suggest somewhat different policy action and international organizations are filled by aca- regarding the use and desirability of financial

112 Constituting the Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

remittances. Notions of economic development exactly the (counter-)paradigmatic strands were. would emphasize the investment character of The first and the third phases were undoubtedly remittances, e.g., into education, health, or man- stimulated by public policy interests—the first in ufacturing. By contrast, notions of social devel- the 1950s and especially the 1960s by the OECD. opment, such as Amartya Sen’s (1984) capability The third and on-going phase has taken off after approach, draw upon the idea that persons have the World Bank placed migrants’ financial remit- a choice in how to employ remittances in aid of tances at the core of its annual report (World certain objectives, for example, geographical Bank 2002). Other agents, national governments mobility, which constitutes one of many possible and international organizations included have elements in the individual’s well-being and qual- followed suit. In the second phase, one also finds ity of life. a correspondence between public policy interests in the South and the North, and academic Issue area 1: public policy, social order, and concepts—a ‘strange bedfellow’ arrangement research of both restrictive migration control on the one This issue area concerns a host of questions hand and a critical analysis of underdevelopment revolving around how research and policy agen- through reference to such deleterious mecha- das are set and potentially interact, and espe- nisms as the ‘brain drain’ on the other hand. In all cially how public policy agendas impact actual three phases, research knowledge was and still is research that is undertaken: how have public pol- scrutinized for its applicability to development, icies, foundations, and other actors influenced based on different theoretical assumptions and research on the migration-development nexus, slightly different policy priorities. and in what ways—e.g. what are the mecha- In phase 1, during the 1950s and 1960s, with nisms of influence, such as funding and hiring? spin-offs into the 1970s, economic policy-makers How have institutions such as the World Bank and most representatives in the economics disci- and state governments set the migration-devel- pline in the global North held that migration con- opment agenda? Since the concept of develop- tributes to the development of sending regions.2 ment achieved prominence in the late 1940s, In fact, most research was actually undertaken how have issues of economic growth and political after restrictive migration policies had been order been bundled over time? What premises implemented in the early 1970s (e.g. Penninx have been underlying policy research agendas, 1982 on Turkey). Following the ‘recruitment such as neo-liberal or grass-roots perspectives stop’ in Western Europe, public policies aimed to and orientations? How did these agendas reflect encourage migrants to ‘return’ to their regions of the changing or even transformed relationships origin. Financial incentives were allotted to those between principles of social order—that is, state, returning. By and large, the theoretical underpin- market, civil society/community? In which insti- ning of the recruitment drive in the global North tutions has research been undertaken—e.g., in of the 1960s was based on social modernization universities, independent research institutes, or theory. International migration, quite apart from in international research institutes and organiza- the much more massive internal migration in the tions? South, was meant to siphon off excess labour and While it is impossible even to begin address- transfer it to the North, where it could—according these questions here, it is helpful to place them into a discursive-institutional context. In 2 Ironically, theories with a perspective from the other words, one needs to identify how the global South on economic development in the 1950s research and policy interests in the migration- and 1960s focused on import substitution industrial- ization and thus did not consider international migra- development nexus have coincided in three con- tion, albeit migration in the latter part of this period secutive cycles or phases (Faist 2008), and what began to take off (again).

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ing to the OECD (Kindleberger 1967)—fill labour and North and between centres and peripheries gaps in labour-intensive industries. In this way, within these regions. Needless to say, there was international South-North migration (East-West little policy impetus in the North to challenge was curtailed by the Iron Curtain) could both such assumptions. After all, restrictive immigra- contribute to development in the South and the tion policies, implemented in virtually all states growth of GDP in the post-war reconstruction in the North/West since the early 1970s, were economies of the West. Although modernization not accompanied by alternative means to pro- theories covered a great deal more terrain than mote development, such as international trade. economic development per se, an economic Thus, restrictive migration controls and the brain lens heavily dominated the focus and terminol- drain rhetoric nicely complemented each other ogy of the migration-development nexus. From in portraying international migration as a social a wide array of complex theoretical components problem. In the research carried out in phase 2 in modernization theory, only the economic the emphasis lay even more forcefully than in perspective was chosen to justify public policy phase 1 on an economic perspective, this time choices. Up until the late 1970s, when the first with a counter-hegemonic political economic studies were published on the effects of remit- drive. tances, social scientists and governments alike Phase 3 in policy clearly took off with the saw migration as a solution to development wake-up call by the World Bank in its report on obstacles in emigration regions. Empirical results, development finance (2002). Now, concepts such however, painted a different picture, often con- as increasing competitiveness, hunting for the cluding that there was little evidence that remit- ‘best brains,’ and other key notions dominated tances boosted local, not to mention national, the policy debate. In tune with globalization talk, economic development (Lipton 1980). concepts such as ‘circularity’ assumed greater Whereas in phase 1 causal reasoning went importance (GCIM 2005), in addition to efforts at from international migration to development, tapping into the benefits brought about by return social science thinking during phase 2 largely migrants. Now terms such as ‘brain gain,’ later reversed causality: the line now ran from under- modified to ‘brain circulation,’ came to replace development to migration. Still rooted in mod- ‘brain drain.’ The European Union (EU) itself now ernization theoretical assumptions, dependency declared its aim to compete on par with the and world systems theories questioned the United States in attracting the so-called highly impact of economic modernization on develop- skilled. In addition, the second demographic ing regions, now cast to the peripheries. Coincid- transition in most immigration states renewed ing with such theoretical underpinnings, policy discussions about attracting migrants to make debates also highlighted the deleterious con- up for a shrinking labor supply and an increase sequences of migration, especially the ‘brain in the number of pensioners over the coming drain’ of professionals. The debate reached a decades. As a legitimizing strategy to engage in climax in the context of discussions of the ‘New attracting the ‘best and brightest’ (Kapur and International Economic Order’ in which many McHale 2005), this development policy for the southern states in the United Nations system North was placed in the context of helping coun- raised their voices. It was then that international tries in the South to develop their economies— migration as a policy solution became problem- and, again a direct demand by the EU—to build atic; it turned into the problem in this reformu- up their migration control infrastructure. This lation of modernization theory, leading to the latter issue has been of particular relevance with conclusion that migration as such contributes respect to states such as Morocco and Turkey, to structural economic heterogeneity and ever bordering on the EU and being transit countries increasing social inequalities between South for migrants from further afar. At this point, this

114 Constituting the Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

linkage between securitized migration control effect of remittances in the earlier literature and and development cooperation has reached into policies was underestimated. Though it would be countries far away from the Mediterranean, such difficult to trace the exact route these changing as most West African states. concepts from the social sciences took to find In all three phases mentioned there was a their way into the decision-making and planning confluence of policy and research cycles on the of (inter-)governmental organizations, it stands migration-development nexus. This is not to say to reason that the changes of analytical patterns that there were one-way streets between sci- used across the three phases of the migration- ence and policy or public debates. Nonetheless, development nexus is no coincidence. In the third it indicates that there were elective affinities or phase, in particular, academia-policy brokers of even mutual conditionings. What can be said knowledge, such as authors of the reports by the with some certainty is that public policy drew intergovernmental International Organization of upon research concepts when suitable, and Migration (IOM), played an important role and that academic research provided suitable mod- thus tried to gain a prominent place among the els which were later (indirectly) used to justify a spate of international organizations dealing with renewed emphasis on remittances. For example, cross-border migration. in the transition from the second to the third The very fact that a reappraisal of the migra- phase, in the 1990s, approaches such as the New tion-development nexus has been going on for Economics of Labour Migration in economics some years now means that perceptions of nega- and the livelihood approach, originating in soci- tive effects of migration upon development, so ology and anthropology, focused on small collec- prevalent in phase 2, have changed. Indeed, the tive units such as families and kinship groups as change would not have been possible without a main decision-making sites and realms of action much broader transformation of the social order regarding (international) migration. The former and the relationships among the underlying prin- approach looks at migration as a form of infor- ciples. Such a sea change can be identified on mal insurance against risks such as crop failure, the discursive level and in institutional and policy whereas the latter views migration through the domains. If, for heuristic purposes, we define lens of ensuring a living in often adverse circum- three principles of social order as state(ness), stances. These mid-range concepts constituted a market, and civil society or community, we can decisive move away from analytical models that trace the shifting emphasis of public policy-mak- prioritized individuals as the main unit of analy- ing and research agendas over the past several sis, as in neo-classical migration economics. The decades, since development entered the lexicon change of perspective from individuals to small of public debate in the late 1940s. Apparent are groups, and from rational choice to social choice, two discursive and policy shifts, both of them led researchers to take a more nuanced look at combinatorial forms including civil society or the origins, the flows, and the consequences of community. The overarching characteristic is a financial remittances (Levitt 2001). For example, move away from the national state (apparatus) in the past, the use of remittances to pay bills as an engine and coordinator of development. for health and tuition fees or consumer products The demise of the national developmental state had been seen as unproductive.Y et a closer look was accompanied not simply by a rise of the mar- at how some families or larger collectives pooled ket, as critics of the so-called Washington Con- resources to cope with risks led researchers to sensus would have it. Indeed, the first shift is a realize that investments into the areas men- combination of stateness and civil society. The tioned could be helpful in coping with diverse national state has not been replaced, but com- economic hazards and combating poverty. Now plemented by local state and international orga- there was a proliferation of arguments that the nizations. Terms such as ‘government’ have been

