DOCSLIB.ORG

BICOM Briefing: the 1947 UN Partition Plan

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
BICOM Briefing: the 1947 UN Partition Plan Key points: Introduction: Britain fails to balance competing claims to Mandatory Palestine • UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (hereinafter the partition plan) sought to Following the Allied victory in the First World provide a solution to what was perceived as a War and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, confict of two peoples with conficting rights the Allied Supreme Council met in San Remo in and claims in Palestine / the Land of Israel 1920 and agreed to create a Mandatory power and established the principle of two states for within Palestine that “should be responsible for two peoples that is still relevant today. putting into efect the [Balfour] declaration…in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a • The decision by UN Special Committee on national home for the Jewish people”. In 1922, Palestine (UNSCOP) to recommend partition the Council of the League of Nations legally resulted from a variety of reasons: the confrmed Britain as the Mandatory power impressive institutions and organisational for Palestine and provided recognition “to the infrastructure established by Jewish historical connection of the Jewish people with community in Mandatory Palestine; Its leaders’ Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting willingness to cooperate with UNSCOP and their national home in that country”. accept the principle of partition – in contrast to the Arab Higher Committee who boycotted Over the subsequent years, British rule in UNSCOP and rejected both its majority and Mandatory Palestine – which following the 1921 minority recommendations; and the pressing creation of Transjordan comprised the territory need to fnd a solution to the hundreds of between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean thousands of Jewish displaced persons in Sea – came under increasing strain as it tried to Europe who had survived the Holocaust. maintain a delicate balance between fulflling rival demands by Palestinian Jews and Arabs. • The rejection of the UN General Assembly On 18 February 1947, following years of violence Resolution 181 by Arab states and the by both sides against the British, and increased subsequent war in 1948 eroded the relevancy international pressure calling for immigration of the proposed borders of the Partition Plan. to Mandatory Palestine for European Holocaust However, even 70 years on, the principle of survivors, UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin partition remains the accepted paradigm in announced that the Palestine issue would be the international community for resolution to referred to the UN. the Israeli-Palestinian confict. A session of the UN on 28 April 1947 • Israel’s Declaration of Independence bases agreed to set up the Special Committee on the legitimacy of Jewish statehood on both the Palestine (UNSCOP), consisting of 11 neutral Jewish people’s historic rights in Palestine / states – Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, the Land of Israel as well as the partition plan Guatemala, India, Iran, Netherlands, approved by the international community. Peru, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia. The proclamation announces that Israel was Representatives of these states were charged declared “by virtue of our natural and historic with making proposals for a solution to the right and on the strength of the resolution of confct which would then be discussed by the the United Nations General Assembly”. UN General Assembly. • This paper details background to the recommendation of partition and the partition UN Special Committee on Palestine plan’s acceptance by the international Recommendations community on 29 November 1947 as well as the consequences of the vote. It also describes The Palestinian Arabs, under the auspices of the history of the principle of partition as the Arab Higher Committee (AHC), opposed well as alternatives that were suggested at proposals to grant Jews national self- the time. determination in Mandatory Palestine and decided to boycott UNSCOP. With British 1 Displaced Persons (DP) camps in Europe. The Committee was ultimately infuenced by its visits to Jewish communities around the country as well to its conversations with various Jewish Agency leaders. It was also reportedly swayed by the plight of the Exodus ship, which arrived at Haifa port in July carrying over 4,500 refugees from European DP camps. The UNSCOP Yugoslavian and Swedish representative were in Haifa to personally witness the British boarding the ship, towing it into harbour and sending