Issue Brief # 233 August 2013

Innovative Research | Independent Analysis | Informed Opinion

China and its Peripheries Limited Objectives in

Tilak Jha School of International Studies, JNU

Of all the nations that border , its to its relatively unstable northeastern comparison with Bhutan would appear to states – the – that could be a paradox. In comprehensive power provide it with a rare political and military terms, Bhutan is almost a nonentity to opportunity in South Asia generally but China. Bhutan’s biggest disadvantage is specifically against in the long term. its geography that limits its connectivity to India in South and China in north with no China’s objectives in Bhutan remains access to sea or any other third country limited in the short term which partly without using either Indian or Chinese explains its comparatively aggressive land or airspace. Nevertheless, in the stance towards Bhutan till the 1960s. Of geopolitical context of today’s South Asia, late, however, Beijing has displayed Bhutan’s geography has strategic relative patient farsightedness in ramifications for both India and China. considering Bhutan as a small but important element of its South Asia policy This provides Bhutan with more diplomatic framework. Like Nepal, Beijing has maneuverability than ever before. As employed a mix of persuasion and Jane Shi (2011) wrote, “Though it has no coercion with Bhutan as well reminding direct access to major waterways or ports, the repercussions of siding with India. With Bhutan is positioned at a strategic Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and even location between India and China, Bangladesh offering Beijing more leverage controlling several important Himalayan in South Asia against India than ever mountain passes.” For China, it is Bhutan’s before, Bhutan could play a critical role location just north of India’s only road link for China: firstly in furthering its strategic depth against India’s northeastern periphery; second in restraining its Tibetan This essay was initially presented in a conference organized by the IPCS in collaboration with the Center for East Asian Studies, JNU dilemma from spilling over into Bhutan; and Department of East Asian Studies, JNU and lastly, in stopping Bhutan from being guided by Indian concerns alone. Views expressed are author’s own.

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Given the importance of the historical Only during the Qing Empire, China tried context in explaining the China-Bhutan exerting relatively direct authority over dynamics, the first section deals with the . With Bhutan, the direct contact historical-contemporary trajectory. The though was established in in the 1720s, second section focuses on the but it remained only informal (Library of contemporary geopolitical aims and Congress 1991) probably for two reasons: objectives of China in particular in South to secure their interests from the British Asia vis-a-cis India and the missing links and satisfy their urge of what B. R. that Bhutan could fill. Tibet’s and India’s Deepak calls “Manchu expansionism.” A inevitable influence both political and Centre for Bhutan Studies report (2004) cultural on the China-Bhutan relationships captures this entire episode till its will be part of the entire discussion. culmination in following words:

I China was involved in Tibetan affairs China and Bhutan: Historical & since the time that Chinese Ambans Contemporary Contexts (residents) were stationed in in the 1720s under the Ching dynasty… The Bhutanese delegation to the Dalai China’s embrace of its external periphery Lama came into contact with the states was historically influenced by what Chinese representatives in Lhasa is now construed as the Chinese notion of although there was no evidence of international system, that is, the tributary any tributary relation with Beijing system (Zhang and Buzan 2012: 3). whatsoever. Relations with Tibet itself, was never better but it was severely The Tibetan plateau probably with the strained after Bhutan supported the exception of its Tang dynasty (618-907 British during the 1904 Younghusband AD) when Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo Expedition. The only contact with unified Tibet and forced the Chinese China was the occasional, informal Emperor Taizong to enter into a marriage meeting of a Bhutanese alliance gave birth only to what could be representative in Lhasa with the Chinese officials. Unlike Nepal, Bhutan termed limited states. Whatever influence never sent tributary missions to China… China ever had over Tibet or Tibet had China made several efforts to exercise over Bhutan and Nepal had an important what it called ‘historic’ rights over logistical determinant. The Bhutan between 1865 when the Treaty communication and connectivity of Sinchula was signed, and the concerns required that even if Tibet was signing of the Treaty of Punakha in some form of a tributary state, the 1910 - a direct outcome of the claim Chinese required Tibetans to be in charge the Manchu Government of China of most of their affairs including even made on Nepal, and Bhutan foreign affairs, occasionally letting them after its invasion of Tibet in 1910-12. China continued to make feudatory get away with near independence level claim on Bhutan even after the 1910 of autonomy (Xinhua, 29 April 2013). Treaty of Punakha. It made a vague suzerainty claim over Bhutan during years just before the Chinese Revolution of 1911 to secure its Since the Opium Wars until 1951 when Tibet southeastern border against increasing finally went under the physical control of China foreign aggression. The new Republic of China slowly let the claim die down, after armed intervention by the People’s only for it to resurface later time and Liberation Army (PLA), Bhutan and even Tibet again. had little to worry about China, as the British Bhutan recognised China as a significant were the most powerful constant in the entire threat for the first time after the joint zone and China was being ravaged by wars both Chinese/Tibetan invasion of Nepal in 1792 civil and foreign. -1793 (Dutt 1981: 58-62). Since the Opium