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complemented by ‘governance’, and ‘state’ has ferences among the various social science disci- been extended to ‘stateness’. Obvious examples plines, such as economics, political science, and of combinations of local state and civil society sociology? And what have been the differences, are programs labelled co-développement, which if any, between the interdisciplinary fields of often include local states—cities, municipalities— migration research and development research? in immigration states and transnationally active What kind of knowledge production has been migrant associations. The second move is the propagated by social scientists, e.g., instrumen- combination of market(s) and transnational civil tal vs. reflexive knowledge? What has been the society. In our case, this shift is best exemplified self-understanding of social scientists involved— by the term diaspora. Both those who advocate professional, critical, or policy-based? the entrepreneurial market citizen, an individ- Again, this sketch may offer only a partial ual migrant who is economically active across frame in which to consider these questions. To borders, and those who favour participatory start with, knowledge gained from research in approaches rooted in collectives, have used the the social sciences can rarely be condensed into term diaspora to indicate a new stage of either social technologies. The specific objects of the individual or civil societal involvement. Those social sciences are not amenable to social engi- who see diaspora as a form of entrepreneurial neering. Yet this technological deficit is not an activity focus on the role of the ‘highly-skilled’ outcome of the inability of most social sciences living outside their country of origin. These per- to devise ever more sophisticated techniques sons are thought to contribute to development of observation and measurement, but is due to via the transfer of knowledge. By contrast, those the specificity of the objects and the associated taken with the notion of cross-border civil soci- normative implications. In societies with high ety emphasize the role of hometown associa- degrees of personal freedom and a high value tions and other small-scale groups in providing on individual autonomy a premium is placed collective goods for the regions of origin. Both on social change. Progress is legitimized by the approaches make far-reaching assumptions concept of ‘modernity’ or even ‘post-modernity,’ about diasporists as brokers. What can be stated itself a cultural consciousness of the changeable- with some certainty is that there has been an ness of things. A direct consequence of this spirit increasing co-optation of diaspora groups in pol- of modernity is that scientific claims usually allow icy-making and policy-consultancy and that it has for various and diverging interpretations. There been national state activities providing the policy is a constant debate over results, based in the infrastructure. competing paradigms and the multiple normatively grounded belief systems underlying social Issue area 2: knowledge production and the scientists’ claims. One does not need to adhere public role of social scientists to a criticism of the ‘strong programme of sci- The second issue area broadly concerns the kind ence’ (Barnes 1974) and thus engage in a social of knowledge produced by academic social sci- reductionist interpretation of the social sciences entists and the role these scientists play in the to realize that the questions posed by social public sphere. The public sphere is much broader scientists and the interpretations of research than the world of public policy-making, and results are guided by normatively bounded ideas. relates to the realm of public debate. The ques- The migration-development nexus in general tions thus are: What role have social scientists and the term ‘development’ as a short-hand for played in the linkage of knowledge production multifarious and even contradictory goals such and public policies through participation in the as ‘the good life’, economic growth, and eco- public sphere as experts, advocates, partisans, logical sustainability lends at least suggestive or public intellectuals? What have been the dif- support to the hunch that such normative ideas

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need not be very specific and may even have interest (e.g. experts working on the migration- passed their conceptual zenith—as the concept development nexus). Public sociology engages of development in fact has—but still serve as diverse publics, reaching beyond the university rallying foci. to enter into an ongoing dialogue with these pub- The crucial point of departure is the linkage lics about fundamental values. However, such an between knowledge and the public. Often, two approach needs to consider that the migration- types of knowledge are contrasted; namely, development nexus is intimately related to the instrumental knowledge which is oriented toward migration-security nexus through the “migration the means to achieve goals, and reflexive knowl- industry” which channels people across borders edge, which is geared toward (normatively desir- (Sørensen 2012). The possibilities for debate able) ends. This stark distinction is reminiscent on the migration-development nexus are there- of Kant’s moral imperative, which argues against fore severely circumscribed by the (sometimes using persons as means rather than ends. Both implicit) linkage to security concerns. Restrictive, forms of knowledge, instrumental and reflexive, or more precisely, selective immigration policies can be found in the various self-understandings of OECD countries are legitimized by pointing of sociology and sociologists. While sociology is out the dangers of migration to national and/or selected here as exemplary of the social sciences, welfare state security, thus severely limiting the it stands to reason that similar distinctions could development potential of migration. also be fruitfully applied to other social science There are also ‘in between’ positions, such disciplines such as political science. Michael as that of ‘involved detachment,’ as claimed by Burawoy (2005) has devised a four-fold typology Norbert Elias, which is rooted in professional of sociology and its public role. He distinguishes sociology but reaches out to public sociology. between professional, policy, critical, and public Elias remarked that the role of social scientists’ sociology. First, in his view, professional sociol- engagement is an issue of ‘how to keep their two ogy is heavily engaged in knowledge production roles as participants and inquirers clearly and along a positivist methodological perspective, consistently apart, and, as a professional group, using both qualitative and quantitative meth- how to establish in their work the undisputed ods. We could classify many contributions to dominance of the latter’ (Elias 2007:84). Public so-called mainstream journals and publications sociology also shows some overlap with critical as professional. This kind of sociology has estab- sociology but is not as openly dedicated to advo- lished clear-cut criteria for ranking the quality of cacy and partisanship as the latter. There are knowledge, such as peer review. Second, policy basically two types of public intellectual knowl- sociology, quite simply, produces knowledge edge, in Antonio Gramci’s terms, ‘traditional’ and for a client. It is mainly engaged in carrying out ‘organic.’ Traditional public sociology speaks to commissioned research for government agen- publics from on high as in such works in Ameri- cies or private end-users. Third, critical sociol- can sociology as Robert Bellah et al.’s Habits of ogy incorporates both those researchers who the Heart (1985) and William Julius Wilson’s are ‘reflexive’— those who openly question the The Declining Significance of Race (1978). In assumptions and underlying politics of the dis- Europe, some of Pierre Bourdieu’s later works, cipline— and people who are politically aligned such as La Misère du monde (1998), may fit this activists, and who see sociology as a way of con- pattern. These books generated public debate fronting injustice or power or elites. We may and raised public consciousness about socio- refer to C. Wright Mills as representative of this political and economic issues. They work through branch. Fourth, Burawoy’s favourite type, public various media—radio, print, film, electronic— sociology speaks directly to ‘publics,’ that is, vari- that easily distort the original message. Organic ous kinds of groups, either randomly gathered public sociology, on the other hand, involves an (e.g. television viewers) or grouped by common unmediated dialogue between sociologists and

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their publics, taking place in the trenches of civil multiculturalism arguing against scapegoating society. Here we find publics that are more local of certain migrant groups. His morally demand- and more active—at any rate, in direct engage- ing statements have been widely diffused in the ment with labour movements, minorities, pris- western world (e.g. Habermas 2010). One may oners, or even transnational NGOs. surmise that while direct input into public policy- The division of the four kinds of sociologies making concerns social scientists, above all, as already gives an idea of the role of social sci- experts, the public sphere is primarily the realm entists in public. Yet we need to go beyond the of the advocate and the public intellectual. Need- ‘intellectual’ typology and distinguish more finely less to say, an overlapping of the three types is the role of social scientists in the public sphere. possible; for example, a mixed type, called parti- Essentially, we may distinguish three main types san, which is a combination of advocate and pub- or functions, since an individual social scientist lic intellectual. S/he comes close to the organic may fulfil various roles successively: social scien- public intellectual described above. tists may act or function as experts, advocates, and intellectuals. A prominent function of the Issue area 3: knowledge and its uses in public first type, the expert, is that of a consultant to policy and the public sphere political organizations. Expert hearings, commis- The third issue brings together the concomitant sions for all types of political issues (ethics, migra- production of knowledge and policy cycles from tion and integration, etc.) abound in democracies. issue area 1 and the public role of social scientists Jürgen Habermas (1968) famously criticized this from issue area 2: How have research findings position of experts in that such politics leads to made their way into public debates and politi- the division of labour amongst experts who are cal decision-making? Under what conditions has no longer able to understand the wider context this transfer taken place? Which researchers and of society. Migration policy, as other policy fields, research institutes have been influential, directly abounds with experts. The ‘Independent Com- or indirectly? What kind of knowledge was used mission on In-Migration’ (Unabhängige Kommis- and on which level of abstraction? Has theo- sion Zuwanderung) in Germany (2000-2002), for retical abstraction left room for human agency? example, consulted about a hundred academic What has made a difference—direct knowledge, experts in its comprehensive look at Germany’s such as concrete research results and sugges- immigration processes. The second type is the tions for policies, or indirect impacts, such as the advocate. Advocates take sides. Their self-under- spread of concepts, ways of thinking, approaches standing may correspond to those of Burawoy’s to problems from the social sciences outward? critical sociologists who are politically aligned Which bodies of research, concepts/theoreti- activists and envision their research as contribut- cal guidelines, empirical results, etc., have been ing to or strengthening the cause in which they picked up, which have been neglected or dis- are engaged. Not only is the area of migration carded, and on which occasions? and development fertile ground for debates on It is of utmost importance to start any analysis social justice, equality, human rights, and other of linkages between research and public policy fundamentals; it is also a field in which advocacy and the public sphere by considering the inher- is coupled with research. Finally, the third type is ent systemic rationalities of the different worlds. that of the public intellectual. S/he corresponds Political decision-making has its own rationality. to the image portrayed above of traditional pub- The instrumental application of social scientific lic intellectual who seeks to change the perspec- knowledge does not by any means lie at the cen- tive of the reader or listener by strength of the tre of political decision-making for public policy. better argument. We may think of Jürgen Haber- Politically, knowledge derived from research is mas’ interventions with respect to migration and a tool but not necessarily an aid to or require-

