the editors aerie

With this issue we regretfully bid farewell to our Associate Editor, Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Hansen, on his retirement. His career spanned three wars, in which he flew variously as a fighter, bomber, and transport pilot. Interspersed among combat and Cold War assignments were academic, staff, and command positions, where he accumulated a wealth of experience that we leaned heavily on in editorial deliberations. We will not only miss his wise counsel but also his prolitic pen and the provocative ideas that flowed from it. It is hoped that you will see more of his work in future issues.

In the opening article, Colonel Herman L. Cilster examines one of the basic Air Force missions— air interdiction— in the light of recent historical experience. His study indicates that the success of an interdiction effort is directly related to the intensity of the ground effort it opposes. Our cover depicts aircraft that have performed the interdiction role in the last three wars.

One of the imponderables of any future confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is the strength of the bonds that hold these respective alliances together. In the March-April issue, Wing Commander Peter Papworth offered his assessment of the integrity of the Warsaw Pact as an entity. Continuing in this issue, he examines the cohesiveness of each individual member nation to the pact. Although he would probably agree that such an undertaking is speculative and subject to ever-changing conditions, the reliability of the Warsaw Pact is certainly a criticai element of the European power equation and invites a best estimate regardless of the relative scarcity of reliable information. We suspect that the Soviets are pondering the same problem and arriving at their own closely held input to their "correlation of forces.”

In another thoughtful examination of intangible inputs to the power equation, Colonel William M. Charles, Jr., weighs the impact of the capability to wage war at all leveis of conflict on our national will. Regardless of your predisposition, "Rethinking the Unthinkable” may provoke you to justify your own thoughts on the matter.

May 21, 1977, marks the 50th anniversary of one of aviation's great milestones, the first solo flight over the Atlantic by Charles A. Lindbergh. As a reminder of his legacy to the Science of flight, we include a number of his thoughts throughout this issue.

AIR UNIVERSITY

May-June 1977 Vol. XXVIII No. 4 ISSN: 0002-2594 ,/lrcuicw From the Editors Aerie...... Facing Page .Air Interdiction in Protracted War: An Economic Evaluation...... 2 Col. Herman L. Gilster, USAF The Diplomacy of Apology: U.S. Bombings of Switzerland during World War I I ...... 19 Dr. Jonathan A. Helmreich JSTPS—The Link between Strategy and Execution...... 38 Maj. Gen. Jerome F. 0 ’Malley, USAF The Integrity of the Warsaw Pact, Part II...... 47 Wg. Cmdr. Peter M. Papworth, RAF Rethinking the Unthinkable: Limited Strategic Nuclear Options—Credible or Dangerous?...... 60 Col. William M. Charles, Jr., USAF Changing Educational Goals at the United States Naval Academy...... 72 Lt. Col. Joseph J. Blum, USAF Books and Ideas American Defense Policy, 1945-1977: A Review Essay...... 83 Roy A. Wemer Potpourri...... 89 The Contributors...... 95

ATTENTION The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking and stimulate dialogue concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air Uni­ versity. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed. AIR J INTERDICTION > IN ,i PROTRACTED* WAR v an economic evaluation NITED STATES Air Force doctrine respect to the success or failure of the ground defines three basic combat missions force it supports. Fortunately, these “meas- for tactical air power: counter air, ures of merit” are tangible, highly visible, Uclose air support, and air interdiction.1 Counand­ immediately apparent. Consequently, ter air operations are conducted to gain and such operations are recognized as viable, maintain air supremacy by attacking the productive missions of air power. True, the enemy’s combat aircraft, air bases, antiair- military Services may debate the question of craft artillery (AAA), and surface-to-air mis- who can most effectively perform these mis­ sile (SAM) sites. Essentially, these attacks are sions, but there is no question of their impor- designed to provide all friendly aircraft the tance or whether they fit into the spectrum capabilit>’ to operate freely in the airspace of vital military operations. above both friendly and enemy territory. The same cannot be said for the third mis­ The second mission, close air support, en- sion, air interdiction. This mission, along compasses the use of air power in direct sup­ with its effectiveness and viability, has been port of friendly land forces. Close air support the subject of some of the most intense de­ attacks are made against targets of urgent bates within civilian and military circles in concern in the immediate battle area and the Department of Defense during the last require direct and effective integration be- ten years. This is not surprising because in­ tween the friendly ground and air forces. Fi- terdiction by its very nature may not carry nally, air interdiction, the subject of this with it an immediate payoff. In addition, it article, is defined as the systematic attack of has been difficult to show, historically, a con- an enemy’s logistics network for the purpose sistent payoff for the supply denial objective of destroying, neutralizing, or delaying his in terms of its impact on the outcome of a military potential (manpower and materiel) campaign. What is observed is merely the before it can be brought to bear effectively ability of the enemy to fight at the current against friendly ground forces. The range of operating levei, a levei which he may or may interdiction strikes may span a distance from not have selected as a result of the burden the immediate battlefield up to, and some- imposed on him by air interdiction. Without times including, the enemy’s heartland. Nor- knowledge of the enemys precise intentions, mally, these attacks are made at such a dis­ one finds it virtually impossible to determine tance to the enemy’s rear that detailed whether the interdiction effort seriously coordination with friendly ground forces is limited his capability to operate at a pre- unnecessary. ferred levei of activity. Indeed, some insight Categorization of the functions of tactical into the impact of interdiction during World air power into the three missions cited al- War II has been gained from German ready should not conceal the fact that these records and interviews, but, barring a similar missions are in no sense mutually exclusive. exchange, we will probably never be able to Nevertheless, mission definition is useful, in assess with certainty its true impact during that it provides a point of departure for any the Korean and Southeast Asian conflicts. discussion of the impact and effectiveness of major air components. For instance, it is rela- tively simple to determine the success of the World War II to Southeast Asia counter air function by noting the ease or Historical reviews of our experience with difficulty with which friendly aircraft operate air interdiction have concluded that the most overhead. Likewise, the impact of the close dramatic successes were recorded when air air support function can be evaluated with interdiction missions were complemented 3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW by aggressive ground operations on the part creating overall shortages at the front. This is of friendly forces. Operation Strangle, the evident in the figures of Table 1, extracted first full-scale, consciously planned interdic- from the quartermaster records of the Ger­ tion campaign of World War II, is a prime man army for three key dates: (1)15 March— example. Conducted from March through the start of Operation Strangle, (2) 11 May— May of 1944 in Italy, this campaign was ini- the start of the ground offensive, and (3) 30 tially assigned the optimistic objective of May—the beginning of the precipitate Ger­ forcing the withdrawal of the German ar- man retreat. mies from central Italy by denying them es- Sallagar attributes the failure of interdic­ sential supplies. This objective was, of course, tion to achieve the supply-denial objective to unrealistic. Only after the Allied ground the following factors, most of which were in- offensive was launched on 11 May 1944 did herent in the tactical situation confronting the tangible effect of air interdiction become the Allies and therefore beyond their con- evident. Within three weeks, the four-month trol. stalemate on the ground had been broken, During Strangle, the major factors were the and the German army was in full retreat. The redundant capacity of the enemy ’s transport enemy withdrew some 200 miles, suffering network, especially in the north where the in­ terdiction belt had been placed; German in- an estimated 70,000 casualties, about one- genuity in effecting quick repairs, finding third of his force in Italy. alternative routes, and improvising substitutes; In an evaluation of this campaign, F. M. the frugal living standards and stringent con- Sallagar of the Rand Corporation concluded servation measures imposed on German ar- that success of the Allied forces cannot be mies, coupled with their low consumption rates during the two months while there was attributed to the accomplishment of the sup- no ground action on the front; the intermittent ply-denial objective.2 The enemy transporta- periods of bad weather when Allied air was tion network had an estimated capacity of grounded so that the Germans were able to over 90,000 tons per day while enemy re- make repairs and move up supplies; and the quirements totaled much less than 5000 tons lack of an adequate night bomber capability, per day. The stocks of some criticai items which made the nighttime relatively safe for such as fuel (gasoline and diesel) and ammu- repair work and the movement of supplies.3 nition remained fairly levei or actually in- If the above rationale sounds familiar, one creased during the pure interdiction phase. should not be surprised. With the possible They declined later when German army con- exception of the last factor, the same list has sumption rose steeply during the Allied been fundamental to debates on the viability ground offensive but never to the point of of interdiction during the Korean and Viet-

Table 1. German army supply status during Operation Strangle (metric tons)

15 March (Average Daily 11 May (Average Daily 30 May Item Stocks Consumption) Stocks Consumption) Stocks

Fuel 6,500 (380) 6,250 (450) 3.600 Ammunition 32.750 (400) 37,450 (800) 30,550

Source: F. M. Sallager, Operation "Strangle" (Italy, Spring 1944): A Case Study ol Tactical Air Interdiction, The Rand Corporation, R-851-PR, February 1972, AIR INTERDICTION 5 nam conflicts where, as Sallagar States, shutting off the whole area. These factors great- “ we faced an enemy who was definitely not ly delayed the concentration of reserves there roadbound, whose consumption needs were —they took three or four times longer to reach frugal beyond anything the Germans ever the front than we had reckoned.5 dreamed of, to whom the holding of territory Despite the theoretical availability of the meant little, and who could select the time most elaborate and interconnected road and and occasion when he was willing to fight.”4 railroad network in the world, the German Despite the obvious failure of Operation army was unable to match the Allies’ cross Strangle to achieve supply denial, Sallagar channel rate of build-up in the battle area. concluded that the interdiction effort de- This failure was in large part the result of air served a major share of the credit for the interdiction strikes. Allied victory. Although interdiction did not Similar successes were recorded during achieve its stated objective, it contributed the first year of the Korean conflict, when the immeasurably to the defeat of the German United Nations’s ground forces were actively armies by denying them the tactical mobility engaged with the enemy. Starting in July that was so essential to them. By the enemy’s 1951, however, when armistice negotiations own testimony, the reduction and occasional were initiated, a new chapter in the history paralysis of his freedom of movement con­ of air power was opened. As a result of the tributed more than any other single factor to politically imposed military stalemate that his defeat. The disruption effected by Allied lasted until the cease fire in July 1953, mili­ air attacks overwhelmed the enemy’s distri- tary commanders were confined in the use of bution system, and although the aggregate air assets to a new, unfamiliar environment supply base was sufficient for combat opera- of protracted war. During the ensuing two- tions, it was impossible for the Germans to year period, a series of special purpose inter­ position men and materiel at the right place diction campaigns was waged on the railroad at the right time. and highway network to the enemy’s rear. This same pattern—aggressive ground ac- Although each of these efiforts met with ini- tion that forces the enemy to expend men tial success, the general consensus was that and materiel in battle, overlaid by systematic these successes were of fleeting nature.6 The interdictive air strikes which limit his capa- flexibility of the enemy’s logistics system, the bility to bring the required replacements ability of the enemy to effect rapid repairs, into action—has resulted in some of interdic­ and the extremely low supply requirements tion’s most acclaimed successes. The classic resulting from little or no ground action mili- example of such a large-scale joint-force op­ tated against any lasting success that might eration occurred preparatory to and during have been visualized. Hence, there is no tan- Operation Overlord, the Allied invasion of gible evidence that interdiction significantly Normandy in 1944. The devastating impact impaired the enemy’s capability during the of air strikes during that campaign was best two-year stalemate, and without access to his described by Field Marshal Karl von Rund- intentions or records, we cannot confirm stedt, Commander of the German Western with certainty the failure or qualified success Front: of the interdiction effort in Korea. After the first few days, I had no hopes of de- The resulting frustrations, doubts, and dif- feating the invasion. The Allied Air Forces par- ferences of opinion over the viability of air alyzed all movement by day, and made it very interdiction were further exacerbated dur­ diffieult even at night. They had smashed the ing the recent Southeast Asian conflict. De­ bridges over the Loire as well as over the Seine, bate raged hot and heavy over the continued 6 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

The armistice negotiations in Korea, from JuJy 1951 until the cease&re in July 1953, occasioned a new development in the application of air power: use of the air capability was limited to the unfainiliar environment of protracted war. Special purpose interdiction was used on the enemy's railroads and highways but to little permanent effect. Enemy reinforcements were severely damaged at this siding in northwest Korea, April 1952, but the track at ríght center shows evidence of recent repair, conBrming that such reversals were only temporary. AIR INTERDICTION 7 support of this expensive but questionable the demilitarized zone between North and mission. This, of course, was no moot exercise South Vietnam, attention immediately shift­ since over one-half of all combat sorties flown ed to the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the panhandle during World War II, Korea, and Southeast of Southern Laos, where the majority of ene- Asia were allocated to interdiction opera- my supplies moving from north to south now tions. traversed. Thus began a series of dedicated Few experts question the viability of the interdiction campaigns, code-named Com- “tactical” variety of air interdiction which mando Hunt, that continued until the North can be closely related to battlefíeld success. Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam in the Rather, it is the viability of the “long-term spring of 1972. Strikes against the trail had supply denial” version, which characterized been conducted earlier, but these were gen- U.S. air efforts during lengthy phases of the erally considered secondary to attacks on pri- protracted conflict in Southeast Asia, that has mary targets in North Vietnam. The official been questioned. Although examples of the beginning of the concerted interdiction former are included, the main thrust of this efifort in Southern Laos was 1 November article is directed toward the latter form of 1968. interdiction. In particular, it concentrates on The geographic and climatic features of an evaluation of the air interdiction cam- Southern Laos conditioned all aspects of cam­ paigns waged for three and a half years in paign planning, operations, and results. southem Laos. Not only did these campaigns Prominent among the geographic features is receive the most extensive quantitative the Annam Mountain Range, which forms a documentation of the war but they also pro- natural boundary between Laos and North vide the purest example of our experience Vietnam. It is rugged and difficult to traverse, with air interdiction in a protracted conflict. and vehicular entry to Laos is possible only at the major passes. The roads through the passes, however, are normally concealed in Air Operations in Southern Laos clouds, and beyond the passes the tropical Although bombing operations had been forests of Laos provide an almost continuous initiated earlier, the first full-season interdic­ roof of natural concealment, severely inhibit- tion campaign in Southeast Asia was con- ing both the detection and destruction of tar­ ducted during the summer of 1966 in an gets from the air. interdiction belt across the lower panhandle A second criticai feature is the climate that of North Vietnam.7 In the summer of 1967, is dominated by two major seasonal the weight of effort shifted north to the ene- phenomena—the Southwest and northeast my's heartland for the purpose of destroying monsoons. The Southwest monsoon normally North Vietnamese military and industrial predominates from June to October and the facilities and paralyzing the railroads. The northeast from November to May. The campaign against the heartland was con- climatological patterns for each of the sea- tinued until the 1 April 1968 bombing halt sons are best remembered with reference to again restricted strike operations to the low­ the Annam Mountains. During the Southwest er panhandle. Then, on 1 November 1968, monsoon, or wet season, a low-pressure area President Johnson halted all bombing of draws air off the Indian Ocean, bringing North Vietnam. thunderstorms and rains to Laos. During the As the result of a contingent agreement northeast monsoon, or dry season, a high- with North Vietnam that prohibited move- pressure area blows over the Gulf of Tonkin ment of men and materiel directly through and South China Sea, bringing low overcast Continued on 10 Operation Strangie Operation Strangie, whose purpose was "to reduee the enemys How of supplies to ... make it impraeticable for him to main- tain and operate his forces in Central It- aly," was successfully effected in the spring of1944 through the combined efforts of air interdiction and aggressive ground action. Allied jeeps move through Arezzo (above), following straBng raids by fíghter-bombers of the First Tactical Air Force. Power sta- tions (right) were obvious targets as were Xíediterranean harbors such as Leghorn (opposite, above), ehoked with wrecked ships after Allied bombings. The destruc- tion of the marshalling yards at Arezzo, a transportation center of central Italy (op­ posite), was yet another challenge to Ger- man proprietorship of the península. 8

10 AIR UNIVEfíSITY REVIEW North Vietnamese supplies into South Viet­ nam. The trail’s history as a line of communi- cation (LOC) dated back to World War II, when Vietminh bands trekked the same jun- gle paths. This LOC was developed from the existing footpaths into a highly organized infiltration route for men and supplies. The road network extended from Mu Gia Pass in the north, southward along the heavily for- ested western slopes of the Annam range, to a series of exit points stretching from just below the demilitarized zone between the two Vietnams, to the triborder region of Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam—some 500 kilometers to the south. (See Figure 1.) Although the road net was initially confined to the western slopes of the Annam range, continued expansion of the system pushed additional miles of motorable routes further westward in Laos, providing the enemy an increasingly wide choice of routes along which he could channel supplies. By the summer of 1971, this labyrinth of routes and bypasses encompassed an estimated 3500 kilometers of motorable roads. In spite of constant improvement, the Figure 1. Ho Chi Minh Trai] logistics Row roads were still primitive by Western stan- dards, consisting primarily of 18-foot-wide tracks carved out of the jungles. Although both gravei and corduroy surfaces were used clouds, fog, and drizzle to North Vietnam to strengthen some sections, the roads were and dry weather to Laos. chiefly dirt and nearly impassable during the The shifting nature of the monsoons had wet season. The roads were originally built an important bearing on the interdiction by manual labor, but as time passed on, the effort because the enemy geared his logistics North Vietnamese made increased use of flow to it. The northeast monsoons brought bulldozers, roadgraders, and other heavy improved weather conditions over the roads equipment. The route network was oper- and made them much more suitable for the ated, maintained, and defended by an es­ movement of men and supplies. Conse- timated 40,000-50,000 personnel organized quently, the enemy concentrated his logis­ in geographic area units called Binh Trams. tics efiforts during these periods, and the Each Binh Tram had the necessary transpor- interdiction campaigns were planned to re- tation, engineer, and AAA battalions to en- spond accordingly. sure movement and security of materiel and These, then, are the characteristic features personnel in its sector. of the famed Ho Chi Minh Trail, which The process by which supplies were served as the primary artery for moving moved southward was extremely complicat- AIR INTERDICTION 11 ed, requiring coordination between various ity by noting acoustic or seismic disturbances transportation elements and numerous within the range of the sensor. They were transfers of cargo in and out of vehicles and delivered by fighter aircraft in strings of six to wayside storage areas. Almost all movement eight beside known routes. Each sensor con- was conducted at night in a series of short tained a self-destruct feature that was ac- shuttles, rather than by long-distance haul- tivated by a timer or an antitamper device. ing. Drivers drove their trucks over the same The sensor activations were received by routes night after night,becoming thorough- orbiting aircraft and relayed to the Infiltra- ly familiar with their assigned segments. tion Surveillance Center, where they were Periods of high moon illumination, which al- analyzed and translated into truck move- lovved travei without headlights, and low ments. These movements then became the cloud cover were exploited to avoid detec- basic index of enemy truck activity. This in- tion from overhead aircraft. Truck move­ formation was used on a real-time basis to ment began shortly after nightfall and position the interdiction force and on a long- normally trailed off about 3:00 a.m. to allow er-time basis to analyze trends, compute time for the unloading, dispersai, and con- enemy input and throughput supply ton- cealment of supplies and vehicles before day- nages, and assist in the location of truck light. These tactics, developed in Korea and parks, storage areas, and new roads. later refined in Laos, might be considered highly inefficient by Western standards, yet they were the most effective way of moving the Commando Hunt campaigns large quantities of supplies through a hostile The Commando Hunt interdiction cam­ air environment. paigns carried numerical designators that Although the North Vietnamese later changed with the semiannual monsoon made limited use of waterways and pipe- shifts. Odd numbers designated the high-ac- lines, their road netvvork and trucks re- tivity/dry season campaigns and even num­ mained throughout the war the heart of their bers the low-activity/wet season campaigns. logistics system. Intelligence estimates put Naturally, the dry season campaigns, con­ the North Vietnamese truck inventory in ducted officially from November to May, re­ Laos alone at 2500-3000 during the 1970 and ceived the most attention and study. Enemy 1971 dry seasons with from 500-1000 mov­ logistics activity in Southern Laos during the ing per night, each carrying about four tons intervening wet seasons was so low that the of supplies. Replacement trucks were drawn corresponding military operations could from large inventories maintained within hardly be classified as campaigns. the sanctuary of North Vietnam in the vicini- Summary statistics for the dry season Com­ ty of Hanoi and Haiphong. During the height mando Hunt campaigns are presented in Ta- of the interdiction campaigns, the trail logis­ ble 2. During the first Commando Hunt, tics system was defended against U.S. aircraft November 1968 through April 1969, the dy- with an estimated 600-700 antiaircraft guns. namic reaction between opposing forces led On the U.S. side, a unique feature that dis- to a refinement of tactics for employing air tinguished the Commando Hunt campaigns power in around-the-clock interdiction and from all previous interdiction campaigns was prompted the development of specialized an electronic detection system that overlaid night attack systems, such as the advanced the enemy logistics network with seismic and gunships, which reached maturity in later acoustic sensors. These sensors were air- campaigns and compensated for the gradual delivered devices that detected enemy activ- withdrawal of other aircraft from Southeast 12 AIR UNIX EfíSITV REVIEW

Commando Commando Commando Commando Hunt 1 Hunt III Hunt V Hunt VII

Inclusive dates 1 November 1 November 10 October 1 November 1968— 30 ApriI 1969— 30 April 1970— 30 April 1971— 30 March 1969 1970 1971 1972 U.S. strike sorties (daily average) F ig h te r-a tta c k 399 288 263 182 Gunship 2 8 11 13 B-52 22 23 30 21 Enemy resupply 1 n pu t (tons) 45,000 54,000 61,000 31,000 Throughput (tons) 8,500 19,000 7,000 5,000 R atio (TP/IP) 1/5 1/3 1/9 1/6 Enemy trucks Destroyed or Damaged 6,000 10,000 20,000 10,000

Source: Commando Hunt reports Table 2. Commando Hunt campaign statistics

Asia.8 During the six-month campaign an es- ing, the Cambodians did deny the North timated 45,000 tons of supplies were tran- Vietnamese use of the port of Kompong Som, sported into Laos from North Vietnam, but through which a large volume of materiel only about 8500 tons reached the border of had been flowing. In addition, the Allied South Vietnam—a throughput/input ratio of crossborder penetration into Cambodia dur­ 1/5.9 Some 6000 enemy trucks, the most lu- ing May and June further compounded the crative interdiction target, were reported to North Vietnamese difficulties: large quanti- have been destroyed or damaged by U.S. air- ties of food and ammunition that had been crews. These reports do not imply that all available to support forces in the Southern 6000 trucks were permanently disabled, only regions of South Vietnam were lost. Subse- that they had been hit with ordnance. Statis- quently, the North Vietnamese became ac- tical estimates indicate that on the average tively engaged with Cambodian government about 60 percent were actually rendered forces in operations that further increased inoperative. their requirement for supplies from North During the next dry season campaign, Vietnam. Commando Hunt III, the North Vietnamese As a result, the Ho Chi Minh Trail assumed logistics push during January and February even greater significance as a LOC for ene­ reached new heights and was probably the my men and materiel. With the loss of Kom­ most intense of the whole war. This effort, pong Som and the supply line through which netted a campaign throughput/input Cambodia, the trail became not only the sup­ ratio of 1/3, may have been inspired by an ply route for North Vietnamese and Viet- anticipated loss of the alternate North Viet­ cong forces in northern South Vietnam but namese LOC through Cambodia. Indeed, as also the main channel for resupply of enemy the Commando Hunt III campaign was end- forces in Southern South Vietnam and Cam- AIR INTEfíDICTION 13 bodia. Although some leakages through oth- aged 182 fighter-attack, 13 gunship, and 21 er areas vvere possible, the Ho Chi Minh Trail B-52 sorties per day and reported destroying remained the last major logistics avenue for or damaging some 10,000 trucks through the the transport of supplies from north to south end of March. The estimated throughput/ as the Commando Hunt V campaign ap- input ratio was running at a respectable 1/6 proached. —5000 tons output for 31,000 tons input— Commando Hunt V was officiaUy inaugu- when the enemy initiated a major invasion of rated on 10 October, three weeks early, to South Vietnam over the Easter weekend at seize the initiative prior to the enemy’s logis­ the end of March. Commando Hunt VII was tics push into Laos, which, according to intel- immediately terminated, and the air re- ligence estimates, was to begin on 14 sources that had been used on the trail were October. The campaign was highlighted by a shifted to close air support and tactical inter- sustained, concentrated bombing effort in diction roles within South Vietnam. the entry passes to delay and impede traffic flow from October to January, followed by direct air support of the South Vietnamese The Estimated Results ground incursion into Laos in February and The 1972 enemy invasion of South Viet­ March, all overlaid with an intensive truck- nam brought into question again the overall killing operation throughout Southern Laos. effectiveness of the interdiction effort in More than 20,000 trucks, double the number Southeast Asia and leads us back to the begin- of Commando Hunt III, were reported de- ning. What was the impact of air interdiction stroyed or damaged, and of the estimated on the Communist capability to fight in 61,000 tons of supplies brought into Laos South Vietnam? Unfortunately, no firm from North Vietnam, only 7000 tons reached quantitative conclusion on the viability of Cambodia and South Vietnam—a through- the interdiction campaigns can be advanced. put/input ratio of 1 /9.10 Unlike World War II, there are no supply The next dry season campaign, Comman­ records or interviews with knowledgeable do Hunt VII, was inaugurated as usual during persons available for assessing true enemy the month of Xovember. U.S. forces aver- desires and the impact of interdiction on the fulfillment of those desires. One can only speculate with the use of esti­ Figure 2. Ho Chi Minh Trail throughput, Xovember mates that may not be completely accurate. 1968-March 1972 Supply tonnages, such as throughput and the TONS PER enemy’s minimum daily logistics require- MONTH ments in South Vietnam, were routinely es­ timated, but intelligence analysts admit that these values could be off by a factor of two. Cumulating these values over several years adds even another dimension of uncertainty if reporting consistency has not been main- tained from campaign to campaign. So al­ though the values presented are best estimates, one should not attribute high ac- curacy to the absolute stock leveis and re- quirements outlined in the following paragraphs. 14 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Figure 2 gives a profile of estimated plied, even though in the northern region of amounts of supplies that reached the borders South Vietnam much of the invasion support of South Vietnam and Cambodia from the flowed concurrently through the demilita- initiation of the Commando Hunt campaigns rized zone and was not the result of a prein- in November 1968 to the enemy invasion of vasion efiFort along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. South Vietnam in March 1972. The seasonal Throughput to South Vietnam and Cam­ nature of the North Vietnamese logistics bodia, of course, is only half the picture. To efiFort is readily apparent as is the major sup- determine the enemy’s supply status, we ply offensive during Commando Hunt III. It must also know something of his basic daily is interesting to note, however, that enemy logistics requirements to survive and main- combat activity in South Vietnam decreased tain current activity leveis. The enemy’s continually throughout this period, including minimum requirements were calculated Commando Hunt III, until the major inva­ monthly by intelligence analysts of the U.S. sion in the spring of 1972. For example, ene­ Military Assistance Command, Vietnam my attacks by fire averaged 216 per month (MACV), and were predicated on estimated during Commando Hunt I, 138 during Com­ enemy strengths, consumption rates, de- mando Hunt III, and 88 during Commando preciation, combat activity leveis, and the Hunt V. Although some analysts have at- supplies destroyed and captured by ground tempted to relate throughput tonnages with and air forces during the month. Additional- subsequent enemy activity in South Viet­ ly, these supply requirements were stratified nam, there appears to be no correlation be- by source based on what portion could be tween the two. In fact, if one compares data obtained internally in South Vietnam and from the Commando Hunt III and VII cam­ what portion must be obtained externally paigns, a negative correlation would be im- through the borders with North Vietnam,

Operation Overlord. the code name for the Allied invasion of Sormandy on 6 June 1944, was the classic large-seale joint-force operation. Prior to the landing, Allied air forces kept the Luftwaffe in a reduced state, to discourage their sending Bghters to Franee, and in late May and early June made Wholesale attacks on French air- Belds. A-20s (ríght) pummel a Coastal bat- tery captured early in the invasion; Malines rail yard (opposite, left) was dam- aged in an attack on 19 June 1944; a gun emplacement at LHerbergement (far ríght) was destroyed by Allied bombs. AIR INTERD1CTION 15 Laos, and Cambodia. Admittedly, these val- percent of the total. When combined with ues, based on a number of assumptions, were throughput tonnages from the trail, these es- rough, but they provide some insight into the timates provide the stock profile presented North Vietnamese and Vietcong supply re- in Figure 3. As stated above, caution should quirements—if not in an absolute sense, at be exercised in interpreting the absolute val- least in a relative sense. ues diagrammed in the figure. The profile Estimated enemy minimum logistics re- depicts the cumulative amount of estimated quirements in South Vietnam declined over supplies that flowed through the trail from time from a total of 300 tons per day during the beginning of Commando Hunt I minus Commando Hunt I to about 200 tons per day the estimated enemy minimum require­ for Commando Hunt VII. This decrease re- ments from the trail during the same time sulted from both declining enemy strength period. All values are trail-related and ex- and activity leveis and from revisions in basic clude internai requirements and acquisi- consumption factors. The average tonnage tions, flows through Cambodia before the requirement was 240 tons per day, of which port of Kompong Som was closed in 1970, 205 tons, or 85 percent, was food. The bulk and the leakages and estimated preinvasion of this food, about 80 percent, was obtained movement of 400-800 tons through the within South Vietnam and Cambodia. The demilitarized zone. If throughput was un- remaining tonnage was comprised of equip- derestimated or minimum requirements ment, weapons, and ammunition. Automo­ were overestimated, stock leveis from the tive fuel requirements, considered to be trail would be higher than depicted; if the minimal, were not included. opposite were true, the levei would be lower. The estimated minimum requirements There is, then, a degree of uncertainty as- from the trail averaged 35 tons per day, or 15 sociated with the height of the stock profile. 16 AIR UNIVERSITY BEVIEW