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Wars until 1951 when Tibet finally went under the physical control of China after armed intervention by the People’s Whatever the Chinese political claims to Bhutan Liberation Army (PLA), Bhutan and even are, it owes them to the largely cultural-religious Tibet had little to worry about China, as Tibetan influence there for centuries. Indeed, the the British were the most powerful constant in the entire zone and China Tibetan claims had political and even military was being ravaged by wars both civil and overtones as reflected in 8th century invasion of foreign. China’s tone changed from Tibet over Bhutan and subsequent strives that claim over Bhutan as the Manchu followed. government did in 1910 to accepting Bhutan as a sovereign state after the 1960s. Nonetheless, the geostrategic balance that had prevailed in this region for decades stood altered forever after The fact that the most “dominant political the British left. and cultural element” in Bhutanese population comprises of the numerically Whatever the Chinese political claims to prominent Ngalop – the people of Bhutan are, it owes them to the largely Tibetan origin who migrated around the cultural-religious Tibetan influence there ninth century and introduced Tibetan for centuries. Indeed, the Tibetan claims culture and Buddhism to Bhutan – made had political and even military overtones them only more likely to realise the as reflected in 8th century invasion of Tibetan crisis (Library of Congress 1991). Tibet over Bhutan and subsequent strives Repeated claims regarding Bhutan by the that followed. However, the conflict was communist government in China and always of a regional texture preceded Chinese leaders further pushed the and followed by the arrival of another set Bhutanese government into a long period of Tibetan lamas who preached of self-imposed isolation from China even Buddhism even as they started settling as the People’s Republic officially denied themselves and encouraging fellow any intention to subdue Bhutanese Tibetans to follow them mainly in the sovereignty. Southern Valleys of Bhutan. In any case, even when there were clashes, it After her independence, Chinese state presented no existential threat to laid its claim over Bhutan in 1954 itself by Bhutanese culture and way of life and the publishing a map in “A Brief History of ground polity (Mathou 2004: 389-391). China” thus beginning a long period of Certainly, these wars served no grand border conflict. The map depicted “a geopolitical big game that spread far considerable portion of Bhutan…as a pre- beyond the Bhutanese soils. historical realm of China.” Four years later, in 1958, China not only published another The Indian engagement in Bhutan was map claiming large tracts of Bhutanese limited to religion and culture till the British land but also occupied about 300 square developed interest in Tibet and then in miles of Bhutanese territory. An anxious Bhutan around mid-eighteenth century. Bhutan took resort to the less than a Historically, Bhutan’s political and decade old British legacy India-Bhutan economic interaction was with Tibet and Treaty of 1949 Article 2 of which stipulated Sikkim alone (Kumar 2010: 243-245). The that (Ahsan and Chakma 1993: 1043): shift towards India began with the British “On its part the Government of Bhutan engagement in Bhutan. agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its Bhutan completely alienated from its new external relations.” northern neighbour China when the Dalai Lama escaped to India and the Tibetan 1960 marked another provocative revolt was ruthlessly suppressed in 1959. declaration from a Chinese leader which