118 Constituting the Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

ment for problem-adequate solutions. Academic in migration policy, it could be used in such a way knowledge may serve three functions for deci- as to legitimate very restrictive immigration poli- sion- and policy-making: a legitimizing, a sub- cies. stantiating, and a symbolic function. Second, academic knowledge may have a sub- First, social science knowledge may serve to stantiating function in that it can strengthen the legitimate decisions already taken or to delay position of an organization, a political party, or decisions deemed undesirable. In this way, pol- politicians vis-à-vis rivals, contending parties, and icy-making authorities in government can gain positions. The World Bank, for example, empha- ‘epistemic authority’ in defining what the public sized the magnitude of financial remittances sent knows, in our case, about migration and devel- by migrants compared to Official Development opment. The fields of immigration and asylum Aid (ODA) in the early 2000s in order to posi- are highly contested policy areas and are char- tion itself as a regulator of international financial acterized by a high degree of methodological flows. After all, in those days fewer and fewer uncertainty, as can be seen most dramatically in developing countries were taking out loans from the field of irregular migration. By definition, it the World Bank. The World Bank thus drew upon is impossible to arrive at a reliable estimate of the migration-development link to reposition the number of irregular migrants. Expert esti- itself among international players in the field of mates can sometimes show an enormous range: finance. In taking the lead among international for instance, experts estimate that the number organizations addressing the above-mentioned of irregular migrants in the U.S. lie somewhere migration-development nexus, the IOM falls into between 5 to 20 million; with the most reliable the same category. figure of close to 12 million established by the Third, knowledge sometimes fulfils a symbolic Pew Research Center’s Hispanic Trends Project function by contributing to the credibility of poli- (http://www.pewhispanic.org). Clearly, and ticians and public authorities. To illustrate, one most importantly, there is a huge asymmetry has only to call to mind the spate of academic in the usage of knowledge; political decision- working papers commissioned or invited by makers may tap into social science knowledge organizations such as the United Nations,- gov at their will, largely unencumbered by the inten- ernment agencies, ministries and other public tions of social scientists. Policy-makers can select agents active in the field both on the national a particular voice from the social sciences to lis- and international levels. ten to and endorse it. For example, in phase 2 Whatever the specific function knowledge of the migration-development nexus discussed from research plays in policy-making and pub- above, a report by the International Organiza- lic debates, political decisions have to be legiti- tion of Labour (ILO), written by authors from the mated by referring to universal values and norms, Hamburg Archive for World Economy (HWWA), although particular interests may guide them. drew on standard trade theory which argued that For example, restrictive immigration clauses in trade should substitute for migration (Hiemenz the EU regarding asylum seekers are not simply and Schatz 1979). That is, instead of migrating legitimated by referring to potentially tight labour to work in garment shops in New York, Bangla markets or the burden upon social welfare sys- Deshi workers should produce shirts in Dhakka tems. Rather, such policies are discussed jointly to be exported to the Americas. In practice, this with ‘positive’ normative goals, such as address- does not work since the rich countries usually ing the so-called ‘root causes’ of migration in the keep protecting their own inefficient industries regions of origin—most prominently migration while forcing the developing countries to drop from African countries. Further, the EU has taken their import tariffs. Yet, precisely because the vigorous measures to link cooperation with Afri- paper mirrored a standard economic argument can countries beyond clear exchange packages—

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migration control in exchange for development How sociological knowledge in the broadest aid, as in the case of Albania, Morocco, Senegal, sense is received depends very much upon struc- and Nigeria. tures of plausibility in public discourse. While Beyond looking at various instrumental link- social science concepts may be received favour- ages between social science knowledge and the ably under certain conditions, these situations world of policy, it is important to consider that themselves may be propelled to keep changing, as an academic discipline, the main self-declared also as a result of the diffusion of sociological task of the social sciences is diagnosis; guiding knowledge. The latest and third phase of the social action and generating remedies is not migration-development nexus re-emerged at a its goal. Social science knowledge may thus be time when the development industry was - cast most effective in publicly disseminating- con ing around for new target groups, when inter- cepts, notions, and associated arguments. In this national financial institutions, most prominently way, social science knowledge can make a differ- the World Bank, was searching for new areas ence in defining the relevant policy targets and of activity. The re-combination of statehood- the indicators to measure social problems. The civil society and market-civil society principles use of knowledge involves attribution of mean- allowed for the emergence of a new development ing, interpretation of events, and (re)definition actor: migrants and migrant associations. Once of situations. Where public policy in the pub- the associated ideas of migrants as development lic sphere is concerned, it is indirect influence agents started spreading across Europe, (local) that counts; that is, those crucial notions and administrations turned to the social sciences for concepts which guide societal perception and help in framing issues. Thus, the transnationalist interpretation of societal processes and not the paradigm, for example, is now strongly embed- actual stock of empirical findings. The definitions ded in various institutions in countries such as of social—economic, political, and cultural—situ- France and Spain (see Lacomba and Cloquell, ations are highly relevant for defining and fram- this issue). Such imports from the social sciences ing issues and questions, not decision-making prefigure the engagement of public authorities as such. A prominent example is Amartya Sen’s through the funding NGOs and migrant associa- work with the United Nations Development Pro- tions engaged in development cooperation with gram (UNDP), in which he advanced his capability regions of migrant origin. concept as an alternative to notions of develop- The proposition that the most important ment built solely around economic growth. Sen effect of social science knowledge is its poten- argued that the main criterion for development tial for creating (a new) public perspective on is the availability of choice for persons to pursue social issues is borne out by the conclusions of certain goals they regard as essential (Sen 1984). researchers who look at the policy implications Moreover, Sen developed indicators which were of the migration-development nexus (de Wind then concatenated into the Human Develop- and Holdaway 2008). Virtually all studies con- ment Indicator (HDI) currently used by the UNDP. clude that it is the analytic (research to deter- In sum, the social sciences give ever-new con- mine the impacts of policies) and the explana- cepts and meanings to the changes of objects in tory (research to explain why governments adopt societies. Ultimately, this influence increases the the policies) functions that loom largest and are reflexivity of societal conditions. most effective, whereas the prescriptive function A decisive and close analysis of how social sci- (recommendations, based on research, regard- ence concepts spread in the public sphere and ing policies governments should adopt to attain in public policy-making necessitates a look at the particular goals) is usually not very successful in secondary effects of social science knowledge finding direct entry into public policy. and, more specifically, a study of feedback loops.

