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Micro Focus Presentation Template Live Hack Passwords are HIGH RISK How hackers act and what you can do Tom Hofmann System Engineer Identity, Access & Security Disclaimer All data and information provided in this webcast are for informational purposes only. The Micro Focus webcast related to Hacking is only for informational and educational purpose. The tutorial and demo provided is only for those who’re willing and curious to know and learn about Ethical Hacking, Security and Penetration Testing. Any time the word “Hacking” that is used on this site shall be regarded as Ethical Hacking. Micro Focus will not be responsible for any action performed by any attendee. http://linkedin.com/in/onlinesecurity/ SE LinkedIn http://slideshare.net/TomHofmann/ Slideshare http://twitter.com/WickedProbl3ms Twitter Tom Hofmann System Engineer IAS 3 Hacking is unauthorized intrusion into a computer or a network. The person engaged in hacking activities is generally referred to as a hacker. This hacker may alter system or security features to accomplish a goal that differs from the original purpose of the system. Technopedia 4 „A hacker is someone who tries to find a way to make a toast with a coffee machine. “ Wau Holland, Founder of Chaos Computer Club 5 Question 1: Is Cybersecurity a strategic topic in your organisation & do you also have the resources to implement it? h0W +0 bEcom A h4x0r H4x0r Starter Kit Hacker Hoodie 89.50 € Guy Fawkes Maske 10 € Laptop Sticker 9.95 € Bildschirmschoner Freeware 8 “Real hacker” APT 28 / Sofacy / Fancy Bear ‒ RUAG, Thyssen Krupp ‒ DeutscherBundestag ‒ En Marche, US Demokraten DNC ‒ Most probably Russian Government Lazarus Group ‒ Sony Hack ‒ SWIFT Hack / Bangladesh Bank heist ‒ WannaCry ‒ Most probably North Korean Gov. Equation Group ‒ Stuxnet ‒ Eternal Blue ‒ NSA ANT Catalog ‒ “Most probably” U.S.A. Gov. / NSA APT 10 / MenuPass / Stone Panda ‒ Managed Service Providers ‒ ”Cloud Hopper” ‒ “Red Leaves” Malware ‒ Most probably Chinese Government 9 State backed hacking, the threat is real! 10 Question 2: Do you have a dedicated Cybersecurity team? Five steps to a happy hack Reconnaissance Assessment Exploitation Execution Have fun 12 Recon Reconnaissance Intelligence SIGINT (COMINT, ELINT): Signal Intelligence (Communication Intelligence & Electronic Intelligence) OSINT: Open Source Intelligence HUMINT: Human Intelligence 13 Assess Assessment Vulnerabilities Electronic vulnerabilites: Software bugs Social vulnerabilites: Human weaknesses Physical vulnerabilites: Building access, etc. 14 Exploit Exploitation Exploits Electronic exploits: Specific software, malicious data packages Social exploits: (Spear) Phishing, calls, manipulation Physical exploits: Installation Rogue WLAN access points, MITM devices 15 Exec Execution Payloads RAT: Remote Access Tools Logging: Video, Screen, Keystrokes Shells: Remote accessible shells 16 Party Have fun 17 Small selection ▪ Vulnerability scanner: checks ▪ Password cracking: recovering assets for known weaknesses passwords from data stored or transmitted by computer systems ▪ Root kit: represents a set of programs which work to subvert ▪ Packet sniffer: capture data control of an operating system packets in transit over networks from legitimate operators ▪ Social engineering: an attack ▪ Trojan horse: serves as a back vector that relies heavily on door in a computer system to human interaction allow an intruder to gain access to the system later ▪ Spoofing attack: involves websites which falsify data by ▪ Viruses: self-replicating programs, mimicking legitimate sites inserting copies of the same program into other executable ▪ Post exploitation: Tools used code files or documents after successful infiltration. Popular tools are psexec, ▪ Key loggers: tools designed to mimikatz, wmic and powershell record every keystroke 18 Question 3: Do you implement and operate Cybersecurity Resilience? Let´s be a h4x0r From leaked cyber weapons to WannaCry, Petya & NotPetya 20 Cyber weapons gone wild 1 3 5 Equation Group WannaCry NotPetya Linked to NSA Ransomware Damage, ransom, credential stealing 2 4 ShadowBrokers Petya Software Dump Wiper disguised as ransomware 21 Try it yourself ▪ https://github.com/x0rz/EQGRP_Lost_in_Translation ▪ https://usa.kaspersky.com/resource- center/infographics/equation ▪ https://securelist.com/equation-the-death-star-of-malware- galaxy/68750/ ▪ https://securelist.com/files/2015/02/Equation_group_questi ons_and_answers.pdf ▪ https://www.kaspersky.com/about/press- releases/2015_equation-group-the-crown-creator-of-cyber- espionage 