Dragon: India-Bhutan Relations
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8 September 2016 The Elephant and the (Little) Dragon: India-Bhutan Relations Lindsay Hughes Research Analyst Indian Ocean Research Programme Key Points Bhutan and India have strong ties that are centuries-old. In the modern era, the relationship was founded upon a perceived common threat. The relationship continued to evolve until Bhutan could assert its complete sovereignty. This has, in part, accounted for the continued strength of their bilateral ties. Summary As it does with Nepal, India has had ties with Bhutan that stretch back into antiquity. Also like Nepal, Bhutan or Druk Yul is a small country – smaller than Nepal, in fact – that is situated on the southern slopes of the Himalayas, is land-locked and depends on India economically. Recorded relations between India and Bhutan date back to 747 AD when a Buddhist saint from India, Padmasambhava, introduced Bhutan to Buddhism; that belief system now permeates Bhutanese society. The British in colonial India fought wars against the Bhutanese, which were usually followed by various treaties and agreements, notably the one signed between the two states in 1865 after the Duar War. Indo-Bhutanese trade is believed to have begun from around 1873. Whatever misgivings Bhutan’s leaders may have had about relations with the British, the Chinese invasion of Tibet in 1910 and its claims to parts of Bhutanese territory saw Thimphu turn to them for protection. The two sides subsequently signed the Treaty of Punakha in 1910, which saw Bhutanese sovereignty protected but, arguably, laid the foundation of its future relationships with both China and India. Bhutan did take steps to protect its independence; when, seeing India’s gradual moves towards its own independence, the British Cabinet Mission visited India in 1946, Bhutanese authorities presented the Mission with a memorandum differentiating their country from the princely states in India. Seeing another opportunity to hinder an independent India (albeit they were correct to do so in this instance), the Mission confirmed Bhutan’s independent status, thus leaving the country’s sovereignty unchanged when India became independent in 1947. Bhutan, nevertheless, worried about the risks to its independence and created an alliance with Tibet and Sikkim. In 1948 a Bhutanese delegation to New Delhi discussed a revision of the treaty signed between the British and India in 1865 with India’s Ministry of External Affairs. Nehru reassured the Bhutanese that India respected their sovereignty and asked that the country accord independent India the same degree of friendship it gave to the colonial British. The two sides agreed to a quid pro quo arrangement; India would return the thirty two square miles or so of territory in the Dewangiri Hill strips that the British had acquired through the 1865 treaty and Bhutan would cease to receive the subsidy it received according to the 1910 treaty it signed with British India. When Thimphu asked that a fresh treaty be signed between the two countries (perhaps to reinforce the idea of an independent Bhutan as much as anything else), New Delhi agreed because it perceived a good relationship could balance, to an extent, the potential threat that China posed. They consequently signed the Treaty of Peace and Friendship on August 8, 1949, in Darjeeling, India. The first article of the Treaty laid the groundwork for future ties: it stated that that the two governments would work towards a perpetual peace and friendship between them. From the Indian perspective, it marked a continuation of the Anglo- Bhutanese Treaty of 1910 and accorded India with a Himalayan security buffer. While this lofty ideal has been more or less fulfilled, Bhutan’s situation in 1949 was not the same as the one in which it found itself in the Twenty-First century. Analysis Article Two of the Treaty, while germane previously, was seen as an implicit assault on Bhutan’s sovereignty. This article called on Bhutan to obtain India’s advice on external matters, while India pledged not to interfere in Bhutan’s internal affairs. Bhutan had every reason to agree to this clause. The People’s Republic of China came into being in 1949 and its subsequent annexation of Tibet by the People’s Liberation Army in 1950 caused a degree of uncertainty throughout the region, including in Bhutan and India. Bhutan was particularly concerned by Beijing’s annexation of Bhutanese enclaves in Tibet and the positioning of its troops on the Bhutanese-Tibetan border. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister and a great believer in statesmanship, however, was convinced that he could deal with Chairman Mao at the diplomatic level. He remained convinced, until India’s 1962 border war with China, that statesmanship, diplomacy, the shared colonial heritage of India and China and his vision of the two countries leading a renewed, independent and economically resurgent Asia would pre-empt any Chinese tendencies towards violence and war. Given his certainty, he felt sure Bhutan would agree to this Article and was proven correct in his assumption. Thimphu lost little time in developing its relationship with India The treaty soon formed the basis of Bhutan’s foreign policy and, in the aftermath of the Lhasa Uprising in 1955, Nehru stated in Parliament that any act of aggression against Bhutan Page 2 of 5 would be seen as one against India. Nehru, for all his idealism, showed he also possessed a pragmatic side, recognising that Bhutan could play an important role in India’s security as a buffer state, much as Tibet did to China’s. He was also pragmatic enough to understand that if his vision of an independent Asia led by China and India were to come to fruition, he would need to keep the Chinese on-side. In effect, he could not afford to upset Beijing. When Thimphu requested New Delhi’s assistance in discussions to resolve its border issues with China in 1959, Nehru turned down the request. Matters were not helped when, in 1960, India released a map that did not show its border with Bhutan as an international one, leading to protestations from Thimphu. Bhutan, ever prickly about threats to (and perceptions of a lack of) its complete independence, was also uneasy with Article Two of the Treaty; Thimphu felt the wording of the Article limited its freedom and its sovereignty. The Bhutanese National Assembly argued that, as a sovereign state, it ought to develop its own foreign policy and diplomatic relations. It 1962, therefore, it joined the Colombo Plan, albeit with India’s assistance, took part in the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development session in New Delhi in 1968, created visa requirements for foreigners, including Indians, in order to enter the country in 1969 and formally established its own Department of Foreign Affairs in 1970. It became a full member of the international community in 1971 when it was admitted to the United Nations, albeit with India’s assistance. Bhutan established diplomatic relations with Bangladesh in 1978. The full declaration of its independent foreign policy, however, came in 1979 when King Jigme Singye Wangchuk declared that while Bhutan heeded India’s advice on foreign policy, that advice was far from binding upon it. It was not surprising, therefore, that Thimphu decided to side with China on allowing the Cambodian Khmer Rouge into the Non-Aligned Movement conference in Cuba that same year. Its Foreign Minister was elected as the Chairman of the Economic and Social Council for Asia and the Pacific in 1980 and in 1984 it initiated discussions with China on their boundary issues. Thimphu reduced Indian assistance over the course of its fifth five-year plan by a full 43 per cent, opting to replace that with assistance from some Western countries and international institutions. In carrying out these reforms, Thimphu was not indicating its move away from India; rather it sought to demonstrate that it was acting as a sovereign country and, as one, sought to place its welfare and that of its citizens first. In 1993, it restated its friendship and support of India and, in 1996, negotiated with India on cross-border terrorism and organised crime. It backed India’s stance on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (India refused to sign the Treaty, saying that it was discriminatory) and supported New Delhi’s bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. On the security front, Bhutan proved its value to India when, in 2003, after Thimphu’s quiet negotiations with United Liberation Front of Assam, Kamtapur Liberation Organisation and National Democratic Front for Bodoland militants to get their members to leave their camps in the country broke down, the King Jigme Singye Wangchuk led the Bhutanese Army into battle against them. There was, allegedly, some assistance from India but the main task of driving the militants from Bhutan fell to its army. South Asia in the Twenty-First century is a world far removed from its situation in 1949. It was only logical, then, that the Treaty of 1949 between India and Bhutan came under Page 3 of 5 scrutiny amid calls for it to be made more relevant to this time and situation. The Treaty, especially Article Two, was reworded. The Article now read, In keeping with the abiding ties of friendship and co-operation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall co-operate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither Government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other. Bhutan had, effectively, come of age in addition to being seen as being an independent state and, it was plain to see, sought to be treated as a responsible equal to India, its smaller physical size notwithstanding.