Surface Deployment & Distribution Command the Road Ahead

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Surface Deployment & Distribution Command the Road Ahead Surface Deployment & Distribution Command The Road Ahead Providing End-To-End Deployment/Distribution Support NDIA Panel: Distribution Challenges and Initiatives BG(P) Charlie Fletcher CG, SDDC 1 Mar 2005 Surface Deployment & Distribution Command (SDDC) OBJECTIVES • SIMPLIFY Deployment for Military Units • EMPOWER E2E Distribution Process • LEVERAGE Commercial Capabilities • MIGRATE to Common C2 Platforms, Systems & Processes OIF/OEF Container Detention Costs Situation: $10-15 Million/Month & Poor On-Hand Visibility • How & Why Did We Get Here No Easy Fix • How Do We Fix It Pre-War Container Business Process SDDC Contract Detention $K/Month Commercial Military t en Customer inm sta Supplier Su Fixed Military Carrier Carrier Facility Container Military Container Container Container Carrier Container Key Points: • Fixed Facilities/Mature Process • Locally Managed/Centrally Paid • Containers = Trans Assets Wartime Container Business Process SDDC Contract Detention $K/Month Commercial Military t en Customer inm sta Supplier Su Fixed Military Military Carrier Carrier Facility Container Container Container Container Key Points: Carrier • Fixed Facilities Overwhelmed Container • Insufficient Military Containers • No Local Mgmt/Visibility Lost • Containers = Trans/Storage/Protection Assets Tomorrow’s Container Business Process Container Management Support Tool SDDC Contract Detention $K/Month Commercial Military Container Container Container Container Mgmt Tm Mgmt Tm Supplier Mgmt Tm Mgmt Tm 2 3 Customer Carrier Fixed Container Container Carrier Military Container Facility Container Carrier Military Military Container Mgmt Tm Container Container Carrier 1 X Dock Military Container Container Key Points: Office • End to End Container Management Structure • End to End Visibility • End to End C2 Tools Inattention • End to End Accountability Assigned Accountability Storage Force Protection Redeployment & Distribution Points Daahhuukk DIAMONDBACK Container Mgmt Elem Dahuk Bashur Tanker Airlift Ctrl Elem Tigris R. (TALCE) Arrbbiill Distribution Activity FLB DIIAMONDBACKMosul Tall Afar Irbil Sulaymaniyah TIKRIT 1 Q WEST KIRKUKKIRKUK /SPEICHER 2 •Deployment Spt Elem Niinnaawaa Kirkuk •MCCoTntainer Mgmt Elem Dayr•aCzonZtaawinrer Mgmt Elem Att TTaamiim • DIIeRRploAAymNNent Spt Elem FLB JOSHUA Ass SSuullaayymaanniiyyaahh DSE Tanker Airlift Ctrl Elem FLB JOSHUA Tanker Airlift Ctrl Elem (TALCE) BAQBUABQAUHBAH Div SSA (TALCE) FLBSSaaSllaaYhhCaaAddMDiOinnRE Deployment SptDElSemE Distribution ActivitHyamadan Distribution Activity Tanker Airlift Ctrl Elem Euphrates R. SSYYRRIIAA Samarra (5TALCE) AANNAACCOONNDDAA Al Qaim 12 MC•BContainer Mgmt Element Al ASAD AL ASAD LSA ANACONDA Diiyyaallaa • Deployment Spt Element Container Mgmt Ele TAJJII MCT Tanker Airlift Ctrl Ele Baqubah TQ Ar Ramadi FLB PECAN CME (TALCE) Tanker Airlift Ctrl Elem 1 Container Mgmt Elem DSE Ar Rutbah Baghdad (TALCE) Distribution Fallujah vF Div SSA 10 Distribution Activity Activity Waassiitt H3 Baabbiill EAD/EAC SSA H4 Al Hillah Karbala All Annbbaarr Kaarrbbaallaa Al Kut TAJI Dezful JJOORRDDAANN Al Kufa Container Mgmt Elem BIAPB/ IBAAPG/HDAD CSC SCANIIA Al Amarah An Najaf Ad Diwaniyah • Container Mgmt Elem BAGHDAD All Qaaddiissiiyyaahh Tanker Airlift Ctrl Elem • Deployment Sp22t Elem (TALCE) CME Maayyssaann Dhhii Qaarr As Samawah 6 Ahvaz Tanker ADirSlifEt Ctrl Elem FLB CEDAR Distribution D(iTvASLCSEA) TALLIL An Nasiriyah Ar’ar Tallil Activity EAD/EAC SSA ADnn Niasajjaatffribution Activity All Baassrraahh Al Basrah Distribution 1 Activity 9 Az Zubayr Umm Qasr Safwan All Muutthhaannnnaa’’ Rafha SSAAUUDDII Container Mgmt Elem Kuwait City AARRAABBIIAA Tanker Airlift Ctrl Elem (TALCE) KKUUWWAAIITT CME = Cont Mgmt ELE Redeployment & Distribution Points DSE = Deployment SPT ELE BAGRAM MCB = Movement Control BN MCT CME MCT = Movement Control Team DSE Distribution Activity BAGRAM vv AFGHANISTAN KANDAHAR KANDAHAR MCT CME Distribution Activity CONTAINER MANAGEMENT TASKS AS OF 15 FEB 05 • All Containers RF Tagged at SPOD Establish Container Content Database (Concept to Fielding 95 Days $400K) Enforce Shipper/Carrier Electronic Documentation (“Do Not Lift” Policy) Equip & Certify SPOD Contractors (Contracts Initiated) • No Carrier Containers North of Tallil Contractor Cross-Load En-route (10-20 Minutes & $200 per box) Military Cross-Load at Tallil (Not Pretty; Govt Owned containers still in short supply) • End-to-End Management Train, Equip & Field SWA Container Management Teams Test and Document Joint Distribution procedures at designated nodes in Iraq. (Coordination with CFLCC, MNC-I, II MEF, 1st COSCOM) Develop an Army capability to complement USAF Contingency Response Groups and provide initial intermodal platform mngt and movement control (Ongoing) • Container Management USTC-Army MOA (Funding, Accountability and Disposition) (NLT 2 May 05) Implement Contingency Clauses in USC 05 (Ongoing) Transition Plan to 4PL (a la Global POV; Discussions Initiated; Long-Range).
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