Issue Brief # 233 August 2013 Innovative Research | Independent Analysis | Informed Opinion China and its Peripheries Limited Objectives in Bhutan Tilak Jha School of International Studies, JNU Of all the nations that border China, its to its relatively unstable northeastern comparison with Bhutan would appear to states – the Siliguri Corridor – that could be a paradox. In comprehensive power provide it with a rare political and military terms, Bhutan is almost a nonentity to opportunity in South Asia generally but China. Bhutan’s biggest disadvantage is specifically against India in the long term. its geography that limits its connectivity to India in South and China in north with no China’s objectives in Bhutan remains access to sea or any other third country limited in the short term which partly without using either Indian or Chinese explains its comparatively aggressive land or airspace. Nevertheless, in the stance towards Bhutan till the 1960s. Of geopolitical context of today’s South Asia, late, however, Beijing has displayed Bhutan’s geography has strategic relative patient farsightedness in ramifications for both India and China. considering Bhutan as a small but important element of its South Asia policy This provides Bhutan with more diplomatic framework. Like Nepal, Beijing has maneuverability than ever before. As employed a mix of persuasion and Jane Shi (2011) wrote, “Though it has no coercion with Bhutan as well reminding direct access to major waterways or ports, the repercussions of siding with India. With Bhutan is positioned at a strategic Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and even location between India and China, Bangladesh offering Beijing more leverage controlling several important Himalayan in South Asia against India than ever mountain passes.” For China, it is Bhutan’s before, Bhutan could play a critical role location just north of India’s only road link for China: firstly in furthering its strategic depth against India’s northeastern periphery; second in restraining its Tibetan This essay was initially presented in a conference organized by the IPCS in collaboration with the Center for East Asian Studies, JNU dilemma from spilling over into Bhutan; and Department of East Asian Studies, JNU and lastly, in stopping Bhutan from being guided by Indian concerns alone. Views expressed are author’s own. 1 LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN BHUTAN 2 Given the importance of the historical Only during the Qing Empire, China tried context in explaining the China-Bhutan exerting relatively direct authority over dynamics, the first section deals with the Tibet. With Bhutan, the direct contact historical-contemporary trajectory. The though was established in in the 1720s, second section focuses on the but it remained only informal (Library of contemporary geopolitical aims and Congress 1991) probably for two reasons: objectives of China in particular in South to secure their interests from the British Asia vis-a-cis India and the missing links and satisfy their urge of what B. R. that Bhutan could fill. Tibet’s and India’s Deepak calls “Manchu expansionism.” A inevitable influence both political and Centre for Bhutan Studies report (2004) cultural on the China-Bhutan relationships captures this entire episode till its will be part of the entire discussion. culmination in following words: I China was involved in Tibetan affairs China and Bhutan: Historical & since the time that Chinese Ambans Contemporary Contexts (residents) were stationed in Lhasa in the 1720s under the Ching dynasty… The Bhutanese delegation to the Dalai China’s embrace of its external periphery Lama came into contact with the states was historically influenced by what Chinese representatives in Lhasa is now construed as the Chinese notion of although there was no evidence of international system, that is, the tributary any tributary relation with Beijing system (Zhang and Buzan 2012: 3). whatsoever. Relations with Tibet itself, was never better but it was severely The Tibetan plateau probably with the strained after Bhutan supported the exception of its Tang dynasty (618-907 British during the 1904 Younghusband AD) when Tibetan King Songtsen Gampo Expedition. The only contact with unified Tibet and forced the Chinese China was the occasional, informal Emperor Taizong to enter into a marriage meeting of a Bhutanese alliance gave birth only to what could be representative in Lhasa with the Chinese officials. Unlike Nepal, Bhutan termed limited states. Whatever influence never sent tributary missions to China… China ever had over Tibet or Tibet had China made several efforts to exercise over Bhutan and Nepal had an important what it called ‘historic’ rights over logistical determinant. The Bhutan between 1865 when the Treaty communication and connectivity of Sinchula was signed, and the concerns required that even if Tibet was signing of the Treaty of Punakha in some form of a tributary state, the 1910 - a direct outcome of the claim Chinese required Tibetans to be in charge the Manchu Government of China of most of their affairs including