it back to Europe. In its fnal report, UNSCOP afrmed that a Jewish National Home as enshrined in the Balfour Declaration and Mandate was a legal right to the “Jewish people as a whole” and did not “preclude the eventual creation of a Jewish State”. The Committee also concluded that the Arabs had strong claims to rights in Palestine “by virtue of being for centuries the indigenous and preponderant people there”. The Committee unanimously approved nine recommendations, which called for the end of the Mandate and suggested that “the preservation of the economic unity of Palestine as a whole is indispensable to the life and development of the country and its peoples”. UNSCOP rejected several options: a Jewish or Arab state in the entirety of the area; canton arrangements; and the creation of a binational state, which the Committee called artifcial and impractical. The majority proposal adopted by UNSCOP Mandate authorities also refraining from making called for two states – one Arab and one any recommendations to the Committee, the Jewish – with an area surrounding Jerusalem Jewish Agency for Palestine, which served as reaching as far south as Bethlehem to be under de-facto government of the Yishuv (the Jewish international trusteeship. The boundaries population of Palestine), was left as the only were drawn to ensure the largest concentration player in the feld. The Jewish Agency saw of Arabs and Jewish populations at the time, UNSCOP’s creation as an opportunity to press as well as for the future requirements of the their claims for independence and voted to sustainability of each state. The Negev desert “take an active initiative” to cooperate fully was added to the Jewish state to allow for with the committee. “considerable room for further development and settlement”. UNSCOP met formally and informally with numerous members of the Yishuv, before The majority proposal would have resulted travelling to Lebanon, Transjordan – where in approximately 500,000 Jews (which would King Abdullah secretly suggested annexing have been supplemented by increased Jewish any Arab area proposed by partition – and immigration over time) and 380,000 Arabs in 2 the Jewish state and approximately 700,000 The UN General Assembly Resolution 181 Arabs and 10,000 Jews in the Arab state. vote and its aftermath The minority proposal, which was advanced In November 1947, the UNSCOP majority by India, Iran and Yugoslavia, called for an recommendations – with amendments to the independent federative structure composed of boundaries that removed approximately 2,000 an Arab and Jewish province with autonomy Square Kilometres in the Negev / Beersheba regarding internal matters. In this proposal, area from the proposed Jewish state – were the territory intended for Jews was primarily incorporated into UN General Assembly limited to a region along the coast and to a Resolution 181. The partition formula was large region in the heart of the Negev desert. presented as a genuine compromise between the competing claims and the large Arab A Zionist General Council meeting in minority in the Jewish state guaranteed September 1947 accepted the majority constitutional requirements respecting their proposal, although some parties continued minority rights. to reject partition and others saw it as a signifcant compromise. Speaking to the UN Resolution 181 was adopted on 29 November Ad Hoc Committee on Palestine of behalf of by 33 votes to 13 with 10 abstentions, which the Jewish Agency, Abba Hillel Silver argued constituted more than the required two-thirds that partition “was never contemplated by majority on. Voting was signifcant in that the Balfour Declaration or the Mandate” and both the USSR and USA voted in favour of the “entails… a very heavy sacrifce on the part proposal. Britain abstained. of the Jewish people,” before concluding that the Jewish Agency was prepared to Although the Partition plan gave 55 per cent of accept it. In a letter to his wife, Chairman the territory to the Jewish state, it posed several of the Jewish Agency executive (and future signifcant challenges: It didn’t provide it with frst Prime Minister of Israel) David Ben- enough arable land to absorb the millions of Gurion acknowledged that should the plan Jews in refugee camps following the Holocaust; be implemented, “it would truly be the it wasn’t thought to provide a long-term solution beginning of the redemption, and more than to the security of the state – especially in light the beginning” while Moshe Shertok (later of the opposition of Arab neighbours; and it Moshe Sharett and the future second Prime created a sizeable Palestinian Arab minority Minister of Israel) referred to the report as “an who would likely rebel against the new state incredible achievement”. and create instability. It also separated the proposed Jewish state from the Holy City of The Palestinian Arab leadership rejected both Jerusalem, which had a Jewish majority. the majority and minority proposals. The vote Those countries voting in favour of the resolution included: Canada, United States, Australia, New Zealand,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Re-Visiting the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 in Palestine