NOVEMBER IMS • MARCH 19Í2 could not be obtained elsewhere, was impor- tant but not large. It would be simple to ac- cumulate a sizable supply stock in light of the low-activity leveis experienced during previ­ ous years. Complete interdiction of a flow of supplies is impossible, and without forced ex- penditure at the destination, a build-up is inevitable. This does not mean the enemy was able to position the right supplies at the right place during the ensuing invasion—only that the aggregate tonnage appeared sufficient for an Figure 3. Cumulative throughput minus daily mini­ offensive. In fact, estimated throughput from mum requirement—from Laos, November 1968- the trail and the demilitarized zone during March 1972 April and May was 4600 tons, and the es­ timated minimum requirement from both was 5300 tons. This decrease of 700 tons was However, if any validity can be attached to only ten percent of the estimated stock levei; the profile, several factors become apparent. yet, the enemy offensive had been blunted First, the North Vietnamese broke about and was completely contained by the end of even as a result of the resupply effort during May. North Vietnamese objectives, which at Commando Hunt I and, perhaps as a result of a minimum included Hue, Kontum, and An this and the prospective loss of the Cambodi- Loc, remained unrealized. From all indica- an LOC, launched a major supply offensive tions, air power had devastated the enemy’s during Commando Hunt III. After that time, capability to continue the offensive.11 however, the stock levei trend became unfa- This is somewhat reminiscent of Operation vorable to the enemy. We might speculate Strangle in Italy, where German aggregate that the increasingly effective interdiction supply tonnages were sufficient for con- effort influenced his decision to launch the tinued operations even after the Allied 1972 invasion of South Vietnam before stock ground offensive, yet the German defensive leveis again approached zero, but the truth posture was broken when tactical interdic­ may never be known. The enemy rationale tion strikes completely overwhelmed the dis- that led to the invasion is but another of the tribution system. It was impossible for many unknowns that contribute to the un- German commanders to move and position certainty over the impact of the Commando men and materiel to the right place at the Hunt campaigns. right time. Mobility denial, rather than sup­ Second, the profile indicates that the ene­ ply denial, had been the key to the Allied my had the logistics capability in March 1972 success. Supply denial has seldom, if ever, to launch an offensive in South Vietnam. Cer- proved to be a viable objective, and the ex- tain critics have advanced the argument that perience in Southeast Asia tends to substanti- the invasion invalidated all previous logistics ate the validity of this premise.12 data because the enemy demonstrated the ability to support an invasion in spite of low throughput predictions. However, the ene­ Observations my supply requirement from the trail, which One of the stated objectives of the inter­ contained the weapons and ammunition that diction campaigns in Southeast Asia was to AIR INTERDICTION 17 make the North Vietnamese pay an increas- value lost associated with these targets could ingly greater cost for aggression in the South. ever make the cost of continued resupply Air interdiction, directed at supply denial, unbearable. does raise the cost of operations to the ene- my; but in a limited war context, this cannot be a primary objective. For one thing, the In summary, increasing the cost to an enemy increasing cost argument often leads to a is a necessary but not a sufficient require- double standard. While U.S. efforts are con- ment for an interdiction effort. The con- sidered successful if they impose an increas­ straints associated with limited war, by their ing cost on the enemy, the increased cost very nature, relegate this objective to sec- imposed on the U.S. by the enemy’s initial or ondary importance. In the end we must re- counter eflForts is not included in the game turn to the original and basic question: What matrix. (Nevertheless, in the end U.S. with- was the impact of air interdiction on the drawal from Southeast Asia was predicated, Communist capability to operate at desired in part at least, on the high cost of continuing combat leveis in South Vietnam? From all the war.) Furthermore, in the North Viet­ indications it was positive but within the namese case, the cost to the enemy of replac- range of North Vietnamese tolerance. The ing bomb damage in Southern Laos was true impact, of course, is uncertain, but this largely shifted through externai aid to other uncertainty in and by itself militates against nations of the Communist bloc. The cost to the future allocation of air resources to long- North Vietnam was mainly the opportunity term supply interdiction—especially if air re­ cost of resources used along the trail. The sources are limited, as they well may be in supplies, trucks, construction equipment, light of increasing budget constraints. and trained personnel employed in Laos Indeed, examples of the vital role played could not be used to rebuild the North Viet­ by air interdiction in the success of friendly namese economy which had never fully ground forces have been cited in this text— recovered from the 1965-68 bombing cam- the campaigns of Europe, the first year of paigns. The fact that they continued logistics operations in Korea, and the 1972 North operations in Southern Laos, however, indi- Vietnamese invasion of South Vietnam—but cates that these costs were bearable. in each case the interdiction effort could be The increasing cost objective might more directly related to a major ground action. appropriately be applied to the December The more intense the action, the more vital 1972 bombing of the North Vietnamese became the interdiction effort in forestalling heartland. This campaign was aimed at ap- replacements for depleted enemy forces. plying maximum pressure through destruc- However, the timeliness of replacements, tion of major target complexes in the vicinity a factor so criticai to success in intense, large- of Hanoi and Haiphong. The large, concen- scale confrontations between opposing trated strike efiFort severely damaged some of forces, fades into relative insignificance as an North Vietnam’s most important and costly element in protracted war. Protracted war military and industrial facilities.13 These par­ implies time; and given time, temporary ticular facilities, which are of greatest inter- structures rise to replace destroyed bridges, est if the increasing cost objective is by-passes circumnavigate interdicted route employed, were previously restricted from segments, and men and materiel are divert- air attack. As a result of these restrictions, less ed from less essential to more criticai func- valuable interdiction targets along the logis­ tions. Moreover, in protracted conflicts tics routes were struck. It is doubtful if the characterized by guerrilla warfare, only a 18 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW minimum of supplies is required, and since wars that degenerated into protracted peri- the option to fight or withdraw remains ods of relative stagnation. Long-term supply open, neither the volume nor timing of re- interdiction, the version assigned to cover placements is paramount to ultimate success. these static periods, could claim few suc- In concluding, then, it should be noted cesses. In fact, it is highly unlikely that any that air interdiction has been a victim of the military operation—land, sea, or air—could type of wars waged during the past 25 years, claim success under such conditions. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense

Notes l. U.S Air Force Manual 2-1. Tactical Air Operations—Counter Air, aircraft visual truck observations. and road and river watch team observa- Close Air Support. and .Air Interdiction, Department of the Air Force. 2 tions along the Laos entry and exit routes. Duplicate counts were then May 1969 eliminated to obtain an estimate of the actual truckloads of southbound 2. F. M. Sallagar, Operation "Strangle"(Italy, Spring 1944): A CaseStudy supplies that entered and exited the system. To the input figure was also of Tactical Air Interdiction, The Rand Corporation, R-851-PR. Februarv added an estimate of equivalent truckloads of supplies that entered Laos 1972. through enemy pipelines and natural waterways. 3. Ibid., p. vii. 10. A detailed account of the campaign by this writer, entitled 'The 4 Ibid.. p. xiii. Commando Hunt V Interdiction Campaign: A Case Study in Constrained 5. Basil H Liddell Hart. The Cerman Cenerals Tolk (New York: Morrow, Optimization," will be published in a forthcoming issue of Air University 1948). pp. 243-44 Review. 6. Cregory A. Carter, Some HistóricaI Notes on Air Interdiction in Korea, 11. It should be pointed out that this represented the first North Viet- The Rand Corporation. P-3452. September 1966. namese offensive in South Vietnam that was conducted in an exclusively 7. Material in this section was extracted from a series of classified reports conventional mode—complete with tanks, sophisticated crew-served prepared annually by the Directorate of Tactical Analysis, Headquarters weapons. and large attack formations. Thus the North Vietnamese were Seventh Air Force, on the interdiction campaigns ín Southern Laos. These clearly more vulnerable to air strikes than in the past. included Commando Hunt. May 1969: Commando Hunt III, May 1970; 12. One reason for this is that troop movement requires greater LOC Commando Hunt V. M a y 1 9 7 1 ; a n d Commando Hunt VII, June 1972. The capacity than does supply movement. For example. the road movement of extracted material is unclassified. a U.S. infantry division normally consumes six to eight times more road 8. The gunships were C-130 and C-119 transport aircraft that were capacity than does its daily resupply requirement. If the movement is by modified with sophisticated night detection equipment and 20. 40, and rail. the capacity difference is even greater. averaging about 135 to one. J. later, 105 millimeter cannons to destroy trucks moving down the trails of VV. Higgins. Military Movements and Supply Lines as Comparative Inter- Laos. These aircraft were by far the most effective truek-killing systems in diction Targets, The Rand Corporation, RM-6308-PR, July 1970. the U.S. arsenal. 13. A classified evaluation of the bombing results can be found in: Her- 9. Throughput and input were calculated by intelligence analysts who man L. Gilster and Robert F. M. Frady, Linebacker II USAF Bombing combined the number of southbound sensor-detected truck movements. Sursey, Headquarters Pacific Air Forces, April 1973.

Science, freedom, beauty, adventure: What more could vou ask of life? Aviation combined all the elements I ioved. ... I began to feel that I lived on a higher plane than the skeptics of the ground; one that was richer because of its very association with the element of danger they dreaded. because it was freer of the earth to which they were bound. In flving I tasted the wine of the gods of which they could know nothing. C harles A. L indberch, Jh (1953) THE DIPLOMACY OF APOLOGY U.S. Bombings of Switzerland during World War II

D r . J onathan E. H elmreich

' A ' HAT the United States bombed the by Swiss aviators and ordered to land by small, neutral State of Switzerland dur- means of green fiares and the lowering of ing World War II seems at first implausi- landing gear if speed permitted. Foreign Tble, but such attacks did occur. There wasmilitary a aircraft in formations of two or more scattering of incidents in 1943. Then on 1 would, however, be attacked by Swiss squad- April 1944 the northern Swiss city of Schaflf- rons without warning. Such an attack actual- hausen was seriously damaged. As the Allied ly occurred early in March 1944 when Swiss air attack on Germany intensified, the num- fighters shot down one U.S. bomber and ber of raids on Swiss territory increased, cul- forced another to land at Dübendorf.2 minating in the nearly simultaneous During this period the United States was bombings of Basel and Zurich on 4 March ably represented in Switzerland by its ex- 1945. perienced minister, Leland Harrison, by the Where pertinent records still exist, the military attaché, Brigadier General Barnwell causes can be traced to bad weather, faulty R. Legge, and by the counselor to the lega- equipment, incompetence, or excess pilot tion, Jerome K. Huddle. The legation at Bern zeal rather than to malice or purposeful plan- was a sensitive assignment, for the Swiss ning. Yet the lack of demonstrable intent did heard much, and discreet inquiries could not mitigate the sufferings and suspicions of produce valuable information. It was impor- the Swiss. The United States’ embarrassment tant that United States oflficials be favorably was considerable, and the eflforts of diplomats received and granted access to as many per- and generais to smooth matters revealed sons as possible. There was also the matter of widely varying degrees of concern and con- the increasing numbers of grounded U.S. air- flicts of interest among agencies that sup- men interned by the Swiss. Their treatment posedly were cooperating. The negotiations and speed of repatriation could be greatly were also peculiarly influenced by the con- influenced by Swiss views of the American flict between American acknowledgment of air war. Key to any list of sensitive issues was Switzerland’s usefulness as a listening post the matter of Swiss trade with the Axis and and irritation over her economic aid to Ger­ the willingness of the Swiss to allow goods in many; on the other hand there was tension transit between Italy and Germany to pass between the aggressiveness of individual pi- over their railway lines. International law on lots and their instructions to observe Swiss this matter is complex, especially when the neutrality. neutral power, virtually surrounded by one Debate, of course, did occur over responsi- group of forces, must exercise discretion. bility for numerous incidents.1 Swiss eflforts When he learned of the 1 April attack on in this regard had two obvious goals: first, to SchaflFhausen, Harrison promptly visited make the oflfending nations aware of the acts Swiss Foreign Minister Marcei Pilet-Golaz to their pilots were committing and take cor- express sympathy and regret. He was told rective steps and, second, to obtain indemni- that the oflfending planes numbered 50, that ty for the damages suflFered. As the the killed and wounded amounted to more expanding Allied air forces carne closer to than 100, and that fires were still ravaging the Axis homeland and blind bombing homes, factories, city buildings, and railway through clouds became a frequent practice, yards of the city of 22,000 inhabitants. The the Swiss established increasingly stringent polite foreign minister voiced his inability to protective procedures. Allied war depart- conceive of an explanation for “what appar- ments were informed that single aircraft vi- ently was a deliberate attack.”3 Neverthe- olating Swiss territory would be approached less, he ordered that radio and press 20 DIPLOMA CY OF APOLOGY 21 announcements be restrained. Harrison him- weather had caused some bombs to fali by self warned his superiors: mistake on Switzerland. The deliberate un- If attribution to American .Air Force is verified derstatement of the size and accuracy of the frankest and fullest explanations should be giv- attack and the alibi of bad weather angered en to S\viss Government soonest possible ac- the Swiss press. In a telegram sent Sunday companied by all other possible amenities from afternoon, Harrison had warned that “there highest quarters. If our culpability confirmed is natural popular feeling throughout Swit­ effects vvill be most difficult to overcome.4 zerland of resentment and indignation on The question of U.S. culpability was quick- material, moral and theoretical grounds but ly resolved. Carl A. “Tooey” Spaatz, Com- it is as yet too early to gauge its depth or manding General of the U.S. Strategic Air estimate its effect.”6 The London statement Forces in the European Theater of Opera- triggered the release of this resentment and tions, reported that two bomber groups ad- indignation into public print. Harrison mitted bombing in the northern salient of winced and telegraphed that “terrestrial Svvitzerland on that Saturday, although the weather conditions Schaffhausen area were pilots claimed they had missed the town. reported exceptionally clear with excellent Commanding General of the Armv Air visibility. If conditions in higher atmosphere Forces Henry H. “Hap” .Arnold decided to were bad, details thereof are essential if let the State Department take prime respon- statement in communiqué to carry any con- sibüity for handling the matter. He did order viction and not be regarded as inept attempt the Operations Division of the War Depart­ at evasion.”7 ment^ General Staff to prepare a statement The Gazette de Lausanne wrote that the to be issued by the Secretary of War; appro- excuse of poor weather was worthless and priate action was also to be taken by the local that “If American commanders know no bet- commander. ter than to multiply bombardments without Such action consisted of a formal call of even taking geography into account it is but apology by Spaatz, in the company of the time to replace them by others.” The Basel United States ambassador to the United National Zeitung was similarly angry over Kingdom, on the Swiss legation in London. the weather comment and claimed Schaff­ In Switzerland, Legge conveyed to Division hausen was willfully attacked. “We do not Colonel Fox Rihner of the Swiss Air Force his exaggerate in characterizing [this] act as [a] chiefs extreme regret and assurances of fu­ ‘war crime’ with its destruction of irreplacea- ture precautions. Legge himself expressed ble lives, unique cultural objects, and much regrets to General Henri Guisan, the com­ valuable property.” The semiofficial Bern mander in chief of the Swiss armed forces. Bund was more restrained. One headline The formal statement of regret that Secre­ called “Stick to the Truth, Please!” but the tary of State Cordell Hull released on Mon- editors did not question that the raid was a day admitted full responsibility and mistake. They urged that henceforth Swit­ indicated the American governmenfs will- zerland should not rely on protests alone but ingness to make appropriate reparations for should insist on specific steps being taken to damages incurred insofar as it was humanly improve security. The Berlin press had a field possible.5 day decrying the terroristic actions of the The good effect of this statement was U.S. gangsters.8 erased by an ill-phrased release by Spaatz’s U.S. Army Chief of Staff George C. Mar­ headquarters in London on Sunday mention- shall, perhaps more than any other member ing that navigational difficulties and bad of the American military, felt serious con- 22 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW cem over the violation of Swiss neutrality. was required for its disbursement, and the The impression to be gained from dispatches Swiss were to know that additional funds of lower-level generais is that of genuine re- would be forthcoming if the total cost of gret and sympathy but irritation that further damages exceeded the million dollars. discussion of the matter was keeping them At a subsequent Swiss press conference, from getting on with their prime task of Harrison gathered that the Americans’ quick fighting the war. This was not the attitude of admission of error had been appreciated and Marshall, a man with a strong conscience and compared favorably with the reluctant atti­ sense of responsibility. He, along with Hull, tude of the British in cases of violation of Legge, and others in the War Department, Swiss airspace. The prompt provision of held that a serious mistake had been made. reparations had similar positive effect.10 Marshall and Hull, therefore, lost little Though the raids on Schaffhausen were not time in instructing Harrison to ask Swiss au- as disastrous as initial Swiss protests had in- thorities for data on the full amount of per- dicated, they were indeed serious.11 He re- sonal and property damage so that the minded his superiors that the death and United States could pay reparations. The damage “add up to a major catastrophe for War Department in particular felt “that Switzerland, and it must be candidly stated prompt action . . . without haggling the that public opinion was profoundly affect- claims ... will redound to our benefit.”9 One e d . ” 12 W h il e t h e Swiss w e r e willing to c o n ­ day later Hull released to Harrison $1 million cede the immediate accidental aspects of the to be placed at the disposal of the Swiss gov- Schaffhausen raid, they saw the fundamental ernment immediately. No special accounting burden of avoiding such occurrences to fali

1 DIPLOMACY OF APOLOCY 23 squarely on the United States government, therefore required to exercise special cau- for American planes would not have found tion. themselves over Switzerland had they been This last dilemma was not spelled out by operating with proper regard for Swiss neu- Secretary of State Hull when he officially trality. communicated the reasons for the mishap to The initial provision of $1 million relief the Swiss minister. Reference was made to funds was followed by another $3 million in unexpected winds, the loss of the division October. An attempt was also made to meet leader, and failure of navigation equipment. the Swiss request for an explanation of the He assured the Swiss that directives were in incident. Investigations revealed that weath- effect to prohibit bombings within 50 miles er had indeed been a factor, but that it was of Switzerland without positive identifica­ not so much the weather over Schaffhausen tion.14 as that over France which caused the difficul- Despite the announced precautions and ty. Clouds and unsuspected winds from the increased concern following the Schaffhaus­ northwest had the bomber formation scat- en tragedy, the incidents multiplied. Bomb­ tered and navigators confused by the time ing damages were small, but there were the planes reached Strasbourg. Three widely many violations of Swiss airspace. The Swiss separated locations had each been mistaken Air Force could do nothing against mis- for the primary target of Ludwigshaven am directed formations as large as 100 bombers, Rhein: Strasbourg, Pforzheim, and Schaff- but the Swiss did take action regarding single hausen. Though the air speed of the 14th planes.15 As these were usually cripples Wing was about 160 miles per hour, its searching asylum, American officers resented ground speed was nearly 100 mph faster. A the Swiss attacks. At the close of May, under gap in the clouds over Schaffhausen gave the prodding from the War Department, Hull bombardier time to recognize a large city on condemned a Swiss attack of 13 April on a the east bank of the Rhine but not enough to damaged U.S. bomber. Six officers and crew- check out details that might have signaled men had been killed despite their answering the error in identification. No attempt was to Swiss rockets with signal fiares and by low- made to search out the butadiene factory, ering their landing gear. Harrison also regis- the benzol storage plant, or the compressor tered a “formal and energetic protest.”16 house, which were intended to be the aiming On 1 June, however, Hull had to admit points for a visual attack.13 that bombs jettisoned by aircraft over Same- Though the command pilot of the 392d dan on 1 October 1943 were American. Bombardment Group was unofficially repri- Damages and investigation expenses of $56,- manded for not following the division lead, 515.00 were allocated from the Emergency the more serious factor in terms of the result Fund for the President of the United States, was the error in identification. Theoretically, a special fund authorized by Congress for such identification problems had been met matters of a confidential nature and account- by a standing Eighth Air Force directive pro- ed for solely on the certificate of the Secre­ hibiting bombing of any target within 50 tary of State.17 miles of Germany’s borders or in enemy-oc- On 11 July eight bombers from a group cupied countries without positive identifica­ raiding Munich were forced to land in Swit­ tion. What passed for positive identification zerland by Swiss pursuit planes; on the was questionable, however, and in this case twelfth ten planes were forced down, and on the combat crews were not even aware they the thirteenth five were required to land. were within 50 miles of Switzerland and The incidents were not denied; the U.S. 24 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW forces merely quibbled over the number of eral Eisenhower failed to reply to a violation planes actually escorted by Swiss fighters to inquiry, the diplomat commented: “It is be- landing fields or landing on their own. On 19 lieved quite likely that the theater com- July one crippled bomber which had been mander has experienced considerable abandoned by its crew crashed into the Cas- difficulty in framing a reply concerning in- tle of Weyden, resident of Max Huber, Presi- stances of this sort which it appears may be dent of the International Red Cross. In reply continued.”21 to Swiss remonstrances, the desk officer in Hull, nevertheless, remained concerned the Division of Western European Affairs of about the repetitious nature of the problem. the State Department told the Swiss chargé Writing to Henry L. Stimson at the War De­ d’affaires that while efforts were being made partment, the Secretary of State commented to avoid violations, nevertheless, “in his per- that he knew such incidents would probably sonal opinion it was obvious that as increas- increase as fighting developed in proximity ing numbers of bombers are used in missions to the Swiss border, but he wished that the against those parts of enemy territory which competent officials be “vividly refreshed” re- are near Switzerland, it is manifestly impos­ garding the prohibition of bombing within sible to hope that occasional violations will 50 miles of the Swiss border without positive not occur.”18 identification. Because the Swiss could ren­ The violations did keep on and with good der invaluable Services on behalf of Ameri­ reason. While some pilots could express total can prisoners of war, Hull wanted to be “in surprise that bombs they had jettisoned land- a position to acknowledge frankly and to ed in Switzerland rather than in France, all offer the regrets of the American Govern­ the Americans knew that if a plane could not ment for such of the incidents . . . as are make it back across the English Channel, it substantiated by the facts.”22 was far better to land in Switzerland than Stimson concurred in part. The Swiss min- behind German lines. The Swiss understood ister should be assured that “every reason- this, but their posture as a neutral required able effort has been made to avoid violation” that they make some mild protests. More- and that previous incidents had been “forci- over, continuous raising of the issue kept the bly brought to the attention of the theater Americans alert to avoid a repetition of the commander. . . . ”23 Schaffhausen affair and ready to make good This had been done, but there was no great on any claims the Swiss might present. interest within the theater command in trac- The Americans grew annoyed with the ing down the various Mustangs and Thun- game. As General Spaatzs chief of staff com- derbolts presumably responsible for the mented later, “We had a war to fight, and we incidents. Major General J. E. Hull of the Op­ had to get on with it.”19 Thus as early as June, erations Division of the General Staff advised Colonel Harold R. Maddux, Chief of the Liai- Stimson that specific responsibility could not son Section, Theater Group, Operations be assessed for many mishaps; it could be Division in the General Staff of the War presumed that American aircraft were in- Department, was telling the State Depart­ volved “even though it is known that the ment that unless a given incident represent- Germans have repaired and flown Allied air­ ed a matter of great importance he “would craft in combat and it is possible that some of not like to irritate . . . [the commanding the incidents were deliberate efforts by the general] by continued requests for informa- Germans to injure Allied relations with Swit­ tion.”20 Paul T. Culbertson of State’s Division zerland.”24 He suggested reparations be paid of West European Affairs agreed. When Gen­ even though there might be doubt of Ameri- DIPLOMACY OF APOLOGY 25 can guilt. Stimson therefore pointed out to and immediate preoccupations of the officers the Secretary of State that: at the front and the policy-makers in Wash­ The diversion from the principal task of pursu- ington. The War Department initially went ing the war in Europe with utmost vigor which along with the Swiss idea but soon encoun- would be required to completely and tered all sorts of opposition. The theater thoroughly substantiate or refute these allega- commanders were not interested in having tions is not warranted at this time.25 to host observers and distrusted the Swiss military. Strong insisted that if overall policy required assent to the Swiss request only two officers of field grade be permitted to ob­ T he pattern of violation, apolo- serve. Their names should be cleared by the gy', reparation, and new violation was not im- British and American attachés in Bem, all pressive. This was why, when the Swiss made their Communications should be sent a special request, the War Department through U.S. ciphers, and their personal mail thought it wise to reply in the affirmative. censored. They should stay at least four There were those who disagreed. Major months, during which they could not travei General Kenneth W. D. Strong, Chief of In- out of the Allied Expeditionary Force zone telligence, Supreme Headquarters, Allied nor move to the very front. They should be Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF), wrote from given no information regarding secret equip- the forward headquarters of the Allied ment or operations and should always be es- forces: corted by an Allied officer. Because of violations of Swiss neutrality by At the close of September Deputy Chief of Army Air Forces, the United States War De­ Army Staff Lieutenant General Thomas T. partment has recommended approval of the Swiss request that Swiss observers be attached Handy, working in the Pentagon, contacted to the Allied Expeditionary Force with the ob- Lieutenant General W. Bedell Smith, Eisen- ject of counter balancing the effect of these hower’s chief of staff, for his opinion. SmitlTs unfortunate incidents and to establish friendly reply was similar to Strong’s. Handy wrote liaison betw'een the United States and the Swiss. Arnold: The reason is that the SHAEF people are con- It is my opinion that the proposed action vinced that the Swiss General Staff is full of will create a serious security hazard to fu­ German sympathizers. As a matter of fact, Be­ ture operations and should not be permit- dell Smith says that they believe about half the ted.26 Staff has a close tie-in with the German General The request had been put forward at the Staff.28 end of September 1944 by General Guisan, Both Smith and Handy agreed that placing the Swiss commander in chief, and support- extensive restrictions on any Swiss observers ed informally by the Swiss foreign ministry. would defeat the object of allowing them to Legge thought acquiescence to the assign- come. It would be simpler and cleaner to say ment of one or two Swiss officers to the Allied no, but Legge was not happy about transfer- staffs in Western Europe would greatly facili- ring that message to the Swiss general. He tate his contacts with General Guisan; Harri- made one last try, writing Bedell Smith on 9 son recommended the move as a step toward November. improving relations.27 Our situation here is extremely tenuous. Re- At work again here, as in the differing de- peated violations of the frontier are bringing grees of concern regarding the accidental about a feeling of bitterness on the part of the bombings, were the varying perspectives Swiss, especially in Army circles. 26 AIR UN1VERSITY REVIEW Today, two Swiss bridges and a dam on the precedent. The tour took place without mis- Rhine were bombed. In view of my recent ap- hap, and in the middle of January 1945 Gen­ proach on the subject of the Rhine control, this eral Guisan wrote Legge a gracious note puts me in rather a difficult situation. . . . thanking him for his assistance. He empha- I feel that with the Swiss it is more a ques- tion of loss of face which is hurting them sized how instructive it was for the Swiss than anything else. They feel that we are officers to watch such a well-regulated orga- friendly towards them but still we do not nization and to sit in on informative confer- trust them on a mission with our Army.29 ences. The case of Swiss military observers was If Smith would reconsider, it would greatly not the only instance in which at least some assist Legge’s problems. The interests of American officers carne to believe that the some thousand air force internees were in- Swiss were trying to take advantage of the volved. United States. When the Swiss legation ex- The following day General Omar N. Brad- pressed concern about an attack on the ley, commander of the Twelfth Army Group, French power station at Kembs, Colonel telegraphed Smith requesting authority to Maddux viewed the démarche as “tan- accept a Swiss military observer in order to tamount to the assertion of a right to have strengthen the hand of Allen Dulles, who the Allies refrain from attacking targets in was heading up the Office of Strategic Ser­ enemy-occupied territory because Swiss citi- vices (OSS) intelligence activities in Bem. zens have a financial or other interest there- This appeal was no doubt stimulated by a in.”32 His blunt reply to the “unwarranted message similar to one Arnold received the presumption” of the Swiss was diplomatical- same day from Bill Donovan, Chief of the ly modified by the Adjutant General’s office. OSS. It enclosed a report of 3 November, Part of the American irritation and distrust from the OSS representative in Bern, in of the Swiss was also caused by Swiss trade which the resentment of the Swiss over the with the Axis powers. As a neutral, Switzer- bombings was described. General Guisan, it land had the right to trade with either camp. was said, was deeply disturbed, for while he Surrounded by German-held territory and realized that some mistakes were inevitable, traditionally accustomed to trading with he could not understand the occurrence of their neighbor, the Swiss naturally had ex- low-level attacks. The whole OSS task of tensive dealings with the Germans during penetrating Germany was being hindered by the first years of the war. Both their own ex- the increasing difficulty of obtaining Swiss ports and those that passed through Switzer- cooperation.30 land from Italy and Spain were ii portant to The pressure brought some results from the German war effort, although it is likely Eisenhower’s headquarters. On 18 Novem­ the aid Germany provided Italy was more ber, Strong telegraphed Bradley that accep- significant than that Germany obtained from tance of a permanent Swiss observer was the south. contrary to higher policy. But, for the sake of Though the Swiss had agreed in December good relations, arrangements would be made 1943 to quotas on the importation and expor- for four Swiss officers to be conducted on a tation of certain goods and foodstuffs, the ten-day visit to the VI Army Group only.31 progress of the war led the Allies to press for The British chiefs of staff agreed to the expansion of the Controls Switzerland exer- limited proposal provided the Swiss were not cised over trade with Germany and transit shown secret equipment and it was under- traffic. Out of fear of German cutbacks on stood that the visit was not establishing a coal shipments to Switzerland if the Swiss DIPLOMA CV OF APOLOCY 27 inhibited German coal shipments to Italy, ish would settle for prohibition of export of the Swiss had dragged their feet in further high priority goods and cessation of transit negotiations. By the end of July 1944, Cordell traffic while allowing the continuation of Hull found the S\viss attitude “most disturb- trade in lower priority exports.35 ing” and “strongly believed that we should In October the Swiss agreed to end the be ready to consider appropriate retaiiatory export of munitions and explosives to Ger­ action now.” He wrote: many, but the issue of transit traffic re- The delaving tactics the Swiss have emploved mained. The Allies were also annoyed by the in this matter are deplored particularly and we amount of other valuable material the Ger- are most dissatisfied with Swiss handling of the matter. .. . The Swiss should be warned in strong terms that we will be forced to con­ sider measures at our disposal to prevent the enemy from continuing to receive un- due assistance from Swiss railway facilities. 33 If the Swiss did not comply with Allied re- quests, then the American ambassador in Britain should discuss with the British Minis- try of Economic Warfare possible counterac- tions. “Withholding food quotas is not favored here. Discussions with military as to feasibility of air attacks on key points in the approaches in Germany and Italy to the two main Swiss rail routes should be considered in any case we believe.”34 The British, however, did not think it wise to give a strong warning to the Swiss without checking with the Air Ministry and the U.S. Fifteenth Air Force, for fear such a warning might coincide with a planned attack and jeopardize the security of the fliers. By August, Hull w’as ready to demand that Switzerland suspend all exports to the ene­ my and prohibit all enemy transit traffic through Switzerland. The British were will- ing to take such a stand but only with an important reservation. They did not w'ant to take any action that would result in a breach in Swiss diplomatic relations with Germany. If the Germans did break with the small neu- tral, Switzerland could not act as a protecting power for prisoners of war. The recent mur- der of captured British airmen in Germany caused London to fear that in the face of defeat the Gestapo might run amuck, killing great numbers of POWs. Therefore, the Brit­ 28 AIR UNIVERSTTY REVIEW mans were still able to purchase from the moving between Switzerland and Germany Swiss, including railroad switching engines, and Switzerland and Italy were obvious industrial supplies and machine tools, and enough to the pilots patrolling the skies of two billion kilowatt hours per year of electric those regions. As the front moved closer to power. Undersecretary of War Robert P. Pat- Germany, violations of Swiss neutrality were terson was therefore quick to inform Major increasingly committed by fighter pilots and General Hull at the Pentagon that Spanish the tactical forces as well as by the strategic exports to Switzerland were resuming by air forces. Many of their intended targets lay truck. He recommended that Switzerland narrowly within German borders, thus not be permitted to make imports across heightening the probability of bombs falling France until she had stopped all war aid to in Switzerland. The nature of the targets Germany. The undersecretary further sug- clearly shows the eagerness of the command- gested that facts regarding the Swiss aid to ers on the scene to slow or halt the shipment Germany be brought to the attention of the of goods and power from Switzerland to Ger­ Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expedi- many.38 tionary Forces. The United States did not hesitate to deny Aware that to inform General Eisenhower responsibility for raids where brief investiga- of the facts of Swiss trade with Germany tion could not reveal the involvement of would be tantamount to directing him to American units. Such was the case for allega- shut off the traffic, Hull recommended that tions regarding attacks on Cornol 3 Decem- the Joint Chiefs of Staíf bring the matter of ber and Niederweningen four days later. Spanish-Swiss transit trade to the attention of There was no accounting for some incidents, the State Department. It might be a useful despite firm Swiss identification of American lever.36 insígnia. Arnold at one point wrote Donovan On 6 November the Swiss chargé d'affaires to inquire if the OSS knew whether German called at the State Department to complain pilots were attacking Switzerland with cap- that all Swiss rail and truck traffic into France tured American planes.39 Just how thorough had been prohibited by a General Gray, who, the American investigations were may be he believed, was in charge of U.S. Army open to question. They were launched ap- transportation in France. The desk officer re- propriately enough at the highest leveis, but plied that the matter of Swiss traffic in the prime interest on the airfields in England France was being left in General Eisenhow- and France was the current war, not past er’s hands as an operations matter; given the history. Then, too, rumors and conversations transportation difficulties that existed, he was with ex-pilots suggest that flight logs were not surprised the order had been issued. By not always well kept, in some cases deliber- implication and innuendo he skillfully left ately so. strong doubt in the mind of the Swiss attaché A severe error in identification occurred as to whether the State Department was ac- on Christmas Day 1944, as planes from the tually behind the order prohibiting Swiss lst Tactical Air Force bombed Thavngen. traffic in France. At the same time, he made The pilots reportedly “were under the im- quite clear that the State Department was pression that they were attacking the Singen very reluctant to interfere with SHAEF op- railroad bridge located in Germany.”40 Al- erational actions until the matter of Axis though the day was cloudy, the Swiss felt that transit through Switzerland was satisfactorily the incident demonstrated the insufficiency settled.37 of the measures the Americans were taking While negotiations dragged on, the trains to prevent accidental bombings. DIPLOMACY OF APOLOGY 29 The diplomats of the small country were German trade might be allowed as the most especiaüy concerned that there be no confu- practical means of achieving the Allies’ goals. sion regarding the regions of Basel near the The Swiss had been stubborn, and this new French and German borders and the Pus- approach seemed worth trying to Grew, who chlav valley in southeastern Switzerland. As was more flexible than the recently retired early as September the Swiss minister and Cordell Hull.43 attaché called the attention of the War De­ In an effort to expedite discussions, the partment to the similarity of terrain in the British and Americans sent a mission to Swit­ Basel area and adjoining France; the mar- zerland headed by President Franklin D. shalling yard in Basel should not be mistaken Roosevelts special assistant, Laughlin Cur- for nearby yards in France and Germany. At rie. By 10 February the Swiss had temporari- Brúsio in the Puschlav valley there was a ly suspended all exports to Germany until highly exposed hydroelectric plant which Germany made up her arrears in shipments might appear to be a good target; the Swiss to the Swiss; there was minimal likelihood of diplomats gave assurance that no electricity the Swiss renewing their trade treaty with went from this plant to Italy.41 Germany on 15 February. As a gesture to the Despite directions that pilots be carefully Swiss, on 22 February Currie traveled to briefed on these areas, several complaints Schaffhausen to lay a wreath on the graves of were received in January and February 1945 the citizens killed in the bombing of the regarding attacks on Brúsio. Responsibility preceding April. for these was denied, but incidents at Chiasso His timing could not have been more awk- were another matter. Just over the border ward, for minutes prior to his arrival the from Como, Italy, Chiasso was hit several Americans had another of their mishaps. The times, the most notable occasions being on damage caused in Switzerland by the raids of 11 and 27 January. 22 February 1945 was extensive. Seven per- .Vleanwhile the German-Italian transit sons were killed and 16 injured at Taegerwil- traffic continued. In January 1945 it involved en and Stein-am-Rhein; eight died at Rafz, as the shipping of more than 7000 tons of cloth- did a child at Vais. A total of 13 separate ing, textile materiais, and foodstuffs to Ger­ attacks took place, that at Stein-am-Rhein, 12 many, while the Italians received more miles from Schaffhausen, being the worst. valuable products, including Chemicals, Currie was aghast but managed a public as­ some ore and iron, and 53,000 tons of coal— surance that every possible precaution an essential commodity for the war effort of would be taken to avoid similar accidents in Mussolinfs Italian Republic.42 the future. He personally visited the ruins at In that month the State Department Stein-am-Rhein and the following day tele- changed its tactics on the recommendation graphed a report and his concern in a person- of the American legation in Switzerland and al message to the President.44 the British government. For political reasons Currie’s skill and statements helped to stemming from Switzerland’s neutral posi- ease tensions, but feelings in Switzerland re- tion and because of the future potential use- mained strong. The weather had been excel- fulness of Switzerland in restoring Europes lent, and there seemed to be no acceptable economy, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. excuse for the errors. Grew expressed his Grew decided that it would be inadvisable to "profound shock” and assured the Swiss of place “too great” pressure on the Swiss. The American willingness to pay reparations if position of principie would be abandoned the responsibility belonged to the United and some concessions on transit and Swiss- States. 30 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