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gave Bhutan every reason to be cautious strength lies. Therefore, China looks for about Chinese intentions (Centre for more of economic and tourism Bhutan Studies 2004: 75): "Bhutanese, cooperation, hydroelectricity and Sikkimese and Ladakhis form a united infrastructure related cooperation and family in Tibet. They have always been resource exploitation – areas where it has subject to Tibet and to the great a decisive edge. Beijing probably motherland of China. They must once believes that with the rise in economic again be united and taught the and related interaction involving financial communist doctrine." The only silver lining stakes, other benefits will simply accrue. in those initial years for Bhutan was that China might not be wrong in having these the Chinese did not attack expectations as obvious from the case of Nepal in particular. When stakes are high, II Beijing has shown no hesitation in China’s Strategies towards mounting military pressure along the Bhutan and the Complexities border. That puts severe restrictions on Involved buffer states like Bhutan whose greatest foreign policy success lies in not being The Chinese aims and objectives in taken as either granted or completely Bhutan over last five decades point out unreliable by India or China. towards a host of conflicting yet complementing interests that envelop China’s strategy towards Bhutan can be issues pertaining to Tibet, India, and South divided into the following three major Asia. More specifically, Bhutan could hold aspects: border, economy and the key to China’s legitimacy claims geopolitics. regarding Tibet and act as the last milestone in discrediting and demoralising A. Border: Military Intimidation, Diplomatic India in its own backyard. Indeed China’s Seduction, Border Talks and Incursions, continued motivation in engaging Bhutan and Siliguri Corridor relates to the strategic benefits its geography can deliver. However, China’s Military intimidation followed by Bhutan policy is certainly of a more diplomatic seduction has formed an comprehensive and subtle nature as important part of China’s policy towards Beijing is least inclined to align or link Bhutan. After the closing of the border, either its Tibetan concerns or its urgency trade and all diplomatic contacts in 1960, to improve ties with India to factors which China resorted to significant military can be relied less upon or simply ignored. posturing against Bhutan at least twice – Thus the Chinese engagement with in 1966 and in 1979 along the border Bhutan seeks engaging Bhutan, getting its which remains the prime reason of objectives fulfilled but without giving dispute. In 1966, on the tri-junction of much due to Bhutan as it achieves them Bhutan, Chumbi Valley and Sikkim, the by enhancing cooperation where its own Tibetan grazers accompanied by Chinese troops entered pastures. China later “formally extended claim to about 300 sq. miles of northeastern Bhutan and The Chinese aims and objectives in Bhutan over also substantial areas north of Punakha, last five decades point out towards a host of the former capital of Bhutan.” When Bhutan requested New Delhi to raise this conflicting yet complementing interests that matter with Beijing, China rejected talking envelop issues pertaining to Tibet, India, and to India saying that the issues concerned South Asia. More specifically, Bhutan could China and Bhutan alone and "the Indian hold the key to China’s legitimacy claims government has no right whatsoever to intervene in it (Singh 2000: 1109-1127)." regarding Tibet and act as the last milestone in discrediting and demoralising India. China followed up this incident by voting