    Oberlin Digital Commons at Oberlin Honors Papers Student Work 2016 Contested Land, Contested Representations: Re-visiting the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 in Palestine Gabriel Healey Brown Oberlin College Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors Part of the History Commons Repository Citation Brown, Gabriel Healey, "Contested Land, Contested Representations: Re-visiting the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 in Palestine" (2016). Honors Papers. 226. https://digitalcommons.oberlin.edu/honors/226 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Work at Digital Commons at Oberlin. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons at Oberlin. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Contested Land, Contested Representations: Re-visiting the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 in Palestine Gabriel Brown Candidate for Senior Honors in History Oberlin College Thesis Advisor: Zeinab Abul-Magd Spring/2016 Table of Contents Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………………...1 Map of Palestine, 1936……………………………………………………………………………2 Glossary…………………………………………………………………………………………...3 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………….4 Chapter One……………………………………………………………………………………...15 Chapter Two……………………………………………………………………………………...25 Chapter Three…………………………………………………………………………………….37 Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….50 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………. 59 Brown 1 Acknowledgements Large research endeavors like this one are never undertaken alone, and I would be remiss if I didn’t thank the many people who have helped me along the way. I owe a huge debt to Shelley Lee, Jesse Gamoran, Gavin Ratcliffe, Meghan Mette, and Daniel Hautzinger, whose kind feedback throughout the year sharpened my ideas and improved the coherence of my work more times than I can count. A special thank you to Sam Coates-Finke and Leo Harrington, who were always ready to listen as I worked through the writing process.
    [Show full text]
  • Urban Arab Palestine, No-Go Areas, and the Conflicted Course of British Counter-Insurgency During the Great Rebellion, 1936–1939
    Chapter 6 “Government Forces Dare Not Penetrate”: Urban Arab Palestine, No-Go Areas, and the Conflicted Course of British Counter-Insurgency during the Great Rebellion, 1936–1939 Simon Davis The Great Palestine Arab rebellion against British rule, sometimes termed the first authentic intifada,1 lasted from April 1936 until summer 1939. The British Mandate’s facilitation of Zionist expansion in Palestine had since the 1920s recurrently aroused violent Arab protest, mainly at urban points of interface with Jewish communities. Initially, the great rebellion seemed just such an- other occurrence, beginning with inter-communal riots in Manshiyeh, the mixed Arab-Jewish workers’ suburb separating the Jewish city of Tel Aviv from its mainly Arab neighbor Jaffa. But despite the reinforcement of exhausted Palestine Police with 300 Cameron Highlanders, a quarter of the infantry in Palestine, the disorders metamorphosed into lasting, territory-wide Arab civil disobedience. Coordinated by National Committees in each principal town, elite leaders hurriedly formed the Jerusalem-based Arab Higher Committee, hoping to preserve leadership over qualitatively new levels of nationally con- scious activism. Proliferating rural sniping and sabotage, mainly on Jewish settlements, most engaged the British military, predisposed to familiar small- war, anti-banditry traditions, largely derived from experience in India. But urban political violence, mainly in the form of reciprocally escalating Arab and Jewish bombings, shootings and stabbings, was left to the increasingly over- whelmed police. Consequent loss of control over Arab towns forced the British High Commissioner, Sir Arthur Wauchope, to invoke emergency regulations in June 1936. But subsequent military repression, frequently contemptuous of civil political context, merely aggravated Arab resistance, which was trans- formed, British observers noted, from past patterns of spasmodic anti-Zionist violence into a comprehensive uprising against British Mandatory rule itself.
