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I Low Intensity Conflict: Contemporary Approaches and Strategic Thinking A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctorate of Philosophy at the University of Waikato by Deane Searle University of Waikato 2006 II Abstract Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) is a significant feature of the contemporary world and it is a particular challenge to the armed forces of many states which are involved is such conflict, or are likely to become so. This thesis is not concerned with how such difficult conflict situations arise. Rather it is concerned with how, from the point of view of the state, they may be contained and ultimately brought to a satisfactory resolution. The work is thus concerned with the practicalities of ending LIC. More specifically, the purpose of this research is to establish a framework of doctrinal and military principles applicable to the prevention and resolution of LIC. The principles of this thesis are based in numerous historical examples of LIC and six in depth case studies. These distilled principles are analysed in two central chapters, and are then applied in two latter defence force chapters so as to ensure there practicality and resilience. Numerous defence academics and military practitioners have been consulted in the production of this thesis; their contribution has further reinforced the functionality of the principles examined in this research. The research illustrates the criticality of a holistic approach to LIC. The function of this approach is to guarantee the stability of the sovereign state, by unifying civil, police, intelligence and military services. The effectiveness of the military elements must also be ensured, as military force is central to the suppression of LIC. Consequently, the research makes strategic and operational prescriptions, so as to improve the capability of defence forces that are concerned with preventing or resolving LIC. III Acknowledgements I want to thank my family for their wonderful support of this thesis. Mum and Dad, thank you for understanding that this document took quite a bit of work. Thank you Aunty, for keeping my strength up with the provision of sugar coated cakes. To Grandma and Granddad, I have finally finished school. I would like to thank my chief supervisor Doctor Ron Smith, who has been a marvellous source of advice, inspiration and encouragement over the past three years, as has my secondary supervisor Professor Dov Bing. I am enormously grateful for their time and expertise. I thank Emeritus Professor Theo Roy for his ability to cook and his intellectual insights. I would like to thank Frances Douch, for her ability to make my administrative problems go away. I would also like to thank Professor Dan Zirker for his support of me presenting my work internationally. To the numerous academics and military personnel who have willingly provided me with material and their time, thank you. I would like to thank the following people especially for their support, Major General Piers Reid, Brigadier Roger Mortlock, Colonel Antony Hayward, Group Captain Tony Forestier, Wing Commander Robert Richardson, Doctor Bob Breen and Doctor Michael Evans. There are numerous friends and colleagues who have provided advice, support and interest in the course of this study. I mention especially, Doctor Mark Rolls, Doctor Michael Siyad, Joseph Hanita, Jeanette Wright, Denis Gibbs, Geraldine Canham-Harvey, Jenine Cooper, Hume Johnson, Raewyn Emett, Melissa Hackell, Doctor Ross Casci, Heather Cunningham, Doctor John Paterson, and Macushla and Olivia Howell. I thank my wife Zavier for supporting and managing me, while I have been focussed on this thesis. You are a happy distraction and I love you. IV Contents Title Page I Abstract II Acknowledgements III Contents IV List of Graphics XII Acronyms and Abbreviations XIII Chapter One Introduction 1 Definition 3 Issues of Morality 4 Theoretical Approach 6 Methodological Approach 8 Thesis Outline 9 Part One Chapter Two The Russian Experience in LIC: Afghanistan and Chechnya 13 The Soviet’s Afghan Intervention 1979 – 1989 14 The Red Army in Afghanistan 16 The Initial Invasion 17 Reclaiming the early Initiative with Airpower 20 Combined Arms 21 Planning from Intelligence 24 Command, Control, Communications and Surveillance 26 The Russian Intervention in Chechnya 1994 – 1996 27 Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics 28 Chechen Strategy and Tactics 30 Russian Infantry, Armour and Direct Support Weapons 31 Russian Aviation 33 Command, Control and Non-Urban Terrain 36 V The Psychological War 37 The End: Russian Defeat 39 Russian Evolution between the Wars 40 Chechen Insurgents and Foreign Interference 41 The Caucasus Revisited 1999 – 2000: Russia’s War 42 Chechen Resistance 47 Conclusion – Doctrine 48 Intelligence 48 Small Scale Operations 49 Terrain 50 Aviation 50 Armour 51 Combined Arms 52 Combat Service Support 52 Civil-Military Affairs 53 Urban Dominance 53 Nationalism versus Clan, Blood or Sect 54 Summary 54 Chapter Three The American Experience in LIC: Somalia and Afghanistan 59 The American Intervention in Somalia 1992 – 1994 60 United Nations Involvement 62 UNOSOM and UNITAF: Provide Relief and Restore Hope 63 UNISOM II 64 Blackhawk Down: Mogadishu, Somalia, 3 – 4 October 1993 65 The Extraction of U.S. Forces: Mogadishu, Somalia, 3 – 4 October 66 1993 Tactics, Communications and Intelligence; American and Somali 67 Restraint and Civil Resolve 68 Hardware and HUMINT 70 An effective Coalition Task Force; Kismayu, Somalia, February – 71 March 1993 VI The American Intervention in Afghanistan 2001 – 2004 73 Operation Enduring Freedom 76 Operation Anaconda 80 Suppressing Fire 82 Soldier’s Kit 83 Communications, Command and Control 84 Between Joint Warfare Synergy and Combined Arms 85 The Air Campaign 87 Aviation: Strike and Support 89 Transformational Weapons 90 ISTAR; Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and 90 Reconnaissance Post Taliban Afghanistan: Psychological and Physical Warfare 91 Taliban Civil Affairs: Fear and Propaganda 92 U.S. Intelligence Sources 93 Pakistan’s Approach 94 Conclusion 94 Chapter Four The Iraq War of 2003 - 2004: The Coalition’s Experience in LIC 100 The Politics of Saddam 102 The Reasons behind the 2003 Iraq War 102 Operation Iraqi Freedom 105 Instances of Low Intensity Conflict in Iraq 107 U.S. Marine Corps battle for Nasiriyah 108 The British 1st Armoured Division enters Basra 110 The V Corps arrives in Baghdad 113 The combined force group, Northern Iraq 115 Lessons Learned: Rapid Manoeuvre and Military Professionalism 119 Urban Conflict and Asymmetric Warfare 122 Sea Power: Power Projection 123 Air Power: Precision Strike, Joint Warfare and C4ISTAR 124 Logistics and Airlift 125 VII Psychological and Media Warfare 126 Post-War Iraq: the Coalition’s adversaries 128 Coalition security building in Post-War Iraq 130 Further Lessons from the Post-War Environment 133 Conclusion 134 Part Two Chapter Five A Doctrine for Low Intensity Conflict 140 The Structural Components of LIC Strategy 141 Principles of counterinsurgency operations in LIC 144 Internal Security: Force and Population Security/Conservation 145 Civil Support and Stewardship 148 Regulation of International Influence 154 Unitary Command and Synergistic Joint Operations: 156 An Expeditionary Civil Service Summary 165 Chapter Six Military Force in Low Intensity Conflict 171 Doctrine 171 Infantry 172 Personnel 173 Tactics, Techniques and Standard Operating Procedures 176 Equipment 178 Armour (Armoured Fighting Vehicles) and Artillery 180 Protection 180 Manoeuvrability 183 Firepower and Visibility 184 Tactics; Command, Control and Communications (C3) 186 Artillery 186 Aviation 188 Helicopters 189 VIII The development of Helicopter use in LIC 189 Essential Nature and Use 192 Protection 192 Firepower and Target Acquisition and Designation Equipment 195 The ‘Friendly Fire’ Problem 196 Trained Personnel 197 Tactics 197 Flying Conditions 200 Aircraft 201 The development of Aircraft use in LIC 201 The Essential Nature of Aircraft in LIC 202 Firepower 202 Protection 204 Tactics and Training 205 Supply 208 Airborne Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) 209 Command, Control, Initiative, Communications and Intelligence 212 (C2ICI) Command, Control and Initiative 212 Communications 215 Intelligence 217 Summary 220 Part Three Chapter Seven New Zealand Defence Force 228 Overview 228 Doctrine and Policy 230 Infantry – Personnel 236 Tactics, Techniques and Standard Operating Procedures 243 Equipment 246 Training 248 Armour 253 IX Protection 253 Manoeuvrability 254 Firepower and Visibility 256 Transforming the Army – Light Infantry to Motorised Light Infantry 258 Tactics; Command, Control and Communications (C3) 261 Artillery 263 Aviation 264 Helicopters - Essential Nature