Fangs of the Lone Wolf Is About Combat Experience in Urban, Mountain and Fairly Open Terrain
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Russia Chechnya
Russia Chechnya Population: 1,200,000 (Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in the Russian Federation, 2007, Inter-Agency Transitional Workplan for the North Caucasus. The population of Chechnya according to the 2002 Russian census was approximately 1,100,000.) Political Rights: 7 Civil Liberties: 7 Status: Not Free Overview: Deputy Prime Minister Ramzan Kadyrov was promoted to the Chechen premiership in March 2006 and continued to strengthen his hold on power in the republic. Critics like investigative journalist Anna Politkovskaya, who was murdered in October, have claimed that Kadyrov and his security forces torture suspected rebels, many of whom disappear without a trace. Rebel violence declined as Kadyrov consolidated his position, and two important rebel leaders were killed during the year, but the larger region remained unstable. Chechnya, a small, partly mountainous North Caucasus republic, has a history of armed resistance to Russian rule dating to the czarist period. In February 1944, the Chechens were deported en masse to Kazakhstan after Soviet leader Joseph Stalin accused them of collaborating with Nazi German forces. Officially rehabilitated in 1957 and allowed to return to their homeland, they remained politically suspect and were excluded from the region’s administration. After winning election as Chechnya’s president in October 1991, former Soviet air force Major General Dzhokhar Dudayev proclaimed Chechnya’s independence. Moscow responded with an economic blockade. In 1994, Russia began assisting Chechens opposed to Dudayev, whose rule was marked by growing corruption and the rise of powerful clans and criminal gangs. Russian President Boris Yeltsin sent 40,000 troops into Chechnya by mid-December of that year and attacked the capital, Grozny. -
Russian History: a Brief Chronology (998-2000)
Russian History: A Brief Chronology (998-2000) 1721 Sweden cedes the eastern shores of the Baltic Sea to Russia (Treaty of Nystad). In celebration, Peter’s title Kievan Russia is changed from tsar to Emperor of All Russia Abolition of the Patrarchate of Moscow. Religious authority passes to the Holy Synod and its Ober- prokuror, appointed by the tsar. 988 Conversion to Christianity 1722 Table of Ranks 1237-1240 Mongol Invasion 1723-25 The Persian Campaign. Persia cedes western and southern shores of the Caspian to Russia Muscovite Russia 1724 Russia’s Academy of Sciences is established 1725 Peter I dies on February 8 1380 The Battle of Kulikovo 1725-1727 Catherine I 1480 End of Mongol Rule 1727-1730 Peter II 1462-1505 Ivan III 1730-1740 Anne 1505-1533 Basil III 1740-1741 Ivan VI 1533-1584 Ivan the Terrible 1741-1762 Elizabeth 1584-98 Theodore 1744 Sophie Friederike Auguste von Anhalt-Zerbst arrives in Russia and assumes the name of Grand Duchess 1598-1613 The Time of Troubles Catherine Alekseevna after her marriage to Grand Duke Peter (future Peter III) 1613-45 Michael Romanoff 1762 Peter III 1645-76 Alexis 1762 Following a successful coup d’etat in St. Petersburg 1672-82 Theodore during which Peter III is assassinated, Catherine is proclaimed Emress of All Russia Imperial Russia 1762-1796 Catherine the Great 1767 Nakaz (The Instruction) 1772-1795 Partitions of Poland 1682-1725 Peter I 1773-1774 Pugachev Rebellion 1689 The Streltsy Revolt and Suppression; End of Sophia’s Regency 1785 Charter to the Nobility 1695-96 The Azov Campaigns 1791 Establishment fo the Pale of Settlement (residential restrictions on Jews) in the parts of Poland with large 1697-98 Peter’s travels abroad (The Grand Embassy) Jewish populations, annexed to Russia in the partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, and 1795) and in the 1698 The revolt and the final suppression of the Streltsy Black Sea liitoral annexed from Turkey. -
La Questione Cecena E La Pubblicistica Italiana Dopo Il 1989-Finale
UNIVERSITA' DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA FACOLTA' DI LETTERE E FILOSOFIA Corso di laurea in Storia delle culture La questione cecena e la pubblicistica italiana dopo il 1989 Tesi di laurea in Storia dell’Europa Orientale Presentata da Relatore Lorenzo Chemello Prof. Egidio Ivetic Sessione di luglio 2009 1 INDICE Introduzione .............................................................. P. 3; Prima parte: Profilo storico della Cecenia Capitolo 1 Dall’Età Antica al crollo del Muro di Berlino .................. P. 5; Capitolo 2 Gli eventi della Cecenia indipendentista ........................... P. 21; Seconda parte: La pubblicistica italiana Capitolo 3 La pubblicistica italiana sulla Cecenia del periodo post-sovietico .................................................................... P. 31; Conclusioni ....................................................................... P. 51; Cronologia ......................................................................... P. 53; Bibliografia ....................................................................... P. 59; Sitografia ........................................................................... P. 63. 2 INTRODUZIONE La tesi che ho preparato si è posta davanti al banco di nebbia che avvolge l’argomento di cui tratta e ha messo in luce, con la dovuta documentazione, quelle problematiche che mi hanno consentito di capire e di esplorare quella regione del Caucaso, il cui nome a molti suona lontanamente come qualcosa di cui si parla troppo poco, forse perché non conviene ad alcuni: la Cecenia. -