    [Show full text]
  • Durham Research Online
    Durham Research Online Deposited in DRO: 12 May 2006 Version of attached le: Published Version Peer-review status of attached le: Peer-reviewed Citation for published item: Ismael, T. Y. (2002) 'Arafat's Palestine national authority.', Working Paper. University of Durham, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Durham. Further information on publisher's website: http://www.dur.ac.uk/sgia/ Publisher's copyright statement: Additional information: Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in DRO • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full DRO policy for further details. Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 | Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971 https://dro.dur.ac.uk University of Durbam Institute for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies *********************************** ARAFAT'S PALESTINE NATIONAL AUTHORITY *********************************** by Tariq Y. lsmael Durham Middle East Paper No. 71 June 2002 - 2 OCT 1001 Durham Middle East Papel"S lSSN 1416-4830 No.11 The Durham Middle Easl Papers series covers all aspects of the economy. politi~s, social SCll~nce. history. hterature and languages or lhe Middle East. AUlhors are invited 10 submil papers to lhe Edl!orial Board for l:onsidcration for publiealion.
    [Show full text]
  • Gregory File
    Nuclear Peace in the Levant By: Gregory A. File, B.S. Political Science Thesis Director: Dr. Peter Rudloff, PhD Political Science Second Reader: Dr. James Scott, PhD Political Science 1 Table of Contents Abstract………………………………………………………………………..3 I. Introduction………………………………………………………..4 II. Literature Review…………………………………………………5 Nuclear Proliferation: The Good…………………………….5 Nuclear Proliferation: The Bad………………………………16 III. Theory………………………………………………………………19 IV. Case Studies………………………………………………………...24 Iraq………………………………………………………………25 Egypt…………………………………………………………….32 Jordan……………………………………………………………40 Lebanon……………………………………………………….....48 Syria……………………………………………………………...56 Summation…………………………………………………….....66 V. The Iranian Threat………………………………………………….69 Friends Now Enemies…………………………………………..70 Going Nuclear…………………………………………………...71 Apocalyptic Government……………………………………….72 The People……………………………………………………….73 Conclusion……………………………………………………….75 VI. Bringing Nuclear Peace to the Levant……………………………..75 Problem………………………………………………………….76 Policy Recommendation………………………………………..77 Summary………………………………………………………..78 VII. Conclusion…………………………………………………………..79 VIII. Bibliography…………………………………………………………82 2 Abstract Ever since the first atomic bomb was dropped over Japan to end World War II, there have been many questions that arise from the use of nuclear bombs. There are two basic arguments for the employment of nuclear weapons. One is the deterrence policy. This ensures that a state will not be attacked by its hostile neighbors. The second is a policy of brinkmanship. This is the policy of using one’s nuclear arsenal to coerce others to give into one’s demands. Both of these policies will be explored in this paper. The main point of this paper is to explore the relations between Israel and the Arab neighbors who were involved in the Arab-Israeli wars. Specifically, the paper will look at when Israel proliferated in order to gain a better understanding if that event played any factor in producing peace/cold peace between Israel and these Arab countries.
    [Show full text]
  • The Intifadah and the 1936-1939 Uprising: a Comparison of the Palestinian Arab Communities 1
    The Intifadah and the 1936-1939 Uprising: A Comparison of the Palestinian Arab Communities 1 Kenneth W. Stein The Carter Center March, 1990 Table of Contents 1. Executive Summary 2. Part I-Similarities 3. Part II-Comparisons I. Palestinian Leadership II. Character and Participation III. The Islamic Dimension IV. Duration and Effects 4. Part III - Conclusions 5. About the Author Executive Summary When comparing the 1936-1939 Palestinian uprising in various parts of western Palestine to the present intifadah, 2 taking place in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem, the most striking conclusion is the large number of general similarities between these two manifestations of Palestinian national consciousness. 3 The two most significant differences between the uprisings, however, are first, that the intifadah generated a deeper and more prolonged Palestinian national coherence across all classes than did its predecessor. Second, the intifadah clarified and crystallized Palestinian opinion which in conjunction with other events helped to create a historic compromise in Palestinian public policy. Other major differences between the two uprisings are self-evident. Many pertain to the political environments in which both uprisings unfolded. During the 1936-1939 uprising, there were no existing UN resolutions about Palestine. There was no Israel, no Israeli Arab population, no Palestinian political organization of the stature and strength of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), no decade-old Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty as a backdrop to an ongoing larger negotiating process, no decision made by the Hashemites in the midst of the uprising to place the responsibility of diplomatic progress on the shoulders of the Palestinian leadership, no willingness by a significant number of leading Palestinian Arab politicians to accept a Jewish state in a portion of Palestine, and no corresponding willingness on the part of an equally important number of Zionist/Israel leaders to assent to the legitimacy of Palestinian national aspirations.