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in favour of Bhutan’s membership at the United Nations (UN) in 1971 which implied its recognition of Bhutan. However, Bhutan’s strong support to India in the UN over Bangladesh issue the same year irked China dissuading them from building further momentum (Ibid). The coronation of the new King of Bhutan in 1974 where China sent a high-level delegation and Bhutan’s vote in the UN in 1977 favouring the Chinese position against India’s on who should represent Cambodia marked opening up of other vistas of cooperation. For Bhutan, the Janata government in New Delhi made Source: Binyon 2013 the task easier as its policy of “beneficial Bhutan, India and China border, is bilateralism” signaled normalisation of significant as it is 500 km from Siliguri India-China relations (Gulati 2000: 79). corridor—the chicken neck which China wanted the border talks to begin connects India to North East India and but with Bhutan still unprepared, it Nepal to Bhutan. Meanwhile Chumbi ensured large-scale intrusions in 1979. The Valley is of geostrategic importance to negotiations finally began in 1984. In 1998, China because of its shared borders they agreed on Four Guiding Principles for with Tibet and Sikkim. The North- further talks which included maintaining Western areas of Bhutan which China peace along the border, something wants in exchange for the Central China often violated to create pressure. areas lie next to the Chumbi Valley tri- junction. After nineteen rounds of talks by January 2010, the two sides are said to have Economy: Inclusion of Tibet, Historic- nearly finalised boundary demarcation Contemporary Trade, Rail Connectivity (Bhutan Research 2012) and almost and Long Term Economic Considerations prepared to establish diplomatic ties with China (Sina.com, 13 April 2012). China China and Bhutan trade totaled a also offered a sweet package deal to pathetic USD 1 million in 2002. The Bhutan that Bhutan has been reluctant to situation has not changed much since. conclude. Medha Bisht (2010) wrote This could entail that for China, Bhutan is about the complexities involved in such a economically irrelevant. However, even deal: with a small economy, Bhutan would be crucial to Tibet and Tibetans. Bhutan The protracted nature of Sino-Bhutan boundary talks and the continuous would also be beneficial for China’s Chinese intrusions into Bhutanese “‘Western development strategy’, that territory reveals the strategic element could allow Tibet to regain a central embedded in the package deal. In position in the Himalayan region (Mathou November 2007, Chinese forces 2004: 389-391).” It will also serve the 2000 dismantled several unmanned posts Communist Party of China resolution near the Chumbi valley. This, analysts which called for “Prosperous Borders; put it, has ‘distorted the Sino- Wealthy Minorities program.” Certainly, it Bhutanese border near Sikkim,’ with would provide China with more leverage Chinese forces only a few kilometers in Bhutan. away from the Siliguri corridor. Chumbi Valley, a vital tri-junction between

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Today more than three fourth of Bhutan’s provides more reason for China to believe trade is with India unlike till the 1960s that Bhutan could again emerge as an when Bhutan had a flourishing trade with economic hotspot in this region. Tibet. The closing of Bhutan’s Tibet trade and diversification of modern trade into China’s oft declared intentions to deepen new areas of commerce like tourism, economic cooperation with India’s industry and technology – areas where Northeast, Bangladesh and Bhutan point Bhutan lagged behind – has made towards reviving above prospects and Bhutan today an economically backward create many more. The mega rail projects country. This is in complete contrast to the that China is building up with significant period even during the British domination investment along its entire Himalayan when Bhutan served as a major trade borders with India includes Yadong near point. the mouth of the Chumbi valley and Nyingchi near Sarkar and Ray (2005: 56) wrote: (Krishnan, 18 January 2012). These rail “According to an eighteenth century routes have been planned to enhance document, her (Bhutan’s) annual trade connectivity of Tibet and link its markets was worth of Rs 200 thousand with with the Himalayan fringe-lands like and Rs 150 thousand with Tibet, including Bhutan. Of course, it has military China.” Françoise Pommaret (1999: 385- dimensions as well which has compelled 386) also writes that: “Bhutan carried out India to improve connectivity of these a substantial trade with her southern neglected lands and listen to its smaller neighbours – Bengal (Cooch Bihar) and neighbours. Even bigger opportunities (Kamrup) – at least from the 17th could be created via Bhutan when the century, if not earlier.” Sarkar and Ray proposed Silk Rail Route’s southern point out in the same article that Bhutan corridor from Europe to Southeast Asia, and Lhasa – the prime centres of trade via Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, India, Burma and commerce in the Himalayan belt for and Thailand reaches this region (Binyon centuries – were linked by four alternative 2013). However, concerns remain. routes facilitating round the year trade Mathou writes that Gangtok is a better even in case of a political turmoil. They location than or Paro to become originated from Paro, Punakha, Bumthang a trans-Himalayan trade hub. Binyon also and Trashigang in Bhutan to Lhasa in underlines the implausibility of the re- Tibet. Bhutan offered one of the shortest emergence of the old Bhutan-Tibet trade routes to Tibetan trade with Bengal pattern as a whole new Bhutanese trade (Trashigang) and Assam (Paro). This pattern has emerged with India as a supplier and a market since 1960. China’s Proposed Rail Lines along the Himalayan Border However, even with economic issues Source: http://www.china-mor.gov.cn/ having the potential to remain the priority in the long run, Bhutan is too strategically positioned to be considered an economic priority alone. Economic ties are actually a real and probably genuine nevertheless shrewd pretext to keep Bhutan hooked up to the Chinese Caravan. A hub or not, China stands to benefit both economically and