History As a Means of Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the North Caucasus/Chechnya by Cecile Druey
History as a Means of Conflict and Conflict Resolution in the North Caucasus/Chechnya by Cecile Druey Starting from the example of the post-Soviet space, this article is interested in how conflicts are caused by – or result in – tensions between groups promot- ing different types and versions of historical memory. In the neo-authoritari- an, (post-) conflict setting of Chechnya, Jan Assman’s concept of cultural and communicative memory offers an interesting entry point to analyse the differ- ent types and levels of conflict, between the Chechens and Moscow, and within society in Chechnya proper. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the nationalisation of historiography in the 1990s, the new elites of Chechnya formulated local alternatives to the dominant Russian (and Soviet) narrative of the past. During the second war in Chechnya in the early 2000s, and with the strengthening of authoritarianism under the Kadyrov regime, the formerly open conflict with Moscow was again pushed underground. Ramzan Kadyrov’s instrumentalisation of history as a means to legitimise his cult of the Kadyrov family and the political choice for Moscow, that is, for Vladimir Putin, plays an important role in fuelling these grievances. Civil society, and expecially young people are an important actor in this conflict between official (or cultural) and popular (or communicative) forms of historical memory – a new conflict that is smouldering within the Chechen society, only waiting to eventually break out. Keywords: Communicative Memory, Cult of Personality. Post-Soviet Space, Memory Conflicts, Chechnya, Cultural Memory, Introduction The newly-gained independence or aspirations for autonomy and self-determi- - nation borne out of the collapse of the Soviet Union have put in motion the redefi nition of national and ethnic identities, which has often resulted in armed conflicts createbetween an minority ongoing riskgroups of re-escalation. -
Health Sector Field Directory
HEALTH SECTOR FIELD DIRECTORY Republic of Chechnya Republic of Ingushetia Russian Federation June 2004 World Health Organization Nazran, Republic of Ingushetia TABLE OF CONTENTS ORGANIZATION 1. Agency for Rehabilitation and Development (ARD/Denal) 2. CARE Canada 3. Centre for Peacemaking and Community Development (CPCD) 4. Danish Refugee Council/Danish Peoples Aid (DRC/DPA) 5. Hammer FOrum e. V. 6. Handicap International 7. International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 8. International Humanitarian Initiative (IHI) 9. International Medical Corps (IMC) 10. Islamic Relief (IR) 11. International Rescue Committee (IRC) 12. Medecins du Monde (MDM) 13. Medecins Sans Frontieres – Belgium (MSF-B) 14. Error! Reference source not found. 15. Medecins Sans Frontieres - Holland (MSF-H) 16. Medecins Sans Frontieres - Switzerland (MSF-CH) 17. Memorial 18. People in Need (PIN) 19. Polish Humanitarian Organisation (PHO) 20. Save the Generation 21. SERLO 22. UNICEF 23. World Vision 24. World Health Organization (WHO) 2 Agency for Rehabilitation and Development (ARD/Denal) Sector: Health; Food; Non-Food Items; Education Location: Chechnya and Ingushetia Objectives: To render psychosocial support to people affected by the conflict; to provide specialised medical services for women and medical aid for the IDP population; to support education and recreational activities; to supply supplementary food products to vulnerable IDP categories with specific nutritional needs; to provide basic hygienic items and clothes for new-born; to help the IDP community to establish a support system for its members making use of available resources. Beneficiaries: IDP children, youth, women and men in Ingushetia and residents in Chechnya Partners: UNICEF, SDC/SHA CONTACT INFORMATION: INGUSHETIA Moscow Karabulak, Evdoshenko St. -
ON the EFFECTIVE USE of PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 © 2021 Andrew Peek All Rights Reserved
ON THE EFFECTIVE USE OF PROXY WARFARE by Andrew Lewis Peek A dissertation submitted to Johns Hopkins University in conformity with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Baltimore, Maryland May 2021 2021 Andrew Peek All rights reserved Abstract This dissertation asks a simple question: how are states most effectively conducting proxy warfare in the modern international system? It answers this question by conducting a comparative study of the sponsorship of proxy forces. It uses process tracing to examine five cases of proxy warfare and predicts that the differentiation in support for each proxy impacts their utility. In particular, it proposes that increasing the principal-agent distance between sponsors and proxies might correlate with strategic effectiveness. That is, the less directly a proxy is supported and controlled by a sponsor, the more effective the proxy becomes. Strategic effectiveness here is conceptualized as consisting of two key parts: a proxy’s operational capability and a sponsor’s plausible deniability. These should be in inverse relation to each other: the greater and more overt a sponsor’s support is to a proxy, the more capable – better armed, better trained – its proxies should be on the battlefield. However, this close support to such proxies should also make the sponsor’s influence less deniable, and thus incur strategic costs against both it and the proxy. These costs primarily consist of external balancing by rival states, the same way such states would balance against conventional aggression. Conversely, the more deniable such support is – the more indirect and less overt – the less balancing occurs. -
