Air University Review:May-June 1977 Vol.XXVIII No.4
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the editors aerie With this issue we regretfully bid farewell to our Associate Editor, Lieutenant Colonel Richard E. Hansen, on his retirement. His career spanned three wars, in which he flew variously as a fighter, bomber, and transport pilot. Interspersed among combat and Cold War assignments were academic, staff, and command positions, where he accumulated a wealth of experience that we leaned heavily on in editorial deliberations. We will not only miss his wise counsel but also his prolitic pen and the provocative ideas that flowed from it. It is hoped that you will see more of his work in future issues. In the opening article, Colonel Herman L. Cilster examines one of the basic Air Force missions— air interdiction— in the light of recent historical experience. His study indicates that the success of an interdiction effort is directly related to the intensity of the ground effort it opposes. Our cover depicts aircraft that have performed the interdiction role in the last three wars. One of the imponderables of any future confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is the strength of the bonds that hold these respective alliances together. In the March-April issue, Wing Commander Peter Papworth offered his assessment of the integrity of the Warsaw Pact as an entity. Continuing in this issue, he examines the cohesiveness of each individual member nation to the pact. Although he would probably agree that such an undertaking is speculative and subject to ever-changing conditions, the reliability of the Warsaw Pact is certainly a criticai element of the European power equation and invites a best estimate regardless of the relative scarcity of reliable information. We suspect that the Soviets are pondering the same problem and arriving at their own closely held input to their "correlation of forces.” In another thoughtful examination of intangible inputs to the power equation, Colonel William M. Charles, Jr., weighs the impact of the capability to wage war at all leveis of conflict on our national will. Regardless of your predisposition, "Rethinking the Unthinkable” may provoke you to justify your own thoughts on the matter. May 21, 1977, marks the 50th anniversary of one of aviation's great milestones, the first solo flight over the Atlantic by Charles A. Lindbergh. As a reminder of his legacy to the Science of flight, we include a number of his thoughts throughout this issue. AIR UNIVERSITY May-June 1977 Vol. XXVIII No. 4 ISSN: 0002-2594 ,/lrcuicw From the Editors Aerie................................................................................................. Facing Page .Air Interdiction in Protracted War: An Economic Evaluation.................................................... 2 Col. Herman L. Gilster, USAF The Diplomacy of Apology: U.S. Bombings of Switzerland during World War I I ................................................................... 19 Dr. Jonathan A. Helmreich JSTPS—The Link between Strategy and Execution..................................................................... 38 Maj. Gen. Jerome F. 0 ’Malley, USAF The Integrity of the Warsaw Pact, Part II................................................................................... 47 Wg. Cmdr. Peter M. Papworth, RAF Rethinking the Unthinkable: Limited Strategic Nuclear Options—Credible or Dangerous?.................................................... 60 Col. William M. Charles, Jr., USAF Changing Educational Goals at the United States Naval Academy.................................................. ........................................ 72 Lt. Col. Joseph J. Blum, USAF Books and Ideas American Defense Policy, 1945-1977: A Review Essay...................................................... 83 Roy A. Wemer Potpourri................................................ 89 The Contributors............................................................................................................................. 95 ATTENTION The Air University Review is the professional journal of the United States Air Force and serves as an open forum for exploratory discussion. Its purpose is to present innovative thinking and stimulate dialogue concerning Air Force doctrine, strategy, tactics, and related national defense matters. The Review should not be construed as representing policies of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, or Air Uni versity. Rather, the contents reflect the authors' ideas and do not necessarily bear official sanction. Thoughtful and informed contributions are always welcomed. AIR J INTERDICTION > IN ,i PROTRACTED* WAR v an economic evaluation NITED STATES Air Force doctrine respect to the success or failure of the ground defines three basic combat missions force it supports. Fortunately, these “meas- for tactical air power: counter air, ures of merit” are tangible, highly visible, Uclose air support, and air interdiction.1 Counand immediately apparent. Consequently, ter air operations are conducted to gain and such operations are recognized as viable, maintain air supremacy by attacking the productive missions of air power. True, the enemy’s combat aircraft, air bases, antiair- military Services may debate the question of craft artillery (AAA), and surface-to-air mis- who can most effectively perform these mis sile (SAM) sites. Essentially, these attacks are sions, but there is no question of their impor- designed to provide all friendly aircraft the tance or whether they fit into the spectrum capabilit>’ to operate freely in the airspace of vital military operations. above both friendly and enemy territory. The same cannot be said for the third mis The second mission, close air support, en- sion, air interdiction. This mission, along compasses the use of air power in direct sup with its effectiveness and viability, has been port of friendly land forces. Close air support the subject of some of the most intense de attacks are made against targets of urgent bates within civilian and military circles in concern in the immediate battle area and the Department of Defense during the last require direct and effective integration be- ten years. This is not surprising because in tween the friendly ground and air forces. Fi- terdiction by its very nature may not carry nally, air interdiction, the subject of this with it an immediate payoff. In addition, it article, is defined as the systematic attack of has been difficult to show, historically, a con- an enemy’s logistics network for the purpose sistent payoff for the supply denial objective of destroying, neutralizing, or delaying his in terms of its impact on the outcome of a military potential (manpower and materiel) campaign. What is observed is merely the before it can be brought to bear effectively ability of the enemy to fight at the current against friendly ground forces. The range of operating levei, a levei which he may or may interdiction strikes may span a distance from not have selected as a result of the burden the immediate battlefield up to, and some- imposed on him by air interdiction. Without times including, the enemy’s heartland. Nor- knowledge of the enemys precise intentions, mally, these attacks are made at such a dis one finds it virtually impossible to determine tance to the enemy’s rear that detailed whether the interdiction effort seriously coordination with friendly ground forces is limited his capability to operate at a pre- unnecessary. ferred levei of activity. Indeed, some insight Categorization of the functions of tactical into the impact of interdiction during World air power into the three missions cited al- War II has been gained from German ready should not conceal the fact that these records and interviews, but, barring a similar missions are in no sense mutually exclusive. exchange, we will probably never be able to Nevertheless, mission definition is useful, in assess with certainty its true impact during that it provides a point of departure for any the Korean and Southeast Asian conflicts. discussion of the impact and effectiveness of major air components. For instance, it is rela- tively simple to determine the success of the World War II to Southeast Asia counter air function by noting the ease or Historical reviews of our experience with difficulty with which friendly aircraft operate air interdiction have concluded that the most overhead. Likewise, the impact of the close dramatic successes were recorded when air air support function can be evaluated with interdiction missions were complemented 3 4 AIR UNIVERSITY REVIEW by aggressive ground operations on the part creating overall shortages at the front. This is of friendly forces. Operation Strangle, the evident in the figures of Table 1, extracted first full-scale, consciously planned interdic- from the quartermaster records of the Ger tion campaign of World War II, is a prime man army for three key dates: (1)15 March— example. Conducted from March through the start of Operation Strangle, (2) 11 May— May of 1944 in Italy, this campaign was ini- the start of the ground offensive, and (3) 30 tially assigned the optimistic objective of May—the beginning of the precipitate Ger forcing the withdrawal of the German ar- man retreat. mies from central Italy by denying them es- Sallagar attributes the failure of interdic sential supplies. This objective was, of course, tion to achieve the supply-denial objective to unrealistic. Only after the Allied ground the following factors, most of which were in- offensive was launched on 11 May 1944 did herent in the tactical situation confronting the