22 Framework Metasploit Aka Fuzzbunch Vulnerability Exploit Payload MS17-010 Metasploit Exploit RAT Meterpreter aka EternalBlue by risksense Aka DoublePulsar 23 But… patch? But… ZeroDay! Microsoft president Brad Smith said WannaCry "represents a completely unintended but disconcerting link between the two most serious forms of cybersecurity threats in the world today – nation-state action and organized criminal action.” https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2017/05/14/need-urgent- 24 collective-action-keep-people-safe-online-lessons-last-weeks-cyberattack/ TYPICAL PATCH MANAGEMENT PROCESS in ITIL Patch Config. Release Sources Mgmt Mgmt. Deploy Prio & Start Schedule Plan Build Test & Install Chng. Mgmt True Audit & Success? Close Assess End False 25 Heartbleed, a phishy PDF and a RAT (GoldenEye) 26 Hacking HR 1 3 5 Bewerbung Gefälschte BfA Your files have Reale Jobangebote Ausführen des Exploits been encrypted der BfA 2 4 ”Sauberes PDF” Fake System Check Der Türöffner Verschlüsselungs- payload 27 References ▪ https://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2016/12/08/golden eye-ransomware-the-resume-that-scrambles-your- computer-twice/ ▪ https://www.heise.de/ct/ausgabe/2017-1- Verschluesselungstrojaner-Goldeneye-greift-gezielt- deutsche-Personalabteilungen-an-3575058.html ▪ https://de.business.f-secure.com/author/delayo16 28 Framework Metasploit Vulnerability Exploit Payload CVE-2010-1240 Social Engineering & RAT Adobe PDF Metasploit Exploit Meterpreter embedded EXE by attackresearch 29 Heartbleed 3 years later, still bleeding https://www.slideshare.net/TomHofmann/ heartbleed-2017-3-years-later-still-bleeding 30 Don’t always focus on the OS Bluetooth protocol BlueBorne Wifi Chipset BroadPwn Headphones SPEAKE(a)R the x86 processor fuzzer sandsifter 31 “…enable the installation of beacon implants directly into our targets' electronic devices. These devices are then re-packaged and placed back into transit…” Tailored Access Operations/Access Operations (AO - S326) Remote Operations Center (S321) 32 “(TS//SI//NF) In one recent case, after several months a beacon implanted through supply- chain interdiction called back to the NSA covert infrastructure. This call back provided us access to further exploit the device and survey the network.” Security by obscurity doesn´t work Not even with three letter agencies On the Viability of Conspiratorial Beliefs 34 https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0147905 Recap What have we seen What can we do ▪ A quick peek at Cybersecurity ▪ Multi Factor Authentication ▪ Remote Exploit and ▪ SIEM ▪ Manual Exploit with Social Engineering ▪ Privileged Account Management ▪ Cybersecurity matters ▪ Active Configuration Change Management ▪ Hacks happen on various different levels and ▪ Enterprise & Web Access Management come in all shapes and sizes ▪ There is not only „one“ solution More to read MELANI on the RUAG Hack https://www.melani.admin.ch/melani/de/home/dokumentation/ber ichte/fachberichte/technical-report_apt_case_ruag.html BroadPwn (Chip level exploit) https://hackaday.com/2017/07/29/broadpwn-all-your-mobiles-are- belong-to-us/ Rogue WLAN Access Points http://www.hackingarticles.in/hack-password-using-rogue-wi-fi- access-point-attack-wifi-pumpkin/ Turning headphones into mics https://www.usenix.org/system/files/conference/woot17/woot17- paper-guri.pdf Breaking the x86 ISA https://github.com/xoreaxeaxeax/sandsifter Oauth and phishing attack at En Marche in France https://media.scmagazine.com/documents/295/trend_micro-two- years-of-pawn-_73730.pdf 36 MicroFocus Advanced Authentication 37 Hard Token Advanced Authentication Time based Event based OATH TOTP OATH HOTP Soft Token Infrastructure Authenticators Services OS Login Windows MacOS Linux SMS eMail OTP Radius Client Server Firewall Features VPN Fingerprint Finger Vein Biometric Advanced Analytics & Authentication Reporting NFC Group & Event Offline Login based controls Smartcard Contact less Contact based RFID 2nd Factor skipping iOS Android Windows FIDO U2F Phone Multi Site Smartphone Support Geolocation & Out of Band Live Ensure API Geofencing Yubikey USB & Smartcard FIDO U2F OATH Swisscom Bluetooth NFC HOTP & TOTP MobileID BLE Q&A 39 Questions, idea, anything else… http://linkedin.com/in/onlinesecurity/ SE LinkedIn http://slideshare.net/TomHofmann/ Slideshare http://twitter.com/WickedProbl3ms Twitter Tom Hofmann System Engineer IAS 40 Thank you. www.microfocus.com.
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