120 Constituting the Migration-Development Nexus New Diversities 16 (2), 2014

Outlook: production of orientation and flows across borders through state agents. Quite meaning often, the rhetoric of the migration-develop- We are now able to return to the original ques- ment nexus occludes that certain migrant cat- tion: Would social science knowledge be more egories are subject to restrictive coercion, such useful if it could be more easily applied instru- as asylum seekers, whereas others are not only mentally? In other words, would we desire a wanted but also welcome, such as those catego- state of affairs in which political action could be ries termed highly-skilled or talents. It is the very systematically based on knowledge about calcu- selectivity of migration policies which needs to lable causal relations? The answer given here is: be considered when calling into question overly no. What applies to societies in general would optimistic ‘win-win-win’ situations; that is, gains also be true for the social sciences. There is a for the emigration countries, immigration coun- difference between formal and material rational- tries and the migrants themselves. Third, social ity, between instrumental rationality and reason scientists need to look behind the smoke and (Weber 1968). In other words, while knowledge mirrors of ideological statements and speak in about causal relations may make political action no uncertain terms about the construction of the more rational in a formal sense, it may also be policy field. For example, frequently, remittances put to service to do normatively undesirable to development schemes are presented as ideal things. Eventually, social scientific knowledge is types and model examples of ‘market’ solutions ‘welt-anschaulich’ and thus has a function for pro- to economic and human development, pointing ducing orientation and meaning. These results out that migrants are their own best develop- suggest going further and examining the role of ment agents. Such statements overlook the fact social sciences and social scientists beyond the that states enable mobility across borders in the realm of consultancy and policy-making. While first place, and that market solutions critically much ink has been spilled over academics as con- depend upon a public infrastructure of enabling sultants and advisors, less has been said about and controlling mobility of persons, remittances the role of researchers in the public sphere. Yet it and other resources across borders. This also is here that their functions in providing patterns implies to call upon the states in the global North of orientation and meaning have potentially the and South to live up to the responsibility for resi- strongest impact—and, in the long run, on politi- dents within their borders and citizens outside. cal decisions and public policies. After all, the ‘other’ is already one of ‘us’. These considerations imply at least three points to be heeded in the post-2015 migration- development dialogue after the Millennium Development Goals. First, social scientists active References in the field should see their role not - primar Bakker, M. 2014. “Discursive representations ily as advising politicians but as entering into a and policy mobility: how migrant remittances dialogue with the public. This would mean that became a ‘development tool’”. Global Networks doi: 10.1111/glob.12055. social scientists should seek to speak to varied Barnes, B. 1974. T. S. Kuhn and Social Science. audiences in the global North and South, not just London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. the representatives of government or organiza- Bellah, R.N., R. Madsen, W.M. Sullivan, tions. Second, social scientists need to engage A. Swidler and S.M. Tipton. 1985. Habits of in setting the agenda of the debate, preferably the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in by widening the scope and horizon of discussion. American Life. Berkeley, CA: University of Califor- For example, the migration-development nexus nia Press. is intimately connected to the migration-security Boswell, C. 2009. The Political Uses of Expert nexus by border control and control of financial Knowledge: Immigration Policy and Social Re- search. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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Bourdieu, P. 1998. La Misère du monde. Paris: Kindleberger, C. P. 1967. Europe’s Postwar Seuil. Growth: the Role of Labor Supply. Cambridge, Burawoy, M. 2005. “For Public Sociology”. Ameri- MA: Harvard University Press. can Sociological Review 70 (1): 4-28. Levitt, P. 2001. The Transnational Villagers. Berke- Burt, R. S. 1992. Structural Holes: The Social Struc- ley, CA: University of California Press. ture of Competition. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Lipton, M. 1980. “Migration from Rural Areas of University Press. Poor Countries: The Impact of Rural Productivity Castles, S. and R. Delgado Wise, eds. 2008. Mi- and Income Distribution”. World Development 8 gration and Development: Perspectives from the (1): 1-24. South. Geneva: International Organization for Luhmann, N. 1992. Die Wissenschaft der Gesell- Migration (IOM). schaft. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. DeWind, J. and J. Holdaway, ed. 2008. Migration Martin, P. L. and Taylor. 1996. “The Anatomy and Development Within and Across Borders: of a Migration Hump”. In: J. Edward Taylor, ed., Research and Policy Perspectives on Internal and Development Strategy, Employment and Migra- International Migration. Geneva: International tion: Insights from Models. Paris: Organisation Organization for Migration (IOM). for Economic Co-operation and Development Elias, N. 2007. “”In: S. Quilley, ed., Collected (OECD). Works of Norbert Elias, Vol. 8. Dublin: University Penninx, R. 1982. “A Critical Review of Theory and College Dublin Press / Dufour Editions. Practice: The Case of Turkey”. International Mi- European Commission. 2002. “Integration of gration Review 16 (4 Special Issue: International concerns related to migration within the exter- Migration and Development): 781-818. nal policy”. KOM 2002/703/FINAL. Sen, A. 1984. Resources, Values and Development. Faist, T. 2008. “Migrants as Transnational Develop- Oxford: Blackwell. ment Agents: An Inquiry into the Newest Round Sørensen, N.N. 2012. “Revisiting the migration- of the Migration-Development Nexus”. Popula- development nexus: From social networks and tion, Space and Place 14, 1: 21-42. remittances to markets for migration control”. GCIM. 2005. “Migration in an interconnected world: International Migration 50, 3: 61-76. New directions for action”. Report of the Global Sørensen, N.N., N. Van Hear and P. Engberg- Commission on International Migration (GCIM). Pedersen. 2002: “The Migration-Development New York: United Nations. Nexus. Evidence and Policy Options. State-of- Habermas, J. 1968. Technik und Wissenschaft als the-Art Overview”. International Migration, 40, ’Ideologie’. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. 5: 3-47. ———. 2010. „Leadership and Leitkultur”. New York UN. 2013. “International Migration Report”. New Times, The Opinion Pages. October 28, 2010. York: United Nations, Department of Economic Hiemenz, U. and K.W. Schatz. 1979. Trade in place and Social Affairs. Population Division. of migration: An employment-oriented Study UNDP. 2009. “Human Development Report – Over- with special reference to the Federal Republic coming barriers: Human mobility and develop- of Germany, Spain and Turkey. Geneva: Interna- ment”. New York: United Nations Development tional Labour Organization (ILO). Programme (UNDP). Hoppe, R. 2005. “Rethinking the puzzles of the Weber, M. 1968 (orig. 1922). Economy and Soci- science-policy nexus: from knowledge utiliza- ety: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, G. Roth tion and science technology studies to types of and C. Wittich, eds. Berkeley, CA: University of boundary arrangements”. Poièsis and Praxis 3 California Press. (3): 191-215. Weiss, C. H. 1979. “The Many Meanings of Re- Kapur, D. and J. McHale. 2005. Give Us Your Best search Utilization”.Public Administration Review and Brightest: The Global Hunt for Talent and its 39 (5): 426-431. Impact on the Developing World. Washington, Wilson, W.J. 1978. The declining significance of D.C.: Center for Global Development. race: blacks and changing American institutions. Keynes, J. M. 1970. The General Theory of Employ- Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ment, Interest and Money. Reprint of the 1936 World Bank. 2002. Globalization, Growth, and edition. London: Macmillan. Poverty. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.

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Note on the Author

Thomas Faist is Professor for Sociology at the Faculty of Sociology at Bielefeld University, Dean of the Faculty and Deputy Director of the Collaborative Research Centre 882 “From Heterogeneities to Inequalities”. His fields of interest are transnational relations, citizenship, social policy, development and migration. Books he recently co-published include Beyond Methodological Nationalism: Social Science Research Methodologies in Transition (2012), Transnational Migration (2013), and Disentangling Migration and Climate Change (2013). His current research focuses on the transnational social question.

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From ‘Multiculturalism’ to ‘Interculturalism’ – A commentary on the Impact of De-racing and De-classing the Debate*

by Harshad Keval (Canterbury Christ Church University)

Abstract Recent discourses surrounding the so-called death or decline of multiculturalism are characterised by a movement towards notions and practices of ‘Interculturality’, ‘Interculturalism’ and what have been called ‘new frameworks’ for diversity and race. The contemporary socio-cultural landscape is characterised by the persistence of racism, both institutionally and interactionally embedded, which is increasingly re-generated onthe political European stage. In this paper I argue that more vigilance may be required before a wholesale acceptance of these ‘new frameworks’ is mobilised. The rise of Interculturalism in un-nuanced forms is underwritten by parallel processes of anti-multiculturalism, cultural racism, and the demise of the spaces within which the class-race dialectic can be articulated. Finally, the policy gaze has both racialised the debate on cultural difference using the focus on particular ‘different’ groups, and deemed other black and minority ethnic groups as officially less troublesome. I argue that this economically and politically expedient rendition of the sociocultural landscape leads to a distorted analysis of differential subjugation. In an apparently ‘post-race’ era of diversity, racialised experiences need to be articulated more richly and with more political weight than interculturalism may currently facilitate. Keywords: multiculturalism, interculturalism, race, intersectionality

‘Thank God the athletes have arrived! Now we can move on from leftie multicultural crap. Bring back red arrows, Shakespeare and the Stones...!’ Aidan Burley, (UK Conservative MP) ‘To put it bluntly, most of us prefer our own kind’. David Goodhart (Author) Introduction Aidan Burley’s remarks broadcast through Twit- announced by political leaders such as David ter during the 2012 Olympiad (Watt 2012) focus Cameron (BBC News Online 2011) and Angela our attention on a number of issues incon- Merkel (BBC News Online 2010). Contemporary temporary society, with the games as the back- debates offer a variety of analyses and formula- drop against which nationalist and conserva- tions about citizenship, identity, belonging and tive political ideology is highlighted. This isset difference. How the idea of difference is trans- against the ‘obituary’ of ‘multiculturalism’ as lated into both everyday encounters as well as institutional experience in society is a much debated spectacle. Often it reveals overt outright * I would like to thank anonymous referees and the editor for their helpful comments on earlier versions rejections of ‘race’, ‘racism’, and ethnicity based of this paper. divides, as well as loudly indicating that well-

New Diversities Vol. 16, No. 2, 2014 ISSN ISSN-Print 2199-8108 ▪ ISSN-Internet 2199-8116 New Diversities 16 (2), 2014 Harshad Keval