HUMANITARIAN AID for the Victims of the Chechnya Conflict in the Caucasus
EUROPEAN COMMISSION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL FOR HUMANITARIAN AID - ECHO HUMANITARIAN AID for the victims of the Chechnya conflict in the Caucasus GLOBAL PLAN 2007 Humanitarian Aid Committee – December 2006 ECHO/-EE/BUD/2007/01000 1 Table of contents Explanatory Memorandum page 1) Executive summary..................................................................................... 3 2) Context and situation.................................................................................. 3 2.1.) General Context.................................................................................... 3 2.2.) Current Situation.................................................................................. 4 3) Identification and assessment of humanitarian needs.............................. 5 4) Proposed DG ECHO strategy....................................................................... 8 4.1.) Coherence with DG ECHO´s overall strategic priorities.................... 8 4.2.) Impact of previous humanitarian response......................................... 9 4.3.) Coordination with activities of other donors and institutions............ 10 4.4.) Risk assessment and assumptions........................................................ 10 4.5.) DG ECHO Strategy.................................................................................11 4.6.) Duration............................................................................................. 12 4.7.) Amount of decision and strategic programming matrix..................... 13 5) Evaluation............................................................................................. -
Economic and Social Council
UNITED NATIONS E Economic and Social Distr. Council GENERAL E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.1 26 March 2004 ENGLISH/FRENCH/SPANISH ONLY COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS Sixtieth session Agenda item 11 (c) CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, INCLUDING QUESTIONS OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION The right to freedom of opinion and expression Addendum ∗ Summary of cases transmitted to Governments and replies received ∗ ∗ The present document is being circulated in the language of submission only as it greatly exceeds the page limitations currently imposed by the relevant General Assembly resolutions GE.04-12400 E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.1 Page 2 CONTENTS Paragraphs Page Introduction 1 – 2 5 SUMMARY OF CASES TRANSMITTED AND REPLIES RECEIVED 3 – 387 5 Afghanistan 3 – 5 5 Albania 6 – 7 6 Algeria 8 – 25 6 Argentina 26 – 34 11 Armenia 35 – 38 13 Azerbaijan 39 – 66 15 Bangladesh 67 – 87 30 Belarus 88 – 94 36 Benin 95 – 96 39 Bolivia 97 – 102 39 Botswana 103 – 106 42 Brazil 107 -108 43 Burkina Faso 109 -111 43 Cambodia 112 – 115 44 Cameroon 116 – 127 45 Central African Republic 128 – 132 49 Chad 133 – 135 50 Chile 136 – 138 51 China 139 – 197 52 Colombia 198 – 212 71 Comoros 213 – 214 75 Côte d’Ivoire 215 – 219 75 Cuba 220 – 237 77 Democratic Republic of the Congo 238 – 257 82 Djibouti 258 – 260 90 Dominican Republic 261 – 262 91 Ecuador 263 – 266 91 Egypt 267 – 296 92 El Salvador 297 – 298 100 Eritrea 299 – 315 100 Ethiopia 316 – 321 104 Gabon 322 – 325 106 Gambia 326 – 328 108 Georgia 329 – 332 109 Greece 333 – 334 111 Guatemala 335 – 347 111 Guinea-Bissau 348 – 351 116 E/CN.4/2004/62/Add.1 -
Covering Conflict – Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media – ARTICLE 19, London, 2008 – Index Number: EUROPE/2008/05
CO VERIN G CO N FLICT Reporting on Conflicts in the N orth Caucasus in the Russian M edia N M AY 2008 ARTICLE 19, 6-8 Am w ell Street, London EC1R 1U Q , U nited Kingdom Tel +44 20 7278 9292 · Fax +44 20 7278 7660 · info@ article19.org · http://w w w .article19.org ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION Covering Conflict – Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media – ARTICLE 19, London, 2008 – Index Number: EUROPE/2008/05 i ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION Covering Conflict Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media May 2008 © ARTICLE 19 ISBN 978-1-906586-01-0 Covering Conflict – Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media – ARTICLE 19, London, 2008 – Index Number: EUROPE/2008/05 i i ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION Covering Conflict – Reporting on Conflicts in the North Caucasus in the Russian Media – ARTICLE 19, London, 2008 – Index Number: EUROPE/2008/05 ii i ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL CAMPAIGN FOR FREE EXPRESSION A CKN O W LED G EM EN TS This report was researched and written by the Europe Programme of ARTICLE 19. Chapter 6, on ‘International Standards of Freedom of Expression and Conflict Reporting’ was written by Toby Mendel, Director of ARTICLE 19’s Law Programme. Chapter 5, ‘Reporting Conflict: Media Monitoring Results’ was compiled by Natalia Mirimanova, independent conflict resolution and media consultant. The analysis of media monitoring data was carried out by Natalia Mirimanova and Luitgard Hammerer, (formerly) ARTICLE 19 Regional Representative - Europe, CIS. -