even made on Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan foreign affairs, occasionally letting them after its invasion of Tibet in 1910-12. China continued to make feudatory get away with near independence level claim on Bhutan even after the 1910 of autonomy (Xinhua, 29 April 2013). Treaty of Punakha. It made a vague suzerainty claim over Bhutan during years just before the Chinese Revolution of 1911 to secure its Since the Opium Wars until 1951 when Tibet southeastern border against increasing finally went under the physical control of China foreign aggression. The new Republic of China slowly let the claim die down, after armed intervention by the People’s only for it to resurface later time and Liberation Army (PLA), Bhutan and even Tibet again. had little to worry about China, as the British Bhutan recognised China as a significant were the most powerful constant in the entire threat for the first time after the joint zone and China was being ravaged by wars both Chinese/Tibetan invasion of Nepal in 1792 civil and foreign. -1793 (Dutt 1981: 58-62). Since the Opium 2 2 IPCS ISSUE BRIEF # 233, AUGUST 2013 Wars until 1951 when Tibet finally went under the physical control of China after armed intervention by the People’s Whatever the Chinese political claims to Bhutan Liberation Army (PLA), Bhutan and even are, it owes them to the largely cultural-religious Tibet had little to worry about China, as Tibetan influence there for centuries. Indeed, the the British were the most powerful constant in the entire zone and China Tibetan claims had political and even military was being ravaged by wars both civil and overtones as reflected in 8th century invasion of foreign. China’s tone changed from Tibet over Bhutan and subsequent strives that claim over Bhutan as the Manchu followed. government did in 1910 to accepting Bhutan as a sovereign state after the 1960s. Nonetheless, the geostrategic balance that had prevailed in this region for decades stood altered forever after The fact that the most “dominant political the British left. and cultural element” in Bhutanese population comprises of the numerically Whatever the Chinese political claims to prominent Ngalop – the people of Bhutan are, it owes them to the largely Tibetan origin who migrated around the cultural-religious Tibetan influence there ninth century and introduced Tibetan for centuries. Indeed, the Tibetan claims culture and Buddhism to Bhutan – made had political and even military overtones them only more likely to realise the as reflected in 8th century invasion of Tibetan crisis (Library of Congress 1991). Tibet over Bhutan and subsequent strives Repeated claims regarding Bhutan by the that followed. However, the conflict was communist government in China and always of a regional texture preceded Chinese leaders further pushed the and followed by the arrival of another set Bhutanese government into a long period of Tibetan lamas who preached of self-imposed isolation from China even Buddhism even as they started settling as the People’s Republic officially denied themselves and encouraging fellow any intention to subdue Bhutanese Tibetans to follow them mainly in the sovereignty. Southern Valleys of Bhutan. In any case, even when there were clashes, it After her independence, Chinese state presented no existential threat to laid its claim over Bhutan in 1954 itself by Bhutanese culture and way of life and the publishing a map in “A Brief History of ground polity (Mathou 2004: 389-391). China” thus beginning a long period of Certainly, these wars served no grand border conflict. The map depicted “a geopolitical big game that spread far considerable portion of Bhutan…as a pre- beyond the Bhutanese soils. historical realm of China.” Four years later, in 1958, China not only published another The Indian engagement in Bhutan was map claiming large tracts of Bhutanese limited to religion and culture till the British land but also occupied about 300 square developed interest in Tibet and then in miles of Bhutanese territory. An anxious Bhutan around mid-eighteenth century. Bhutan took resort to the less than a Historically, Bhutan’s political and decade old British legacy India-Bhutan economic interaction was with Tibet and Treaty of 1949 Article 2 of which stipulated Sikkim alone (Kumar 2010: 243-245). The that (Ahsan and Chakma 1993: 1043): shift towards India began with the British “On its part the Government of Bhutan engagement in Bhutan. agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its Bhutan completely alienated from its new external relations.” northern neighbour China when the Dalai Lama escaped to India and the Tibetan 1960 marked another provocative revolt was ruthlessly suppressed in 1959. declaration from a Chinese leader which 3 3 LIMITED OBJECTIVES IN BHUTAN 4 gave Bhutan every reason to be cautious strength lies. Therefore, China looks for about Chinese intentions (Centre for more of economic and tourism Bhutan Studies 2004: 75): "Bhutanese, cooperation, hydroelectricity and Sikkimese and Ladakhis form a united infrastructure related cooperation and family in Tibet.