Promises and payments could not be the ington caused him to order that the tactical only response; something had to be done to air forces make no attacks even with good prevent further recurrence of such inci- visibility within ten miles of the frontier; un- dents. This was clearly the thinking of Gen­ der conditions requiring instruments, they eral Marshall. On 25 February he sent a should not attack within 50 miles. The 50- personal cable to Eisenhower, expressing the mile limit for strategic air forces, save for growing concern in Washington over the in- positively identified targets, was to stay in creasing number of attacks on Switzerland: effect. Yet he felt constrained to reply to Mar­ “everything within our power” should be shall on 28 February that: done to ensure that American pilots were Under existing conditions, however, there can properly briefed and aware of the impor- be no positive guarantee that such incidents tance of positive identification.45 will not occur. Weather conditions are such Eisenhower, too, was disturbed by the fre- that air navigation is largely dependent upon quent mistakes, and the message from Wash­ dead reckoning except in areas contiguous to DIPLOMA CY OF APOLOCY 31 our front lines where navigational aids can be drive Germany to her knees. The prosecu- utilized. Our Air Forces are performing thou- tion of the war had been carried on so in- sands of successful missions daily in weather conditions that would normally prevent all fly- tensely in his headquarters that little ing. We will continue to make every effort to attention had been paid to the first Schaff- prevent recurrence of these incidents."16 hausen incident. It was only with the 22 Feb- ruary affair that significant concern began to So matters stood when four days later, as a mount, and then only because Marshall and result of faulty equipment, bad weather over others in Washington seemed disturbed.50 France and haze in Switzerland, navigational The feisty General Spaatz did the job, and error, and misplaced zeal, six American B- with a flair. Proper groundwork was done in 24H bombers dropped 12.5 tons of heavy ex- advance by Harrison and Sam E. Woods, the plosives and 12 tons of incendiaries on Zu- American Cônsul General in Switzerland. rich, while more planes dropped 16.5 tons of The latter toured the Zurich site with Legge, heavy explosives and five tons of incendiaries privately called on the mayor, and even at- on Basel.47 tended the funeral of several of the victims. NlarshalTs reaction to the news was strong The details of Spaatz’s trip were left to Harri­ and immediate, as he ordered Eisenhower to son and the chief OSS agent in Switzerland, send Spaatz to Switzerland “to clear up Allen Dulles, who was in charge of travei bombing mishaps.”48 The Chief of Staff felt a arrangements. The mission was to be secret, sense of personal responsibility. He undoubt- and so it was thought best that the emissaries edly knew that the State Department had arrive in civilian clothes. Spaatz journeyed to run out of ways of saving “sorry.” Reparation the small French border town of Annemasse, costs were mounting at a steady rate, and where he donned ill-fitting civilian garb in- important negotiations were being jeopard- cluding a Tyrolean hat, drove across the ized. Currie had also telegraphed that the bridge to Geneva, and there was publicly Swiss “have cooperated magnificently” in met by a large Swiss military delegation in the negotiations and had agreed to prohibit full uniform.51 transit of coal from Germany to Italy; surely Harrison, Spaatz, and his chief of staff, some statement was needed to counteract Brigadier General Edward P. Curtis, met this “most painful impression” created by with Swiss Foreign Minister Max Petitpierre, the bombings.49 Minister of War Karl Kobelt, and Generais It was Marshall, rather than the State De­ Guisan and Rihner the next morning. Fol- partment, who decided that a special emis- lowing a handsome apology delivered in flu- sary should apologize to the Swiss. The ent French by General Curtis, Minister of choice of Spaatz would impress the Swiss and War Kobelt read a prepared statement list- assured Marshall of getting the attention of ing every violation since 1 April 1944 and the Commanding General of Strategic Air bluntly demanded full indemnity and repa­ Forces, European Theater. Spaatz was capa- ration. The session was difficult. Spaatz care- ble of doing the job; if he were annoyed at fully expressed his regrets and explained the having to do it, then he might take steps to navigational and weather difficulties affect- ensure that he would not have to do it again. ing American fliers. He assured the Swiss that Spaatz's irritation was more than passing. not only had strenous efforts been made to He did not like receiving such a curt order. avoid recurrence since the first SchafFhausen Nor did he wish to leave his headquarters affair but that also new arrangements were even for a few days when the next weeks being made which he would discuss in detail would tell whether or not the air war could with the Swiss generais. 32 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW Spaatz and Eisenhower knew that the ease in talking with fellow officers, and cer- Americans could not go to Bern with the tainly he was aware of rumors concerning same tired statements about weather, Kobelfs alleged pro-German leanings. He precautions, and positive identification with- impressed on Guisan and Rihner the impor- in 50 miles of Switzerland. The 50-mile limit tance of keeping the regulations in strict had not worked, nor had the notion of posi­ confidence and warned that if, because of a tive identification. On paper they seemed to leak, the Germans should take advantage of be satisfactory enough precautions, but prac- the bomb-free zone it might be necessary to tice had proved otherwise. Whether General order more attacks in that area. The confer- Spaatz formally acknowledged it or not, in ence ended in cordiality.52 poor weather his pilots often had no more Although the trip had gone well, Spaatz awareness of being within 50 miles of Swit­ detected a faint smell of reprimand in being zerland than of actually being over the bor- sent to Switzerland. After his return, he sent der. At 300 mph ground speed, the long personal letters to Generais Marshall difference was only ten minutes of flight and Arnold in defense of his air war effort. time. Although the existing navigational aids Precautions had been taken previously, and were a wondrous improvement over the “fortunately, priority targets within one- pure dead reckoning and visual sighting of hundred-fifty miles of Switzerland now num- the first months of the war, these technical ber only thirteen, I do not include tactical achievements were not always free of error targets, so that it is now possible to take re- or malfunction. strictive action which would have been unac- The news Spaatz brought was, therefore, ceptable a few months ago.” He concluded that the zone requiring positive identifica­ that “although I feel that the restrictions now tion of targets would be expanded to stretch in effect are greater than normal prudence 150 miles from the Swiss frontier; within 50 would demand, my thought is that the limita- miles of Switzerland no targets of any sort, tion they impose on operations is acceptable especially targets of opportunity, were to be at this time.”53 bombed even under perfect visibility with- Arnold knew that his able general was out Spaatz’s personal authorization. Should a seeking support. He also had to indicate his target within that area have to be attacked agreement with MarshalPs views. Arnold for military reasons, highly experienced therefore, like Marshall, sent an appropriate crews would be picked for the mission and note of thanks. But he also drew on the care- given special briefings. ful wording proposed by Major General Lau- These regulations would henceforth hold rence S. Kuter in his original draft for the for all of the Eighth Air Force’s activities and letter: “I am confident that you will maintain for most of the Fifteenth’s. The tactical air the effort necessary to prevent your aggres- forces directly under General Eisenhower’s sive but sometimes careless leaders, from command were forbidden to attack any tar­ poor target identification.”54 He went on to get within ten miles of Switzerland and re- say he “understood and appreciated’ quired to have positive identification of any Spaatz’s part in showing determined leader- target in a zone extending 10 to 50 miles ship and a keen desire to put the Air Forces from the frontier. in the forefront of the war. Spaatz withheld discussion of these new Spaatz and Eisenhower were not the only bombing restrictions until the civilian minis- generais in the European Theater of Opera­ ters had left the room following a magnifi- tions called to account by Marshall. Viola- cent luncheon. He may have felt more at tions of Switzerland had also been DIPLOMACY OF APOLOCY 33 committed by planes from the Mediter- United States did not have sufficient supplies ranean Theater. The commander there, to make the deliveries in kind, and there Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney, were other complications in any case. The was called on to report. He promptly had a chief delay, however, was caused by the special board of oflBcers investigate. Its con- necessity of determining responsibility for clusions were that adequate instructions did various violations. exist to prevent air attacks on Swiss territory For the Swiss, the matter was one of princi­ and that large formations under sênior com- pie. Eventually the U.S. decided that manders seldom had difficulty in finding the reinvestigation of unresolved cases was not correct targets. The problems arose when practicable; the damage costs were low, and small formations peeled off to attack alterna- the headquarters concerned with these inci­ tive targets in small groups or when individu­ dents had by that time been disbanded and al and less-experienced pilots, unfamiliar its records stored.58 with the terrain, shot up Swiss trains and rail- On 21 October 1949 the State Department road yards. and the Swiss government agreed on A number of important targets within 50 62,176,433.06 Swiss francs (equivalent to miles of Switzerland remained to be at- $14,392,692.82) as full and final settlement of tacked. Xevertheless, no strategic air force balance and interest due, in addition to the attacks would be made between the Swiss $4 million already paid, for damage caused to border and a line from Strasbourg through persons and property in Switzerland by all Reutlingen, Laupheim, and Innsbruck, nor United States armed forces during World within 40 miles of the Southern Swiss border War II. with the exception of Milan and Bergamo Financial reparation was not the only con- without special clearance. Visual means on cern of the Swiss, especially in the first assigned targets would be required for months of 1945. They obviously had reason bombing in the large area south of Frankfurt to demand information regarding the cause and Nürnberg to the no-bombing line. of the accidental bombings and solid proof McNarney further ordered that crews aban- that the individuais involved had been held doning aircraft over Switzerland should set responsible. The minor border incidents and them on automatic pilot toward either Ger- cases of crippled planes jettisoning defused many or the Mediterranean and that great bombs were understandable; indeed the two care should be used in jettisoning bomb Schaífhausen aflfairs had been fairly well ac- loads.55 counted for and the exposed location of that A glance at the map shows that a large part canton was further explanation. of Germany was being given some form of A case such as that of Zurich was different. protection by the new limitations, but the The city not only was located on an easily course of the war permitted this. The restric- recognizable landmark, the Lake of Zurich, tions, joined with the rapid collapse of Ger­ but it also represented the deepest penetra- many, did bring an end to the bombing tion of Switzerland by attacking United violations of Switzerland except for two mi- States bombers during the war. Swiss officials nor incidents.56 had long feared an accidental raid on the Reparation negotiations progressed only border town of Basel, yet it was at Zurich slowly. At first the delay was caused by Swiss that the greater number of personnel casual- requests for American P-51 Mustang fighter ties occurred. If the Swiss asked questions, planes and the replacement of destroyed the State Department would need to demon- leather hides as part of the payment.57 The strate that the matter had been fully investi- 34 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW gated and the individuais concerned held oning navigator of the plane that had led a responsible. makeshift squadron over Zurich were Indeed, a court martial was held on 1 June charged with violation of the 96th Article of 1945, at the headquarters of the Second Air War: they had “wrongfully and negligently Division, Eighth Air Force, Horsham St. caused bombs to be dropped in friendly ter- Faith, England. The presiding officer was ritory” and had negligently and incorrectly Colonel James M. Stewart (who despite his determined the location of the aircraft. Con- fine war record is more widely known for his siderable evidence was presented regarding acting career). The pilot and the dead-reck- equipment malfunction, poor visibility, er-

S c.Y\ hàusen. DIPLOMA CY OF APOLOGY 35 rors of judgment, and the zeal with which and criticism that has almost become stan­ attack crews were necessarily imbued. The dard since the height of the Vietnam war. fliers were acquitted of any criminal intent.59 In recent years, some spokesmen have sug- gested that events in Vietnam represented the first occasions when the United States T he st or y of the bombings of Switzerland is bombed neutral targets. This was not so. The one more reminder of the desperate nature more important issue is one of intent. The of the total struggle then occurring. The Cambodian incursion was a deliberately ramifications of that war and the tensions it planned campaign. Not so with the Swiss produced were far reaching. Conflict be­ bombings. To the extent there is demonstra- tween State Department and Pentagon, be- ble evidence, these were accidents. Acci- tween general headquarters and field dents do happen, although they do not command, between Army intelligence and necessarily occur accidentally. Many of the OSS was not unusual. The same could be said crews that committed violations displayed of tension between the desire to prosecute unusual skill, initiative, and aggressiveness. the war fully and the need to treat lightly Without these highly esteemed attributes, with neutrals harboring downed fliers and they might have aborted their missions shipping goods to the enemy, between the before entering into serious error. In acting aggressive zeal of pilots and the fine lines of beyond the call of duty, some men win a regulations easily obscured by the clouds of medal of honor; others receive a court mar- both climate and war. The peculiar relations tial. of the United States and Switzerland provide The war was made up of men. As such, a microcosm that sets these problems in es- conflicts regarding policy and procedure pecially sharp focus. were bound to arise. The intent of high com­ The question may well be asked why the mand to avoid violations of Switzerland is violations of Swiss neutrality did not receive clear. The attitude of the on-the-scene gen­ much publicity in the United States. Many of erais was less concerned. Yet where there the bombings were given extensive coverage was personal contact, there was more sympa- in the Swiss press, and certainly American thy for the Swiss position. The attitudes of reporters had access to these accounts. Prob- Spaatz and Curtis and their suspicion of the ably in the news of the day, the Swiss events German proclivities of the Swiss were al- seemed of minor significance. The official his- tered as a result of their visit with the Swiss tory, The Army Air Forces in World War II, generais. Throughout the war Legge, Harri- contains only a sparse account of the embar- son, and Currie strongly supported the Swiss rassing episode, and the individuais involved both out of diplomatic necessity and out of have for the most part been reticent about their own personal horror at the events. Mar­ discussing their experience.60 It should not shall did not have the benefit of such contact, be implied, however, that this low profile was yet he exercised the most balanced leader- the result of a cover-up. During World War ship. In the Swiss affair, as in so many events II, United States bombing practices simply of the period, his character stands forth. were not subject to the close public review Allegheny College

Notes 1 For example, investigations showcd British rcsponsibility for minor incidents at Samedan on 1 October 1943 and at Coblenz, across the Rhine attacks on Geneva, B&sel, and Zurích in 1940. There was controversy over from WaJdshut, Germany, on 16 February 1944. Because British planes 36 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW

were involved ín violations of Swiss airspace during these periods. U.S. 22. DS, Bombing, Jck. 1, 811.2354/9-1344. Hull to Stimson, 15 Sept. representatives imtiaily blamed the British. Eventually the U.S. accepted 1944. responsibiiity for the Samedan incident, but that for the Coblenz affair was 23. MMR, WDGS, OCS 091 Switzerland, Stimson to Hull. 25 Sept. 1944. still undecided several months after the European War was over; at that 24. Ibid., memorandum by Gen. Hull, 10 Oct. 1944. time the Swiss submitted a map charting the path taken over Switzerland 25. Ibid., OPD 336 Switzerland 1-A, Stimson to Hull, 12 Oct. 1944. by an American Thunderbolt which allegedly attacked Coblenz at 2:45 26. Ibid., OPD 336 Switzerland II, Strong to Chief of Staff, 4 Oct. 1944. p.m. 27. Ibid., Harrison to Hull, 12 Oct. 1944. 2. Department of State Records, National Archives (hereafter eited as 28. Ibid., Handy memorandum for Amold, 19 Oct. 1944. DS). 740.0011 European War 1939/33139, Legge and Harrison to War 29. Ibid., SHAEF 091/1 Switzerland I, Legge to Smith, 9 Nov. 1944. Dept.. 9 Feb. 1944. Modern Military Records Division, National Archives, 30. Ibid., Bradley to Smith, 10 Nov. 1944, and Amold papers, Library of Records of War Department General and Special Staffs (hereafter eited as Congress. Box 44, Donovan to Amold, 10 Nov. 1944. MMR. WDCS), OSW 360.112 Switzerland, prècis of Hull note to Stimson, 31. MMR, WDGS, SHAEF 901/1 Switzerland 1, Strong to Bradley, 18 15 March 1944. Nov. 1944. 3. Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers (Washing­ 32. Ibid., OPD 336 Switzerland II, Maddux to Commanding General, ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) (hereafter eited as FR), 1944, Army Service Forces, 14 Nov. 1944. IV. no. 2020, Harrison to Hull, 1 April 1944, p. 792. 33. FR, 1944, IV, Hull to Winant, 26 July 1944, pp. 751-52. 4. DS, 411.54 Bombing (hereafter eited as Bombing), Jck. 1. Harrison to 34. Ibid. Hull, 1 April 1944. 35. Ibid., Winant to Hull, 2 Sept. 1944, pp. 764-65. 5. Arnold papers, Library of Congress, Box 190, Spaatz to Amold, 1 April 36. MMR. WDGS. OPD Switzerland 1 I-A, summary by Gen. Hull, 21 Oct. 1944, plusattached notes by Lt. Cen. B. M. Cilesand Arnold. DS, Bombing, 1944. Jck. 1,740.0011 European War 1939/4-2244, Legge report 14 April 1944; 37. FR, 1944, IV. memorandum of Wallner conversation with Feer, 6 740.0011 European War 1939/34-24, Culbertson to Hull, 10 April 1944. Nov. 1944, pp. 781-82. 6. DS, Bombing. Jck. 1, 740.0011 European War 1939/33785, Harrison 38. On 29 October several planes attacked the railway station at Noir- to Hull, 2 April 1944. mont. The attack was attributed to a mistake in border identification. de- 7. FR. 1944, IV, no. 2086. Harrison to Hull, 4 April 1944, pp. 793-94. spite the presence of Swiss fiags painted on four of the village roofs. 8. Ibid. and DS, Bombing, Jck. 2, 740.0011 European War 1939/33794, Sometimes the violations were the result of near misses on legitimate tar- Harrison to Hull, 3 April 1944; the translatíons are Harrison's. gets. Such was the case for the raids of 9 November which embarrassed 9. FR. 1944. IV. Hull to Harrison. 5 April 1944, p. 795. Legge in his negotiations regarding Swiss observers and the Rhine control. 10. DS. Bombing, Jck. 1. 740.0011 European War 1939/33837, Harrison At Diessenhofen, U.S. units were attempting to bomb the German end of to Hull, 5 April 1944, the bridge over the Rhine. Near Eglisau the attack was on a power dam; 11. By 20 April the death toll was 39, with 33 persons still hospitalized, an error in bombing technique caused the bombs to fali wide, strildng near 12 of whom were seriously injured. There were 428 homeless persons, the Swiss bridge over the River Glatt.—DS, Bombing, Jck. 1,811.2354/12- including 102 families; 67 buildings had been damaged. Sixteen persons 1644FIS, Stettinius to Bruggman, 22 Dec. 1944. had been killed at the railway station. and one bomb at the city administra- 39. DS, Bombing, Jck. 2,811.2354/2944, Stettinius to Bruggman, 19 Feb. tive offices killed ten, including a member of the town government and a 1945. Arnold papers, Box 44, Arnold to Donovan, 12 Nov. 1944. cantonaj judge. Valuable treasures had been destroyed at the Museum of 40. MMR, WDCS, OPD 336 Switzerland III, memorandum by Col. D. Natural History and at the Allerheiligen Museum, where nine works of Divine II, 26Jan. 1945. Tobias Stimmer and the collection of Swiss painters of the seventeenth and 41. DS. Bombing, Jck. 1. Maddux memorandum to Dept. of State, 10 eighteenth centuries were bumed.—DS, Bombing, Jck. 2. 740.0011 Euro­ Sept. 1944. MMR, WDGS. OPD 336 Switzerland II, Maddux to Culbertson, pean War/4-2044, Harrison to Hull. 20 April 1944. 29 Nov. 1944. 12. Ibid. 42. DS, 740.00112 European War 1939/2-845CS EG. Huddle to Grew, 13. Washington National Records Center at Suitland, Maryland. Record 8 Feb. 1945. Group 18; report of operations 1 April 1944 to Amold from Hq Eighth Air 43. FR, 1945, V, Grew to Crowley, 15 Jan. 1945, pp. 770-71. Force (24 June 1944) including: lead bombardier’s narrative, 44th Bom- 44. DS. 740.0011 European War 1939/2-2345, Harrison to Grew en- bardment Group, mission of I April 1944 (2 April 1944); A-3 narrative of closes Currie note, 23 Feb. 1945. Other towns hit on 22 Feb. were Neider- operations, 44 th Bombardment Group, mission of 1 April 1944 (2 April dorf, Lohn. Beringen, Neuhausen, Hundwil, Otelfingen, Igis, and Zizers, as 1944 ); command pi!ot's narrative, and lead navigator's report, 392d Bom­ well as a train running between Neunkirch and Schaffhausen.—MMR, bardment Croup, Mission of 1 April 1944 (3 April 1944). See also MMR, WDGS, Eighth Air Force Target Summary, 17 August 1942-8 May 1945. WDGS, OPD 336 Switzerland I. Spaatz to Arnold, 2 April 1944. 45. MMR. WDGS. OPD 353.4TS I. Gen. Hull (for Marshall) to SHAEF, 14. FR . 1944, IV, Hull to Charles Bruggman (Swiss minister in Washing­ 25 Feb. 1945. ton), 25 April 1944. 46. Ibid.. SHAEF 373.5 Switzerland I, Eisenhower to Marshall, 28 Feb. 15. On 24 April, 100 bombers had flown over the Schaffhausen area; 12 1945. damaged bombers had landed in the country, another crashed at Balten- 47. MMR. WDGS. Eighth Air Force Target Summary. 17 August 1942-8 swil. and still another was shot down by the Swiss over Greifensee. Two May 1945. In Basel, bombs landed in the main freight station, causing much planes were forced down at Dübendorf. and two more made emergency damage: seven persons were injured. At Zurich. 23 bombs exploded in an landings.—MR, WDCS. OPD 336 Switzerland I-A, copy of Dept. of State open field. Two houses were directly hit, while others were severelv dam­ memorandum of conversation among Bruggman. Culbertson, and MacAr- aged; about 22 persons were rendered homeless. Five people were killed thur. and 12 more required hospitalization.—DS, 411.54 Bombing, Jck. 2, 16. DS, 740.0011 European War 1939/34724C, Hull to Harrison, 30 Mav 740.0011 European War 1939/3-745, Lehrs to Grew, 7 March 1945. 1944. 48. MMR, WDGS, SHAEF 373.5 Switzerland I, Marshall to Eisenhower. 17. DS, Bombing, Jck. 1, 740.0011 European War 1939/735, Hull to 5 March 1944. Bruggman, 1 June 1944; ibid., 740.0011 European War 1939/7-844, G. H. 49. DS, 470.00112 European War 1939/3-545. Harrison to Marshall en- Shaw to H. D. Smith, 8 July 1944. closing Currie message for Marshall, 5 March 1945. Curries reaction, as 18. MMR, WDCS, OPD 336 Switzerland I-A, Bonbright to Maddux, 26 well as those of others, indicates the inaccuracy of persistent rumors in July 1944. Switzerland that the American bombings were not accidental but rather 19. Author's interview with Gen. Edward P. Curtis, 19 Feb. 1972. heavy-handed efforts by the U.S. to force Swiss compliance in the Cume 20. MMR, WDGS, OPD 336 Switzerland I-A, memorandum for record negotiations. of Maddux telephone conversation with Culbertson, 13 June 1944. 50. Interview with Gen. Curtis, 19 Feb. 1972. 21. Ibid., memorandum for record, 18June 1944. InSeptember the Swiss 51. DS, Bombing, Jck. 2, 740.0011 European War 1939/3-945. Woods to charged that on the fifth American pursuit planes attacked two Swiss planes Grew. 9 March 1945. Interview with Cen. Curtis, 19 Feb. 1972. escorting U.S. bombers to fields near Dübendorf, resulting in the death of 52. MMR, WDCS, OPD 353.4TS I. Spaatz to Marshall, 10 March 1945. one Swiss pilot and the wounding of another. On 8 September the railway Interview with Gen. Curtis, 19 Feb. 1972. stations of Delémont and Moutier were attacked and trains strafed; moving 53. MMR, WDGS, OPD 336TS I, Spaatz to Marshall. 13 March 1945. trains were strafed on 9 September near Rafz and Weiach / Kaiserstuhl. 54. Amold papers, Box 49. Arnold to Spaatz, 26 March 1945, and at- September 10 saw steady violations and the attack by a Mustang on two tached memoranda. Swiss pursuit planes. The Zurich-Basel express was reportedly strafed on 55. MMR, WDGS, OPD 353.4TS 1, McNarney to Marshall. 13 March 11 September.—MMR. Air Force Central File, Attacks and Raids 384.5B, 1945. Hodges to Amold, 12 Sept. 1944. 56. On 8 April six bombs were dropped on Münster, shattering stoined DIPLOMA CY OF APOLOGY 37

Windows is the church and dotster: Brús» » jí also bombee oc 26 59 Washington National Recorda Center. Suitiand. Marvland. Record of Apd- tria! of Lt Wiiliain R. Sineock by general court martial. Horaham St Falth. 5” Arncid papers. Bca 130. SAS 152.1 Saitzeriand. Sjsue to Arnold. 11 Fngtanri. 1-2 June 1945 Mtrcfe 1945, to âpaatz. 23 March 1945: Eaker to Legge, 10 Sept 60. Weslev F. Craven and James L Cate. editors. The Asm? Air Forces 1945 DS, Boccbmg. jck. 2. 740.00112 \a'icero 7-1345, Gre» to Sfaroson. a World War II. 7 volumes (Chicago: Vmversitv of Chicago Press. 1948- 17 JuK 1945 VÍMK. WDG& OCS 0S1 44-15 . Semson to Gre». 3 Aug. 561. 111. 307. 735-36. 1945 ' 58. The C-S. deeied cennecòon »ith modents ti Brusio oc 30 Jasuary u c 2 3 Feóruary 1945 but aémittec possibie guiit fcran artack an 26 \pni Author s Acknowledgment The W*r Depurtmenr »cuíd aot pay for oamage to the Thur Ri%er bndge ber»ees Feiben u é Pfvn u é rejecteé responsibikry for certun attacks ar Much of the arade is derived from intervie» s and correspondence with o-.,y ué C M r-rrr There »as much debate over inodents at sanous persons. I especially » ish to express apprecxation for the <.,.cae.--. Scsauna u é Poete.—DS. Bomhmg Jek. 2. 740.0011 Europeu assistance aí General Edward P Curtis and of the late Dr William R War 1953 3-2145 Rejd to Culbenson. 21 Sept 1945 WMR. WDCS, OPD Sincodt. »ho uutialiy urged roe to explore thia topic Gr atitude is also 42-45 336 S»«2eriei2Ú III. Chrtsteooerr> to Adjutant General. 25 Oct extended to ABegheny College and the Ford Foundation for grants 1945 facilitaOng thia research.