The Second Chechen War: the Information Component
WARNING! The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. The Second Chechen War: The Information Component by Emil Pain, Former Russian Ethno-national Relations Advisor Translated by Mr. Robert R. Love Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. This article appeared in The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may have been moved, renamed, or deleted. Verify that the link points to the correct file a Military Review July-August 2000 In December 1994 Russian authorities made their first attempt to crush Chechen separatism militarily. However, after two years of bloody combat the Russian army was forced to withdraw from the Chechen Republic. The obstinacy of the Russian authorities who had decided on a policy of victory in Chechnya resulted in the deaths of at least 30,000 Chechens and 5,000 Russian soldiers.1 This war, which caused an estimated $5.5 billion in economic damage, was largely the cause of Russia's national economic crisis in 1998, when the Russian government proved unable to service its huge debts.2 It seemed that after the 1994-1996 war Russian society and the federal government realized the ineffectiveness of using colonial approaches to resolve ethnopolitical issues.3 They also understood, it seemed, the impossibility of forcibly imposing their will upon even a small ethnoterritorial community if a significant portion of that community is prepared to take up arms to defend its interests. -
Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications
Order Code RL32272 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications Updated February 11, 2005 Jim Nichol Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Bringing Peace to Chechnya? Assessments and Implications Summary Russia’s then-Premier (and current President) Vladimir Putin ordered military, police, and security forces to enter the breakaway Chechnya region in September 1999, and these forces occupied most of the region by early 2000. The conflict has resulted in thousands of military and civilian casualties and the massive destruction of housing and infrastructure. Putin’s rise to power and continuing popularity have been tied at least partly to his perceived ability to prosecute this conflict successfully. In the run-up to Russian legislative elections in December 2003 and a presidential election in March 2004, Putin endeavored to demonstrate that peace had returned to the region. Since Chechen terrorists held hundreds of Moscow theater-goers hostage in late 2002, the Putin administration has appeared unequivocally opposed to talks with the rebels and more dedicated to establishing a pro-Moscow government in Chechnya. Such a government will use its own forces to battle the remaining rebels, ostensibly permitting the disengagement and withdrawal of most Russian troops from the region. This “Chechenization” of the conflict, along with related pacification efforts, constitute the main elements of the Russian government’s campaign to wind down the fighting. Pacification efforts aim to gain the support or acquiescence of the population to federal control and include rebuilding assistance and elections. -
Disquiet on the Chechen Front
www.JusticeForNorthCaucasus.com Disquiet On The Chechen Front Posted Sunday, April 20, 2003; 14.23 BST Anna Politkovskaya, a correspondent for the Moscow biweekly Novaya Gazeta, was in Los Angeles last October, picking out her dress for a media awards ceremony, when some staggering news came from Moscow: Chechen terrorists were holding 850 hostages in a theater. The Russian authorities tried to send in negotiators, but the Chechens refused to see most of them. They asked for Politkovskaya. And so Politkovskaya rushed back to cover yet another episode of one of the world's nastiest and longest wars, which this time had shifted to Moscow. The terrorists, she says, "wanted someone who would accurately report things as they were. My work in Chechnya makes people there feel that I don't lie. But there wasn't much I could do for the hostages anyway." She mighty pen: Politkovskaya braves the hell of Chechnya to get the truth carried water and fruit juice to them, and reported their dejection and feelings of doom to the world. Two days later, Russian Special Forces stormed and gassed the theater, killing 41 terrorists and 129 hostages. Politkovskaya, 44, made her name by writing detailed, accurate and vivid reports on the plight of the civilian population in Chechnya, caught in the horrors of war since 1994. She tells stories of people who are taken from their homes at night and never come back; about extrajudicial executions; about the hungry refugees in cold and damp camps. "It was the refugee problem that started it," she now recalls.