worn tropes of racialised identity are never too justified in the face of new modes of neo-liber- far away from rhetoric and practice, as exempli- alised global capital and labour exchange but fied in the ‘raciological meanings’ of Cameron’s remain precariously perched on problematic 2011 speech (Gilroy 2012). The re-emergence of race and ethnicity notions. cultural racism framed as the politics of citizen- Secondly, as the shift towards political and ship, rights and ‘reasonable prejudice’ of some policy interculturalism tilts towards citizenship far right groups, such as the English Defence and universalist values oriented discourse, so League, has become a particularly problematic the debate moves to a more fixed, non-intersec- trope used in tandem by political parties such as tional analysis of difference. I argue that, whilst United Kingdom Independence Party. Since the not completely absent from the debate, inter- English northern disturbances in early 2001, then sectional analyses which utilise the complexity later in the same year, the terrorist attacks that of class, race and gender (to name but three constitute the ‘9/11’ event, the nature of prac- of many) have gradually been marginalised in tical, political and symbolic processing of differ- intercultural framed work despite academic and ences – religious, ethnic, cultural, linguistic and activist attempts. geo-political – have been the focus of media and Thirdly, the paper attempts to identify the government surveillance. Indeed, the constant parallel yet thus far invisible process of some focus on ‘Muslims’ in national policy and media minority groups becoming more visible and is the topic of much academic debate, especially ‘problematised’, while others seemingly perform as related to perceived threats to ‘security’ – the a disappearing act, deemed ‘correctly’ or ‘safely’ securitisation of minority populations, and the integrated. This contrasts with other groups con- securitisation of race policy (Fekete 2004, 2011). structed as ‘troublesome’ or examples of ‘poor’ In this paper, I do not intend to provide an integration. This conspicuous absence is high- exhaustive account of neither the rise of Islamo- lighted as having an impact on the landscape of phobia, nor reproduce the many detailed discus- multi-cultural negotiation, and forms an inte- sions of both multiculturalism and intercultural- gral strand of the history of race politics. Recent ism. Rather, I intend to contextualise the current negative, ideological constructions of Muslims UK policy announcements and ‘citizenship’ based in the UK (and Europe), as well as much needed formulations of difference against the backdrop reactions from academics intending to contest of a de-racing argument. By this, I mean that these negative constructions may have left their critiques of multiculturalism have moved away mark on the multicultural landscape in the form from the existence of the acknowledgment of of homegenising and neglecting the existence of enduring racialised experiences, towards ‘new’ problems in these other, ‘other’ communities. ideas about diversity. These focuses for the paper are brought together This paper aims to first briefly highlight some in the service of raising some questions around salient critiques of ‘new’ frameworks of diversity the continued death-knell of multiculturalism, such as Interculturalism, which attempt to deal the wholesale and unquestioned acceptance of with the inevitability of cultural diversity (Parekh interculturalism as a framework for diversity, and 2000a) against the scenery painted above. I will the related co-opting and officialised acceptance not provide a blow by blow account of the debate, of some forms of cultural difference rather than but rather utilise the literature to frame my main others. critique. Several aspects of Interculturalism will be highlighted as items specifically moving away Situating the Critiques of Multiculturalism from what are known as intersectional analyses, As formulations about the nature of belonging and the resultant ‘de-classing’ and ‘de-racing’ and the negotiation of ‘multiple identities’ circu- tendency. Such moves are seen as expediently late within debates, highly politicised philosophi-

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cal moves regarding duties, rights and responsi- alised and vague notion that interculturalism bilities render this arena ever more complex. In may provide a platform for understanding diver- this section, I want to outline interrelated areas sity whilst maintaining a framework of universal of the critique of multiculturalism, development values. So, the critiques of multiculturalism pre- of community cohesion, and some of the prob- date the current panic, and yet, as a variety of lems with these entities. writers have argued (Meer and Modood 2012b; The various attacks on multiculturalism are Kymlicka 2012; Werbner 2012; Lentin and Titley a feature of contemporary debates and neither 2011), there appears to be an oversimplification new nor surprising, given the force of politically of both multiculturalism and interculturalism, expedient shifts to the right. The critiques have as well as an avoidance to explore fundamental been gaining momentum in recent years, but can similarities. Other writers have also pointed out be traced back to the reaction to the urban dis- that situating the two approaches in compet- orders in the UK cities of Bradford and Oldham, ing positions is neither helpful nor conceptually in 2001 and the 9/11 and 7/7 bombings in New accurate since there are different versions of York and London. The complex, prevailing and both approaches (Gomarasca 2013). I would like, contested idea of ‘integration’, as Rattansi (2011) therefore, to contextualise what Werbner has surmises was already on the wane, resulting in called the ‘failure-of-multiculturalism’ discourse questions about who is to be integrated into (2012: 201). The ideological move away from what, and how this might be effected in egalitar- constructing groups as bounded entities (a typi- ian and fair terms. The multidimensional nature cally simplistic caricature of multiculture) to a of ‘integration’, having spatial, structural and cul- more ‘integrationist’ model of sociality was over- tural levels to contend with resulted in numerous taken by the ‘community cohesion’ approach, ‘warnings’ and reports, for example those com- itself the result of a number of reports written in missioned by the UK Home Office (Cantle 2001). the wake of the urban disorders (Denham 2001; The perceived result of multicultural policies Cantle 2001). The reports proposed the notion stemming back to the 1980s was identified as of ‘community cohesion’ as a way of building the lessening of integration between groups of bridges between groups who were said to be collective identities. The assumption underlying “sleep walking into segregation…” and living “par- this unravelling of cohesion was that culturally allel live” (Philips 2005). Trevor Philips’s infamous, bounded groups would remain only within the often cited and selectively employed observa- social and psychological confines of their own tion of black, minority and white community group, and the reduced integration would cause interactions in the UK under so-called ‘multicul- more problems in society. The public disorders turalism’ both fuelled pre-existing fears (worked in Northern cities were seen as evidence of this on partly by discourse surrounding the northern new problematic (Hussain and Bagguley 2005). disorders of 2001) and gave rise to new, more However, the critique of multiculturalism as powerful, and intuitively attractive discourses an approach appears a while before the cur- of difference. The healing solution was said, cer- rent identity laden ‘moral panics’ that we see in tainly by adherents and proponents of commu- the media and various policy formulations. As nity cohesion, to be a common ground on which Kymlicka (2012) reminds us, in 2008, the Council to unite social and cultural futures. As Rattansi for Europe generated and discussed the White (2011) has argued, this form of bridge building Paper on ‘Intercultural Dialogue’ in which the pre- rests on three main drivers – communitarianism, ferred model for dealing with the so-called fail- Putnam’s theoretical extension of ‘social capital’, ures of post-war multicultural segregation would and the experiences of the white working classes. be ‘interculturalism’. The focus in the White Paper The problems with these cohesion based under- is, as Kymlicka emphatically indicates the gener- pinnings have been discussed in more detail else-

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where (e.g. Crowley and Hickman 2008; Philips racial difference and equality were filled in each 2006; Amin 2002). These involve the complex era by these tensions; on the one hand, with and dynamic notion of ‘community’ being reified resistance and activist movements, and on the and rendered static; social capital mobilised as other, with politically motivated discourse from a subtle form of recycling culturalist arguments the right. Interculturalism, therefore, appears to about prescriptive norms of integration; and offer some form of relief to the political indiges- the homogenised and simplified construction tion caused by unwanted, problematic ‘others’, of the white working class experience, placed certainly re-framing the problem of minority- in contrast to the experiences of other minority majority culture. communities. In a similar vein, Battercharya’s cri- The ubiquity of ‘community cohesion’ as state tique contests the use of ethnicity ‘as the source policy is evidenced in both the organisations of antagonisms and differences that must be charged with investigating public disorders in overcome’, and instead suggests that ‘ethnicity is Northern cities as well as the various government itself multiple and changing and is unlikely to be backed ‘cohesion’ initiatives. The generalised a basis for articulating shared values’ (2009: 4). ‘trickle down’ idea of culturalised capital-based The European idea of ‘Interculturalism’ is deficit amongst affected communities appears to viewed as a remedy for some of the prob- have facilitated a transition to ‘new frameworks lems which previous approaches seemed to be for race and diversity’ (Cantle 2008) and the plagued by (James 2009). Before multiculturalism ‘new era of cohesion and diversity’ (Cantle 2012). was embraced in the UK (noting the discursive Discussions around Interculturalism (Cantle 2001, and multiple constructions of this practice), the 2012; Modood and Meer 2008; Rattansi 2011; dominant counter hegemonic political resistance James 2008, 2009), while relatively young in the was driven by the machinery of ‘anti-racisms’, UK, have traditionally had a variety of purchases much of it mobilised by organisations such as in many countries, including Canada and Aus- the Institute of Race Relations and various grass tralia in varying guises, and employing differing roots organisations (Farrar 2004). This particular social and psychological emphases. Certainly a mode of resistance through representing and key example of the national policy utilisation of amplifying the voices of oppressed minorities an intercultural framework can be found in Que- was underwritten by the tacit identity agreement bec’s approach to diversity situated in contrast to which combined the experiences of all racial and Canada’s federal multicultural approach (Meer ethnic minorities. This political and practical 2014). The sheer range and diversity of ideas unity, while not unproblematic (Modood 1994), within the broad label ‘interculturalism’ prohib- served as a basis for both grass roots organisa- its an extensive discussion here, but I will firstly tion of resistance, as well as representation in select some defining features and then move local and national politics (see Virdee 2010). As onto discussing their implications. socio-economic and political landscapes shifted, In providing an extensive critical discus- so did official reactions to the ‘diversity issue’. sion of where interculturalism and multicul- The caricatured identity-politics of ‘crude mul- turalism overlap and differ, Meer and Modood ticulturalism’, as it has been termed, came to (2012a; 2012b) initiate a welcome appraisal of replace the class-race conscious alliances with the debate. I will draw on Meer and Modood’s separate group identity movements (Lentin (2012a; 2012b) comparisons between the two 2008). This movement should not be understood approaches, since they have clearly defined the as linear and mutually exclusive segmentation, relevant parameters for engagement in this area. and is rather a dialectically tensioned position, They outline four main issues in relation to this as discussed by Farrar (2004). The spaces left comparison that need tackling, as follows: com- behind by ideologies and conceptualisations of munication and dialogue as a defining feature