We (that's my ship and I took off rather suddenly. We had a report somewhere around 4 oclock in the afternoon before that the weather wouid be fane, so we thought we would trv it.

I saw a fleet of fishing boats ! flew dou n almost touching the craft and yelled at them, asking if 1 w as on the right road to Ireland. They just staxed Maybe they didnt hear me Maybe I didn't hear them Or may be they thought I was just a crazy fool An hour later I vaw land landber#h s Own Story Iof hn non-stop tíijiht, Long Island to Paris], m the New York Times May 23, 1927 JSTPS The Link between Strategy and Execution

Majok Genekai. J ekome F. O M aeeey The very existence of an integrated nuclear team has lent enormous weight and credibility to our deterrent to aggression . . . virtually with the stroke of a pen, the nations nuclear striking power has been strengthened immeasurably. General Thomas S. Power Commander in Chief, SAC and Director of Strategic Target Planning, 1964

HE “integrated nuclear team” referred relative simplicity of this strategy. With only to by General Power is the Joint Strate- a few hundred delivery vehicles and a small Tgic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS) con- arsenal of nuclear weapons, the plan consist- ceived in the late 1950s, brought into being ed of a small number of options employing in 1960, and which from that day to this, has our total nuclear force, designed to be exer- been the nuclear general war planner for all cised at the general war levei. Because a sin­ United States forces. Comprised of 340 high- gle unit within the Air Force, the Strategic ly talented men and women from all Ser­ Air Command (SAC), maintained and oper- vices, this unique organization converts ated all U.S. strategic delivery vehicles, nu­ broad national strategy into the detailed plan clear war planning was almost entirely a SAC that forms the framework of our deterrent. task. This plan—the Single Integrated Operation- al Plan (SIOP)—integrates and coordinates the forces committed by the nuclear Com- Initial Nuclear Planning manders in Chief (CINC). Because this plan Planning for the few nuclear-equipped is based on the actual capabilities of forces in theater forces was the responsibility of the being, it measurably increases the credibility appropriate theater commander, and all of the U.S. deterrent as perceived by our ad- such plans were coordinated yearly at a plan­ versaries as well as our allies. ning conference. Changes to the plans dur­ The SIOP, as with any plan, reflects the ing these years were evolutionary. The thrust and flavor of the strategy on which it growth in the U.S. capability was arithmetic, is based. The national strategy in the years and planning was a comparatively simple following World War II was based on the les- process carried out primarily by a small num­ sons leamed during that war. Conditioned ber of personnel at SAC Headquarters, OflFutt by several years of world war and possession AFB, Omaha, Nebraska. of a nuclear monopoly, the U.S. strategy was to threaten massive retaliation as the ulti- mate deterrent against any nuclear aggres- early planning problems sor. That strategy served the U.S. interest The process, however, had several potential well; it acted as an effective deterrent to limitations that would be amplified by events large-scale nuclear or conventional attacks underway in the late 1950s, as it became in- on the U.S. and its allies. creasingly apparent that the Soviet Union Our nuclear plan at that time mirrored the was developing a meaningful nuclear deliv- 39 40 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ery capability. In the face of this growing ranged from a revision of the “ . . . existing threat, it became evident that the process of coordination procedures to establishment of nuclear war planning would have to undergo a ‘United States Strategic Command fundamental changes. which would “ .. . incorporate all forces pos- The size and the power of our nuclear arse­ sessing a nuclear strategic capability . . . nal were also increasing. The global capabili­ and provide plans for the employment of ty of the air-refueled B-52 and the those forces. The decision was made by then introduction of the intercontinental ballistic Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates. Calling missile (ICBM) and submarine-launched bal­ it “ . . . the most important decision I have listic missile (SLBM) added significant new participated in since I have been in the Pen- capabilities to our strategic inventory, and tagon,”2 he established the Joint Strategic new air and ground nuclear delivery poten- Target Planning Staff, a single multiservice tial made for increased breadth and planning nuclear war planning agency. complexities. Plans capitalizing on the differ- Under this concept, each nuclear CINC ent qualities of these new weapon systems “commits” forces to the JSTPS which, in ac- could not be handled by a simple expansion cordance with guidance from the Joint of existing practices. The complexities of ap- Chiefs of Staff (JCS), develops detailed plans plying the major force of three separate to employ these nuclear forces in a much Triad elements—tactical aircraft and tactical more efficient manner than was previously atomic missiles and artillery—in an optimal possible. manner required new skills and an increas­ Our NATO allies are represented in the ing reliance on automation. JSTPS, where the NATO nuclear war plan is Another element emerged about the same coordinated with the SIOP. Inputs to the time; the NATO alliance, formed earlier, was JSTPS—JCS guidance, CINC committed nu­ seeking a greater voice in the determination clear forces, and detailed intelligence data— of the defense of Europe. Some, however, are melded into a plan that applies available feared that nuclear proliferation might waste forces against the most criticai strategic tar­ valuable economic resources of our allies and gets for varying leveis of readiness and cir- “uncork the nuclear genie.” cumstances of hostility. In concept, this Differentiating between theater and seems a straightforward and relatively sim­ strategic targets also created problems that ple task. Yet, it is an amazingly intricate pro­ were difficult to work out at “after-the-fact” cess, providing for the application of planning conferences. These factors were all thousands of weapons to widely dispersed working to strain the capabilities of the plan­ targets, timing of the arrival of each of these ning mechanism of that time. It became ob- weapons with a tolerance measured in sec- vious that the planning would have to onds, and a capacity for the plan to be exe- increase in sophistication and complexity to cuted under any condition of warning or at- cope with these rapidly unfolding develop- tack. ments. Guidance. The first ingredient necessary to the SIOP construction process, the JCS guidance, is necessarily broad in nature. This the nuclear team characteristic allows a wide latitude to JSTPS According to General Power, SAC Com- planners during the initial planning phases. mander in Chief at the time, several ap- To ensure that, as the planning becomes proaches were suggested to cope with this more detailed, it remains in consonance with increasing complexity. These proposals this guidance, the SIOP is briefed at specified JSTPS 41 intervals to the JCS. A constant, present in ater responsibilities. Each CINC, at the time U.S. nuclear strategy since World War II, has he commits these forces, provides a quantita- been the primary goal of deterring a nuclear tive estimate of their capabilities. attack. Yet it was evident even at the begin- Intelligence data. The third ingredient for ning of the atomic age that there was no ade- planning, after JCS guidance and the nuclear quate direct defense against a well-armed forces commitment, is intelligence data. and determined enemy. Even a defense that Highly classified intelligence from all sources is 99 percent effective—an unattainable feat is made available to the JSTPS. It is evalu- —would still allovv some enemy delivery ated, and potential targets are sorted accord- vehicles to penetrate borders, each possess- ing to their suitability and priority in fulfilling ing a capability for great destruction. national objectives. These three inputs—na­ The goal of deterrence, given those cir- tional guidance, nuclear forces, intelligence cumstances, is one of making attack unat- —are then melded, and from them flows a tractive to a prospective aggressor. The most single output, the SIOP, the single integrated effective method of attaining that goal is to plan for strategic employment of U.S. forces ensure a capability for counterattack of suffi- in nuclear conflict. cient size and force to negate any possible advantage an enemy perceives in his attack. The capability of a sufficient portion of our organization strategic forces to ride out a surprise attack The organization of the JSTPS is arranged and still inflict unacceptable damage on an along functional lines. (See Figure 1.) At the aggressor has been the foundation of our de- top of the structure is the Director of Strate­ terrent throughout the nuclear age. Secre- gic Target Planning. The present Director, tary of Defense Robert S. McNamara stated General Russell E. Dougherty, was appoint- the goal of this assured destruction, as being ed to the position on his assumption of the able "... to ensure the destruction, singly or command of SAC, as have all CINCSACs in combination, of the Soviet Union, Com- since 1960. The Deputy Director has, by tra- munist China, and the Communist Satellites dition, been a Navy Vice Admirai. Support- as national societies.”3 ing the Director and Deputy, the Joint Forces. Fundamental to an understanding Secretariai performs an executive function of the work of the JSTPS is the recognition and presides over the myriad administrative that its product is a true, actual operational details attendant in a large-scale planning plan . .. based on extant, operational weap- operation. on systems in the hands of in-being opera­ Sênior officers from the Supreme Allied tional forces. The SIOP’s work is with actual Commands and the Unified and Specified forces, actual targets, actual planning tools; it Commands are assigned to the JSTPS to pro­ is not futuristic, not theoretical, not of a “re- vide an interface between the planning quirements” nature. This point must be agency and the executing commands. Within borne in mind. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), The forces committed by each nuclear Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SAC- CINC provide the second ingredient that EUR) is designated as the NATO nuclear helps form the SIOP. Because SAC is a global targeting coordinating authority; thus, these command, its allocation of available nuclear representatives ensure a high levei of coordi- forces is almost total. Commitment from the nation between the NATO nuclear forces as­ other CINCs is based on characteristics and signed to the international commanders: availability of their possessed forces and the- Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SA- 42 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW CLant), SACEUR, and the U.S. nuclear- evaluating intelligence equipped forces of Commander in Chief, At­ When all intelligence data are located, iden- lantic (CINCLant), Commander in Chief, Pa­ tified and evaluated, an accurate picture of cific (CINCPAC), U.S. Commander in Chief, the total target structure is compiled by Europe (CINCEUR), and CINCSAC. The NSTL analysts. The listing and description of U.S. Army, Navy, Marine, and Air Force per- each target comprises the National Target sonnel assigned to the JSTPS work in two Base (NTB). It is from this list that suitable divisions, the National Strategic Target List targets are selected for weapons application, (NSTL) Division, and the SIOP Division. The at a later point in the SlOP-building process. NSTL Division translates the national guid- ance into specific targeting guidelines used by the SIOP Division to assign individual selecting the aim points weapons to designated targets. The emphasis at this step is to select each aim point in a manner that will satisfy the target­ ing objectives with an optimum economy of Building the SIOP effort. Factors peculiar to an installation con- The first step in any military planning exer- sidered include location, altitude, type of cise is an analysis of intelligence data. In construction, distance from other installa- building the SIOP, this step is distinguished tions, and terrain. These characteristics pro- by the depth of the analysis and the vide a starting point in selecting a weapon thoroughness in the examination of each po- (for example, if the installation is hardened to tential target. Information from all civil and resist blast effects, a weapon with larger yield military intelligence sources flows into the or better accuracy must be selected). JSTPS and is evaluated in order to identify The proper height of burst (HOB) for the those targets that best satisfy national target­ weapon must be planned so that the combi- ing guidance. nation of accuracy, aim point, yield, and

Figure 1. Organization of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Supreme Unified and _ Director _. Allied Command' Specified Command Deputy Director Representatives Representatives

Joint Secretariat

National Single Integrated Strategic Target Operational Plan List Division Division 9 JSTPS 43 HOB can produce the required levei of dam- a guideline during force application by the age to the target vvithout producing unwant- SIOP Division. ed collateral effects on other nearby installations. Computers are used to model the effects of a weapon at various aim points. applying the force The damage that could be inflicted on the Where the NSTL Division analyzes overall target installation is calculated for each aim weapons against overall targets in the alloca­ point, and the optimum aim point is selected. tion process, the SIOP Division is concerned The aim point is referred to as a Desired with each delivery vehicle during force ap­ Ground Zero (DGZ). If, for any reason, the plication. SIOP Division missile and aircraft factors which affected the construction of a application teams actually plan a delivery DGZ are changed, such as weapon yield or vehicle/weapon combination for each DGZ. HOB, the entire process of reoptimizing For this task, the teams use the forces com- weapon effects on the DGZ may have to be mitted to the SIOP by the Unified and Spe- repeated. Thus, the iterative process of cified Commanders and the JCS-approved matching installations and weapons begins to planning factors, such as weapon system reli- shape the SIOP. Each successive step in de- ability or prelaunch survivability. veloping the SIOP is a refinement of the Using intelligence data and maps, the ap­ previous work. For example, the selection of plication teams study possible attack routes individual deÜvery vehicles and the actual for each DGZ. The aircraft team selects tank- numbers of each weapon available are ig- ers for each bomber in order to provide nec- nored in early DGZ construction efforts. If essary bomber range. Computer programs conflicts in actual weapons application devel- are used to simulate the route of each bomb­ op later, adjustments in earlier work may be er and model the defenses along the route. required. This use of an iterative methodolo- Routes are adjusted and re-evaluated until an gy ensures integration of each element of the acceptable probability of arrival is achieved. task in a systematic, properly sequential Using ballistic missile trajectory models, manner. the missile team applies ICBMs and SLBMs to ensure that target assignment is compati- ble with missile range and footprint* determining damage capabilities. The missile team also selects expectancy goals specific ICBMs for appropriate DGZs and de­ When Desired Ground Zeros have been con- termines if penetration aides (such as chaff or structed for the appropriate installations in decoys) will be required. the National Target Base, the DGZs are en- After each sortie has been planned for ev- tered in the National DGZ List. An initial ery option, the entire force must be timed. allocation of available weapons is made Force timing meshes the entire effort, to pre- against the DGZs to maximize target value clude intersortie conflicts and to phase the destroyed. The allocation is analyzed to see attack, particularly in dense target areas. If how well the Damage Expectancy (DE) re- conflicts between different delivery vehicles quirements in the employment guidance cannot be resolved, the weapon assignments have been met. If the requirements are not or attack routes must be reaccomplished. met, the allocation is revised. When the DE When all timing conflicts have been re- and target coverage requirements in all • Footprint: that area to which a multi-warhead missile can deli ver war- areas are met, the weapons allocation is heads. Footprint is normally described as an elliptical figure with cross documented as the DE goals. They serve as range and down range dimensions in nautical miles. 44 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW solved, a painstaking re-evaluation is made of cent phenomenon. Four presidents have all sortie assignments and timing plans. Only publicly stated a desire to have additional after all the data are verified are the plans nuclear force options covering the gap be- ready to be reproduced and distributed to tween nuclear “nothing” and “all.” The Sen- the individual aircraft, ICBM, and submarine ate Armed Services Subcommittee on crew. Preparedness in 1968 worded the require- ment as having the ” ... capability and flexi­ bility to respond so that no matter how the coordination war is initiated, we will be in a position to The ultimate product of this efiFort is the Sin­ assure the termination of hostilities under gle Integrated Operational Plan—a plan that conditions which are relatively favorable to assigns forces, targets, and times and coordi- us. >»c5 nates the entire U.S. strategic arsenal. It was not, however, until the 1970s that The capability of each CINC to fulfill his the generally worded call for flexibility in the portion of the plan is assured through in- planning and the plans for employing our teraction at regular intervals throughout the nuclear strategic forces began to assume spe- planning process. The NATO nuclear plans cific meaning. Secretary of Defense Schles- are also coordinated with the SIOP. Routine inger spelled out the need for preplanning planning problems are resolved within the for the possible use of a “ . . . series of mea- JSTPS—by the Director if necessary—and sured responses which bear some relation to each is briefed at the next update to the JCS the provocation; have prospects of terminat- and the CINCs. ing hostilities before general nuclear war breaks out and leave some possibility for re- The Call storing deterrence.”6 for Flexibility A common perception throughout the implementing 1960s was that most U.S. strategic weapons the new guidance were targeted indiscriminately and mainly The new nuclear policy emphasis taking against urban population in cities and indus­ shape during this period retained the basic trial areas. In fact, during this period large features of the planning policy in being— numbers of available weapons were assigned while adding some new ones and altering to targets of a direct military nature, giving others. There is no plan for a disarming first these weapons a prime countermilitary role. strike; there is no national policy require- Thus when it became known that increased ment, nor do we field the capability for such flexibility would be attained by emphasis on a strike. The reasons underlying this absence improved targeting of an enemy’s military of a first-strike plan reflect both military ca­ forces, many mistakenly perceived this em­ pability and national policy-making. In his phasis a “switch” or “shift” in targeting FY 1977 Annual Defense Department Re- philosophy.4 port, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rums- In actuality, it was the call for exploiting feld expressed the policy in these words: the flexibility of our weapon systems and for This degree of flexibility . . . necessarily in- cludes the option and the capability to strike a larger number of available options in the accurately at military targets, including some use of our strategic forces that provided the hardened sites. But it does not permit, and our basis for the new flexibility. This desire for a programs do not aim to acquire, a disarming wider array of available choices is not a re- first strike capability against the USSR. Such an JSTPS 45 objective is not even attainable at present be- previously been conducted independently cause the Soviets themselves maintain a by the CINCs. The planning gap between TRIAD of offensive forces—along with inassive the various foreseeable conflict leveis of tacti- active strategic defense—that preclude a suc- cal warfare and those that called for the use cessful simultaneous attack on all three forces.7 of strategic nuclear forces had been bridged Retained in the new strategy was the fun­ —in fact as well as in theory. damental reliance on achieving a high de- gree of assured destruction on primary targets as the ultimate deterrent to full-scale interservice cooperation attack and as a deterrent necessity to limit This change in strategy held a special mean- escalation. Recognizing that neither the U.S. ing within the JSTPS. Although changes nor the U.S.S.R. has sufficient weapons for a were primarily additive ones of emphasis disarming first strike, our planners concen- and options, the fundamental policy for plan­ trate targeting emphasis on those installa- ning the use of nuclear forces remained. Ob- tions and facüities that are key to the viability viously, the complexity of building the SIOP of a nation to support conflict or recover ag- with additional preplanned options involv- gressive capabilities as well as those forces ing strategic forces has increased substantial- and capabilities that can damage our nation ly. Assigning weapons in a manner that takes and our allies. The intent is to ensure that the best advantage of the qualities each brings to U.S. and its allies are not left in an inferior the SIOP is extremely complex and painstak- position following any nuclear strike, no mat- ing. It has been especially challenging to plan ter how aggressive or devastating an attack the various attack options and weapon use or we may have experienced. nonuse against the range of target categories New options were added that furnished while maintaining weapons carrier “purity” more finely graduated, preplanned nuclear —each individual aircraft/missile load of responses against a variety of meaningful tar­ weapons on only one type of target so the gets at intermediate leveis of conflict. While options are indeed discreet. The entire task the SIOP retained the ultimate large-scale represents interservice cooperation at its nuclear options, it now includes an increased best, and the finished products provide the number of lesser options that were integrat- framework for the most flexible deterrent ed into our overall planning for the use of use of strategic forces possible under current U.S. nuclear forces. SACEUR and SACLant capabilities—all within present circum- also have comparable, coordinated plans for stances of threat and equipment. forces under their command—in accordance with NATO nuclear planning precepts. The alternative of committing or with- The siop.then,is the embodiment of our ac- holding certain categories of weapons and tual (vs. theoretical) nuclear strategy. It has targets was designed into each of these lesser translated concepts and guidance into a com­ options for the intended purpose of control- plex of detailed plans that are both operable ling lesser hostilities within well-defined and credible—a specified necessary part of limits. which is available in the individual ICBM This new planning exploited the flexibility launch control center, nuclear missile sub- of our systems without compromising the ul­ marine, SAC bomber, and theater aircraft. timate leveis of preplanned attacks and The existence of these plans and the optional thereby provided a credible response— use of capabilities they represent must give where specifically formulated planning had pause to any potential adversary. 46 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW In this context, the Joint Strategic Target increases in complexity in the planning revi- Planning Staff serves as a vital link between sions, the JSTPS has again proved its value: its strategy and execution. By translating strate- ability to meet dynamic and changing plan­ gy into operational planning that allows vari- ning requirements in a fluid nuclear threat ous nuclear responses to be considered in environment and the abilities of its com- greater variations of provocation, we have bined membership to perform complex, increased our ability to deter at all leveis— multiservice planning smoothly and effi- and do it without sacrificing any major capa- ciently. bility that we have had in the past. By suc- Offutt AFB, Nebraska cessfully accommodating the significant

Notes 1. General Thomas S. Power, "The U.S. Nuclear Team," a speech deliv- 11, 1974, p. 6; and U.S. News and World Report. January 28, 1974, p. 22. ered at the Armed Forces Day Luncheon, Detroit, Michigan, May 14, 5. U.S. Congress, Status of U.S. Strategic Power. Report of the Prepared- 1964. ness Investigating Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee 2. Ibid. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1968). 3. U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropria- 6. James R. Schlesinger, AnnuaJ Defense Department Report—FY 1975 tions for 1965, Hearings of the 88th Congress, lst Session, Part 4 (Washing­ (Washington, D.C.: 1974), p. 38. ton. D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 25-28. 7. Donald H. Rumsfeld. AnnuaJ Defense Department Report—FY 1977 4 See Washington Post. January 11,1974, p. 1; New York Times. January (Washington, D.C.: 1976), p. 18.

In his later years, Lindbergh took up the cause of conservation— the urgent need to balance technology and nature. He was in- spired by a trip to África. As he once said: “Lying under an acacia tree with the sounds of the dawn around me, I realized more dearly the facts that man should never overlook: that the con- struction of an airplane, for instance, is simple when compared , to the evolutionary achievement of a bird; that airplanes depend on an advanced civilization, and that where civilization is most advanced few birds exist. I realized that if I had to choose, I would rather have birds than airplanes.” Journal of Aerospace Education April 1977 THE INTEGR1TY OF THE WARSAW PACT