    [Show full text]
  • British Army and Palestine Police Deserters and the Arab–Israeli War
    This is a repository copy of British Army and Palestine Police Deserters and the Arab– Israeli War of 1948. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: http://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/135106/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Caden, C and Arielli, N (2021) British Army and Palestine Police Deserters and the Arab– Israeli War of 1948. War in History, 28 (1). pp. 200-222. ISSN 0968-3445 https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344518796688 This is an author produced version of a paper accepted for publication in War in History. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher's self-archiving policy. Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ 1 British Army and Palestine Police Deserters and the Arab-Israeli War of 1948 British servicemen and policemen who had been stationed in Palestine towards the end of the British Mandate and deserted their units to serve with either Jewish or Arab forces have only received cursory academic attention.1 Yet, this is a relatively unique occurrence, in the sense that in no other British withdrawal from colonial territories did members from the security forces desert in notable numbers to remain in the territory to partake in hostilities.
    [Show full text]
  • CDC) Dataset Codebook
    The Categorically Disaggregated Conflict (CDC) Dataset Codebook (Version 1.0, 2015.07) (Presented in Bartusevičius, Henrikas (2015) Introducing the Categorically Disaggregated Conflict (CDC) dataset. Forthcoming in Conflict Management and Peace Science) The Categorically Disaggregated Conflict (CDC) Dataset provides a categorization of 331 intrastate armed conflicts recorded between 1946 and 2010 into four categories: 1. Ethnic governmental; 2. Ethnic territorial; 3. Non-ethnic governmental; 4. Non-ethnic territorial. The dataset uses the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset v.4-2011, 1946 – 2010 (Themnér & Wallensteen, 2011; also Gleditsch et al., 2002) as a base (and thus is an extension of the UCDP/PRIO dataset). Therefore, the dataset employs the UCDP/PRIO’s operational definition of an aggregate armed conflict: a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths (Themnér, 2011: 1). The dataset contains only internal and internationalized internal armed conflicts listed in the UCDP/PRIO dataset. Internal armed conflict ‘occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states’ (ibid.: 9). Internationalized internal armed conflict ‘occurs between the government of a state and one or more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from other states (secondary parties) on one or both sides’(ibid.). For full definitions and further details please consult the 1 codebook of the UCDP/PRIO dataset (ibid.) and the website of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University: http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/definitions/.
    [Show full text]
  • The Palestinian People
    The Palestinian People The Palestinian People ❖ A HISTORY Baruch Kimmerling Joel S. Migdal HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England 2003 Copyright © 1994, 2003 by Baruch Kimmerling and Joel S. Migdal All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America An earlier version of this book was published in 1994 as Palestinians: The Making of a People Cataloging-in-Publication data available from the Library of Congress ISBN 0-674-01131-7 (cloth) ISBN 0-674-01129-5 (paper) To the Palestinians and Israelis working and hoping for a mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement to their century-long conflict CONTENTS Maps ix Preface xi Acknowledgments xxi Note on Transliteration xxiii Introduction xxv Part One FROM REVOLT TO REVOLT: THE ENCOUNTER WITH THE EUROPEAN WORLD AND ZIONISM 1. The Revolt of 1834 and the Making of Modern Palestine 3 2. The City: Between Nablus and Jaffa 38 3. Jerusalem: Notables and Nationalism 67 4. The Arab Revolt, 1936–1939 102 vii Contents Part Two DISPERSAL 5. The Meaning of Disaster 135 Part Three RECONSTITUTING THE PALESTINIAN NATION 6. Odd Man Out: Arabs in Israel 169 7. Dispersal, 1948–1967 214 8. The Feday: Rebirth and Resistance 240 9. Steering a Path under Occupation 274 Part Four ABORTIVE RECONCILIATION 10. The Oslo Process: What Went Right? 315 11. The Oslo Process: What Went Wrong? 355 Conclusion 398 Chronological List of Major Events 419 Notes 457 Index 547 viii MAPS 1. Palestine under Ottoman Rule 39 2. Two Partitions of Palestine (1921, 1949) 148 3. United Nations Recommendation for Two-States Solution in Palestine (1947) 149 4.