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of intercultulrality as opposed to multicultural- human sociality is integral. In addition, if notions ism; ‘less groupist and culture bound’, therefore of identity are to be underlined by a complex more interactive; reinforces a stronger sense of interplay of individual rights, responsibilities and national identity through cohesion; and, finally, communitarian agendas, then people should also that interculturalism is more likely to prevent equally be given the opportunity to opt out of illiberal practices within cultures. The authors go intercultural dialogue. James’s (2009) summary on in a number of publications to systematically is a considered discussion of the pitfalls associ- tackle these issues. I will not rehearse the intrica- ated with creating policy in relation to culture, cies of Meer and Modood’s exposition but will citizenship and collective egalitarian cooperation draw upon it to make my central points. and that intercultural work of any kind needs to be premised on notions of identity, culture and Defining Interculturalism difference which are not racialised. A key feature of interculturalism, as defined by One of the key functions of interculturalism James, is ‘…its sense of openness, dialogue and is communicative and dialogic nature of its pro- interaction’ (2008: 2). As critics of multicultural- gramme, but the dialogic and cultural exchange ism allege that it has stunted interactive diversity, propensities of multiculturalism have been interculturalism is framed as a way to reinstate staunchly defended by writers, such as Meer and the fluidity of culture. Indeed, a prominent fea- Modood (2012a; 2012b). The way in which mul- ture of the move-on from the so-called corpse ticulturalism has made dialogue and communica- of multiculturalism towards interculturalism is tion central to its concerns seems to have been the absorption of sociological and social psycho- ignored, and replaced by a caricature of multicul- logical ideas. For James, there is something to be turalism as a static and separatist dividing force. gained in using social psychological work in reduc- As Parekh (2000b) asserted, there is an inherent ing prejudice through contact (the “contact the- value in different cultures coming across each sis”), the principal idea being that contact, in var- other and experiencing both uncertainty as well ious forms between different people and groups as learning to identify those aspects of their cul- will, in ‘optimal’ circumstances, reduce prejudice tures which are different and importantlyvalued and negative stereotypes (Hewstone et al. 2007). differentially. This fundamental aspect of mul- James (2008) summarises a number of important ticulturalism speaks to the embedded compo- perspectives, including Parekh’s (2000b) inter nents of dialogue and communication, as well active multiculturalism, Gilroy’s (2004) planetary as the crucial aspects of what Taylor identified humanism in a cosmopolitanised world, Brah’s as respect and dignity (Taylor 1994). Similarly, as work (1996) on diaspora and space and Sen’s Gomarasca (2013) has pointed out dialogue is (2006) wide ranging and multidisciplinary work not the sole character of interculturality, but is within human rights and global conflict arenas. part of every culture. The presence of intercul- James identifies Sen’s singular toxicity towards tural dialogue playing a role in ‘creative spaces’ cultural theorists for being the drivers of a move- may not be quite enough to mitigate the ever ment which ultimately extract real people, living persistent and hugely damaging issues of institu- real lives from their social action, and place them tional and individual racism. in preconceived categories of civilisation, thus As I mention earlier in relation to Meer and ignoring all diversity within and between groups. Modood’s work, one of the defining, citizen- Certainly, in multidisciplinary understandings of ship fuelled drivers of intercultural frameworks, race relations and discrimination, such integra- certainly as proposed by Cantle (2008; 2012), tions of psycho-social frameworks are laudable is the need to subscribe to a national identity, and frequently used. Exploring the multifaceted whilst acknowledging cultural and ethnic differ- and shifting nature of identity as a lived, dynamic ences. Such uniting glue (Bourne 2007) would

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then function as a way of bridging the perceived policy equation as the persistent legacies of colo- gaps and separations that appear to have been nial and imperial histories. generated by people living in cultural silos. The One of the problems with the vague basis of problems with this are numerous (elaborated by interculturally framed interventions this is that Meer and Modood 2012a; 2012b), but focus on it does not appear to specify the mechanisms of the assertion by authors such as Modood (2007) creating the appropriate conditions for change. that multiculturalism has already been and con- The proposed shift in thinking about identity in tinues to be at the forefront of allowing expres- this direction towards a nuanced, context rich sions of cultural identity; it also simultaneously and agency-structure informed analysis is some- advocates a series of national narratives which thing sociologists and political scientists have are inclusive, and not dependent on essentialis- been focusing on for many decades. The dynamic ing, nationalist notions of majoritarian belonging complexities of identity, as well the enduring (CMEB 2000). social, cultural, psychological and economic The charge of illiberality and relativism often legacies of empire would need to be translated circulates within the discourse of culture, citi- into radical modification in political representa- zenship and rights, and has forcefully emerged tion and a connected redistribution of resources. in relation to caricatured Muslim communities. Such vigilance against structural inequalities and This is contested through the example of Muslim connected discriminatory practices are necessar- claims being characterised as difficult to accom- ily connected to multicultural diversity, not sepa- modate because of the perceived ways in which rate. Interculturalism’s focus on global, ‘trans- the faith imposes limits on individual rights. Meer locational’ (Anthias 2001) identities as newly and Modood (2012b.) argue that through this formed, liberating articulations of identity which negative association between Muslim groups and can transcend prejudicial dispositions echoes ‘illiberality’, a sense of ‘otherness’ is perpetuated, the transnationalism and cosmopolitanism (Beck one which invokes a variety of related miscog- 2006) project. However, there is a persisting ten- nitions. For example, some practices which are sion between these movements and the endur- perceived to be sourced in religious orthodoxy ing nation-state fuelled ideas of difference and are actually cultural in their formation and ori- belonging. As Bulmer and Solomos (1998) have gin (e.g. forced marriages, clitoridectomy), and pointed out, border crossing and border chal- would be more effectively eliminated using reli- lenging is often underpinned by inequalities, gion rather than condemning faith based prac- hostilities and conflict. Such conflicts are part of tices. Similarly, the increasingly public issue of the complex backdrop of race and class, which faith schools appears to have been carried along require various levels of re-engagement. by the misconception that a community’s needs for specific requirements to be met are ‘cultural’, De-racing and De-classing the Debate? when in fact as research (Pecenka and Anthias It seems that a major characteristic of the rela- 2014) indicates, these requests are more to do tionship between multicultural analyses, cultural with securing future opportunities for young sociological observations and interculturalism is people within a community. From this reading, precisely the over culturalisation and de-politi- some consideration needs to be made in moving cisation of experiences. Anti-racist discourse wholesale and uncritically from notions of mul- (accepting the diversity in ‘discourses’ and their ticulturalism to interculturalism. The contingent political contexts) in the form sustained by, for and shifting nature of the internal and external example, the Institute of Race Relations contin- organisation of ideas of cannot be reduced to ues to maintain a notable presence and vigilance a single dialogic, intercultural space. Rather, it against forms of race related discrimination. needs to be placed in the same intellectual and Authors such as Virdee (2010) articulate the need

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to frame and redraw the multiculturalism and rapidly transcending the right of centre position, race debate along the lines of historical mate- and populist parties such as UKIP take a stronger rialism and the continued impact of unequal position in national politics. We necessarily need economic relations. In engaging with ‘debates to raise concerns about the politicised reactions on difference’ in the contemporary era, there to ‘others’. As Hall in his intellectual questioning is an increasing importance in maintaining con- of what a ‘more profoundly inclusive British-ness’ nection with a material analysis of experiences. might require argued, ‘unstable localisms, spaces Lentin (2008: 313) asks an important question of proliferating difference ultimately become of the ‘positive turn’ – the turn away from the communities in translation’. (2000: 217, cited in perceived negativity of ‘anti-politics’ towards the Jaggi 2000). ‘celebration of diversity’ – namely, what happens While Modood (2005) has already called for next? A similar question can be asked of the cur- multicultural approaches that recognise and rent debates and themes of this paper – where tackle multiple racisms and different forms of does the debate move to if this is a post-racial discrimination, there appears to be more room age but within which race is still an undeniably for an incorporation of Sivanandan’s (1977) early lived experience? The ‘post-race-ness’ stance arguments in anti-racism and trade union rac- within these frameworks of diversity may be side ism regarding the conditions he thinks would be stepping crucial identifications of oppression and absolute prerequisites for an ‘inter-racial work- inequalities, hidden beneath the multiple layers ing-class agency’. In Sivanandan’s early writings, of ‘attitudinal surveys’ (e.g. Department for Com- there is a necessity for racialised, discriminated munities and Local Government 2011). groups to raise their class consciousness through Interculturalism indicates that systems of glo- ‘colour’ consciousness, and for ‘white’ people, balisation, freedom of capital, and movement a recovery of class awareness through under- of labour (Cantle 2012) positively corrode insu- standing and consciousness of racial oppression. lar, individualist notions of identity. This - appar In a contemporary multi-ethnic, linguistic, and ently leads almost magically to forms of cosmo- culturally globalised world, clearly such stark politan, international, hybrid allegiances which binarism could not do justice to social complex- transcend outdated notions of ‘race’. Intercultur- ity. And yet it redirects our attention to the idea alism’s defiant stance toward race thinking in a of consciousness of materiality – and how this contemporary socio-political landscape riddled is played out against the backdrop of racialised with populist political spinning (for example, differences. There appears to be some scope for with the moveable feast that is immigration), a re-engagement with this modality, certainly in appears to be somewhat matter out of place. the way in which interculturalism defends its uni- The weight of evidence which indicates current versalistic, intergroup dialogue driven emphasis. immigration discourse is still mobilising the ever As Virdee (2000, 2010) has argued, independent, present tropes of dangerous and economically autonomous self-organisation was crucial in the / culturally draining foreigners is overwhelming gradual solidifying of class solidarity, importantly (Grayson 2013; Burnett 2013). This, then, raises involving white organised labour. This mobilisa- an important question about discourses around tion of political and practical unity was an invalu- multiculturalism and ‘interculturality’ – where able, pragmatic tool in furthering race-class dia- are ‘they’ located now and where might they be lectical analysis in the context of understanding located in the possible future, given the chang- the world through a historical materialism that ing national and global landscape in economic allowed for agency. The point I emphasise here and psycho-social manifestation of reactions is that whilst globalisation and transnational to different ‘others’? These are pertinent ques- labour and capital movement makes the class- tions given as current UK government policies race relationship ever more complex, this should

