Order Code RL34387 Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress Updated October 28, 2008 Catherine Dale Specialist in International Security Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress Summary Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was launched on March 20, 2003, with the immediate stated goal of removing Saddam Hussein’s regime and destroying its ability to use weapons of mass destruction or to make them available to terrorists. Over time, the focus of OIF shifted from regime removal to the more open-ended mission of helping the Government of Iraq (GoI) improve security, establish a system of governance, and foster economic development. Over time, an insurgency gained strength in Iraq and violence escalated. In January 2007, the Bush Administration announced a new strategy, the “new way forward,” which included both a troop surge and new counter-insurgency approaches that emphasized population security and reconciliation. The last surge brigade redeployed from Iraq without replacement in July 2008. Most observers agree that security conditions in Iraq have improved markedly since mid-2007. In August 2008, then-Commanding General of Multi-National Force-Iraq, General David Petraeus, noted that there had been “significant progress” but argued that it was “still not self-sustaining.”1 On September 9, President Bush, calling the decision a “return on success,” announced that about 8,000 additional U.S. troops would redeploy from Iraq without replacement by February 2009. The next major OIF development may be the conclusion of a U.S.-Iraqi Status of Forces-like agreement (SOFA) that establishes a legal basis for the presence of U.S. forces in Iraq after the expiration of the current United Nations mandate on December 31, 2008. Constraints imposed by the SOFA are expected to have a bearing on the conduct of U.S. military operations in Iraq. Near-term issues include determining how best to build on recent security gains; assessing “how much U.S. help is enough” in terms of funding, personnel, and other assistance, to support the GoI but also to encourage its independence; establishing the criteria for further troop drawdowns; and continuing to revise the organization and focus of the Iraqi Security Forces training and advisory mission. Longer-term Iraq strategy and policy considerations include clarifying long-term U.S. strategic objectives related to Iraq and shaping a more traditional future bilateral relationship with Iraq; defining U.S. policy toward Iranian intervention in Iraq; and assessing the implications of OIF “lessons learned” for the future of U.S. military forces and for U.S. government inter-agency collaboration in general. This report is designed to provide an assessment of current OIF developments, in the context of relevant background, in order to support congressional consideration of these short-term and long-term strategy and policy issues. 1 Rod Nordland, “No Victory Dances,” interview with General David Petraeus, Newsweek, August 21, 2008. Contents Overview........................................................1 Background ..................................................1 Current Situation: Strategic and Operational Dynamics ................2 Operational Dynamics: Transitions............................2 Strategic Dynamics: Potential “Spoilers” .......................3 Diminishing U.S. Leverage ..................................4 Next Steps: Policy Decisions.....................................4 Legal Basis for U.S. Troop Presence in Iraq .....................4 U.S. Troop Drawdowns .....................................5 Operational Considerations......................................7 How Much Help Is Enough? .................................7 Further Troop Drawdowns ...................................7 Future of the Iraqi Security Forces Training Mission .............12 Future of the U.S. Forces Footprint...........................14 Coordination on Operations.................................15 Civil-Military Roles and Responsibilities ......................17 Strategic Considerations .......................................18 Clarifying and Updating U.S. Strategic Objectives...............18 Applying Strategic Leverage................................19 Shaping a Long-Term U.S. Presence in Iraq....................19 Defining U.S. Policy Toward Iranian Intervention in Iraq..........20 Assessing the Implications of OIF Lessons for the Future of the Force............................................20 Applying OIF Lessons to Interagency Coordination..............21 Options Available to Congress ..................................22 Structure and Aim of the Report .................................23 Decision to Go to War in Iraq .......................................24 Antecedents in the 1990s .......................................24 Bush Administration Strategy and Role of the United Nations..........25 Ultimatum to Saddam Hussein ..................................26 War Planning....................................................26 Strategic Objectives...........................................26 Military Objectives ...........................................27 Planning for Major Combat.....................................28 Post-War Planning............................................31 Inter-Agency Post-War Planning.............................32 Military Post-War Planning .................................34 Organizational Decisions...................................36 Major Combat Operations..........................................36 Early Infiltration ..............................................37 The Launch .................................................37 The Ground Campaign .........................................38 Iraqi Contributions to Major Combat .............................41 End of Major Combat .........................................41 Post-Major Combat: Basis and Organization ...........................42 Legal Basis for Coalition Presence ...............................43 Formal Occupation........................................43 Iraqi Request for a Multinational Force ........................43 Status of Forces Agreement.................................44 Coalition Command Relationships ...............................46 Post-Major Combat: The Force......................................47 Structure and Footprint ........................................47 Headquarters Organization .................................47 Provincial Iraqi Control....................................48 U.S. Forces in Iraq............................................49 Coalition Partner Forces .......................................51 Post-Major Combat: Security Situation................................54 Major Sources and Forms of Violence ............................54 Sunni Extremism .........................................54 Shi’a Extremism .........................................55 Nature of Sectarian Violence................................59 Criminality ..............................................59 Other Security Challenges......................................59 Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) .............................60 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) .................................60 Post-Major Combat: Military Strategy and Operations ....................61 Nomenclature: Characterizing the Conflict.........................62 Military Strategy and Operations During Occupation .................63 Operation Phantom Fury (Fallujah II).............................66 Counter-Insurgency in Tal Afar ..................................68 “Clear, Hold, Build” ..........................................70 Operation Together Forward....................................71 New Way Forward............................................73 “New Way Forward” National Strategy: Theory of the Case .......73 Surge Forces.............................................74 Surge Military Strategy: Theory of the Case ....................75 Surge Operations in 2007 ...................................77 Military Operations in 2008 .................................80 Counter-IED Efforts .......................................85 Special Operations Forces..................................86 Air Power...............................................86 Iraqi Security Forces (ISF)..........................................88 Requirement for New Iraqi Security Forces ........................89 ISF Training Efforts During the Formal Occupation..................90 Unity of Effort: Creation of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq...........................................91 ISF Training: Theory of the Case.................................93 ISF Training: Organizational Structure and Responsibilities ...........94 ISF Training: Transition Teams..................................95 Interior Ministry Transition Teams ...........................95 Defense Ministry Transition Teams...........................96 ISF Training: Unit Partnering ...................................99 Iraqi Security Forces: The Numbers .............................101 Iraqi Security Forces: Evaluating the Results ......................102 Iraqi Security Forces as a Whole............................102 Iraqi Army.............................................106 Iraqi Air Force..........................................110 Iraqi Navy..............................................111 Iraqi Special Operations Forces.............................112 Iraqi Police