part II

W lNC COMMANDER PETER M. P a PWORTH, RAF

HE first part of this report, published in the March-April edition of Air University Review, provided an overall assessment of the reliability of Tthe East European members of the Warsaw Pact. The political, military, economic, and social unifying and divisive factors were considered with the conclusion that, on balance, the unifying factors were the more decisive. The examination of the Pact as an entity was made on the basis of a scenario that assumed a rough balance in conventional forces in Europe between NATO and the U.S.S.R. In such a scenario it appears that collectively the East European States would support their Soviet ally. However, the countries in question vary considerably geographically, historically, and in many other ways. Therefore, before any conclusions can be drawn, these differences must be examined in detail. 47 48 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW NSWP National Assessments ern and western borders unless the GDR act- Historically, the area occupied by the Non- ed in concert with her. The likelihood of this Soviet VVarsaw Pact (NSWP) States has been will be discussed later, but certainly in either an area of conflict, a region in which the Rus- case a change in the GDR—Polish border sians, and now the Soviets, have traditionally would be a risk. If the GDR acted against the clashed with the nations of Western Europe. Soviets, the possible reunification of the two The whole of this area has now been domi- Germanys would have to be considered, and nated by the Soviets and Soviet-style Com- this might provide an even greater threat to munist governments for more than 27 years. Polish territorial integrity from the West, Few of the States concerned have ex- notwithstanding the Polish—Federal Repub­ perienced true Western style democracy lic of Germany treaty in 1969 that recog- and, therefore, have no basis for comparison. nised the Polish Oder-Neisse border.1 How many of the national Communist par- Although a Communist government was ties are prepared to declare their indepen- imposed upon Poland following World War dence of the U.S.S.R. in exchange for the II, the Polish people periodically have been risks of free contact with, and possibly a de- able, to some extent, to influence the actions gree of domination by, a Western capitalist of their government. In 1956, the workers at country? Which of the NSWP countries has a Poznan revolted and, with the support of population sufficiently dissatisfied with its other groupings, were instrumental in caus- government and sufficiently well organised ing a change in the leadership that brought to overthrow its Communist leadership? Wladyslaw Gomulka, an indigenous Commu­ With these types of questions in mind, a nist, into power. This was achieved, and study of each member of the NSWP in turn political and social stability was re-estab- might indicate whether, it would remain loy- lished without the use of Soviet forces—un- al to the Soviets and the Warsaw Pact or elect like Hungary the same year. In 1970 the for neutrality or an alliance with the West or workers at Gdansk and Lodz revolted, and, seek some other Communist Champion. although some 600 people died,2 a change in leadership was achieved again without the use of Soviet troops. Both revolts were prompted Poland by poor wages and standards of living, and Geographically, Poland is bordered to the both brought a degree of liberalisation. In east and west by two nations that have tradi­ the 1956 case this liberalisation was short- tionally been her enemies; paradoxically, lived, but, since Edward Gierek replaced Go­ both the U.S.S.R. and the German Democrat- mulka in 1971, a measure of general econom- ic Republic (GDR) are now her allies. At the ic improvement has been enjoyed; when end of World War II the Soviets compensat- dissatisfaction is felt, a degree of freedom to ed the Poles for the east Polish territories express it is permitted. Even as recently as 10 that she annexed by establishing the Polish November 1975, according to an Agence western borders on the Oder-Neisse Line, France Presse report,3 a debate between dis­ thereby giving Poland territory that was satisfied housewives and the Polish party German prior to World War II. In discussing leaders was televised. Thus, since 1970 the Polish loyalty or adherence to her obligation liberalisation trends have continued, and to the Warsaw Pact, we must keep her geo- some intellectual freedom and social con- graphical position in mind. Should Poland tacts with the West have been allow’ed take independent action, she would certainly through travei, films, and books.4 Further- be confronted by enemies on both her east- more, if progress in meeting consumer de- WAfíSAW PACT 49 mands and the standard of living can be ised control was probably further strength- improved steadily, many of the causes of dis- ened by the elimination of 314 district, satisfaction with the government will have middle levei administrations in May 1975.7 been removed. The leadership has indicated the extent of Caution must be exercised in putting too the actions it is prepared to take to retain much faith in Communist economic plan- control by the events of 1970 with the killing ning, but if the results of the first three-quar- of Polish people by the Polish army. The ters of 1974 can be used as a guide, then armed forces also demonstrated their loyalty Poland’s economic growth shows promise. to the government at the same time. The Although trade with the West increased rap- liberalisation and, at least, limited satisfac- idly in 1974, despite some political problems, tion of consumer demands under Gierek can economic plans also involve greater trade only increase the people’s willingness to ac- with other Council for Mutual Economic .\id cept their present form of government, par- (COMECON) partners and further measures ticularly if continued progress is made in for coordination of Pohsh and Soviet industry these respects. Although trade with the West in order to increase the rate of modernisa- is increasing more rapidly than that with its tion.5 COMECON partners, it is still much lower in Socially and culturally the Poles have absolute terms. Economically, Poland has become relatively independent of the Sovi- displayed no disloyalty to COMECON in its ets, and, as has already been said, contact general trading policy. with the West is not that restricted in spite of Politically and economically Poland ap- official censorship. The resurgence of Polish pears firmly lodged in the Soviet Communist nationalism is being satisfied, as perhaps in- bloc. The Communist leadership appears dicated by the official restoration of the his­ likely to be able to retain control of the coun­ torie White Eagle of Poland. The White try and is progressively removing the causes Eagle represents the visible Symbol of Polish of popular dissatisfaction. In any conflict be- patriotism. The banners under which the tween the Soviets and NATO, therefore, the Poles defended their country in 1939 bore Poles would have to balance the present the same Symbol. During the Gomulka situation against the risk of yet another revi- regime there was considerable conflict be- sion of their Western border and the total tween the State and the Roman Catholic collapse of her political and economic Sys­ church, but these conflicts have largely been tem. In such circumstances it seems likely resolved under Gierek. The youth in Poland that Poland would actively support the Sovi­ tend to react against the authority of the ets through the Warsaw Pact and, perhaps, Communist party at times, as they do against seek a further degree of independence as the authority in the West. How'ever, party influ- price for doing so. ence is being extended deeper into the youth organisations. Whether the party will be suc- cessful in obtaining the loyalty of the national German Democratic Bepublic youth is uncertain, but there are indications The GDR differs from its Warsaw Pact part­ that, while not fully understanding all the ners in that it was created as a separate State ramifications of the Communist ideology, the only by the post-World War II confrontation youth no longer reject the present social or­ in Europe between the Soviet bloc and the der.6 capitalist West. Thus, while trying to assess The present Communist leadership is the loyalty of the GDR towards the Warsaw firmly in control in Poland, and this central- Pact, one must continually júdge by how 50 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW much the artificiality has become reality. system has provided the SED leadership How much do separate values and attitudes with many problems, the most significant of differ between the GDR and Federal Repub- which was, and probably still is, the underly- lic of Germany (FRG)? ing anti-Soviet feeling in the GDR. This anti- Since the end of World War II, the GDR Soviet feeling, engendered by their occupa- has been modelled on the U.S.S.R. and has tion of the GDR after World War II, was fur- had Soviet troops based on its soil continu- ther reinforced when Soviet troops were ously. The Socialist Unity Party (SED) was used to put down the workers’ revolts in imposed on the GDR people by the Soviets 1953. There was another revolt by both party and has had the task of building its own eco- and nonparty intellectuals in 1956, but this nomic structure—a difficult one since its in- was anti-Stalinism/anti-Ulbricht rather than dustry was either destroyed during the war anti-Communist. These revolts, and the reac- or was sent to the U.S.S.R. in the form of tion to them, accelerated defections to the postwar reparations—and creating a national West. Officially, 2,759,922 East Germans fled identity. to the FRG between 1949 and 1962.10 In the Economically, the GDR has made good long term this may have been to the advan­ progress by East European standards and has tage of the GDR leaders, in that many of probably the highest standard of living of all those likely to have provided an active oppo- the Warsaw Pact members. The GDR econo- sition to the government left the country. my has been structured to meet Soviet and However, economically the GDR could not COMECON demands which, under Walter afford to allow further depletion of its labour Ulbricht, who was in his latter years ex- force. The Berlin Wall in 1961 and a fortified tremely nationalistic, would seem to have border prevented more mass defections. worked to the GDR’s advantage, at least Both the wall and the border fortifications compared with other COMECON members. remain, and one cannot help assuming that In 1970, 43 percent of all imports and 40 the SED leadership believes them still to be percent of all exports were to and from the necessary. This view is supported by a poli U.S.S.R., which is indicative of GDR depend- taken of juveniles in January 1975 that ence on the Soviets and the degree of their showed an “overwhelming number” who economic integration.8 The GDR, while would defect to the West, given the opportu- seeking advantageous trading arrangements nity.11 This may be another case of youth with the West for herself, gives the impres- reacting against authority since it tends to sion of trying to deter other COMECON conflict with other reports: between 1962 members from doing the same; this is under- and 1966 there was a steady increase in standable since her steady economic devel- popular support for the SED leadership.12 opment and relative success is based on the Although Erich Honecker, to whom power availability of the COMECON market for was transferred in 1971, is less nationalistic in her more advanced industrial goods. The Outlook than Ulbricht, he has led the GDR GDR is also in a relatively good position to back to the Soviet model with regard to for- influence COMECON policies as she pro- eign policy while maintaining the national vides the chairman for three COMECON identity that Ulbricht worked so hard to Standing Commissions.9 All this may not en- achieve. With economic progress, national dear the GDR to some of her partners, but it confidence also appears to have increased as does lock her fairly firmly into the socialist has international recognition. It is also prob­ economic system of Eastern Europe. ably in the Soviets’ best interest to allow a The creation of a solid, socialist political degree of GDR nationalism since it can only WAfíSAW PACT 51 increase the division between the two Ger- throughout the country.14 In the Czechoslo- manys and act against a strong reunified Ger- vakian democracy of that time, the Commu- many in the future. Certainly the Soviets nists possessed one of the four largest parties have displayed a remarkable degree of confi- in parliament. Maybe this is not too surpris- dence in the GDR National Peoples Army ing in view of the threat to which she was (NPA), many units of which are directly exposed by fascist Germany and the lack of subordinated to the Group of Soviet Forces support she received from the rest of West­ Germany (GSFG). The NPA also receives ern Europe. Thus, for many Czechoslovaks more advanced Soviet weapon systems ear- the invasion by the “Mother of Socialism" in lier than other NSWP armed forces,13 for ex- 1968 must have been even more traumatic ample, the Scud-B surface-to-surface missile than it would have been for some of the oth­ appears to have been supplied only to the er NSWP States. It must also be remembered GDR so far. that although the liberalisation by the Dub- The SED leadership certainly is firmly in cek regime may well have produced a multi- control in the GDR and appears to have the party State, Alexander Dubcek himself was a confidence of the Soviets. Under Ulbricht, “socialist,” and he enjoyed increasing popu­ who lost the support of the Soviet leaders not lar support. One should not, perhaps, put too because of his nationalistic attitudes but be- much faith in East European public opinion cause he was “rocking the détente boat,” the polis, but in one such poli conducted in Au- GDR was a staunch supporter of the Soviets gust 1968, Dubcek received a “political in keeping the other NSWP members in line; trust” rating of 96.1 percent and at the same they played a leading role in the 1968 inva- time only five percent preferred a return to sion of Czechoslovakia. Under Honecker, capitalism.15 Indeed, it has been suggested— who is following the Soviet line more closely, although it is not clear who was on which the GDR is likely to be even more supportive side—that there was some disagreement be­ of the U.S.S.R. Undoubtedly, there remain tween Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and those who wish for German reunification, Marshal Andrey Antonovich Grechko (Soviet particularly those with close relatives in the Defence Minister) over the invasion,16 and it FRG, but the number so affected is decreas- may have been the views of the other NSWP ing with time, thus reducing one of the major countries involved in the invasion, and the incentives for reunification. The GDR people GDR in particular, which tipped the balance. have now developed a national identity and For the majority of Czechoslovaks the inva­ are, therefore, more likely to support their sion of 1968 engendered nothing but hatred leaders, who in turn would undoubtedly for the Soviets and the NSWP countries that meet their full obligations to the Warsaw helped them. Pact in any conflict with NATO and the FRG Prior to 1968, Czechoslovakia was consid- since their whole separate identity would be ered one of the most reliable members of the at risk to do otherwise. Warsaw Pact and Gustav Husak, who suc- ceeded Dubcek, has had the task of trying to recreate that “normal” situation. Some quar- Czechoslovakia ter of a million of the previous party upper Although Czechoslovakia fell under Com- echelons and about half a million Communist munist rule through the intrigue of her in- party members were purged following the digenous Communist party in 1948, it must removal of Dubcek; when one adds to this be remembered that even before World War about 100,000 people, presumably those II the party had considerable support with some initiative, who fled to the West17 52 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW it is not difficult to understand the economic now as she does with her Communist part- and intellectual stagnation that occurred in ners.20 However, it would be an extreme the years immediately following the inva- Western optimist who would forecast that sion. Replacements for the purged elite had these trade contracts would be likely to influ- to be found from those who, prior to the inva- ence the Czechoslovak leadership or pro- sion, had shown little interest in politics, and duce any political adventuring in that some degree of “political normalcy” now has country, particularly bearing in mind the al­ been restored. However, this normalcy is re- most total lack of Western reaction to the garded by a number of Western observers as events of 1968. a stability created by political apathy rather One interesting facet of the Czechoslovak than one brought about by genuine political political scene has been the increasing con- interest.18 Doubts still exist, however, in the flict between the Czechs and the Slovaks; this minds of the present leadership, and presum- conflict is supported by the opinion polis to ably the Soviets, since it was only in August which reference was made earlier. Husak is 1975 that Dubcek was expelled by a Czecho- a Slovak and a consistent federalist; it is pos- slovak trade union. One can only assume that sible that these were among the reasons for it was believed that he might still become a his selection by the Soviets. Although the focal point for at least token opposition to the Slovakian Communist Party is led by the “ul- Husak regime and that this was a final at- tras” (hard liners), Husak has had consider- tempt to rob him of any standing in the coun- able Slovak support. However, the Slovaks, try. Furthermore, continued official criticism who comprise only 30 percent of the total of the interpretation of Science and ideology population, are now equally represented in education19 would indicate that normalisa- with the Czechs in the national government. tion is by no means complete, although this The Slovaks also enjoy their own ethnically could be merely a facet of the increased ideo- separate Communist party while the Czechs logical propaganda effort throughout the have to be satisfied with the national Czecho- Warsaw Pact. slovakian Communist Party.21 This has given The political apathy of the people has had rise to at least hints of an increase in Czech a twofold benefit to the current leadership. nationalism and is certainly not conducive to Since the people failed in their attempt to political stability within the country as a seek political freedom, they have now whole. turned their efforts towards seeking freedom In any conflict between the Warsaw Pact in the area of consumption; as a result they and NATO, one of the most significant fac- tend to work harder to earn the money to tors dictating Czechoslovak actions would buy consumer goods, and the economy has undoubtedly be the presence of Soviet improved overall. Yet, since political loyalty troops within the country. The Soviet troops produces better job opportunities, many are are there under a Czechoslovakian/Soviet prepared to pay lip Service to the Husak lead­ Friendship Treaty—a manifestation of the ership in order to secure better jobs. While Brezhnev Doctrine—and the Czechoslovak the economy is improving and Husak dares people would think twice before openly take no real economic initiatives that would changing sides after the 1968 debacle, even signal a departure from the Soviet line, and if the Soviet troops were actively engaged in while Czechoslovakia remains a full partici- hostilities in the border area. Husak is a Sovi­ pant in COMECON, she is also increasing et puppet, and on the face of it he appears to her trade with the West. Czechoslovakia be unwilling and incapable of taking an inde- does almost half as much trade with the West pendent line. No other dominant figure has, WARSAW PACT 53 as yet, appeared from the apparently politi- local population, and they had to be replaced calíy disinterested party administration. The hurriedly by Mongolian troops from Sibé­ Czechoslovak armed forces took little or no ria.23 The Mongolian troops were brutal in action to resist the 1968 invasion, and there their suppression of the Hungarians, and the is no reason to doubt that they will follow the memory of their action has undoubtedly national government and Soviet directives in been passed on to the generations that have the future. At present the people of the coun- followed. Thus, if the European/Asian bal­ try seem interested only in improving their ance in the U.S.S.R. continues to swing in material well-being, but their reactions in favour of the Asians, it is unlikely to contrib- the future might depend on the potential ute to any pro-Soviet revival! conflict that exists between the Czechs and Janos Kadar, who carne to power after the the Slovaks. The Slovaks would seem unlike- revolts, has been successful in gaining a real ly to wish to jeopardise their new-found pari- measure of popular support by his liberalis- ty with the Czechs, but the latter, from ing actions, despite the terrorist oppression whom Dubcek received most of his support, that occurred during the first few years of his might conceivably allow their hatred of the regime. At the same time Kadar has exer- Soviets to overcome their earlier disillusion- cised care not to offend the Soviets who in- ment with the West and react against the stalled him as the leader of the Hungarian Soviets in some numbers. Certainly it would Socialist Workers’ Party (HSWP). Kadar has be easier for the Czechs, who live predomi- confined his national initiatives primarily to nantly in West Czechoslovakia, which has a the domestic scene and has followed the common border with the FRG. Much will Soviet line on foreign policy; although hav- depend on the continued satisfaction of con- ing said this, and perhaps because the domes­ sumer demands and the possible return of tic successes have increased the confidence the political elite of pre-1968. of the Hungarian leaders, they are as bitterly opposed to the Brezhnev Doctrine as Ro- mania, although less blatantly so. Kadar is a Hungary dedicated international Communist and a The relationship of Hungary with the War- genuine friend of the U.S.S.R.24 He is also saw Pact need only be traced back to 1956 regarded as a believer in the “more humane when she tried to resign from the Pact and type of socialism.” Prior to 1968 the Hungari­ establish a multiparty system of government. an leadership enjoyed particularly good rela- (Incidentaliy, the Warsaw Treaty made no tions with the Dubcek administration in provisions for withdrawal until one year pri­ Czechoslovakia, and it is by no means obvi- or to the twentieth anniversary, and no ous why the Soviets have allowed Hungary member was “bold” enough to do so—even some of the latitudes they were not prepared assuming they wished to.) Soviet troops were to accept in Czechoslovakia. Whatever the used in "persuading” the Hungarians to re- reasons, Kadar has retained the leadership main within the Pact. The Hungarian revolts against domestic opposition from both right of 1956 were really the result of factional and left. conflict between the pro- and anti-Stalinist, The heart of Kadar’s domestic success has accompanied by individual protests by work- been the 1968 introduction of the New Eco- ers and students. The Hungarian armed nomic Mechanism (NEM), which reduced forces did not act effectively on either side.22 the centralised economic control to the mini- Strangely enough, the Russian troops garri- mum consistent with an authoritarian, one- soned in Budapest were sympathetic to the party State.25 Certainly the country has ben- 54 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW efited economically from the NEM, but a pean Economic Community (EEC) and profit-motivated economy has brought prob- COMECON should facilitate contacts rather lems for the party; bourgeois attitudes have than direct economic exchanges,”30 which is developed as has a management-worker dif- certainly open to favourable Western inter- ferential to the extent that trade unions have pretation. become more militant and the government It would appear that while reforms are has had to act to meet their demands.26 It is likely to continue in Hungary, as perhaps in- interesting to note that organised labour, as dicated by concessions continuing to be opposed to party organisations, has the made towards the Catholic church, there has power to influence government decisions! been a slowing down of such reforms to a rate However, Hungary has few natural re- acceptable to the Soviets and to enable the sources, and her economy is based on raw HSWP to retain control of the situation. materiais and fuels imported almost exclu- Economically, the State is dependent on sively from the U.S.S.R.27 Although Hungary Soviet raw materiais but also on Western has made strenuous efforts to increase her technology to progressively improve the trade vvith the West, including the U.S.,28 she standard of living of the people. Kadar also is firmly tied to COMECON with which she appears to be in a position where he is cer­ does about 75 percent of her trade. While tainly influenced by public opinion as is trade with the West may bring the technolo- manifest by his acquiescence to trade union gy required to continue to meet her consum- demands—rather like a number of Western er demands, her balance of payments in leaders! convertible currency is unfavourable, and The Hungarian people are no doubt aware her basic economic structure would suffer if of the success of their “taste of capitalism,” as she had to compete on the open market for the leadership must be, even if they are now raw materiais that are still available from the a little embarrassed by it. Given the opportu- U.S.S.R. at lower-than-world prices. nity, it is unlikely that either the leadership There are now signs, however, despite the or the people would wish to risk another continuation of economic and social reforms, 1956 by openly siding with the West. How­ that there has been a degree of ideological ever, despite possible initial economic diffi- tightening-up;29 Soviet pressure could have culties, it is conceivable that the nation as a dictated this, but it is also common to the whole could opt for a neutral attitude like other members of the Warsaw Pact since the that of Yugoslavia, with which there is con- beginning of the détente era. In 1973, a soci- siderable social contact, a lengthy common ologist and two prominent philosophers border, and strong economic ties. Hungary were expelled from the party because their might well see neutrality as a means of re- work was politically unacceptable; and, in taining economic ties with both East and 1974, three early reformers, Rezsõ Nyers, West and a means of continuing, with rela- Gyõrgy Aczél, and Lajos Feher, were tive independence, its experiment in “gou- removed from the HSWP Secretariat. Fur- lash Socialism.” Without doubt, few reports thermore, the guidelines for the party con- written on contemporary Hungary indicate a gress in March 1975 dictated that while party great love of the Soviets and most suggest a members were entitled to hold their own marked lack of Marxist-Leninist revolution- views they were not to be voiced if they ary fervour while they all confirm a leader­ clashed with those of the party. However, ship that is prepared to continue reforms, even as recently as September 1974, “Janos albeit at a limited rate, to satisfy national Kadar said that relations between the Euro- public opinion. This assumes a continuation WAfíSA WPACT 55 of present policies in Yugoslavia after Titos refused to allow the Pact to hold multination- death; a pro-Soviet Yugoslavia would un- al military exercises on her territory. In re- doubtedly influence any decisions made by cent years Romania has had but a token the Hungarian leaders. representation in the form of observers at most Pact military exercises. In 1968 she was the only NSWP member who did not partici- Romania pate in the invasion of Czechoslovakia and In 1945, Dr. Petru Groza, the Prime Minister even formed an armed militia, which was of Romania said, “We wish to guarantee [our undoubtedly a response to that invasion. people] a development based on the de- Economically, the Romanian leadership served participation of the masses ... and the has refused to remain a peasant nation, solely weeding out of irritating privileges ... politi- to provide food and raw materiais to the cal stability amid the instability of interna- U.S.S.R., and has attempted to industrialise. tional politics, in which small States risk being Since dependence on the Soviets was absorbed and crushed.”31 The Romanian deemed unacceptable, Romania, under Party statement on 26 April 1964, plainly re- Ceausescu, has increasingly turned to West­ jected the supranational control and plan- ern trade as a means of obtaining the indus­ ning of COMECON as having the most trial goods and the technology required by its “serious political and economic implica- industry. Certainly Ceausescu can justifiably tions” and went on to delineate the absolute claim some successes in improving the mate­ sovereignty of socialist States to decide their rial well-being of his people, but the price has own route to a socialist society.32 The been to become increasingly indebted to the Romanian Communist Party’s (RCP) resolu- West. For example, the trade déficit in 1974 tion at the 11 th congress in November 1974 was reported to be somewhere between DM. contained the following: “The Congress 3,000 million and DM. 892 million with the commissions the party to attend a confer- FRG alone.34 This could be the reason why ence of European communist and workers’ the Romanians plan to halve their exchanges parties, bearing in mind the need that it be with the West in the next five years. Further- conducted in a democratic spirit and that the more, although in March 1971 a law was full equality of all parties in preparing and passed allowing for the setting-up of joint discussing the relevant matters be en- West/Romanian industry in the country, sured.”33 only a very limited number of Western com- These quotations serve to illustrate the panies have taken advantage of this opportu- economic and politically independent line nity so far. Overall, Ceausescu’s Western that Romania has attempted to follow from trading policy, while having some initial suc­ the end of World War II to the present time cesses, is now foundering, and, whether under the leadership of Nicolae Ceausescu, through economic necessity or political pres- who carne to power in 1965. Despite Ceau- sure, there are indications that Ceausescu is sescu’s Stalinist approach to government and increasing Romanian participation in the very limited freedom of any sort allowed COMECON.35 the Romanian people, his policy of indepen- Despite the fact that the Political Execu- dence has appealed to Romanian national- tive Committee (PEC) of the Romanian ism, and the support that it has brought him Communist Party met on 14 October 1975 has enabled a continuance of that policy. Ro- especially to discuss food and consumer imania has been anything but an active mem- goods, indicating a desire to meet some of 'ber of the Warsaw Pact since 1964, when she the demands of the people, there is no doubt 56 AIR UNIVERS1TY REVIEW that Ceausescu is firmly in control of the creased if one considers how Bulgaria might country; the mass media are heavily con- react. trolled, and travei, even to other Communist countries, is restricted to the privileged few. Ceausescifs task is made somewhat easier Bulgaria since in modem times the Romanian people Since World War II, Bulgaria has been the have never known a stable, free society. Soviets’ most consistent ally, both economi- Thus, in assessing Romanian reactions to a cally and politically. Because of this, and be- NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, one need only cause of her strategic value in relation to the assess the reactions of the RCP and its leader- Middle East and the eastern Mediterranean, ship, namely Ceausescu, who seems likely to the Soviets have cultivated this loyalty and occupy that position for some time. tend to treat Bulgaria as the “favourite” of There are already signs that Ceausescus the Warsaw Pact. Western trading policy has not paid off, and At the end of World War II, Bulgaria was he is moving into the COMECON and Soviet placed firmly in the Soviet orbit. The Bulgari- economic fold. While in the past Romania an Communist Party (BCP) had no difficulty has become increasingly an inactive mem- in consolidating its political position, with ber of the Warsaw Pact, a complete break Soviet support, and has been in power ever and an alternative alliance with the capital- since. The natural stoicism of the Bulgarian ist West would mean a considerable risk of people has made it easier in many respects unsettling influences, which the increased for the BCP to retain its effective authoritari- contacts of such an alliance would bring; this an control over the domestic scene.36 There is a risk that Ceausescu would be unlikely to were internai party problems in 1965, and a accept. An alternative policy would be one of conspiracy against Todor Zhivkov, the BCP neutrality, again rather like that of Yugos- leader, failed and resulted in the trial of sev- lavia. Although such a policy is more conceiv- en party members, five of whom were in- able since the emergence of the PRC as an volved with the military; one of the alternative centre of world Communism, un- ringleaders, Ivan Todorov-Gorunya, shot like Yugoslavia, and Albania too, Romania himself in April of that year.37 However, “enjoys” a lengthy border with the U.S.S.R. there are no apparent indications that any The latter would most likely deter the pro-Western elements were involved in the Romanians from really taking advantage of conspiracy; it was either between pro- and the support that she would receive from the anti-Stalinist factions or between local fac- PRC, with whom she maintains fairly good tions since there is a strong sense of localism relations. Furthermore, Romania has no within Bulgaria. common border with the NATO nations. In the 1950s the Muscovites (those who Romania’s most likely course of action were Moscow trained with obvious primary would be to side with the Soviets and try to loyalty to the Kremlin) within the BCP were retain, and perhaps increase, its domestic in- replaced with younger, indigenous Commu- dependence as a reward for its loyalty. One nists, but despite this the BCP is an aging could also draw the conclusion that the Sovi­ party. Many of the older generation of ets have made the same assessment of ideologists have been retained in the leader- Romanian reactions and that is why her inde- ship because there is a general feeling that pendent economic and foreign policies have the younger generation desire more free- been tolerated. The likelihood of Romania dom and lack the revolutionary fervour of adopting this course of action is further in­ their fathers. Ideological pressure is now be- WARSAW PACT 57 ing directed at the Bulgarian youth, and the Bulgarian children are taught Russian.42 BCP has “expressed concern at the apparent Thus, one can detect no evidence of signifi­ reactivation of church and religious activi- cant political, economic or cultural deviation ties, especialiy in regard to young people.”38 from the Soviet line either domestically or in The BCP has also experienced some prob- foreign policy. Bulgaria has made consider- lems of nationalism. To some extent an outlet able progress with its past policy, and, there- has been found for nationalism by means of fore, one must conclude that she would meet the Macedonian problem with Yugoslavia. her full obligations to the Soviets and the However, this has not satisfied all demands, Warsaw Pact in any future conflict with and in Februarv 1975, “Secretary Lilov, in NATO. his report to the plenum . . . noted that ‘nationalism based on the anti-Soviet grounds’ has ‘unfortunately recorded some W it h the assumption of an even success.’ ”39 Although these minor perturba- balance of Soviet-to-NATO military force in tions in the othervvise stable domestic scene Europe, one must also assume that any fu­ could, conceivably, develop into significant ture conventional conflict would take place, problems, the BCP remains firmly in control at least initially, adjacent to the present and its foreign policy precisely follows that of NATO/Warsaw Pact borders. If one excludes the U.S.S.R., including its policy towards the the Southern and northern flanks, all NSWP PRC. countries that have a common border with Economically, Bulgaria has benefited con- NATO, plus Hungary which borders on neu- siderably by her loyalty to the U.S.S.R., par- tral Áustria, have Soviet troops based on ticularly when compared with Romania. their soil. Therefore, even if Soviet first ech- Bulgaria is the Soviets’ fourth largest trading elon combat forces were diverted from any partner, and economic and industrial devel- East European “policing duties,” the second opment is virtually integrated with that of and third echelon forces moving through, the U.S.S.R. The Bulgarians are investing in and the support elements within, those coun­ the development of Soviet raw material and tries would have a considerable deterrent energy resources not only in financial terms effect against any unilateral action by those but also with Bulgarian labour. Reportedly, NSWP countries. between 30,000 and 45,000 Bulgarians are Politically, there is reasonable accord be­ employed in the U.S.S.R.40 although this “in- tween the Communist party leaders in all of vestment” has been criticised by some Bul­ the NSWP countries and the U.S.S.R., with garian experts. Bulgaria can now be the possible exception of Romania. Even Ro­ regarded as an industrialised nation, and in mania, which has been permitted a degree of the 1960s her growth rate in industrial out- independence in its foreign policy, was care- ut was the highest in the world after Ja- ful to sign new treaties of friendship with the an.41 Although trade with the West, and the U.S.S.R. and Poland within two years of the FRG in particular, has been indispensable to events in Czechoslovakia in 1968. Internally, Bulgarian industrial growth, she has a consid- the national Communist parties are firmly in erable trade déficit and will, inevitably, have control. In Bulgaria and Romania the degree o cut back this Western trade to some ex- of freedom of the people is quite limited, and ent. there would appear to be little likelihood of any coordinated opposition of significant size to overthrow their current leaders. In the remaining NSWP countries public opinion ICulturally, Bulgaria cooperates more ílosely with the Soviets than any other East Luropean country, even to the extent that all 58 AIR UNIVERSITY REV1EW appears to have some influence over govern- Hungary; she has experimented with capital­ mental decisions, and attempts to satisfy pub- ist techniques and had a measure of success. lic demands are made; if this policy A degree of social liberalisation has followed continues, then national leaderships are like- the Hungarian economic initiatives, and, ly to be able to retain control, not only while a slower rate of reform might be ac- through repression but through increasing cepted by the Hungarian people, a halt and popular support. In Czechoslovakia political a reversion to earlier policies might well pro- apathy has been the consequence of the 1968 duce sufficient dissatisfaction to trigger some invasion, and, regardless of political policies, pro-Western actions. However, the memory no cohesive opposition is likely while the ma­ of 1956 remains, and the Hungarian people terial demands of the people continue to be would be unlikely to defy the Soviets openly; met. Since the invasion of Czechoslovakia, a passive reaction would be a more likely only Poland, in 1970, suffered any significant course. internai disturbance, and this was put-down There has been a resurgence of national- by national armed forces. Politically, the ism in Eastern Europe, but in general this has NSWP countries’ leaders would most likely been successfully channelled into support for support their fellow Warsaw Pact members national leadership. The only country where and appear to have sufficient control of their nationalism could be a problem for the lead­ populations and armed forces to prevent sig­ ership is in Czechoslovakia, between the nificant opposition. Czechs and the Slovaks; if this should devel- Ideologically, the Warsaw Pact countries op into real conflict, then it is conceivable recognise a threat in the increased contacts that the Czechs, sharing a common border likely in a period of détente and are collec- with the FRG, might seek to break away de- tively taking action to boost their ideological spite the lack of support they have received integrity. Even Romania is taking great care from the Western allies in the past. to limit contact between the Romanian peo­ Overall, the assessment of the reliability of ple and the West, and only the favoured few the NSWP countries can only be a positive are permitted to make such contacts. one. Prior to any future armed conflict be­ Economically, all the NSWP members are tween NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the bat- heavily dependent on each other and the tle will be waged on the economic and U.S.S.R. In a resource-scarce era, they are ideological front. Trade has its advantages investing jointly with the Soviets in exploit- and disadvantages, but the trading contacts ing Soviet raw materiais. Certainly they all that are made must also be used to further trade with the West to obtain the technology ideological interests. This type of attack is to further their own industrial development, feared by the Communist Party and, hence, but without exception they are operating a the stepping-up of ideological propaganda. trade déficit with the capitalist countries and The West must not just ignore Eastern are likely to turn more towards trade with Europe and must, whenever possible, active- their Soviet and other COMECON partners. ly encourage nationalism in the area. To do Furthermore, there is some opposition to otherwise could result in Progressive “Es- trade by COMECON with the West by some tonisation” of Eastern Europe. of the specialised industrial States since they Until such time as the ideological battle cannot compete for the COMECON markets begins to show real results, in planning for with Western suppliers. One country that the contingencies of a conventional war in could suffer considerably from a reversion to Europe, as postulated in the scenario for this a COMECON integrated economy would be examination, one must draw the conclusion WAfíSAW PACT 59 that the Warsaw Pact would act in concert that all the other NSWP States would meet against NATO, with the possible exception of their full obligations to the Pact. Hungary and part of Czechoslovakia, and Air War CoIIege

Notes Sciences," Radio Free Europe Research. Czechoslovakia/31, 6 August l. Robin Alison Remington, The Warsaw Pact. Case Studies in Commu-1975. nist Confiict Resolution (Cambridge. Massachusetts and London, England: 20. Thomas E. Heneghan, "Czechoslovakia." Radio Free Europe Re­ The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press. 1971). search. RAD Background Report/116 (Eastem Europe), 18 July 1975. 2. Rjchard C. Longworth. “Eastem Europe: Where Life Is Not So Good, 21. Seiucky, p. 34. Vet Not So Bad." Saturday Review. March 8. 1975, p. 11. 22. Beck and Rawling, p. 20. 3. Times (London), 11 November 1975. p. 5. 23. Griswold. pp. 27-32. I. Daniel Weiss. "Poland’s Sense of History." Suiss Review of World 24. William F. Robinson, The Pattern ofReform in Hungary—A PoliticaJ, Affairs, August 1975, p. 8. Economic and Cultural AnaJysis (New York and London: Praeger, 1973). 5. Quarterly Economic Review—Poland. East Germany. No. 1-1975, 25. Paul lgnotus, Hungary (New York: Praeger. 1972), p. 277. The Economist Intelligence Unit. 26. "Hungary: Expanding Contacts," Australian Foreign Affairs Record, 6. Weiss. p. 9. March 1975, p. 127. 7. Thomas E. Heneghan, "Poland," Radio Free Europe Research, RAD 27. Ibid., p. 125. Background Report,116 (Ejetem Europe), 18July 1975. 28. "Czechoslovakia and Hungary," No. 1-1975, Quarterly Economic 8. Robert Culver, “East Germany," World Survey (London: The Atlantic Review, The Economist Intelbgence Unit. Education Trust, December 1971). 29. Ibid. 9. Peter Christian Ludz. "Two Germanys ín One World," The Atlantic 30. Stanislav J. Kirschbaum, "Trade and Détente Challenge Uniformity Papers 3/1973 tFaraborough, England: The Atlantic Institute for Interna­ in Eastem Europe," International Perspectives. March/April 1975, p. 24. tional Affairs). 31. Carol Kormos, "Rumania,” World Survey. The Atlantic Education 10. Arthur M. Hanhardt, Jr., The Cerman Oemocratic Republic (Bal- Trust, July 1974, pp. 3-4. timore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1968), p. 7. 32. Jonathan Steele, editor. Eastern Europe since Stalin (New York: II. Lawrence Griswold. "Warsaw Pact: The Brood of the Bear." Sea Crane, Russak and Company, Inc., 1974). pp. 125-27. Power. April 1975. pp. 27-32. 33. Situation Report. "Rumania/40." Radio Free Europe Research, 16 12. Hanhardt, p. 124. October 1975, p. 2. 13. Ibid., pp. 103—4. 34. Ibid., pp. 4-5. 14. Paul Neuburg, The Heros Children— The Post War Generation in 35. Ibid., pp. 3-4. Eastem Europe (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc.. 1973). p. 36. Joseph Rothschild, "Commumsm in Bulgaria," Problems of Commu- 27. nism. July/August 1975. p. 75. 15. Peter Crothe. "Public Opinion in Eastem Europe.” Problems of Com- 37. J. F. Brown, Bulgaria under Communist Rule (New York and London: munism. July/August 1975. Praeger, 1970), pp. 173-5. 16. Carl Beck and Karen Elide Rawling. The Military as a Channel of 38. “Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania No. 1-1975," Quarterly Economic Entry into Positions ofPolitical Leadership in Communist Party States. Air Review, The Economist Intelligence Unit. University Conference on the Role of the Military in Communist Societies, 39. Robert R. King, "Socialist Internationalism ín Action." Radio Free November 1975, p. 20. Europe Research, RAD Background Report/89 (Bulgaria). 26 May 1975. p. 17. Radoslav Seiucky. "Czechs Respond to Normalisation with Consuinp- 7. tion and Apathy." International Perspectives. March/April 1975, p. 31. 40. Ibid., p. 8. 18. Ibid. See also Longworth, p. 54. 41. Rothschild, p. 74. 19. Situation Report. "Struggle against Revisionism in the Social 42. King, p. 8.