    [Show full text]
  • 30112010135254 Hijazi (Library).Pdf
    Palestinian Representation and the Struggle for Statehood Ammar Hijazi A dissertation presented to the faculty of Arts in the University of Malta for the degree of Master in Contemporary Diplomacy May 2010 Declaration I hereby declare that this dissertation is my own original work. Ammar Hijazi 31 May 2010, New York, USA ~ i ~ Acknowledgments To my parents who taught me how to love my homeland and take pride in being a Palestinian; to my wife for her boundless love, patience and support. I am also grateful to my colleagues at work; Ambassador Riyad Mansour for his support and understanding; my dear friend Feda Abdelahdi for her support and assistance; thanks too to my dear colleagues Nadya, Yussef, and Somaia for their support and encouragement. Last but not least, my gratitude goes to Ambassador Victor Camilleri, my mentor, for his valued advice and comments, which gave me the guidance, encouragement and enthusiasm to accomplish this important achievement. ~ ii ~ Dedication To those who dedicated their lives and sacrificed selflessly for Palestine's freedom ~ iii ~ Abstract Palestinian national identity evolved as Palestinians came under the rule of a colonial power with an agenda whose aim contradicted their very existence as a nation. Quickly, Palestinian political activists realized that forming a uniting and unified representative body that could engage the international and regional players was a political and practical requirement for the achievement of their national aspirations. But with the formation of the first Palestinian representative body, the struggle for independence began and with it, the crucial battle for recognition. Palestinian representation was greatly and negatively affected by competing regional and international players.
    [Show full text]
  • Arab Nationalism
    Arab Nationalism Journal of Integrative International Relations, 5:1 (2020) 1-32 Copyright © Department of International Relations UIN Sunan Ampel Surabaya ISSN 2477-3557 (Print) DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.4785114 Arab Nationalism: Past, Present, and Future Hadza Min Fadhli Robby Department of International Relations, Islamic University of Indonesia, Yogyakarta Email: [email protected] Abstract This article would like to discuss the development of Arab Nationalism throughout history. Arab Nationalism is discussed intially as a part of resistance against Turkish and Ottoman power. The construction of enmity between Arab and Turkish nation became one of the most important feature of Arab Nationalism. However, the enmity against Turkish nation was not the only factor contributing to the Arab Nationalism. The existence of Arab nationalist movement and rise of Arab intellectuals gave the momentum for Arab nationalism to obtain a prominent place. As Arab nations declared their independence, there are aspirations which seeks Arab nations to be united into one country. One such ideal was brought up by Gamal Abdel Nasser, previously the President of Arab Republic of Egypt. Arab Nationalism experienced its hey-day during these days, but soon after, loses its charm after the war with Israel. This paper will also discuss the problems and reasons behind the decline of Arab Nationalism. Tulisan ini akan membahas tentang perkembangan nasionalisme Arab sepanjang sejarah. Awalnya, nasionalisme Arab tumbuh sebagai sebuah konstruk dan perlawanan terhadap kuasa Turki dan Usmani. Namun, seiring dengan tumbuhnya pergerakan akar rumput yang memperjuangkan nasionalisme Arab dan kebangkitan intelektual Arab, gerakan nasionalisme Arab mulai mendapatkan pamornya di tengah masyarakat Arab.