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not detract from the fact that racialised struc- intercultural dialogue (exchanging greetings as tural and economic inequalities endure in the UK. ‘chit-chat’). This may over-simplify many of the These perpetual mechanisms of exclusion will complex interactional and structural operations require more than locally acted and state driven which might be involved in these frameworks versions of a national identity narrative, even of diversity. Cantle (2012), for example, con- less so one which is built on fragile conceptual tends that interculturalism, as contrasted against ground. intercultural dialogue, ‘involves wider commu- It is the intersectionality and multiplicity of nity, structural and political processes’ (2012: inequalities which have driven wedges between 157). The discourse in the area itself, however, groups of identified ethnic and cultural unities, consistently utilises these simple tropes (inter- not the presence of multiculturalism as policy actions between people via the newsagent, the or practice (Rattansi 2011). Evidence for these local shopkeeper and the school gates). My cri- structural inequalities is now well established tique is by no means without support – Meer and, in relation to cohesion (indicated by trust), and Modood are vehemently critical of this there is also a well-established array of evidence attempt to “…displace the political; to critique to indicate that trust is lowest in the poorest a political multiculturalism with an apolitical, areas (c.f. Crowley and Hickman 2008). So, whilst local-encounters-based individualism”. (2012b: a plethora of empirical research and theoretical 235). These tropes do not allow for the constant progress exists and continues to re-assert the interplay of both ‘old’ and ‘new’ generations of importance of this multiple consciousness of racialised subjugation, the enduring and recycled structural contexts to racial and ethnic division, legacies of colonialism, nor the stark realities of the populist sentiment as well as policy direction colourised and ethnicised markers of difference, rests on the lack of cohesive glue between com- such as skin colour, cultural and religious adorn- munities (Bourne 2007). Race as a modality of ments and dress. As Sivanandan reminds us, subjugated experience and divisive entity is still some of us live with: “…racism that cannot tell a very much alive, enacted and operates through settler from an immigrant, an immigrant from an organised / institutionalised forms as well as asylum seeker, an asylum seeker from a Muslim, unorganised and violent everyday action (Lentin a Muslim from a terrorist. All of us non-whites, at and Titley 2011). We may very well be ‘post- first sight, are terrorists or illegals. We wear our race’, but as Lentin (2008) points out, socio-eco- passports on our faces”. (2008: xv). nomic contexts continue to have a huge impact This deficit then throws into question the on racialised experiences. ‘Post-race’ does not, ability of these frameworks to hold significant therefore, mean post-racialisation, and aca- emancipatory purchase during a time of increas- demic debates about race nomenclature do not ing turbulence throughout not only European prevent racist violence – practical or symbolic. but global political debates concerning immigra- The links between apparently looking forward tion. The recent debacle around the UK Home through globalised lenses towards intercultural- Office immigration ‘initiatives’, which involved ism and dismissing the revolutionary and resis- the placement of vans displaying threatening tance movements which fought and won race messages to would-be illegal immigrants, was and equality battles appear in relief. The gradual enacted using official state machinery and all the silencing of race under a ‘new’, analytical regime apparatuses available at the time, including UK of contact, mixing, assimilationist integration is Border Agency and British Transport police staff less challenging to state fuelled muscular liber- (Grayson 2013). What Grayson calls the ‘main- alism than the presence of muscular dissidence. streaming’ and ‘embedding’ of racism into Brit- Indeed, “banal interactions” (Cantle 2012: 148) ish politics is also part of the current ideological are identified as a significant component to transition facing communities at the moment.

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The sanitisation of racism, via various cultural, activism and discussion concerning structural, faith, security and immigration risk-tropes is White hegemonic fuelled discrimination, espe- really the politics of reasonable prejudice, and cially in light of institutional racism (Pilkington might not be fully contained, articulated or man- 2011), a one-size-fits-all approach simply cannot aged by interculturalist approaches in a manner do justice to the many ways in which dimensions which facilitate an understanding of both old and of difference are interlinked. This reinforces one new forms of racialised oppression. of the main aims of this paper, to emphasise that interculturalist based critique of multiculturalism Intersectional Possibilities? is facilitated by a gradual reduction of racialised In this section, I raise the question of where experiences to ‘diversity’ and ‘citizenship’ based intersectionality can sit if interculturalism is debates. The implication of these reductions is charged with the resolution of problems related a de-racing and de-classing pattern, which fun- to a multi-ethnic UK. My principal point is that in damentally undermines the ethos of interacting the process of moving away from the race-class and cooperating diverse societies. consciousness that informed multiculturalism Regardless of whether we engage with the (if not completely characterised it), there is a dif- ‘new interculturality’ (Cantle 2012), racist attacks, ferential cost of omitting these layers of context racist verbal and physical abuse, and institu- for black and minority people. It is yet another tional racism all persist (IRR 2012). Importantly, missed opportunity to take strength from a fuller, as bell hooks (1994) has cogently and persis- radicalised and political questioning of policy, tently argued the normalised, routinized, mun- academic discourse and practice, which does dane acceptance (for all parties) of racialization not treat the intersectionality as trivial. Whilst of everyday social action is an eroding force in I do not intend to exhaustively rehearse the collective civil societies. There appears to be well-established arguments in the field of inter- then a place for an interrelated and integrated sectionality, a number of broad brush strokes to approach to anti-racist, citizenship based ‘critical describe the approach may help in contextualis- multiculturalism’ (Farrar 2012) at both policy and ing the impacts of neglecting it. Firstly, why do civic level which does not operate simply on the I invoke the area of intersectionality here? The ‘incident-based’ reactive level. Rather, it works on answer lies in the sociological and anthropologi- the overwhelmingly evidenced existence of what cal insight that racism and racialisation (Miles hooks (1994), discussing North American values, 1989) are not limited to binary oppositions, nor has consistently called the ‘white supremacist is racial discrimination characterised solely by capitalist patriarchy’. These networks of eco- reference to race (Song 2014). Intersectional- nomic, material, and intellectual hegemonised ity brings into the debate not just the unreduc- racism perpetuate negative representations and ible facticity of cultural diversity (Parekh 2000a) resist any form of dissent activated from within but fully recognises the interlinking of subjugat- subjugated racialised groups. This empowering experiences on a range of dimensions. Thus ment / resistance framework may be explicitly Anthias (1989) and Yuval-Davis (1997) have con- useful here because an integrated multi-disci- sistently articulated the importance of viewing plinary approach necessarily needs to look at social divisions through an intersectional lens. the insights brought into focus by academics Rather than treating race and gender as epiphe- and activists working at the margins of discourse nomena – playing second fiddle to the ‘real’ issue but at the centre of intersectionality. Such an of class relations ‘…classes are always gendered approach facilitates a critical engagement with and racialised and gender is always classed and and between the practical and symbolic markers racialised…’ (Anthias 2010: 241). As Song (2014) of difference – the lived and abstracted realities – reminds us, while there needs to be a vigilant as crucial for full cultural and political citizenship.