Unless we are prepared to defend portions of the world outside of North America, we shall soon find ourselves with nothing else but North America to defend. J ames Schlesinger RETHINKING THE UNTHINKABLE Limited Strategic Nuclear

Options— credible or dangerous?

COLONEL WlLLIAM M. CHARLES. J r . HE dynamics of American security in a ponent. And in large measure, perceptions nuclear world have fostered vigorous are solidly rooted in strategic force capabili­ Tdebate over the military capabilities re- ties across the entire spectrum of conflict sce- quired to protect and preserve national free- narios. dom. Defense intellectuals and strategists For the past decade or so deterrence of generally agree that our principal security nuclear war has been based on the doctrine objective is to avoid a nuclear war, but there of assured destruction—the United States are disagreements on the military forces re- possessed sufficient strategic forces so as to be quired to meet this objective and the able to withstand a Soviet first strike and re- capabilities these forces should have. For spond with a second strike of sufficient mag­ many years this country has felt relatively nitude to destroy the Soviet Union as a viable safe under the security blanket of our assured society. Eventually the Soviet forces were ex- destruction forces, but there has been a panded sufficiently to obtain a comparable growing suspicion that today this is not assured destruction capability against the enough. The Soviet Unions continued strate- United States. It became customary to refer gic force buildup far in excess of what would to this condition as “mutual assured destruc­ be reasonably needed for the assured de­ tion”—each side had enough nuclear struction task has initiated a fundamental re- strength to destroy the other with a retaliato- examination of the doctrinal basis of Ameri­ ry strike. In the United States it soon became can defense policy. To this end, the key issue the practice to determine the desired that has resurfaced is the question whether strength of the strategic forces by their con- the President of the United States has need tribution to the assured destruction role; thus of a capability for engaging in limited strate- the scenario of spasm war, the least likely gic nuclear options (LNO) as an optimal re­ type of conflict because of its suicidai nature, sponse in acute crises with a tended to become the typical case. Because nuclear-equipped adversary. of this practice it is now thought that Ameri­ can strategic forces will perform very well in the least likely kind of war. But it has become deterrence and assured destruction increasingly difficult to visualize the Presi­ The comerstone of American military strate- dent, or even his opposite in the Soviet gy has been the deterrence of nuclear war. Union, unleashing assured destruction forces Deterrence is basically a psychological phe- for all possible scenarios. nomenon, based on forces in being and the It was the growing conviction that mutual enemy belief in both the effectiveness of assured destruction was not a panacea for those forces and in our willingness to employ survival that led President Richard M. Nixon them decisively if necessary. Because deter- to ask his thought-provoking questions in xence finds its strength in what the opponent 1970: thinks his adversary can do and, more impor- Should a President, in the event of a nuclear tantly, will do in response to any outside attack, be left with the single option of order- provocation, perceptions become a key com- ing the mass destruction of enemy civilians, in 61 62 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW the face of the certainty that it would be fol- weapons will needlessly jeopardize the bal­ lowed by the mass slaughter of Americans? ance of nuclear forces and fuel the bilateral Should the concept of assured destruction be narrowly defined and should it be the only arms race. Arrayed on the “flexibility” side measure of our ability to deter the variety of are those who question a continued reliance threats we may face?* on an assured destruction policy for deter- The needs were amplified by Secretary of ring nuclear conflict at all leveis. This school Defense James R. Schlesinger in his fiscal of thought believes that the “stability” argu- year 1975 report to the Congress: ment fails to come to grips with the central Rather than massive options, we now want to issue: because total reliance on an all-out re­ provide the President with a wider set of much sponse is essentially suicidai, if deterrence more selective targeting options. Through fails, how is the United States to respond to possession of such a visible capability, we hope a Soviet limited nuclear attack? To aid in ar- to reinforce deterrence by removing the temp- riving at some conclusion about flexible op­ tation for an adversary to consider any kind of tions, the major arguments advanced by the nuclear attack.2 two schools of thought will be examined. The theory behind flexible options or limited “Stability”arguments. There are three ba- strategic nuclear options encompasses the sic arguments against more flexible nuclear capability to use a single or several nuclear options: (1) arms competition between the weapon systems to strike carefully selected superpowers “will almost inevitably result”; military targets in the Soviet Union, not for (2) a capability for “limited counterforce op­ revenge but as an additional option short of tions will make limited nuclear war more full nuclear response. It is not a question of credible and therefore more likely”; and (3) seeking new systems but of improving the more flexibility and “improved accuracy may current forces through modest improve- lead to instability in time of crisis.”4 There ments in accuracy and greater targeting flex- are refinements to these three points and also ibility. This second requirement provides the several minor arguments such as the claim “option” characteristic; with it the President that costs of force modernization are exces- could select and order an attack on one or sive and that continued modernization in an several military targets depending on de­ era of détente is counterproductive. We shall fense objectives. present the three basic arguments in some When one reads the numerous articles that depth and then briefly review the two minor gushed forth on the heels of Dr. Schlesingers issues. report to Congress, he cannot fail to be im- LNO is criticized by the “stability” school pressed by the scholarly examination to for the arms-building interactions between which all facets of the problem have been the superpowers that will surely result; that subjected, on the whole with more clarity is, if the United States deploys forces de­ than emotion.3 In general, there are two signed for flexible options, the Soviet Union sides to the debate. On the “stability” side will not stand still. Then, as the Soviet Union are those who believe that the concept of reacts, the United States must respond fur- limited strategic nuclear options (or flexible ther; thus, the arms competition spirais up- operations) embraces nuclear gamesmanship ward. Our greatest assurance for deterring which could bring the world to the brink of political probes as well as preventing nuclear disaster. They believe that American strate­ or conventional weapon strikes, the argu- gic forces are already adequate and suffi- ment continues, is the reliance on our as­ ciently flexible, and, therefore, new sured destruction forces—a mutual hostage programs designed to modernize strategic strategy. Furthermore, for this role we have RETHINKING THE UNTHINKABLE 63 more than enough strategic forces; actually when negotiations deteriorate because he the United States possesses a wasteful and believes that if he does not attack first his dangerous capacity for “overkill.”5 strategic force will be destroyed, before be- The second “stability” argument is that if ing launched, by a counterforce strike from nuclear weapons become more usable and the opponent. less mysterious, it will become more “thinka- Two minor arguments focus on détente ble” to resort to their use during a crisis and, and defense spending. Many writers believe therefore, more acceptable. And as nuclear that in this era of détente a deliberate attack war becomes more acceptable, it becomes by the Soviet Union is very unlikely. There­ more likely. Many opponents of LNO seem fore, because détente has seemingly obviat- to have one fear underlying their opposition ed the need for strong defenses, continued —nuclear warfare, with all its potential for an force modernization is seen by some to be Armageddon, simply cannot be tolerated. In inconsistent and self-defeating. Further- other words, the consequences of nuclear more, the current condition of strategic force warfare are so horrible, so destructive to parity, mutual assured destruction, the humanity, that nothing must be done with avoidance on both sides of explicit threats, our strategic forces that would seem to dis- and the mutual determination to preserve an turb the “mutual balance of terror”; it is “un- atmosphere of détente have persuaded thinkable” to experiment with strategic many that it is now safe to relax defense forces lest a destabilizing process result. spending. Much of the opposition focuses on Built-in “flexibility” will only tend to increase the high price we shall have to pay, on plea the suitability of nuclear weapons for use of a problematic threat, to provide for re- during a crisis, particularly when our backs search, development, production, and opera- are to the wall—again a dangerously destabil­ tional costs of new, more sophisticated izing condition. Thus culminates a vicious weapons of war. The opponents of defense circle that returns us to the war we must spending want dollars saved from unneeded avoid. The underlying assumption behind and costly new military Systems to be devot- these beliefs is that, as in most physical con- ed to domestic needs, for example, more and flicts, the use of force would escalate au- better medicai and social programs. tomatically, that is, any exchange of nuclear “Flexibility” arguments. The argument violence would bring the human race to the concerning arms race inducements has a log- brink of extinction. The “stability” school in- ical basis, but in reality, claims the “flexibili­ sists, in other words, that “controlled” nu­ ty” school, the action-reaction syndrome is clear warfare is a myth; once the nuclear based on intuitive feelings as little hard evi- threshold has been crossed, escalation to gen­ dence exists which demonstrates that the eral nuclear war is inevitable. Soviet Union is impressed by American force This leads to the third principal argument initiatives to the point that it attempts to opposing flexible nuclear options: the coun- “mirror-image” United States moderniza­ terforce danger. LNO, if “counterforce” tion programs. A review of historical events weapons are involved, is considered to be reveals that the Soviets have sized their destabilizing in that the opponent, on view- forces and modernized their weapons for ing the enemy's counterforce arsenal during reasons generally independent of American a crisis, may perceive his own nuclear force actions. Past behavior suggests it is unlikely to be in imminent danger from an enemy that the Soviet Union would attempt to du- first strike. Hence he may initiate (or will be plicate specific American modernization tempted to initiate) a pre-emptive strike programs; students of Soviet arms policy gen- 64 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW erally agree, the argument continues, that pation or a penetration of the Federal the Soviets adopt policies, commit scarce re- Republic of Germany—German Democratic sources to research and development pro- Republic border by Warsaw Pact armies, grams, and expand strategic forces for should a nuclear fusillade be the only option reasons other than to copy American efforts open to the President? The Middle East off- in these same areas. They point out, for ex- ers further possibilities for such a confronta- ample, that the stimulus to the arms race tion. If our conventional forces are must already have occurred, as evidenced by ineffectual at the lower conflict leveis and it the current land-based missile force is unrealistic to launch the total nuclear force asymmetry. The American intercontinental in response to a political probe or even a ballistic missile (ICBM) restraint of the past limited conventional intervention, could not few years did not succeed in constraining the this bring in question the credibility of a de- Soviets from major expansion and moderni- terrent policy based solely on the use of those zation of their strategic offensive forces, and “unusable” forces? This is a dilemma the there is no guarantee that it will do so in the Soviet leadership may find beneficiai to ex- future. The "flexibility” school believes, ploit, and, if so, the American decision-maker moreover, that the United States must take could find himself in a crisis situation where advantage of new technology and strive to he has no options but to give in to the coer- maintain qualitative superiority because cive threats of the Soviet Union or resist and quantitative expansions are counter to im- demonstrate “resolve” by calling on the full plied and explicit arms control agreements destructive power of United States strategic reached during SALT I and the Vladivostok forces. The mutual assured destruction pos- discussions. These latter discussions essential- ture, because of its suicidai nature, makes ly placed a lid on unabated force-building this second alternative highly irrational. It is initiatives; therefore, an arms race in the un- on this repugnant note that the “flexibility” controlled sense is no longer a useful objec- argument essentially rests. tive for either side. Furthermore, claims the The “flexibility” school disputes the argu­ “flexibility” school, taking advantage of ment that a counterforce capability produces inevitable technological advances to mod­ destabilization wáth four counterpoints. ernize forces is not a true arms race. First, both sides have nearly always pos- The “flexibility” side also takes issue with sessed some counterforce capability, for in the “unthinkable” tag placed on limited nu­ reality a counterforce target is any military clear exchanges. The more we broadcast that target whether it be a soft airfield, depot, all nuclear responses are “unthinkable,” the radar, or control center or, more to the point, more the pragmatic Soviet leadership will be a hardened missile silo, nuclear storage area, tempted to seek political advantage in those or launch-control facility. Second, regardless areas where the threat of total nuclear of the pre-emptive provocation, the side that retaliation is not logical, hence not credible. attacks first must have extremely high confi- If all nuclear responses are considered un­ dence in the kill probability of its force or thinkable, then surely forces that are struc- else must accept being left wide open to a tured exclusively for an all-out nuclear counterattack from the enemy s manv response, and a nuclear strategy that is limit­ residual ICBMs, bombers, or submarine- ed to revengeful retaliation, are of no use for launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Uncer- demonstrating resolve during a serious crisis. tain kill probabilities and unsolved technical If the use of conventional-force options was problems (such as fratricide and dust and de- unsuccessful in responding to a Berlin occu- bris) raise serious doubts regarding the use- RETHINKING THE UNTHINKABLE 65 fulness of engaging in nuclear duels. In other sides and approach proposals for force reduc- words, as between opposing strategic Sys­ tions carefully. In sum, it is important to tems, while some counterforce capability is recognize that détente does not afford the difficult if not impossible to avoid, a decisive United States the luxury of decreasing mili- first-strike capability is likewise difficult if not tary strength unilaterally. impossible to achieve. The third point is that any first-strike or pre-emptive plans must ac- knowledge that the enemy may adopt a the Soviet threat “launch-under-attack” tactic. This in itself Because the purpose of any nuclear deter- would essentially negate the anticipated dis- rent policy is to deter a perceived or known arming nature of a first strike. The final point threat, the major threat factor should be con- advanced by the “flexibility,, school is that, sidered when treating proposed alterations even if successful in destroying over 95 per- to this policy. Policy-makers can issue more cent of the opponent’s ICBM force, the pre- useful guidance, and planners can better de- empting side would still be exposed to a vise successful strategies if the attempt is retaliatory strike from the enemy’s undam- made to understand the potential adver- aged undersea missile force and alert sary’s underlying politico-military philoso- bomber force. Questions concerning disarm- phies and war-making capabilities. This ing first strikes or pre-emptive actions must scrutiny is relevant if we are to assess the consider the synergistic relationships of the Soviets’ strategic force buildup during the total strategic force. For example, the com- past decade that has given them a levei of pounding effects of the Triad of land- and forces far in excess of what is needed for a sea-based missiles and manned bombers secure second-strike capability. would make it almost impossible for the Sovi- We know that the Russian view of the fun­ et Union to contemplate, much less carry- damental values of human life is different out, a planned, coordinated strike that could from the usual Western attitudes. A constant successfully destroy or negate all three com- in Russian history has been, for most of her ponents of our strategic nuclear force. people, an existence on the edge of terror; it As for excessive defense spending and dé- is a culture created by frequent chãos, the tente, the “flexibility” school acknowledges extreme tensions caused by stifling govern- that such things as medicai and social pro- ment Controls, and the desire to survive. The grams are worthy requirements. But the Russians have lived with hunger, violence, school also insists that the stark realities of unimaginable deprivations, the ever-present the strategic arms competition, aggravated fear of secret police, exile to labor camps, and by continued inflation, oblige the United torture—these have become a way of life to States to maintain or even increase leveis of the Soviet Citizen whether under the Czar or defense spending. Furthermore, States the Marxism-Leninism. The savage, prolonged argument, we must be careful not to become purges under Stalin (during which as many as enchanted with détente. Regardless of sur- 15 million Soviet citizens may have died6) face relationships, a healthy skepticism of offer stark examples of the carnage that lurks Soviet claims for peaceful coexistence is war- in the background of Russian existence. Ex- ranted as long as the Soviet Union continues periences such as these have produced a with its major strategic force modernization view of the world that cannot be perceived programs. Prudence dictates that we adopt a with any degree of confidence using Ameri­ pragmatic view and consider détente as a can attitudes and experiences. Thus, it is like- political or psychological tool used by both ly that the current generation of Soviet 66 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW leaders does not have the same perspective bility of Soviet strategic might, if the United of the world that American leaders have and States appears to be at a disadvantage, the is not likely to assess a crisis situation using Finlandization of nearby non-Communist the same criteria that we in this country countries may well follow—the latter select- might use. ing their positions on international issues so Of most importance is the Soviet view of as not to alarm or annoy the Soviets. If this strength and power in the international occurs, the international political equilibri- arena. Given their firm belief in the deca- um may be fatally disturbed, with Soviet in- dence and corruption of capitalism, they are fluence expanding as American influence certain that the fali of capitalist governments wanes. The potential consequences are awe- is inevitable. Capitalism is still seen as the some. This may not be a brilliant plan, but, as enemy of Marxism-Leninism, and the Soviets evidenced by their philosophy and their con- appear not to be completely confident that tinued buildup of military forces, it appears the capitalist States will not one day turn on that this is the way the Soviet leaders see it.8 the Soviet Union and seek to destroy it. At Given the Soviet determination to pre­ the same time, they remain convinced that serve what they have accomplished and to time is on the side of Marxism-Leninism, that survive capitalism, it would be unrealistic to patience is a virtue; “adventurism” is to be expect that the Soviets would invite disaster avoided, but weaknesses can be exploited. by initiating purposely all-out city-busting In the meantime the Soviets are striving warfare. However, conditioned for struggle for a higher ratio of strength vis-à-vis the as they are, they may be less inhibited than capitalist societies. The Russian philosophy we are about the employment of armed has always emphasized mass, whether it be force for political purposes. Consequently, it in the size of armies or numbers of tanks, would be imprudent of us not to recognize airplanes, missile forces, and soldiers. Any in- the possibility that the Soviets are better pre- crease in quantity provides a qualitative pared than we are to employ military forces change in the nature of reality, and superior for political objectives. If this is true, we forces are sought to enable them to over- might presume that if nuclear war comes it come the inferiority by which they are still so will be initiated with a modest test as the obsessed. With nuclear forces, a superiority Soviet Union seeks to manipulate enemy in numbers may present the Soviets with a perceptions of resolve and will. This should new kind of military potential. If the Soviet not be an unexpected by-product of a super- strategic force becomes so strong that the power force imbalance; unless the United correlation of forces shifts decisively in their States can meet the Soviets on an equal-capa- favor, the West may no longer be able to bility footing, we could expect a greater as- withstand Soviet political initiatives. The sertiveness from the Soviet bloc. Soviets are extremely conscious of power re- lationships; if they perceive the balance to “stability” versus “Rexibility " have changed in their favor, they can be ex- As between the stability/ flexibility argu- pected to seek political advantages.7 ments, the choice is not an easy one, in light This is not to say that they will launch reck- of the threat discussed in the preceding para- less military attacks; historically, they have graphs. Although the Soviet Union does not not been reckless. Furthermore, they may usually duplicate American military pro- believe overt military action to be unneces- grams, arms competition is a real problem. sary. Once the weaker non-Communist As one nation perceives new strategic countries become convinced of the invinci- capabilities being incorporated by the other, RETHINKINC THE UNTHINKA BLE 67 it is not unreasonable to expect the first to and flexible offensive counterforce capability explore the feasibility either of obtaining the need not suggest an intent or capability to new capabilities for itself or of developing install a disarming first-strike force against oflFsetting capabilities. Whether emerging the Soviet strategic forces. As emphasized technology or mere duplication is the stimu- previously, the relative invulnerability of the lus, whether it means an antiship cruise mis- undersea force and the rapid reaction of sile for the United States or the first aircraft which an alert bomber force is capable carrier for the Soviets, and multiple in- makes a first-strike tactic inconsistent with dependently targetable reentry vehicies for rational strategy even if the possibility of a the Soviets or a mobile ICBM for the United missile launch-under-attack tactic is dis- States, there is, and will continue to be, costly counted. arms competition between the two super- Nevertheless, the fear that more strategic powers. It is doubtful that unilateral efforts, flexibility would make nuclear war more like- based on sincere pleas that someone must be ly is certainly not entirely without justifica- first to stop the “insane” arsenal buildup, will tion. This is the most difficult objection to be successful alone in dampening the compe­ LNO to refute; if during a crisis a President’s tition in arms. Unilateral cutbacks would choices of actions involving nuclear weapons only succeed in permitting the other side to are not limited to unleashing the total strate­ grow stronger, and this is too great an advan- gic force, he may well be substantially less tage to give to the power-seeking Soviet gov- hesitant about ordering a nuclear attack, al- ernment. As long as communism and beit one limited in numbers and expected capitalism are opposing political systems, damage. Conceivably he might do so in lieu each side will continue to modernize and im­ of exploring all the diplomatic initiatives that prove its military forces in order to improve could possibly dampen the situation. Even or strengthen its security position. As insane more disturbing is the possibility that, once and costly as this may be, it appears that only nuclear exchanges begin, the tempo of the through additional arms-limiting negotia- conflict would increase and uncontrollable tions will there be any hope for real success escalation would be difficult to prevent. in slowing or ending arms competition be­ However, the threat of uncontrollable esca­ tween the rivais. lation also lends support to the case for LNO. The arguments against counterforce Today most strategists are agreed that deter- capabilities have been convincingly an- rence of nuclear war is not perfect; there is swered by the “flexibility” school. The rela- no guarantee that deterrence will never fail. tionship between LNO and a counterforce If nuclear war does erupt, it is difficult to capability that threatens a disarming first believe that the systems required for LNO strike would seem to be valid only if associat- (such as highly reliable sensors and com- ed with active or passive defenses capable of mand and control systems) and possessed by thwarting all three components of the strate- both sides would not aid in preventing esca­ gic Triad. It is highly improbable that this lation to massive exchange leveis. The ques- situation will ever occur as both sides are in- tion, then, is whether the LNO capability tent on seeing that perfect defenses are not will unacceptably diminish the inhibition to developed, as evidenced by the antiballistic initiate limited nuclear actions. missile (ABM) agreement reached during SALT I. For flexible options, the President confrontation needs only a limited force; this point is im- The most criticai test thus far between the portant to LNO advocacy. A small, accurate, Soviet Union and the United States began in 68 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW October 1962, when reconnaissance photo- by either side. But the Soviets were conced- graphs revealed that the Soviet Union was ed some advantages in missile throw-weight. installing offensive ballistic missiles in Cuba. The Vladivostok framework agreement be­ It is probable that the world came closer to tween President Ford and Secretary General nuclear holocaust during the subsequent 13 Brezhnev essentially placed an upper limit, a days than at any time before or since. In the ceiling, on the aggregates of the central end President Kennedy was able to convince strategic system, but not before the Soviets Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership that had achieved a quantitative lead in missile American resolve to have the missiles dis- forces.11 Now, with a limit on numbers, qual- mantled and removed was such that even a ity becomes the stimulus rather than quanti- shooting war was not too high a price. In ty. If throw-weight and yield increase and retrospect it appears that American naval accuracy and reliability are improved, coun- and strategic force strength provided the terforce capabilities will result whether they United States with sufficient politico-military are desired or intended. It will be unsettling leverage to convince the Soviets to back if to all of their large throw-weight missiles down and remove the missiles.9 the Soviets add multiple warheads with im­ There were cogent lessons to be learned proved guidance and thereby gain a qualita- from this remarkable episode. For American tive superiority as well. leaders the need to couple restraint with re­ solve probably was foremost. For the Soviets the lesson was also significant—a political perceptions venture in the international arena that is not There is an aspect of power relationships that backed by superior conventional and strate­ does not seem to be well understood in the gic forces is a bad risk. It appears to many United States; it centers on “political” or analysts that this lesson had a catalyzing “psychological” advantages that are likely to effect on Soviet force planners, and the mis- be perceived by all actors involved—the sile imbalance that we face today may well Soviet Union, the United States and her al- have had its roots in the outcome of the mis- lies, and countries of the Third World. Inter­ sile crisis. It appears that since then the Sovi­ national stability can best be served by a ets concentrated research and development perception of an equilibrium of strategic efforts on what they knew they could accom- forces as well as by fact. If American allies plish first: a quantitatively superior buildup and friends, and neutral countries, perceive of their long-range strategic missile force. that the Soviet Union possesses a marked Their massive missile program has given quantitative superiority vis-à-vis the United them a superiority in both size and numbers States, we can reasonably expect increasing of ICBMs, although not yet in numbers of doubt as to American capabilities to with- warheads or accuracy.10 stand Soviet political pressures. Possibly Recent arms control efforts have tended to emerging from this would be an eventual put a roof on the continued buildup. SALT I weakening of our alliances as confidence in was not an end in itself but the important first American resolve eroded. There is an addi- step of several that hopefully will reduce the tional consideration; qualitative inferiority is competition between the superpowers. It also significant and would add to the hand­ was a political agreement as much as it was icap of quantitative inferiority if both were a military one in that both sides essentially present. agreed to mutual vulnerability—no real This concern is exacerbated if American ABM defensive system was to be constructed leaders begin to doubt the utility of our own RETHINKINC THE UNTI1INKA BLE 69 strategic forces. The assured destruction sideration, however, is that the Soviets may philosophy is based on the fears associated find ways to use their expanding nuclear vvith the awesome destruction that accompa- force for political purposes other than mas- nies thermonuclear war. Whether we have sive, instantaneous nuclear exchanges cominced our potential adversary that nu­ against urban-industrial areas. It is unlikely clear war is too horrible to contemplate is a that the Soviets will challenge us directly, question we can never answer with any satis- but there remains the possibility of the de- factory degree of certainty. However, we velopment of a crisis situation wherein the may well have succeeded in convincing our- President may suddenly find himself contest- selves of this, and in a time of crisis we may ing issues that both he and his Soviet counter- become gripped by the paralysis of fear. If part consider “vital” to national security. our missile force is considered to be more Crises are likely to occur for unexpected rea- vulnerable and less effective than the Soviet sons and may well be the result of client-state Union’s, we could lose faith in its deterrent actions in the “tinderbox” areas of the world value. Flowing from this could be a subse- (World War I revisited?) and an inability on quent erosion of courage or resolve during the part of one or the other superpower to any major confrontation with the “superior” control adequately his competing client State Soviet Union. To counter this eventuality, we (e.g., the Middle East arena). It is possible need a symmetry of capabilities to provide that either superpower might initiate mili- faith in our ability to meet each strategic tary intervention or provide direct military blow' with an equivalent, adequate, but pru- assistance to a client so as to prevent that dent, counterblow. client from being defeated. The other super­ power may then attempt to counter partici- pation by his opponent, and in subsequent crisis management negotiations he could miscalculate objec- Is there any reason why we should be dis- tives and resolves and fali back on coercive turbed by an inequality of forces? Of what threats backed up with missile rattling. If, in value is all of the nuclear power possessed by such a situation, the confrontation escalates the two superpowers? That is, can this power to the point where the Soviets use or threat­ be translated into useful political instru- en to use nuclear weapons to coerce the ments for other than straightforward deter- United States, the President will need strate- rence of an all-out first strike? How can these gic-force options that do not involve either devastating forces be brought into play at the surrender or the high probability of mutual lower leveis of political confrontation? suicide. He will need a range of alternatives Heretofore, the Soviets have fallen back on between the two extremes corresponding to “rocket rattling” threats, and the United the Soviet threats or actions; that is, the capa- States has placed strategic forces on alert bility of threatening to respond or, if neces- status, but then what? Because of the strate­ sary, of actually responding with a limited gic realities of the “two scorpions in a bottle” nuclear strike against military targets. The situation, one can get only a limited amount most dangerous condition during a major cri­ of coercive mileage from tough attitudes that sis would be a unilateral capability for flexible threaten mutual annihilation. options; for the United States to forfeit an Today and in the foreseeable future the LNO capability would provide the Soviets a probability of a deliberate all-out nuclear ex- trump card to play during a crisis and expose change between the United States and the us to nibbling aggression. If it must be as- Soviet Union is very low. The decisive con- sumed that the Soviets will find that special- 70 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW ized nuclear capabilities are useful for pability for LNO requires improvements in demonstrating resolve and determination such areas as command and control mecha- during an acute crisis, then the United States nisms, secure Communications Systems, rapid must also incorporate capabilities to use her retargeting capabilities, and improvements strategic forces in something other than spas- in current missile guidance systems. Suggest- modic exchanges. Indeed, if the Soviet Union ed improvements are relatively inexpensive, recognizes that the United States possesses and none of the proposed programs would be capabilities and plans for flexible responses, in violation of any arms agreements or would the Soviet leadership may be less likely, not they require new missile silos. The concept more likely, to experiment with nuclear co- of limited strategic nuclear options is directly ercion; hence, the effectiveness of deter- related to our national security in time of rence should actually be improved. severe crisis situation and is developed on the basis of our perception of the Soviet threat and corresponding capabilities de­ LNO can provide signed to deal with that threat. “adaptive ” deterrence The basic question confronting American In conclusion, the theory of flexible re­ leaders and policy-makers is twofold: (1) how sponses—nuclear options—is not to be to escape a nuclear paralysis if we find our- feared; thinking the “unthinkable” need not selves confronting Soviet conventional- mean that nuclear war becomes more likely. forces victory or Soviet exploitation of its On balance, a mutual superpower capability limited strategic operations capability, while for LNO should tend to reduce the likelihood simultaneously (2) minimizing the risk of un- of a nuclear war rather than increase its controllable escalation. The military strength likelihood. What/5 dangerously destabilizing of a nation during a crisis depends, in the to the superpower nuclear balance is a uni­ final analysis, on capabilities and on resolu- lateral ability to employ nuclear weapons in tion. The United States needs a deterrence a finite measure in order to blackmail or co- posture that is adaptable and credible across erce the side that lacks a flexible response the entire spectrum of military scenarios. capability. Indeed, unilateral capability may This calls for nuclear weapons that can be induce the possessor to open the crisis game used to threaten, and conceivably to carry with a small nuclear strike designed to dem­ out, carefully planned, long-range “demon- onstrate resolve and determination to stration” strikes. achieve perceived objectives. A response-in- The primary purpose for a small attack ca­ kind capability possessed by both sides pability is to provide options short of an all- should discourage experimentation with nu­ out nuclear strike that should aid in deter- clear gamesmanship by either side; deter­ ring the Soviets from using their counter- rence of limited nuclear attacks becomes force advantages against this country as a real, and the international political equilibri- means of coercion during a crisis. LNO forces um is maintained and strengthened. What then would be designed for a selective and emerges from this is an unambiguous neces- flexible capability able to demonstrate: (1) an sity to be able to deter a Soviet coercive ability to make discriminate attacks, (2) a strategy for the rest of this decade and on desire to avoid escalation, and (3) a resolve to into the 1980s. avoid capitulation on enemy terms. The ca­ Offutt Air Force Base. Nebraska RETHINKING THE UNTH1NKABLE 71

Notes 7. For a scholarly discussion of the Soviet view on the use of nuclear 1. "President Richard M. Nixons Message on Foreign Policy for theweapons and their relationship to conventional warfare, see Palias C. 1970's to the Congress of the United States. February 18. 1970," Nixon: Brown, "Conventional Warfare in Europe—Soviet View," Military Review,, The Second Year ofHis Presidency (Washington: Congressional Quarterly. February 1975, pp. 58-71. 1971), p. 76-A. 8. For current Soviet politico-military philosophies, doctrines. and views, 2. "Report of the Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Con­ see Mdixism-Lenmsim on War and Army; Colonel Ceneral N. A. Lomov et gress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Pro- al„ ScientiBc-Technical Progress and the Revolution in MUitary Affairs; V, gram" (Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, March 4. 1974), p. Ye. Savkin et al.. The Basic Principies of Operational Art and Tactics; A. 4. S. Milovidov and V. C. Kozlov, The Philosophical Heritage of V. I. Lenin 3. Examples include Ted Greenwood and Míchael L Nacht, "The New and Problems of Contemporary War; and A. A. Sidorenko, The Offensive, Nuclear Debate: Sense or Nonsense?" Foreign .4ffairs. July 1974: Law- all translated and published under the auspices of the U.S. Air Force, rence Martm. "Changes in .American Strategic Doctrine—An Initial Inter- Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washing­ pretation." Surviv,a/. July-August 1974; and Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "The ton. 1970-1974. Rise of the Schlesinger Strategy." Washington Post. July 14.1974. Also see 9. For an easily read analysis of the Cuban Missilc Crisis from the rational- Orbis, Fali 1974, for eight related articles by authors such as C. W. Rath- actor viewpoint. see Elie Abel, The Missile Cnsis (Philadelphia: Lippincott, jens. Donald R. Westervelt. and Colin S. Cray. 1966). 4. G. W. Rathjens. "Flesrible Response Options," Orbis. Fali 1974, pp. 10. For the quantitative factors that are germane to deterrent relation- 683 óc 687-8. ships, see lan Bellamy. "The Essential Arithmetic of Deterrence." Journal 5. For a detaded exposition of this argument see Barry E. Carter, "Nu­ of the Royal United Services Institute. March 1973, pp. 28-34. clear Strategy and Nuclear Weapons," ScientiSc American. May 1974. pp. 11. See Edward Luttwak. “The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Nuclear Weapons Bal­ 20-31. ance," The Washington Papers, vol. II, no. 13, 1974, for a comparison of 6. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror Staíws Purge of the Thrrties U.S. and Soviet Union strategic nuclear forces (data obtained from unclas- (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 533. sified sources).