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politically from engaging Thimpu. China’s oft declared intentions to deepen C. Geopolitics: Chinese Foreign Policy, economic cooperation with India’s Northeast, Dalai Lama and Bhutan and India in South Bangladesh and Bhutan point towards reviving Asia above prospects and create many more. The mega Concerning the Tibetan issue, the focus rail projects that China is building up with on Bhutan appears to be even more significant investment along its entire Himalayan fundamental. Though Chinese policies borders with India includes Yadong near the inside Tibet have displayed little concern for Tibetan aspirations, it is entirely possible mouth of the Chumbi valley and Nyingchi near that by having Bhutan in good faith – a Arunachal Pradesh country that shares ethnic, religious, cultural and historic ties with Tibet – Beijing plans to assuage Tibetans’ ill will against Conclusion China. That Bhutan never invited the current Dalai Lama nor was his Gelugpa China’s pragmatic foreign policy in sect ever allowed to build any monastic contemporary times with the smaller institutions due to hierarchical feelings South Asian countries – for example the which subordinated Bhutan’s Drukpa sect studied non-interfering role it played in Tibet only suits communist ideology to when the Sri Lankan Tamil crisis required an extent (Mathou 2004: 390-397). an Indian Peace Keeping Force – indicates that China fully takes into Nevertheless, the most important account the existing geographical and geopolitical consideration for China in economic limitations of Bhutan. China keeping Bhutan tagged remains India. realises the extent to which Bhutan can The approach of Beijing over last five go against India, and definitely does not decades has been to minimise the role expect a lean to China’s side. However, it and importance of India in Bhutan. By aims at neutralising Bhutan in the wake of consistently refusing to accept any Indian any political or military conflict with India advocacy for Bhutan coupled with the and use it as a base to further trade and “pressure tactics of border incursions,” the commerce in Tibet and rest of South Asia. Chinese have brought Bhutan to the On a hopeful note, it might expect negotiation table even though they been Bhutan to look up to China as an unsuccessful in making deep inroads in effective and reliable counterbalance to Bhutan (Malik 2001: 77). contain the inevitable Indian domination, something like Nepal. Bhutan has asserted China realises its limited leverage in its acceptance of China’s core foreign Bhutan given critical Indian centrality in policy concern i.e. One China Policy Bhutanese affairs and South Asia as well (Firstpost.com, 14 August 2012). Bhutan’s due to sheer geographic advantage that transition from monarchy to parliamentary India enjoys. All that China wants from democracy saw the revision of the 1949 Bhutan is for it to follow an 'independent' treaty with India in 2007 to one on a policy which essentially means that “more equal footing with both sides Bhutan do away with its traditional policy agreeing to ‘cooperate closely with each tilt towards India. China blames India of other on issues relating to their national dominating Bhutan unfairly in the name of interests (Jacob 2012)’.” The next in line ‘hegemony’ – calling it the Indian version could be Indian military presence there. of Monroe Doctrine. Thus, Beijing wants As recent developments suggest, it could Bhutan to confer on Beijing a diplomatic be a matter of time that Bhutan moves to status equal to that of New Delhi and balance its tilt towards India. In a world accept a Chinese Ambassador (Ibid). under growing Chinese domination and III reducing geographical barriers, one can

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always expect an upward revision of Jane, Shi. 2011. "The China Alternative – Bhutan." China Briefing. 4 April 2011. http:// Chinese strategies and objectives. www.china-briefing.com/news/2011/04/04/ the-china-alternative-bhutan.html. Accessed References on 1 May 2013.

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