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The Liancourt Rocks Dispute – a “Love Triangle” Among Japan, South Korea, and the U.S

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The Liancourt Rocks Dispute – a “Love Triangle” Among Japan, South Korea, and the U.S THE EDWIN O. REISCHAUER CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES The United States and Japan in Global Context: 2011 The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins University Washington, D.C. Edwin O. Reischauer (Oct.15, 1910-Sept. 1, 1990) TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction William L. Brooks ················································································································ i U.S.-Japan Security Alliance under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Nicholas Phan ······················································································································· 1 Japan’s Nuclear Allergy, Disarmament Policies, and the U.S.-Japan Alliance Cordelia Chesnutt ················································································································· 20 The Role of Non-Bureaucratic Actors in Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy James Pai ······························································································································ 35 Japan’s Hedging Strategy and Its Implications for Regional Peace and Security Yimian Li ····························································································································· 46 Bridging the Gaps between Japan and China Yanan Wang ························································································································ 56 Japan’s Role in Regional Economic Integration – Rebalancing Power with a Weakened Japan Wallis Yu ····························································································································· 65 The Liancourt Rocks Dispute – A “Love Triangle” Among Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. Jason Park ···························································································································· 82 Japan’s Environmental Policy: Consistencies and Contradictions Jamie Shellenberger ············································································································· 92 Japan’s African Aid Strategy Calita Woods ······················································································································· 106 The DPJ Confronts the Growing Gender Gap and Demographic Crisis in Japan Juliana Knapp ······················································································································ 119 Special Alumnus Feature: F-X: Japan’s Response to a Changing Asia and American Alliance Shoji Shin ···························································································································· 141 Celebrating the Reischauer Centennial: The 2010-2011 Academic Year in Review Kent Calder ··························································································································155 Reischauer Center 2010-2011 Events ················································································· 159 Contributors ·························································································································161 INTRODUCTION The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) swept into power on August 30, 2009, having taken 308 out of 480 seats in the House of Representatives (Lower House) election. It unseated the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which had ruled the country since 1955, with the exception of one year in the 1990s. On September 16, 2009, a three-party coalition of the DPJ, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and the People’s New Party (PNP) was formed under Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama. But despite the DPJ’s overwhelming victory and its first cabinet’s initially high- support rates in opinion polls, the first year of the DPJ as a ruling party in coalition with two small parties was by all accounts unsuccessful. The DPJ appealed to the electorate in their 2009 campaign for regime change by promising alternative solutions to a host of domestic issues, such as medical care, pensions, cutting waste in government, covering child-care costs, removing tolls on highways, and reviving agriculture through direct subsidies. Change would come through “political leadership” that by-passed the bureaucracy’s monopoly on policy and legislation. But campaign slogans were not enough to make the news policy agenda work; implementation was at best spotty and some programs, such as child-care subsidies, were underfunded. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s approval rates started at a heady 70% but continued to plummet each month until his popularity dipped below 20% by May 2010. The embattled prime minister finally resigned in June 2010, the final blow being a “money and politics scandal” involving unreported political contributions and a highly unpopular decision in May on a volatile U.S. basing issue in Okinawa. Hatoyama reneged on a campaign promise to relocate a U.S. Marine base, Futenma Air Station, to a site outside of Okinawa. After months of searching for another site, he in the end went along with the original U.S.-Japan agreement in 2006 to relocate the base to another part of the prefecture. Hatoyama’s successor Naoto Kan came into office also with high public support rates, and at first seemed to be a popular choice. Taking a pragmatic approach to diplomacy, Kan attempted to repair some of the damage done to the U.S.-Japan relationship by his predecessor. But Kan, too, was plagued by internal party disputes and growing public disaffection. Faultede for a series of policy blunders, Kan rapidly loss his popularity in the polls, with the public faulting him for an alleged lack of leadership. Most damaging was Kan’s ill-founded decision in the July 2010 Upper House campaign to call for higher taxes. That move cost the party the election. The DPJ took deep losses and lost its majority control of the Upper House to its rival the LDP, leaving the Diet divided and making it almost impossible to pass legislation. Gridlock in the Diet continued into 2011. Kan continued in office, but his popularity continued to plunge, reaching the levels of his predecessor. Alliance under strain During the period starting September 2009 and ending in early 2011 that this yearbook covers, U.S.-Japan relations were under great strain, as a new and untested party came into power in Japan and for a while acted like a wrecking crew out to dismantle and somehow reconstruct the Introduction alliance relationship, based on slogans and election campaign promises and not on a coherent strategic vision. From the start, the DPJ government under Prime Minister Hatoyama seemed to rub the Obama administration the wrong way. Hatoyama adopted a foreign-policy agenda that unnecessarily targeted areas or issues affecting relations with the U.S. The Hatoyama Cabinet came into office with an understanding based on the DPJ Manifesto – a list of election campaign promises adopted by the government as policy goals – that there would be a full review of all policies of the previous LDP administrations, especially relations with the U.S. The DPJ government wished to part with a perceived negative legacy of the LDP but in so doing it even targeted policies that worked well, even those that were linked to U.S.-Japan security arrangements that protected Japan’s vital national interests. Hatoyama also failed to build up a relationship of mutual trust with President Barack Obama. The Prime Minister’s now famous promise to the President, “Trust me,” with respect to resolving a contentious basing issue was seen in Washington as just empty words. Further complicating the matter were such constraints on normal patterns of decision- making as the DPJ’s rejection of bureaucratic input into policy formulation. As we will see in James Pai’s chapter on DPJ policy-making, decisions had to be political and top-down; advisory councils were shunned; and brain-trusts were avoided. The DPJ’s muddled tripartite agreement with the two coalition parties, perceived in the U.S. as not alliance-friendly, created doubts about the new government’s ultimate intentions. These words were especially worrisome: “We will create an autonomous foreign policy strategy, and form a close and equal alliance between Japan and the United States. By promoting cooperation between Japan and the United States we will create a future-orientated relationship, thereby realizing a stronger bond of mutual trust. On this basis, from the perspective of reducing the burden placed on the residents of Okinawa prefecture, we will propose a revision of the Japan Status of Forces Agreement, and move in the direction of re-examining the realignment of US forces and the role of US bases in Japan.” Such security issues as host-nation support levels, the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and the Okinawa base problem were all under review. Hatoyama’s continued emphasis on transferring the operations of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to a location outside of Okinawa Prefecture also contributed to U.S. unease. In addition, the Hatoyama administration launched an investigation into alleged secret nuclear pacts with the U.S. that allowed the transit of nuclear weapons into Japan on U.S. warships and military aircraft. Most of these issues were either dropped or resolved in the months that followed, except for the Okinawa base issue, which ultimately proved to be the Prime Minister’s undoing. Campaigning in the 2009 Lower House election, the DPJ criticized the LDP’s diplomacy of “overemphasis on the U.S.-Japan” and its “toeing of the U.S.
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