    [Show full text]
  • 1948 Arab‒Israeli
    1948 Arab–Israeli War 1 1948 Arab–Israeli War מלחמת or מלחמת העצמאות :The 1948 Arab–Israeli War, known to Israelis as the War of Independence (Hebrew ,מלחמת השחרור :, Milkhemet Ha'atzma'ut or Milkhemet HA'sikhror) or War of Liberation (Hebrewהשחרור Milkhemet Hashikhrur) – was the first in a series of wars fought between the State of Israel and its Arab neighbours in the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. The war commenced upon the termination of the British Mandate of Palestine and the Israeli declaration of independence on 15 May 1948, following a period of civil war in 1947–1948. The fighting took place mostly on the former territory of the British Mandate and for a short time also in the Sinai Peninsula and southern Lebanon.[1] ., al-Nakba) occurred amidst this warﺍﻟﻨﻜﺒﺔ :Much of what Arabs refer to as The Catastrophe (Arabic The war concluded with the 1949 Armistice Agreements. Background Following World War II, on May 14, 1948, the British Mandate of Palestine came to an end. The surrounding Arab nations were also emerging from colonial rule. Transjordan, under the Hashemite ruler Abdullah I, gained independence from Britain in 1946 and was called Jordan, but it remained under heavy British influence. Egypt, while nominally independent, signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 that included provisions by which Britain would maintain a garrison of troops on the Suez Canal. From 1945 on, Egypt attempted to renegotiate the terms of this treaty, which was viewed as a humiliating vestige of colonialism. Lebanon became an independent state in 1943, but French troops would not withdraw until 1946, the same year that Syria won its independence from France.
    [Show full text]
  • INSTITUTE of JERUSALEM STUDIES JERUSALEM of INSTITUTE Winter 2017 Winter
    Jerusalem: Fifty Years of Occupation Nazmi al-Jubeh Ribat in Palestine Kenny Schmitt Revocation of Residency of Palestinians in Jerusalem Tamara Tawfiq Tamimi Benefactresses of Waqf and Good Deeds Şerife Eroğlu Memiş Winter 2017 Jerusalem and Bethlehem Immigrant Families to Chile Bernard Sabella Resting in Peace in No Man’s Land at the Jerusalem War Cemetery Yfaat Weiss Filastinʼs Changing Attitude toward Early Zionism Emanuel Beška The Husayni Neighborhood in Jerusalem Winter 2017 Mahdi Sabbagh How Israel Legalizes Forcible Transfer: The Case of Occupied Jerusalem Report by Jerusalem Legal Aid and Human Rights Center (JLAC) Trump vs. a Global Consensus and International Law Infographics by Visualizing Palestine www.palestine-studies.org INSTITUTE OF JERUSALEM STUDIES Editors: Salim Tamari and Issam Nassar Associate Editors: Penny Johnson and Alex Winder Managing Editor: Carol Khoury Advisory Board Yazid Anani, A. M. Qattan Foundation, Ramallah Rochelle Davis, Georgetown University, USA Beshara Doumani, Brown University, USA Michael Dumper, University of Exeter, UK Rema Hammami, Birzeit University, Birzeit George Hintlian, Christian Heritage Institute, Jerusalem Huda al-Imam, Palestine Accueil, Jerusalem Omar Imseeh Tesdell, Birzeit University, Birzeit Nazmi al-Jubeh, Birzeit University, Birzeit Hasan Khader, al-Karmel Magazine, Ramallah Rashid Khalidi, Columbia University, USA Roberto Mazza, University of Limerick, Ireland Yusuf Natsheh, al-Quds University, Jerusalem Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian, Mada al-Carmel, Haifa Tina Sherwell, International Academy of Art Palestine, Ramallah The Jerusalem Quarterly (JQ) is published by the Institute of Jerusalem Studies (IJS), an affiliate of the Institute for Palestine Studies. The journal is dedicated to providing scholarly articles on Jerusalem’s history and on the dynamics and trends currently shaping the city.
    [Show full text]