chapter 11 Sino – Indian Relations after the War of 1962

Writing in 2015, half a century after the first edition of this book, the border dispute between and virtually remains as it was after the 1962 war. Dozens of rounds of talks did little more than stating the claims of both sides and agreeing some Confidence Building Measures. Rather surprisingly in com- parison with other border disputes, overall relations normalised and even led to mutual visits at the level of presidents, prime ministers and foreign minis- ters. Differences over the border were not allowed to hamper progress in other fields, yet professions of Sino-Indian amity continued to be clouded by the boundary question and the ability of China to raise it at will in connection with other foreign policy issues. To a visitor from Mars, a solution would not appear to be too difficult, with a swap between Indian acceptance of the Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin area in the West and the Chinese giving up their claim to Arunachal (formerly the North East Frontier Agency) in the East. At one stage the notion of a “package deal” was mooted by Deng Xiaoping but rejected by Indian insistence on sector-by-sector talks. The Indian parliament’s resolution of 1963, stating that not an inch of Indian territory should be given up, made any negotiation very difficult. Yet, Indian authors increasingly have criticised the sector-approach for removing any bargaining flexibility on either side.1 The Joint Declaration signed in New Delhi by the presidents of China (Hu Jintao) and India (Abdul Kalam) of 21 November 2006 seemed to bridge this controversy by stating in paragraph 21 that the Special Representatives appointed in 2003 “shall complete at an early date the task of finalising an appropriate framework for a final package settlement covering all sectors of the India-China boundary”.2 Shortly before the visit China had made clear that it maintained its claims to the whole of . Whether influ- enced by this sobering news or not, India adapted its position, but many years have passed without any sign of a useful framework emerging. With every high level meeting positive statements were made and progress seemed possible, but to no avail. In the years immediately following the 1962 war two major events occurred: firstly the armed clash between India and , which was settled with Soviet mediation while China strongly supported the Pakistani position; and

1 Deepak, op. cit., p. 441. 2 Alka Acharya, op. cit., p. 230.

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Sino – Indian Relations After The War Of 1962 235 secondly, the explosion of nuclear devices by China.3 The situation on the Sino-Indian border remained relatively quiet and the exchange of notes between the two countries dealt mainly with mutual accusations concerning minor intrusions and violations of air space.

War with Pakistan – Tension on the Border

During the 1962 war with China some skirmishes occurred on the border with Sikkim and the at the end of the (where in 1959 a start was made in building a ropeway) was closed for trade. The Sikkim border was not the focus of the dispute, being the only stretch of the boundary which had been clearly described in a treaty. In it gave rise to some concern when India protested against a Chinese intrusion,4 but it was this sector which Peking used for an ultimatum during the fighting between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. Skirmishes in Kashmir started in early August 1965, when raiders from Pakistan crossed the armistice line. Indian troops went into major action on September 6, 1965 and the next day China accused Delhi of aggression and disregarding Kashmir’s right to self-determination: “It is entirely proper that people in India-occupied Kashmir should rise up in resistance.” Peking further declared that it was strengthening the defences along its border. Its next note included accusations of intrusions, not only in the Sikkim-area, but also in the Western sector, and it again proposed joint investigation. Delhi replied with a proposal for inspection by an independent and neutral observer.5 On September 16, China served an ultimatum on India demanding withdrawal of her posts on the Nathu La and and the return of allegedly kidnapped border inhabitants and livestock. India had observation posts on both passes, but the main defences of the 17 and 27 Mountain Division were at Changgu and Lungthu respectively. The divisional commanders had authority to vacate these posts in case of hostilities. Jelep La was abandoned and promptly occu- pied by the Chinese, but Major General Sagat Singh, goc 17 Mountain Division, refused to vacate Nathu La, arguing that it was on the watershed and thus the natural boundary. Moreover, Indian artillery posts on adjoining high terrain overlooked the valley and could bring down accurate fire. The Chinese

3 India reacted by accusing China of a reversal of her stand at the Bandung conference, which had appealed for a suspension of nuclear experiments. White Paper xi, p. 80. 4 Documents on China’s ultimatum to India, p. 8. 5 Deepak, op. cit., p. 277. Jagat Mehta, op. cit., pp. 106–108.