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Overall Risk Level Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 CHINA Overall risk level High Reconsider travel Can be dangerous and may present unexpected security risks Travel is possible, but there is a potential for disruptions Overview Emergency Numbers Medical 120 Upcoming Events 30 August 2021 - 14 September 2021 Medium risk: Chinese officials suspend Nairobi-Changsha flights from 30 August-13 September- Update Chinese authorities announced that China Southern Airlines flight CZ6044 from Nairobi Airport (NBO/HKJK) in Kenya to Changsha Huanghua Airport (CSX/ZGHA) in China was suspended from 30 August for two weeks, due to COVID-19. 30 August 2021 - 14 September 2021 Medium risk: Aeroflot flights from Moscow to Shanghai suspended on 30 August-13 September - Update Aeroflot flight SU208 from Moscow Sheremetyevo Airport (SVO/UUEE) in Russia to Shanghai Pudong Airport (PVG/ZSPD) in China will be suspended from 30 August for two weeks, due to COVID-19. 30 August 2021 - 14 September 2021 Medium risk: Chinese officials suspend flights from Paris and Cairo on 30 August-13 September - Update Air China flight CA934 from Paris Charles de Gaulle Airport (CDG/LFPG) in France to Tianjin Binhai Airport (TSN/ZBTJ) in China and Egyptair flight MS953 from Cairo Airport (CAI/HECA) in Egypt to Hangzhou Xiaoshan Airport (HGH/ZSHC) in China will be suspended from 30 August for two weeks, due to COVID-19. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / China 2 Travel Advisories Medium risk: Border tensions with India and Bhutan in Tibet and Xinjiang Exercise caution for travel to the international border areas with India and Bhutan, particularly in and around the Chumbi Valley in Yadong and Gar counties of the Tibet region (Xizang) and Aksai Chin in Hotan county, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, until further notice due to periodic clashes between Chinese and Indian forces. In early May 2020, Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Indian Army (IA) forces engaged in periodic scuffles in areas along the India-China border near the Galwan Valley in Aksai Chin, Hotan county, Xinjiang and Ngari prefecture, Gar County, Tibet. The scuffles were triggered by increased Chinese patrols in the areas in response to alleged road constructions by Indian forces near Aksai Chin, a territory claimed by both China and India, and near Ngari. The situation escalated to violent clashes between Chinese and Indian forces who threw stones at each other near Aksai Chin on 14-15 June; Indian officials claim at least 20 Indian soldiers were killed. Similar clashes again occurred in the same area on 25 January 2021. However, authorities on both sides were keen on de-escalating the situation from turning into a full-blown conflict and thus engaged in negotiations. The latest scuffles follow border tensions between PLA and IA troops which resulted in an 84-day armed standoff in June-August 2017, in the Chumbi Valley, after Indian troops, on behalf of their ally Bhutan, intervened to stop China from constructing a border road through the Doklam (Donglang) plateau, which lies between China’s Tibet (Xizang), Bhutan and India’s Sikkim state. India was concerned that the border road construction in Doklam would give China easy access to northeastern India. Bhutan opposed the construction of the road as it claims the area, but relied on India for military and diplomatic support. Finally, China claimed that Doklam is part of Chinese territory and it has full right to build infrastructure. Despite formally ending the confrontation over Doklam, both Chinese and Indian forces continued developing infrastructure and increased patrols in the region. It is possible that existing tensions between China and India could result in further clashes in border areas in the near term. Heightened security is thus likely to remain in and around the Chumbi Valley and Galwan Valley until further notice. While the risk of an escalation to a full- blown conflict between Chinese and Indian forces remains low, visitors face the risk of incidental harm in the event of clashes. Anticipate robust security measures and major travel disruptions; avoid taking photographs of military installations and infrastructure. Travellers should ensure that identification documents are up-to-date and readily available for check by security personnel. Context: India and China fought a war over the border in 1962, resulting in a Chinese victory. New clashes broke out again in 1967, and not infrequently, tensions still boil. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / China 3 Moderate risk: Northeastern and border regions of Inner Mongolia Anticipate disruptions for travel across northeastern areas of Inner Mongolia and the international border with Mongolia until further notice, because of unrest by ethnic Mongolians. The Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region, making up more than one-tenth of China's territory and rich in coal reserves, formally enjoys a high degree of autonomy. However, ethnic Mongolians, who constitute roughly 20 percent of the total population, have increasingly complained that their grazing lands were damaged by Beijing-controlled mining projects and by unabated desertification. Ethnic Mongolians also complained that the local government has repeatedly attempted to resettle them in permanent houses and that the Han Chinese majority has been the only ethnic group benefitting from the economic development. Furthermore, protests were held against the government’s alleged advocation of Han Chinese language and culture over Mongolian language and culture in schools and local media. Interethnic tensions have therefore worsened in recent years, although the region has never witnessed major outbreaks of ethnic unrest as seen in Tibet or Xinjiang. However, violent protests involving clashes with policemen have become more frequent in recent years. Previous protest flashpoints included the provincial capital Hohhot, Hulunbuir, Hinggan and Xilin Gol. In the weeks following unrests, anticipate elevated security and possible unannounced disruption to internet services and mobile telephone networks. Avoid all demonstrations, particularly ethnic protests, on an ongoing basis as they are likely to result in unrest. It is illegal to photograph demonstrations, and travellers suspected of supporting anti-Chinese activities may be subject to detention and expulsion from China. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / China 4 Medium risk: Tibet (Xizang) and Tibetan-populated areas Exercise caution for travel to western China's Tibet (Xizang) region and other Tibetan-populated areas of Sichuan, Qinghai, Gansu and Yunnan provinces until further notice because of unrest by ethnic Tibetans against the Chinese government. Tibet has been the scene of violent unrest and protests by ethnic Tibetans resisting the perceived repression of their cultural identity by the Chinese government in Beijing. Following the March 2008 pro-democracy riots in Lhasa, unrest has spread to a number of Tibetan autonomous prefectures and counties outside the Tibet Autonomous Region, which are culturally Tibetan to various degrees and require special permission for access. Self-immolations and associated protests by ethnic Tibetans have led to violent confrontations with police forces in Tibet and Tibetan-populated areas of Sichuan (Seda, Aba, Dege, Muli and Luhuo counties), Qinghai (Huangnan Tibetan autonomous prefecture), Gansu (Gannan Tibetan autonomous prefecture) and Yunnan. Whenever unrest has spiralled into violence, it was aimed at ethnic Han immigrants and other non-Tibetan Chinese residents, although no foreign national was targeted. While the scale of Chinese security deployments makes any serious deterioration in public order unlikely, isolated security incidents continue to frequently occur in cities and towns with a large Tibetan population. All identification and required travel documentation should be up-to-date and readily accessible for presentation at checkpoints; immediately comply with all instructions from security forces. A number of areas of Tibet are known to have frequent internet services and mobile telephone networks outages as well as permanent restrictions. In the weeks following unrests, anticipate the closure of overland transport routes and the possible total shutdown of communication systems. Avoid all demonstrations, particularly ethnic protests, on an ongoing basis as they are very likely to result in unrest. It is illegal to photograph demonstrations, and travellers suspected of supporting pro-independence activities may be subject to detention and expulsion from China. Riskline / Country Report / 29 August 2021 / China 5 High risk: Western areas of Xinjiang (Kashgar, Aksu, Hotan, Yili) Reconsider travel to the southwestern prefectures of Xinjiang region, including Kashgar, Aksu, Hotan and Yili, on an ongoing basis, due to violence related to unrest by the ethnic Uyghur people. These rural areas of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region have witnessed a spike in spontaneous unrest by ethnic Uighurs and bloody attacks plotted by the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), another name allegedly used by Uighur militants, fuelled by heavy-handed anti-terrorist operations by Chinese security personnel. The attacks have predominantly targeted local and central government offices and security infrastructure, including army and police buildings. More recently, transportation hubs and other soft targets, including local markets and other public areas with large Han Chinese crowds have been targeted.
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