We not only need backup satellites, both in surveillance and Communications areas, but we will probably also need in the not too distant future what one might call defensive satellites so that our surveillance and Communications Systems can be protected from potential attack. We cannot forget that we live in a very insecure world and (that) there will be military purposes for that [Space Shuttle] system. Senator Harrison Schmitt (R-N.M.) Former Astronaut Defense /Space Daily, 8 March 1977 80 percent of all midshipmen must select an engineering ot Science major

CHANGING EDUCATIONAL GOALS AT THE UNITED STATES NAVAL ACADEMY Lieut ena nt Colonel Joseph J. Blum 72 F THE 16,294 young men who gradu- gram is very strong academically, fully ac- ated from the United States Naval credited, and benefits from an outstanding Academy (USNA) as members of the new physical plant. classes of 1949 through 1968, a total of 2142 O elected to be commissioned in the UnitedhistóricaI development States Air Force (USAF). A comprehensive research study completed in late 1972 in- The current USNA dedication to a strong en­ dicated that of this group, 1060, or about gineering and Science program is, in terms of 49%, were then on active USAF duty.1 Al- the institutions 131-year history, a fairly re­ though no data are available to update these cent phenomenon. The Naval Academy has figures, it is reasonable to assume that a large often been described by critics as a "trade number of these USNA graduates are still on school”—because of its real or perceived em- active duty.* phasis on applied disciplines and practical There is currently a high levei of interest training.3 That view is reinforced by the in, and interservice study of, the academic charge given to the academic board by Com- and professional training programs at the mander Franklin Buchanan, the first Super- three Service academies and at the U.S. Coast intendent, when the Naval Academy was Guard Academy. While it would be inaccu- organized in 1845: rate to assert that this interest and coopera- The course of instruction will be comprised un- tion have not always existed, it is a fact that der the following heads—Mathematics, Natu­ ral Philosophy, Chemistry, Gunnery, the use of recent developments, especially involving Steam, Geography, English Grammar, Arith- activities of the DOD Committee on Excel- metic, History, the French and Spanish lan- lence in Education (the so-called Clements’s guages and such other branches desirable to Committee, named for its chairman, W. P. accomplishment of a Naval Officer as your Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense) judgment may dictate. have accelerated this activity.2 Because of The implementation of this philosophy of the significant influence on current USAF training, designed to produce the “immedi- policies and programs exerted by sênior Air ately employable ensign,” resulted in devel­ Force officers (including several USAF gen­ opment over the years of a curriculum that erais) who are USNA graduates, and in view produced generations of outstanding naval of the current interest in academy curricula, leaders. The intent was not to produce re- it is instructive to examine the current Naval nowned scholars.4 The Naval Academy met Academy academic program. changing technical and operational require- Of primary interest is that portion of the ments in an evolutionary way; changes were USNA program that is designed to meet the always designed to meet the needs of the ever-increasing need for technically trained Navy while retaining the common educa- graduates. The changes that have taken tional experience considered by many to be place since 1968 have been so significant as essential for creating a cadre of dedicated to render the old, so-called “lock-step” cur- and technically proficient officers. riculum experienced by pre-1968 graduates The years after World War II through the unrecognizable in terms of the majors that late 1950s saw some course modifications and exist today. The current engineering pro- moderate shifts in emphasis, but it was a •Ai a hutoncal footnote. it should b« stated that not many USNA gradu- board of visitors report of March 1957 that ates have been added to the USAF rolls lince 1968. The áuthor is aware served as the impetus for significant changes of only two (one each from the cLasses of 1972 and 1976) who were direct USAF accessions Except in vcry unusual cases, such Navy-to-Air Force that took place in the Naval Academy cur­ transfers of graduates are not alknved. riculum beginning about 1959. Plans were 73 74 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW approved that year providing for integration If development of a minors program could of several courses and for greater emphasis be termed the second phase in the evolution on underlying principies and fundamentais of the Naval Academy engineering program, in technical and professional courses, rather then the third phase certainly is the im- than on current systems and material subject plementation of the majors-for-all program. to obsolescence. The “pendulum was begin- The development of the majors program in ning to swing toward greater emphasis on the years 1966-1969 was based on compre- academic effort,” eflFort designed to provide hensive introspection and courageous deci- a greater challenge to the brighter student sions on the part of innovative and to go well beyond the scope of the pre- superintendents and educators. The majors scribed curriculum.5 The realization of this program was established in September 1969 concept included the institution of valida- for the Class of 1971 and all subsequent tion, advanced elective courses, and over- classes. It was recognized from the begin- loading privileges. The first steps in what ning that significant emphasis needed to be rightly has been termed an “academic revo- placed on technical majors, in order to satisfy lution” in the Naval Academy curriculum the expanding needs of the Navy for techni- had been taken.6 cally trained graduates.7 Since the classes of Even though significant curriculum ad- 1971, 1972, and 1973 were on-board at the vances had taken place in the early 1960s, inception of the majors program, the Class of two-thirds of the brigade of midshipmen 1974 was the first class for which a goal defin- were still taking the prescribed 164-semester ing a desired distribution of majors could be hour curriculum. While these men were un- stated. This goal carne to be known as the doubtedly receiving a good, solid education, “40-30-20-10 split”: 40% of each class in the there was great concern that their education engineering majors, 30% in mathematics might not be adequate for the world of and other Sciences, 20% in the humanities change that they would encounter in the and social Sciences, and 10% in manage- 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, the load of ment. 164 hours was 20 more than required for The goal was not met by the Class of 1974; most degrees in engineering, and no real op- over 20% of the class selected analytical or portunity existed for the kind of in-depth general management majors and only 30% study that is generally recognized as a neces- selected engineering. The development of a sity in the professional development of engi­ common plebe (fourth-class) year, cur­ neering majors. Recognition of these riculum changes, and a more-effective re- deficiencies led to the development of a mi- cruiting campaign resulted in majors nors curriculum for the classes of 1968,1969, selections by the Class of 1975 that very and 1970 which included a 34-course core nearly matched the desired 40-30-20-10 curriculum and an elective sequence of six split. Since the engineering and Science ma­ courses. This program allowed for comple- jors are usually viewed as being equally effi- tion of a minor by every midshipman in one cacious in satisfying Navy needs, the goal was of 23 fields of concentration. This minors pro­ redefined in 1973 (for the Class of 1976) as gram was the genesis of the present majors being “70-30”: 70% in the combined engi­ program and included engineering study in neering and Science majors and the remain- aerospace, marine and mechanical engineer­ ing 30%in the humanities, social Sciences, and ing, naval architecture, and weapon systems. management. The initial free-choice selec- Science minors included applied Science, tion by the Class of 1976 resulted in a 69.8- chemistry, electrical Science, and physics. 30.2% split. Similarly, the Class of 1977 met 75 76 AIR UMVEfíSITY REVIEW the desired 70-30 split, even though the With this historical perspective, the majors humanities-social Sciences majors were over- program for the Class of 1979 can be de- subscribed at the expense of the mathemat- scribed in greater detail, and the USNA engi­ ics-sciences majors. neering majors can be reviewed. None of the The desired distribution of majors for the earlier USNA graduates who selected USAF Class of 1978 was influenced by a totally un- duty would recognize the curriculum today. related matter—that of visual acuity require- ments! In response to the Superintendent’s request to permit admission of more young the current program men with eye waivers, the Chief of Naval The twenty-five academic majors available Operations gave his approval, but with the for selection by the Class of 1979 are shown caveat that the requested 10% increase of in the following summary. men in this category be used to increase to 80% the number of technical majors (science and engineering) in each class.8 Thus, was born a new “80-20” requirement for majors selection, the same figure that is in effect to- day and which is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. The distribution of ma­ jors for 1978 at 77.1-22.9% attests to the painstaking search for candidates. Since the desired 80-20 split was not achieved, it was decided to ask the 2.9% “overage” (38 mid- shipmen) to accept their second choice (which had to be an engineering-science ma­ jor). Individual wishes were accommodated wherever possible, and ultimately, only two midshipmen raised strong objections. The U.S. Naval Academy is now firmly and eflfectively committed to the 80-20 split, and the entire admissions-through-selection pro- cess is geared to this need. The current USNA Catalog States it very clearly: “The needs of the Navy require that at least 80% of midshipmen in each class be enrolled in engineering, scientific, or mathematics ma­ jors.” Candidates are advised of this require­ ment before selection, and they are continually and forcefully reminded of it on several occasions prior to majors selection. That the process is working is evident from the fact that, when the Class of 1979 selected academic majors in March of 1976, 83.5% signed up for one of the 16 engineering- science choices. There were few complaints when they “missed” the 80-20 goal. EDUCA TIONA L COALS A T USNA 77 Management and Technology Group I—Engineering Mathematics Aerospace Engineering Oceanography Electrical Engineering Operations Analysis Engineering Physics Physical Science General Engineering Physics Marine Engineering Mechanical Engineering Naval Architecture Group III—Humanities and Ocean Engineering Social Sciences Systems Engineering American Political Systems Economics Group II—Sciences English Chemistry European Studies 78 AIR UNIVEfíSITY REVIEW Far Eastern Studies the past decade as have the engineering ma­ History jors. Many of the courses were developed (or International Security Affairs at least significantly modified) during that pe- Latin American Studies riod, initial professional accreditation was Soviet Studies won, and completely new laboratory and There is some modification to this list for the classroom facilities were constructed. The Class of 1980. The number of majors avail- engineering program is now very strong and able has been reduced to 18; the language is, to a very measurable degree, largely re- programs are no longer identified as majors, sponsible for the significant increase in tech- and several majors, such as engineering phy- nical majors over the past several years. This sics and operations analysis, have been elimi- is a noteworthy achievement in light of the nated. confusion as to exactly what is meant by the The 80-20 split required that 80% of the term “engineering” at the Naval Academy. Class of 1979 choose majors from Groups I A former Superintendent stated it very well: and II; the remaining 20% could choose from When many of us talk about engineering at the Group III. The actual free-choice selection Naval Academy, we mean instruction in the carne out as follows: operation and maintenance of machinery on board ship. More specifically, we are referring Group Number Percent to an understanding of boilers, turbines, hot 1 564 47.9 wells, surge tanks, feed pumps, electrical Sys­ II 420 35.6 tems, and their interrelationships. This is im­ portant material for each Naval Academy III 194 16.5 graduate and much of my effort over the past four years has been involved with reinserting As mentioned earlier, few objections were this sort of work back into our program. How- raised to this result, although some faculty ever, it has little to do with engineering educa- tion in its academic sense. If we are to produce members are concerned because any further graduates who have a reasonable grounding in significant increase in Group I and II choices the analytical aspects of engineering, we must could adversely affect the viability of the be certain that we have sound programs in Group III majors. This concern, incidentally, such areas as dynamics and statics, strength of is shared as much by the engineering and materiais, fluid dynamics, thermodynamics, and heat transfer. The engineering field has Science faculty as by instructors in the Group become so complex that some specialization is III areas. Since midshipmen enrolled in the required. Those who would study in depth in engineering majors must take a total of 24 the electrical and electronic fields must pursue semester hours of humanities/social Sciences a different program from those whose main in- courses, it is extremely important that majors terest is in, say, the mechanical or aeronautical in these areas remain “alive and well.” The fields.9 discontinuation of these majors would obvi- The Naval Academy has developed the ously (and quickly) affect the quality of both “sound programs” Admirai Calvert called the humanities/social Sciences faculty and for. The best measure of that soundness is the courses, and the remaining majors would fact that all those engineering programs list- suffer for it. ed for which accreditation was sought were granted this distinction. The national agency that conducts such reviews for all U.S. engi­ the engineering majors neering curricula is the Engineers* Council Probably no area of the Naval Academy cur- for Professional Development (ECPD), riculum has changed so dramatically over which includes representation from 15 of the EDUCA TIONAL GOALS A T USNA 79 most prestigious engineering societies in this The major has “gotten well,” however, and country. The following USNA engineering has re-emerged as a midshipman favorite. majors received initial ECPD accreditation The systems engineering major has also ex- in the year indicated and still hold that dis- perienced unprecedented growth, which is tinction: somewhat remarkable in view of the low 1970:Aerospace Engineering public awareness of this relatively new ma­ Electrical Engineering jor. Only eleven ECPD-accredited systems Mechanical Engineering engineering programs exist in the U.S.; the Systems Engineering 45 men who graduated from the USNA in 1972:Marine Engineering 1975 with that degree represented nearly 24 Naval Architecture percent of the entire U.S. output! Ocean Engineering While it might be instructive to examine There is no intent to achieve such accredita­ each, or even several, of the USNA engineer­ tion for the major in general engineering; ing or Science majors in detail, space limita- only one member of the Class of 1979 was tions obviously preclude such an analysis. permitted to enter it as an initial choice, and However, the engineering majors have a sig- it is usually reserved as a fall-back position nificant amount of commonality so that it is from the ECPD-accredited curricula. possible, and perhaps worthwhile, at least to There has been a steady increase in the summarize the content of one of them. numbers of midshipmen selecting the vari- ous engineering majors o ver the past several years. These numbers are shown in Table l.10 The catastrophic decrease in the strength of a representative the aerospace engineering major that oc- engineering major curred between the classes of 1974 and 1975 The newest engineering major at the Naval reflected attitudes regarding the aerospace Academy, and indeed in the U.S., is systems industry, and education in that area, vvhich engineering. Any discussion of this major ob­ existed in 1971-1972 throughout the U.S. viously should be preceded by a clear and

Table 1. Engineering major selections NAVAL ACADEMY CLASS Engineering 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Major______Mkjshipmen Selecting Major Dutlng Plebe Year

Aerospace 92 91 125 120 28 64 64 76 89

Electrical 26 43 58 67 48 63 62 82 87

Mechanical 67 58 62 62 89 64 88 139 125 Naval Architecture 16 13 21 28 37 24 38 43 37

Ocean 15 17 56 93 86 48 55 82 74

Marine 14 17 13 24 30 30 28 52 64

Systems 29 22 35 29 60 53 58 59 76

General -_ _24 9561

Total 259 261 370 423 402 355 398 539 553

EDUCA TJONAL COALS A T USNA 81 unambiguous definition of the term. It would In this major, as in most of the USNA engi­ be nice if such a definition existed; many very neering curricula, required study in math- eloquent words have been written to de- ematics extends one course beyond a formal scribe the various curricula which carry this course in differential equation theory. For designation, but there is little agreement as systems engineering, this includes a course in to precisely what topics or subjects are com- probability and statistics. The engineering mon.11 In any event, at the Naval Academy, Science group includes eight semester-hours it is meant to be an interdisciplinary major of electrical engineering and 14 semester- encompassing all the separate fields of engi- hours of mechanical engineering. Required neering as well as the physical and, more re- work in the basic Sciences includes eight cently, the social Sciences. It involves hours each of chemistry and physics (two significant analog, digital, and hybrid Com­ courses in each area) and one two-hour puter work and automatic control. In many course in digital Computer programming. U.S. engineering schools, this major might be The professional courses in the systems engi­ viewed as a sub-set of electrical engineering. neering major are the same as those required The systems engineering curriculum, like in the other ECPD-accredited USNA engi­ all other USNA engineering curricula, has neering curricula and include navigation, na­ undergone significant change in the past val Science, leadership, seamanship and year or so in the so-called professional course tactics, naval weapon systems, and law. area. This area includes a number of courses designed to provide the midshipman with specialized training and education necessary The U.S. Naval Academy, like the academies for professional development as a naval offic- of its sister Services, was created in order to er. These professional courses are required of increase the professionalism of the officer all midshipmen and are probably the closest corps.* The continuing development of the courses in the current program to some of curriculum over the years, culminating in those studied by graduates of the old school. implementation of the majors-for-all pro- For the Class of 1980, the systems engineer­ •The need, however. was not nearly so dramatically illustrated in 1954 in the Air Force as it was in 1842 in the Navy. A near-mutiny at sea resulted ing major contains those major areas of study in trial, conviction, and hanging of a midshipman and two enlisted men. shown in Table 2. Unfortunately, the midshipman was the son of the Secretary of War!

Table 2. USKA Systems Engineering major

Semester-Hours of Study by Semester Area of Study 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total Mathematícs 4 4 3 4 3 18 Other Basic Sciences 64 44 18 Engineering Sciences 5 3 4 7 3 22 Systems Engineering,Required 3 6 6 3422 Elective 6 6 12 Humanities/Social Sciences, Required 6 6 3 15 Elective 3 3 39 Professional 34 3 5 6 3 2 2 28 Other Electives 3 3 Total 19 18 18 19 19 19 17 18 147 82 AIR UMVERSITY REVIEW grams, has always been designed to accom- emphasis has sometimes created potential plish this objective. In today’s environment, conflicts between technical education and in all the Services, a need for professionalism professional training—the “balance between equates to a need for the best technical train- Athens and Sparta” as a previous USNA su- ing possible. The engineering majors are perintendent described it—the academies eminently well-suited to this goal. An ECPD- must remain, above all else, engineering accredited engineering degree is visible schools.12 The dedication and professional­ recognition of the attainment of a high levei ism of the Spartan are necessary requisites of technical achievement; it is a benchmark for military and naval success, but the schol- against which the quality of an institution’s arly and intellectual depth derived from suc- graduates can be measured. It is small won- cessful pursuit of a tough technical major der, then, that the Navy and Air Force as- represents modern-day Athenian virtues on siduously guard the integrity of their which that professionalism can be built. academies’ engineering degrees. While this United States Naval Academy

Notes 1. Lieutenant Colonel R.J. Lucas. USAF. and Major W. E. Hodge, USAF, 8. CNO Memorandum to USNA Superintendent et al„ Subject: Visual "The USNA Craduate in the Air Force." Shipmate, vol. 36, no. 10, Novem- Acuity Requirements for Entrance to the USNA, 9 January 1974. ber 1973, pp. 34-38. 9. Vice Admirai James Calvert, USN, "Thoughts upon Conclusion of a 2. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum to the Departments of the Four-year Tour." Shipmate, vol. 35, no. 4. April 1972, pp. 7-9. Army, Navy. and Air Force, Subject: The Service Academies: Conclusions 10. History, United States Naval Academy. Division of Engineering and and Initiatives, 28 April 1975. Weapons. 1 July 1975-30 June 1976. 3. Professor John D. Yarbro, "USNA Curriculum Development," revised 11. Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Blum, USAF. "An Introductory Course in edition, January 1974. Systems Engineering," Engineering Education, vol. 65. no. 3, December 4. Rear Admirai R. W. McNitt, USN iHet). "Challenge and Change, the 1974. pp. 238-11. Naval Academy: 1959-1968,"Shipmate. vol. 35, no. 4, April 1972, pp. 3-6. 12. Vice Admirai James Calvert, USN, "The Fine Line at the Naval 5. Ibid., p. 3. Academy," Naval InstituteProceedings, vol. 96, no. 10/812, October 1970, 6. Yarbro, p. 5. pp. 63-67. 7. Dr Bruce M. Davidson, Academic Dean, USNA, "VVho Takes What?” Shipmate, vol. 38, no. 8. October 1975, pp. 33-35. Editor's note: The article reflects data available as of July 1976.

A decision is the action an executive must take when he has information so incomplete that the answer does not suggest it- self. A dmiral Arthur Wil l ia m Radford Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (1957) world of competing alliances and weapons. / t i books Stung by Soviet actions culminating in the 1948 Berlin blockade, the U.S. returned to conscription, and the spiral of military com- petition emerged. These developments, cou- pled with the inevitability in a pluralistic democracy of both defense policy and the defense budget being products of political competition, combined to create the postwar environment in which decisions were made. Although the policy debates in pre-Korean days are notable for the absence of heavy civilian involvement, the constant theme of “who gets how much money for what mis- sions” does appear. The military Services themselves were the primary actors before 1950. In 1948 a Presidential Commission on Air Power argued that although bombing might not win the next war, it could prevent AMERICAN DEFENSE losing that war. In 1949, General Ornar Brad- POLICY, 1945-1977 ley asserted that one must first blunt the ene- my attack, then mobilize and deploy the A Review Essay Army to win the crucial land battles. General Hoyt Vandenberg, meanwhile, believed that Roy A. W erner air power would weaken political resolve. But President Truman obviously disagreed and partially impounded funds for “exces- sive” air wings. The Navy criticized the B-36 EFENSE, like all political language, is a and its atomic strategy with Admirai Arthur Deuphemism. It imparts a neutral tone W. Radford reminding us that the atomic to the ugly reality of conflict. Reviews of fiveblitz was not an effective deterrent. The only books that are concerned with the formula- significant civilian involvement, aside from tion of U.S. defense policies, the impact of the White House, carne with George Kennan allies on those policies, and what forces and his containment concept which fur- might shape future defense policies are pre- nished the intellectual rationale for policy- sented in this article. Because policy deci- makers. sions are always part philosophy and part These early policy debates naturally in- exigency, it is important to understand the volved the allocation of resources. As early as constellation of forces that interact in the May 1946, Truman had declared that the FY policy formulation process. 1948 military programs “could have one- In 1945 many hoped that the cooperation third of the funds remaining after the fixed of the Allies might carry over into a peaceful [domestic] charges had been met.”1 By the international system. Spheres of influence, spring of 1950, however, the National Securi- however, were soon established, and the ty Council had noted the sharply increased division of Germany made bipolarity a fact. Soviet capabilities and recommended im- The international system again became a mediate corresponding U.S. increases. Tru- 83 84 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW man held firm against the recommendation three weeks.2 Finally, contrary to Mackind- until the outbreak of Korean fighting made er’s original theory, the heartland is now ac- the issue obsolete. cessible to nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles. Walters’s work is often irrelevant to its Strategy central theme (still, the chapter on the blitz- Now a provocative bookj by a British krieg is excellent). Nevertheless, the world is scholar, Robert E. Walters, argues that the entering a new maritime era where oceanic U.S. committed two basic mistakes in its post- natural resources, strategic deterrence, and World War II policies: first, we allowed mili- the natural rivalry between States will make tary strategy to determine overall policy; the seas critically important to all. Perhaps and, second, this “mistaken” nuclear strategy the most interesting segment of the book is produced the wrong policies. The author the discussion of the new capital ship, a nu­ holds that American policy-makers unwit- clear underwater vessel. Even though the tingly married the heartland theory of Sir idea is old, Walters’s treatment is lively and Halford J. Mackinder to nuclear deterrence. informative. One suspects that in the near However, contrary to his statement, the au­ future Admirai Hyman G. Rickover will also thor does not prove his theory “by analysis quote Sir Julian S. Corbett, a turn-of-the-cen- and reasoning.” Secretary of Defense Louis tury British naval strategist, who said the ma­ Johnson cut back pre-Korean force leveis be- jor problem in naval history is “reconciling cause of the American nuclear monopoly and sea endurance with free movement.” a desire to save money. This same concern for dollars, the failure of the NATO alliance to meet the 1953 Lisbon manpower goals, Allies and the overwhelming Soviet conventional If, then, Walters is wrong and our re­ superiority led to the adoption of a series of sources dictated our foreign policy and defensive strategies centering about the un- American military strategy was derived from certainty of nuclear release. The key deter- a grand strategy, the paramount issue of the minants were clearly budgetary constraints early postwar years was how to treat our de- and manpower leveis. Moreover, Walters feated enemies. Both Germany and Japan seems unable to comprehend that deter­ were judged to be capable of resuming ag- rence existed long before nuclear weapons gressive actions. Thus, to allow demobiliza- ushered in our revolutionary epoch. Many tion while fulfilling occupation duties readers will agree with the author that a bal­ demanded a political strategy incorporating ance of power is desirable and that NATO significant political, economic, and military needs greater maritime strength. However, elements. Policy toward Japan was clear— the recent Soviet growth in air power assets disarmament, demilitarization, and democ- is ignored. More fundamentally, Walters fails ratization. Policy toward Germany was, of to explain how control of the Atlantic affects course, more complex given the Cold War tank battles on the Central Front. Sea control and the later realization of the need for Ger- is vital but, as the Chief of Naval Operations man military manpower. notes, only in a NATO war lasting more than Alliance politics inevitably imposes limita- f Robert E. Walters, Sea Power and the Nuclear Fallacy: .4 Re-evalua- tion of Global Strategy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1975, $10.95), 215 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 85 tions on the freedom of all members. The and the 1976 initiative on intemational ter- United States first encountered these limita- rorism at the United Nations (the first major tions with Germany and, more recently, has FRG intemational action). Contrast this to witnessed these mutual constraints in deal- the increasing difficulties faced by America ing with Japan. Although the Federal Repub- and Japan in recent years: military bases, lic of Germany (FRG) renounced possession American-imposed fishing reductions in U.S. of nuclear arms in 1954, Chancellor Konrad waters, the “two Chinas” problem, the issue Adenauer’s insistence on equality within the of whether Japan should assume additional alliance made nuclear sharing a constant defense responsibilities, and now a clash over domestic and alliance problem between nuclear reprocessing. Clearly, the early occu- 1954 and 1966. Solutions such as the Multilat- pation years dramatically affected the Japa- eral (nuclear) Force (MLF) were advanced, nese. and eventually the Nuclear Planning Group The three most commendable essays in (NPG) granted Germany the prestige of full a volume edited by a former Army officer, partnership and enhanced diplomatic flexi- James Buck,ff clarify the impact of the bility. occupation: the absence of a viable military In an obviously academic work, Catherine tradition; the continuing urbanization that Kelleher richly describes the German ex- further shrinks the manpower recruitment perience of these years and relates it well to pool; and the patterns by which antimilitary broader intemational events.f For example, opinion is formed within the culture. Despite she notes that in 1948 General Hans Speidel the success of our policies promoting pa- argued that German feelings of military in- cifism and discrediting the gumbatsu (mili­ feriority would make them a weak link in the tary clique), the present Director General of Western defensive system. Full rearmament, the Japanese Defense Agency (JDA), utiliz- however, was clearly unacceptable to our ing his talents and credibility as a former British and French allies. Thus, the creation minister of education, is beginning to change of a nuclear weapons advisory committee attitudes. Now in Japan one can encounter became the solution. Yet today the NPG still public discussions of defense issues. Further, obscures basic policy differences between the September 1976 translation of the latest the allies. The desire of the FRG is to halt the JDA "White Paper” hints at the Soviet mari- war at the border. Their reasoning is obvious: time threat—something never before done if the nuclear threshold is passed, better that by a government unwilling even to discuss the release occur on the frontier instead of threat perceptions. The importance of such deep in German territory since more than shifts in societal attitudes has been made fifty percent of the work force is within eight clear by Zbigniew Brzezinski in discussing hours of the border by armor column. Never- the impact of possible American attitudinal theless, the resolution of the nuclear sharing shifts that make it “almost axiomatic that an issue has freed German foreign policy—as is isolationist U.S. will definitely create a na- evident from the earlier efforts at Ostpolitik tionalist and militarist Japan.” The mainte-