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Although in terms of policy recognition there is Many of the issues focused upon to mobilise widespread approval and utilisation of intersec- this new hybridised left/right political rhetoric – tional approaches (Anthias 2012), there is doubt in the service of creating new symbolic, practical about the level of criticality that approaches and political boundaries of tolerance have been can engage in when one takes into account the about Muslims communities – people, practices relative activist-state positioning of research and and beliefs (Lentin and Titley 2011; Kundnani interventions. In other words, if interculturalism 2012; Ahmad and Modood 2007). This raises a purports to force through centralised policies question around those communities in Britain of for example ‘community cohesion’, to what which, although traditionally were part of the extent could those same policies allow for an mainstream focus of ‘race relations’ and ethnic- internally critical gaze? State led formulations of ity discourse (Ballard 1994), have now been rela- ‘national’ identity would fundamentally need to tively hidden from the spotlight. The attention be questioned. seems to have turned away from the continued In the case of Intersectionality and intercul- racialised experience of for example South Asian turalism, there is a sense that through gaining a Hindus and Black African Caribbean populations, national citizenship based unity through dialogue and shifted towards Muslim based discrimina- and communication, racialised and gendered tory discourse. Moreover, simply because the subjugation become secondary and peripheral. mainstream academic focus has shifted does not Structures of subjugation rarely operate on mean we can assume that the everyday, lived one dimension so current discourse necessarily experience of other groups in the UK does not needs to be involved in analysis of several frames continue to be characterised and punctuated of experience simultaneously. Without a prop- by many different forms of subjugation. Kund- erly systematic and organised engagement with nani (2012) perceives there to be a widespread voices of resistance and empowerment, forms (ideological and expedient) pessimism about ‘… of internalised, habituated and embodied subju- resolving this supposed crisis of Muslim identity gation will be glossed over in favour of populist and liberal values through conventional demo- ideas which seem to corroborate the constructed cratic processes…’ (2012: 158). Does this invis- need to ‘citizenise.’ ibility imply that other minority groups have now been successfully ‘integrated’ and therefore no Where are the Other ‘Others’? longer pose a challenge to the neo-imperial and As some minority groups become more visible neo-colonial philosophical and political ontolo- and ‘problematised’, others appear to be - per gies underpinning British democratic citizen- forming a disappearing act, seemingly deemed hood? Since relatively little material seems to ‘correctly’ or ‘safely’ integrated, as contrasted to be emerging in this debate around these groups other groups constructed as ‘troublesome’, or (exceptions are Zavos 2009; Mawani and Muk- examples of ‘poor’ integration. I intend to high- adam 2012), it might be useful to maintain a crit- light this seemingly conspicuous absence as hav- ical resistance against the rapid transformation ing an impact on the landscape of multi-cultural of racialised discourse into anti-Muslim discrimi- negotiation. This leads me to ask if recent nega- nation. A continued examination of the burdens tive, ideological constructions of Muslims in the and dynamic tensions in people’s lives when UK (and Europe), as well as much needed reac- they are subject to what Back and Sinha call ‘the tions from academics intending to contest these social weight of racism’ (2012: 13) would need to negative constructions, have left their mark remain critical about this apparently differential on the multicultural landscape in the form of integration into ‘Englishness’ or ‘Britishness’. homegenising and neglecting the existence of This supposed differential ‘Englishness’ felt problems in these other, ‘other’ communities? by different cultural, ethnic and religious groups

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is interestingly evoked by Uberoi and Modood I make this point because there appears to be (2010: 312) and highlighted in an interview with a similar, symbolic and practical move reflected David Blunkett (the then Home Secretary) in in the focus on intercultulrality. Political rheto- 2008, who stated: ‘The Hindu community have ric in this direction also implicitly accepts some managed not to be the focal point of bitterness minority groups (specifically middle class Hindu and hatred…because there’s very much a larger groups in the UK) who have been a feature of middle class, and wherever you have a larger established migrant networks as a feature of the middle class…then integration, social cohesion British landscape. Their ‘integration’ and ‘assimi- go hand in hand…’. Blunkett performs the func- lation’ are constructed as complete therefore do tion of reinforcing existing stereotypes about not re-emerge as ‘troublesome’ in any symbolic ‘bad’ migrants and ‘good’ migrants, and sec- or practical way. Cameron’s 2011 Munich speech ondly manages to homogenise an entire range of firmly asserting “Frankly, we need a lot less of groups differentiated by geographical and class the passive tolerance of recent years and much origin, dialect, caste, and crucially material posi- more active, muscular liberalism”, was clearly tion. In many ways this raises the more general not aimed at British Hindus when he visited a question about the ‘absent presence’ of other temple in North West London, as part of the 2013 ‘others’, and more specifically about the unwill- annual Diwali festival. Indeed, in a speech given ingness to acknowledge the continuity in adverse at this visit, he was instead aligning his idealised socio-economic positions among groups. As British, muscular liberalism with the beliefs, prac- Kundnani summarises, ‘…the crises of multicul- tices, and value of this group of accepted others, turalism discourse erases the complex histories arguing that the values of the UK’s Indian com- of settlement and interaction which have charac- munity should be “ever more involved” in shap- terised actual multiculturalism in Britain, and this ing British life (Asian Image 2013). Such official discourse is stubbornly ignorant of the multiple and state sanctioned openness can be traced in meanings that multiculturalism has always had’ the history of both modern British government (2012: 158). If we are to consider this seriously in (Margaret Thatcher, John Major, Tony Blair and light of recent academic moves in critical citizen- Gordon Brown as Prime Ministers all publically ship based multiculturalism and intercultulralism, visited Hindu Temples in the UK) and colonial then we need to remain vigilant against over sim- and imperial legacy (Suleri 1992). plifying who it is that remains at the ‘impact end’ The history of diversity in the UK proves that of these practices. some groups have been in positions where The politically, economically and ideologically mobilisation of networks, length of established expedient dismissal and somewhat mysterious settlement and the inherited economic, bio- disappearance of these other, non-Muslim groups graphical and migration legacies have been from debate and discussion reflects attempts at favourable. How the state utilises its cultural a “unified discourse of identity” (Kundnani 2012: and racial gaze will form part of the normalis- 159). The ideological hybridisation of left-wing, ing, nationalist civilising gaze. These differential right wing, conservative and liberal ideas of citi- ‘otherings’ need to be located as examples of cul- zenship and belonging, result in what Lentin and tural racialisation; otherwise, the uneven shifts Titley (2011) call ‘assimilationist integration poli- in cultural, economic, and political power lead cies’. This ultimately leads to the conclusion that to injustices to those groups who still occupy new integrationist tendencies (to do ostensibly positions outside of and below this hierarchy. with culture and citizenship, rather than explic- This automatically dismisses the continued- dif itly race and belonging) are part of the liberal ferential advantages and disadvantages that can struggles to attain rights in the arenas of sexual exist in the experiences of a diverse group of freedom, secular citizenship, and expression. people, and negates the possibility that within

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these non-Muslim groups there also exist politi- way in which enduring experiences of systematic cal ideologies, expression and notions of coun- racialised subjugation can be mitigated by inter- ter liberal beliefs. These ‘closed-chapter’ narra- sectional analyses. The importance of multi-fac- tives, exemplified by the state’s congratulatory eted approaches to the study of inequalities and stance on Asian business development and intervention in the discursive processes of power ‘contributions’ to the UK (BBC News 2007), also relations cannot be underestimated. They can, fail to acknowledge the political, ideological and however, be undermined by wholesale rejec- economic divisions which mediate associated tion of multiculturalism in favour of intercultural relationships between caste and class. Recent approaches. Finally, I raise a question about the research (Metcalf and Rolfe 2010) indicates that processes of differential treatment of minori- discrimination based on caste is an important ties as they become subject to varying politically positive and negative feature of many UK South expedient gazes. Some minorities are deemed Asian communities, further indicating that these acceptable, having achieved the prescriptive particular chapters on assumed ‘assimilation’ or level of ‘integration’’ or are regarded as more ‘integration’ are far from closed. culturally malleable. Others such as the vari- How, then, will progress in critical debates ous Muslim communities in the UK have been about difference take into account these shifting deemed troublesome, and a threat to national and temporal positions within a social and politi- British identity, public order and national secu- cal landscape which itself appears to be in ideo- rity. These debates play out against a backdrop logical and practical flux? The named ‘crises of of critique railed towards the constructions of multiculturalism’ has emerged as a practical and multicultural failures, and are part of contempo- symbolic crossroads, brought together by new rary, ideological power relations in the arena of European integrationist liberal notions of citizen- race, diversity, culture and identity. The question ship, fully awake to a wide variety of geo-political remains focused on how the UK and its counter- fragilities (Kundnani 2012). These insecurities parts in mainland Europe can mobilise the politi- operate not just in processes currently within the cal and ideological will to remain vigilant against academic and policy analysis discourses but also the worst excesses of fear-fuelled conceptu- on an everyday, lived and embodied level (Back alisations of the ‘other’. Continuing to reframe and Sinha 2012). citizenship within an intersectional understanding of materiality, race and difference, within an Conclusion understanding of inclusive citizenship requires a In this paper I have argued that contemporary re-engagement with the success of multicultural- discussions regarding interculturalism’s better fit ism. These observations and critiques raise some for dealing with diversity is problematic and sim- questions about the impacts of new frameworks plistically conceptualised. I have drawn on Meer of diversity and difference which may relegate and Modood’s (2012a; 2012b) tackling of these notions of racism, class and differential othering comparisons. In discussing these issues, I assert to secondary importance. that the interculturalist’s critique of multiculturalism, especially the policy-backed directions, is particularly troublesome because it neglects References some important considerations. The prominence AHMAD, F. and T. MODOOD. 2007. “British Muslim of ‘diversity’ in all its forms, an emphasis on Perspectives on Multiculturalism”. Theory, Cul- universality, forms of allegiance to constructed ture and Society 24 (3): 187-213. AMIN, A. 2002. “Ethnicity and the Multicultural national identities, and the ubiquity of ‘cohesion’ City”. Environment and Planning A 34(6): 959- policies have a de-racing and de-classing effect 980. on the debate. Such impacts then hinder the

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Note on the Author

Harshad Keval is senior lecturer in Sociology at Canterbury Christ Church University, Kent, UK. He has worked on the intersection of ethnicity, culture, race and health in a variety of countries and contexts, including culture and mental health in South Asia, childhood illnesses in Tanzania and Leprosy in Sri Lanka. His UK research has focused on the experience of diabetes in South Asian populations in the UK, having published previously on the discursive constructions of racialised risk in contemporary health arenas, and now the subject of a forthcoming book. His research interests also span the nature of ‘normalised’ race based rhetoric in contemporary political contexts, and the emergent concerns around post-race discourse.

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