tCatherine McArdle Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons(New York: Columbia University Press, 1975, $15.00), 372 pages. tf James H. Buck, editor, The Modern Japanese Military System (Beverly Hills, Califórnia: Sage Publications, 1975, $15.00 hardback, $7.50 paper), 249 pages. 86 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW nance of alliance cohesion is indeed in the Pearl Harbor,” and the avalanche of criti- best interests of America, her allies, and re­ cism began. Even a “cold warrior" New York gional stability. Times editorialized in support of a crash pro- gram to “assure our superiority in missiles.” The only commonality among the critics was Eisenhower under Attack a desire for change.4 “Innovators” such as Eisenhower continued the Truman policy Maxwell Taylor, Hyman Rickover, and James of a ceiling on defense spending and pro- M. Gavin, influenced “popularizers” such as ceeded to finalize a network of regional the Alsop brothers, John Finney, and Hanson security treaties. Events, however, forced in- Baldwin. Both categories of people found creases in defense budgets. Defense spend­ their ideas and arguments articulated by ing rose, in constant 1954 dollars, from a “capitalizers” such as Senators Johnson, Sym- 1950 figure of $16 billion to a 1954 high of ington, and later Kennedy, for political ad- $41.2 billion, before leveling ofif at about $38 vantage. However, those senators, each billion annually for the remainder of Eisen- seeking the Presidency, were guilty of the hower’s term.3 same error often committed by legislators to- The Sputnik launching in 1957, however, day—an emphasis on defense budgetary is- destroyed Ike’s hopes for a “long-haul” de­ sues to the exclusion of the relationship fense budget that avoided the peaks and val- between defense and foreign policy. Indeed, leys of pre-Korean days. Although the the weakest chapter in Aliano’s book con- Eisenhower administration never added sub- cerns precisely those civilian theorists who stantial new funds, the dissent caused by the raised such troublesome points: Brodie, Soviet space success made possible rapid in- Kahn, Kaufman, Kissinger, Osgood, Wohl- creases in the early sixties. Individual mili- stetter. The chapter merely strings together tary dissenters found civilian allies and their quotes devoid of any analysis. Are men attacked the administration policies. Superb of ideas blind to the transfer problems of aca- coverage of this crucial 1957-1960 period is demic models to policy prescriptions? How found in Richard Aliano’s book.f His work do scholars deal with conflicts of loyalty— also subjects the various “process theories” truth or partisan political advantage? Why (Huntington and Janowitz on the military, did the renaissance of the fifties, the power of Fenno on Congressional committees, Cohen these “action-intellectuals” in the sixties, on the press) to examination, and the theo­ lead to the doubting of their contribution in ries stand the test well. The analysis of the the seventies? shift from massive retaliation to flexibile re­ sponse concludes rather obviously that strategic policy formulation is a “social rather than an intellective process, involving A New Era myriad interests and opposing values and Pax Americana ended in 1973. Now we are their conciliation.” groping for an uncertain future. Because di- The reality of this social process was clear plomacy must attempt to influence events when Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. before core security interests become Johnson called Sputnik “today’s scientific predominant, the essays assembled by

fRichard A. AIianOy4/ne/7can Defense Policy from Eisenhower to Kennedy{Athens: Ohio University Press, 1975, $13.50), 309 pages. BOOKS AND IDEAS 87 Professor Richard Rosecrance deserve care- Geographically, an essay by François Du- ful reading.f The premise of this volume is chene presents a role for the European Com- that the era of American hegemony is over munity as a regional resource in crisis but that the United States now enjoys a management situations. Cyprus, however, greater maneuverability in foreign policy as proves that the community needs improve- contrasted to those earlier years. The basic ment to reach such a position. Brigadier lesson, according to Rosecrance, is simply “If Hunt then develops a medíocre essay on the American forces are engaged in any conflict Far East that fails to weigh the Taiwan issue . . . the encounter must be short and deci- adequately, given the security treaty which sive.” Such analysis followed Korea and was makes a “Japanese solution” of trade feasible forgotten in Vietnam except by General but diplomatic recognition more difficult. Giap. Yet, Rosecrance’s formula needs an ad- Hunt ignores his Commonwealth neighbors, dition—can America successfully make war Australia and New Zealand, while doing a without going on a moral crusade? Our slightly better job on the regional impact of renewed emphasis on short war strategies in possible American withdrawals from South Europe and Korea would indicate that many Korea, recognizing that the mode of disen- are concerned that the answer is negative. gagement is all important. Even here, however, there exist bedeviling The gem of the Rosecrance volume is the questions: What is in the national interest? display of argumentative reasoning by Coral VVhat is the role of tactical nuclear weapons Bell. She contends that the benefits of dé- in escalation options? Thus, our immediate tente outweigh its costs. “Détente is a strata- future should be devoted to re-establishing a gem for the management of adversary power basic consensus on these points, for in a which aims at securing the essential power democratic society strategy must rest on interest of America and maintaining its es­ what is possible. sential diplomatic competitiveness at less The single area where the American pub- than exorbitant costs.” This relationship be- lic has become more aware is the increasing- tween “enemy brothers,” to use Raymond ly important economic dimension. Robert Arons phrase, is, she believes, a safety net Gilpin, in a lucid piece included in America which insulates the superpowers from re­ as an Ordinary Country illustrates how gional disasters such as the 1973 Middle East- political economy should be written. He links ern War. Bell argues that détente is worth economic and political change and then for- the slight risk of Soviet economic gain, espe- mulates a pattern of how such changes may cially given the greater leverage gained by affect political decisions and governmental the U.S. from playing on the Sino-Soviet dis­ policies toward multinational corporations pute. Of course, the criticai unstated assump- (MNCs). The Assistant Secretary of Treasury tion is that the Western powers are not lulled for International Affairs, C. Fred Bergsten, into a false sense of security. Recent Soviet supplements that analysis with a selection pronouncements make clear that détente is emphasizing the U.S. need to redress likely but a continuation of earlier peaceful coexist- future imbalances by MNCs—at U.S. expense ence tactics. One also wonders if an ex- —toward their hosts in developing countries. pert on the Soviet system would contend

t Richard Rosecrance, editory4/ne/7ca as an Ordinary Country: U.S. loreign Policy and the Future(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1976, $9.75), 276 pages. 88 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW that these economic gains will serve to focus The criticai issue of nuclear nonprolifera- the leadership more on the satisfaction of tion illustrates these new trends. American material desires or simply allow them to ex- policy is creating disagreement with tradi- pand military capabilities? It is a pity that the tional allies over nuclear supply issues. This editor did not seek such a contribution. situation is then further complicated by the desire of other States to acquire these weap- ons for security and prestige reasons, despite O ur future, however, will assuredly see in- the limited utility of such weapons. Non- creased linkages between international proliferation, thus, cuts across a mix of eco­ events and domestic political struggles. The nomic, political, and military issues. theater of international politics has one per- Deterrence, for example, may be impossible vasive factor, its own interdependence: rapid in the year 2000 if a State cannot identify population growth in developing countries; a who launched a nuclear attack because of the widening gap in the economic standing be­ proliferation of such weapons. In such a tween rich and poor nations; dwindling sup- world no reprisal makes sense unless one is plies of energy and agriculture; and, perhaps willing to unleash the spasm of total nuclear most significantly, the lengthy periods re- conflict. How, then, are leaders to formulate quired for scientific advances that may help defense policies? alleviative such problems. Thus, shifting in­ Future policy implementation will de- ternational coalitions, greater intrusion of mand both cross-national actions and new in­ domestic politics into foreign policies, a de- ternational institutions. Yet there is no way clining (but still necessary) utility of military to ignore the truth, “Threat systems are the force, multiple channels for influencing basis of politics as exchange systems are the world events, and the intertwined nature of basis of economics.”5 Policy-makers and these problems, all combine to force a new those governed by them cannot afford illu- agenda on statesmen. sions. Washington, D.C.

Notes either the amount requested for defense or. not uncommonly. even more dollars. 1 Samuel P Huntington. The Comrnon Defense (New York: Colum- 4. Conventional wisdom often fails to consider a later press conference bia University Press, 1961), p. 42. in 1954 in which John Foster Dulles stated that massive retaliation was a 2. Admirai James L. Holloway III, Hearings: Department of Defense "capacity," not a policy. Hence. the doctrine quickly became one of selec- Appropriation Fiscal Year 1976. part 3, 1975. p. 197. Note especially the tive retaliation. Further. few note the beginnings of both the Polaris and favorable assumptions that convoys were formed prior to the outbreak of Minuteman programs in the Eisenhower administration. war and that they encounter no hostile forces. 5. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War (London: Macmillan, 1973), p. 3. Indeed, from 1950 until 1969 the administrations always received 31.

We view our command, and all our military forces as but a part— a single thread in the total fabric of the society that nurtures us. We have no needs beyond the needs of that society—what the citizens of the United States want from their strategic forces. G eneral Russell E. D ougherty. USAF Commander, Strategic Air Command POTPOURRI

The Superwarriors: The Fantastic World of ly, on what each feels is the best approach to Pentagon Superweapons by James W. national security. In this regard, Mr. Canan Canan. New York: Weybright and Tallev, has done us a disservice by concentrating on 1975, 375 pages, $12.50. the negative aspect of things. The Superwarriors also suffers from tech- The pendulum of public opinion regarding nical inaccuracies that may be a result of the military seems to sway back and forth. oversimplification and condensation more Current support for a record defense expen- than anything else. Controversies such as the diture indicates that we may have “turned squabbles over the F-14 and F-15 are re- the comer.” Yet, it was less than twelve duced to simple terms and do not take into months ago, in the aftermath of Watergate, account the hard realities that each Service that aspiring journalists and public figures set has had to consider in planning for its future out to conduct a “national purification.” Such missions and operating conditions. agencies as the FBI, CIA, and others were Still, some of what the author says is inter- subjected to increased scrutiny. esting and provocative. Perhaps this is the In light of all these activities, it seems ap- greatest value of the book: it gives us a pic- parent that the Department of Defense ture of the way in which some of those out- carne out of the investigations in fairly good side of the Department of Defense view the standing. However, some “hits” were taken organization. Whereas many professional in books such as The Superwarriors: The Fan­ officers will find weaknesses in the book, it is tastic World of Pentagon Superweapons by nevertheless worth reading just to get anoth- journalist James Canan. This work has two er view from outside the establishment. themes: first, the Pentagon is supposed to be Captain Robert S. Bartanowicz, USAF procuring a multitude of unnecessary super­ Department of History weapons; and, second, (and most disturbing) USAF Academy interservice conflict has driven the Depart­ ment of Defense into a series of grave fiscal and operational sins. Out of the Blue: U.S. Army Airborne Opera- Mr. Canan uses the Pentagon’s superweap­ tions in World War II by James A. Huston. ons as foils to launch an attack on interservice West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue Universi- competition and to accentuate Joint Chiefs of ty Press, 1972, index, xi -f 327 pages, Staff differences with their civilian superiors. $ 10.00. Though many may accept some of the allega- tions, taken in the proper perspective, these For the thoughtful armed forces officer, rivalries should sometimes be considered as this is a disturbing book, detailing the cre- healthful and perhaps even necessary. In- ation and use of American airborne forces in terservice differences of opinion among the World War II. Though James Huston sur- past, present, and future Secretaries of De­ prises and disappoints the reader, in the end fense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are not he performs valuable Service by providing necessarily based on any competition for au- perspectives that enrich professional judg- thority or funding advantages but, more like- ment. The book is a useful case study in deci- 89 90 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW sion-making for those seeking preparation ing grace is that there is enough in Out of the for wartime crises of rapidly changing tech- Blue to enable the reader to develop an in- nologies, industrial trade-offs, and strategic formed opinion. options. Lieutenant Colonel Rod Paschall Huston disappoints the reader by his un- Cominander, 3d Bn 5th SpeciaJ Forces Group even handling of operations and other sub- Fort Bragg, N.C. jects. He goes to great lengths in discussing Operation Market-Garden but gives Pacific- Asian exploits only brief coverage. While he The Shah: The Glittering Story of Iran and explains the American prewar concept of air- Its People by Edwin P. Hoyt. New York: borne forces as the use of small detachments Eriksson, 1976, 244 pages, $10.00. of demolitionists placed behind enemy lines, he neglects the rather significant contribu- Since Edwin Hoyt has chosen to give me tion of the use of both parachutists and air the benefit of his prejudices in his book, The supply techniques Office of Strategic Ser­ Shah, I feel justified in giving him mine in vices during the war. this review. The book reads like a Reader's The author is at his best in describing the Digest compendium of irrelevancies artfully rather surprising trade-off between strategic strung together to give the impression of bombing and airborne forces in the Euro- thorough research and penetrating analysis. pean theater, a controversy that placed Gen­ It is neither. Rather, the book is an attempt erais Eisenhower and Marshall in opposite to elevate facile journalism to the levei of corners. Huston points out that, despite its serious historical writing without sacrificing low priority, by 1945 American airborne any of those delicious tidbits from the Shah’s capacity could have projected, and likely sus- personal life that might titillate the reader tained, a force of ten infantry and airborne and justify the book’s subtitle, The Glittering divisions deep in enemy territory. However, Story of Iran and Its People. Sad to say, Mr. the dedication to strategic bombing severely Hoyt has once again proved the old adage retarded the growth of airborne potential. that “all that glitters is not gold.” Perhaps the most important result was that Our story begins as the author lands in Te- airborne forces never had a suitable combat heran to write his book and is confronted by aircraft designed for their use. American air­ the great clichê of modem Middle Eastern borne units went to war with a great mill- life: the juxtaposition of the Old and the stone because of the resulting limitation: a New. Thus, the scene is set, metaphorically crippling lack of ground mobility and fire- speaking, for the rest of the book. By means power once they had landed behind enemy of a series of flashbacks, we glimpse the flow- lines—the natural consequence of the strate­ ering of the Modem Imperial Idea as the old gic bombing priority. Shah, Reza Khan, schools his son Muham- The author concludes that, since airborne mad, soon to be the Shahinshah, the Light of was denied a strategic role, it was destined to Lights, in the art of Oriental statecraft. We be used as a tactical adjunct to other forces, ponder whether this young man of ascetic usually relegated to securing bridgeheads or and religious proclivities can bridge the gap preventing enemy reinforcement. Unfortu- between the East and the West, the Tradi- nately, Huston does not take a stand. His tional and the Modern, and in his person sources suggest that he has done more re- bring Iran into the twentieth century. Old search in this field than any other historian, Reza Khan, autocratic, cruel, and despotic but he deprives the reader of his judgment. but burning to become the Ataturk of the One cannot read the book without wonder- Persians, must pass this burden to his son and ing if the author believes airborne forces de- go into exile, the victim of Great Power ma- served a bigger claim on the limited chinations. Will the new Shah make it? Can resources of World War II America. The sav- there be any doubt? And in the meamvhile. BOOKS AND IDEAS 91 Muhammad Reza will make it with a succes- 1974, xiv + 340 pages, $14.95 hardback, sion of lovely Shahbanous and royal mis- $3.95 paper. tresses, all slim, dark-eyed women with impressive bosoms. This book has a rather misleading title for Mr. Hoyt, however, does not allow us the a work that has little to do with the nitty- luxury of dwelling too long on the Shah’s in- gritty of military-civilian interaction. Actual- discretions. After all, sexual Service in the ly the volume is largely a collection of papers, cause of dynastic continuity is a burden to be first presented at the 1971 Inter-University bome by all heads who wear a crown. The Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, real problem for the Shah is not the produc- which deal primarily with the issues of for- tion of an heir but an Iranian bourgeoisie, eign and military policy formation. Accord- insensitive to the need for change, a military ingly, the reader might expect the topics in caste victimized by its own immobilism, a each chapter and the approach taken by the lachrvmose Prime Minister Mossadegh who various authors to be somewhat unrelated, would make a pact wãth the devil if only to and this is generally true. Although coeditor overthrow the monarchy, a reactionary class John Lovell does an admirable job of at- of Islamic mullahs, a nihilistic Marxist move- tempting to knit the pieces together in his ment, and the rapacity of the superpowers in extensive introduction, continuity frequent- their quest for absolute control over Iranian ly just does not exist. The articles themselves national resources. are a mixed lot. Some are quite good, but The Shah survives, of course, by combin- most contribute little that is new to the study ing the ability to coerce men, learned at his of civil-military relations. father’s knee, and his unerring faith in a A number of the articles provide excellent grand design for Iran. Although Mr. Hoyt food for thought. For instance, John Lovell, seems to admire the exercise of dictatorship Edwin Fedder, and Davis Bobrow have writ- in the interests of modernization, he won- ten chapters explaining that our present for- ders at the end of his book if perhaps time eign/defense policy is based on premises that will not catch up with the Shah before the no longer exist, and each supplies some evi- reconciliation of the Old with the New is dence to substantiate his position. Bruce Rus- realized. We may wonder at this, too. sett oflFers a piece concluding that public and As an inquiry into serious questions of Congressional permissiveness toward de- Iranian history and political directions, I can fense spending—an attitude that he main- hardly recommend this book. Moreover, The tains has become a national tradition over Shah may be positively dangerous in the the past 30 years—no longer exists in the aft- hands of a reader seeking information about ermath of the Vietnam war. Vincent Davis Iran but incapable of applying criticai intel- reviews the question of the willingness of lect to his reading. Nevertheless, as a histori- Americans to serve in the armed forces; he cal potboiler the book does have some merit asserts that, while U.S. citizens have always and will no doubt find its place with an unsus- been reluctant to enlist, in the post-Vietnam pecting public. era a “dire immediate threat to national sur- Dr. Lewis B. Ware vival" will be required to arouse a popular Documentary Research DiVision commitment. John Probert looks at our re­ Air University serve forces and concludes that had Presi- dent Johnson used them in their traditional role as the nation’s second line of defense, the issue of public support for the Vietnam New Civil-Military Relations: The Agonies of war would have brought it into the open Adjustment to Post-Vietnam Realities by much earlier. John P. Lovell and Philip S. Kronenberg. Davis Bobrow’s chapter, “Bread, Guns, New Brunswick, New’Jersey: Transaction, and Uncle Sam,” while very interesting, con- 92 AIR UXIVERSITY REVIEW tains some of the book's more dubious con- military interplay detract from its value for clusions. Bobrow is convinced that too much all but those who are deeply interested in the of our national treasure is being devoted to national policy formation process. defense spending. He claims that we should Major John F. Shiner reorient our foreign policy and national pri- Department of History orities in an effort to improve the quality of USAF Aeademy life throughout the world. Money taken from the defense budget could thus be used for the benefit of mankind. Incidentally Bobrow U.S. Policy and Strategic Interests in the was a firm supporter of the extremely mea- Western Pacific by Dr. Yuan-li Wu. New ger defense budget proposed by Senator York: Crane, Russak; St. Lucia, Queens- McGovern during his bid for the Presidency. land: University of Queensland Press, He believes that a “decline in US military 1975, 214 pages, $14.50 hardback, $7.50 striking power from current leveis will not paper. increase the probability of war,” and that “a credible minimum deterrent can be planned If the United States had any policy regard- with relative certainty.” The author appar- ing or strategic interest in the western Pacific ently discounts the continued growth in during the Nixon years, a reader cannot de­ Soviet nuclear strength and the Kremlin’s termine them from this book. Yet the stated firm commitment to the Leninist concept of purpose of the work is to explain and analyze world revolution. this policy. Written in a language best de- The least useful contribution is that pro- cribed as “old academese,” it takes slightly vided by coeditor Philip Kronenberg in the more than 200 pages to say what could have conclusions. Kronenberg, embellishing his been stated in 20 pages of concise English. article with heavy doses of social Science jar- The book calls to mind S. I. Hayakawa’s ob- gon, favors decentralized decision-making in servation that “the purpose of language is as a “multiplex” approach to national policy much to conceal thought as to reveal it.” formation. He feels this will inhibit the con- Let us, nevertheless, try to find the elusive centrations of power that tend to undermine thesis of the tome. The concept emerges that the nation’s democratic principies. He calls the Nixon Doctrine is a workable response to for a massive—and politically impractical— changing forces in the western Pacific. This reorganization of the government to accom- policy, according to the author, is valid de- plish this goal, which would require the uni- spite the fact that the Nixon Doctrine result- formed Services to divest themselves of such ed from domestic pressures for change and functions as research and development and not from long-term planning. Rather than procurement; civilian government agencies develop this thesis, however, the author em- would then take these over. Apparently the barks on a kaleidoscopic trip through the author does not recall his military history, for “shopping lists” approach to teaching inter- a similar, unsatisfactory arrangement beset national relations. the United States Army prior to the Root Re- The book inundates the reader with seven forms of the early twentieth century. Then, issues relevant in 1973-74, the four condi- various War Department bureaus controlled tions for force reduction, four necessities to such functions in a way generally unrespon- deter nuclear war, six characteristics of Sovi­ sive to the needs of the soldier. As a result, et response, seven scenario characteristics, the man in the field often had to do his duty and on and on. The rigidity of such an ap­ without the necessary tools. proach does little to explain U.S. policy in the The book as a whole makes some useful Pacific during the Nixon years. comments and may warrant reading. Yet its A two-chapter section titled “Perception diffused nature and emphasis on policy-mak- and Response” provides the only material of ing rather than on the substance of civilian- possible value. Here the author lists various BOOKS AND IDEAS 93 permutations of alliances possible in Asia and that distinction. Rather, it was written for the considered changes in military strengths, popular market as part of a British series of economic pressures, and ideological differ- regimental histories. The book summarizes ences. Also, a reader might determine that the history of the USMC in fewer than 400 the State of foreign relations in the western pages, brevity alone precluding its being a Pacific and east Asia is anvthing but static and definitive study. Yet, this is not to say that it that many changes will occur. is not a scholarly work—quite the contrary! Unfortunately, in the rush to publish, the The usual popular history is often subject to author relies on the assumption of continued inaccuracy; here, the research is carefully American presence in Southeast Asia. If the done. Furthermore, the chest-thumping one disjointed organization, the conjectures, the might expect is absent. The work is honest: unending shopping lists, and lack of sub- the defeats (rare enough in any event) are stance do not dampen an appetite for this there along with the triumphs. book, one recent event will. The collapse of Simmons’s work is not a study of ideas—it Saigon in April 1975 negates a sizable por- is largely a chronological campaign summary tion of the book’s foundation. that deals only briefly and in a peripheral The author closes with a call for America to way with doctrinal matters. The amphibious create “a sense of community among all the doctrine that is the justification of the Corps free nations of Pacific-Asia and of the world.” is treated in an introductory way—it had its Analysis would suggest that an American-led origins in the Spanish-American War and re- “sense of community” in Asia was the last ceived great impetus as a result of the Gal- thing Americans or Asians wanted in 1975 lipoli fiasco in 1915. Fortunately, the and beyond! Thus, the book closes its discus- doctrine (and the necessary equipment) was sion of the Nixon Doctrine and U.S. policy in well developed before Pearl Harbor, and its the Pacific with a backstep in time of 75 years upholders have been on the defensive about to a period when “carrying the white man’s it since Hiroshima. Because of the assertion burden” in Asia was more in vogue. that the USMC is but a second army, the Captain Thomas F. Menza Corps has long assumed that posture. This USAF Academy, Colorado defensiveness is frequently apparent in the present work, but more often it is the Army, not the Air Force, that is the adversary. The United States Marines, 1775-1975 by While Simmons does incline toward the Air Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, Force position on theater air control, he USMC (Ret). New York: Viking, 1976, 342 makes no concessions at all on amphibious pages, $8.95. doctrine—it is a viable concept and should be cultivated. From the shores of Tripoli to the halls of The old doctrinal bone between the USAF Montezuma? All these years we have had the and USMC had its origins in World War II chronological order reversed. This handy and concerns the control of air power within work points out many interesting (though a theater. The Marine Corps, of course, has sometimes obvious) bits of lore to those not ever been on the side of responsiveness to already familiar with the Marine Corps. the will of the individual ground commander The author, Brigadier General Edwin Sim­ while the USAF has desired centralized con­ mons, USMC (Retired), is the Director of Ma­ trol to exploit fully air power’s speed and rine Corps History and Museums. Educated flexibility. General Simmons’s fundamental as a journafist, Simmons does honor to his evenhandedness is apparent here. While la- training in his prose. menting that Marine ground units in Korea The United States Marines, 1775-1975 is were not as well served by tactical air power not a definitive history of the Corps—it lacks after their air units were placed under the Fhe scholarly impedimenta that would give it operational control of the theater air com- 94 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW mander, Simmons does grant that perhaps nevertheless a useful one. It is well-written, the overall quality of air support improved. accurate, and up-to-date, and its bibliogra- He concedes the same point in connection phy will guide the curious reader to other, with the control of air power in Vietnam, and more comprehensive sources. A good popu­ this is all the more remarkable a concession lar history, it provides an interesting, bal- because he is not an aviator himself. anced introduction to a sister service. Although The United States Marines, 1775 Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets -1975 is neither the ultimate source of Corps Air University Review doctrine nor its definitive history, the book is Maxwell AFB, Alabama

An anonymous verse inscribed on the grave of an English soldier: God and the soldier all men adore In time of war and nevermore. In time of peace vvhen all is righted God is forgotten and the soldier slighted. Quoted in Orville D. Menards “Educational Aspects of Civil-Military Relations” * the m contributors Dean of Instruction at Allegheny College, Meadville, Pennsylvama. He was a gruduate assistant at Princeton and held a Fulbright Scholarship Crant in Brussels. Belgium. His chief areas of historical mterest are inodern European diplornatic history, France. and the low countries. Dr. Helmreich is the au- thor of several artícles and of Belgium and Europe: A Stud) in Srnall Puw er Diploniacy (The Hague: Mouton, 1976).

Wing Commander Peter M. Papworlh. r | RAF, (Royal Air Force College. Cranwell) is Royal Air Force Advisor to the Comman- Colonel Herman L. Cilster (USMA; Ph D.. dant. Air Command and Staff College. Air Harvard University) is Director of Interna­ University, and a member of the Air Univer­ tiona) Economic Affairs in the Office of the sity Review Awards Cominittee. His flying Assistant Secretar> of Defense for Interna­ assigmnents have been in RAF Training tional Security Affairs. His former assign- Command as a pilot instruetor, squadron ments include B-47 commander. Strategic commander. and wingcoinmander/chief in­ Air Command; Associate Professor of Eco- struetor. His staff tours have been in Train­ nomics at the USAF Academy; operations ing Command. on missile staff duties, and as research at Headquarters Seventh Air Sênior RAF Liaison Officer at the Royal Force. PACAF. and USAF; and as Air Force Military Academy. Sandhurst. Wing Com­ Research Associate at the Brookings Institu- mander Papworth is a graduate of the RAF tion. His articles have been published in the Staff College and of the USAF Air War Col­ fieriVu and *»ther profcssional juurnals. Col­ lege. unei Cilster is a Distinguishcd Graduate oi Squadron Officer School.

Major General Jerome F. O Malley (USMA; M.S., George Washington University) is Vice Director. J-3 (Operations). the Joint Staff, Washington. D.C. Previously, lie was Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations Plans. Strategic Air Command. with additional duty as Chief, Single Integrated Operation- Colonel William M. Charles, Jr„ (USMA; al Plan Division. Joint Strategic Target Plan- M.A., Central Michigan University) is Ex- mng Staff. Prior to that he was Assistant ecutive to the Commander in Chief, Strate­ Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. SAC, with gic Air Command. His assignments include additional duty as the CINCSAC Represen- flying B-47. B-52, and F-100 aircraft; as an tative to the JSTPS. A command pilot with Air Officer Cotnmanding at Air Force more than 4700 flying hours, heserved as air Academy; at Hq USAF in the Directorate of training officer. USAFA; B-47 pilot. and SR- Doctrine, Concepts. und Objectives (DCS/ 71 pilot. In SE A. General 0'Malley flew 116 PòtO): as assistant deputs commander for combat missions in the F-4D and RF-4C. operations of a B-52H w ing; and Deputy After serving as vice commander and com­ Director of Operations, Hq SAC Colonel mander of tactical and strategic reconnais- Charles is a graduate of Squadron Officer sance wings, he was named Chief of Staff. School. Army Command and General Staff Fifteenth Air Force. General 0'Malley is a College. and Naval War College, and has Dr. Jonathan E. Helmreich iPh.D.. Prince- Distinguished Graduate of Air Command completed Air Command and Staff College ton University) is Professor of History and and Staff College and Naval War College. and Industrial College of the Armed Forces. 95 IJeutenant Culoncl Joseph J. Bluin (M.S.E.E., Air Force Institute of Technolo­ Captain Roy Wemer, U.S. Army Reserve gy) is Chairman of the Weapons and Sys­ (B. Phil.. Oxford University. England) is a tems Engineering Department at the U.S. Legislative Assistant to Senator John Clenn. Naval Academy and serves as Sênior AF His government Service includes stints with Representative. He held R&D assignments the Federal Energy Administration (Inter­ before completing a six-year tour as associ- national Affairs), the White House Confer- ate professor of electrical engineering at the ence on Youth. and the Office. Secretary of USAF Academy. He is a registered engineer the Army. He is an honor graduate of the and the author of a Computer textbook, tech- Army Air Defense School. Previous articles nical papers. and articles. Colonel Blum is a have appeared in America, The Atlantic graduate of Squadron Officer School. Air Community Quarterly. The Journal of the Command and Staff College, and Air War Royal United Services Institute, Militar;t /fe­ College. He is a colonel selectee. rre». and the AFROTC Edueation Journal.

V The Air University Review Avvards Committee has selected “The Integrity of the Warsaw Pact, Part I” by Wing Commander Peter M. Papvvorth, Royal Air Force, as the outstanding article in the March-April 1977 issue of Air University Review. EDITORIAL STAFF C olonel Glenn E. YVasson, USAF Editor L ieu t en a n t Colonel Richahd E. H ansen, USAF Associate Editor L ieu t en a n t Colonel David R. M ets, USAF Acquisitions Editor Jack H. Mooney Managing Editor John A. YVestcott Art Director and Production Manager E nrique Gaston Associate Editor, Spanish Language Edition Lia Midosi May Patterson Associate Editor, Portuguese Language Edition YVili.ia m J. D e P aola Art Editor and Illustrator Rudolph W. M organ Financial and Administrative Maruiger

ADVTSERS C olonel Arthur S. Ragen //(/ Aerosfiaec Defense Command C olonel Eujon YY'. Downs //

Address manuscrípts to Editor. Air University Review Division, UldH- 1211, Maxwell AFB, AL .16112. Printeil bv Government Printing Office. Address subscriptions to Supcrintendent oi Documents. GPO. Washington DC 20402: yearlv $11.60 domes- tic, $ 14,50 foreign. single eopy $2.00, Air Force Recurring Publieation 50-2.______The ProfessionaI Journal of the United States Air Force revieiniJ IN R I VE R S IT Y JLY-AUGUST 1977